SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.

¶ 1 This is an appeal of a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha County, J. Mac Davis, Judge, granting summary judgment in favor of Jeffrey Brown, American Family Mutual Insurance Company, and Regent Insurance Company (collectively the defendants). The part of the judgment at issue here dismissed the consolidated actions of Hailey Marie-Joe Force, Mehgan Force, and Lauren Force, collectively the minor children of Billy Joe Force, the deceased, against the defendants.

¶ 2 The court of appeals certified the action to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.

¶ 3 The issue before the court is: Can minor children recover for the wrongful death of their father under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) (2011-12),1 when the deceased leaves behind a spouse who was estranged from the deceased and who is precluded from recovering for the wrongful death?

¶ 4 Linda Force, the deceased's spouse in the instant case, is precluded from recovery for her husband's wrongful death because the circuit court dismissed her claim, concluding that she has no compensable damages under the wrongful death statute; this dismissal of Linda Force's wrongful death claim was not appealed.

¶ 5 In the instant case, Linda Force did not receive any financial support from the deceased from the time of their separation in 1997 to the deceased's death in 2008. Their long separation with no communication for many years was evidence that there was no interaction or affection between the spouses. The circuit court concluded that the unique facts of the instant case demonstrate that the deceased's spouse had no claim for damages for her husband's wrongful death under the wrongful death statutes. The dismissal of Linda Force's wrongful death claim is not before us.

¶ 6 The defendants argue that because the deceased's spouse is still living, she is a "surviving spouse" under the statutes; that her recovery for the wrongful death of her husband is zero; and that consequently the deceased's minor children do not have any set-aside from the surviving spouse's recovery.

¶ 7 The defendants rely on the statutory hierarchy of beneficiaries created by Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).2 The first class of beneficiaries is the surviving spouse, with a set-aside from his or her recovery for minor children "in recognition of the duty and responsibility of a parent to support minor children." If there is a "surviving spouse," other beneficiaries do not have a cause of action for wrongful death. If there is no "surviving spouse," the cause of action passes to the next beneficiary in the statutory hierarchy.

¶ 8 We disagree with the defendants' interpretation of the statutes. We conclude that in order to avoid an absurd, unreasonable result contrary to the legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2), we construe the statutes under the unique facts of the instant case to allow the minor children to recover even though the deceased's spouse in the instant case is alive and does not (according to the circuit court) recover any damages for the deceased husband's wrongful death.

¶ 9 Our result comports with the dual legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes: (1) to impose liability on the wrongdoer; and (2) to protect relational interests, especially the interests of the deceased's minor dependent children.

¶ 10 The statutory interpretation advocated by the defendants would contravene these fundamental purposes of the wrongful death statutes by barring any wrongful death claim by Linda Force and the minor children, along with all lower-tier beneficiaries.

¶ 11 The defendants call for the unfair, unreasonable outcome that the Wisconsin legislature sought to avoid by enacting the first wrongful death statute in 1857: the wrongdoer would be immune from liability and no compensation would be recovered by the deceased's relatives who would have recovered had the deceased lived. The interpretation of "surviving spouse" should avoid such unreasonable, absurd results.

¶ 12 We examine the meaning of the phrase "surviving spouse" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), in the unique fact scenario presented in this case.3 The words "surviving" and "spouse" are commonly used words. The text of the wrongful death statute does not define who is or is not a "surviving spouse."

¶ 13 To interpret and apply the phrase "surviving spouse" in the wrongful death statutes, we examine the text of the wrongful death statutes using various interpretive aids. In interpreting words in a statutory text, we do more than focus on the dictionary definition of each word. Interpretive aids such as the legislative purpose, prior Wisconsin case law and case law from other jurisdictions, and statutory history help guide our interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse."

¶ 14 The legislative purposes are clear: impose liability on the tortfeasor and allow recovery by the deceased's relatives who would have recovered had the deceased lived. Our case law demonstrates that courts interpret the wrongful death statutes to apply to the unique fact situation presented by a case in order to meet the legislative purposes, rather than apply a strict literal interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse." Sister state case law similarly recognizes that a lower-tier beneficiary can maintain a claim even if a higher-tier beneficiary is alive, when the unique facts would otherwise contravene the purposes of the wrongful death statutes.

¶ 15 The statutory history of the wrongful death statutes demonstrates that the legislature has explicitly protected the rights of minor children to recover for wrongful death and left interpretation of the term "surviving spouse" to the courts in unique and specific fact situations.

¶ 16 Upon examining the statutory text with these interpretive aids, we conclude that the phrase "surviving spouse" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) does not always simply mean any living spouse of the deceased. The meaning of the phrase "surviving spouse" has been elucidated by scrutinizing unique fact situations to define "surviving spouse" in accord with the legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes, rather than considering only the literal meaning of the phrase "surviving spouse."

¶ 17 For the reasons set forth, we interpret the phrase "surviving spouse" in the present case as not including Linda Force, the deceased's estranged spouse who, as a result of the circuit court's dismissal of her wrongful death claim (which was not appealed), is barred from recovery under Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2). If Linda Force is not a "surviving spouse" under the statute, the parties do not dispute that the minor children have a cognizable claim as lineal heirs. As lineal heirs of the deceased, the children would be first in line for any recovery for the wrongful death of their father.

¶ 18 We conclude that the circuit court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment against the minor children and erred in dismissing the minor children's causes of action against the defendants for wrongful death. The minor children in the present case have a cause of action against the defendants for wrongful death as if Linda Force were not alive at the death of the deceased.4

¶ 19 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court against the children and in favor of the defendants and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

¶ 20 To assist the reader, here is a table of contents to this opinion:

Conclusion: ¶¶ 126-129.

