The Issue Whether the involuntary transfer of Trooper Fred T. Wimberly from Troop "A" in Pensacola, Escambia County, Florida to Troop "E" in Tavernier, Monroe County, Florida was a transfer for the benefit and convenience of the state.
Findings Of Fact Notice of hearing and objections to these proceedings, including the manner of the preservation of the record, were waived by the parties. This Hearing Officer and the Career Service Commission have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this action. Florida Highway Patrol personnel rules and regulations General Order number 43 and Career Service Commission rules and regulations Chapter 22A-09(c) provide for Career Service hearings on involuntary transfers. Fred T. Wimberly, Petitioner in this cause, is a Career Service Employee of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Division of the Florida Highway Patrol. He was sent a notice of his transfer by certified mail dated January 7, 1976. By Order of the Honorable Ernest E. Mason, Judge of the Circuit Court, Escambia County, said transfer as been restrained until April 15, 1976. 5, Seventy trooper positions allocated to the Florida Highway Patrol were not filled during the last fiscal year because of insufficient funds and this information was circulated by letter from Mr. Ralph Davis, Executive Director, on May 23, 1975. Col. J. E. Beach, Director of the Florida Highway Patrol by memorandum July 23, 1975, informed all Florida Highway Patrol troops: "We feel it only fair that all troops share the burden rather than a few carry the entire load" and informed the troopers that the Department had decided that each troop run 7.4 as a vacancy ratio. Troop "A" in Pensacola, Florida was to have seven (7) vacancies and Troop "E" was to have eleven (11) vacancies. On February 1, 1976, the time of the transfer of the Petitioner, Troop "A" in Pensacola had three (3) more troopers than allowed under the readjustment total of minus 7. Troop "E" had fourteen (14) less troopers beyond those readjustment figures of minus 11. Thus, Troop "A", in West Florida, had four (4) vacancies and Troop "E" in Broward, Dade and Monroe Counties had twenty-five (25) vacancies. The memorandum withheld voluntary transfers until the required ratio should be achieved. At the time of a needed involuntary transfer the long standing policy of the Florida Highway Patrol, established to help keep employees more satisfied and to retain experienced troopers, has been to consider the following factors: The troop of least need Seniority Marriage factor Wife's employment Number of children Number of school children Other considerations (a) It was determined by the Director of the Florida Highway Patrol that a trooper was needed in Tavernier, Florida, as an increment to Troop E. This determination was based on population need and road conditions. It was determined that Troop A was the troop statewide which could best accommodate itself to losing a trooper. The list of troopers was examined insofar as seniority was concerned and it was found that approximately fourteen (14) troopers had less seniority than Petitioner and therefore each trooper was examined, consistent with established policy, as to marriage status, children living with trooper, school age children living with trooper and wife's employment. It was found that two troopers, Petitioner and Trooper Pembroke Burrows, III, were most eligible for involuntary transfer insofar as these human factors were concerned both being single men with the approximate same seniority. It was decided that Trooper Burrows remain in Troop "A" since he is the only black trooper in the area, the other eleven (11) black troopers being located in the central and southern part of the state. It therefore appeared to the director of the Florida Highway Patrol that Trooper F.T. Wimberly should be chosen to fill the vacancy in Troop "A" and he was so notified of his transfer to be effective February 1, 1976. Said transfer was restrained until after a public hearing and until the Order of the Career Service Commission or April 15, 1976. Petitioner contends: That the transfer was arbitrary and disciplinary in nature and the involuntary transfer was the result of actions in his personal life that were of no concern to the Florida Highway Patrol; that if the transfer was disciplinary it should have been so designated. That the fact of his divorce and the living arrangements he made as to room and board in the home of a woman and her two sons was under investigation by the Florida Highway Patrol prior to the involuntary transfer. That the transfer was made in total disregard to his job performance, his career status and his job seniority. Respondent contends: That the involuntary transfer was for the benefit and convenience of the state and that it followed a long established policy in transferring Petitioner to a needed area. That there were several other involuntary transfers as a result of the shortage of troopers in the state, particularly the southern part of Florida, and that there must be more involuntary transfers. That each trooper signs a statement as a part of a job application which reads "I fully understand that I may be stationed anywhere in the State of Florida and may be transferred at the convenience of the department." That the oath taken by Trooper Wimberly states that "I will render strict obedience to my superior in the Florida Highway Patrol and observe and abide by all orders and regulations prescribed by them for the government and administration of said Patrol." That the rules, regulations and policy of the Florida Highway Patrol were followed in the involuntary transfer of Petitioner and the transfer is to a place of great need and in fact is for the benefit and convenience of the state. That had the transfer been disciplinary in nature the result would have been suspension or dismissal. The Hearing Officer finds: The Florida Highway Patrol has presented substantial evidence that there is a need for a transfer to Troop "E" and that Troop "A" is a logical troop from which to withdraw a trooper and that Petitioner is not the only trooper in the state being transferred to fill the southern Florida need. The Petitioner signed a statement upon his application for employment that he understood that he might be transferred for the benefit and convenience of the state. The Florida Highway Patrol followed the established rules, regulations and policies in the involuntary transfer of Petitioner. That there were two troopers in the area who were most eligible to suffer an involuntary transfer but the reason for the determination to transfer Petitioner rather than Trooper Burrows is a valid reason. That in the field of law enforcement and for the protection of the people in the state there is a need for the Florida Highway Patrol to transfer troopers in an expeditious manner but with due regard to the individual rights of employees. That the evidence shows the human considerations were considered before Petitioner was selected to be transferred. That a determination as to whether the personal conduct of Petitioner was conduct unbecoming a police officer is not necessary for the determination of the issue.
