STEPHEN J. DWYER, Judge.
Billy Colburn appeals from the summary judgment dismissal of his negligence claim against David Trees. Colburn's vehicle was struck by Trees' vehicle after Colburn made a left turn through an intersection, against oncoming traffic. On appeal, Colburn contends that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Trees acted negligently. Finding no error, we affirm.
On August 23, 2011, Colburn was traveling north on 23rd Avenue East, a north-south arterial roadway in Seattle. At the intersection of 23rd Avenue East and East John Street, Colburn made a left-hand turn through the intersection. While so doing, Colburn was struck by Trees, who was heading south on 23rd Avenue East. There were no designated turn lanes.
Trees initially approached the intersection in the left-hand lane. After seeing that a bus ahead of him in that lane was preparing to turn left at the intersection, Trees switched to the right-hand lane prior to entering the intersection. As Colburn and Trees each approached the intersection, the bus at least partially obscured each of their views of the intersection and oncoming traffic.
Colburn and Trees each proceeded into the intersection through a green light. Upon entering the intersection, Trees continued heading southbound, while Colburn made a left turn, crossing the southbound lanes. Although Trees attempted to swerve to avoid a collision, his vehicle struck Colburn's vehicle.
Trees, who was driving straight through the intersection, had the statutory right-of-way, making him the "favored driver." Colburn, who was turning left across traffic, was statutorily required to yield, making him the "disfavored driver."
On August 22, 2014, Colburn sued Trees in superior court for personal injuries and damages sustained in the collision. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Trees. Colburn appeals.
Colburn contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Trees. We disagree.
We review a summary judgment order de novo, performing the same inquiry as the trial court.
To establish a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must prove (1) the existence of a duty to the plaintiff, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) injury to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant's breach.
Colburn contends that unresolved genuine issues of material fact exist. This is so, he asserts, because Trees violated eight different traffic codes and was negligent in a variety of ways, including speeding, driving inattentively, failing to engage his turn signal at least 100 feet before changing lanes, and swerving to the right upon entering the intersection. Each of these assertions is addressed in turn.
Colburn first asserts that Trees' speeding was a proximate cause of the collision.
Colburn has produced no evidence tending to establish when Trees' "point of notice" was. Colburn asserts that, had Trees decelerated to the lawful speed after making the lane change, he would have had 2.4 seconds to avoid the collision rather than the 1.2 seconds his actual speed afforded him. However, Colburn's evidence does not account for the time it takes to decelerate and does not establish that 2.4 seconds was sufficient time for Trees to (1) see Colburn's vehicle, (2) appreciate the danger, and (3) initiate and complete a responsive movement so as to avoid the collision. Nor does Colburn produce any evidence that Trees' vehicle's excessive speed actually impacted Trees' point of notice. Absent evidence tending to establish when, and at what point on the roadway short of the intersection, Trees should have seen Colburn and recognized that Colburn was not yielding, Colburn cannot (and does not) contrast Trees' actions with that of a reasonable driver exercising ordinary care. Thus, he does not establish that Trees' speeding was a proximate cause of the collision.
Colburn next contends that Trees' delayed use of his turn signal constituted negligence and proximately caused the collision.
Trees stated in his deposition that he engaged his turn signal roughly 20 feet before changing lanes. Despite admitting that he never saw Trees engage his turn signal, Colburn contends that, had Trees engaged his turn signal 80 feet earlier, as required by law, Colburn would have seen the turn signal and the collision would have been avoided.
There is no evidence in the record that Colburn would have seen such a properly-timed turn signal. Colburn stated in his deposition that he could see all around the bus.
Colburn next contends that Trees violated RCW 46.61.140(1), which prohibits drivers from changing lanes until it is reasonably safe to do so. This claim is also without merit. The evidence is clear that Trees executed his lane change safely. Colburn cites no authority for the proposition that Trees' obligation to ensure that his lane change could be safely executed included an obligation to account for unlawful driving on the part of drivers traveling in the opposite direction on the other half of the arterial roadway.
Colburn also contends that Trees acted negligently by driving inattentively.
Lastly, Colburn contends that Trees acted negligently upon seeing Colburn's vehicle by swerving to the right—the same direction as Colburn— rather than to the left, in the direction of the bus and oncoming traffic.
Negligence cannot be predicated on a reasonable, split-second decision, simply because an alternative decision may be more reasonable in hindsight.
As with Colburn's other assertions of negligence, there is no evidence that the direction Trees swerved proximately caused the collision. Even assuming that Trees swerved to the right, Colburn has not established that it was possible for Trees to avoid the collision by turning to the left—or that it was unreasonable for Trees to turn to the right under the circumstances.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by granting Trees' motion for summary judgment.
Colburn next asserts that the "deception doctrine" is applicable in this situation, effectively reducing his own liability and allowing him to recover against Trees under a theory of negligence. To the contrary, the deception doctrine does not apply.
Decades ago, pursuant to Washington's contributory negligence rules, in cases involving intersection collisions, a disfavored driver turning left could be found negligent per se, completely barring a recovery based on the favored driver's own negligence.
The deception doctrine may apply in two situations. The first is when the disfavored driver actually sees the favored vehicle and is deceived by the actions of the favored driver.
The other situation is when there is a clear stretch of road, where "the disfavored driver, consistent with the primary duty of caution resting upon him, and consistent with the physical surroundings, carefully looked from a point of appreciable observation and could not see a negligently operated favored vehicle because of a physical obstruction upon or about the roadway."
Neither situation applies here.
First, Colburn's assertions do not match the "clear stretch of the road" situation. "[I]f the obstruction that blocks the view of the disfavored driver is one that reasonably can be expected to move, such as another occupied vehicle . . . then the disfavored driver must permit the impairment to his view to move on so he can see the stretch of the road from which a favored driver might be approaching."
Second, Coburn's evidence does not establish that he saw Trees' vehicle and was deceived by Trees' actions. That Colburn saw Trees' vehicle in the left-hand lane with no turn signal engaged is not "tantamount to an entrapment," particularly given that Colburn never saw Trees' vehicle come to a stop behind the bus.
Affirmed.
JAMES VERELLEN and ANN SCHINDLER, JJ., Concurs.
Colburn submitted to the trial court a collision report written and signed under oath by the responding police officer, as well as a police traffic collision report instruction manual. Taken together, the report and instruction manual establish that the speed limit along 23rd Avenue East is 20 miles per hour. Trees stated in his deposition that he was traveling roughly 35 to 40 miles per hour.