The Issue The issue here concerns the entitlement of the Petitioner, Hernstadt Broadcasting Corporation to be granted certain environmental permits from the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation, which would allow the Petitioner to construct a radio transmitter tower and access dock within the Biscayne Bay which is located in Dade County Florida. 1/
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this action, Hernstadt Broadcasting Corporation, owns and operates radio station WKAT, which is located in Miami Beach, Dade County, Florida. The Petitioner is licensed by the Federal Communications Commission to pursue this enterprise. On April 30, 1980, the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation received an application from the Petitioner, which application requested permission to construct a radio transmitter tower and access dock in Biscayne Bay, Dade County, Florida. (The tower end dock are part of a proposed station complex in which the radio station building is to be constructed upland from the Bay.) The project, if allowed, would be located off the north side of the Julia Tuttle Causeway which connects the City of Miami and the City of Miami Beach via the Biscayne Bay. The tower and access dock, if constructed, would be located in submerged lands owned by the State of Florida. In view of the location of this apparatus in Biscayne Bay, it would be subject to the provisions of the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve Act found in Chapter 258, Florida Statutes, together with other provisions of statute and rule. To place the access dock in the Bay, the Petitioner proposes to drive pilings into the Bay bottom to support the access dock which is 200 feet long and four (4) feet wide. The support mechanism for the radio tower would also be constructed by the driving of pilings into the Bay bottom and the radio transmitting tower, once built, would be 400 feet tall and would have attached stabilizing guy wires connected to anchors driven into the Bay bottom. As the pilings are driven into the floor of the Bay, the displaced soils will be compressed into lower elevations or redistributed against the pilings. Respondent's Exhibit No. 15, admitted into evidence, is a copy of the original application for permit, which was modified by site plans and sketches depicted in Respondent's Exhibit No. 16, admitted into evidence, shortening certain dimensions related to the access dock. (These modifications came about subsequent to the Department of Environmental Regulation's permit application appraisal found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 10, which is dated June 23, 1980.) After review of the project, in the face of the aforementioned modifications, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued a letter of intent to deny the permit request. This letter of intent was dated September 9, 1980, a copy of which may be found as petitioner's Exhibit No. 11, admitted into evidence. The authority stated for such denial are these provisions of Subsection 258.165(3)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), and Rule 17-4.242(1), Florida Administrative Code. Subsequent to the issuance of the letter of intent to deny, a further modification was made on the project increasing the length of the proposed access dock to the presently requested 200 feet. This modification is depicted in petitioner's Exhibit No. 12, admitted into evidence, which shows site plans and other pertinent information related to the project. Another modification to the project which the Petitioner claims is not subject to permit review by the Department of Environmental Regulation, and for which the Department of Environmental Regulation takes a contrary point of view, concerns the use of a grid of nickel-plated copper straps, approximately 40 feet by 40 feet, constituted of a mesh of approximately 1/4 inch in diameter by 1 inch sections to be placed underneath the tower and on the Bay bottom for purposes of grounding the tower. This item was not made known to the Respondent until September 30, 1980, at a time subsequent to the letter of intent to deny. The Petitioner in this action pursues the project on the basis of a joint use agreement entered into with the State of Florida, Department of Transportation, in which the Department of Transportation, in return for the ability to use the radio tower for communications in connection with a surveillance and traffic control system for Interstate Highway-95 and for the ability of the City of Miami, Florida, to use the facility for a tactical communication repeater installation, would grant to the Petitioner the Department of Transportation's rights and opportunities as easement holder in the area where the subject project would be constructed. See Petitioners' Exhibit No. 3, admitted into evidence. The Department of Transportation's rights stem from an easement grant from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. See Petitioner's Exhibit No. 13, admitted into evidence. The rights of the Petitioner, by assignment from the Department of Transportation, do not relieve Petitioner of the obligation to gain the necessary approval of the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund in the person of the State of Florida, Department of Natural Resources for permission to use those submerged lands over which the access walkway and tower would be constructed, notwithstanding any rights and privileges assigned to the Petitioner by the Department of Transportation as easement from the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund. This is true because the perpetual easement granted from the Trustees to the Department of Transportation for right-of-way and dredging purposes related to the roadway which is constituted of the Julia Tuttle Causeway and to the adjacent Bay bottoms related to construction and maintenance of that roadway, does not envision assignment of the submerged lands to an entity in the position of the Petitioner, which entity does not have as its purpose the construction or maintenance of the roadway; hence, the necessity to gain permission from the Department of Natural Resources if the access dock and tower are to be constructed on the submerged land of the State. The easement held by the Department of Transportation is specific in nature and does not contemplate the construction of a radio station. (It is not necessary to comment on the question of whether a joint use agreement between the Department of Transportation and Hernstadt as that Department's assignee for rights and privileges bestowed upon the Department from the Trustees based on the easement rights granted on October 2, 1941, would allow the construction of the building of the radio station building which would be at the upland terminus of the access dock which also adjoins the radio tower, the Department of Environmental Regulation having offered no claim for permitting jurisdiction over the radio station building.) The Petitioner proposes to move its radio station from the existing location in Miami Beach because buildings in the general area of the radio station interfere with the radio signal and, in addition, there is interference caused by radio transmissions from Cuba. The terms of the license held by Petitioner on issuance from the Federal Communications Commission limit the movement of the station's transmitter tower to a location no more than four (4) miles from the current location. At the time of the hearing, the Petitioner had not located an alternative tower site, other than the proposed site. As stated before, if the tower were constructed, the State of Florida, Department of Transportation would utilize the tower in its communications network and the City of Miami Fire and Police Departments would likewise desire to use the tower. The Florida Marine Patrol and the Florida Highway Patrol would also be interested in using the proposed tower for communications purposes. The City of Miami Planning and Advisory Board and the City Commission of that municipality would be in favor of the construction of the proposed radio tower. Dade County, Florida, has adopted a Comprehensive Master Plan, copies of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 19, admitted into evidence. Within that document is a discussion of environmental concerns within the county to include Biscayne Bay and, in particular, concern for protection of environmentally sensitive areas such as Biscayne Bay and an interest by the County to provide a wide range of public water oriented opportunities for the populace. Subsequent to the time of the submission of the permit application, and specifically, in October, 1980, Dade County, through its Metropolitan Planning Department and in conjunction with the Metropolitan Dade County Environmental Resources Management Department prepared a proposed Biscayne Bay Management Plan, a copy of which may be found as Respondent's Exhibit No. 17, admitted into evidence. This plan was approved by the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County, Florida, by an Ordinance, a copy of which may be found as the Respondent's Exhibit No. 18, admitted into evidence. The Biscayne Bay Management Plan encourages the enhancement of public access to the Bay for uses such as fishing, boating, shoreline wading and view in and the preservation and enhancement of the environmental, chemical and aesthetic qualities of the Bay. Furthermore, if the necessary permission could be obtained, Dade County, has future plans to use the subject Julia Tuttle Causeway as a public access to the Bay. The location of the radio tower and associated facilities would interfere with the proposed use by Dade County. The Department of Environmental Regulation, in keeping with Section 403.0615, Florida Statutes, 2/ through a program in conjunction with Dade County is attempting the restoration of the biological and chemical characteristics of the Biscayne Bay. Some of the items included in this program would be enhancement of aquatic vegetation, including seagrasses and mangroves and the promotion of aesthetics and public access to Biscayne Bay, to include the area of the Julia Tuttle Causeway. Radio station WKAT presents public service programs; is a part of the Emergency Broadcasting System and broadcasts emergency information in times of natural disaster. On the question of environmental implications of this project, the placement of the pilings would cause the destruction of certain seagrasses in that area, while at the same time promoting the introduction of marine life along the surfaces of the tower and dock supports. Seagrasses in the area where the grounding system would be placed may be destroyed and although the copper to be used would be nickel plated, thereby inhibiting the release of the toxic properties of the coated copper, eventually the nickel plating would break down and the marine life communities adjacent to the mesh would be harmed by the copper. The loss of seagrasses under the grid could cause a reduction in fish population. The installation of the radio tower and access dock in the Biscayne Bay is an impediment to navigation; however, the Petitioner intends to place channel markers to divert boat traffic away from the tower and its environs. There is no expected difficulty with run-off, discharges or other forms of pollution related to the construction or operation of the tower facility, although there will be some turbidity caused in the construction phases of the project. The project would be located in a State Aquatic Preserve within the meaning of Chapter 258, Florida Statutes; would be located in waters of the State within the meaning of Chapters 253 and 403, Florida Statutes; would be in navigable water within the meaning of Chapter 253, Florida Statutes, end would be in an Outstanding Florida Water within the meaning of Rule 17-4.242(1), Florida Administrative Code.