Findings Of Fact In November of 1960 the Petitioner, Frankie L. Mills, became employed by the Florida Highway Patrol, and he was a member of the Florida Highway Patrol Pension System (Chapter 321, Florida Statutes). On approximately December 1, 1970, the Petitioner transferred from the Florida Highway Patrol Pension System, and he became a member of the Florida Retirement System (Chapter 121, Florida Statutes). In June of 1976, the Petitioner resigned from the Florida Highway Patrol to run for Sheriff of Okaloosa County. He was elected, and began his position as Sheriff in January of 1977. In the election of 1980 the Petitioner was not re- elected as Sheriff of Okaloosa County. As a result, his term of office as Sheriff ended on January 6, 1981, and the Petitioner vacated the office of Sheriff of Okaloosa County. The Petitioner did not resign from his position as Sheriff of Okaloosa County. His termination from the office of Sheriff was occasioned by the expiration of his elected term of office as of January 6, 1981.. During the time the Petitioner served as Sheriff of Okaloosa County, until January 6, 1981, he was a special risk member of the Florida Retirement System (Chapter 121, Florida Statutes). In August of 1981, the Petitioner became employed as a deputy sheriff of Gulf County. This employment qualified him as a special risk member of the Florida Retirement System (Chapter 121, Florida Statutes). The Petitioner has been employed as a deputy sheriff in Gulf County since August, 1981, and he is so employed at present. Between January 6, 1981, and at least August 11 981, the Petitioner was not employed by an "employer" as this term is defined in Section 121.021(10), Florida Statutes, and during this time he was absent from the payroll of any such "employer." Between January 6, 1981, and August of 1981, the Petitioner was not a "state law enforcement officer" as this term is used in Section 121.021(38), Florida Statutes, and Rules 22B- 2.002(5)(e) and (g), Florida Administrative Code. Between January 6, 1981, and August of 1981, the Petitioner had a break in his continuous service under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, including Section 121.021.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter its Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Frankie L. Mills, had a break in his continuous service in the special risk category of the Florida Retirement System during the period of time he was not employed as a law enforcement officer between January and August, 1981. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 26th day of November, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32301 Robert Scott Cox, Eq. P. O. Box 1876 Tallahassee, FL 32302-1876 Burton M. Michaels, Esq. 2639 North Monroe street Suite 207, Building C Tallahassee, FL 32303 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings are not in consecutively numbered paragraphs, but the unnumbered paragraphs will be considered to be consecutively numbered. 1.-3. Accepted. 4. Rejected, as not a proposed factual finding, but an argument of law. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent 1.-9. Accepted.
Findings Of Fact William B. Barker, Jr., is certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida employed by the Walton County Sheriff's Department and stationed at DeFuniak Springs, Florida. On or about 20 June 1981, Diana Marie Preston was driving her automobile west on Interstate Highway 10, in Walton County, Florida, on her way to her grandparents' home in Gulf Breeze, Florida. She had just completed the Law School Admissions Test in Tallahassee that morning and was on her way back home. Due to heavy rain in the area, she was driving carefully and was not exceeding the speed limit. At approximately 3 to 4 p.m., she was hailed by a police officer in a county police car. When she pulled over to the roadside at his request, the officer advised her she had been speeding and requested to see her driver's license. Since her license was in her purse which was in the trunk of her car, she had to get out of her car and open the trunk, at which time the officer noticed a pair of high-heeled shoes she had in there and asked her to take them out, indicating he had been looking at a pair like that for his wife. When Ms. Preston got her license out, the officer requested that she accompany him to his car, get in on the passenger side and close the passenger door. She complied, though she did not close the door completely. During this period, she noticed that though the officer was in uniform, he was not wearing either a name tag or a badge with a number on it. She does not recall whether he was wearing a pistol, but states there was a rifle in the vehicle on which he placed his hand several times while talking to her. The officer took Ms. Preston's driver's license and reached across her to the glove compartment for his ticket book, but at no time did he use his radio to call in either her driver's license number or her car tag number. Before writing out the ticket, the officer indicated he would not issue a ticket to her if she would put on her high heels (she had been driving barefoot) and let him try to guess her shoe size. He stated that for every size he was off in his guess, he would kiss her foot a certain number of times. Ms. Preston repeatedly refused, but because the officer was insistent and she felt she was in a difficult position due to the fact that she was alone on a lightly travelled (at the time) section of highway, she ultimately acquiesced. Though the officer had ample opportunity to see the shoe size when he examined the shoes, he guessed wrong on the size by several sizes. At this time, her left foot was in his lap, and he picked it up and kissed it several times. When he was finished, in the course of conversation, the officer asked her what she had been doing in Tallahassee. She told him she had been taking the LSAT, and his attitude changed immediately. He told her to go on with her trip, but cautioned her not to tell anyone what had happened, as he could get into trouble. Upon being released by the officer, Ms. Preston proceeded on to Gulf Breeze to the home of her grandparents, whom she told about the incident the following day. She did not report the incident