DAVIS, Justice:
The case sub judice presents appeals filed by two individuals [collectively, "the claimants"] who sustained employment-related injuries and who seek additional workers' compensation benefits as a result of further symptoms related to their original workplace injuries. In both cases, the claimants timely requested that the new diagnoses be added to their original claims, but, in both cases, denials of compensability and/or medical treatment required extensive litigation through the workers' compensation system until this Court ultimately found the claimants to be entitled to the compensability ruling/medical treatment they had requested.
While each of the claimants' appeals herein presents the same legal issue, the facts giving rise to their individual claims vary. Therefore, we separately will discuss the facts relevant to each of their appeals.
The petitioner in Case Number 12-1473, Gary E. Hammons ["Mr. Hammons"], sustained a work-related injury to his leg in the course of and as a result of his employment as a truck driver with the respondent herein, A & R Transport, Inc., on January 5, 2004. Mr. Hammons received a 4% permanent partial disability ["PPD"] award for his leg by Claims Administrator order entered June 6, 2005. Thereafter, Mr. Hammons experienced low back symptoms that his doctor determined also were attributable to his work-related injury and sought to have that diagnosis added to his original workers' compensation claim. Despite repeated denials of compensability by the various workers' compensation tribunals, this Court ultimately ruled Mr. Hammons' low back injury to be a compensable component of his original work-related injury by order entered January 4, 2010. This Court also awarded Mr. Hammons temporary total disability ["TTD"] benefits for his low back injury from October 18, 2005, through July 25, 2006. Thereafter, on March 8, 2010, the Claims Administrator closed Mr. Hammons' claim for TTD benefits related to his back injury.
Pursuant to W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(f) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010),
(Emphasis and footnotes added). See also W. Va.Code § 23-4-22 (2003) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("In every claim closed after the effective date of this section, the commission shall give notice to the parties of the claimant's right to a permanent disability evaluation."). Despite the fact that Mr. Hammons met the requisite criteria for a mandatory PPD evaluation referral, the Workers' Compensation Commission ["Commission"] never referred him for such an evaluation. On August 9,
Mr. Hammons then appealed to the Office of Judges ["OOJ"], which reversed the Claims Administrator's determination by order entered September 27, 2011. In so ruling, the OOJ disagreed with the Claims Administrator's description of Mr. Hammons' letter as a request for reopening. According to the OOJ,
Mr. Hammons' employer appealed to the Board of Review, which reversed the OOJ's ruling and reinstated the Claims Administrator's initial determination by order entered November 28, 2012. From this adverse ruling, Mr. Hammons appeals to this Court.
The petitioner in Case Number 13-0312, Clara L. Stinnett ["Ms. Stinnett"], sustained a work-related injury to her wrist in the course of and as a result of her employment with the respondent herein, the West Virginia Department of Corrections, on August 31,
Ms. Stinnett claims that her back injury could not be evaluated for PPD benefits until she reached her maximum degree of medical improvement, which occurred once she had and subsequently recovered from her back surgery. See W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(c) ("When the authorized treating physician concludes that the claimant has either reached his or her maximum degree of improvement or is ready for disability evaluation,... the authorized treating physician may recommend a permanent partial disability award for residual impairment relating to and resulting from the compensable injury[.]"). Although W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(f) required the Commission to refer Ms. Stinnett for a PPD evaluation, it failed to do so. See also W. Va.Code § 23-4-22. Therefore, on July 5, 2011, Ms. Stinnett requested consideration of PPD benefits related to her compensable back injury, which request the Claims Administrator denied by order entered July 28, 2011, as an untimely request to reopen her original claim governed by W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2).
In both Mr. Hammons' and Ms. Stinnett's appeal to this Court, the pivotal question concerns whether their requests for a PPD evaluation were timely pursuant to W. Va. Code § 23-4-16(a)(2). The standard of review applicable to this Court's consideration of workers' compensation appeals from the Board of Review is set forth in W. Va.Code §§ 23-5-15(b-d) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010):
In recognition of this standard, we have held:
Syl. pt. 1, Bowers v. West Virginia Office of the Ins. Comm'r, 224 W.Va. 398, 686 S.E.2d 49 (2009). See also Syl. pt. 4, Emmel v. State Comp. Dir., 150 W.Va. 277, 145 S.E.2d 29 (1965) ("An order of the workmen's compensation appeal board, approving an order of the state compensation commissioner, will be reversed by this Court on appeal, where the legal conclusions of the appeal board are erroneous.").
Finally, insofar as the cases sub judice require us to determine the applicability of the temporal requirements of W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) to the claimants' claims herein, we also are guided by our standard of review of statutory provisions: "Interpreting a statute or an administrative rule or regulation presents a purely legal question subject to de novo review." Syl. pt. 1, Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dep't of West Virginia, 195 W.Va. 573, 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W.Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) ("Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.").
