The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Respondent retaliated against Petitioner in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, based upon her complaints about a coworker’s conduct perceived by Petitioner to be sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony and documentary evidence presented at hearing, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner, a female, was employed as a server with Respondent from May 6, 2011, through September 29, 2012. Respondent, Stavro's Pizza, Inc., is a restaurant located in New Smyrna Beach, Florida. Respondent employs more than 15 individuals at any given time and therefore is subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. §§ 760.01-760.l1, Fla. Stat. Early on the morning of Friday, September 27, 2012, it was reported to Martha Trimble, long-time General Manager of Respondent, that a "weird conversation" took place between Petitioner and another employee, Brian Hayes, the previous evening.2/ During this conversation, Mr. Hayes allegedly told Petitioner that “he knew everything about her, including where she lived, and that her favorite color was blue.” Mr. Hayes also allegedly told Petitioner that he was soon to be the new manager of the restaurant. Ms. Trimble approached Petitioner later that day about the alleged incident with Mr. Hayes, and while Petitioner admitted she had had a strange conversation with Mr. Hayes, she denied that she was upset by it. Nonetheless, Ms. Trimble told Petitioner she would investigate the matter and that she took it seriously. Later that same day Ms. Trimble also questioned Mr. Hayes, who denied making the reported comments. And while Ms. Trimble was aware that Petitioner had voluntarily given Mr. Hayes her address,3/ out of caution, Ms. Trimble placed Mr. Hayes on leave while she continued her investigation. The following day, Saturday, September 28, 2012, there was a mandatory meeting for all employees of Respondent. The meeting was mandatory because Ms. Trimble had been made aware of horseplay among some employees, and was concerned that staff training had been inadequate. Notice of the meeting was conspicuously posted in the restaurant for two weeks prior to the meeting. The notice explained that the meeting was mandatory and that all employees were to attend unless they contacted Ms. Trimble prior to the meeting to be excused. Petitioner did not attend the Saturday meeting and was not excused in advance. Four other employees contacted Ms. Trimble ahead of time and explained that they would be unable to attend due to schedule conflicts. Those employees were excused. When Ms. Trimble contacted Petitioner later in the day, Petitioner told Ms. Trimble that she had been ill, and in bed all day. That evening Ms. Trimble also reviewed the security camera video of the one hour period the previous Thursday during which Petitioner and Mr. Hayes had been alone in the restaurant, and during which the suspect comments had reportedly been made. In reviewing the video, Ms. Trimble specifically watched for physical contact, lingering conversations, and body language. At hearing, Ms. Trimble related her observations from the restaurant video as follows: So I watched the tape. Brian basically stayed back in the kitchen. Uh, we have side work we do. We make garlic bread. We make boxes. We do little oil containers for to-go salads. And Brian was back doing that almost the entire time. Once I saw him go up to the waitress station and get a beverage and bring it back. Amanda basically was at the register. She would come back every once in a while, hang a ticket, kind of stand there and chitchat until, uh – until, uh, a salad was given to her or something like that. So, um, but mainly they were both in their own areas. I did not see anything that indicated that there was anything improper going on. Following her review of the surveillance video Ms. Trimble concluded that there was no basis to believe that Mr. Hayes had engaged in any form of sexual harassment against Petitioner. The following day, Sunday, September 29, 2012, Ms. Trimble met with Petitioner regarding her absence from the mandatory meeting the day before. At this meeting Ms. Trimble informed Petitioner that because she failed to attend the mandatory meeting without being excused, and had failed to even call Ms. Trimble to explain she was ill and would be unable to attend, her employment was terminated. A former employee of Respondent, Lindsey Yauch, testified on behalf of Petitioner. Ms. Yauch testified that she had once missed a mandatory meeting called by Ms. Trimble but had not been fired as a result. However, on cross-examination Ms. Yauch could not remember the purpose, date, or any other details surrounding the meeting. Ms. Trimble’s testimony regarding the meeting that Ms. Yauch missed was more precise. Ms. Trimble recalled that it was a “safe-staff meeting”, which is a food-handler’s course that all employees must take. Because all 27 of Respondent’s employees were required to take the class, it was offered on two separate dates, and employees were permitted to choose which session they would attend. Ms. Yaugh had chosen to attend the first session, but overslept and missed the class as a result. Since a second class offering was still available, Ms. Yaugh was permitted to attend the second session, which she did. There is no credible evidence in this record that Petitioner was treated differently than other similarly situated employees when she was terminated for missing a mandatory meeting. At hearing Ms. Trimble testified that Petitioner's termination had nothing to do with her gender or the alleged comments made by Brian Hayes. Rather, Petitioner’s termination was the result of her missing a mandatory staff meeting without excuse. This testimony is credible. To his credit, in his closing statement counsel for Petitioner candidly acknowledged that, even if true, the comments made by Mr. Hayes would not constitute sexual harassment.
