Findings Of Fact On June 19, 1991, the Petitioner, Lemuel L. Cole, filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing. The Petitioner challenged a proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.004, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioner's challenge was instituted pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The notice of the proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.004, Florida Administrative Code, was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 17, Number 21, page 2318, on May 24, 1991. The Petitioner's Petition challenging proposed amendment to Rule 33- 3.004, Florida Administrative Code, was filed twenty-six days after notice of the proposed amendment to the challenged rule was filed.
Findings Of Fact 11. The factual allegations in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 18, 2010, and the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on August 5, 2011, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the 2" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 10-053-D4 and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 18, 2010, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 10-053-D4 to McDonnell Painting, d/b/a Painting and Wallcovering by McDonnell (McDonnell). The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of rights wherein McDonnell was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 2. On March 3, 2010, the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served via certified mail on McDonnell. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On February 19, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to McDonnell in Case No. 10-053-D4. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $10,058.88 against McDonnell. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein McDonnell was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 4. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on McDonnell by certified mail on February 25, 2010. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On March 15, 2010, McDonnell timely filed a Petition requesting a formal administrative hearing. The Petition failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 28-106.2015(S), Florida Administrative Code, in that it did not contain a statement requesting an administrative hearing which identified those material facts in dispute, or in the alternative a statement that there were no disputed issues of material fact. As a result, on April 23, 2010, the Department issued an Order Dismissing Petition for Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, Hearing Without Prejudice, giving McDonnell 21 days to file a Petition that satisfied the requirements of Rule 28- 106.2015(5), Florida Administrative Code. 6. The Order Dismissing Petition for Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, Hearing Without Prejudice was served on McDonnell by certified mail on April 27, 2010. 7. On May 19, 2010, McDonnell timely filed an Amended Petition requesting an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. A copy of the Amended Petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings, where it was assigned Case No. 10-2788. 8. On January 10, 2011, the Department and McDonnell reached a negotiated settlement in which the Department agreed to issue a 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessing a penalty in the amount of $2,379.00, and McDonnell agreed to pay the total penalty of $2,379 and to no longer contest the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and gn Amended Order of Penalty Assessment. 9. On January 10, 2011, the Department filed a Notice of Settlement with the Division of Administrative Hearings, advising the Administrative Law Judge that the parties had resolved all issues pending in Case No. 10-2788. A copy of the Notice of Settlement is attached hereto as “Exhibit D.” 10. On January 10, 2011, Administrative Law Judge R. Bruce McKibben entered an Order Closing File, relinquishing jurisdiction to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit E.” 11. On August 5, 2011, the Department issued a 2"™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to McDonnell in Case No. 10-053-D4. The 2™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment lowered the penalty assessed against McDonnell to $2,379.00 pursuant to the negotiated settlement. The 2"? Amended Order of Penalty was served on McDonnell by email on August 11,2011. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit F” and incorporated herein by reference.
Findings Of Fact Outdoor Advertising Art, Inc. is the owner of a 12 x 40 foot sign located on State Road 540 in Polk County. The records of the Department of Transportation show the last valid permit for this sign was issued in 1973. The Respondent forgot to renew the permit for 1974 due to clerical error of its staff although it received notice as required by statute from the Department of Transportation. On October 2, 1975, Outdoor Advertising Art, Inc. attempted to obtain a permit for this sign for the year 1974 and 1975, and tendered a check to Department of Transportation in the amount of $20. In doing so, the Respondent relied upon what it stated the policy of the Department had been regarding renewal of delinquent permits; however, it did not fail to renew in reliance on this policy but through its own oversight. The Department of Transportation denied the permit on the sign which did not conform to the existing rules and regulations adopted by the State of Florida as part of the federal highways beautification program. Testimony was received that delinquent applications have been allowed to be filed by the Department of Transportation, but not in District I of the Department of Transportation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this Hearing Officer recommends that the sign be removed. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John J. Rimes, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William D. Rowland, Esquire Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida 32789
The Issue Whether subject signs should be removed for failure to secure current permits and for failure to keep signs in good repair.