Mindful of these standards, we proceed to consider the parties' arguments.
The cases presented for our resolution herein concern the statutory time periods within which a workers' compensation reopening request must be filed pursuant to W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2). Each of these claimants timely requested the addition of a diagnosis for a compensable injury but were required to avail themself of the appeal rights provided by the workers' compensation system in order to receive approval for their respective requests. See generally W. Va.Code §§ 23-5-1(b)(1); 23-4-1c(a)(3); 23-5-3; 23-5-10; 23-5-15(a). During, or shortly after, the extensive litigation required to exercise their appeal rights, which ultimately culminated in favorable rulings by this Court, the statutory time period for reopening expired in each claimant's case. See W. Va. Code § 23-4-16(a)(2). After receiving approval of their requests from this Court, each claimant thereafter sought a PPD evaluation referral because the Commission had failed to make such a referral as required by statute. See W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(f). Each of the claimant's PPD referral requests was treated as an untimely request for reopening because it had not been filed within the time limits established by W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2). Upon appeal to this Court, we are asked to determine whether the claimants are entitled to the PPD evaluation referrals they have requested.
We previously have recognized that "`[t]he right to workmen's compensation
With specific respect to workers' compensation statutes, we have held that
Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. ACF Indus. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525, 514 S.E.2d 176 (1999) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Syl. pt. 2, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925). Accord Syl. pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1938) ("Where a particular construction of a statute would result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity, will be made."). Finally, "[i]t is always presumed that the legislature will not enact a meaningless or useless statute." Syllabus point 4, State ex rel. Hardesty v. Aracoma-Chief Logan No. 4523, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Inc., 147 W.Va. 645, 129 S.E.2d 921 (1963).
Having reiterated the rules of statutory construction guiding our analysis, we now turn to a determination of the issue before us. Integral to our deliberation are three distinct rights afforded to injured workers by the governing statutes: (1) an injured worker's right to the payment of benefits for workplace injuries; (2) an injured worker's right to appeal adverse decisions; and (3) an injured worker's right to be referred for a PPD evaluation when the circumstances of his/her injury support such a referral. We find the confluence of these statutes supports the PPD evaluation referrals that Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett have requested. Finding that Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett are entitled to request such referrals irrespective of the reopening time periods provided by W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) is consistent with the enforcement of the claimants' rights to receive benefits for their work-related injuries; to appeal adverse workers' compensation rulings; and to be referred for
Pursuant to W. Va.Code § 23-4-1(a) (2008) (Repl. Vol. 2010), "[s]ubject to the provisions and limitations elsewhere in this chapter, workers' compensation benefits shall be paid the Workers' Compensation Fund, to the employees of employers subject to this chapter who have received personal injuries in the course of and resulting from their covered employment [.]" (Emphasis added). Accord Syl. pt. 1, Barnett v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 153 W.Va. 796, 172 S.E.2d 698 (1970) ("In order for a claim to be held compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act, three elements must coexist: (1) a personal injury (2) received in the course of employment And (3) resulting from that employment."). Encompassed within this scope of workers' compensation coverage is the right of employees to avail themselves of all of the provisions thereof: "[A]ll employees covered by the West Virginia Workers' Compensation Act are subject to every provision of the workers' compensation chapter and are entitled to all benefits and privileges under the Workers' Compensation Act[.]" Syl. pt. 3, in part, Bell v. Vecellio & Grogan, Inc., 197 W.Va. 138, 475 S.E.2d 138 (1996).
Commensurate with an injured employee's right to receive benefits for his/her workplace injuries is the corresponding right recognized by the Legislature to provide medical treatment and compensation to such workers in a timely manner. With respect to medical treatment, "[t]he Legislature hereby finds and declares that injured claimants should receive the type of treatment needed as promptly as possible[.]" W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(a). See also W. Va.Code § 23-4-1c(a) (2009) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (requiring determination of "whether the claimant has sustained a compensable injury" and entry of "an order giving all parties immediate notice of the decision"). As to the payment of benefits, "[t]he Legislature hereby finds and declares that two of the primary objectives of the workers' compensation system established by this chapter are to provide benefits to an injured claimant promptly and to effectuate his or her return to work at the earliest possible time[.]" W. Va.Code § 23-4-7(a) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010). See also W. Va. Code § 23-4-1d(e) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010) ("An award for permanent partial disability shall be made as expeditiously as possible and in accordance with the time frame requirements promulgated by the board of managers.").
