Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
ALREE PORTEE vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 91-002306 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Apr. 16, 1991 Number: 91-002306 Latest Update: Sep. 14, 1992

The Issue The issue for determination in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive benefits under the retirement plan of his deceased mother, Violet Portee, pursuant to the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. 1/

Findings Of Fact Violet Portee was employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital ("Jackson") in Dade County, Florida, as a ward clerk from 1970 through October 3, 1990. Mrs. Portee retired from her employment at Jackson effective December 1, 1990. 4/ Mrs. Portee was a member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner is the son of Mrs. Portee and Mrs. Portee's closest surviving relative. Mrs. Portee was diagnosed with terminal, gastric cancer sometime in August, 1990. Petitioner first learned of his mother's condition from the attending physician when Petitioner visited his mother in the hospital. Mrs. Portee was admitted to the hospital for approximately one week on three separate occasions between August, 1990, and December, 1990. She began taking medications for pain in November, 1990. Her pain medication included Percodan, Tylenol 3 with codeine, Demerol, and morphine. Mrs. Portee went on sick and annual leave, and eventually went on leave without pay. Mrs. Portee executed a power of attorney in favor of her son on October 25, 1990. On November 14, 1990, Mrs. Portee met for approximately an hour and a half with Luis Gonzalez, a compensation specialist in the Jackson Human Resources Division. One of Mr. Gonzalez's primary functions is counseling employees on retirement matters. Mrs. Portee completed a request for estimate of her retirement benefits ("FRS Form FR-9") and her application for retirement ("FRS Form FR-11"). A retiree may select one of four options for retirement benefits on the FRS Form FR-11. Mrs. Portee selected Option 1 on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11. Option 1, Member Benefit Only, provides maximum monthly benefits for the retiree during his or her lifetime but provides no benefit for survivors of the retiree. Option 2, Ten Years Certain, provides benefits to the retiree during the retiree's lifetime and, in the event of the retiree's death within 10 years of the date of retirement, the same monthly amount is paid to the retiree's beneficiary for the balance of the 10 year period. The monthly benefit to the retiree under Option 2 is paid at an actuarial rate that is less than that paid under Option 1. Options 3 and 4 provide benefits to joint annuitants. 5/ Sometime before November 28 or 29, 1990, Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez discussed the retirement status of Mrs. Portee. Petitioner asked Mr. Gonzalez for instructions on how to change the option selected by Mrs. Portee on her Application For Service Retirement, Form FR-11, from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez explained that Mrs. Portee's selection of options could be changed in one of two ways. First, Mrs. Portee could come into Mr. Gonzalez's office, execute a new Form FR-11, and select Option 2. Second, Mrs. Portee could return the first retirement benefit warrant uncashed to the Division of Retirement and write on the warrant that she wished to change the benefits option from Option 1 to Option 2. Mrs. Portee was too ill to return to Mr. Gonzalez's office to execute a new retirement option. Petitioner decided to wait and return the first benefit warrant uncashed and request a change in the options selected. The first benefit warrant was dated December 31, 1990, Warrant No. 0580615. Mrs. Portee died on December 6, 1990, before receiving the first benefit warrant. The first benefit warrant was neither cashed nor returned to the Division of Retirement with written instructions to change the selection of benefit from Option 1 to Option 2. During his conversations with Mr. Gonzalez, Petitioner disclosed neither the seriousness of Mrs. Portee's medical condition nor that Petitioner had power of attorney for Mrs. Portee. If Mr. Gonzalez had known either fact, he would have proceeded more expeditiously to change Mrs. Portee's selection of Option 1 to Option 2. Petitioner and Mr. Gonzalez next spoke on December 8, 1990. Petitioner had telephoned Mr. Gonzalez on December 6, 1990, but Mr. Gonzalez was not in. When Mr. Gonzalez returned Petitioner's telephone call on December 8, 1990, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez that Mrs. Portee had died two days earlier. A meeting between the two men was set for December 18, 1990. At the meeting on December 18, 1990, Petitioner inquired about changing his mother's retirement benefits from Option 1 to Option 2. Mr. Gonzalez telephoned the Division of Retirement in Tallahassee, Florida, and was advised that Mrs. Portee's retirement benefits option selection could not be changed after her death. A final meeting was conducted on December 24, 1990, between Petitioner, Mr. Gonzalez, and Mr. Brian Derer, a benefits specialist with Jackson. Petitioner had come into the office to complete certain documents concerning Mrs. Portee's life insurance. During this meeting, Petitioner informed Mr. Gonzalez and Mr. Derer for the first time that Petitioner had power of attorney from Mrs. Portee. Mr. Gonzalez informed Petitioner that there was nothing he could do to change Mrs. Portee's option selection after her death. Mr. Gonzalez explained that he was an employee of Jackson and that neither he nor Jackson was an agency of the Division of Retirement or the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner contacted the Division of Retirement on January 14, 1991, for assistance. Petitioner was advised by Stanley Colvin to write to the Division of Retirement. In response to Petitioner's written request, the Division of Retirement advised Petitioner that the only benefit to be paid was a return of contributions to the retirement plan.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent should enter a final order awarding Petitioner those benefits that are most favorable to Petitioner pursuant to Sections 121.091(6), (7)(b), and (8), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1991.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68121.011121.091
# 1
THERON J. OWEN vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 79-000485 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-000485 Latest Update: Jul. 20, 1979