I

¶ 21 The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed for purposes of this appeal. Billy Joe Force, the deceased, was driving a motor vehicle for his employer. He died when his vehicle collided with a motor vehicle driven by Jeffrey Brown, the individual defendant.

¶ 22 The deceased's estranged spouse, Linda Force, and his three nonmarital minor children, Hailey, Mehgan, and Lauren,5 each sought compensation from Jeffrey Brown, the individual defendant; American Family, the insurer of Brown's vehicle; and Regent Insurance Company, the insurer of Billy Joe Force's employer. The allegation is that Brown's negligence caused Billy Joe Force's death.6

¶ 23 Billy Joe Force and Linda Force were married in 1995 or 1996 and separated after six months of marriage. They never were legally separated or divorced. They did not have any children together. Billy Joe Force had three children with two women who were not his wife. Linda Force has no legal obligation to support these three minor children.

¶ 24 At the time of the motor vehicle accident in 2006, Linda Force lived in New York; Billy Joe Force lived in Wisconsin. During the five years before his death in 2008, Linda Force had no contact with Billy Joe Force. Billy Joe Force never provided any pecuniary support to Linda Force from 1997 until his death in 2008.

¶ 25 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding, inter alia, that Linda Force, as a surviving, estranged spouse, had no compensable damages under the wrongful death statute and that none of the three children had a cause of action for wrongful death.7

¶ 26 The three minor children appealed the dismissal of their actions. Linda Force has not appealed the dismissal of her personal claim for damages for wrongful death.

II

¶ 27 We review a grant of summary judgment independently of the circuit court, using the same methodology as the circuit court.8 Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9

¶ 28 The material facts are undisputed in the present case and the resolution of the dispute between the three minor children and the defendants turns on a question of law, that is, the interpretation and application of the wrongful death statutes to these undisputed facts. The interpretation and application of a statute to undisputed facts are ordinarily questions of law that this court determines independently of the circuit court, although it benefits from the circuit court's analysis.10 We also benefit from the analysis of the court of appeals in its certification memorandum in the present case.11

¶ 29 To interpret and apply the phrase "surviving spouse" used in the wrongful death statute, we examine the text of the statute.

¶ 30 In examining the statutory text, however, we do more than focus on a dictionary definition of each word. Words are given meaning to avoid absurd, unreasonable, or implausible results and results that are clearly at odds with the legislature's purpose.12 We scrutinize the words in view of the purpose of the statute.13 We consider the meaning of words in the context in which they appear.14 The definition of a word or phrase can vary in different circumstances.15 Different fact scenarios may require different interpretations of the text, because words cannot anticipate every possible fact situation.16 "[R]easonable minds can differ about a statute's application when the text is constant but the circumstances to which the text may apply are kaleidoscopic."17

¶ 31 We also examine our case law interpreting the statute18 and the statutory history of the statute to determine the meaning of words.19

III

¶ 32 This court has declared that there is no common-law action for wrongful death; the right to bring suit is purely statutory.20

¶ 33 We turn first to the text of the wrongful death statutes, Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2).

¶ 34 Wisconsin's wrongful death statute was first enacted in 1857.21 The present statute retains the 1857 statutory framework:

¶ 35 Sections 895.03 and 895.04 are viewed in pari, materia, having been created together and relating to the same topic.22

¶ 36 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 states the conditions under which a wrongdoer is liable for wrongful death. It is straightforward, clear, and easy to read. It is largely unchanged since the creation of the wrongful death cause of action in 1857.

¶ 37 The legislature has declared in every iteration of the wrongful death statute since 1857, including Wis. Stat. § 895.03, that "in every such case" in which a wrongdoer has caused death, the wrongdoer is "liable to an action for damages" as if death had not ensued. Thus, the legislature has proclaimed that a wrongdoer should be liable for a wrongful death when the injured party could have maintained an action and recovered damages from the defendant, had the injured party survived.

¶ 38 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.03 states in full:

¶ 39 No one disputes that the conditions set forth in Wis. Stat. § 895.03 that make a wrongdoer liable for wrongful death are met in the instant case.

¶ 40 Wisconsin Stat. 895.04(1) lists the persons who may bring a wrongful death action:

¶ 41 In the present case, the wrongful death actions were brought by the personal representative and by persons claiming to be the persons to whom the amount recovered for wrongful death belongs. No one disputes that the proper persons have brought the instant actions.

¶ 42 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) enumerates the persons to whom the amount recovered for wrongful death belongs. Unlike Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(1), § 895.04(2) is a dense and difficult statute to read and understand. It has evolved to its present language by repeated legislative amendments.

¶ 43 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) creates a hierarchy of persons to whom the amount recovered belongs.24 The first class of beneficiaries is the "surviving spouse," with a set-aside for minor children "in recognition of the duty and responsibility of a parent to support minor children." The second class is lineal heirs.

¶ 44 Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2) reads as follows:

¶ 45 There is a difference between a wrongful death claim and a survival claim. A wrongful death claim, as we explain above, compensates the deceased's relatives for the damages they suffer as a result of the deceased's death.29 A survival claim compensates the estate of the deceased (or persons who paid expenses on behalf of the estate) for damages suffered by the deceased between the time of the injury and the time of death.30

¶ 46 The personal representative may bring both a wrongful death claim and a survival claim, but the beneficiaries receiving the damages recovered under the two claims may be different.31 "[T]he right to sue under the wrongful death statute must be distinguished from the ownership of the recovery. Because the [wrongful death] action is granted by statute, ownership of the recovery is limited to the beneficiaries designated under the statute."32

¶ 47 In order to determine whether a beneficiary exists who may recover under a wrongful death claim, the court has frequently grappled with disputes regarding the interpretation of the wrongful death statute's hierarchical beneficiary structure.33 The legislature did not anticipate numerous fact scenarios in its enactment of the wrongful death statute, and the courts have had to fill the gaps in the statute.