In this regard,
Meadows v. Lewis, 172 W.Va. 457, 469-70, 307 S.E.2d 625, 638-39 (1983) (footnote added).
Therefore, it is apparent that "[o]ne of the primary objects of the Legislature in establishing the Workmen's Compensation system is to provide prompt and fair compensation to persons entitled to the protection which the law affords in that respect and courts look with disfavor upon delay in the accomplishment of that legislative purpose." State ex rel. Conley v. Pennybacker, 131 W.Va. 442, 448, 48 S.E.2d 9, 13 (1948). As such, "[l]ong delay in processing claims for [workers'] compensation is not consistent with the declared policy of the Legislature to determine the rights of claimants as speedily and expeditiously as possible. W. Va.Code, 23-5-3a." Syl. pt. 1, Workman v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 160 W.Va. 656, 236 S.E.2d 236 (1977).
Not only do injured workers have the aforementioned rights to receive medical treatment and benefits for work-related injuries and to receive such compensation expediently in the first instance, but claimants also may seek to reopen their claims to permit them to receive further medical treatment or benefits attributable to additional symptoms they experience from their initial work-related injury. See generally W. Va. Code § 23-5-3 (2009) (Repl. Vol. 2010) (discussing progression or aggravation of claimant's condition, or other facts not previously considered in relation thereto, necessary to support claimant's reopening request). Where the claimant has received an award of PPD benefits, he/she must file a reopening request within five years of the initial claim's closure:
W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2). "The time limitations contained in Code, 23-4-16, as amended, are applicable only to the reopening
Thus, it is apparent that both Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett had the right to receive workers' compensation benefits to which they are entitled as expediently as possible and to request that their claims be reopened to add further diagnoses and/or medical treatment necessitated by their initial work-related injuries.
When a claimant receives an unfavorable ruling, the workers' compensation statutes allow him/her to appeal that decision through the workers' compensation system and ultimately to this Court. W. Va.Code § 23-5-1(b)(1) (2009) (Repl. Vol. 2010) recognizes the right to protest an adverse ruling of the Claims Administrator. The pertinent statutory language provides:
The Legislature further has granted claimants the right (1) to request the reopening of their claims when they experience "a progression or aggravation in the claimant's condition" or can demonstrate "some other fact or facts which were not previously considered in [the Commissioner's] former findings and which would entitle the claimant to greater benefits than the claimant has already received" and (2) to object to a decision denying a reopening request. W. Va. Code § 23-5-3. Accord Syl. pt. 1, Bostic v. State Comp. Comm'r, 142 W.Va. 484, 96 S.E.2d 481 (1957) ("Where an injured employee makes application in writing for further adjustment of his claim, within the time provided in Code, 23-4-16, as amended, and the application discloses facts not theretofore considered by the commissioner, and which if true, would entitle claimant to further benefits, the claimant is entitled to have his claim
Should a claimant appealing from an adverse decision of the Claims Administrator to the Office of Judges still fail to obtain a favorable resolution of his/her claim, he/she may then appeal the adverse ruling to the Board of Review. W. Va.Code § 23-5-10 (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010) expressly recognizes that "[t]he employer, claimant, workers' compensation commission, the successor to the commission, other private insurance carriers and self-insured employers, whichever is applicable, may appeal to the appeal board created in section eleven of this article for a review of a decision by an administrative law judge."
Finally, from an unfavorable ruling of the Board of Review, an aggrieved claimant may appeal to this Court as provided by the pertinent language of W. Va.Code § 23-5-15(a):
Accord Syl. pt. 2, Glenn v. State Comp. Comm'r, 118 W.Va. 203, 189 S.E. 705 (1937) ("An order of the compensation appeal board, from which an appeal may be had to this court, is one entered upon a final decision of the case by the appeal board.").
From these statutes granting claimants appeal rights, it is clear that
Mitchell v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 163 W.Va. 107, 117, 256 S.E.2d 1, 9 (1979). Thus, it is apparent that both Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett were exercising their legislatively-granted appeal rights when they were pursuing favorable determinations of their compensability and medical treatment requests which relief provides the foundation for the PPD evaluations they seek in the cases sub judice.
Once a claimant's treatment for his/ her work-related injury permits him/her to return to work and/or the claimant has reached his/her maximum degree of medical improvement, the claimant is entitled to be referred for a PPD evaluation to determine the permanent disability caused by his/her work-related injury and the resulting benefits therefor. See W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(c) (indicating referral for PPD evaluation is appropriate when "the claimant has either reached his or her maximum degree of improvement or is ready for disability evaluation, or when the claimant has returned to work"). In recognition of this right, the Legislature has expressly charged the Commission with the responsibility of facilitating such a referral when a claimant has a lengthy period of temporary total disability:
W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(f) (emphasis added). The Commission's statutory duty to refer a claimant for a PPD evaluation once the requirements of W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(f) have been satisfied is mandatory as indicated by the Legislature's use of the word "shall" to define this duty:
Syl. pt. 1, E.H. v. Matin, 201 W.Va. 463, 498 S.E.2d 35 (1997). Nevertheless, while both Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett have received TTD benefits in excess of the referenced 120-day benchmark, neither claimant has received a PPD evaluation referral from the Commission.