The Issue By this action Petitioner seeks to recover costs, expenses and damages associated with state response to an oil spill incident occurring February 26, 1987, within three miles of the Florida shoreline. Respondent's vessel was responsible for that spill. In particular the costs, expenses and damages claimed are related to salaries, per diem allowances, Federal Express charges, beach sand replacement, equipment, use of a cellular phone, and consulting work at the shore and off site. Petitioner also seeks damages for bird mortality resulting from the spill. See Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N- 16, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact On the evening of February 26, 1987, the motor vessel Fernpassat struck the south jetty at the entrance to the St. Johns River at a location within three miles of the Florida shoreline. In doing so it ruptured the hull and spilled a substantial amount of heavy fuel oil. The type of the oil was No. 5 or 6 Bunker C. A preliminary estimate placed the amount of oil in excess of 100,000 gallons. While the true amount may have been somewhat less, it was a significant spill in that it substantially threatened the public's welfare and the environment and generated wide public interest. Petitioner's exhibit 3 is a map which depicts the basic location where the vessel collided with the jetty with an "X" mark. The area impacted by the discharge ran from roughly Atlantic Beach, Florida, to Guana State Park in St. Augustine, Florida. This is approximately 25 miles of beach front. Beach property over which Petitioner has regulatory and proprietary responsibility had oil deposited upon it. The oil spill killed or injured a number of birds. The event was responded to by the "Federal Region IV Regional Response Team" (RRT). The federal on-scene coordinator (OSC) was Captain Matthew Woods, U.S. Coast Guard. The RRT, through management and control provided by the OSC, took necessary steps to combat the effects of the spill. Respondent immediately accepted responsibility for the cleanup through the use of a consultant and cleanup contractor. Under this arrangement the OSC monitored the contractor's cleanup efforts to make certain that the job was done satisfactorily. Florida officials were part of the RRT. Rule 16N-16.009(21), Florida Administrative Code, calls for personnel from Petitioner; the State of Florida, Department of Environmental Regulation (DER); and the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs (DCA) to represent state interests as members of the RRT. Each of these agencies participated as members of the RRT. This furthered the legislative intent expressed at Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, to support the RRT through implementation of the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act," which is also known as the "Clean Water Act," 33 U.S.C. ss. 1251-1376. By its efforts the RRT promoted the removal of the oil in accordance with a national contingency plan. Pursuant to Section 376.021(6), Florida Statutes, the state is expected to complement applicable provisions within the "Federal Water Pollution Control Act" as well as render the support previously described. Both the support and complementary functions of the state are part of Florida's "Pollutant Spill and Prevention Control Act," Sections 376.011-376.17, 376.19-376.21, Florida Statutes. Chapters 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, more completely identifies the role played by the state agencies in this instance. This chapter was adopted pursuant to authority set out in Section 376.07, Florida Statutes, which, among other things, empowered Petitioner to make rules which developed and implemented criteria and plans to respond to spills such as the one at issue. In its complementary role the state has established a "State Response Team" (SRT). This organization in defined at Rule 16N-16.009(13), Florida Administrative Code. It is constituted of predesignated state agencies available continually to respond to a major spill. This incident was a major spill or discharge as defined in Rule 16N-16.009(18), Florida Administrative Code. The predesignated state agencies, pursuant to the rule defining the SRT and Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes, act independently of the federal authorities, although they are expected to cooperate with the federal authorities in the efforts at cleanup. What that meant here is that notwithstanding the concerns which Captain Woods had and the state participation in the RRT through Petitioner, DER and DCA, there was a parallel function by the SRT which had its own mandate. This allowed the SRT to pursue an independent agenda in the spirit of cooperation with the OSC in an attempt to protect the resources over which the state has jurisdiction, including the beach front and birds. Both Captain Woods and the consultant to the spiller, James L. O'Brien, who is a man of considerable credentials in giving advice about oil spill problems, expressed their understanding of the interests which the state might have in carrying out its functions and did not find that reality a hindrance in performing their duties. As a result, even though state employees and equipment and consultants to the state had limited utility for the OSC and the consultant to the spiller in carrying out their duties, it does not follow that claims by the state for reimbursement in categories set out in the statement of issues must fail unless found to support the OSC or spiller's choice in attempts at cleanup. The question is whether the costs, expenses and damages are reasonably related to support for the RRT or complementary of that function through the SRT and owed or expended from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund (Fund) for recoverable items. See Section 376.11, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's exhibit 15 is a copy of the state contingency plan. See Section 376.07(2)(e), Florida Statutes. It identifies the membership of Petitioner, DER and DCA. Other claimants for costs, expenses, and damages who were involved in the response to this incident as predesignated agencies are the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission (Commission), the State of Florida, Department of Transportation (DOT), and the Attorney General. The state contingency plan explains the operational responsibilities of state agencies when responding to the incident. This is a more specific reference to those responsibilities as envisioned by the general guidelines announced in the "Pollution Spill Prevention and Control Act." Having considered the testimony and exhibits in the context of the state support and complementary role in responding to the spill contemplated by the aforementioned laws, regulations and contingency plans, the costs, expenses and damages sought by the Petitioner are reasonably related to those purposes. Those costs, expenses and damages are detailed in Petitioner's exhibit 16 and summarized in Petitioner's exhibits 8 and 9. With the exception of $15,654.37 in costs and expenses for Petitioner's Executive Office and Division of Law Enforcement and $3,336.16 for salaries for the Commission, DOT and DCA, all claims for expenses and costs have been paid from the Fund. Petitioner wishes to impose the costs, expenses and damages in the state response whether or not claims were disbursed from the Fund. The damage claim associated with future beach re-nourishment by replacement of sand that had been befouled by oil and needed to be removed is a reasonable claim in the amount of $10,222.50. It has been paid from the Fund and is held in the Erosion Control Trust Fund until needed. The on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00 and the oil spill assessment study fee of $9,880.00 commissioned by Petitioner through Jacksonville University are reasonably related to the Department's role in response to the spill. As Petitioner's exhibit 8 depicts, $30,312.53 has been disbursed from the Fund in costs, expenses and damages reasonably related to the response to the spill. There remains unpaid from the Fund the aforementioned costs and expenses in the amount of $18,990.53 which are reasonably related to the response to the spill. Those latter amounts, although presented for payment from the Fund by the agencies in question, were not paid, based upon some fiscal anomaly. By inference, it does not appear from this record that the Fund owes the agencies for these claims. According to Section 376.13, Florida Statutes, on February 27, 1987, Governor Martinez declared a state of emergency in response to the oil spill. That proclamation was withdrawn on March 25, 1987. The activities for which claims for costs and expenses are advanced transpired in the time frame of the state of emergency declaration. The amount which Respondent has expended in the cleanup effort is $700,000 plus or minus $200,000. None of this money has been paid to satisfy claims for costs, expenses and damages previously described. While it has been found that costs, expenses, and damages are reasonably related to the state's purposes in responding to the spill, not all items are recoverable. They are only recoverable if recognized for recovery by Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 16N-16, Florida Administrative Code, and owed or expended from the Fund. Petitioner's claims in its exhibit 8 in the amount of $12,901.30 and DOT claims for $675.19 in that exhibit qualify for recovery as well as the on-scene consulting fee of $3,525.00. Other claims do not qualify with the exception of a limited recovery for bird mortality. Reasons for this fact finding are set forth in the conclusions of law. Petitioner has disbursed $176,058.00 to the Commission for damages related to alleged bird mortality. This money was disbursed from the Fund. Petitioner now concedes that the amount should be reduced by half. This recognizes that the cost estimate for damages dealt with pairs of birds not single birds. Petitioner now asks for $88,075.00. Two hundred fourteen (214) birds are said to have died as a result of the spill, according to Petitioner. Petitioner seeks damages for each of these birds. The number proven to have been killed by the event and the theory upon which the damage claim is predicated leads to a result which diminishes the claim for reasons to be explained. As with other claims, Section 376.021.