¶ 48 To determine the meaning of the phrase "surviving spouse" in the unique fact scenario of the instant case, we must fill the gap in the statute. In enacting Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), the legislature did not anticipate the fact scenario presented in the instant case in which a long-time estranged spouse does not obtain a divorce, has no recoverable damages on the death of the deceased husband, and has no legal obligation to support nonmarital minor children of the deceased.

¶ 49 In referring to a "surviving spouse" and creating a hierarchical structure of beneficiaries in the wrongful death statute, the legislature envisioned an intact marriage with minor marital children whom both the deceased and the deceased's spouse were obliged to support. Indeed, "[a] careful reading of the entire section [895.04(2)] makes it clear that the trial court in an attempt to protect the children must work from the amount recovered by the spouse who is charged with the support of the minor children."34

¶ 50 The defendants argue that the statutory hierarchy of beneficiaries bars the minor children in the present case from asserting a claim for wrongful death because the deceased left a living spouse, and the surviving spouse, Linda Force, cannot claim any damages for wrongful death according to the circuit court.

¶ 51 The defendants rest their position on a literal interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse":

¶ 52 The defendants' reading of the statute is not without support in the text, but the defendants' interpretation is not necessarily a reasonable reading of the phrase "surviving spouse" in unique fact situations.

¶ 53 First, the statute does not define who is or is not a surviving spouse.35

¶ 54 Second, the text of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) does not expressly state that minor children are barred from recovery when a surviving spouse fails to recover any damages. Rather, § 895.04(2) provides that minor children get a set-aside from the surviving spouse's recovery and recover as lineal heirs if no surviving spouse exists.

¶ 55 A study of the text demonstrates that we are unable to discern the answer to our inquiry in the present case by a mere examination of the words of Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) isolated from interpretive aids. We next look for assistance from the legislative pronouncement of the purposes of the wrongful death statutes.

IV

¶ 56 The minor children's position that they should recover under the wrongful death statutes is supported by the legislative purposes advanced by Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2).

¶ 57 The legislature has declared in Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2) that the purposes of the wrongful death statutes are (1) to hold wrongdoers liable for damages upon death of an injured person, and (2) to compensate relatives of the injured party for the losses caused by the wrongful act. A holding that the minor children cannot maintain a wrongful death claim in the instant case would contravene those fundamental purposes. The wrongdoers would escape liability and the minor children would not be compensated for their losses.

¶ 58 The purposes of the wrongful death statutes have existed since the law's enactment in 1857. The wrongful death statute was enacted to correct a perceived injustice at common law providing no cause of action for wrongful death.36

¶ 59 As the Prosser & Keeton treatise explains, the common-law rule had perverse "intolerable" consequences: "The result was that it was cheaper for the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him, and that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the victim, who frequently were destitute, without a remedy."37

¶ 60 In 1846, Parliament passed Lord Campbell's Act, which sidestepped the common law and created a statutory right of action for surviving spouses, children, and parents, as well as other lineal descendants.38

¶ 61 States too adopted laws recognizing a statutory right of action for wrongful death.

¶ 62 In Wisconsin, the wrongful death statute enacted in 1857 was an almost verbatim copy of the New York wrongful death statute,39 which itself was copied nearly word for word from Lord Campbell's Act.40

¶ 63 A New York court explained that the New York statute extended the principle of liability to a wrongdoer who causes the death of another and gave the right to damages to representatives of the deceased.41

¶ 64 Wisconsin courts have echoed these general principles as the driving purposes behind the wrongful death statutes. First, "[t]he injustices and hardships resulting from the common law principles in wrongful death cases caused the legislature to create statutory remedies and liability."42

¶ 65 Second, "[t]he purpose of the wrongful death statute is to compensate for the loss of the relational interest existing between the beneficiaries and the deceased."43

¶ 66 In 1961 the legislature explicitly protected the interests of minor children of the deceased "in recognition of the duty and responsibility of a parent to support minor children."44

¶ 67 In contrast to these purposes, the defendants' interpretation of the wrongful death statutes liberates the alleged wrongdoer from all liability for the wrongful death in the instant case. According to the defendants, the liability of the wrongdoer for the deceased's death in the present case is zero and no relative of the deceased, including his minor children, recovers any amount. If we accept the defendants' reasoning, the wrongdoer in the instant case gets a windfall at the expense of the deceased's surviving dependent minor children.45

¶ 68 The defendants' interpretation contravenes the legislative purposes and produces an unfair, unreasonable, or absurd result that the legislature could not have intended.

V

¶ 69 We turn to case law to assist us in interpreting the phrase "surviving spouse" within the context of the wrongful death statutes.

¶ 70 In several cases, the court has employed a literal interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse," holding that a spouse living at the time of the wrongful death is a "surviving spouse" under the wrongful death statutes.46 In other cases courts have not read the phrase literally.47 No prior case is directly on point, but we can derive principles from the case law that inform our resolution of the instant case.

¶ 71 We begin with Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis.2d 350, 353, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967), a lead case governing to whom a recovered wrongful death award belongs when a living spouse may not be able to recover damages and children seek to recover.

¶ 72 In Cogger, Darla Trudell was killed in a car accident. She was the passenger; her husband, Joseph Trudell, was the driver. The two minor Trudell children sued their father, as well as the driver of the other car.

¶ 73 The father, being one of the defendants in the wrongful death suit, could not bring a claim for wrongful death on his own behalf against himself. The children argued that Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), as amended in 1962,48 gave the children equal status with the surviving spouse, and thus, the fact that the father was alive did not bar their claim.