We previously have held that,
Syl. pt. 1, Hardy v. Richardson, 198 W.Va. 11, 479 S.E.2d 310 (1996) (emphasis added). By equal measure, though,
Syl. pt. 2, Baker v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 164 W.Va. 389, 263 S.E.2d 883 (1980) (emphasis added).
Despite the clear and express duty of the Commission to facilitate an injured claimant's referral for a PPD evaluation, the Legislature additionally has stated that failure to effectuate such a referral does not leave the claimant's claim open indefinitely until a PPD referral is made. However, the Commission is required to inform claimants of their right to receive a PPD evaluation.
W. Va.Code § 23-4-22. We have interpreted this section to mean that "West Virginia Code § 23-4-22 (1993) is applicable only to cases described in the section for which an order closing the case has been made by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner." Syl. pt. 2, Hardy v. Richardson, 198 W.Va. 11, 479 S.E.2d 310 (1996). We further have recognized that "West Virginia Code § 23-4-22 (1993) is effective only after ninety days had passed from its enactment to preclude the Workers' Compensation Commissioner from conducting a permanent disability evaluation with respect to any case closed for receipt of temporary total disability within five years of any order of closure." Syl. pt. 3, Hardy, 198 W.Va. 11, 479 S.E.2d 310.
From these authorities, it is apparent that both Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett had a legislatively-created right to be receive a PPD evaluation referral and that such a referral was required to be initiated by the Commission.
Upon a review of the preceding authorities, it is clear that Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett, as injured workers, enjoy numerous rights that have been granted to them by the workers' compensation system: to receive medical treatment and compensation for their compensable workplace injuries, to appeal adverse workers' compensation decisions, and to be referred for a PPD evaluation to ascertain the permanent debilitating effects of their workplace injuries. Nevertheless, the Board of Review's denial of their requests for PPD evaluation referrals deprives Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett of their right to receive such evaluations. This result is patently inconsistent with the workers' compensation statutes affording them the aforementioned rights and our caselaw interpreting the same.
We previously have held that
Syl., Bowman v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 150 W.Va. 592, 148 S.E.2d 708 (1966). Accord Partlow v. Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 150 W.Va. 416, 421-22, 146 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1966). The Claims Administrator's initial and, ultimately, the Board of Review's ultimate application of W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2)
In order to have requested their PPD evaluations within the time contemplated by the Board of Review pursuant to W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2), Mr. Hammons would have had to request a PPD referral for his back injury before, or immediately after, it was held to be a compensable component of his initial work-related injury. Likewise, Ms. Stinnett could have timely requested a PPD referral for her back injury only if she had done so before her request for medical treatment therefor had been approved, which surgery was necessary for her to achieve her maximum degree of medical improvement requisite for a PPD evaluation. We have held that "[t]he law does not require a suitor to do a futile thing." Syl. pt. 2, Brawley v. County Court of Kanawha Cnty., 117 W.Va. 697, 188 S.E. 139 (1936). We can fathom no factual circumstance in which a claimant's request for a PPD evaluation-which, we reiterate, the Commission, and not the claimant, was statutorily required to facilitate — would have been more futile than those presented by the cases sub judice. We also cannot condone rulings by the Board of Review that produce such absurd results by awarding TTD and medical benefits as to one part of a compensable injury while simultaneously refusing as untimely a permanent disability rating for the same part of the same compensable injury when the delay was occasioned not by the claimants' fault but by the workers' compensation system's refusal to afford the requested benefits in the first instance and its failure to facilitate the supported PPD evaluations in the final instance.