The Issue Whether Petitioner's retirement benefits should be suspended pursuant to Section 121.091(9)(c) , Florida Statutes. Petitioner appeared at the hearing unaccompanied by counsel or other representative. His rights in administrative proceedings conducted pursuant to Chanter 120, F.S., were explained to him and he elected to represent himself in the matter.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Theron J. Owen was employed by the Department of Transportation, State of Florida, for a period of 13 years, and made contributions under the applicable retirement system during that period. On March 1, 1977, at the age of 56, he retired under the Florida Retirement System, Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, with a monthly benefit of $88.79. (Testimony of Petitioner, Respondent's Exhibit 1) Petitioner was reemployed by the Department of General Services as a security guard at the State Office Building in Winter Park, Florida, on Nay 19, 1978. In December, 1978, Respondent received from Petitioner an executed Form FR23 "Application of Retiree for Suspension of Retirement Benefit and Return to Service" wherein he advised the Director of Retirement of his employment with the Department of General Services and that he had reached 500 hours of reemployment on August 15, 1978. Petitioner previously had provided verbal notice of his reemployment to Respondent in November, 1978. (Respondent's Exhibits 1-2) Petitioner's retirement benefits were suspended by Respondent in November, 1978, pursuant to Section 121.091(9) Statutes. However, December, benefit was inadvertently paid to Petitioner. During the period August- December, 1978, Respondent received $314.70 in retirement benefits. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Stipulation of Parties) Petitioner elected to take "early" retirement, but obtained reemployment with the state for financial reasons. He acknowledges his indebtedness to the state, but has been unable to obtain a loan to repay the overnayments. He has not received retirement benefits during 1979. He is of the opinion that the statutory provision which limits a retired state employee to state benefits only during the first 500 hours of reemployment with the state shows a punitive intent on the part of the legislature to prevent retired personnel from returning to gainful state employment. During his one-year tenure with the Department of General Services, he has been promoted and received an "above-satisfactory" performance rating. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1)

Recommendation That Respondent suspend payment of retirement benefits to Petitioner until restitution has been made of excess benefits paid in the amount of $314.70, plus accrued interest at 10 percent compounded annually from date of receipt of such excess benefits until date of repayment. DONE and ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Theron J. Owen 818 San Juan Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32807 L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (2) 121.021121.091
# 2
TIMOTHY GREEN vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 85-001824 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-001824 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 1985

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Timothy Green (Green), was born on April 19, 1941. Green was employed by Manatee County as a Highway Maintenance Technician on March 26, 1966. As a Highway Maintenance Technician, Green cleared ditches, brush and culverts. He also installed storm drainage pipe and operated chain saws and related tools. On September 24, 1984, Green was terminated from his job because of his inability to perform his assigned duties. Green referred to his termination as a "retirement." Having been promoted to Highway Maintenance Technician II, Green was earning $1,016.01 per month gross pay at the time he was terminated. He had accumulated 18.40 years of creditable service under the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Green is unable to read and has had no formal schooling other than the attendance of what he describes as "opportunity classes all his life." Green has not been found by any court to be incompetent to handle his personal affairs and generally paid his personal bills through money orders he purchased at convenience stores. However, Green's mental capabilities and ability to communicate are obviously quite limited, and his more complicated personal affairs were handled by his mother and sister. On September 28, 1984, Green sought out and met with Mr. A1 Chandler, Records Manager for Manatee County, at Chandler's office. Green thought that Manatee County already had "retired" him because of his disability and just wanted to get his retirement benefits. He did not understand the various optional benefits available to him as a member of the FRS. Green was able to communicate to Chandler only that he wanted to get all his money from retirement, or words to that effect. Chandler interpreted those words to mean that Green wanted to withdraw his contributions to the system. Based on his general familiarity with the FRS, Chandler discouraged Green from doing what he believed Green wanted to do (i.e.. withdraw his contributions from the system). Chandler believed intuitively that Green should not withdraw his contributions because he had accumulated 18.40 years of creditable service under the FRS. Chandler understood that Green's years of creditable service would entitle him to favorable benefits upon normal retirement at age 62. He therefore advised Green to wait and not to withdraw the contributions. Green, who never clearly understood the difference between getting his money (or benefits) out of the retirement system and withdrawing his contributions to the retirement system, decided that he did not want to wait as Chandler advised. Accordingly, Chandler gave Green a form to request a refund of his contributions to the FRS, and Green signed the form. The Request For Refund Form FRS-M81 Green signed contains the following information above his signature: TO THE DIVISION OF RETIREMENT: I hereby make application for refund of my accumulated contributions in the Florida Retirement Systems. I do hereby waive for myself, my heirs and assignees all rights, title and interest in the Florida Retirement Systems. However, Green could not read the refund language. He did not think there was any reason to ask Chandler to read it to him, and Chandler did not read it or explain it to him. Neither Chandler nor anyone else fully explained to Green what optional benefits he might be entitled to as a member of the Florida Retirement System other than to wait until normal retirement or withdraw his contributions. Specifically, neither Chandler nor anyone else explained to Green that his request for refund of his accumulated contributions would eliminate his right to apply for disability retirement benefits. In fact, on that same day, September 28, 1984, Green began completing an application for disability retirement benefits. On October 2, 1984, Green's Statement Of Disability By Employer was received by Manatee County's Personnel Office. The form was completed by Green's former immediate supervisors. On October 3, 1984, Green's Request For A Refund Form FRS-M81 was mailed to Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement (Division) by Manatee County. Sometime between October 18, 1984 and November 20, 1984, Green's completed Florida Retirement System Application For Disability Retirement, with his Statement Disability By Employer, was sent to and received by the Division. On October 29, 1984 the Division sent Green the refund of his accumulated contributions totaling $1,686.52. Until Green received the refund, he expected to receive monthly checks. When he received the refund, Green realized for the first time that he would not be receiving monthly checks and that his lump sum check would be in the amount of only $1,686.52. Green never had any actual intent to relinquish his right to apply for disability retirement benefits from the FRS.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Department of Administration, Division of Retirement: (1) enter a final order granting the Petition For Formal Proceedings in this case and determining that Petitioner, Timothy Green, has not waived his right to apply for disability retirement benefits: and (2) process the application of Petitioner, Timothy Green, for disability retirement benefits. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of October, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Office Division of Administrative Hearings 309 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1985.