¶ 74 The Cogger court held that Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) created a "series of priorities with regard to the ownership of a cause of action for wrongful death" and that these priorities were not changed by the 1962 amendment, which added the provision allowing a court to determine an amount to be set aside for the minor children from the surviving spouse's recovery.49

¶ 75 The Cogger court rejected the children's argument that the 1962 amendment creating a set-aside for minor children had put both the surviving spouse and the surviving children in the first priority class.50 Rather, the court stated: "A careful reading of the entire section makes it clear that the trial court ... must work from the amount recovered by the spouse who is charged with the support of the minor children."51

¶ 76 Looking to case law construing the pre-1962 wrongful death statutes, the court concluded that both before and after the 1962 amendment, "[t]he beneficiaries and their preferred status are as follows: First, the spouse; second, a child or children; third, the parents. Thus the nonexistence of the preferred beneficiary or beneficiaries is essential to a right of action by or in behalf of other beneficiaries."52

¶ 77 Even though one of the two children in Cogger was not the child of the surviving spouse, the Cogger court assumed that the surviving spouse had an obligation to support both children and interpreted the statute as specifically addressing minor children supported by the surviving spouse.53

¶ 78 Cogger has been invoked in several cases to bar a minor child's recovery when the surviving spouse who had the obligation to support the children was allegedly responsible in some way for the wrongful death. Perhaps the result of these cases may be explained by the fact that holding for the children who were supported by the surviving spouse could indirectly inure to the benefit of the surviving spouse who caused the death.

¶ 79 In Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis.2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971), the minor children of the surviving spouse and the deceased were barred from bringing suit for the deceased parent's wrongful death when the surviving parent allegedly caused the wrongful death.

¶ 80 The Hanson court relied on Cogger, stating that "surviving children do not have a cause of action for the wrongful death of one of their parents when the [deceased] is survived by his or her spouse, and the fact that the surviving spouse was responsible for the death does not create a new cause of action in the children." Hanson, 51 Wis.2d at 475, 187 N.W.2d 151.

¶ 81 A second case, Bowen v. American Family Insurance Co., 2012 WI App 29, 340 Wis.2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887, held that even when the surviving spouse expressly waives the wrongful death claim, the Cogger rule still applies and the child has no recovery.

¶ 82 In Bowen, the deceased died while a passenger in a car driven by her spouse when the car collided with another car. An adult child of the deceased and the spouse argued that even if the Cogger rule applied, the court should look to the spouse's express disclaimer of his wrongful death claim to pass the claim on to the adult child.

¶ 83 The court of appeals declared that the living spouse was a "surviving spouse," even though the spouse did not wish to pursue a claim and did not want to be a "surviving spouse."54

¶ 84 The Cogger decision and its progeny are informative, but Cogger is not dispositive in the present case. The Cogger court did not consider the fact situation presented in the instant case, in which the deceased's spouse is not negligent in causing the death, has no obligation to support the deceased's minor children, and (according to the circuit court) cannot recover damages for wrongful death under any circumstances.55

¶ 85 A third case that adheres to Cogger and informs our decision in the present case is Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v. Xiong, 2002 WI App 110, 255 Wis.2d 693, 648 N.W.2d 900.

¶ 86 Mai Xiong died as a passenger in a car driven by Nhia Xiong. Mai Xiong and Nhia Xiong were the parents of minor and adult children. The Xiong children brought a wrongful death action against their father, Nhia Xiong. The circuit court dismissed the children's action because Nhia Xiong was responsible for Mai Xiong's death and, pursuant to Cogger, could not recover in a wrongful death claim. The Xiong children argued that the parents were not married, and thus, that their father was not a "surviving spouse."

¶ 87 On appeal, the court of appeals observed that there was no evidence of any official marriage of the parents, in Laos, Thailand, or Wisconsin.56 Nonetheless, the court valued the unique facts over the literal interpretation of "surviving spouse" and determined that the word "spouse" in the wrongful death statute could include a "putative spouse." The court of appeals assessed the unique facts surrounding the relationship between the parents and used its "equity powers" to recognize the relationship as sufficient to establish Nhia Xiong as the "surviving spouse" for the purposes of the wrongful death statute.57

¶ 88 The court of appeals in the Xiong case then applied Cogger and concluded that a surviving spouse existed and the children could not recover.58

¶ 89 Cogger and its progeny at first blush seem to preclude the children's recovery in the instant case.

¶ 90 On closer examination, however, Cogger and its progeny are, as we explained previously, factually distinguishable from the present case. They therefore are not dispositive. Linda Force did not contribute in any manner to the injury and death of the deceased. Rather, the circuit court concluded that she cannot recover because of her estrangement from the deceased. Because Linda Force has no support obligations to the deceased's minor children, she will not benefit if the children recover damages for wrongful death.

¶ 91 Furthermore, Xiong buttresses the minor children's position in the instant case. Xiong teaches that courts interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) in line with the unique fact situation and the purposes of the wrongful death statutes, rather than in line with formal compliance with laws governing the formation of a marriage.

¶ 92 In Xiong, the parties treated each other as husband and wife, and the court concluded that they should be treated as married under the wrongful death statutes even though no proof of a formal marriage at law existed.

¶ 93 In the instant case, the parties were estranged for over a decade. Adhering to the teaching of Xiong and examining the unique relationship of the parties in the present case dictate that the long-time estranged relationship not be treated as a marriage and that Linda Force not be considered a "surviving spouse" under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2).

¶ 94 Additional support for the children's position comes from Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis.2d 159, 423 N.W.2d 540 (1988).

¶ 95 Steinbarth, like Xiong, relied on the unique facts rather than the formality of the legal relationship. Steinbarth teaches that under unusual circumstances in which the purposes of the statutes would not be met, the phrase "surviving spouse" excludes a living spouse and the children may recover damages under the wrongful death statutes.