Insofar as statutes cannot be read in isolation but rather must be considered as a part of the entire statutory scheme of which they form a part, we cannot conceive that this unjust and inconsistent result comports with the Legislature's stated intent to fully compensate workers injured during the course of and as a result of their employment. "`Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments.' Syllabus Point 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975)." Syl. pt. 3, Boley v. Miller, 187 W.Va. 242, 418 S.E.2d 352 (1992). Accord Syl. pt. 2, Beckley v. Kirk, 193 W.Va. 258, 455 S.E.2d 817 (1995) ("`"Statutes in pari materia, must be construed together and the legislative intention, as gathered from the whole of the enactments, must be given effect." Point 3., Syllabus, State ex rel. Graney v. Sims, 144 W.Va. 72 [105 S.E.2d 886 (1958) ]. Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Slatton v. Boles, 147 W.Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).' Syl. pt. 1, Transamerica Com. Fin. v. Blueville Bank of Grafton, 190 W.Va. 474, 438 S.E.2d 817 (1993)."). Moreover, we are constrained to construe statutes consistently with one another and not in such a manner so as to produce an absurd or inconsistent result:
Syl. pt. 2, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925). Accord Syl. pt. 2, Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W.Va. 774, 200 S.E. 350 (1938) ("Where a particular construction of a statute would result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction, which will not produce such absurdity, will be made."). See also Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. ACF Indus. v. Vieweg, 204 W.Va. 525, 514 S.E.2d 176 (1999) (holding that "[i]nterpretations as to the meaning and application of workers' compensation statutes rendered by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner, as the governmental official charged with the administration and enforcement of the workers' compensation statutory law of this State, pursuant to W. Va.Code § 23-1-1 (1997) (Repl. Vol. 1998), should be accorded deference if such interpretations are consistent
In both Mr. Hammons' and Ms. Stinnett's case, their compensability and medical treatment rulings were denied by the Claims Administrator; such denials were upheld by the Board of Review; and this Court reversed the adverse rulings to grant the claimants the benefits they had initially requested as part of their original, compensable, work-related injuries. During the pendency of their litigation, or shortly thereafter, the time period for reopening provided by W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) expired. However, without this Court's rulings finding Mr. Hammons' back injury to be compensable and authorizing Ms. Stinnett's request for medical treatment for her back injury, neither claimant would have had the medical evidence necessary to support their instant requests for PPD evaluations. Despite the claimants' clear entitlement to receive the PPD evaluation referrals they have requested herein, the effect of the Commission's denial thereof produces an absurd and inconsistent result. In essence, the Claims Administrator's ruling recognizes Mr. Hammons' additional back injury as compensable, but denies him any compensation, i.e., PPD benefits, therefor. Likewise, the Claims Administrator recognizes Ms. Stinnett's additional back injury also is compensable, but denies her any compensation, i.e., PPD benefits, therefor. We simply cannot countenance such an absurd or inconsistent construction of the governing workers' compensation statutes that would rule an injury compensable on the one hand, but then would deny an award of benefits therefor with the other hand.
Accordingly, we hold that when a workers' compensation claimant (1) receives an award of permanent partial disability (PPD) for an initial workplace injury; (2) timely files a reopening request pursuant to W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010) seeking to add an additional, related injury to his/her claim; (3) such additional injury is ruled compensable; and (4) the Commission, or other named party, fails to refer the claimant for a PPD evaluation in accordance with W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a(f) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010), the claimant may request a PPD evaluation referral even if the time period for reopening the initial claim, contemplated by W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2), has expired. To hold otherwise would effectively deny the claimant his/her statutory right to receive a permanent disability evaluation of his/her additional injury as provided by W. Va.Code § 23-4-7a (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010) and deprive the claimant of his/her statutory right to receive benefits for his/her workplace injury pursuant to W. Va. Code § 23-4-7(a) (2005) (Repl. Vol. 2010). We note that this holding is consistent with the recognition that "the statutory provisions authorizing reopening of workmen's compensation
We also find this result to be in keeping with our recent holding in Syllabus point 5 of Sheena H. for Russell H. v. Amfire, LLC, 235 W.Va. 132, 772 S.E.2d 317 (2015), wherein we determined that the applicable filing period for workers' compensation dependent's death benefits should be tolled as a result of the medical examiner's delayed completion of the decedent's autopsy report when such report provided the only medical evidence indicating that the decedent's death had been caused by his work-related injury.