(4)(c), Florida Statutes, anticipates the payment of damages from the Fund. Section 376.11(1), Florida Statutes, is in aid of recovery of damages, as is Section 376.11(4)(d), Florida Statutes. However, these claims must be susceptible to proof that readily identifies and explains valuation methods of the birds and recognizes the predicate of establishing the actual number lost in this episode. For the most part, Petitioner has failed in the endeavor. Mark Damian Duda is a wildlife biologist with the Commission. He earned a bachelor of science degree from West Virginia University and received his master's degree in natural resource policy and planning from Yale University, both with honors. He was assigned the task of trying to arrive at an acceptable method for valuing birds that had been killed. His assessment is generally set forth in a report, a copy of which is Respondent's exhibit 3. Having considered a number of options, he reached the decision to employ what he describes as the replacement value method. Quoting from his report concerning this method, he has this to say: Replacement Value Method We believe the replacement value method is the most useful and logical method to determine the value of wildlife lost in the February 27 Jacksonville oil spill. A replacement cost approach can avoid many of the problems involved in attempting to estimate the use of value of biological resources. Under the replacement cost approach, the resource is valued at what it would cost to replace it. If the resource is replaced, the problems of identifying all its uses, the monetary value of these uses, and the users affected by the resource loss are eliminated, except for the period between the initial loss and the replacement. Four Florida institutions were asked to estimate the cost of obtaining specimens of the birds killed in the Jacksonville oil spill, or the price at which they would be willing to sell members of each species. Their estimates are shown in Table 4. One problem with most of these estimates is that they are not true replacements costs; but rather the cost of collecting already existing specimens from the wild and redistributing them to the Jacksonville Area. This does not represent true replacement, since true replacement requires a complete recovery of the species population. This can be most clearly assured by using only captive breeding programs for replacement. However, many of the species in this list probably cannot be bred in captivity. Therefore, true replacement of these species through captive breeding is probably impossible. It is absurd to value them at zero since they cannot be replaced. Therefore, this section presents some calculations on the assumption that they could be redistributed or replaced. Table 1 presents the replacement costs for the birds. The numbers were derived by multiplying the number of dead birds times the average replacement costs given in Table 4. Using this approach, the total replacement costs for the birds estimated to have been killed in the Jacksonville oil spill is $176,058.00. It should be noted that we use a deliberately conservative approach, using body counts only, and thereby underestimating the total mortality. There is an increasing amount of scientific literature indicating that actual body counts appear to significantly underestimate the total mortality resulting from a spill. For example, there have been a variety of experiments that show only 5 percent to 25 percent of the birds that die at sea, wash in or beach themselves on shore. The percent of loons found is probably even lower because of their low buoyancy and wide-ranging distribution. An alternative approach to estimating replacement costs is to estimate the cost of creating new habitat or enhancing existing habitat to support enough nesting pairs of each species to replenish the population. Again, to represent true replacement costs, this should be new or enhances habitat, not just the cost of acquiring already existing habitat. Tables 1 and 4 within Respondent's exhibit 3 are replicated here for convenience as Appendix 2 and Appendix 3, respectively. The numbers of birds shown in Duda's table are not numbers about which he has direct knowledge. They are numbers purportedly obtained from Tim O'Meara and Peter Southall, biologists who work for the Commission who got their information from the Central Region and Northeast Region, respectively. In particular, they allegedly received their information from rehabilitators working in the two regions. Neither biologist testified at hearing, and the exhibits do not satisfactorily establish what involvement the biologists had in a direct inventory of birds, if any, or the other sources of their information which was then given to Duda in preparing his report. The rehabilitators in the Central Region did not testify nor were any exhibits presented which spoke to records kept by those individuals that set out bird deaths in that area. The only person who presented any reliable information concerning bird mortality was Cindy Mosling, rehabilitator in the Northeast Region. Any records which she maintained were not produced at hearing. Nonetheless, she did remember some details concerning bird mortality, and from this testimony 56 common loons, 3 gannets, 1 black skimmer and 2 hooded mergansers are found to have died as a result of the oil spill. The replacement value method by Duda speaks to the fact that his method does not constitute a complete recovery of the species population. Instead, what is shown in Respondent's exhibit 3 is averaging of estimates from Table 4 on costs for collecting existing specimens from the wild and releasing them back to the Jacksonville area after a period as opposed to a captive breeding program. That explanation is not correct, either, because there is no intention to release birds to the wild after raising them or rehabilitating them in captivity in one of the Florida institutions mentioned in Table 4. Moreover, only one of those programs has been relied upon by Petitioner in arriving at a cost estimate. That program is Sea World. As a consequence, the cost analysis in Table 1 related to hooded mergansers is incorrect in that it reflects an average of $150 and not the $200 quoted by Sea world. Again, the prices reflect pairs and not single birds. Robin Friday is the curator from Sea World who supplied cost estimates for pairs in Table 4 to Respondent's exhibit 3. He arrived at his price estimates in a 15 to 20 minute telephone conversation with Duda. To the extent he had no actual experience with price lists reflecting cost of a specie, he assumed that theoretical permits would be issued to collect live birds or eggs in the wild and that he would keep them in a captive environment, hoping they would breed while in captivity. In the latter category, the costs to promote the outcome of breeding in captivity formed his estimate. It can be seen that this departs from Duda's method for valuation. Notwithstanding this fact, Duda relied upon the price quotation by Friday. The main species of birds which Friday has had experience with are waterfowl. Of the species which have been verified as lost in this incident, he had had experience with common loons and hooded mergansers. The hooded merganser is a waterfowl with which he has close experience in breeding, acquisition and disposition. The common loon is a shore bird. In his career he has worked to rehabilitate two or three of those birds. He has had no experience with gannets and black skimmers, which are shore birds. As Friday identified, waterfowl may be sold, shore birds may not. Sale of the shore birds is prohibited by law. His price quotes for the hooded mergansers are from actual experience in sales. His quotations on the other species are matters of conjecture in collecting, housing, feeding and establishing a breeding program for them based upon limited experience in rehabilitating common loons and no experience with gannets and the black skimmer. The price estimate on the hooded merganser of $100 per bird is accepted. The price estimates for common loons, gannets and black skimmers are not. They are too speculative. Jean Benchinol is a curator in Gulf Breeze, Florida, who works for Animal Park, Inc. She testified at hearing. She was presented as a witness who could corroborate the Friday opinion on bird valuation. Her cost estimates may be found as Petitioner's exhibit 14, quotes for single birds. She has had direct involvement with hooded mergansers. She has sold those birds and quoted the price at hearing as being $100. This coincides with the price per bird quoted by Friday. For other birds in her price estimates that cannot be bought and sold and that remain at issue here, that is, common loons, gannets and the black skimmer, she categorized them as capable of surviving in captivity or not. The black skimmers can live in captivity and the common loon and gannet cannot, according to the witness. She had had a common loon in captivity before and noted that it did not do well, being more receptive to northern climes. At hearing her opinion about birds that could not survive in the Florida environment was rejected. In this final analysis, that refers to the common loons and gannets. Likewise, having considered her explanation concerning her valuation for the black skimmer, that opinion is rejected. In rejecting this method, the cross examination at hearing concerning valuation for the royal tern was significant in that it pointed out the inexact and unreliable nature of the method. This method contemplated receiving a live bird in her facility and the costs for medication, housing, feeding and staff time for approximately 60 days. In summary, on the subject of bird mortality, there is no inherent prohibition against valuation; birds do have a value that can be measured in monetary terms. Here the effort to arrive at that understanding fails in the inventory of casualties and method of valuation, with a limited exception. It is also observed that the Respondent had paid the rehabilitators to house, feed and nurse birds back to health that were injured, a similar activity to the theoretical exercise envisioned by Duda, Friday and Benchinol.