¶ 96 In Steinbarth, the husband allegedly intentionally shot and killed his wife. The deceased wife's adult children (the husband's stepchildren) sued the husband for wrongful death. Using a literal interpretation of the statute rendering the husband a "surviving spouse," the circuit court and court of appeals concluded that the adult children's wrongful death claim was barred under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) (1985-86).59 The supreme court reversed.

¶ 97 The Steinbarth court was persuaded that statutes prohibiting an intentional killer from benefiting from the crime aided in interpreting the phrase "surviving spouse" in the wrongful death statute.60 The Steinbarth court held "that a spouse who `feloniously and intentionally' kills his or her spouse is not a surviving spouse for purposes of [the wrongful death statutes], and is treated as having predeceased the decedent so that the cause of action may accrue to the next designated beneficiary."61

¶ 98 The Steinbarth court noted that the unique facts of the case dictated the outcome. The court reasoned that an alternative holding would create an "anomalous result" that "[t]he legislature could not have intended."62

¶ 99 The Steinbarth court distinguished Cogger. Cogger involved a surviving spouse who negligently caused the wrongful death; no basis existed in Cogger for stopping a surviving spouse who unintentionally but negligently caused the spouse's death from seeking wrongful death benefits for the loss of the spouse from a more negligent wrongdoer.63

¶ 100 On the other hand, in Steinbarth, the "surviving spouse," a felonious and intentional killer, could not "under any conceivable circumstance seek recovery under the wrongful death statute for the loss of the decedent."64 Unlike Cogger and its progeny, the surviving spouse in Steinbarth had no claim against a third-party wrongdoer or any ability to recover for wrongful death of the deceased.

¶ 101 The instant case does not align precisely with Cogger, Hanson, Bowen, Xiong, or Steinbarth. Nevertheless, these cases support the conclusion that under the unique facts of the instant case, the claim of the minor children should prevail.

¶ 102 The case law demonstrates that the meaning of the phrase "surviving spouse" has been elucidated by scrutinizing unique fact situations to define "surviving spouse" in accord with the legislative purposes of the wrongful death statutes, rather than considering only the literal meaning of the phrase "surviving spouse." Linda Force, like the spouse in Steinbarth, is barred from recovering for wrongful death under any circumstances, according to the circuit court. To hold against the children here would allow a wrongdoer to escape liability and deprive relatives of recovery for their loss, simply because of an unusual fact scenario.

¶ 103 Courts in other jurisdictions that have wrongful death laws similar to Wisconsin's placing children in a secondary beneficiary class,65 when confronted with unique facts, have held that the secondary beneficiaries have a claim even when the primary beneficiary may exist. Courts have allowed ameliorating common-law principles to apply to fill in a legislature's unintended gaps in a wrongful death statute.

¶ 104 The case Evans v. Atlantic Cement Co., 272 So.2d 538, 541 (Fla.Ct.App. 1973), is a typical example of a court looking to the unique factual circumstances to fulfill the underlying purpose of the wrongful death statute. In Evans, the court held that a woman who lived with the deceased for nine-and-a-half years and had children with him, and for whom the decedent provided support, could maintain an action for wrongful death although she was not literally a "surviving spouse" of the deceased. The deceased was survived by a surviving spouse and another child from a different marriage who, under Florida law, could maintain a wrongful death action.

¶ 105 The court reasoned that it had to construe the statute in the context of the unique facts of the case in order to avoid a result contrary to the purposes of the wrongful death statute:

¶ 106 Other state courts have permitted secondary beneficiaries to recover damages when the deceased's spouse is still alive. They have done so on a variety of grounds.

¶ 107 For example, in Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn.App.1991), the Tennessee court of appeals held that when a spouse still living after the death of the deceased affirmatively waives his or her claim, the secondary beneficiaries (in that case, the deceased's nephews) can collect the proceeds from the wrongful death action.67 The Foster court reasoned that a secondary beneficiary, who would otherwise be barred from a claim by the existence of a surviving spouse, must be able to pursue a claim "to keep alive the decedent's cause of action" and to achieve the statutory purpose of ending the regime in which "it was more economical to kill someone than to merely inflict a nonfatal injury."68 Although Wisconsin courts have explicitly rejected this waiver approach to the wrongful death statute,69 Foster is instructive, standing for the proposition that sister states with hierarchical beneficiary structures permit secondary beneficiaries to collect even when primary beneficiaries are still alive, in order to fulfill the purposes of the statute in unusual or unique fact situations.

¶ 108 Georgia courts have similarly held that in some circumstances, secondary beneficiaries can recover damages when the deceased's spouse is still alive. In Brown v. Liberty Oil & Refining Corp., 261 Ga. 214, 403 S.E.2d 806 (1991), the Georgia Supreme Court held that although the deceased's spouse was still alive and prior interpretations of the statute had barred children's wrongful death claims when there was a surviving spouse,70 in the unique fact scenario of the case in which the surviving spouse abandoned the children and could not be located, "the factual circumstances of this case demand the exercise of [equity] powers to preserve the rights of the minor children."71 The Georgia courts have subsequently applied this holding to other unusual fact scenarios to hold that secondary beneficiary children can recover damages for wrongful death even when the deceased's spouse is still alive.72

¶ 109 Although these cases are not dispositive of the instant case and do not present a unified theory, they are informative in teaching that state courts have recognized that secondary wrongful death beneficiaries can bring claims in unique fact scenarios in which barring such claims would undermine or contradict the wrongful death statutes' purposes of punishing wrongdoers and compensating the deceased's relatives.

¶ 110 In sum, Wisconsin case law and case law from other jurisdictions supports the children's claim in the present case.