However, we would be remiss if we did not also acknowledge that several of our prior decisions have not resolved similar cases in the same manner. Distinguishable from the instant case is this Court's prior opinion in Pugh v. Workers' Compensation Commissioner, 188 W.Va. 414, 424 S.E.2d 759 (1992). In Pugh, we found a claimant's reopening request for PPD benefits to be untimely where the claimant previously had received a PPD award for the same compensable injury and sought additional PPD benefits therefor. By contrast, the claimants in the instant proceeding have not sought an increase in the PPD awards they received for their initial work-related injuries to their leg and wrist, but rather request PPD evaluations for their additional back injury diagnoses. See also Littleton v. West Virginia Office of Ins. Comm'r, No. 11-0540, 2013 WL 598492 (W.Va. Feb. 14, 2013) (unpublished mem. dec.) (claimant filed untimely application for permanent total disability ["PTD"] benefits based upon same injuries for which he previously
Finally, a review of this Court's unpublished memorandum decisions issued in workers' compensation appeals indicates that we have reached a contrary result in cases presenting fact patterns similar to the cases sub judice wherein a claimant (1) has received a PPD award for one work-related injury; (2) has been permitted to add an additional compensable diagnosis to his/her initial work-related injury claim; but (3) subsequently has been denied a PPD evaluation for the additional diagnosis because the filing deadline of W. Va.Code § 23-4-16 expired during litigation regarding the compensability or medical treatment for the additional diagnosis. See, e.g., Lewis v. West Virginia Office Ins. Comm'n, Nos. 11-1689 & 11-1722, 2012 WL 5834630 (W.Va. Nov. 16, 2012) (unpublished mem. dec.); Lovas v. West Virginia Office of Ins. Comm'r, No. 11-0288, 2012 WL 4054100 (W.Va. Sept. 14, 2012) (unpublished mem. dec.); Buzzard v. West Virginia Office of Ins. Comm'r, No. 101433, 2012 WL 3195758 (W.Va. Mar. 29, 2012) (unpublished mem. dec.); Stover v. West Virginia Office of Ins. Comm'r, No. 11-0097, 2011 WL 8199963 (W.Va. Dec. 7, 2011) (unpublished mem. dec.); Fox v. West Virginia Office of Ins. Comm'r, No. 100806 (W.Va. July 21, 2011) (unpublished mem. dec.). Given the abbreviated factual and legal discussion set forth in this Court's memorandum decisions, we cannot say that such prior decisions have fully considered and analyzed the applicable statutory and jurisprudential law as thoroughly and thoughtfully as does our extensive discussion of the issue herein. "[A] precedentcreating opinion that contains no extensive analysis of an important issue is more vulnerable to being overruled than an opinion which demonstrates that the court was aware of conflicting decisions and gave at least some persuasive discussion as to why the old law must be changed." State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 679 n. 28, 461 S.E.2d 163, 185 n. 28 (1995). Thus, "[a]lthough this Court is loathe to overturn a decision so recently rendered, it is preferable to do so where a prior decision was not a correct statement of law." Murphy v. Eastern American Energy Corp., 224 W.Va. 95, 101, 680 S.E.2d 110, 116 (2009). See also Farley v. Sartin, 195 W.Va. 671, 678, 466 S.E.2d 522, 529 (1995) ("[S]tare decisis does not require static doctrines but instead permits law to evolve and to adjust to changing conditions and notions of justice as well as to varied sets of facts[.]"). Based upon our foregoing analysis, we conclude that the detailed statutory analysis of the governing workers' compensation statutes to find that the claimants' requests for PPD evaluations should have been allowed despite the operation of the statutory reopening time period set forth in W. Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) more faithfully fulfills the stated legislative purpose to ensure injured workers are fully compensated for their injuries than our cursory discussions in recent memorandum decisions that have "elevate[d] form over substance." Sheena H., 235 W.Va. at ___, 772 S.E.2d at 320 (Loughry, J., concurring). Therefore, we expressly overrule those prior opinions of this Court ruling untimely a claimant's request for a PPD evaluation where the claimant (1) has received a PPD award for one work-related injury; (2)
Applying the holding announced herein to the facts of the cases sub judice, we conclude that both Mr. Hammons and Ms. Stinnett should have received the PPD evaluation referrals they requested herein because they both timely requested to reopen their initial work-related injury claims to add an additional diagnosis; their additional diagnoses were ruled compensable; and the Commission failed make the permanent disability evaluation referrals in the first instance. To rule otherwise would deprive the claimants of the benefits to which they are entitled as compensation for their workplace injuries.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision rendered November 28, 2012, by the Workers' Compensation Board of Review in Mr. Hammons' claim, Case Number 12-1473, is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded to allow Mr. Hammons' request for a PPD evaluation of his compensable back injury. Likewise, the decision rendered February 25, 2013, by the Workers' Compensation Board of Review in Ms. Stinnett's claim, Case Number 13-0312, also is reversed, and this case also is remanded with directions to allow Ms. Stinnett's request for a PPD evaluation of her compensable back injury.
Case Number 12-1473 — Reversed and Remanded.
Case Number 13-0312 — Reversed and Remanded.
Justice LOUGHRY dissents and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
LOUGHRY, Justice, dissenting:
Despite the fact that this Court has on numerous occasions recognized that it cannot sit as a "superlegislature" and rewrite statutes under the guise of statutory interpretation,
The majority opinion is premised on the notion that the claimants could not timely request additional permanent partial disability benefits because of pending litigation involving their requests to add another compensable component, i.e., diagnosis, to their claim or to obtain authorization for additional medical treatment. Had the majority actually taken the time to closely examine the records submitted in these consolidated cases, it would have realized that the pending litigation in both of these matters in no way prevented the claimants from timely requesting the reopening of their claims for additional permanent partial disability benefits.