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which requires the Respondent to reimburse the Fund in the amount of $17,301.58 and dismisses all other charges against Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX 1 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts of the parties. Petitioner's Facts Paragraphs 1 and 2 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences of Paragraph 6 are subordinate to facts found. The last two sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 7 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 8 is subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences of Paragraph 9 are subordinate to facts found. While it is agreed that the correspondence from Petitioner to Respondent did not indicate that claims for costs and expenses were only subject to collection if paid from the Florida Coastal Protection Trust Fund, in the administrative forum recoupment of costs, expenses and damages may only be permitted for monies owed or expended from the fund. Paragraphs 10-13 are subordinate to facts found. It is acknowledged as set forth in Paragraph 14 that money was transferred from Coastal Protection Trust Fund to the Erosion Control Trust Fund for future beach renourishment. The more relevant fact is whether the claim for damages of value under the renourishment is legitimate and that determination has been made favoring the Petitioner. The concept of using the funds that are being held for purposes of future renourishment is in keeping with a reasonable disposition of the damage claim. Paragraphs 15-24 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence to Paragraph 25 is contrary to facts found. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. The third sentence is an accurate statement of what Table 1 contributes but the findings in that table are rejected in part. The first sentence to Paragraph 26 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is accepted in the sense of recognizing that a list was maintained; however, that list was not produced at hearing as an aide in determining the number of birds that were killed. The third sentence is rejected. The fourth and fifth sentences are knowledged and those underlying facts were taken into account in accepting the representations by the witness Mosling concerning the number of birds that died as a result of the oil spill which she could recall. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 29 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The first sentence to Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The first sentence to Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is accepted with the exception that certain categories of water fowl are bought and sold in the free market. Concerning the third sentence, while it is acknowledged that curators are the better persons to attempt valuation, they must have sufficient understanding of the varieties on which they are commenting to have their opinions accepted and their methods of analysis of costs must stand scrutiny. This was not achieved in this instance. The last sentence in Paragraph 31 is not accepted in that the replacement value method was not adequately explained and does not allow a ranking of whether it is inexpensive, or cheaper or some where in the middle. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. The first sentence to Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found as it references hooded mergansers. The other references are to species which have not been found to have been lost to the spill. The last sentence is accepted in the sense that the remaining species have limitations placed upon their use by state and federal law which prohibits the buying and selling. Paragraph 34 in its reference to the cost of hooded mergansers is accepted. The balance of the information was not utilized in that the Petitioner failed to demonstrate that other species had been lost to the spill. In Paragraph 35 of the species that testimony was presented about, only the common loon, gannets and black skimmer pertain. While it is acknowledged that the method that the witness Friday used to estimate the value of those species is an accurate portrayal of his efforts, those efforts were rejected as were those of Ms. Benchinol described in Paragraph 36. In Paragraph 36 the explanation of her methods is correct. The methods were not accepted either in support of the testimony by Friday or in her own right. There is no significance to the discussion concerning the brown pelican and inadequate proof was made that the brown pelicans were lost. Respondent's Facts The first sentence to Paragraphs 1 is subordinate to facts found. The last two sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. As to Paragraph 2, it is acknowledged that Mr. Healey served as the liaison to the RRT and OSC. In the second sentence to that paragraph it is accepted that the state supports the RRT. It also has the function to compliment the RRT and to act independent of the federal response. The first sentence to Paragraph 3 is subordinate to facts found. The second and third sentences are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The fourth and fifth sentences are subordinate to facts found. While Paragraph 4 accurately describes the circumstance, this did not deter the state from pursuing its independent function in responding to the spill event. Paragraph 5 accurately portrays the OCS's idea of who was necessary to support the federal response. It does not preclude the activities of other state employees in carrying out their functions. Paragraph 6 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 7 is a correct statement but does not preclude the state's efforts in its own right at responding to the spill. Paragraph 8 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 while an accurate portrayal does not preclude the state in its efforts. The same pertains to Paragraph 10. Paragraph 11 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 13 is contrary to facts found as is Paragraph 14. Paragraph 15 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 16 is not relevant. Paragraph 17 is an accurate portrayal of the federal use of the state helicopter but does not preclude request for reimbursement for uses which the state had of that helicopter. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to facts found. The first two sentences within Paragraph 19 are subordinate to facts found. The third and fourth sentences are not relevant to the issue of whether the state was entitled to seek the assistance or Jacksonville University for its own purposes distinct from those of the federal response. The latter sentence is a correct portrayal of the outcome but for reasons different than contemplated by the Respondent. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to facts found in its first two sentences. The third sentence is not accepted beyond the fact that the Department of Interior using a nonconsumptive use technique, whether other federal agencies use that method was not subject to determination from the record. The first three sentences to Paragraph 23 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. The fourth sentence is not accepted. The fifth and sixth sentences are subordinate to facts found. As to the seventh sentence, it is not clear that there was the intention of redistributing to the Jacksonville area. The eighth sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found as are Paragraphs 25 and 26. The suggestion of the price for hooded mergansers as set out in Paragraph 27 is not accepted. The lesser scaup was not found to have been lost to the spill. The state price of $100.00 per bird for hooded mergansers is accepted. Paragraphs 28-31 are subordinate to facts found as it pertains to the species that were proven to have been lost. Paragraph 32 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 33 and 34 are subordinate to facts found, with the exception that it has been determined that the number of dead birds which Ms. Mosling can recall involvement with is accepted. Paragraphs 35 through 37 are subordinate to facts found in the species determined to have been lost, with the exception that the actual price for hooded mergansers was $100. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gardner, Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Kenneth J. Plante, General Counsel Lynn M. Finnegan, Assistant General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399 Robert B. Parrish, Esquire James F. Moody, Jr., Esquire Taylor, Moseley & Joyner 501 West Bay Street Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-10.041(3)(d) of the South Florida Water Management District (“the District”) is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Conservancy is a non-profit Florida corporation with its offices in Naples, Florida. It has 6,200 members residing in Southwest Florida. The mission of the Conservancy is to protect the environment and natural resources of Southwest Florida. The Caloosahatchee River is an important focus of the Conservancy’s organizational activities and objectives. A substantial number of the members of the Conservancy use the Caloosahatchee River for drinking water, boating, fishing, wildlife observation, and scientific research. The proposed rules create a prospective reservation of water in the not-yet-operational Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Reservoir “for fish and wildlife.” The Conservancy’s interests would be substantially affected by the proposed reservation. The District is a regional water management agency created, granted powers, and assigned duties under chapter 373, Florida Statutes (2013). It is headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida. Proposed rule 40E-10.041(3) states: (3) Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir: All surface water contained within and released, via operation, from the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is reserved from allocation. The water reserved under this paragraph will be available for fish and wildlife upon a formal determination of the Governing Board, pursuant to state and federal law, that the Caloosahatchee River (C-43) West Basin Storage Reservoir is operational. The reservation contained within this subsection and the criteria contained in section 3.11.4 of the Applicant’s Handbook for Water Use Permit Applications within the South Florida Water Management District, incorporated by reference in Rule 40E-2.091, F.A.C., shall be revised in light of changed conditions or new information prior to the approval described in paragraph (3)(b) above. Pursuant to subsection 373.223(4), F.S., presently existing legal uses for the duration of a permit existing on [RULE ADOPTION DATE] are not contrary to the public interest. The Conservancy challenges only paragraph (3)(d), contending that it modifies or contravenes the implementing statute, section 373.223(4).