Florida Laws (3) 121.021121.081121.091
# 3
FREDERICK M. RHINES vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 07-005050 (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 02, 2007 Number: 07-005050 Latest Update: Sep. 23, 2008

The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner became an employee of an FRS employer within a calendar month after completing his participation in the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) in violation of Subsection 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes (2006)1; whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an unadopted rule; and whether Respondent's interpretation of relevant statutes is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority.

Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to several facts in this proceeding. Respondent is the state agency responsible for administering the FRS. Petitioner was employed as an equipment operator (street sweeper) by the City of Venice, Florida (the City), for more than 35 years until he completed his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. At that time Petitioner was earning approximately $38,000.00 annually. The City revoked its participation in the FRS effective January 1, 1996, and established a new City retirement plan. The new City retirement plan applies to all employees hired after January 1, 1996. However, the City continued its participation in the FRS for all employees who were members of the FRS prior to January 1, 1996. Petitioner elected to participate in DROP on March 31, 2002. At the conclusion of DROP, Petitioner received a lump-sum payment of approximately $84,279.00 and received monthly benefits until Respondent ceased paying benefits in accordance with the proposed agency action. Petitioner's efforts at reemployment were unsuccessful. On January 31, 2007, the City employed Petitioner to perform the same work he previously performed at a base salary as a "new hire."2 The City assured Petitioner that reemployment would not adversely affect Petitioner's FRS retirement benefits because the City does not consider itself an FRS employer. A member of the City's human resources department contacted a representative for Respondent to verify the City's statutory interpretation. The conversation eventually led to this proceeding. Petitioner was not employed by an employer under the FRS during the next calendar month after completing his participation in DROP on January 11, 2007. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law hold that the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is a factual finding. When Petitioner began employment with the City on January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not a member of the FRS within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(12). He was not an employee covered under the FRS because he was hired after January 1, 1996, when the City revoked its participation in FRS. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(11). Petitioner was not employed in a covered group within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(34). Petitioner did not become a member under Chapter 121, and the City was not a "city for which coverage under this chapter" was applied for and approved for Petitioner. On January 11, 2007, Petitioner ceased all employment relationships with "employers under this system" within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(39). When Petitioner resumed employment on January 31, 2007, Petitioner did not fail to terminate employment with an employer under the FRS system. Petitioner's new employer was not an employer under the FRS system and had not been such an employer after January 1, 1996. After January 1, 1996, the City was not a covered employer for any employees employed after that date, including Petitioner. On January 31, 2007, Petitioner was not an employee of an employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(10). The City did not participate in the FRS system for the benefit of Petitioner. The employment of Petitioner by the City on January 31, 2007, had no financial impact on the FRS, and Petitioner did not begin to accrue new benefits with the FRS. Respondent did not demonstrate in the record why the agency's proposed statutory interpretation requires special agency insight or expertise and did not articulate in the record any underlying technical reasons for deference to agency expertise. Nor did the agency explain in the record or its PRO why the issue of whether Petitioner is an employee of an FRS employer is not an issue of fact that is within the exclusive province of the fact-finder. Respondent proposes a literal interpretation of selected statutory terms without explaining legislative intent for the prohibition against reemployment within the next calendar month.3 Respondent's proposed statutory interpretation also fails to distinguish the economic impact in situations involving what may be fairly characterized as a dual-purpose employer; that is one like the City which is part covered employer and part non-covered employer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order reinstating Petitioner's monthly retirement benefits, paying all past due amounts to Petitioner, with interest, and dismissing its request for reimbursement of past FRS benefits from Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 2008.

Florida Laws (3) 120.56120.57121.021
# 4
HERMAN H. WILLIAMS vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 77-000982 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000982 Latest Update: Mar. 08, 1978