VI

¶ 111 Finally, we examine the statutory history. We have explored statutory history previously in our discussion of the text, the legislative purposes, and the case law. The statutory history shows that the legislature has repeatedly amended the classes of potential beneficiaries. It appears from the statutory history that when a court excluded a class from being a beneficiary, often the legislature would amend the wrongful death statute to include the class.73

¶ 112 For our purposes, amendments in 1961 and 1962 are key in the statutory history, because they directly addressed the right of minor children to recover for wrongful death.

¶ 113 Before 1961, the statute made the spouse the primary beneficiary and the children secondary beneficiaries as lineal heirs of the deceased:

Wis. Stat. § 331.04(2) (1959-60).

¶ 114 The 1961 amendment switched the order of the beneficiaries, placing the children as primary beneficiaries and the surviving spouse as a secondary beneficiary. If there were no minor children, the surviving spouse recovered. The legislature amended the statute in 1961 to read as follows:

Ch. 285, Laws of 1961 (enacted July 27, 1961).

¶ 115 The bill drafting file does not reveal the backstory of this amendment, but the language makes clear that the legislature intended to favor minor children whom the deceased was legally charged to support over a surviving spouse.

¶ 116 A 1962 amendment reveals the legislature's second thoughts about the newly adopted 1961 hierarchy. The bill drafting file of the 1962 amendment also does not reveal the backstory of this amendment.

¶ 117 The 1962 amendment, adopted about six months after the 1961 amendment, returned the surviving spouse to primary beneficiary status but protected the minor children by creating a set-aside from the surviving spouse's recovery. This amendment supports the defendant's interpretation of the wrongful death statute that the children are not in the primary class of beneficiaries.

¶ 118 The 1962 amendment reads as follows:

Ch. 649, Laws of 1961 (enacted Jan. 30, 1962).

¶ 119 This 1962 amendment gave the courts discretion to consider how much the set-aside for the minor children would be, considering "the age of such children, the amount involved, the capacity and integrity of the surviving spouse, and any other facts or information [they] may have or receive." The legislature made clear that the statute was enacted to protect the spouse but also to recognize "the duty and responsibility of a parent to support his minor children."

¶ 120 Other than the 1961 and 1962 amendments, in recent years the legislature has left the wrongful death statutes largely intact in the wake of cases depriving or granting the children recovery in unusual fact situations.

¶ 121 Cogger established that a surviving spouse, even one who was a wrongdoer in causing the deceased's death, remained a primary beneficiary despite cutting off the claims of the minor children.74 After Cogger, the legislature took no action to amend the statute.

¶ 122 Steinbarth established that a living spouse who intentionally kills the deceased cannot be a surviving spouse under the wrongful death statute, and the children can recover.75 Again, the legislature took no action to amend the statute.

¶ 123 According to the defendants, their position is supported by the legislature's failure to revise Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) after Cogger and other cases. These cases barred secondary beneficiaries from recovering under certain circumstances.

¶ 124 We are not persuaded that the legislative inaction supports the defendants. Legislative inaction is ordinarily weak evidence of legislative acquiescence in or countenance of a judicial or executive branch interpretation.76

¶ 125 Rather, the statutory history, including the 1961 and 1962 amendments, teaches that the legislature has protected the interests of both the surviving spouse and the minor children and that the legislature has left interpretation of the phrase "surviving spouse" to the courts when unanticipated fact scenarios have emerged.

¶ 126 In the instant case, we must consider, as the statutory history instructs, the interests of both the surviving spouse and the children based on the facts at hand.

* * * *

¶ 127 For the reasons set forth, we interpret the phrase "surviving spouse" in the present case as not including Linda Force, the deceased's estranged spouse who, as a result of the circuit court's dismissal of her wrongful death claim (which was not appealed), is barred from recovery under Wis. Stat. §§ 895.03 and 895.04(2). If Linda Force is not a "surviving spouse" under the statute, the parties do not dispute that the minor children have a cognizable claim as lineal heirs. As lineal heirs of the deceased, the children would be first in line for any recovery for the wrongful death of their father.

¶ 128 We conclude that the circuit court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment and erred in dismissing the minor children's causes of action against the defendants for wrongful death. The minor children in the present case have a cause of action against the defendants for wrongful death as if Linda Force were not alive at the death of the deceased.77

¶ 129 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court against the children and in favor of the defendants and remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The judgment and order of the circuit court are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.

DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (concurring).

¶ 130 This is a case of statutory interpretation. The seminal case on statutory interpretation in recent years is State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.

¶ 131 In Kalal, the court emphasized the importance of statutory text when it embraced the principle that a court's role is to determine what a statute means rather than determine what the legislature intended. Id., ¶ 44. The court said:

Id.

¶ 132 The court explained that statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. Id., ¶ 45. "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning." Id. (citations omitted). Then the court added:

Id., ¶ 46 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

¶ 133 In my view, this case requires the court to confront head-on statutory language that, if applied literally, would produce an absurd or unreasonable result.

¶ 134 Historically, courts have tried to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. The year before Kalal, this court said in State v. Hamilton, 2003 WI 50, ¶ 38, 261 Wis.2d 458, 661 N.W.2d 832: "The court should not search for ambiguity. It should enforce a clear statute." However, "One of the few exceptions to this sound principle is that the court will seek to avoid a truly absurd or unreasonable result." Id., ¶ 39 (citing State v. Burkman, 96 Wis.2d 630, 642, 292 N.W.2d 641 (1980); State v. Mendoza, 96 Wis.2d 106, 115, 291 N.W.2d 478 (1980); Kayden Indus., Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis.2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967)).

¶ 135 There are innumerable cases in which Wisconsin courts have repeated or actually invoked this exception.

