The Issue The issues are whether Respondent's construction of Section 11.062, Florida Statutes (2006), is an unadopted rule, described in Subsection 120.56(4), Florida Statutes (2006); whether rulemaking is not feasible for a reason authorized in Subsection 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2006); and whether either of the petitioners is a person substantially affected by the unadopted rule. (Statutory references are to Florida Statutes (2006)).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel-Middle Region (CCRC-MR), is one of three governmental units authorized in Section 27.701 to provide collateral legal representation for certain persons convicted and sentenced to death in the state. Each governmental unit functions in a distinct multi-county region identified in the statute as either the northern, middle, or southern region. The middle region in which CCRC-MR is statutorily required to function consists of eight judicial circuits. The judicial circuits are statutorily identified as the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Judicial Circuits. Petitioner, John W. Jennings, is the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel with statutory responsibility for administering CCRC-MR. The Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Committee recommended Mr. Jennings to the Governor, the Governor appointed Mr. Jennings, and the Florida Senate confirmed the appointment. Each appointment is for a three-year period. Mr. Jennings is currently subject to reappointment. The administration of CCRC-MR is supervised by the Commission on Capital Cases (Commission). The Commission has exclusive statutory responsibility for the oversight of each regional office pursuant to Section 27.709. The Commission consists of six members each of whom serves a term of four years. The Governor appoints two members to the Commission. The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House each appoint two members. One of the two members appointed by the President and Speaker, respectively, must be a member of the majority party, and the other appointee must be a member of the minority party. The Office of Legislative Services is statutorily required to provide staff support to the Commission. Salaries for each regional office must be submitted annually to the Justice Administrative Commission and the offices of the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House in accordance with Subsection 27.705. However, Section 27.702(1) provides, in relevant part: The three capital collateral regional counsels' offices shall function independently and be separate budget entities, and the regional counsels shall be the office heads for all purposes. The Justice Administrative Commission shall provide administrative support and service to the three offices to the extent requested by the regional counsels. The three regional counsels shall not be subject to control, supervision, or direction by the Justice Administrative Commission in any manner, including, but not limited to, personnel, purchasing, transactions involving real or personal property, and budgetary matters. Respondent is a state agency authorized in Section 17.002. Respondent is an executive agency described in Subsection 20.121. Section 11.062, in relevant part, prohibits an executive, judicial, or quasi-judicial department from using public funds to retain a lobbyist other than a full-time agency employee (outside lobbyist) to represent the department before the legislative or executive branches of government (prohibited lobbying). If public funds are misused for prohibited lobbying, the statute provides that Respondent "shall" deduct the amount of misused public funds from the salary of the responsible state employee and that the offending department will be barred from authorized lobbying for two years.2 It is undisputed that Petitioners have registered and paid outside lobbyists to lobby the legislative and executive branches of government on behalf of CCRC-MR from 2001 through 2005. The primary purpose of the lobbying effort has been to ensure annual budgets that are adequate for effective legal representation of persons convicted and sentenced to death in those judicial circuits that are within the functional and territorial purview of CCRC-MR. Between April 15, 2002, and June 22, 2005, Petitioners submitted approximately 28 invoices to Respondent totaling $119,000. Two invoices on April 15 and May 23, 2002, were for $10,000 each. Five invoices from August 25, 2003, through January 26, 2004, were for $2,600 each. The remaining 21 invoices ranged from $3,400 to $7,500 each. Each of the invoices were earmarked as payments for "consulting services." However, Respondent has been aware since 2001 that CCRC-MR has engaged outside lobbyists to represent CCRC-MR before the legislative and executive branches of government. Respondent approved all of the invoices. A primary dispute between the parties involves the issue of whether CCRC-MR is an agency of the executive branch of government (executive agency) or an agency of the