Findings Of Fact The Division of Retirement will make no Findings of Fact relating to whether Petitioner's disability was in-line-of-duty. Accordingly, for the reasons mentioned previously, all findings contained in paragraphs 5, 6, 7, and 8, of the recommended order are rejected. However, the Division accepts the remaining Findings of Fact contained in the recommended order. As taken from the order these findings are: Herman Williams was an employee of the Department of Transportation and a member of the Florida Retirement System. The Division of Retirement approved payment of regular disability benefits to Herman Williams. Herman Williams is currently receiving and accepting these benefits. Herman Williams is an illiterate Seminole Indian, 62 years of age. Williams' duties with the Department of Transportation were driving a mowing tractor and cleaning out roadside ditches. Williams worked for the Department of Transportation approximately 21 years 11 months prior to being placed on the retired roles [sic]. On May 1, 1975, Williams was driving his tractor in the course of his regular employment at the Department of Transportation when the power steering of the tractor malfunctioned causing the front wheels to swerve violently, wrenching the steering wheel in Williams' hands and nearly throwing him from the tractor. Repairs had to be made to Williams' tractor by a Department of Transportation mechanic because the tractor was inoperative. The mechanic discovered a loose nut in the power steering assembly when he exchanged the power steering unit in Williams' tractor with another from the maintenance yard. When the new unit was installed in Williams's tractor it functioned normally. When the power steering from Williams' tractor was installed in the other tractor, it also functioned normally. The mechanic stated that the loose nut which he had discovered could cause the tractor to swerve violently in the manner Williams' had described. On the afternoon of May 1, 1975, Williams reported this instant [sic] to his supervisor, David McQuaig. Mr. McQuaig inquired as to any injuries to Williams and the tractor. Williams reported to McQuaig that the tractor had not been harmed and that he was only sore and stiff. No report of injury was prepared by McQuaig whose duty it was to file such reports. Williams' condition did not materially improve after seeking medical treatment by Dr. Albritton. Williams remained on sick leave until August 11, 1975, when it was exhausted. Williams then took annual leave from August 12, 1975 until September 23, 19975, when his retirement became effective. When the Petitioner's sick leave was exhausted, he was contacted by his supervisor in the Department of Transportation. He suggested that Williams could retire on disability if two physicians would state that he was disabled. This letter was read to Williams by his son, Eddie, because Williams is illiterate. Retirement application forms were provided Williams by the Department of Transportation. The physician report forms were completed by Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wilkerson. The statement of disability by employer form was completed by Williams' supervisor, David A. Young, Maintenance Engineer, for the Department of Transportation. Young stated that he completed the Statement of Disability by Employer, indicating that the application was for regular disability benefits because he had determined that no workman's compensation claim had been made by Williams and because Dr. Wilkerson's medical report had stated that the injuries occurred at Williams's home. The determination that the application was for regular disability benefits was solely Young's. The Application for Disability Retirement signed by Williams was prepared by personnel at the Department of Transportation District Office. This form was signed by Herman Williams; however, this form does not make provision for the member to state the nature of the disability benefits sought. Eddie Williams, son of Herman Williams, took his father to sign the forms at the Department of Transportation office. These forms were not explained to Williams, nor did Eddie Williams read them. Herman Williams was also unaware that such a benefit existed. Herman Williams stated he sought disability benefits based upon his injury on the job. Disability retirement was not discussed between Herman Williams and David Young. Based upon the application submitted in his behalf, the Division of Retirement made a determination that Williams was entitled to regular disability benefits. Williams was unaware that he was not receiving the in-line-of-duty benefits until his son inquired as to how much money he was receiving. When he was advised, he told his father that it appeared to be too little money. At this point Eddie Williams discovered that the application had been for regular disability.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the administrator permit the applicant to file an amended application for disability in-line-of-duty retirement, and, further, that said application be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. W. Chalkley, III, Esquire Post Office Box 1793 Ocala, Florida 32670 Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Asst. Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF RETIREMENT DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION HERMAN H. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-982 STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, Respondent. / FINAL AGENCY ORDER A petition for formal proceedings having been duly filed, and a request for hearing officer having been duly made, a hearing was held in the above-styled cause pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, before the Honorable Stephen F. Dean, Hearing Officer, in Ocala, Florida, on September 15, 1977. The Petitioner requested relief from the Division's determination that Petitioner was not entitled to resubmit an application for disability retirement requesting in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits because he had previously applied for and accepted regular disability retirement. The purpose of the hearing was to determine the factual basis for Petitioner's claim that he should be allowed to apply for in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. APPEARANCES AT THE HEARING: Eric E. Wagner, Esquire J. W. Chalkey, III, Esquire Law Offices of Eric E. Wagner, P.A. Post Office Box 1763 Ocala, Florida 32670 For the Petitioner E. Douglas Spangler, Jr., Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C-Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 For the Respondent The Hearing Officer entered his Recommended Order on December 8, 1977, in which he sustained Petitioner's assertion and concluded, on the basis of the findings made as a result of the hearing, that Petitioner should be entitled to resubmit his application and request in-line-of-duty disability benefits. In addition to this determination, the Hearing Officer found that Petitioner was in fact entitled to in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. In making this latter conclusion, both as a matter of fact and of law, the Hearing Officer went beyond his scope of authority. As will be developed more fully herein, the Hearing Officer was without jurisdiction to consider the issue of whether Petitioner was in fact entitled to the in-line-of-duty benefits. Therefore, so much of the recommended order as purports to address this issue is of no effect, being the result of a hearing that did not comply with the essential requirements of law.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57121.091121.23
# 5
ROBERT CHAPIN AND STUART CHAPIN vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 98-003543 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 05, 1998 Number: 98-003543 Latest Update: Feb. 23, 1999