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Jupiter Hills Lighthouse Marina is entitled to be issued a permit by the Department of Environmental Protection for its project application submitted July 29, 1992, and revised November 15, 1993, to enlarge an existing marina and add new slips.
Findings Of Fact On July 29, 1992, Jupiter Hills Lighthouse Marina (Respondent Jupiter Hills) submitted an application to the Department of Environmental Protection (Respondent DEP) for a permit to enlarge an existing dock facility to 488 feet and to increase the existing 6 slips to 48 new slips. Respondent Jupiter Hills is located 0.7 miles north of Martin County Line Road, on U. S. Highway One, Indian River Lagoon, Jensen Beach to Jupiter Inlet Aquatic Preserve, more particularly described as Martin County, Section 19, Township 40 South, Range 43 East, Indian River Lagoon Class III Waters. On November 15, 1993, Respondent Jupiter Hills amended its application at the request of Respondent DEP. The revised proposed project increases the dock facility from 6 slips to 18 slips, restricting 12 of the 18 slips for sailboat use; and proposes a new 149 foot long T-shaped pier from the existing pier, creating a total dimension of 180 feet by 60 feet. Further, Respondent Jupiter Hills proposes to remove four existing finger piers and 10 existing mooring pilings, to add eight finger piers and 34 new mooring pilings, and to place riprap along the existing seawall and new pier. The proposed project is located in an Outstanding Florida Water (a designated aquatic preserve), the Jensen Beach to Jupiter Inlet Aquatic Preserve, which is a part of the Indian River Preserve. Significant water quality parameters for this proposed project include coliform bacteria, heavy metals, and oil and grease. Water quality standards for oil and grease are not being currently met. However, to address this noncompliance, Respondent Jupiter Hills has agreed to include, as part of this project, the installation of an exfiltration trench to trap grease coming from the uplands. This trench will improve water quality, causing a net improvement of water quality in the proposed project area. Stormwater from the area, including a portion of U. S. Highway One and parking areas within U. S. Highway One right-of-way, discharge directly into Respondent Jupiter Hills. This stormwater then drains directly into tidal waters. The exfiltration trench is designed to intercept up to three-fourths of an inch of the stormwater flow currently draining into the basin. The owners of Respondent Jupiter Hills will maintain the exfiltration trench. They have signed a long-term agreement with Respondent DEP for the maintenance of the trench, and the agreement is included in Respondent DEP's Intent to Issue. Water quality standards for fecal coliform are currently being met. The construction of the proposed project will not preclude or prevent continuing compliance with these standards. Respondent Jupiter Hills has proposed a sewage pump-out station which is not currently in the area and which will encourage boaters to pump boat sewage into the city treatment area instead of dumping the sewage into the water. The pump-out station will be connected to the central sewage system, but boaters will not be required to use the sewage pump-out station. However, since liveaboards are more likely to cause fecal coliform violations, Respondent Jupiter Hills has agreed that no liveaboards will be permitted in the proposed project. Water quality standards for heavy metals are currently being met. The construction of the proposed project will not preclude or prevent continuing compliance with these standards. Respondent Jupiter Hills proposes to use construction materials which have not been treated by heavy metals. Also, because the proposed project area flushes in one tidal cycle, any additional metals from the boats themselves would be swept away quickly. The proposed project will not adversely impact or affect the public health, safety or welfare or the property of others. Respondent Jupiter Hills has provided reasonable assurance that water quality standards will be met, continue to be met, and not violated. As a result, the public health and safety are protected. The proposed pump-out facility will reduce the incidences of illegal head discharges into the Jupiter Sound. Thus, this facility will benefit the health and safety of swimmers or others participating in water-related activities in the Jupiter Sound. The proposed project will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. Respondent Jupiter Hills has agreed to several measures designed to reduce any adverse impacts to fish and wildlife and the measures have been incorporated into the Intent to Issue. Respondent Jupiter Hills has agreed to not allow new power boats to dock at the proposed facility, which will prevent adverse affects on the manatee population in the area. Additionally, the proposed pump-out facility will improve the water quality, resulting in a benefit to fish and wildlife, including the Benthic habitat and seagrasses. Respondent Jupiter Hills has further agreed to install navigational signs, directing boaters away from manatees, and no wake signs, indicating the presence of manatees; these signs do not presently exist. Furthermore, Respondent Jupiter Hills has agreed to post signs directing boaters away from any seagrasses located in the proposed project area. Whether seagrasses in the proposed project area will be adversely affected is also a factor to be considered. Inspections and surveys of the proposed project area in December 1992 and mid-March 1993 revealed one patch of Halophila decipiens and Halophila johnsonii at the 100 foot contour but no seagrasses within the footprint of the proposed project. A survey of the area in late April 1994 revealed some seagrasses in the proposed project area but no seagrasses within the footprint of the proposed project. In September 1995, an examination of the area revealed Halophila decipiens just waterward of the existing slips down to the southern property boundaries 20 to 30 feet wide and revealed sparse seagrasses approximately 300 to 500 feet from the shoreline. Halophila decipiens is more abundant and thick in the summer and tends to die off and at its thinnest in the winter. Neither Halophila decipiens nor Halophila johnsonii are threatened or endangered species of seagrasses. The seagrasses provide a significant environmental benefit. The benefits include nutrient recycling in the area and providing habitat for Benthic invertebrates, such as crabs, which are at the bottom of the food chain. Also, other plants grow on the seagrasses, such as algae, and the other plants provide food for other organisms. Manatees eat several seagrasses, including Halophia decipiens but it is not one of the manatees preferred seagrasses. Seagrasses can be adversely affected in two ways. One way is that prop dredging could scar the seagrasses. However, as to the proposed project, the depth of the water in the area of the seagrasses will prevent any adverse affects from prop dredging. The second way that seagrasses can, and will, be adversely affected is being shaded by the proposed dock or by boats tied-up to the dock. The density of the seagrass, pertaining to this proposed project, is thin and low and approximately one percent of actual coverage. In determining whether the proposed project is clearly in the public interest, Respondent DEP uses a balancing test which consists of taking the public interest criteria and weighing the pros and cons of the proposed project. Balancing the adverse impacts on the seagrasses and the positive effects of the public interest criteria, the proposed project is clearly in the public interest. The slips in the proposed project will increase by 12; however, the slips can only be used by sailboats. Since sailboats move slowly, the manatees in the area will not be adversely affected by the proposed project. Neither navigation nor the flow of water will be adversely affected by the proposed project. Further, no harmful erosion or shoaling will be caused by the proposed project. Adequate depths are off of the end of the dock for boats to safely navigate. Shoaling is not a potential problem, and therefore, any potential shoaling which may develop will not adversely affect navigation. The proposed dock will not impact navigation into the Intracoastal Waterway (ICW) because the dock will not extend into the ICW and because Respondent Jupiter Hills will provide navigational aids to guide boaters to access the Atlantic ICW. Furthermore, there is sufficient depth for navigation between the end of the proposed dock and the sandbar where the seagrasses are located. Boat traffic coming from the south will primarily originate from the residences to the south. The proposed dock will force these boaters 200 feet offshore where the natural channel is located. Additionally, the dock will keep boaters further offshore from the riparian land owners to the north, including the Petitioners. To improve the public interest aspects of the project, Respondent DEP proposed that Respondent Jupiter Hills install riprap, which Respondent Jupiter Hills agreed to do. Installation of the riprap will be 367 feet along the perimeter of the proposed dock and in a 10 by 50 foot area along the bulkhead north of the dock. Some shoaling will result but will not affect navigation. The riprap will provide substrate and shelter for marine life. The fishing or recreational values or marine productivity will not be adversely affected by the proposed project. Marine productivity will increase because the sewage pump-out station will improve the water quality which will benefit the Benthic community. The proposed project will be of a permanent nature. Significant historical and archaeological resources will not be adversely affected by the proposed project. The Department of State, which is responsible for historical and archaeological resources, reviewed the Notice of Intent and has no objection to the proposed project. The current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed project will be increased and, therefore, benefited. No cumulative impacts are associated with the proposed project. The proposed project is not in an area of pristine shoreline; the area is highly developed. Approximately 1,200 feet to the south of the proposed project is a 270 foot dock with about 50 slips. When considered with the other docks in the area, the extension of the dock in the proposed project will not significantly or measurably further violate the water quality. Respondent Jupiter Hills has provided reasonable assurance that the proposed project is clearly in the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue a final order issuing Permit No. 432170499 to Jupiter Hills Lighthouse Marina. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioners Proposed Findings of Fact Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Rejected as being irrelevant, or unnecessary. See, conclusion of law 43. Also, partially accepted in findings of fact 19-27, 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5 and 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Rejected as being unnecessary. Also, see finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8, 9, and 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in findings of fact 12 and 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. See, conclusion of law 46. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9 and 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18 and 28. Partially accepted in findings of fact 29 and 30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. Rejected as being argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being argument, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 24. Rejected as being irrelevant, or unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 20 and 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3 and 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Rejected as being not supported by the greater weight of the evidence, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being not supported by the greater weight of the evidence, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 19-27. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejectd as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Respondent Jupiter Hills' Proposed Findings of Fact Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in findings of fact 30 and 31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. Partially accepted in findings of fact 29, 30 and 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Partially accepted in findings of fact 4, 5, 8, and 11. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5 and 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5, 8, and 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9, 14, 15, and 16. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18, 24, and 27. Partially accepted in findings of fact 18 and 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. Partially accepted in findings of fact 20 and 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Partially accepted in findings of fact 20 and 26. Rejected as being irrelevant, or unnecessary. Rejected as being unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27. Rejected as being argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, argument, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 25. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33 Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 40. Rejected as being irrelevant, or unnecessary. Rejected as being irrelevant, or unnecessary. Rejected as being irrelevant, or unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Rejected as being unnecessary, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 27 and 41. Respondent DEP's Proposed Findings of Fact Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9 and 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. Partially accepted in findings of fact 12 and 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 18. Partially accepted in findings of fact 19 and 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 21. Partially accepted in finding of fact 22. Partially accepted in findings of fact 25 and 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 26. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 28. Partially accepted in finding of fact 29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 30. Partially accepted in finding of fact 31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 32. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 34. Partially accepted in finding of fact 35 Partially accepted in finding of fact 36. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 38. Partially accepted in finding of fact 39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 40. Partially accepted in finding of fact 41. NOTE: Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainer has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, not supported by the evidence presented, not supported by the greater weight of the evidence, argument, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: J. A. Jurgens, Esquire Post Office Box 1178 Winter Park, Florida 32790-1178 Timothy C. Laubach, Esquire Sears and Manuel, P.A. 1218 Mount Vernon Street Orlando, Florida 32803 M.Tracy Biagiotti, Esquire Scott Hawkins, Esquire Jones, Foster, Johnston & Stubbs, P.A. Post Office Box 3475 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 (Attorney for Jupiter Hills Lighthouse Marina) Lynette L. Ciardulli Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Douglas MacLaughlin Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Douglas Building 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the amended petition alleges facts sufficient to establish standing and a legal basis for a hearing pursuant to 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact For the purposes of this recommended order the following substantive facts alleged by Petitioner are deemed to accurate: On May 22, 1970, the Department entered into a lease agreement with the City which, for the sum of one dollar per year, leased the right of way to the south approach to the Bakers Haulover Bridge located in Dade County, Florida. According to this lease, the property was to be used as a parking lot and remain open to all members of the motoring public. The property leased to the City was, and is, adjacent to Biscayne Bay. This bay has been designated an aquatic preserve as defined in Section 258.39(11), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is a sport fisherman who for many years has utilized the public right of way leased to the City to gain access to fishing at Bakers Haulover Inlet. On or about July 11, 1987, the City erected a fence on the right of way which blocked Petitioner's access to the water at Haulover Cut. The fence was erected without a permit from the Department. On November 13, 1987, Petitioner and other members of the public, primarily fishermen, met with officials from the Department to complain about the fence and to attempt to reach a compromise. As a result, the City was to apply for an after the fact permit to erect the fence. Petitioner and the other protesting fishermen believed they would be given an opportunity to review and comment upon the permit application. No notice was provided to Petitioner nor any other member of the group regarding the permit application. On December 1, 1987, the Department approved the City's permit for the erection of the fence. Petitioner has not been given an opportunity to respond to the permit application submitted by the City.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the amended petition filed by Dan Dawson. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred W. Van Vonno Suite 1750, Courthouse Tower 44 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130-1808 Charles G. Gardner Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, Mail Station 58 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether 1044PVB, LLC (“Applicant”), is entitled to Environmental Resource Permit (“ERP”) No. IND-109-143282-1 from the St. Johns River Water Management District (“District”), authorizing the construction of a surface water management system to serve a proposed residential development in St. Johns County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner Nancy Condron is a resident and landowner in St. Johns County. Her residence is located across Ponte Vedra Boulevard from the Project. Petitioner uses the nearby Guana River Wildlife Management Area for nature-based recreation, including hiking and bird-watching. Applicant is a foreign limited liability company and the applicant for the ERP at issue in this case. The District is an independent special district granted powers and assigned duties under chapter 373, Florida Statutes, including powers and duties related to the regulation of construction activities in wetlands. The Project is within the boundaries of the District. The Project Site The Project site is 17.13 acres located at 1044 Ponte Vedra Boulevard in St. Johns County, Florida. The site currently consists of forested lands on the east and west and pasture areas in the middle. There is an existing trail road that runs the length of the property and a small residence. The site has four small ponds excavated as watering holes, ranging in size from 0.04 to 0.24 acres. There are 4.41 acres of wetlands and other surface waters on the site. There is a 3.49-acre area of mixed forested wetland on the site that continues offsite to the south and west. There are also three isolated wetlands on the site, each less than a half-acre in size. The wetland system adjacent to the Project site flows to the Guana River. The Guana River is a freshwater, Class III waterbody. It is an Outstanding Florida Water, but has been designated by the Department of Environmental Protection as impaired for nutrients. The site is not