legislative branch (legislative agency). Respondent construes Section 11.062 to mean that CCRC-MR is an executive agency and that Section 11.062 prohibits CCRC-MR from using public funds to lobby the legislative or executive branches of government. Petitioners construe Section 11.062 to mean that CCRC-MR is a legislative agency that is not prohibited from using public funds for prohibited lobbying.3 A determination of whether CCRC-MR is an executive or legislative agency is not necessary for the disposition of this rule challenge. A rule challenge conducted pursuant Section 120.56(4) does not require a determination that Respondent's statutory construction of Section 11.062 is invalid because it exceeds the scope of delegated legislative authority or for any of the other reasons described in Subsections 120.52(8)(b) through (f). The scope of this rule challenge is limited to a determination of whether the challenged statutory construction is invalid solely because Respondent has failed to promulgate the statutory construction as a rule within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(8)(a). For Petitioners' rule challenge to succeed, Subsection 120.56(4) first requires the evidence to show that the challenged statutory construction is a rule. Subsection 120.52(15) defines a rule, in relevant part, to mean: . . . each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, prescribes law or policy [but] . . . does not include [the express exceptions in Subsections 120.52(15)(a)-(c)]. Subsection 120.52(15) imposes several requirements that must be satisfied in order for Respondent's construction of Section 11.062 to be defined as a rule. First, Respondent must express the challenged statutory construction as an agency statement. Second, the agency statement must satisfy the test of general applicability. Third, the statement of general applicability must, in relevant part, implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. Finally, the statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy must not fall within one of the express exceptions to the definition of a rule. Respondent has expressed the challenged construction of Section 11.062 in several statements of longstanding agency policy. That policy traces its roots to the early 1990s, and Respondent has iterated its policy through various means of government communication. Most recently, Respondent stated its policy in a letter to Mr. Jennings dated September 27, 2006, approximately eight days after Petitioners filed the instant rule challenge. In relevant part, the letter states: This is in response to your letter to the Bureau of State Payrolls dated September 20, 2006, regarding your W-4 Form. Whenever state employees are under investigation for possible misuse of state funds, we routinely flag their W-4 record in our payroll system; your payroll account was flagged because of questions surrounding lobbying expenditures you authorized. Because of this action, however, our data processing system automatically generated a new W-4 form that was inadvertently sent to you twice. Please disregard both of these W-4 forms. No action of any kind has ever been taken by this office as a result of the duplicate forms you received. We apologize for any inconvenience that may have been caused. Petitioner's Exhibit(P)- 9. Respondent previously stated the challenged statutory construction in an investigative report precipitated by several complaints against the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel for the Southern Region (CCRC-SR), the last of which Respondent received on March 29, 2005. Respondent's Office of Fiscal Integrity (OFI) initiated a formal investigation of CCRC-SR and subsequently expanded the scope of the investigation to include the lobbying activities of CCRC-MR. Respondent issued a final report of the investigation on August 29, 2006. In relevant part, the report expressed the challenged statutory construction as follows: CCRC officials have argued that CCRC's are not part of the executive branch, claiming this would make them exempt from the provisions of Section 11.062. . . . A legal opinion dated January 11, 2006, by DFS counsel indicates that although CCRC's were initially created in the judicial branch, they were moved to the executive branch in 1997. The legal opinion noted that the CCRC's have been repeatedly defined by statute as executive branch agencies. . . . Examples include Section 23.21(1). , which notes that CCRC's are included as "principal administrative unit(s) within the executive branch of state government. . . . CCRC's are also defined by name in Section 186.003(6) . . . as state agencies, which are in turn defined in this section as "any official, officer, commission, board . . . or department of the executive branch of state government.