¶ 136 In Worachek v. Stephenson Town School District, 270 Wis. 116, 124, 70 N.W.2d 657 (1955), the court stated: "This court has repeatedly held that a statute should not be construed so as to work an absurd result even when the language seems clear and unambiguous." Id. (citing Connell v. Luck, 264 Wis. 282, 58 N.W.2d 633 (1953); Laridaen v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 259 Wis. 178, 47 N.W.2d 727 (1951); Pfingsten v. Pfingsten, 164 Wis. 308, 159 N.W. 921 (1916)).

¶ 137 In Isaksen v. Chesapeake Instrument Corp., 19 Wis.2d 282, 289-90, 120 N.W.2d 151 (1963), the court stated:

Id. (some citations omitted) (quoting Rice v. Ashland Cnty., 108 Wis. 189, 192, 84 N.W. 189 (1900)).

¶ 138 In Kayden Industries, Inc. v. Murphy, 34 Wis.2d 718, 732, 150 N.W.2d 447 (1967), the court stated:

Id. (citations omitted).

¶ 139 In Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶ 10, 232 Wis.2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515, the court stated:

Id. (brackets in original) (citations omitted).

¶ 140 In Teschendorf v. State Farm Insurance Companies, 2006 WI 89, ¶ 15, 293 Wis.2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258, the court stated:

Id. (internal citations and explanatory parentheticals omitted). The court went on, "The reason to doubt a literal meaning of [the statute] is that it clashes with related statutes." Id., ¶ 24.

¶ 141 In Gasper v. Parbs, 2001 WI App 259, ¶ 8, 249 Wis.2d 106, 637 N.W.2d 399, the court of appeals stated:

Id.

¶ 142 These principles were undoubtedly applied in Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis.2d 159, 423 N.W.2d 540 (1988), where the court said: "A court will not ordinarily engage in statutory interpretation unless a statute is ambiguous. A statute may be ambiguous and require judicial construction if the literal application of the language would lead to an absurd result." Id. at 165, 423 N.W.2d 540 (citing DeMars v. LaPour, 123 Wis.2d 366, 370, 366 N.W.2d 891 (1985)). Steinbarth, of course, interpreted the same statute now before the court.

¶ 143 Courts try to avoid absurd results, but courts are not eager to disregard the seemingly clear language of a statute. This reluctance is salutary because it reflects the deference and respect of the judiciary for the policy choices of other branches of government.

¶ 144 For judges, there is plenty of solid ground between judicial activism and judicial paralysis. Our precedent provides guidance on when judges should act and when they should not.

¶ 145 Absurd results are much more than undesirable results. Absurd results are aberrations that clash with the manifest purpose of a statute or related statutes (evidenced by statutory language) and cannot be explained as a rational exception to the statutory scheme. Absurd results are usually unexpected. They are different from harsh consequences because they are seldom the fault of an adversely affected party. Instead, they almost always result from circumstances beyond the party's control. Absurd results produce hardship or unfairness that is quickly recognized and cannot be ignored.

¶ 146 This case satisfies these standards, as is documented in the majority opinion. We ought to act but also implore the legislature to rewrite the statute.

¶ 147 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.

PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J. (dissenting).

¶ 148 While the majority opinion reaches an appealing result as it permits the minor children of Billy Joe Force to maintain a claim for his wrongful death, I cannot join the opinion. In my view, the majority opinion's conclusion that the statutory term "surviving spouse" does not mean a spouse who has survived the death of her husband because she was estranged from her husband at his death is not based on statutory construction and will create considerable mischief in the future. Accordingly, I would affirm the circuit court, and I respectfully dissent.

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 149 The underlying facts are not disputed or complicated. On November 12, 2008, Billy Joe Force died as a result of a motor vehicle accident. At the time of his death, Billy was married to Linda Force. However, Billy and Linda had been separated since 1996, and Billy had not provided any support to Linda since 1997.

¶ 150 Billy and Linda had no children of their marriage. However, at his death, Billy had three minor children, born of two women, neither of whom he had married. It is these three children who seek to maintain this wrongful death action against Jeffrey Brown, the driver of the other vehicle in the accident; his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Company; and Regent Insurance Company, the insurer of Billy's employer, for whom Billy was driving at the time of the accident.1

¶ 151 The circuit court granted summary judgment of dismissal, concluding that: (1) Linda survived Billy; (2) the children had no independent cause of action under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2); (3) Linda had no compensable damages; and (4) because Linda could not recover, no offset was available for the children. The court of appeals certified the issue of whether children have an independent claim for relief under § 895.04 when there is a surviving spouse, who has been estranged from the decedent for more than ten years and could not recover, thereby precluding any set aside for the children.2 We accepted certification.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

¶ 152 We are asked to construe the term "surviving spouse" in Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2). Statutory interpretation presents a question of law for our independent review; however, we benefit from the circuit court's discussion. Spiegelberg v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶ 8, 291 Wis.2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641. When we construe a statute, we also consider our past interpretations of that statute. Schill v. Wis. Rapids Sch. Dist., 2010 WI 86, ¶ 49, 327 Wis.2d 572, 786 N.W.2d 177.

B. Wisconsin Stat. § 895.04(2)

¶ 153 We are not writing on a clean slate as we interpret Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) in the case now before us. As the court of appeals correctly pointed out, our interpretation of Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis.2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967), precludes recovery for children when there is a surviving spouse who cannot recover. Courts have followed Cogger with only one exception since 1967, Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis.2d 159, 423 N.W.2d 540 (1988).