The Issue Whether subject signs were properly permitted and which subject sign on Hacienda Drive was also unsightly and not permitted.
Findings Of Fact Subject signs were not properly permitted and subject sign on Hacienda Drive was also unsightly.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a licensed all lines adjuster, committed the offenses alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a licensing and regulatory agency of the State of Florida charged with, among other duties, the responsibility and duty to enforce the provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, which consists of Chapters 624-632, 634, 635, 641, 642, 648, and 651, Florida Statutes (2002). See § 624.307(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). Respondent has been continuously licensed in the State of Florida as an independent all lines adjuster authorized to transact insurance adjusting business since August 1986. On January 1, 1999, at approximately 11:55 p.m., Respondent was driving his Ford Bronco in Tampa, Florida. Hillsborough County Sheriff's Deputy White noticed that Respondent's license tag appeared to be expired. He followed Respondent for about a quarter of a mile, while he ran Respondent's tag number through the computer to determine whether it was, in fact, expired. Upon receiving an affirmative response, Deputy White pulled over Respondent's vehicle. Reserve Deputy McLaughlin was riding with Deputy White. Deputy McLaughlin approached Respondent's car and immediately detected a strong odor of burning marijuana. Deputy White then approached the car and confirmed the smell of marijuana smoke. The deputies asked Respondent for permission to search his vehicle. According to both deputies, Respondent not only gave them permission to search his car, but told them where they could find the marijuana, which was inside a black travel bag on the back seat of the car. Both deputies testified that Respondent told them he had received the marijuana as a Christmas gift. Respondent was arrested for possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis, a third-degree felony pursuant to Subsection 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1998). At the hearing, Respondent testified that the black travel bag containing the marijuana belonged to an acquaintance to whom he had earlier given a ride. Respondent testified that he did not know the marijuana was in the car until the deputies found it and denied having told the deputies where to find it or that it was a Christmas gift. Respondent's testimony on these points was not credible. On or about February 12, 1999, a one-count information was filed in the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, charging Respondent with possession of cannabis in violation of Subsection 893.13(6)(a), Florida Statutes (1998), a third-degree felony. On September 30, 2002, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge, which was accepted. Adjudication of guilt was withheld, and Respondent was placed on probation for a period of six months and ordered to perform 50 hours of community service. Respondent successfully completed his probation, and an order terminating probation was entered on February 5, 2003. After Respondent's arrest, but before the disposition of his case, the Department received an unrelated complaint concerning the manner in which Respondent was handling claims. Ms. Raulerson, a Department investigator, performed an investigation. She discovered that the Department did not have a current resident address for Respondent and obtained the correct address through Respondent's father. On January 3, 2002, Ms. Raulerson issued a letter of guidance to Respondent regarding the subject matter of the investigation. Ms. Raulerson's letter also reminded Respondent of his obligation to notify the Department of changes in his principal business, residence, and mailing addresses. She enclosed a copy of the appropriate form on which to notify the Department of address changes. During her investigation of Respondent's claims handling, Ms. Raulerson had a telephone conversation with Respondent. Ms. Raulerson mentioned that, unrelated to her investigation, the Department had received information indicating that Respondent had been charged with a felony. Respondent told Ms. Raulerson that the charge had been dismissed. Ms. Raulerson responded that if the charges had been dismissed, Respondent would be prudent to forward the paperwork to the Department so that its records could be corrected. In October 2002, Mr. Wilds, a Department investigator, was assigned to investigate whether Respondent had been convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, and had failed to notify the Department of his conviction or plea. Mr. Wilds was unable to contact Respondent at the addresses in the Department's files, which indicated that Respondent did not take the advice in Ms. Raulerson's letter of guidance. Mr. Wilds added the failure to notify the Department of his address change to his investigator. Mr. Wilds contacted the Hillsborough County Circuit Court to request documentation regarding the outcome of Respondent's criminal case. In response, the Hillsborough County clerk's office provided Mr. Wilds with certified documents indicating that Respondent had pled nolo contendere and been placed on probation. Mr. Wilds next contacted the Department of Corrections to obtain information on Respondent's probationary status. By letter dated December 6, 2002, Respondent's probation officer, Robert Hughey, confirmed that Respondent was serving a probationary period of six months, commencing September 30, 2002, and scheduled to terminate on March 29, 2003. Subsection 626.621(11), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that the following constitutes grounds for the discretionary discipline of an agent's licensure: (11) Failure to inform the department or office in writing within 30 