[4] * * * In the case of the CCRC-Middle office, a staff attorney working for Jennings wrote an opinion saying essentially that the CCRC's were exempt from the provisions of Section 11.062 . . . because in their opinion, they are not part of the executive branch. In Jennings sworn statement, he acknowledged that he did not seek a legal opinion from anyone outside of his office. According to Jennings' sworn statement, he continues to pay . . . for lobbying services even though the contract reflects "consulting services." Jennings, on behalf of CCRC-Middle authorized payments . . . totaling $119,000. * * * It is recommended that . . . DFS legal staff initiate action against . . . Jennings to recover . . . funds that were inappropriately paid by Jennings to lobbyist[s] in violation of Sections 11.062 and 216.311. P-1 at 19 and 20. Respondent has also stated the challenged statutory construction in an Interoffice Communication dated January 11, 2006, and in a memorandum to state agencies dated March 31, 2003. Respondent issued the latter memorandum as a direct result of the lobbying expenditures of CCRC-MR but did not deliver the memorandum to CCRC-MR. Respondent argues that it has not uttered an agency statement, in relevant part, because the recommendation in the Report of Investigation has no force or effect without the authorization of the agency head.5 The argument ignores substantial evidence of other iterations of the agency statement over the years as well as the consistent interpretation by agency witnesses of the force and effect of the statement in its various iterations. The agency statement of the challenged statutory construction satisfies the test of general applicability. Respondent intends the agency statement to have the force and effect of law. Respondent applies the statement in a manner that requires compliance by all state agencies and employees with the direct and consistent effect of law. The statement creates enforcement rights in Respondent and imposes substantive standards on state agencies and employees who are not described in the express terms of Section 11.062. According to the Program Manager in charge of OFI, it is unlawful for Petitioners to expend funds for outside lobbying irrespective of whether CCRC-MR is an executive agency or legislative agency. "The issue of whether they're an executive agency is just an issue of collection." Respondent's Director of the Division of Accounting and Auditing agrees with the testimony of the Program Manager. The agency statement of general applicability interprets and implements Section 11.062. Section 11.062 does not expressly define an executive agency to include CCRC-MR.6 The agency statement defining CCRC-MR as an executive agency interprets law within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(15). The executive branch of government is constitutionally and statutorily required to organize its executive agencies into no more than 25 departments.7 The executive departments enumerated in Chapter 20 do not expressly identify CCRC-MR as an executive agency. The agency statement that CCRC-MR is an executive agency interprets law within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(15). Respondent relies on Subsection 23.21(1) to define CCRC-MR as an executive agency for the purposes of Section 11.062. Subsection 23.21(1), in relevant part, defines the term "department" to include "a principal administrative unit within the executive branch . . . and includes . . . the Capital Collateral Representative. . . ." However, the quoted definition is expressly limited to "the purposes of this part", i.e., the Paper Reduction provisions in Sections 23.20 through 23.22. Expanding the quoted definition for purposes other than Paper Reduction, including the purposes of Section 11.062, interprets law within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(15). In similar fashion, Respondent relies on Subsection 186.003(6) to define CCRC-MR as a state agency. Expanding the definition beyond the purposes of Chapter 186 to include the purposes of Section 11.062 interprets law within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(15). Respondent states in the alternative that CCRC-MR is not an agency but is a subdivision of an executive agency. The parties devoted a substantial amount of evidence in an effort to demonstrate that CCRC-MR is a unit of either a legislative or executive agency of government. As previously stated, the scope of this proceeding does not require a resolution of the dispute between the parties. The competing evidence, however, does demonstrate that the challenged agency statement interprets law within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(15). The agency statement of general applicability that interprets law and implements Section 11.062 does not fall within an express exception to the definition of a rule in Subsection 120.52(15). The iteration of the agency statement in the letter to Mr. Jennings that followed the report of investigation is not an internal management memorandum, legal memorandum, or memorandum to other state agencies within the meaning of Subsections 120.52(15)(a), (b), or (c). The iteration of the agency statement in an internal management memorandum issued as a direct result of the lobbying efforts of CCRC-MR affects the private interests of Mr. Jennings, if for no