Findings Of Fact No currents permits were secured for subject signs and said signs are in a poor and unsightly condition with damaged faces. Letters in the file show owner promised to refurbish subject signs on September 12, 1974 and also March 31, 1975. At date of hearing the sign was in the same unsightly condition. Notice of Violation was sent September 3, 1974.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a closely held corporation owned and operated by Salvatore Studiale and his family, including his wife, Celia, their son Jack Studiale and their daughter, Caroline Greenlaw. Respondent owns and operates Tropical Acres Steak House, a restaurant located in Broward County, Florida. Respondent erected a sign in 1975 in Broward County ninety feet north of Griffin Road adjacent to I-95 that is the subject of this proceeding. In a 1976 proceeding involving the same parties to this proceeding, Petitioner cited the same sign that is the subject of these proceedings for having been erected without certain permits in violations of Sections 479.02, 470.07(1), and 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (1975). Thereafter the case was referred to the Florida Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and assigned DOAH Case No. 76-473. A formal administrative hearing was held in Case No. 76- 473 by a DOAH Hearing Officer who entered a Recommended Order. The following findings of fact, taken from the Recommended Order entered in Case No. 76-473, are consistent with the evidence presented before me and are hereby adopted as my findings of fact: In July, 1975, Salvatore Studiale and his wife Celia purchased certain real estate located between Interstate Highway I-95 and Griffin Road, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On August 1, 1975, Salvatore Studiale, President of Respondent Corporation, and his wife, leased the property to Respondent. A variance for the erection of the sign was required from Broward County and this was approved on the condition that frontage of the property be deeded to the county. This was done on December 8, 1975. The property deeded to Broward County was of a value of approximately $18,000. Subsequently, Respondent had a sign erected which read "Tropical Acres Steaks [and] Seafood 1/2 Mile". Investigation by Petitioner's representatives in the Spring of 1976 revealed that no state permit had been applied for prior to erection of the sign and that no permit tag was affixed thereto. The premises of the business establishment advertised in Respondent's sign is located at a place other than the property on which the sign was erected. In early June, 1976, Respondent changed the copy on its sign to delete the words "1/2 Mile" and substitute therefor the word "Lessee". The Hearing Officer in Case 76-473 concluded that the subject sign was exempt from Petitioner's permitting requirements: ... because Section 479.16(11)1/ excepts from the provisions of Chapter 479 "Signs or notices erected or maintained upon property giving the name of the owner, lessee or occupant of the premises". The copy on the sign that reads "Tropical Acres Steaks Seafoods" (sic) adequately reflects the name of the lessee of the property. In fact, since the alleged violation was noted, Respondent has even added the word "Lessee" to the copy on the sign. It is concluded that Respondent properly falls with the exception stated above. The Hearing Officer in Case No. 76-473 recommended that "the allegations against Respondent be dismissed". Thereafter on August 12, 1976, Petitioner entered a Final Order in Case 76-473 which found that the findings of fact and the conclusions of law contained in the Recommended Order were correct and adopted the Recommended Order as its Final Order. The site of the subject sign had been the location of a gasoline service station before the Studiales purchased the property. When the sign was erected, the site was located in unincorporated Broward County. In July 1990 the site was annexed so that at the time of the formal hearing the sign was located within an incorporated municipality. In 1978, Respondent's sign was damaged by a wind storm. With Petitioner's approval, the sign was restored. On June 13, 1991, Petitioner's investigators inspected the subject sign. At an undetermined time between 1978 and June 13, 1991, a strip was attached to the supporting posts beneath the main faces of the sign so that two additional sign faces, one facing north and the other south, were created. The message that was placed on each face of this smaller sign was "1/2 Mile West" together with directional arrows. This addition was for the purpose of directing traffic to Respondent's restaurant, which was located 1/2 mile west of the sign. The directional message on each face of the smaller sign was removed prior to the formal hearing that was held in this proceeding. No permit for the sign has been applied for by Respondent or the Studiales and no permit has been given by Petitioner. Petitioner does not charge any permit fee for a sign unless a permit has been issued. There was a dispute as to whether Respondent had been charged and had paid annual fees for the subject sign. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that in 1986 and 1987 Respondent received billings from Petitioner for the subject sign as a result of computer error and that Respondent paid those billings. It is clear, however, that the Studiales were aware that no permit had ever been issued for this sign and that they relied on the determination made in Case 76-473 that the sign was exempt from permitting. Respondent has attempted to establish that it has placed great reliance in making its business plans on Petitioner's representations and assurances that the subject sign was a legal structure. Although it is clear that the subject sign is important to Respondent's business because it serves to direct customers to the restaurant location, Petitioner's delay in challenging the legality of the sign has not prejudiced Respondent. Respondent has been benefitted by the continued existence of the subject sign. The size of the sign exceeds 10 square feet. On June 20, 1991, Petitioner issued a notice of alleged violation of Sections 479.07(1), 479.105, and 479.07(9)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1991), for the subject sign, based on its determinations that the sign was not exempt from pertinent permitting requirements, that it did not have a permit, and that it was improperly spaced.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which finds that the status of Respondent's sign is "nonconforming" and which rejects Petitioner's contention that the sign is illegal. DONE AND ORDERED this 2 day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2 day of April, 1992.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's request for attorney's fees and costs should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In these cases, Petitioner, Couch Construction, L.P., seeks to impose sanctions against Respondents, Darel Holland (Holland) and Diane Lowery (Lowery), on the ground that they allegedly filed petitions for an improper purpose challenging the issuance of a permit by the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). In responsive papers filed by Respondents, both deny that the actions were initiated for an improper purpose. The facts in the underlying DEP case involving Holland (OGC Case No. 98-3015) show that on October 30, 1998, Petitioner published a copy of DEP's Notice of Intent to Issue Permit to Petitioner authorizing the construction of a hot mix asphalt concrete plant at 2780 North Highway 95-A, Cantonment, Florida, with potential emissions of up to 29 tons per year of particulate matter. After learning of the proposed action, various citizens in the Cantonment area signed a petition opposing the project. In addition, a local attorney, John T. Reading, Jr., Esquire (Reading), offered to provide them with pro bono assistance as a "community service." Among other things, Reading prepared a form petition challenging the issuance of the permit and requesting a formal hearing. That form was apparently made available to the local citizens so that they could sign and file it, if they chose to do so. Holland says that he did, and it is fair to infer that this form was the source of Lowery's petition as well. Holland lives only 9 blocks from the proposed plant and suffers from a lung disease which has left him with only 58 percent of his lung capacity. Because of his legitimate concerns about the projected amount of particulate emissions and their potential effect on his respiratory system, on November 12, 1998, he filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the proposed issuance of the permit. Holland's petition alleged that he was a property owner in the area where the plant would be constructed; that "due to respiratory problems," he would be "substantially affected by the permitted 29 tons of particulate emissions"; that his property "may be substantially reduced in value and peaceful enjoyment" as a result of the permit being issued; and that the petition was not "being interposed merely for the purposes of delay, or any other improper purpose as listed in F.S. 120.57(1)(b)(5)." There was no showing that the petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Holland's concerns were not genuine. Holland's petition also requested an extension of time "to determine which rules or statutes require reversal or modification of the Department's action" and "to obtain counsel" to assist him in his action. On December 21, 1998, DEP entered an order dismissing Holland's petition on the ground that he failed to allege the information required by Rule 28-106.201(2)(e), Florida Administrative Code. It also determined that no good cause had been shown to warrant an extension of time for Holland to determine if any rules or statutes