days after pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted or found guilty of, any felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment of 1 year or more under the law of the United States or of any state thereof, or under the law of any other country without regard to whether a judgment of conviction has been entered by the court having jurisdiction of the case. Respondent failed to report to the Department, within 30 days of doing so, that he entered a plea of nolo contendere to a third-degree felony charge of possession of cannabis on September 30, 2002. Respondent testified that he did not inform the Department of his plea of nolo contendere to a felony because Mr. Hughey assured him that he had already notified the Department. The evidence establishes that Mr. Hughey contacted the Department only after Mr. Wilds requested information as to Respondent's probationary status and that this occurred more than 30 days after Respondent entered his plea. However, Respondent's reliance on Mr. Hughey militates against a finding that Respondent's failure to notify the Department was willful. As to the failure to notify the Department of his address changes, Respondent testified that he has always relied on his employers to notify the Department of his address when appointment papers are filed on his behalf and that there was never a problem until these investigations commenced. While Respondent's reliance on his employers does not absolve him of the personal responsibility envisioned by Section 626.551, Florida Statutes (2002), it does militate against a finding that Respondent's failure to notify the Department of his address changes was willful. Respondent's insurance license has not been previously disciplined in the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint; guilty of violating Subsection 626.621(11), Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint; and guilty of violating Section 626.551, Florida Statutes (2002), as alleged in Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's licensure as an all lines adjuster be suspended for three months for the violation of Count I, for three months for the violation of Count II, and for two months for the violation of Count III, with the suspensions for Counts II and III to run concurrently. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the owner of a sign located alongside U.S. 19, .72 miles north of SR 60 in Pinellas County facing south bound traffic on U.S. 19. When inspected on April 13, 1987, this sign advertised a product not associated with the premises on which the sign is located. However, subsequent thereto the board on the sign has been changed to advertise office warehouses and is now an integral part of the activities taking place on the premises. As such, the sign qualifies as an on-premise sign.
The Issue Whether signs were properly permitted and whether the subject sign violated the set back requirements of state and federal law.
Findings Of Fact Subject signs were not properly permitted and subject sign on U.S. 1 North was nearer than 660 feet from the nearest edge of the right of way.
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on September 18, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. In the Petition Rule 33-3.018, Florida Administrative Code, and Policy and Procedural Directive No. 2.02.15 were challenged. The Challenged Rule is titled "Inmate Bank Trust Fund". The Challenged Rule is lengthy and provides for the "policies of the Department with respect to money received for the personal use or benefit of inmates . . . ." The Directive deals with the same general subject. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioners frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 4, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 4. That the (Petitioner) seek to challenge D.O.C. Policy and Procedure Directive $2.02.15 entitled (Administration on Inmate Trust Funds) as being invalid, arbitrary, capricious, that goes beyond the powers, functions, duties, to exceed legislative authority. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalize", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of three employees of the Respondent, J. L. Ward (see paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition), R. E. Davis (see paragraphs 14 and 23 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition), and B. E. Goss (see paragraph 24 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition). See also paragraphs 13-14 and 18 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rule and the Directive. See paragraphs 17, 22 and 25 of the Statement of the Case and Facts of the Petition and most of the portion of the Petition labeled "Affect the Petitioner [sic] Interest." The statements concerning constitutional issues consists of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rule or the Directive are unconstitutional. Finally, the following relief was requested in the Petition: The Petitioner demand [sic] relief of: That D.O.C. #2.02.15 et. seq. be declared invalid, arbitrary, capricious, to delegate outside the scope of Florida Statute and Constitution. Any and all other applicable authority that's statutory protected or judicial mandate under Federal mandate as [unreadable] v. Wainwright, TCA-75-3 (11/18/77). Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F. 2d 118 (2nd Cir. 1978) (Cite omitted). That the Respondents, be required to incorporate State Constitution and Federal Constitution protection as statutory mandated at 944.09 120.54 et. seq. (1991). Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rule and the Directive are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On November 1, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On November 21, 1991, a pleading titled "Amended Petition as Ordered November 1st 1991" was filed by the Petitioner. The First Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. Additionally, it is more apparent in the First Amended Petition that the Petitioner is challenging alleged actions of certain employees of the Respondent and not the Challenged Rule or the Directive. The First Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the First Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rule and the Directive are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On December 9, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Amended Petition was entered dismissing the First Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders. On December 13, 1991, the Petitioner filed a document titled "Amended Petition". This Second Amended Petition does nothing to correct the deficiencies of the Petition or the First Amended Petition.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Pamela Williams, doing business as Secure Home Management, seeks a license to operate an adult congregate living facility (ACLF) in Palatka, Florida. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the operation and practices of adult congregate living facilities and licensure thereof, together with enforcement of licensure standards contained in Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes (1981). Preliminary discussions and informal meetings between representatives of the Department and the Petitioner, Pamela Williams, occurred at various times in January 1983, during which discussions the Petitioner was advised by the Department that she was required to apply for an ACLF license in order to legally operate her business. The Petitioner took the position that the facility she operates was a transient rental facility and thus exempt from the ACLF licensing provisions contained in Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, which exemption is provided for at Section 400.404(d) of that chapter. However, as a result of these informal discussions between the parties, the Petitioner ultimately elected to apply for licensure as an ACLF and did so on January 31, 1983. After further deliberations by the Department, requests for additional information and further informal negotiations and conferences, the Respondent Department ultimately elected to deny the application for licensure and so informed the Petitioner on May 4, 1983. In essence, the reasons for the Respondent's denial of the application for licensure was the belief by the agency and its representatives that the applicant Petitioner lacked the financial ability to provide continuing adequate care to residents under authority of Section 400.414(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). Subsequent to the denial of licensure, the Petitioner made a number of good-faith efforts to attempt to meet the Respondent's criteria for licensing in the area of furnishing proof of financial responsibility. For instance, on April 15, 1983, just before denial of licensure, a letter from Jack Allen, a financial backer of the Petitioner, was provided to the Department promising adequate financial support. That letter was admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit 1. However, the Department nonetheless elected to deny licensure, being unsatisfied that that constituted adequate establishment of financial security for the proposed licensed institution. Following the denial of the license, the Petitioner and the Respondent continued to attempt to resolve the problem regarding establishment of financial support for the institution. The Petitioner in that regard furnished the Respondent with additional documentary evidence from Jack Allen, dated May 12, 1983, and admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit 2, in which unlimited resources were promised in order to assure that the ACLF would embark on its operations on a secure financial footing. Sometime in August 1983, in part at the behest of the Respondent, the Petitioner retained an attorney, with the result that a document establishing financial worth and responsibility for operating the facility with adequate provision for care for its residents from a financial standpoint was provided the Department, with the result that after certain other informal negotiations the license was ultimately issued on October 14, 1983, authorizing Pamela W. Williams, d/b/a Secure Home Management, to operate the subject ACLF. Prior to this licensure, the Petitioner continued to operate the facility while making good-faith attempts to meet the requirements of the Department and during which time the dispute concerning whether she needed licensure or conversely whether she came under the above-described exemption was unresolved in part between the parties. It was established through Petitioner's testimony, as well as that of Lee Darden, a representative of the Division of Aging and Adult Services of HRS, that at all times pertinent hereto, before and after licensure, the residents of the Petitioner's facility received at least adequate care and that the failure of the Petitioner to be licensed did not in any way jeopardize the health, safety or well-being of any of the Petitioner's residents.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that no fine be assessed and levied upon Pamela W. Williams, d/b/a Secure Home Management. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Albert W. Whitaker, Esquire Post Office Drawer D Palatka, Florida 32078-0019 James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District III Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1000 NE 16th Avenue, Building H Gainesville, Florida 32601 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue : The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioner has a disability, whether she was discriminated against based upon the disability, whether there was a reasonably requested accommodation which was refused by the Respondent employer, and whether it maintained a hostile working environment.