other reason, by subjecting his salary to garnishment. The challenged statutory construction is a rule within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(15). Respondent has not promulgated the rule pursuant to the rulemaking procedures prescribed in Section 120.54. A preponderance of evidence does not support a finding that rulemaking is not feasible within the meaning of Subsection 120.54(1)(a)1. Respondent argued but offered no factual evidence to support such a finding. Nor did Respondent initiate rulemaking in accordance with Subsection 120.56(4)(e). Mr. Jennings is a person substantially affected by the unpromulgated rule within the meaning of Subsection 120.56(4)(a). Subsection 11.062(1) requires Respondent to garnish the salary of Mr. Jennings if Respondent determines that Mr. Jennings violated the statutory prohibition against outside lobbying. After Respondent concluded the administrative investigation on August 29, 2006, the Director of the Division of Accounting and Auditing directed the Bureau Chief for the Division of State Payrolls to access the personal payroll account of Mr. Jennings on two occasions. Respondent subsequently exercised prosecutorial discretion not to garnish the salary of Mr. Jennings. Mr. Jennings is currently subject to reappointment to his position of employment. Mr. Jennings must disclose to the Supreme Court Judicial Nominating Committee that he is currently under investigation by OFI. The disclosure subjects Mr. Jennings to a potential loss of reappointment. CCRC-MR is a person substantially affected by the unpromulgated rule. A change in leadership would impair the institutional knowledge required to adequately represent persons in eight judicial circuits who have been convicted and sentenced to death. Placement of CCRC-MR within the executive branch of government creates a potential conflict of interest for CCRC-MR. Such a placement arguably would make the legal representative of death row inmates responsible to the executive branch of government which, in turn, must either execute the clients of the representative or commute their death sentences.
Findings Of Fact We find the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact to be supported by competent substantial evidence. We adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact. Conclusions of Law We find the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the law to the facts to result in a correct disposition of the matter. We adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law. Exceptions Petitioner filed exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order in a document entitled, “My statement on the Recommended Order by Judge Robert S. Cohen,” along with some attachments. Petitioner’s exceptions take issue with facts found, and not found, by the Administrative Law Judge, and with the inferences drawn from the evidence presented at Recommended Order, 13, { 15, 20, and at various places in the Recommended Order in which the Administrative Law Judge makes reference to Respondent’s efforts to provide accommodation and find Petitioner a position. The Commission has stated, “It is well settled that it is the Administrative Law Judge’ s function ‘to consider all of the evidence presented and reach ultimate conclusions of fact based on competent substantial evidence by resolving conflicts, judging the credibility of witnesses and drawing permissible inferences therefrom. If the evidence presented supports two inconsistent findings, it is the Administrative Law Judge’s role to decide between them.’ Beckton v. Department of Children and Family Services, 21 F.ALR. 1735, at 1736 (FCHR 1998), citing Maggio v. Martin Marietta Aerospace, 9 F.ALR 2168, at 2171 (FCHR 1986).” Barr v. Columbia Ocala Regional Medical Center, 22 F.A.L.R. 1729, at 1730 (FCHR 1999). Further, there is no indication on Petitioner’s exception document that it was served on Respondent by Petitioner as is required by Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.110. Petitioner’s exceptions are rejected. Dismissal The Petition for Relief and Complaint of Discrimination are DISMISSED with prejudice. The parties have the right to seek judicial review of this Order. The Commission and the appropriate District Court of Appeal must receive notice of appeal within 30 days of the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the Commission. Explanation of the right FCHR Order No. 05-039 Page 3 to appeal is found in Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110. DONE AND ORDERED this St day of [UW FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HU Filed this a day olan eh 2005, in Tallahassee, Florida. Violet Crawford, Clerk 4 Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, FL 32301 (850) 488-7082 Copies furnished to: Eulalio Centeno 3275 South John Young Parkway, Suite 219 Kissimmee, FL 34746 Eulalio Centeno 794 Royal Palm Drive Orlando, FL 32743 Orange County, Florida Public Utilities c/o P. Andrea DeLoach, Esq. Assistant County Attorney 435 North Orange Avenue, Suite 300 Orlando, FL 32801 FCHR Order No. 05-039 Page 4 Robert §. Cohen, Administrative Law Judge, DOAH James Mallue, Legal Advisor for Commission Panel I HEREBY CERTIFY that a oe of the foregoing in been mailed to the above listed addressees this day of Cheri scot the ff he Florida Commission on Human Relations