With regard to Mr. Hammons, the record shows that on January 5, 2004, he slipped and fell in the course of his employment, sustaining a large contusion on his left lower leg above his ankle. Subsequently, he filed his application for workers' compensation benefits and received a favorable compensable ruling for "contusion of lower leg" and "swelling of the limb." On June 6, 2005, he was granted a four percent permanent partial disability award and his claim was closed for permanent partial disability benefits. For purposes of West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2), this was his initial award of permanent disability. In that regard, West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) provides:
Thus, pursuant to the plain language of the statute, Mr. Hammons had until June 6, 2010, to file a request for a change, modification, or reopening of his prior award.
The record shows that after receiving his initial award, Mr. Hammons developed back pain and requested that the claims administrator add "disc protrusion at L5-S1, lumbar radiculopathy and lumbar strain" as compensable components of his claim. This request
The majority bases it decision on the fact that Mr. Hammons was awarded an additional period of temporary total disability benefits by this Court when we reversed the Board of Review's October 15, 2007, decision and held his back injury compensable.
Although the majority pays lip service to our rules of statutory construction, it proceeds to ignore all of them. In particular, the majority disregards the fundamental rule that "[s]tatutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments." Syl. Pt. 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). Given the language in West Virginia Code § 23-4-16, which this Court has previously found to be "clear and without ambiguity" and not subject to "rules of interpretation,"
Perhaps even more perplexing than its interpretation of West Virginia Code § 23-4-7a(f) is the majority's conclusion that this statutory provision also affords Ms. Stinnett the right to a permanent partial disability evaluation despite the fact that she was not granted additional temporary total disability benefits. The record shows that Ms. Stinnett slipped and fell on August 31, 1998, while working for her employer, fracturing her right wrist and straining her back. She subsequently filed an application for worker's compensation benefits that was held compensable for "lower fracture radius/ulna." After Ms. Stinnett underwent treatment, including surgery on her wrist, the claims administrator entered an order on January 21, 2000, which granted her a twenty-two percent permanent partial disability award and closed her claim for permanent partial disability benefits. For purposes of West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2), this was Ms. Stinnett's initial award. Accordingly, her five-year time period for requesting a modification, change, or reopening of her prior award extended until January 21, 2005.
On January 14, 2005, Ms. Stinnett's claim was further ruled compensable for "sprain/ strain of the lumbar region." Yet, Ms. Stinnett did not seek to reopen her claim for additional permanent partial disability benefits for her back injury at that time. Instead, she waited until July 5, 2011, more than five years after expiration of the time limitation provided by West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2), to make such a request. The pending litigation that the majority relies upon in Ms. Stinnett's case to excuse her untimely filing of her request for permanent partial disability benefits was not initiated until August 30, 2005, which was also after the expiration of the five-year time limitation provided by West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2). Clearly, this pending litigation did not prevent Ms. Stinnett from timely seeking further permanent partial disability benefits.
The pending litigation in Ms. Stinnett's case concerned her request for authorization for back surgery. Ms. Stinnett's request was denied by the claims administrator based upon its finding that her symptoms were the result of pre-existing degenerative changes rather than her compensable conditions. While this decision was upheld by the Office of Judges and the Board of Review, Ms. Stinnett ultimately received a favorable ruling from this Court on July 20, 2009, which authorized her requested surgery.
Ironically, the majority overlooks the fact that Ms. Stinnett is unable to satisfy the criteria set forth in its new syllabus point for requesting a permanent partial disability referral. Pursuant to syllabus point five of the majority opinion, two of the criteria for requesting a permanent partial disability evaluation beyond the time period for reopening the initial claim contemplated by West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) are the "timely fil[ing of] a reopening request pursuant to W.Va.Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) seeking to add an additional, related injury to his/her claim" and a ruling that "such additional injury is [] compensable." However, Ms. Stinnett never
The issue in these cases-whether a claimant may seek additional permanent benefits when diagnoses are added to a claim and/or medical treatment is received after the expiration of the five-year time limitation set forth in West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2) — has come before this Court on several occasions.
Lewis, 2012 WL 5834630, at *2-3 (footnote omitted).