¶ 154 In Steinbarth, the husband feloniously and intentionally killed his wife, whose death was the basis for the children's wrongful death claim. During our consideration of the children's claim, we reviewed Wis. Stat. § 852.01(2m) (1985-86), which precluded one who feloniously and intentionally killed a decedent from recovering as an heir of the decedent. Id. at 166, 423 N.W.2d 540. We noted that § 852.01(2m) (1985-86) treated the killer as having predeceased the decedent.3 Id. We reasoned that the husband in Steinbarth should be treated consistent with the statutory directive of § 852.01(2m) (1985-86).4 In order to do so, we concluded that a husband who feloniously and intentionally killed his wife will be treated for purposes of a wrongful death claim as though he had predeceased his wife. Accordingly, there would be no surviving spouse under Wis. Stat. § 895.04 and the children could maintain an action for wrongful death. Id. at 167, 423 N.W.2d 540.

¶ 155 In Steinbarth, we distinguished Cogger by noting that the spouse's death in Cogger was based on negligence and in Steinbarth, it was based on intent to kill. We also noted a specific legislative directive about the status of one who kills his spouse for purposes of claims made relative to the death of the spouse. Neither distinction is present here. Linda had nothing to do with Billy's death, and there is no statutory directive, other than the wrongful death statute, Wis. Stat. § 895.04, that applies here.

¶ 156 If I were writing for the majority, I would affirm the circuit court and fully describe how unfair the current statute is to children who have suffered significant damages due to the wrongful death of a parent, but who have no claim when the surviving spouse has no recovery. By the 1961 amendments to Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2), the legislature made an attempt to independently protect children who suffered a loss because of the wrongful death of a parent, but more is needed today to finish what the legislature then began.

¶ 157 Instead of acknowledging that a claim for wrongful death is purely statutory and that at common law no such claim existed, Bowen v. American Family Insurance Co., 2012 WI App 29, ¶ 10, 340 Wis.2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887, the majority opinion pretends that it is construing Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) and creates a new claim.5 It interprets the statutory phrase, "surviving spouse," as not including Linda, Billy's spouse who survived him. The majority justifies the result it reaches by relating that Linda and Billy have been estranged for ten years and that Linda could not prove wrongful death damages on her own behalf.6

¶ 158 While the majority opinion's result is appealing, I cannot join the majority opinion's interpretation of the Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) term "surviving spouse." The methods employed to interpret § 895.04(2) comport with none of the legal principles that guide statutory interpretation. See, e.g., State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶¶ 38-46, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110. Saying that § 895.04(2) means whatever the majority wants it to mean will cause confusion and repetitive litigation.

¶ 159 For example, is an estrangement of five years sufficient time to cause a spouse who survives the decedent to no longer be a "surviving spouse" under the majority opinion's construction of Wis. Stat. § 893.04(2)? Is two years long enough, if there has been absolutely no communication between the spouses? Furthermore, how does the majority opinion line up with spousal intestate succession under Wis. Stat. ch. 852, which says nothing about a spouse's rights being limited due to the husband and wife being separated? See Wis. Stat. § 852.01.

¶ 160 Claims of the type now before us under Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) are commonly brought and commonly denied because of our decision in Cogger.7 We would assist children who attempt to bring wrongful death claims in the future by pointing out the unfairness the current statute creates and asking the legislature to consider revising § 895.04(2), rather than creating a common law fix for the children in the present case and leaving all similarly situated children without a claim due to our interpretation of § 895.04(2) in Cogger.

III. CONCLUSION

¶ 161 While the majority opinion reaches an appealing result as it permits the minor children of Billy Joe Force to maintain a claim for his wrongful death, I cannot join the opinion. In my view, the majority opinion's conclusion that the statutory term "surviving spouse" does not mean a spouse who has survived the death of her husband because she was estranged from her husband at his death is not based on statutory construction and will create considerable mischief in the future.

¶ 162 Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and I respectfully dissent.

¶ 163 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL GABLEMAN join this dissent.

ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J. (dissent).

¶ 164 I join Justice Roggensack's dissent, but write separately to clarify that, had the majority been able to link the Force children's ability to recover with the language of the statute, and reconcile that text with our prior case law, see, e.g., Cogger v. Trudell, 35 Wis.2d 350, 353, 151 N.W.2d 146 (1967), I would have joined the majority. The majority was unable, however, to find a satisfactory, textual way to construe Wis. Stat. § 895.04(2) so to allow the Force children to recover in a wrongful death action. As a result, I am compelled to join Justice Roggensack's dissent.

¶ 165 Justice Prosser concludes that the application of the statutory language produces an "absurd" result. See Justice Prosser's concurrence, ¶ 133. An unpalatable result is not the same as an absurd result. We are to look to the text of the statute to determine whether relief is afforded to the litigants. "In construing or interpreting a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶ 46, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted). It is not the role of the courts to "save" the legislative branch from the consequences of the laws it passes, or to create a remedy when the plain language of the statute does not afford relief.

¶ 166 As a practical matter, the legislature cannot be expected to meaningfully reconsider legislation if the court usurps the role of the legislature in order to create a remedy where none otherwise exists. The long and complex history of the wrongful death statute provides support for the notion that the legislature should consider revision to provide relief when it should be due. See majority op., ¶¶ 69-102 (discussing Steinbarth v. Johannes, 144 Wis.2d 159, 423 N.W.2d 540 (1988); Hanson v. Valdivia, 51 Wis.2d 466, 187 N.W.2d 151 (1971); Cogger, 35 Wis.2d 350, 151 N.W.2d 146; Bowen v. American Family Ins. Co., 2012 WI App 29, 340 Wis.2d 232, 811 N.W.2d 887; Xiong v. Xiong, 2002 WI App 110, 255 Wis.2d 693, 648 N.W.2d 900). The majority's apparent difficulty in distinguishing these cases provides an apt illustration of the problem. The court should not avoid the plain language of a statute in order to prevent unpleasant results. In my view, legislative action is required.

¶ 167 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.