to the police nor discuss it until several weeks later when she was contacted by two investigators who showed her a large photograph of individuals who, it was represented to her, were members of the Walton County Sheriff's Department. From this group, she identified the Respondent, Barker, and subsequently again identified him at the hearing as the officer in question, describing him as a heavyset man with a mustache and wearing tinted glasses. Respondent, upon graduation from high school, attended O. W. Junior College and then went on to the University of West Florida where he received his bachelor's degree in criminal justice. He unequivocally denies the allegations against him, stating he had never seen Ms. Preston until the day of the hearing at the hearing room. In fact, his shift was over, and he signed out just prior to 3 p.m. on 20 June 1981. In his opinion and that of his mother, the allegations against him are attributable to his stated position in a political dispute during which he sided against the incumbent sheriff for whom he was working. There is no evidence bearing on this issue other than the testimony of the Respondent and his mother.
Recommendation From the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in this Administrative Complaint. It is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 24th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1983.
The Issue Whether the disciplinary action taken against Arthur Ray Campbell was for good cause.
Findings Of Fact Arthur Ray Campbell is a Career Service Employee of the State of Florida employed by the Division of Law Enforcement, Department of Natural Resources. He was suspended for a period of eleven (11) working days for using the blue light on a Marine Patrol vehicle to run a red traffic signal in Cross City. Campbell filed a timely appeal of his suspension with the Career Service Commission. On February 10, 1976, the Florida Marine Patrol was ordered by the Office of the Governor of the State of Florida to provide personnel for a special assignment in Pensacola, Florida. These personnel were to assist local law enforcement authorities in controlling a civil disturbance in that city which had resulted from racial tensions in one of the high schools. Pursuant to those orders, Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Brown of the Florida Marine Patrol directed Major Louis Shelfer, the staff officer in charge of the Marine Patrol Emergency Squad, to notify the District Offices of the Florida Marine Patrol to dispatch Marine Patrol Emergency Squad personnel to Pensacola. Major Shelfer was ordered by Colonel Brown to make certain that all supportive personnel understood that in their movement to Pensacola blue lights and sirens would not be used. Colonel Brown further instructed Major Shelfer to advise the various district offices that personnel were to move as quickly as possible to Pensacola and that he wanted the Emergency Squad in Pensacola the morning of February 11, 1976. Just prior to 5:00 p.m. on February 10, 1976 Major Louis Shelfer called each of the district offices from which Emergency Squad personnel were being dispatched to Pensacola and advised the officer in charge or the dispatcher that the personnel on the Emergency Squad, who were already on standby for movement, were to be dispatched to Pensacola. Major Shelfer further directed that these personnel were to move to Pensacola as soon as possible but were not to run blue lights or sirens. He further advised that there was no emergency existing in Pensacola at the time. Major Shelfer did not give a time by which personnel would report in Pensacola. It was, however, the understanding of Colonel Brown and Major Shelfer that all personnel would be in Pensacola by 6:00 a.m. on February 11, 1976. In District 7, Major Shelfer spoke with Mrs. Patricia Morgan, secretary/dispatcher. Mrs. Patricia Morgan, who is also the wife of Captain H. C. Morgan, Jr., the District Supervisor of District Seven, received Major Shelfer's first alert call for the movement of the Emergency Squad personnel of District 7 to Pensacola at 4:45 p.m. on February 10, 1976. Shortly thereafter, she received the second call from Major Shelfer directing that the Emergency Squad personnel would proceed to Pensacola. Upon receiving the second call Mrs. Morgan contacted Officers Malcolm and Johnson on the communications radio and advised them that they were to proceed to Pensacola as quickly as possible but not "1018" by which she meant it was not an emergency. Mrs. Morgan further instructed these Marine Patrol Officers not to run red lights while proceeding to Pensacola. She specifically instructed Officer Malcolm that he would pick up Officer Campbell who would ride with him to Pensacola. While Officer Malcolm remembered Mrs. Morgan's reference to red lights, neither Officer Malcolm nor Officer Schumaker, who monitored their conversations, remembered any information passed on by Mrs. Morgan that the trip was not a "1018" run or not an emergency run. Mrs. Morgan was initially unable to contact Officer Campbell by radio and therefore called Officer Campbell's home and spoke with his wife giving her the information that she had given Officers Malcolm and Johnson. However, while speaking with Officer Campbell's wife, Officer Campbell called District 7 on his radio and asked Mrs. Morgan if she had any information for him. She advised Officer Campbell at that time that he would be going to Pensacola and would ride with Officer Malcolm. Mrs. Morgan did not remember giving Officer Campbell any information on the use of lights during the trip, but said that she did remember telling him it was not a "1018" run. Officer Campbell states that the information he received ordered him to return to his home and get ready to be picked up by Officer Campbell and that the information he needed had been passed on to his wife and Officer Malcolm. At approximately 7:30 p.m. on February 10, 1976, having secured from Water Patrol, gone to his home and packed, picked up Officer Campbell at his home, Officer Malcolm left Daytona for Pensacola. Officer Malcolm drove to Ocala using blue lights, where the men purchased hamburgers for their meal. Officer Malcolm ate while Officer Campbell continued to drive and the two