Recognizing that its decision in the cases sub judice is a departure from this Court's previous ruling in Lewis, as well as several other factually similar cases,
I am dumbfounded by the message that this statement sends to all of the litigants that come before this Court. For the majority to indicate that this Court does not give full consideration and attention to cases that are decided through memorandum decisions is absolutely appalling and inaccurate. As explained in the comment to Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court began issuing memorandum decisions in December 2010 to "reinforce the fact that every appeal will receive a decision on the merits that sets forth the considered judgment of the Court." W.Va. R.App.P. 21 cmt. "[T]here is no question that memorandum decisions are pronouncements on the merits that fully comply with the constitutional requirements to address every point fairly arising upon the record and to state the reasons for a decision concisely in writing." State v. McKinley, 234 W.Va. 143, 151, 764 S.E.2d 303, 311 (2014). For the majority to suggest otherwise in order to justify a radical departure from the doctrine of stare decisis will only reinforce the belief held by some that we do not "thoroughly and thoughtfully" decide every case that comes before us.
I would also point out that the Lewis decision was issued on November 16, 2012, after the case was orally argued before this Court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. At that time, this Court was comprised of all the members of the majority herein.
The fact of the matter is that the applicable statutory law has not been amended since Lewis was decided, and there is no "evidence of changing conditions or serious judicial error in interpretation sufficient to compel deviation from the basic policy of the doctrine of stare decisis, which is to promote certainty, stability, and uniformity in the law." Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 157 W.Va. 1023, 207 S.E.2d 169 (1974). "[A]dherence to prior decisions of this Court, and the consistency among the rulings of this Court that necessarily results therefrom, is particularly warranted when those prior decisions involve a matter of statutory construction." Jenkins v. City of Elkins, 230 W.Va. 335, 341, 738 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2012).
It is painfully clear that although the Legislature has expressly indicated that workers' compensation claimants may not seek to reopen their claims more than five years after their initial awards are granted, the majority has decided to act as a superlegislature and impose a different policy based upon nothing more than judicial whim. When the founding fathers decided that separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government would be a wise approach to governing, they did not contemplate
The majority's conclusion that denying the claimants in these cases the right to reopen their claims will produce an absurd result contrary to legislative intent to fully compensate injured workers' for their injuries is simply wrong. The Legislature has obviously recognized that workers may suffer complications for their work-related injuries throughout their lifetimes. Accordingly, the Legislature has provided that such injured workers can continue to receive medical care for their injuries after their claims are closed for permanent benefits.
The majority maintains that denying these claimants further permanent partial disability benefits for compensable injuries simply because the applicable time limitation has expired is contrary to clear statutory intent to fully compensate injured workers for their work-related injuries. While I am certainly sympathetic to injured workers who might be entitled to additional benefits but for the applicable time limitation, again, it is not this Court's place to cast aside clear and unambiguous statutory language that precludes the granting of further benefits absent a valid constitutional challenge. "When specific statutory language produces a result argued to be unforeseen by the Legislature, the remedy lies with the Legislature, whose action produced it, and not with the courts. The question of dealing with the situation in a more satisfactory or desirable manner is a matter of policy which calls for legislative, not judicial, action." Worley v. Beckley Mech., Inc., 220 W.Va. 633, 643, 648 S.E.2d 620, 630 (2007) (Benjamin, J., dissenting) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
It is unfortunate that the majority has used the recent decision in Sheena H. to justify its creation of an exception to the time limitations set forth in West Virginia Code § 23-4-16(a)(2). Expressly "recogniz[ing] that the language of the Workers' Compensation Act evidences an intent to limit a claimant's ability to file for benefits, protest, object, or appeal, subject to strict time limitations," the holding of Sheena H. was limited to dependent's benefits where the State Medical Examiner failed to make an autopsy report available to the decedent's family before the six-month time limitation for filing a claim for benefits expired and where there was no other evidence that the death was work-related. Id., 235 W.Va. at ___, n. 4, 772 S.E.2d at 323, n. 4. As I explained in my concurrence, because of the unique situation in Sheena H., it was obvious that the Legislature had never contemplated such a factual scenario involving the failure of a governmental entity to timely act when it statutorily imposed a six-month time limitation for the filing of a workers' compensation dependent's benefits claim. Id., 235 W.Va. at ___, n. 4, 772 S.E.2d at 323, n. 4 (Loughry, J., concurring). The same cannot be said in the case at bar.
While the majority wants to equate the claimants' situations in these cases with that of the claimant in Sheena H., there is simply no comparison. The claimants in these cases have already been afforded significant workers' compensation benefits; conversely, the claimant in Sheena H. could not even obtain a favorable compensability ruling because of the inaction of a state official — an unusual and unique circumstance that was clearly beyond the claimant's control. I firmly stand behind the decision in Sheena H. as I believe that it was the only fair result given the abject failure of the State Medical Examiner to timely provide an autopsy report to the decedent's family. Unfortunately, rather
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision in this case.