The Issue Whether or not the Petitioner is liable for tax, penalties and interest under the authority of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, on certain purchases, rentals/leases and repairs to capital equipment made by the Petitioner on paging equipment, for the audit period October 1, 1974 through September 30, 1977. The audit also considers the purchase of office supplies in the aforementioned period, but for the purposes of this hearing the Petitioner is not contesting the imposition of tax, penalty and interest on those items. Furthermore, the Petitioner does not contest the mathematical calculations in arriving at the tax as set forth in the Notice of Proposed Assessment; instead, it is an attack on the right of the Respondent to affect such a tax against the Petitioner on the items in dispute.
Findings Of Fact This cause came on for consideration based upon the Petition filed by Gabriel Communications Corporation protesting a proposed deficiency of sales tax liability asserted by the Respondent, the Florida Department of Revenue, by its 1st Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest Under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The contents of that 1st Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment, to include the worksheets of the Respondent's Tax Examiner, may be found as the Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. The proposed assessment contains claims for tax, penalties and interest on the Petitioner's purchase, rentals/lease and repair to capital equipment; to wit, pagers made by the Petitioner. The purchases and rentals/leases were involved in transactions between the Petitioner and certain suppliers to the Petitioner and the repairs pertain to materials necessary to keep the pagers in working order. There are additional items in the audit which concern certain office supplies purchased by the Petitioner for which sales tax was not paid; however, for the purposes of this proceeding those items are not contested by the Petitioner. Moreover, Gabriel Communications Corporation does not contest the amount of the assessment, assuming that the Respondent is entitled in law to make the assessment on the matters in dispute. Gabriel Communications Corporation is a Florida corporation and a holder of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity issued by the Florida Public Service Commission, which certificate authorizes Gabriel to provide radio, telephone and paging services to the public in certain areas in Florida. The Petitioner's corporate office is in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Gabriel Communications Corporation is one of forty-three organizations licensed by the Public Service Commission of the State of Florida as a radio common carrier. (The conclusion is borne out in the late-filed exhibit of the Petitioner, which is Exhibit No. 5, admitted into evidence, being a statement from the Commission Clerk for the Florida Public Service Commission.) The tax that the Respondent is attempting to impose in this matter is a tax on the pagers which the Petitioner has purchased or rented/leased from suppliers to be provided to the Petitioner's customers to assist in establishing the paging services which the Petitioner offers to those customers. The proposed tax also involves a tax asserted against the Petitioner on those items of inventory which the Petitioner purchases from its suppliers for purposes of making repairs to the equipment its customers are utilizing. The focus of the Petitioner's argument in support of this Petition is centered on the provision of Rule 12A-1.46(8) (i), Florida Administrative Code, which in discussing taxation involving telephone, telegraph and other communication services by radio common carrier states as follows: "(8) Radio Common Carriers. * * * The charge by the radio common carrier for one-way pocket pager service is exempt." In the view of the Petitioner this means that the entire transaction between the Petitioner and its customers involving paging services, to include the initial purchase or rental/lease of pagers from its suppliers and repairs thereto, would be exempt from any tax under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner supports its argument in this vein by citing Attorney General's Opinion 68-62, dated 1968, dealing with an interpretation of Section 212.05(5), Florida Statutes, and the subsequent Florida Revenue Commission ruling No. 068-56 of June 27, 1978. That section, 212.05(5), Florida Statutes, states: (5) At the rate of 4 percent on charges for all telegraph messages and long distance telephone calls beginning and terminating in this state; on recurring charges to regular subscribers for local telephone service and for wired television service; on all charges for the installation of