used by threatened or endangered species for feeding, nesting, or breeding. The Project The proposed Project is a 22-lot, single-family subdivision. The proposed surface water management system for the Project includes curb and gutter paved roadways, storm inlets, concrete pipes, vegetated natural buffers, treatment swales, and a wet detention stormwater pond. The wet detention stormwater pond would discharge into adjacent wetlands that flow to the Guana River. Wetlands The point of discharge from the Project’s stormwater management system is not in the designated Outstanding Florida Water. Applicant proposes to fill the four ponds and the three isolated wetlands. Applicant also proposes to fill 0.28 acres of the larger wetland. The Project includes a number of upland buffers that are a minimum of 15 feet in width and average of 25 feet in width. These buffers are intended to prevent potential adverse secondary impacts to adjacent wetlands. All wetland impacts and mitigation were assessed using the Uniform Mitigation Assessment Method (UMAM) in Florida Administrative Code Rule 62-345. The UMAM assessment takes into consideration the location and landscape support, water environment, and community structure of the wetlands to be impacted. The District also considers the condition, hydrologic connection, uniqueness, location, and the fish and wildlife utilization of the wetlands and other surface waters. The District did not require mitigation for filling the artificial ponds. The District also did not require mitigation for filling the isolated wetlands because each is less than a half-acre in size. As mitigation for filling 0.28 acres of the larger wetland, Applicant would purchase 0.25 mitigation bank credits from the St. Marks Pond Mitigation Bank. The St. Marks Pond Mitigation Bank is located in the same drainage basin as the wetland area that would be filled. The District determined that purchasing the mitigation bank credits would offset the functional loss associated with filling part of the wetland. Two areas on the site where no upland buffers are proposed were assessed for secondary impacts to wetlands in the UMAM evaluation. The mitigation bank credits proposed for the Project would offset all of the adverse, direct, and secondary impacts to wetlands or surface waters associated with this Project. Because direct and secondary impacts would be fully mitigated, the Project would not cause cumulative impacts. Water Quantity A majority of the Project’s stormwater runoff would be conveyed to the wet detention pond. The wet detention pond provides water quantity protection by attenuating the post- development peak rate of discharge. Applicant modeled the pre-development peak rate of discharge and the post-development peak rate of discharge. The modeling indicated that the post-development peak rate of discharge will not exceed the pre-development peak rate of discharge for the 25-year, 24-hour storm event. Section 3.3 of the Applicant's Handbook, Volume II, prohibits a reduction in the 10-year or 100-year floodplain for projects with an upstream drainage basin of five square miles or greater. The proposed Project has an upstream drainage basin of 4.6 square miles, so this criterion is not applicable. Applicant showed the Project would increase offsite flood elevations by only 0.01 feet, which is negligible. The Project would not cause adverse water quantity impacts to receiving waters or adjacent lands. Water Quality Water quality would be managed in the Project through a combination of wet detention pond, swales, and vegetative natural buffers (“VNBs”). The wet detention pond would treat a majority of the runoff from the Project. Section 8 of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume II, contains presumptive criteria for the design of a wet detention pond. The proposed wet detention pond meets the presumptive criteria. Therefore, the detention pond is presumed to provide reasonable assurance that the water quality of receiving waters will be protected. Applicant is proposing to construct swales at the back of Lots 20, 21, and 22 to treat runoff by infiltration. Section 9 of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume II, contains presumptive criteria for swale system design and performance. The Project meets the presumptive criteria for swales. Applicant is proposing VNBs on Lots 1 through 14. The use of VNBs is a commonly-used best management practice accepted by the District for treating stormwater runoff. Like swales, VNBs treat runoff by infiltration. Stormwater runoff from the backyards of Lots 1 through 14 would drain to the VNBs. On some of these lots, stormwater runoff from the front yards, side yards, and rooftops would also drain to the VNBs. The lots would be graded so that runoff would sheet flow to the VNBs to maximize their treatment function. The VNBs would have native soils and plants. The VNBs would have Type A soils, which are well-drained soils that provide the highest rate of infiltration and the most permeability. Petitioner contends that, because soil borings were not taken at the location of the VNBs, reasonable assurance was not provided that the VNBs would function as proposed. However, Petitioner did not show that the soils at the VNB locations were unsuitable soils. In addition, Applicant agreed to use Type A soils in the VNBs. Therefore, reasonable assurance that the VNBs would have suitable soils was provided by Applicant. Petitioner referred to a draft rule to support her contention that the proposed VNBs are not properly designed, but the draft rule has no controlling effect and is hearsay. The Applicant’s Handbook does not contain presumptive criteria for VNBs. Applicant demonstrated that the VNBs would infiltrate 80 percent of the runoff from a three-year, one-hour storm event, which is the same treatment efficiency the District requires when swales are used. Reasonable assurance was provided that the VNBs would function as proposed. Because the Project would discharge to wetlands that flow to the Guana River, a waterbody impaired by nutrients, section 2.2 of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume II, requires Applicant to demonstrate there would be a net improvement in water quality with respect to nutrients. Applicant performed a pollutant loading analysis using the BMPTRAINS model. The BMPTRAINS model is a generally-accepted tool used by stormwater engineers for this purpose. The BMPTRAINS model incorporates the information about the pre- and post-development conditions associated with land use and impervious area. The model accounts for site-specific conditions, including the elevation of the groundwater table and storage capacity of the soil. The design of the surface water management system is then incorporated into the model to estimate the pollutant removal efficiency and estimate the average annual pollutant load that will leave the site. Applicant’s BMPTRAINS modeling indicated that the average annual post-development loading for total nitrogen and total phosphorus would be substantially less than the pre- development loading for those nutrients. Therefore, Applicant demonstrated the Project would result in a net improvement. Operation & Maintenance The Ponte Vedra Beach Preserve Homeowners Association would be the entity responsible for operation and maintenance of the stormwater management system. The wet detention pond, swales, and VNBs would be located within an easement and maintained by the homeowner’s association. Applicant and the Ponte Vedra Beach Preserve Homeowners Association have the ability to accept responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the Project. Public Interest An applicant for an ERP must demonstrate that a proposed project affecting wetlands and other surface waters would not be contrary to the public interest. This determination is made by balancing seven factors found in section 10.2.3(a) through (g) of the Applicant’s Handbook, Volume I. Public interest factor (a) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect public health, safety, or welfare, or the property of others. There is no aspect of the Project that would affect public health, safety, or welfare, except the potential for flooding. Reasonable assurance was provided by Applicant that the Project would not cause flooding. Factor (b) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species or their habitats. The mitigation bank credits offset all of the potential adverse impacts that the proposed project would have on the conservation of fish and wildlife. Factor (c) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect navigation or the flow of water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The parties stipulated that the Project will not adversely affect navigation or cause harmful erosion or shoaling. The record evidence shows the Project will not adversely affect the flow of water. Factor (d) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity. The Project would not affect fishing or recreational values in the vicinity. The mitigation bank credits offset all of the potential adverse impacts the proposed project would have on marine productivity in the vicinity. Factor (e) is whether the regulated activity will be of a temporary or permanent nature. The activities are of a permanent nature. The mitigation is also permanent. Factor (f) is whether the regulated activity will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and archaeological resources. The Project will have no effect on historical and archaeological resources. Factor (g) is the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed regulated activity. The relatively small loss of functional value would be offset by the proposed mitigation. Considering and balancing these seven factors, the Project would not be contrary to the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the St. Johns River Water Management District enter a final order approving the issuance of Environmental Resource Permit No. IND-109-143282-1 to 1044PVB, LLC, with the conditions set forth in the Technical Staff Report dated April 11, 2016. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen C. Ferguson, Esquire St. Johns River Water Management District 4049 Reid Street Palatka, Florida 32177 (eServed) Jane West, Esquire Josh Smith, Esquire Jane West Law, P.L. 6277 A1A South, Suite 101 St. Augustine, Florida 32080 (eServed) Eric Olsen, Esquire Amelia A. Savage, Esquire Hopping, Green and Sams, P.A. Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 (eServed) Ann B. Shortelle, Ph.D., Executive Director St. Johns River Water Management District 4049 Reid Street Palatka, Florida 32177 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact The proposed addition to the existing commercial docking facilities in the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve would consist of approximately 5,000 square feet of additional overwater structure. The effects of such a facility on the marine ecosystem were described in expert testimony. The structure would cut off penetration of light to the bottom and the organisms living below. The resultant change in the biota under the dock would reduce the number of sedentary species, that is to say those species that remain essentially stationary in a given area, and would increase the number of errant species, that is to say those species which move from place to place. This change in the existing ecosystem directly affects the food chain and ultimately adversely affects commercial and sports fishing. Other negative impacts on the area due to the proposed construction would be increased boat traffic, sewage, introduction of petroleum products into the waters and an increase in the number and size of boats docking in the area thereby expanding the shaded area beyond that of the dock itself. Though the actual amount of damage to the preserve from both the shading effect and usage as a whole cannot be quantified without appropriate natural asset inventroy and study, some amount of damage would occur to the biological integrity of the area. The proliferation of docks within the Aquatic Preserve along with the cumulative impact of such construction must be considered as a potential threat to the Preserve. The cumulative impact and extent of damage which might occur as a result of the proposed construction must be determined through the conduct of a study developing a management plan for the Preserve, balancing present and future needs and values. Each individual Petitioner owns waterfront property within the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. Because of the potential negative impact of the proposed project and its cumulative impact with other projects on waterfront property, each Petitioner would be materially affected by the granting of this lease. No use or management criteria, ultimate or incipient, for the Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve have been adopted. However, since December, 1975, DNR has been engaged in the process of adopting such rules for the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve. Once adopted, these rules will serve as a model for rules to be promulgated for the other aquatic preserves including Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. No studies have been conducted by DNR of Pine Island Sound Aquatic Preserve. There is no inventory of available commercial docks, boat traffic, ingress or egress within the Preserve. The proposed rules for the Biscayne Bay Aquatic Preserve are not presently being applied to aquatic preserve leases.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: Banana Island is separated by marshland into areas known as Islands No. 9 and No. 10. The respondent Association presently owns and operates on Island No. 10 a dock and a dive shop which sells snacks and compressed air to divers who use the nearby springs. The purpose of the proposed boardwalk is to connect the existing dock facilities on Island No. 10 to the upland area on Island No. 9, a portion of which will be used as a picnic area for boaters, swimmers and divers. The boardwalk is to be 220 feet long and six feet wide. The immediate area upon which the boardwalk is to be constructed is not utilized by the manatee because of its shallow depth. While the boardwalk would result in the shading of approximately 1,000 feet of marshland, this amount is too insignificant to affect the manatee. There are approximately 1,000 manatee in the United States, and the manatee has been designated as an endangered species under Federal and Florida law. The manatee exists throughout the southeastern portion of the United States. They inhabit areas off Texas, Louisiana, Florida, on up to North Carolina, though it is unusual to see them north of Brunswick, Georgia. The Kings Bay area of Crystal River, primarily around the Springs, and the area of Homosassa Springs provides a winter home for approximately 110 manatee, or about ten percent of the entire manatee population. The manatee come to the Kings Bay area in the winter months from mid-November through March 31st due to the warmer temperatures of the water around the springs. There is only occasional use of the springs area by the manatee between March 31st and November 15th. The numbers of manatee coming into the Kings Bay area has increased since 1971. This increase could be due to better observation techniques or to the reduction of other suitable habitats for the manatee. At least seventy percent of the population return each year. This year, seven new calves were born in the area. During the cooler months, approximately forty- five percent of the manatee can be found within five-eights of a mile of the main spring in Kings Bay. The proposed boardwalk is to be located approximately 150 feet from the main springs. No manatees have been sighted within twenty-five yards of the boardwalk site. The existing dock is located about seventy feet from the main springs. Manatees have been sighted near the end of this dock, which was built in 1971. The general area surrounding the site of the proposed boardwalk, primarily the springs area, is used heavily by boaters, swimmers and divers. Observations during a nonconsecutive seven-day period in late November and early December noted some 603 boats using the general area of Kings Bay, some 250 divers around the springs area and over 430 top-water observers of the manatee. These numbers would lessen during the Spring and pick up again during the Summer and latter part of the Fall months. On January 1, 1979, some fifty-two boats were served within the main springs area. In Citrus County alone, there are over 5,700 registered pleasure and commercial boats. When cruising, the manatee generally travels at a rate of speed of two to three miles per hour. When moving out of the way of a boat, the manatee can move at about eight to nine miles per hour. When confronted by an oncoming boat, the manatee either immediately submerges or turns to the right. Many manatee in the Kings Bay area have propeller scars on their bodies. A few of the manatee, generally the juvenile manatee, appear to enjoy and seek contact and association with the divers. The majority move away and seek to avoid the divers. During periods of heavier boat traffic around the springs, the manatee generally move out into the colder water adjacent to the springs. Continued disruptive activity such as motor sounds, fast moving boats, heavy diver or boat traffic, and harassment from divers and swimmers can prove to be dangerous to the manatee. Such activity can result in a failure to mate and reproduce, body wounds, and a forcing of the manatee out into colder waters, thus disrupting normal feeding patterns and behavior. In 1978, the Florida legislature passed the "Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act," declaring the State of Florida to be a refuge and sanctuary for the manatee. Section 370.12(2), 1978 Supplement to Florida Statutes. This Act directed the Department of Natural Resources to adopt rules regulating the operation and speed of motorboat traffic between the dates of November 15th and March 31st in the Kings Bay area of Crystal River, as well as in other portions of the waters of the State. At the time of the administrative hearing in this cause, the Department of Natural Resources was in the process of adopting Chapter 16N-22 in implementation of the Florida Manatee Sanctuary Act. These proposed rules establish slow speed zones, idle speed zones and prohibited zones for motorboats in Citrus County. The area in dispute herein is designated as an idle speed zone, defined as the minimum speed that will maintain the safe steerageway of a motorboat. The federal government is expected to adopt all state regulations pertaining to the protection of the manatee. It was the opinion of both of the witnesses having knowledge and expertise regarding the activities and behavior patterns of the manatee that any development which attracts and promotes human activity in the springs area could possibly have a deleterious effect upon the manatee. As noted above, the dock and dive shop have been in existence and operation since 1971. Boating and diving activity has increased since that time. The respondent Association has no objection to and is in favor of the proposed new boat speed regulations. While a few boats can now tie up to the existing dock, boats would not be able to tie up to the boardwalk. Trash receptacles are planned for Island No. 9. If Banana Island No. 9 were accessible via the proposed boardwalk for recreational and/or picnic activities, it is entirely possible that there would be less boating activity around the immediate area of the main springs. The majority of the boats around the springs are small boats which the divers and manatee observers rent for those purposes. It is possible that larger boats could be utilized to provide transportation for swimmers and divers to and from the area, thus reducing the number of boats in the immediate area of the springs. During the hearing, the applicant offered and stated its willingness to close down the boardwalk during the winter months should future studies or surveys illustrate that the manatee is being harmed therefrom. The successful and profitable operation of the respondent's boating and diving enterprises depends upon the continued habitation of the area by the manatee.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the respondent's application for a permit to construct and maintain a boardwalk be granted, subject to the stipulations proposed in the permit appraisal relating to the opening and the maintenance of vegetation. Respectfully submitted and entered this 15th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth F. Hoffman Rogers, Towers, Bailey, Jones and Gay Post Office Box 1872 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Alfred W. Clark Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Baya M. Harrison Mark J. Proctor Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Assistant Department Attorney Carothers and Proctor 202 Blount Street Post Office Box 391 Crown Building Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Tallahassee, Florida 32304