supported his position. He was, however, granted leave to file an amended petition within 15 days from the date of service of DEP's dismissal order (December 23, 1998). This meant that an amended petition had to be filed with DEP no later than January 7, 1999. After learning that his petition had been dismissed, Holland had a brief conversation with Reading about the dismissal and was left with a somewhat vague understanding that Reading "would get an extension" from DEP. Thereafter, on January 12, 1999, or 5 days after the due date, Reading filed with DEP an Amended Petition of Darel Holland for Administrative Hearing. The petition was signed by Reading, and it represented that a copy of the petition had been served on Petitioner's counsel on January 5, 1999. On January 14, 1999, Reading also filed with DEP on behalf of Holland a paper styled Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time in which Reading claimed that "due to circumstances not known," the amended petition had not been timely filed. Reading accordingly requested that DEP authorize the untimely filing. By order dated January 28, 1999, DEP denied the Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissed the amended petition, with prejudice, as being untimely. No appeal from that final agency action was taken. Lowery did not attend the final hearing. However, according to Holland, Lowery lives only 500 feet from the proposed cement plant. She boards horses on her property and frequently has children visit the property to ride their horses. The papers filed in her underlying case (OGC Case No. 98-2932) reflect that the facts in that case are essentially the same as those involving Holland. On November 12, 1998, Lowery filed in proper person a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was virtually identical to the petition filed by Holland. As an additional ground, however, she alleged that the October 30, 1998, notice published by Petitioner was defective, and she requested that DEP require Petitioner to re-advertise the matter. There was no evidence that this petition was filed for an improper purpose or that Lowery's concerns were not genuine. On December 21, 1998, Lowery's petition was dismissed by DEP because she had failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 28-106.201(4), Florida Administrative Code. Like Holland, she was given until January 5, 1999, in which to file an amended petition. In papers filed by Lowery after this sanction proceeding arose, she denies that she had any knowledge that any further papers in the permit case would be filed on her behalf after the DEP dismissal order was entered. In any event, on January 12, 1999, or five days after the due date, Reading filed on Lowery's behalf with DEP an Amended Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing which was identical to that filed on behalf of Holland. Also, on January 14, 1999, Reading filed a Plaintiff's Motion to Enlarge Time seeking to excuse his tardiness in filing the amended petition. Both papers were served on Petitioner's counsel. On January 28, 1999, DEP entered its Final Order Denying Motion to Enlarge Time and dismissing Lowery's amended petition, with prejudice. No appeal from that final order was taken. Because no appeal was taken by either Respondent, DEP's intent to issue a permit became final, and it is fair to infer that a permit has been issued to Petitioner. On January 7, 1999, or prior to DEP's final order of dismissal, Petitioner's counsel noticed both Respondents for a deposition in Pensacola, Florida, on January 14, 1999. Because Reading had signed the amended petitions, Petitioner's counsel logically served the notices by Federal Express on Reading. However, Reading failed to notify Respondents, and neither he nor Respondents appeared at the deposition or advised counsel prior to the depositions that they would not appear. As a result, Petitioner incurred the costs and fees for having its counsel travel to Pensacola. In addition, Petitioner presumably incurred the cost of a court reporter's appearance fee. Assuming that Petitioner's claim is meritorious, those costs would be the responsibility of Reading, and not Respondents. At the hearing, it was represented that Reading is no longer a member of the Florida Bar. This is because in an unpublished order dated January 7, 1999, the Florida Supreme Court revoked his license to practice law effective 30 days thereafter, or on February 7, 1999. His current address is unknown. Petitioner has asserted that in defending against Respondents' petitions, "the bulk" of its costs and fees are related to the deposition and that a few other undisclosed fees and costs have been incurred. At the final hearing, Petitioner did not specify the amount of fees and costs that it seeks or provide any breakdown of those amounts; rather, it opted to provide an affidavit detailing those costs after this final order is rendered, assuming it prevails in this action.
Findings Of Fact A McDonald's sign visible to automobile traffic on the I-75 is located .08 miles north of CR-54 along the I-75, 934 feet into the interchange between the I-75 and CR-54 in Pasco County, Florida. The I-75 at this location is part of the federal interstate highway system and is outside an incorporated town or city. The sign has no permit tags attached and no permit tags have ever been approved for the site. The property on which this sign is erected is approximately 77' by 52' with the southeast corner cut off owned by McDonald's Corporation. The site is connected to the restaurant site by a 15 foot strip of land which intersects a proposed road 275 feet north of the restaurant site. The sign is 1122 feet from the restaurant as measured along the paved surface between the sign and restaurant. Between this sign and the restaurant along CR-54 is a Standard station, an Amoco station, a Circle K shop and a Days Inn. The closest businesses to the sign are Abe Chevron station and the Days Inn Motel. Respondent presented proposed plans evidencing an intent to construct a McDonald's playland on the property on which the sign is located, presumably as an integral part of the restaurant. However, at the time of the hearing the property served only as a site for the sign. McDonald's playlands have been developed as a selling tool for families traveling over interstate highways and are generally located adjacent to the restaurant so children occupying the playland can be monitored by the parents from inside the restaurant. Respondent's witnesses were aware of no McDonald's playland located other than immediately adjacent to the restaurant building. Construction of the playland at the site of the existing sign has never-been started due to construction, drainage and sewage disposal problems at the restaurant site.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent's sign which is the subject of this proceeding was erected on Kaley Avenue, approximately 124 feet east of the intersection of Kaley Avenue with U.S. 17/92/441, in Orange County, Florida. This location is approximately .64 mile north of 1-4, as alleged in the violation notice. The subject sign is located on the south side of Kaley Avenue facing east and west which is parallel to U.S. 17/92/441. U.S. 17/92/441 is a federal-aid primary highway. Kaley Avenue is a non-controlled road. The parties stipulated that it was the position of personnel of the Fifth District of the Department of Transportation prior to May of 1985 that state permits for outdoor advertising structures were not required when such structures were to be erected on a non-controlled highway, although said structures might be within 660 feet of a federal- aid primary highway. In March of 1981 the Respondent had applied to the Department for a permit to erect a sign at the location in question in this proceeding. By letter dated April 24, 1981, the Department returned the Respondent's application for the reason that the sign location requested does not face or serve a federal-aid primary highway, and no state permit is required. Based upon the Department's response to its permit application, the Respondent erected its sign at the location where its application sough a permit. The sign was erected in May of 1981. The sign that was erected is visible to traffic on U.S. 17/92/441, although it is parallel to U.S. 17/92/441 and at right angles to Kaley Avenue. There is another permitted sign located on the south side of U.S. 17/92/441, approximately 96 feet from the subject sign. This other sign faces north and south not east and west, and is not on Kaley Avenue. The notice of violation issued for the subject sign in August of 1985 seeks removal of this sign for not having the permit which the Respondent had applied for in 1981, but which had not been issued. It was as a result of the Department's erroneous interpretation of the applicable statutes and rules that the Respondent's application for a permit was returned in April of 1981 advising the Respondent that a permit was not required. As a result of this erroneous interpretation, the Respondent's sign was built.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against the Respondent, Cashi Signs, in the violation notice issued on August 21, 1985, be dismissed, and that the sign which is the subject of this proceeding be given the classification of non-conforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 23rd day of October, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Thomas Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
The Issue Should the Petitioner be granted an exemption from disqualification to work in a position of special trust?
Findings Of Fact The Initial Order herein was mailed on May 6, 1998. The Respondent Agency's response thereto was filed May 13, 1998. Petitioner did not file a response. A Notice of Hearing for August 11, 1998, and an Order of Prehearing Instructions were entered and mailed on May 29, 1998. On July 27, 1998, the Agency filed its unilateral Response to Prehearing Instructions, reciting that the Agency's counsel was unable to confer with Petitioner. Petitioner did not comply with the Order of Prehearing Instructions. On August 7, 1998, the Agency's counsel informed the secretary to the undersigned that Petitioner could not be reached due to her unlisted telephone number. The secretary to the undersigned verified that Petitioner's number was unlisted. Formal hearing was convened at the appointed time and place contained in the Notice of Hearing. Petitioner did not appear. After waiting one-half hour and determining that Petitioner had not notified anyone at the hearing site that she would be delayed, the undersigned sounded the docket in the waiting area. Petitioner still had not appeared. Agency counsel then orally moved, in the alternative, for a Recommended Order of Dismissal or for an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction to the Agency. The motion was taken under advisement, and formal hearing was concluded. The undersigned has now reviewed the docket in this cause and made inquiries of Division of Administrative Hearings staff and has determined that Petitioner has not contacted the Division by telephone prior to formal hearing. Also, Petitioner has not filed any pleading seeking to excuse her non-appearance or to withdraw her request for formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order dismissing the Request for Hearing dated April 22, 1998 (Petition), and ratifying its April 15, 1998, denial of Petitioner's Request for Exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Julie Waldman, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 1621 Northeast Waldo Road Gainesville, Florida 32609 Makeda Bryant 3311 Southeast 20th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32609 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