The Issue Whether the Petitioners are entitled to benefits as joint annuitants of the deceased employee.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are the adult, nondependent children of the deceased, Leonora Chapin. Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of managing the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Leonora Chapin was a vested member of the FRS with over ten years of service as a teacher with the Miami Dade County School District. The exact number of years of her service was not established nor is it dispositive of the issues of this case. In February of 1991, Ms. Chapin became extremely ill. This illness prevented her from returning to work but she did not formally retire. Instead, Ms. Chapin continued as an active member of the FRS until her death, April 14, 1991. At the time of her death, Ms. Chapin had designated "according to will" as her beneficiary to receive benefits, if any, which would be payable at her death. This Personal History Record form is the only record of any designation by the deceased received by the FRS. Based upon the foregoing designation, the Respondent determined that the deceased's two sons would share the deceased's personal contributions to the FRS account. This amount totaled $4,305.17. The Petitioners have disputed this determination and claim they are entitled to benefits as joint annuitants.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying Petitioners' claim for benefits and returning the member's contributions in the amount of $4,305.17. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Robert Chapin 14014 Northwest Passage Unit 240 Marina Del Ray, California 90292 Stuart Chapin 10729 Westminster Avenue Los Angeles, California 90034 Barry M. Brant, C.P.A. Berkowitz, Dick, Pollack & Brant, LLP One Southeast Third Avenue, Suite 150 Fifteenth Floor Miami, Florida 33131

Florida Laws (1) 121.091
# 6
JOYCE E. LAYTON vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-000685 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Dade City, Florida Feb. 27, 2004 Number: 04-000685 Latest Update: Aug. 09, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for disability retirement benefits should be reinstated.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner Joyce Layton is a member of the Florida Retirement System. In November 2002, Ms. Layton submitted an application for disability retirement benefits to the Division. The application was not notarized and was incomplete. Several documents were needed to process the application. By letter dated December 10, 2002, the Division wrote Ms. Layton acknowledging receipt of the disability application and requesting additional information. Enclosed with the letter were two blank FR-13b forms (Physician's Statement Forms), which were necessary to complete the application. Ms. Layton did not respond to the December 10, 2002, letter. The Division mailed another request on January 13, 2003, again, including two blank FR-13b forms with the letter. Ms. Layton did not respond to the January 13, 2003, letter. On February 17, 2003, the Division mailed a third request for information to Ms. Layton. Blank FR-13b forms were also included with this letter. Ms. Layton did not respond to the February 17, 2003, letter. The Division mailed a fourth request to Ms. Layton on March 24, 2003, again, requesting information necessary to complete her application for disability retirement benefits. After the Division did not receive a response to its previous letters, it sent a letter dated April 15, 2003, by certified mail, to Ms. Layton advising her that she had 21 days from the date of the letter to submit the necessary information or her application would be cancelled. Ms. Layton did not respond to this letter. Finally, the Division sent a letter dated June 3, 2003, by certified mail, to Ms. Layton notifying her that her disability application was cancelled and giving her 21 days to request a hearing. She did receive this letter, and this timely appeal followed. The applicant is responsible for ensuring the Division receives the information necessary to process an application for disability retirement benefits. Ms. Layton did not provide the necessary information.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, issue a final order denying the request of Petitioner, Joyce E. Layton, to reinstate her disability retirement application. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Joyce E. Layton 5980 Boyette Road Wesley Chapel, Florida 33544 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominquez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
# 7
EVELYN S. DAY vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 90-002085 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Crestview, Florida Apr. 03, 1990 Number: 90-002085 Latest Update: Aug. 17, 1995

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Evelyn S. Day, is entitled to modify her type of retirement benefits from "early service retirement" to "disability retirement."

Findings Of Fact The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 1 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 2 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 3 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 4 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 5 are accepted in part. In that paragraph, the Hearing Officer found as follows: Her memory and thought processes had evidentially [sic] already begun deteriorating because Mrs. Day was unable to ask guestions concerning her retirement rights, responsibilities, and entitlements very well. Because of this condition, Ms. Hobby agreed to accompany her to the offices of the Division of Retirement in order to ascertain what her retirement rights, entitlements, and responsibilities might be preparatory to Mrs. Day electing to retire. The above-quoted findings are rejected as conclusory and not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 6 are rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence, except the finding that Mrs. Day retired and Ms. Hobby filled out her application for retirement. Additionally, the Hearing Officer's findings that petitioner was incompetent and suffering from Alzheimer's disease are rejected as being legal conclusions not supported by any judicial order or by any competent, substantial evidence in the record. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 7 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 8 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 9 are accepted. That portion of the Findings of Fact in paragraph 10 which concluded the petitioner was incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The petitioner has never been declared incompetent or determined to be incompetent by a medical doctor. Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 11 are accepted in part and rejected in part. That portion of the Findings which states that the application for retirement was not filed by Ms. Day is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. In point of fact, the Division has a filed application signed by the petitioner. The portion of the paragraph finding the petitioner incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. There has been no legal or medical determination that the Petitioner is incompetent. Additionally, there is no competent, substantial evidence that petitioner is suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The Hearing officer's finding that the petitioner's application was filed in error is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, according the Petitioner, Evelyn Day, the opportunity to change the status of her retirement benefits from early retirement to disability retirement, effective as of the date her earlier retirement application was accepted by the agency. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 48B-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-2085 PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-8. Accepted. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Accepted. Accepted to the extent that the record establishes that the Petitioner signed the application. Accepted to the extent that it was established that Petitioner has received the retirement checks. It is not established that the Petitioner cashed or deposited those retirement checks by preponderant evidence of record. Accepted insofar as it recites the Respondent's position in this matter. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esq. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Mr. Joseph G. Stokes 911 "B" Street Crestview, Florida 32536 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560

Florida Laws (5) 120.56120.57120.68121.031121.091
# 8
DORIS G. HUTCHINSON vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 91-003870 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 25, 1991 Number: 91-003870 Latest Update: Jan. 31, 1992

The Issue The general issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner is entitled to modify her deceased husband's retirement benefit option by changing from "Option 1" to "Option 3". Embodied within that issue is the question of whether the Petitioner's deceased husband was competent to effect a change in his retirement option from service retirement "Option 3" to disability retirement "Option 1."