Findings Of Fact This cause arose upon the filing of a Charge of Discrimination and ultimately a Petition for Relief by the above-named Petitioner against the Respondent, Principal Senior Living Group, d/b/a Benton Village (Benton Village or Respondent). The Petitioner was an employee at the Respondent's assisted living and memory care facility, located in Panama City, Florida. That facility employs approximately 28 to 30 employees and had 53 residents as of the time of hearing. The Respondent has an equal employment opportunity policy in place which precludes discrimination on the basis of any protected status including handicap or disability as to any employees, customers, vendors, or applicants for jobs. The Petitioner signed a document indicating that she had received a copy of that policy when she began employment on or about January 29, 2007. The Respondent, enforces the policy against discrimination and harassment and encourages employees to bring any such discrimination or harassment issues to the Respondent's attention so that it can take necessary steps to correct the situation. The Petitioner received a handbook at the beginning of her employment period that outlined the Respondent's benefits, practices, and policies. The Equal Opportunity Policy is restated in that handbook. On page 18 of the handbook under the title "Discourtesy or Disrespect," the Respondent stated a rule as follows: We expect all employees to be courteous, polite and friendly to our residents, vendors, and to their fellow employees. No one should use profanity or show disrespect to a resident or co-worker, or engage in any activity that could harm the company's reputation. The Petitioner began working for the Respondent in early February 2007 as a personal care assistant (PCA). Her general job description included assisting residents with personal care and activities of daily living and performing daily housekeeping tasks. Mr. Alan Williams is the Respondent's executive director. His duties involve resident care staffing including evaluation for promotion and administering discipline and managing the facility's budget. Mr. Williams was responsible for evaluating the Petitioner's job duties and performance. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Tiffany Sims who was the Resident Services Director while the Petitioner was employed at the Respondent's facility. The Petitioner is hearing-impaired and wears a hearing aid that allows her to hear within a normal range and follow normal conversations. She does have difficulty hearing when people speak in a low voice and at times has to request them to speak louder. The Petitioner acknowledged that her hearing aid allowed her to perform her job without any special treatment. Moreover, she was able to attend training course, which involved listening to a lecturer in a classroom, and did not request or need any special accommodation to understand the lecturer. When the Petitioner was hired by the Respondent, she did not tell anyone she had a disability that prevented her from performing the job duties in her job description. She received the same training as the other employees and did not request or receive accommodations for her alleged hearing impairment during the training process. She acknowledged that she did not request special treatment because she did not need special treatment. During her testimony at hearing she admitted that she had never requested an accommodation of her employer. During less that three months of employment she was disciplined once by Ms. Sims and on two separate occasions by Mr. Williams. The Petitioner admits receiving corrective action admonishments from Ms. Sims on or about February 8, 2007. The corrective action document informed the Petitioner that there had been several resident complaints regarding the Petitioner's resident care and the care with meal assistance. The corrective action also embodied an instruction to the Petitioner that within 30 days she should show significant improvement with care of residents, with no resident complaints or she could be subject to termination. Mr. Williams disciplined the Petitioner on February 26, 2007. He was notified on that occasion by Supervisor Sandy Simon and his Assistant Director Renee Rhodes, that the Petitioner had been observed watching television by herself in the Alzheimer's ward. Mr. Williams went to an office where he could view a security monitor and personally observed the Petitioner watching television by herself. Mr. Williams accordingly executed a corrective action form or memorandum to the Petitioner, which the Petitioner admits receiving. Mr. Williams administered discipline to the Petitioner on a second occasion on Tuesday, April 3, 2007. Mr. Williams had learned that the Petitioner had been involved in an altercation with a resident that involved raising her voice, yelling and engaging in disruptive behavior. Mr. Williams informed the Petitioner that this was unacceptable behavior and reflected badly on the Respondent. The Petitioner admitted the occurrence to Mr. Williams when he questioned her. There is a dispute over whether the Petitioner quit or was terminated as a result of this discussion. Mr. Williams established that, under the duly-adopted policy, arguing with a resident can be a terminable offense. Mr. Williams' testimony is deemed credible and is accepted. It was thus established that the Petitioner became angry and informed Mr. Williams that she was quitting her employment during the course of this discussion. One other incident occurred with Mr. Williams when he terminated an employee because the employee had yelled or cursed at a coworker. The employee who was terminated did not have any sort of disability of which Mr. Williams was aware. Mr. Williams' undisputed testimony shows that the Petitioner's hearing impairment did not play any role in the decision to discipline for the television incident, nor in the decision to speak to her about the altercation with the resident or with any other employment decision he made with regard to the Petitioner. The Petitioner admitted that Mr. Williams never made any negative comments to her about her hearing or hearing impairment. The Petitioner contended that some co-workers made fun of her hearing impairment during the course of her employment. The Petitioner acknowledged, however, that she never complained of this to the Human Resources manager or to Mr. Williams, even though she had received a copy of the company's policies against harassment and discrimination.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Demetrice Worthy Post Office Box 121 Panama City, Florida 32401 Scott E. Wood, Esquire 990 Hammond Drive, Suite 910 Atlanta, Georgia 30328 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