telephonic, wired television, and telegraphic equipment; and, at the same rate, on all charges for electrical power or energy. Telephone and telegraph services originating within this state and completed outside this state or originating outside this state and completed within this state are not taxable. The provisions of s. 212.17(3), regarding credit for tax paid on charges subsequently found to be worthless, shall be equally applicable to any tax paid under the provisions of this section on charges for telephone and telegraph services and electric power subsequently found to be uncollectible. The word 'charges' in this subsection shall not include any excise or similar tax levied by the federal government, any political subdivision of the state, or any municipality upon the purchase or sale of telephone, wired television or telegraph service, or electric power, which tax is collected by the seller from the purchaser." The Petitioner makes a further argument that the provision which the Respondent relies on in proposing its assessment does not have application. That provision is Rule 12A-1.46(8)(e), Florida Administrative Code, and it reads: "(8) Radio Common Carriers. * * * (e) Sales, rentals or repairs of machines, equipment, parts or accessories to a radio common carrier for its use in providing communication services are taxable. This includes parts and materials used by radio common carriers in the repair and installation of their own communication equipment. When purchasing equipment for resale or for exclusive rental, a radio common carrier should furnish its supplier a resale certificate in lieu of paying the tax." The Petitioner doesn't feel that this provision has application to it because of the perception that the sale-rental or repair of equipment is not for purposes of the radio common carrier's use in providing communication service, but is for the benefit of the ultimate consumer/customer of the Petitioner. Finally, the Petitioner argues that if a tax should be allowed, it should be on the arrangement between the Petitioner and the customer, on the theory that the arrangement involves the rental of a pager by the customer and the Respondent should not make that tax have retroactive application to the transactions in question. From the point of view of the Respondent, Section 212.21(2), Florida Statutes, establishes the general proposition that tax shall be levied for sales and rentals considered under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, except to the extent that those transactions were specifically exempted. To the Respondent, the only exemption in application is that exemption found in Rule 12A-1.46(8)(i), Florida Administrative Code, and that only pertains to the one-way pocket pager service, not as Rule 12A-1.46(8)(e), Florida Administrative Code, sets out, the, "sales, rentals or repairs of machines, equipment, parts or accessories to a radio common carrier for its use in providing communication services." In the position of the Respondent, the purchase or rental of equipment and the repair to that equipment made by the Petitioner are for its own use in providing the separate exempt service to the Petitioner's customers. After analyzing the arguments in behalf of the parties, the Respondent's position is found to be persuasive. Although the service charges made by the Petitioner to its consumer are exempt from taxation, under authority of Rule 12A-1.46(8)(i), Florida Administrative Code, the purchase or rental/lease and repair to the capital equipment of the Petitioner which it uses in providing that service to its consumers are taxable pursuant to Rule 12A- 1.46(8)(e), Florida Administrative Code. There flows from that tax liability certain interest charges not to exceed a total penalty of 25 percent in the aggregate (see Section 212.12(2), Florida statutes). However, the Respondent may for good cause shown compromise those penalties after investigation reveals that the penalty would be too severe or unjust (see Section 212.12(5), Florida statutes). In view of the testimony offered by a number of radio common carriers in the State of Florida licensed by the Florida Public Service Commission to the effect that they misunderstood the tax liability under Rule 12A-1.46(8)(e), Florida Administrative Code, and the acknowledgement of the undersigned of that difficulty, it would be recommended that no penalty be imposed in this instance. (A review has been made of the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted, and they have been utilized in this Recommended Order in those instances in which the proposals were deemed to be appropriate.)
Recommendation Upon a full consideration of the facts in this cause, it is recommended that the Petitioner be required to pay the tax and applicable interest due and owed under the 1st Revised Notice of Proposed Assessment of Tax, Penalties and Interest, which is the subject of this case. It is further recommended that the penalties be waived. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1978 COPIES FURNISHED: John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John W. Costigan, Esquire Post Office Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida Maxie Broome, Jr., Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue Whether proposed Rules 69O-175.003, 69O-170.005-007, 69O- 170.013, 69O-170.0135. 69O-170.014, 69O-170.0141, 69O-170.0142, and 69O-170.0155 are valid exercises of delegated rulemaking authority.
Findings Of Fact Section 20.05, Florida Statutes, addresses the structure and powers of the Department. Section 20.05 provides as follows, in pertinent part: 20.05 Heads of departments; powers and duties.-- (1) Each head of a department, except as otherwise provided by law, must: * * * (b) Have authority, . . ., to execute any of the powers, duties, and functions vested in the department or in any administrative unit thereof through administrative units . . . designated by the head of the department, . . . unless the head of the department is explicitly required by law to perform the same without delegation. * * * (e) Subject to the requirements of chapter 120, exercise existing authority to adopt rules pursuant and limited to the powers, duties, and functions transferred to the department. The Financial Services Commission (Commission) was created within the Department pursuant to Section 20.121, Florida Statutes. However, the Commission is not “subject to control, supervision or direction by the Department of Financial Services in any manner.” § 20.121(3), Fla. Stat. The Commission is composed of the Governor and Cabinet, who collectively serve as the agency head of the Commission. Action by the Commission can only be taken by majority vote “consisting of at least three affirmative votes.” Id. OIR is a structural unit of the Financial Services Commission. Section 20.121(3) states in relevant part, as follows: Structure.— The major structural unit of the commission is the office. Each office shall be headed by a director. The following offices are established: 1. The Office of Insurance Regulation, which shall be responsible for all activities concerning insurers and other risk-bearing entities . . . * * * * Organization.-- The commission shall establish by rule any additional organizational structure of the offices. It is the intent of the legislature to provide the commission with the flexibility to organize the offices in any manner they determine appropriate to promote both efficiency and accountability. Powers.— Commission members shall serve as the agency head for purposes of rulemaking . . . by the commission and all subunits of the commission. . . . (emphasis supplied) Clearly, under the Department’s, the Commission’s and the OIR’s organizational structures, only the Commission may promulgate rules for both itself and OIR. The Department does not have rulemaking authority over areas that have been given to the Commission. On the other hand, nothing in the statute prohibits OIR, as directed by the Commission, to perform steps, preliminary to proposing a rule, that often occur in the rule development process prior to the actual Notice of proposed rulemaking. See also § 120.54, Fla. Stat. To that end, the Commission, by non-rule policy, has delegated authority to OIR to engage in rulemaking activities on behalf of the Commission. However, this delegation is not limited to rule development activities that occur prior to the Notice of proposed Rules, but authorizes publication of the Notice prior to approval by the Commission of any proposed language or policy statement. As indicated, the Notices for the proposed Rules were published in the Florida Law Weekly in November 2004, with various changes made thereafter. The proposed Rules were published as OIR rules. Disturbingly and misleadingly, all the Notices for the proposed Rules state that the agency head approved the Rule that is the subject of the Notice on September 3, 2004 or November 2, 2004. However, none of the proposed Rules were approved by the Commission, the agency head, prior to their publication as a proposed rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The specific agency authority listed in the Notices for promulgating the proposed Rules was Section 624.308(1), Florida Statutes. Section 624.308(1) grants the Department of Financial Services (Department) and the Financial Services Commission (Commission) the general authority to adopt rules, pursuant to Sections 120.536(1) and 120.54 in order to implement laws that confer duties upon them. The statute does not confer the authority on the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) to adopt rules. See § 624.05, Fla. Stat. The statutes that confer a specific grant of rulemaking authority over the areas of the laws implemented in the proposed Rules are Sections 627.0651 and 627.331, Florida Statutes. These two statutes confer specific rulemaking authority over certain areas of insurance ratemaking only to the Commission; specific rulemaking authority is not granted to the Department or to OIR. Other than rulemaking authority, the various duties assigned in the laws implemented by proposed Rules are given to OIR.