Findings Of Fact The decedent, Elijah B. Hutchinson, was a teacher of math and science for the Calhoun County school district for some 31 years. In the early 1980's, his health had deteriorated significantly due primarily to diabetes mellitus, which caused a number of associated complications necessitating several hospitalizations during the early 1980's. In consideration of his deteriorating health, the decedent elected to retire in the spring of 1983. He filed an application dated May 27, 1983, seeking regular retirement benefits from the Florida Retirement System. See Exhibit 1 in evidence. In response to his application, the decedent received information from the Division advising him of his retirement benefits under the different retirement options he was entitled to select. On or about June 24, 1983, the decedent elected retirement Option 3. Option 3 retirement benefits include the retiree's entitlement to a reduced monthly retirement benefit during his lifetime with the same monthly retirement benefit being paid, after his death, to his "joint annuitant", in this case, his surviving spouse, the Petitioner. Thereafter, and before he received any benefit check from his initially-selected Option 3 retirement, the decedent appeared at the Division's offices and requested to change his type of retirement or option. On August 12, 1983, therefore, the decedent requested to change his type of retirement benefit from regular retirement to disability retirement. On that date, he requested to change his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. An explanation of the benefits to be provided and the differences in the two options as to his benefits was given to the decedent by an employee of the Division. See Exhibit 4 in evidence. The decedent thereupon changed his option selection from Option 3 to Option 1. In 1983, a retirement system member receiving retirement benefits as the result of a disability could only receive benefits in accordance with either Option 1 or Option 2, if he chose to elect disability retirement. On September 16, 1983, the decedent was mailed a letter from the Division advising him that his application for disability retirement benefits had been approved by the State Retirement Director and acknowledging that he had elected Option 1 for disability retirement. Thereafter, the decedent received and cashed a number of State warrants representing payment of those retirement benefits under Option 1. See Exhibit 10 in evidence. The decedent died on March 8, 1991. The Petitioner had been unaware that he had changed from Option 3 benefits to Option 1 benefits, as delineated above. Upon learning of this, after the decedent's death, the Petitioner, on April 30, 1991, requested the Division to modify the benefits option selected by the decedent to Option 3 benefits. Her basis for requesting this change was that the decedent had not been mentally or physically competent to make an informed selection at the time he changed his Option 3 retirement benefits election to Option 1 and that, therefore, she should be allowed to modify and reinstitute his retirement election to Option 3 benefits, which would provide her the death benefits permitted under the Option 3 election. This request was denied by the Division by its "final agency action letter" dated May 21, 1991, by which the Division advised the Petitioner that based upon its records, the decedent, who had requested Option 1 retirement benefits, was added to the retirement payroll in that category for September, 1983 and that he had received benefit payments and negotiated the checks, so that, under the provisions of Rule 22B-4.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, the selection of the option could no longer be altered. The Petitioner's testimony and that of Phillip H. Hutchinson indicates that sometime in 1983, the decedent suffered a cerebral-vascular incident or "stroke". This testimony is borne out by the medical records in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 1, which, however, does not indicate when the stroke occurred. The Petitioner and her son maintain in their testimony that the stroke resulted in a deterioration in the decedent's mental faculties such that he could no longer manage his business affairs, pay bills, and handle financial matters in general. They maintain that this was evidenced also by a marked personality change whereby the decedent became extravagant with money, as evidenced by impulsively ordering and purchasing items which he observed advertised on television, sending money to television evangelists, and otherwise being free with donations. This was entirely different from his character and personality before he suffered the stroke, whereby he was known to be miserly with the family funds and very careful about not spending money unnecessarily. As a result of his stroke, he was no longer able to handle his business affairs; and his spouse, the Petitioner, had to assume the duties of paying family bills and otherwise handling financial and business matters for the family. When the decedent first decided to retire, he had explained to the Petitioner that he would select a retirement option which would give her something after he "passed"; and he showed her the retirement system booklet of allowable retirement options in discussing the matter with her. He never mentioned to her that he decided to or did change his option to Option 1 disability retirement. Although the Petitioner may have established that due to the stroke he suffered, the decedent may have, indeed, had difficulty attending to financial matters and overseeing and managing the family finances, the Petitioner failed to establish that at the time he made the election to select Option 1 retirement benefit, he did not possess the mental capacity to make a knowing and intelligent selection of that option and to waive his previously-selected Option 3 benefits. The evidence shows that he appeared at the Division's offices and, after an explanation of the option he chose to select, he freely and voluntarily selected that option and signed the pertinent documents attesting to it. It has simply not been demonstrated by substantial evidence that at the time the decedent made the second retirement option election, he did not understand the nature and consequences of that election, especially since it was not established by the Petitioner when he actually suffered the stroke, other than that it occurred sometime in 1983. As found above, the decedent made the election to chose Option 1 retirement benefits in August, 1983. Consequently, due to insufficient evidence, it cannot be found that the Petitioner's decedent was incompetent to knowingly and intelligently elect to receive Option 1 retirement benefits at the time he made the election.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Division denying the request of the Petitioner to modify the retirement benefits elected by the decedent from Option 1 retirement benefits entitlement to Option 3 retirement benefits entitlement. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrativ Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24 day of December, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 91-3870 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted, except that the evidence does not support that the stroke actually occurred in mid 1983. 3-4. Accepted. Rejected, as not being demonstrated by the preponderant evidence of record. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-14. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: A.J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Bldg. C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Phillip H. Hutchinson 4115 Tanglewood S., Apt. 570 Palm Beach Gardens, FL 33410 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1560