officers changed over when they stopped to get gasoline. Officer Campbell then drove from the vicinity of Ocala to Cross City. As they approached Cross City, Officer Malcolm advised Officer Campbell to turn on the blue light because they were slightly over the local speed limit entering Cross City. As they approached the second traffic light in town which was red, Officer Campbell stopped or came almost to a complete stop at the light. As he started to proceed forward, having made certain the intersection was clear, the traffic light turned green. Malcolm and Campbell continued on through Cross City using the blue light until they reached the open highway on the north side of the city. Officer Malcolm's car does not have a siren but is equipped with blue light only. On the evening of February 10, 1976 Trooper J. R. Touchton was proceeding south on U.S. 19 in Cross City at approximately 9:00 or 9:30 p.m. He observed a northbound automobile, which shortly after he initially saw it, turn on its emergency blue lights. Trooper Touchton, not immediately identifying the type of vehicle he had passed, called his dispatcher to determine if another Florida Highway Patrol vehicle was operating in the area because the car which he had passed was a marked state law enforcement car similar to those of the Florida Highway Patrol. Touchton thought that the car which he had passed was in the process of stopping a truck immediately ahead of him. Touchton executed a "U" turn and proceeded north but shortly after Touchton turned, the truck which Touchton had thought the other patrol car was stopping turned left off the highway and the patrol car in front of him proceeded north out of Cross City still using its blue lights. Touchton saw the patrol vehicle ahead of him slow down or stop at the second traffic light but did not observe whether the second traffic light was red or green when the vehicle proceeded through it. In response to Officer Touchton's call the Highway Patrol Dispatcher advised Touchton that the vehicle which he had observed was probably a Marine Patrol vehicle being dispatched to Pensacola. Sergeant J. D. Peacock was following Officer Touchton south on U.S. 19 in Cross City and first observed that later he identified as a Marine Patrol vehicle approaching the second traffic light in Cross City. At that time the Marine Patrol had its blue lights and emergency flashers on; however, it did not have its siren on. Sergeant Peacock observed the Marine Patrol vehicle slow or stop at the traffic light and then proceed through the traffic light headed north on U.S. 19. Both Highway Patrol Officers indicated that the Marine Patrol vehicle was driving within the posted speed limit. On March 5, 1976 personnel in the Cross City, Florida Marine Patrol Office brought to Colonel J. J. Brown's attention the fact that a Marine Patrol car had passed through Cross City on February 10, 1976 using blue lights. This had been brought to the attention of the Cross City Marine Patrol by the Florida Highway Patrol Supervisor in that area, Sergeant J. D. Peacock. Colonel Brown directed Major Shelfer to conduct an investigation into the matter. Major Shelfer contacted all of the district supervisors who had sent personnel to Pensacola and requested that they provide him with the times and routes of travel of personnel which had been sent to Pensacola. From an analysis of this data, Major Shelfer determined that only personnel sent from District 7 in Daytona to Pensacola would have passed through Cross City enroute to Pensacola at the hour in question. Having determined this Major Shelfer directed Captain Morgan, Supervisor of District 7, to have the personnel from District 7 who were sent to Pensacola prepare written reports on their trips to Pensacola. Officers Campbell and Malcolm prepared and submitted written reports to Captain Morgan which were received into evidence at the formal hearing as Exhibits 5 and 6 respectively. Based upon the investigation conducted by Major Shelfer, Officer Campbell was suspended. Employee evaluations were introduced that indicate that Officer Campbell's efficiency for the period of time involved here was downgraded as a result of the conduct for which he was suspended.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer finds that substantial and competent evidence does not exist to show that the agency had good cause to suspend Officer Arthur Ray Campbell for insubordination. The Hearing Officer recommends that the suspension be set aside and further, that the Career Service Commission consider whether remedial action is necessary to clear his employee evaluation for the period in question. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Kent A. Zaiser, Esquire Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Department of Natural Resources Appeals Coordinator 202 Blount Street Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Melvin R. Horne, Esquire 800 Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment as a teacher based on his conviction of the crime of vehicular homicide.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was hired as a teacher by Miami-Dade County Public Schools in February 2000. On August 13, 1999, Respondent was involved in a motor vehicle accident in Monroe County, Florida. The accident resulted in criminal charges filed against Respondent in December 2000 for vehicular homicide (Section 782.071, Fla. Stat. [sic]). On or about May 2002, Respondent pled no contest and was adjudicated guilty of the offense of vehicular homicide by the Circuit Court for the Sixteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Monroe County, Florida. Respondent was placed on probation for five years, ordered to pay $50.00 court costs per month for his suspension [sic], and ordered to perform 500 hours of community service work. On March 15, 2006, Petitioner took action to suspend and initiate dismissal proceedings against Respondent due to his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. School Board Rule 6Gx13-4C-1.021 defines vehicular homicide (Section 782.071, F.S. [sic]) as a crime involving moral turpitude.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order terminating Respondent’s employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 2007.
The Issue The issues in the case arc whether Respondent, on October 22, 1987, unlawfully and intentionally touched or struck Mary Ann Lanning and Denise Lanning and, if so, whether Respondent violated Sections 943.1395(5) and (6), Florida Statutes, and Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, which require that a law enforcement officer have good moral character, and thus failed to maintain the qualifications established in Sections 943.13(4) and (7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner certified Respondent on December 31, 1970. Respondent received Certificate Number GF-1813. At the time of the events in question, Respondent was a trooper employed by the Florida Highway Patrol. On the evening of October 21, 1987, Respondent was at the office where he held a part-time job. At home were Respondent's wife, two young children born of their marriage, and two older daughters born of a prior marriage of Respondent. The two older daughters are Kim, who was then 15 years old, and Chris, who was then 16 years old. Respondent's wife and the two older daughters got into an argument, and the daughters angrily went to a neighbor's home a couple of houses away. The daughters had undergone significant emotional turmoil, largely the result of successive abandonments by their natural mother, who was Respondent's first wife, and then their adoptive mother, who was Respondent's second wife. The neighbor's house was the Lanning residence where Mary Ann Lanning and her daughter Denise lived. Denise was Kim's close friend and had been for several years. Kim and Chris were upset and crying when they arrived at the Lanning's home. Mrs. Lanning and Denise comforted them. In the meantime, Respondent's wife called him at about 6:00 p.m. and informed him of the problem. Respondent was not overly surprised. The two girls had recently been misbehaving, and relations between them and their father had been strained. Respondent and his wife, who were due to go to church that night, agreed, as was customary, that they would drive separately and meet at church. Respondent instructed his wife to lock up the house, which contained valuable personal items, including firearms. When Respondent and his wife returned from church that evening, his daughters were still gone, but a note was attached to the front door. The note informed Respondent that they were okay. The note also began to recite the telephone number at which they could be reached. However, Chris, unknown to Kim, had ripped the number off from the note before posting it on the door. At this point, one of the first of many factual disputes emerges. Although it concerns a matter that is not, in itself, of critical importance, Respondent and Mrs. Lanning advance their varying viewpoints with vehemence. The animosity between Respondent and Mrs. Lanning is incomprehensible as they were barely acquainted prior to the evening in question, and neither of them testified to any prior disagreements. In any event, it has proven impossible to credit the testimony of either of them, when their testimony is in dispute. The excitability of Mrs. Lanning coupled with the impulsiveness and arrogance of Respondent, which probably went a long way toward generating a series of failed communications, also detracted from their credibility as witnesses. Therefore, in the many instances in which their testimony is in dispute, the testimony of Respondent alone has been used to construct the events of the following eighteen hours or so, unless otherwise indicated. As the evening progressed, Chris and Kim, who were accompanied by Denise at least part of the way, went back home to see if they could get into the house to get their clothes. They intentionally went when they knew everyone would be gone at church. However, they found that they could not gain access to the house. The daughters may have visited their house a couple of more times when they knew that no one would be home. The record does not disclose whether they returned to try different means to get into the locked house, to mislead Mrs. Lanning into thinking that they were genuinely trying to contact Respondent and his wife, or to entertain themselves by walking around their neighborhood at night. Mrs. Lanning did not try to telephone Respondent or his wife that evening, although this apparently is due to her justifiable belief that they knew where the children were. An uneventful evening followed during which Chris and Kim slept at the Lanning's home and generally enjoyed themselves. Although she was good friends with Denise, Chris had never spent an evening at her friend's house. Respondent was a strong disciplinarian. The following morning, which was a school day, Chris and Kim again tried to reenter their house when they knew their stepmother would be taking their stepsister to school. Unable to gain access to their house and without school clothes, Chris and Kim decided to remain at the Lanning's home that day, and Denise stayed home with them. Later that morning, Mrs. Lanning telephoned Respondent at work and left a message for him to call her. As soon as he was able, Respondent returned the call. The time was about 10:00 a.m. Although the conversation was memorable, neither Mrs. Lanning nor Respondent remembers the conversation in the same terms. They agree that Mrs. Lanning told Respondent that his daughters were at her house, they were upset, and Respondent's house was locked. The remainder of the conversation is based on the testimony of Respondent. Frequently calling her "babe" and "darling," notwithstanding Mrs. Lanning's objections to this offensive practice, Respondent informed Mrs. Lanning that the house would remain locked as long as no one was at home. When Mrs. Lanning offered her advice that he should allow the girls to eat eggs, Respondent replied, "Hey, babe, that's none of your business." Mrs. Lanning retorted, "I'm not going to send [the children] down to that bitch [Respondent's third wife]." Respondent then informed Mrs. Lanning that he would pick up his daughters when he returned home from work that afternoon. At this point, Respondent called his wife and related the conversation, omitting the offensive reference to her. Respondent's wife said that she had reported the girls as missing persons when they had not returned from school that afternoon. At about 3:30 p.m., Respondent arrived home still in uniform and in a marked patrol car. When he greeted his wife, he learned that Mrs. Lanning had spoken with an older daughter of Respondent. The older daughter, who lived in St. Cloud, had called Respondent's wife and told her that Mrs. Lanning was crazy and they should get the children as soon as possible. Respondent immediately went to Mrs. Lanning's house, still in uniform and still wearing his gun. He knocked on the door. Mrs. Lanning answered the door by opening it slightly. Chris, Kim, Denise, and a friend, Deanna, were in the vicinity of the patio in the back, not clearly visible from the doorway. When the door opened partially, Respondent stepped into the house, uninvited and obviously unwelcome. When Respondent entered the house, Mrs. Lanning exhorted him loudly to leave. Respondent said that he just wanted his kids and would leave once he had them. Mrs. Lanning tried to push him out the door. He warned her not to. She kept trying to push him out the door. In a raised voice and threatening tone, Respondent insisted, "Hey, babe, I want my kids and I want them now." As Respondent testified, "It took 20 years of training and every fiber of my being not to go over there and strangle her." Resisting this impulse, Respondent instead grabbed the wrist of Mrs. Lanning and informed her, "That's it, darling. You're under arrest." When she asked what was the charge, he told her, "Well, we'll start off with kidnapping." Respondent was aware that Mrs. Lanning was not guilty of kidnapping. Respondent then turned Mrs. Lanning's arm behind her back. The children entered the room. Denise came to the aid of her mother. She tried to grab Respondent, who informed her: "Get your hands off me, toots." Denise then called him and his wife sons of a bitch. Although Respondent denies touching Denise, his daughter, Kim, whose testimony was generally favorable to her father, testified that Respondent took Denise by the wrist and pushed her away. Kim's testimony is credited. In a similar regard, Kim testified that she saw her father remove a telephone from Mrs. Lanning's hand in an attempt to prevent her from calling the police. Kim's testimony is credited on this point as well. After additional heated exchanges, Respondent was unable to persuade his daughters to return home. He instead left the Lanning's home a few minutes before a deputy from the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrived on the scene in response to calls from Mrs. Lanning and Denise. Changing into civilian clothes, Respondent prepared himself to speak with the deputy. The deputy initially treated the call as a neighborhood dispute, which he tried to settle. He spoke first with Mrs. Lanning and found her sensible and composed. She reported nothing of being touched by Respondent, only that he had forced his way into her home. The deputy then went to Respondent's house and found him in a similar state. The atmosphere deteriorated when the deputy brought Respondent back with him to Mrs. Lanning's house to apologize. Mrs. Lanning became irate and hostile. Recognizing that he was involved in a domestic disturbance, the deputy wisely called for supervisory assistance. After a corporal arrived on the scene, the deputy issued Respondent a trespass warning, which ordered him to stay off Mrs. Lanning's property. Notwithstanding the best efforts of both law enforcement officers, they could not mollify Mrs. Lanning. Mrs. Lanning later complained to the Orange County Sheriff's Office about the deputy and corporal. The record discloses no basis whatsoever for such complaint. To the contrary, the timely decision of the deputy to involve a supervisor in the investigation negates any suggestion that he intended to treat Respondent deferentially because of his status as a law enforcement officer. As a result of the above-described event, Respondent was terminated from the Florida Highway Patrol. Mrs. Lanning claims that she sustained a dislocated shoulder and serious injuries to her arm, back, and neck. She now suffers from bursitis and arthritis as a result of the incident. This testimony is not credited. Mrs. Lanning proved capable of complaining when she felt the need, yet she said nothing of a dislocated shoulder, pain, or even the physical touching when she first spoke with the deputy. The case involves more than Respondent's demonstrated inability to regain custody of his daughters in a prudent and appropriate manner. The case involves more than a lack of "people skills," such as in repeatedly calling a woman "babe" or "darling," especially after she has asked not to be called that, in a transparent effort to intimidate and patronize. The case involves a uniformed, armed law enforcement officer, trembling with rage for perceived but insignificant threats to his authority, allowing fury to overwhelm his reason and ignoring the critical distinctions among his roles as trooper, parent, and neighbor. Under these facts, Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character. On August 16, 1988, the Office of the State Attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit filed a two count information alleging that Respondent committed the offense of battery upon Mrs. Lanning and her daughter. On November 10, 1988, Respondent pled nolo contendere to the charges in Orange County Court. In his twenty-one years with the Florida Highway Patrol, Respondent maintained a good record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character and suspending his certificate for a period of two years. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. 10-20: adopted or adopted in substance. 21: rejected as recitation of testimony and subordinate. 22-43: adopted or adopted in substance. Treatment Accorded Respondent's Proposed Findings I, a-c: rejected as not findings of fact. II: adopted in substance except "near-perfect" record rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. II, a-b: adopted or adopted in substance. II, c: first sentence rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence. Remainder adopted in substance. II, d: adopted. II, e: rejected as subordinate. II, f-k: adopted or adopted in substance, although the proposed facts do not adequately describe the incident at Mrs. Lanning's house. II, l: adopted in substance except that complaint filed against Mrs. Lanning is rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Attorney Douglas E. Whitney Maitland Springs Office Park 377 Maitland Avenue, Suite 101 Altamonte Springs, FL 32701 Jeffrey Long Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's Correctional Certificate No. 164605 should be disciplined for the reasons set forth in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this disciplinary proceeding, Petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Commission), seeks to discipline Correctional Certificate No. 164605 held by Respondent, Eric T. Jenkins, on the grounds that in December 1998 he was in possession of more than 20 grams of cannabis, a controlled substance, and he illegally carried contraband (cannibis) onto the grounds of Florida State Prison (FSP) while employed at FSP as a correctional officer. In his request for a hearing, Respondent denied the allegations. Periodically, and without notice, the Department of Corrections (DOC) sends a small contraband interdiction team (team) to various state correctional institutions for the purpose of intercepting contraband that may be covertly brought into the facility by DOC employees or inmate visitors. The team consists of a small number of specially trained DOC employees, including K9 units, and a volunteer Florida Highway Patrol trooper, who assists the team in making arrests. On Sunday, December 20, 1998, a team targeted FSP and arrived on the premises around 5:00 a.m. The inspection lasted until shortly after the last shift of employees reported to work around 4:00 p.m. Besides patting down employees and visitors, the team also searched the vehicles of employees that were parked in the employees' parking lot inside the prison. Respondent worked the last shift that day and arrived shortly before 4:00 p.m. He was driving an Isuzu Amigo with Florida vehicle tag "WSM 82B." To assist the team in its search, the team used several specially trained dogs (Blue, Smokey, and Thor) who were assigned the task of sniffing parked vehicles for narcotic odors. When a dog recognizes a narcotic odor, it "alerts" or responds to the odor and remains passively in front of the vehicle. After Blue "alerted" at the rear of Respondent's vehicle, a second dog, Thor, was brought to the vehicle and he also responded in the same manner. Respondent was then notified that the team wished to search his vehicle, and he executed a written Consent to Search form ageeing to a search. A search conducted by a DOC officer discovered a latex glove hidden under the front passenger seat of Respondent's vehicle. Inside the glove were two compressed baggies containing approximately 55 grams of a substance that appeared to be cannibis. Laboratory testing by a state chemist confirmed that the substance was indeed cannabis, and that it weighed 51.5 grams. Although the street value of the drugs was only around $275.00, in a prison environment, the drugs had a far greater value. Respondent initially agreed to be interviewed by a Florida Highway Patrol trooper at the prison regarding the contraband. He subsequently had a change of heart and declined to answer any questions. Respondent was then arrested for "drug offenses," booked into the Bradford County Jail, and charged with violating Sections 893.13 and 944.47(1)(a)4., Florida Statutes (1997). However, the disposition of the criminal matter is unknown. In any event, after being arrested, Respondent was immediately terminated from his position at FSP. In mitigation, Respondent has been certified as a correctional officer since June 26, 1996, and there is no evidence that prior disciplinary action has been taken against him. In aggravation, Respondent used his official authority to facilitate his misconduct; he was employed as a correctional guard when the misconduct occurred; Respondent has made no efforts of rehabilitation; Respondent stood to receive pecuniary gain by selling the contraband in the prison; and there are two established counts of violations of the statute requiring that correctional officers maintain good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order determining that Respondent has failed to maintain good moral character, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and that his Correctional Certificate No. 164605 be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowrey, Jr., Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael R. Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Eric T. Jenkins 1000 Bert Road Jacksonville, Florida 32211
The Issue The issues are whether the agency statement identified as Section 5.02.08 of the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary Policy Manual falls within the definition of a rule, and if so, whether rulemaking is feasible and practicable.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, including the stipulation of facts, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Berwyn R. Spear, also known as Pete Spear, operates a business under the name of "Pete's Chevron" located at 2151 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida. Among other things, the business provides wrecker services for towing automobiles. Besides operating his service station, for the last twelve years petitioner has been a member of the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary (Auxiliary), a statutorily created volunteer service organization whose members ride with and assist members of the Division of the Florida Highway Patrol (FHP) in the performance of their regular duties. He has expended almost $1,000 for equipment and uniforms. The Auxiliary functions under the direct supervision of the FHP, which in turn is a governmental unit under the jurisdiction of respondent, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. Auxiliary members are not required to be sworn police officers but are certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission. Members are required to have monthly activity amounting to a minimum of twenty-four hours per calendar quarter, but they receive no pay or benefits other than those prescribed by Part IV of Chapter 110, Florida Statutes, which governs volunteer organizations. Finally, Auxiliary members serve at the pleasure of the FHP director and are subject to removal at will. They have no statutory right of review or appeal for disciplinary action but there is an internal disciplinary review process administered by an FHP review board in Tallahassee. Pursuant to state law, and subject to further requirements in Chapter 15B-9, Florida Administrative Code, the FHP maintains a wrecker rotation list, by which the FHP facilitates wrecker services to persons needing assistance on the roadways. For the last twelve years and until February 1992, petitioner's business was on the rotation list and he derived several hundred dollars per month in such towing income. The rotation list works in the following manner. Whenever a trooper encounters circumstances requiring the towing of a motorist's vehicle, the trooper notifies the dispatcher of the need for a wrecker from the rotation list, unless the motorist expresses a desire for a specific wrecker service. The dispatcher then telephones the next appropriate wrecker service from the rotation list and makes a request for services. It is noted that FHP troopers are prohibited by internal policy 5.19.00 found in the FHP Policy Manual from being employed by any wrecker company (as opposed to just those on the rotation list) since the FHP deems this to be an unacceptable conflict of interest. The FHP has developed an Auxiliary Policy Manual (Manual) containing various written standards and guidelines governing the conduct of Auxiliary members. Like other policy manuals developed by the FHP, the Manual has not been formally adopted as a rule. As is relevant to this controversy, Section 5.02.08 of the Manual relates to the subject of conflict of interest, and prior to January 1992, simply stated in part that "any conflict between private employment and the FHP or any abuse of a member's FHPA position that benefits his employment will result in immediate dismissal from the FHPA." However, the FHP did not construe this provision as barring petitioner from being a member of the Auxiliary and at the same time having his wrecker business on the FHP rotation list. On January 29, 1992, the director of the FHP issued a memorandum to all troop commanders regarding a change in Section 5.02.08 of the Auxiliary Policy Manual. The newly added language read as follows: Due to the sensitive relationship between the Florida Highway Patrol and wrecker companies, employment involving wrecker companies that do business with the Florida Highway Patrol is considered to be a conflict of interest. The director's memorandum provided the following instructions to all troop commanders regarding the new language in Section 5.02.08: The attached policy revisions will bring the Florida Highway Patrol Auxiliary Manual in line with the Florida Highway Patrol Manual regarding employment by wrecker companies. If (sic) is requested that you survey all Auxiliary members in your troop to determine if any are in violation of this policy. Please take the necessary action to bring members found in violation of this policy into compliance. In the event the member cannot comply with this policy, it will be necessary that the member resign from the Auxiliary. Pursuant to this new policy, an FHP troop commander contacted petitioner in February 1991 and advised him that he must either remove his wrecker business from the FHP wrecker rotation list or resign from the Auxiliary. Although strongly disagreeing with the policy, petitioner advised the FHP by letter dated February 18, 1992, that he wished to remove his wrecker business from the rotation list. He did so in order to remain a member of the Auxiliary. After his informal appeal challenging the policy was denied, on August 7, 1992, petitioner filed his petition seeking to have the new language in Section 5.02.08 declared invalid as an unpromulgated rule. According to the FHP's chief of special operations, there is no discretion on the part of the troop commander or other enforcing officer except to require strict adherence to the policy. In other words, the policy in question is not subject in application to the discretion of the enforcing officer. Therefore, the policy has uniform application to all Auxiliary members and requires those members who own wrecker businesses on the FHP rotation list to choose between remaining a member of the Auxiliary or removing their business from the FHP rotation list. Since he is directly impacted by the policy, petitioner has standing to bring this action. In August 1992, respondent adopted substantial amendments to Chapter 15B-9, Florida Administrative Code, which relate to "Wrecker Qualifications and Allocation System." However, the rules do not address petitioner's concerns nor codify the so-called conflict of interest policy applicable to Auxiliary members. At hearing respondent also expressed the view, without further explanation, that if it had to adopt the Auxiliary policies as formal rules, it would be a difficult and "cumbersome" task, it might well "have the effect of eliminating the auxiliary service", it would "serve to inhibit the agency from doing its statutory job", and it "would seriously affect the ability of the agency to effectively operate an auxiliary volunteer service." These assertions were not contradicted. Even so, rulemaking is found to be feasible and practicable since there is no evidence to support a finding that at least one of the exceptions in Subsections 120.535(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, is applicable.