Florida Laws (4) 120.56120.57121.091121.131
# 9
CARLENE RENY, PETITIONER FOR THE ESTATE OF ANNE M. BIRCH vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 16-007617 (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Dec. 30, 2016 Number: 16-007617 Latest Update: Apr. 30, 2018

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive survivor benefits from a joint and survivor annuity, under Option 3 of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) defined benefit plan, following the death of her spouse, Anne M. Birch, who, as an FRS member, elected Option 1 in 2012 when Florida law would not allow Ms. Birch to elect Option 3 or 4 and designate the joint annuitant as Petitioner, whom she lawfully married after electing Option 1.

Findings Of Fact Ms. Birch, who was born on September 12, 1950, and Petitioner, who was born on August 26, 1956, fell in love and began to live together in 1992. They jointly owned all significant property, including their primary residence, with a right of survivorship and were jointly liable for household expenses and debt, including the mortgage note on their primary residence. On January 31, 2001, Ms. Birch executed a will that left any remaining property to Petitioner and named her as the personal representative of the estate.1/ Ms. Birch designated Petitioner as her primary beneficiary for employee benefits that authorized such designations. On October 11, 2002, Ms. Birch and Petitioner signed an Amended Declaration of Domestic Partnership, pursuant to the Broward County Domestic Partnership Act of 1999, to register themselves as domestic partners under Broward County Ordinance 1999-18. Fully vested and having accrued substantial benefits from having worked for Broward County in an FRS-covered position for nearly 30 years, on October 23, 2012, Ms. Birch entered DROP, effective October 1, 2012. At that time, Ms. Birch elected Option 1 for the payment of her benefits, checking the "no" box in response to the question of whether she was married. As described in the Conclusions of Law, Option 1 is the maximum benefit and is payable for the life of the retiree. Ms. Birch's monthly Option 1 benefit was $3039.25. The monthly Option 3 benefit, which, as described below, is payable until the latter death of the FRS member or her surviving spouse,2/ would have been nearly $1000 less than the monthly Option 1 benefit.3/ Respondent implemented Ms. Birch's election by paying Ms. Birch's Option 1 benefits into her DROP account. In August 2013, Ms. Birch became ill with cancer. She eventually had to quit working and terminated DROP, at which point Respondent paid Ms. Birch her Option 1 benefits directly. On June 16, 2014, Ms. Birch and Petitioner were lawfully married in Massachusetts. Almost two years later, on May 24, 2016, Ms. Birch died, at which time all payments under Option 1 ended. When Ms. Birch and Petitioner registered as domestic partners in Broward County, no state allowed or recognized same- sex marriage, often pursuant to a "Defense of Marriage Act" (DOMA). Continuously since 1997, Florida law banned the allowance and recognition of same-sex marriage, even if performed in a jurisdiction where such a marriage were legal, and restricted "marriage" to a legal union between a man and a woman and "spouse" to a member of such a union. § 741.212(1) and (3); Ch. 97-268, § 1, at 4957, Laws of Fla. (Florida DOMA).4/ Massachusetts was the first state to allow and recognize same-sex marriage, effective in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (decision stayed 180 days to allow legislature to enact law consistent with the court's ruling). Three or four years after Goodridge, Ms. Birch and Petitioner visited Massachusetts, but did not exercise their right to enter into a lawful marriage at that time. A series of court decisions invalidated the federal and state DOMAs, including the Florida DOMA. On June 26, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), held that the federal DOMA, as applied to federal tax law, was unconstitutional. By order entered August 21, 2014, in Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (N.D. Fla. 2014) (Brenner I), Respondent was enjoined from enforcing or applying the Florida DOMA, although the court stayed its injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court lifted the stay,5/ as reported by the district court in Brenner v. Scott¸ 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91969 (N.D. Fla. 2016) (Brenner II), in which, on March 30, 2016, the court issued a summary judgment on its injunction in Brenner I. Between Brenner I and Brenner II, on June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state DOMAs were unconstitutional in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Petitioner testified that she and Ms. Birch would have been lawfully married by October 2012, when Ms. Birch retired, but for the Florida DOMA. This testimony is credited. Long prior to 2012, Ms. Birch and Petitioner organized their financial affairs as though they were lawfully married, sharing assets and liabilities equally. Petitioner testified credibly that she and Ms. Birch always "played by the rules": thus, Ms. Birch and Petitioner would have been deterred from getting married prior to Ms. Birch's retirement, such as when they were visiting Massachusetts in 2007, due to the legal futility of attempting to obtain recognition in Florida of a marriage lawfully performed elsewhere. Less persuasive is Petitioner's testimony that, in October 2012, Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3, if this option had been available to her, and it is impossible to find on this record that she would have done so. There is no evidence that Ms. Birch and Petitioner rearranged their financial affairs to achieve, to the extent possible, an Option 3 election. Household income was $1000 per month greater under Option 1 than Option 3, so life insurance on Ms. Birch or an annuity for Petitioner could have mitigated Ms. Birch's inability to choose Option 3 when she retired. Prior to retiring, Ms. Birch did not attempt to elect Option 3 in writing or orally. Even after retiring, as noted below, Ms. Birch displayed ambivalence about whether she wanted to change her election. As a named defendant in Brenner I, on April 14, 2015, Respondent responded to the injunction against its enforcement or application of the Florida DOMA by issuing Information Release #2015-184 (Release). Sent to FRS members who retired prior to January 2, 2015, and elected Option 1 or 2, the Release states: . . . FRS retirees and . . . DROP participants who were in legally-recognized same-sex marriages at the time they retired or began DROP participation and chose Option 1 or Option 2 will have an opportunity to change benefit payment options in light of . . . Brennan. These retirees will be able to change their retirement payment option from their current selection to Option 3 or Option 4 to provide a continuing monthly benefit to their spouse. The retirees impacted by this change have an effective retirement date or DROP begin date on or before January 1, 2015. The Release provides that an eligible retiree interested in a second election must contact Respondent in writing, identify the retiree's spouse, and certify that the retiree and spouse were married in a state or country that allowed same-sex marriage when the FRS member retired. The Release states that Respondent will respond with an estimate of the new benefit payment under the option that the retiree intends to select and provide the retiree with the paperwork necessary to make the second election. Available on Respondent's website,6/ the Release provides the opportunity of a second election of Option 3 or 4 to any FRS member7/ who retired prior to January 2, 2015; chose Option 1 or 2 when she retired; and was in a same-sex marriage when she retired. The Release places no limit on how far in the past the retirement took place.8/ The thrust of Petitioner's case is directed toward backdating her lawful marriage to Ms. Birch to a point prior to Ms. Birch's retirement. As noted above, the timing of the lawful marriage is a problem under the Release, which requires a lawful marriage at the time of retirement, but another problem under the Release is the fact that the Release provides to the FRS retiree, not her surviving spouse, the opportunity for a second election, nor, as discussed immediately below, is this a technical requirement that can be overcome by Petitioner's serving as a representative of Ms. Birch--the second election is extended only to living FRS retirees. The virtue of the Release for Petitioner is that it confers the opportunity of a second election without any proof that, at the time of the first election, the FRS member would have elected Option 3 or 4. If Petitioner does not rely on the Release, she must also prove that Ms. Birch would have elected Option 3 or 4, which, as noted above, she has failed to prove. By limiting the second election to the FRS retiree, the Release limits the potential of adverse selection in allowing a second election, possibly years after the first election.9/ There are three possibilities at the time of the second election: both spouses are alive, only the FRS retiree is alive, and only the surviving spouse is alive. The Release's restriction of the right to make the second election to the FRS retiree means that the second and third possibilities do not result in second elections: respectively the FRS retiree would not reduce her payment to provide an annuity to a spouse who is already deceased10/ and a surviving spouse has no right to make an election under the Release. The couple may gain a minor financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option several years after the retirement of the FRS member, so that they may be better informed of the health of each of them. But the surviving spouse would gain a significant financial advantage by the opportunity to revisit the payment option after the death of the FRS member. Shortly after Respondent issued the Release, Ms. Birch filed with Respondent a Spousal Acknowledgement Form that she had signed on May 8, 2015. This form indicates that Ms. Birch is married, but nothing else. At about the same time, though, Ms. Birch contacted Respondent by telephone to discuss the Release and any choices that she may now have under the Release. By letter dated May 26, 2015, Respondent calculated monthly benefit amounts under Options 1 through 4, but the letter warns: "Your benefit option will not be changed unless you complete and return the required forms noted in this letter" and indicate a choice of repaying in a single payment or installments the excess benefits of Option 1 over the smaller benefits paid under Option 3 or 4. The May 26 letter requires further action on Ms. Birch's part and predicates any right to a second election upon a lawful marriage at the time of retirement. The record provides no basis for finding that any of Respondent's representatives misstated the lawful-marriage condition. To the contrary, in at least one conversation with Ms. Birch, Respondent's representative insisted on verification of a lawful marriage as of October 2012. Additionally, Ms. Birch was not requesting a right to make a second election; at most, she was gathering information to prepare to decide whether to ask to change her election. By June 26, 2015, pursuant to a note documenting a telephone conversation between Ms. Birch and a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch decided to keep Option 1 rather than make a second election of Option 3.11/ In May 2016, Ms. Birch finally made a clear attempt to change her election to Option 3. By letter dated May 12, 2016, Ms. Birch stated that she was lawfully married to Petitioner on June 12, 2012, and asked for "the change in beneficiary for my pension, due to the one time option given" in the Release. Even at this late date, Ms. Birch was not yet ready to elect Option 3 because the letter concludes: "I would like to see the breakdown of monetary options to make an informed decision." However, on May 20, 2016, during a telephone call with a representative of Respondent, Ms. Birch provided the date of birth of Petitioner and asked Respondent to expedite her request because she did not have long to live. On the same date, Ms. Birch signed an Option Selection form electing Option 3. By letter dated July 18, 2016, Respondent acknowledged the death of Ms. Birch and informed Petitioner that all pension benefits ended at that time. By letter dated September 22, 2016, Petitioner asked for reconsideration and supplied copies of various documents, the relevant provisions of which have been referenced above. By letter dated October 20, 2016, Respondent denied the request for reconsideration.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for benefits under Option 3 from Ms. Birch's FRS account and dismissing Petitioner's Request for Administrative Hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of January, 2018.

# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer