The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for disability retirement benefits should be reinstated.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Joyce Layton is a member of the Florida Retirement System. In November 2002, Ms. Layton submitted an application for disability retirement benefits to the Division. The application was not notarized and was incomplete. Several documents were needed to process the application. By letter dated December 10, 2002, the Division wrote Ms. Layton acknowledging receipt of the disability application and requesting additional information. Enclosed with the letter were two blank FR-13b forms (Physician's Statement Forms), which were necessary to complete the application. Ms. Layton did not respond to the December 10, 2002, letter. The Division mailed another request on January 13, 2003, again, including two blank FR-13b forms with the letter. Ms. Layton did not respond to the January 13, 2003, letter. On February 17, 2003, the Division mailed a third request for information to Ms. Layton. Blank FR-13b forms were also included with this letter. Ms. Layton did not respond to the February 17, 2003, letter. The Division mailed a fourth request to Ms. Layton on March 24, 2003, again, requesting information necessary to complete her application for disability retirement benefits. After the Division did not receive a response to its previous letters, it sent a letter dated April 15, 2003, by certified mail, to Ms. Layton advising her that she had 21 days from the date of the letter to submit the necessary information or her application would be cancelled. Ms. Layton did not respond to this letter. Finally, the Division sent a letter dated June 3, 2003, by certified mail, to Ms. Layton notifying her that her disability application was cancelled and giving her 21 days to request a hearing. She did receive this letter, and this timely appeal followed. The applicant is responsible for ensuring the Division receives the information necessary to process an application for disability retirement benefits. Ms. Layton did not provide the necessary information.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, issue a final order denying the request of Petitioner, Joyce E. Layton, to reinstate her disability retirement application. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Joyce E. Layton 5980 Boyette Road Wesley Chapel, Florida 33544 Sarabeth Snuggs, Interim Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominquez, General Counsel Department of Management Services 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Evelyn S. Day, is entitled to modify her type of retirement benefits from "early service retirement" to "disability retirement."
Findings Of Fact The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 1 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 2 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 3 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 4 are accepted. The Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph 5 are accepted in part. In that paragraph, the Hearing Officer found as follows: Her memory and thought processes had evidentially [sic] already begun deteriorating because Mrs. Day was unable to ask guestions concerning her retirement rights, responsibilities, and entitlements very well. Because of this condition, Ms. Hobby agreed to accompany her to the offices of the Division of Retirement in order to ascertain what her retirement rights, entitlements, and responsibilities might be preparatory to Mrs. Day electing to retire. The above-quoted findings are rejected as conclusory and not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 6 are rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence, except the finding that Mrs. Day retired and Ms. Hobby filled out her application for retirement. Additionally, the Hearing Officer's findings that petitioner was incompetent and suffering from Alzheimer's disease are rejected as being legal conclusions not supported by any judicial order or by any competent, substantial evidence in the record. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 7 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 8 are accepted. The Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 9 are accepted. That portion of the Findings of Fact in paragraph 10 which concluded the petitioner was incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. The petitioner has never been declared incompetent or determined to be incompetent by a medical doctor. Findings of Fact as set forth in paragraph 11 are accepted in part and rejected in part. That portion of the Findings which states that the application for retirement was not filed by Ms. Day is not supported by competent, substantial evidence. In point of fact, the Division has a filed application signed by the petitioner. The portion of the paragraph finding the petitioner incompetent is rejected as not supported by competent, substantial evidence. There has been no legal or medical determination that the Petitioner is incompetent. Additionally, there is no competent, substantial evidence that petitioner is suffering from Alzheimer's disease. The Hearing officer's finding that the petitioner's application was filed in error is not supported by competent, substantial evidence.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, according the Petitioner, Evelyn Day, the opportunity to change the status of her retirement benefits from early retirement to disability retirement, effective as of the date her earlier retirement application was accepted by the agency. DONE AND ORDERED this 3rd day of January, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 48B-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-2085 PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 1-8. Accepted. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT Accepted. Accepted to the extent that the record establishes that the Petitioner signed the application. Accepted to the extent that it was established that Petitioner has received the retirement checks. It is not established that the Petitioner cashed or deposited those retirement checks by preponderant evidence of record. Accepted insofar as it recites the Respondent's position in this matter. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esq. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Mr. Joseph G. Stokes 911 "B" Street Crestview, Florida 32536 Larry D. Scott, Esq. Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 1639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, Thelma H. Dampier, is entitled to consideration of her second application for disability retirement benefits based on the submission of new medical information.
Findings Of Fact Thelma H. Dampier was a member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS), Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and had more than ten years of creditable service. She terminated her employment in August, 1988. In October, 1988, Ms. Dampier applied for in-line-of-duty disability retirement under FRS. By its final action letter received by Ms. Dampier on July 27, 1989, the Division denied her application for disability benefits. Under the applicable procedural rules, Ms. Dampier had 21 days to file a petition for an administrative hearing before the State Retirement Commission. She failed to request a hearing on the denial of benefits and her right to a hearing ceased. On September 8, 1990, Ms. Dampier filed a second application for in- line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. The application included medical records from Doctors Evans, Andrews, Barrow, and Chance. The medical records of Doctors Evans and Andrews had been submitted with and considered in connection to the first application. The medical records of Doctors Chance and Barrow were submitted for the first time with the second application. The report of Dr. Barrow opines that Ms. Dampier is permanently and totally disabled, but it does not reflect her condition at the time she terminated employment or any connection between her condition and her employment. The report of Dr. Chance, a chiropractic physician, relates to neck, shoulder and lower back pain. The report does not state that Ms. Dampier is totally and permanently disabled. Instead, it states that Ms. Dampier suffers only mild degenerative changes. It also does not relate that opinion to the date on which her employment terminated. The Division has a policy set forth in a Memorandum for Record dated July 17, 1990, regarding handling of reapplications for disability benefits. The policy specifies that reapplications will be considered "only when the member presents information of the existence of a medical condition that existed prior to termination of employment--unknown at the time of the initial application." This policy is reasonable and consistent with the Chapter 121.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that The Division of Retirement enter a Final Order denying consideration of Thelma H. Dampier's second application for in-line-of-duty disability benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division ofAdministrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Division of Retirement Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); and 4(4). Proposed findings of fact 5 and 6 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed finding of fact 7 is repetitive and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Thelma H. Dampier Post Office Box 342 Melrose, FL 32666 Stanley M. Danek Division Attorney Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 A. J. McMullian III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Building C Tallahassee, FL 32399 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to disability retirement benefits calculated as if she had reached the age of 65, irrespective of her true age.
Findings Of Fact From April 1969 until March 1996, Petitioner, Bobbie Jones Scott, was employed as a school teacher by the Okaloosa County School Board. She served 27 years as an elementary school teacher, teaching at the same Okaloosa County elementary school for her entire tenure. Prior to commencing her teaching career, Petitioner served as a library aide in Okaloosa County for the full 9-month term of that position in the 1967-1968 school year. Petitioner is a member of the TRS. The TRS was closed to new members on December 1, 1970. Since closure, teachers have been enrolled in the Florida Retirement System (FRS). At some point, Petitioner purchased retirement credits in TRS for the school year during which Petitioner served as a library aide. Early retirees under both TRS and FRS, retiring without disability, have their retirement benefits actuarially reduced by five percent per year or five-twelfths percent per month for each year or fraction of year that the retiree is under the age of 62. See, Section 121.021(30), Florida Statutes and Rule 6S-7.003, Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner first inquired about retirement in 1993, when her husband, also a teacher, retired. She requested and obtained from the Division an estimate of early retirement benefits. In 1993, the early retirement penalty reduced Petitioner's retirement benefit to 67.9 percent of her normal retirement benefit. The reduction was so great that Petitioner elected to keep teaching. On October 16, 1994, Petitioner severely injured her arm when she slipped on a freshly waxed floor at the elementary school. Several surgical procedures were required over the next two years as a result of this accident. Despite extensive physical therapy, Petitioner did not regain full range of motion and full use of her dominant right arm. Petitioner could not raise her arm above shoulder level and could not raise it high enough to write on a blackboard. The injury clearly interfered significantly with Petitioner's ability to teach. In December 1994, because of her injury, Petitioner requested an estimate of retirement benefits. Again, the early retirement penalty reduced the retirement benefit to 77.9 percent of normal benefits. The reduction was so great that Petitioner could not afford to retire. Approximately three months after her accident on January 17, 1995, the Petitioner returned to teaching. Her physical therapy and surgical treatment continued. In June 1995, while recuperating from the third operation on her arm, Petitioner called the Division of Retirement to request information on disability retirement. She specifically told the person she spoke with that she was a member of TRS. Petitioner was sent an application form and instructions for retirement under FRS instead of an application and instructions for TRS. At that time, the Petitioner did not submit the application because a decision on the application would not be reached before the start of the 1995-1996 school year. Petitioner wished to avoid commencing the school year, only to leave teaching several weeks into the school year, necessitating finding and hiring a replacement teacher and disrupting the students’ course of studies. In November 1995, Petitioner was diagnosed with diabetes. Teaching was becoming detrimental to Petitioner's health. At the urging of her physician she elected to pursue disability retirement. The Petitioner reviewed a booklet sent to her by Respondent entitled "Florida Retirement System Disability Benefits." The Petitioner relied on the statement on page 27 of the booklet which states, "Disability benefits are not reduced for early retirement." Based on that statement Petitioner applied for disability retirement and submitted the disability retirement application which she had received earlier along with the requisite supporting documentation on January 10, 1996. Neither the FRS disability retirement application form nor the FRS Disability Retirement Handbook informed Petitioner that there would be an early retirement penalty for disability retirees. However, the FRS literature also indicates that employees who are members of other retirement systems may be governed by different rules and should look to those other retirement systems. Unfortunately, Petitioner had been given the wrong information by the Division of Retirement even though she had specified she was a member of TRS. On February 9, 1996, after receiving Petitioner's application, the Division of Retirement sent a letter to Petitioner advising her that the incorrect disability retirement application form had been used. A TRS Disability Retirement Application form was enclosed with the letter. Only the title of the application was changed. In essence, the TRS application was the same as the FRS application. No booklet or pamphlet explaining the TRS system was provided. On February 14, 1996, immediately upon her receipt of the February 9, letter and the TRS Disability Retirement Application form, Petitioner telephoned the Division of Retirement and spoke with Mark Sadler, a retirement administrator in the disability determination section within the Division of Retirement. The Petitioner explained that she had used the disability retirement forms provided to her by the Division. She inquired as to whether an additional 30 days would be needed to process her application. She also indicated that the reason she was still working and had not retired previously is that she could not afford to be assessed the early retirement penalty. Mr. Sadler informed the Petitioner that she would need to submit the correct TRS Disability Retirement application. However, Mr. Sadler agreed to accept the physician’s report of disability already submitted with the FRS form and to expedite her request for disability retirement since the medical information which Petitioner had submitted met the TRS requirements for disability documentation. On or about March 7, 1996, Petitioner received notification from the Division of Retirement that her application for disability retirement had been approved. The next day, Petitioner met with Virginia Bowles, a benefits specialist with the Okaloosa County School Board, to obtain an estimate of her retirement benefits under Plan E of the TRS system. Mrs. Bowles prepared an estimate of Petitioner’s benefits. The estimate did not show any reduction of benefits for early retirement. The form Ms. Bowles prepared was clearly labeled "estimate" and provided, inter alia, that Petitioner would receive a calculation of her retirement benefits from the Division of Retirement in approximately three weeks. While in Mrs. Bowles’ office, Petitioner insisted on confirmation from the Division of Retirement that an early retirement penalty would not be imposed on her benefits. In the Petitioner’s presence, Mrs. Bowles called the Division of Retirement to verify that there was no early retirement penalty for disability retirees. Mrs. Bowles was assured that there was no such penalty. Mrs. Bowles immediately relayed that information to Petitioner. Based on this representation, Petitioner immediately resigned her position on March 8, to be effective March 13, 1996.1 Had Petitioner known there would be a reduction in her disability retirement benefits and had she not received incorrect information from both the Division of Retirement and the Okaloosa County School Board, she would have found some way to continue working to avoid the early retirement penalty even though continued employment would have been detrimental to her health.2 At the time of her retirement, Petitioner had attained the age of 58 years and 4 months, 44 months short of the normal retirement of age 62. The estimate prepared by Ms. Bowles reflected that Petitioner's monthly retirement benefit would fall between $1,458.20 and $1,512.41. At the time of her resignation, Petitioner was earning over $39,000 per year as an experienced teacher. Once Petitioner resigned her position, she could not immediately return to work. Board policy required her to wait one year before re-employment and then she could be rehired at a starting teacher’s salary of about $21,000. A couple of weeks after resigning her position, Petitioner received a calculation of her retirement benefits from the Division of Retirement. The benefits were significantly lower than the estimate of benefits prepared by Mrs. Bowles. Retirement benefits under Plan E are calculated by, first, determining an "average final compensation," or AFC, for an employee by averaging the 10 highest years of salary in the employee’s last 15 years of employment. The employee’s compensation percentage, or "comp percent," is then determined by assigning a 2 percent value for every year of creditable service. The AFC is then multiplied by the comp percent to arrive at a retirement benefits figure. In Petitioner’s case, the Division calculated AFC as $32,601.10. The Division, based on 27.9 years of service, arrived at a comp percent of .558, resulting in a normal retirement allowance of $18,191.41 per year or $1,515.95 per month.3 However, because Ms. Scott fell into the early retirement category under TRS her benefits were reduced. In calculating Petitioner’s disability benefits, the Division of Retirement reduced the otherwise normal retirement benefit calculation by 18.33 percent to 81.667 percent of her normal benefit. The reduction resulted in a monthly retirement benefit of $1,238.03. The reduction is the result of a five- twelfths of one percent reduction for each month that Petitioner was short of age 62 and is the correct benefit calculation under TRS. See Rule 6S-7.003, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it RECOMMENDED: That the Division of Retirement calculated Petitioner’s benefits correctly and is not estopped from reducing Petitioner’s benefits based on her status as a disability retiree. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1997.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer would recommend that the decision of the Division of Retirement to terminate the retirement benefits of Peter C. Versage be sustained, and that said benefits be terminated until the amount of $1,261.96 is repaid to the trust together with interest at ten percent per annum from the date of May 23, 1977. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Peter C. Versage 6929 NW 34th Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the exhibits presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Since 1964, Petitioner has been employed by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation. His duties consist of operating a tractor pulling a rotary mower which cuts grass on the rights of way of primary and interstate highways. Exhibits 2, 3 and 4. Prior to 1970, Petitioner was a member of the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System, under which he was not covered for in line of duty disability retirement benefits. In 1967, while employed by the State of Florida, Department of Transportation, Petitioner injured his lower back and left leg when a tractor fell off the back of a lowboy trailer. Exhibits 1, 3, 4 and 11. In 1970, Petitioner transferred from the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Exhibit 17. During his regular working hours in March of 1974, Petitioner again injured his back while moving road material. Exhibits 1, 3, 4, 8 and 13. On October 31, 1974, Petitioner applied for disability retirement on the basis of the March of 1974 injury. Exhibit 1. Mr. W. W. Ray, Engineer II with the Department of Transportation, completed a "Statement of Disability by Employer" form on October 21, 1974, answering affirmatively the question of whether petitioner was, prior to his alleged disability, able to perform all of the duties of his position fully and completely. It was further stated by Mr. Ray that petitioner "has been very good employee during his employment. Had worked up to lead worker in his mowing crew." Mr. Ray concluded that "most any job which we have would require a certain amount of working with hand tools and stooping over or standing for long periods of time which could be painful for persons with back problems." Exhibit 2. Two Florida licensed physicians submitted Florida Retirement System Physician's Reports. Form FR-13b. Dr. W. J. Newcomb stated that Petitioner "had strained his back and aggravated the degenerative arthritic condition that existed in his back." He had no "definite indication of proof that the original injury of 1966 [sic] or the subsequent injury of 1974 caused his degenerated condition." Dr. Newcomb felt "it was just probably aggravated by the related accidents." It was opined that Petitioner could do the duties of his occupation in a protected manner, but he would have chronic difficulty with his back. The performance of Petitioner's duties would produce pain because of his current illness or injury. Exhibit 3. Dr. Howard T. Currie opined that Petitioner was unable to, perform any of the duties of his occupation because of his current illness or injury. Exhibit 4. On June 5, 1975, a letter was sent to Petitioner by Administrator, Robert L. Kennedy, Jr., under the signature of David W. Ragsdale, Supervisor, Disability Determination Unit. This letter notified Petitioner that the State Retirement Director was unable to approve his application for in line of duty disability retirement benefits "[s]ince your injury is an aggravation of a preexisting condition and since your initial injury occurred prior to the Florida Retirement System..." However, it was determined that Petitioner did meet the requirements for regular disability retirement as described in F.S. 121.091(4)(b) Exhibit A. In accordance with F.S. Chapter 120, the Petitioner filed a petition requesting a hearing and the Respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that Petitioner be awarded the greater benefits allowable for a member totally and permanently disabled in line of duty. Respectfully submitted and entered this 9th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George Ralph Miller, Esquire P.0. Box 112 DeFuniak Springs, Florida 32433 L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The primary issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Sections 121.091(3)(b) and 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, based on an effective retirement date of February 1, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Historical Facts When he passed away on January 26, 1996, at the age of 56, Roy Hoffman, Jr., was a fully vested participant in the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"), having worked as a professor at Florida Atlantic University for nearly 27 years. Professor Hoffman's named beneficiary and joint annuitant was his wife, Petitioner Jeanne Hoffman ("Hoffman"). As such, Hoffman became entitled, upon her husband's death, to receive a lifetime retirement benefit from the FRS. By letter dated March 8, 1996, Respondent Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement ("Division"), which administers the FRS, first notified Hoffman of her eligibility to receive a benefit. The letter provided in pertinent part as follows: As the designated beneficiary and joint annuitant, you are entitled to the Option 3 monthly retirement benefit. The Option 3 monthly benefit is payable for your lifetime and is estimated to be $1,812.58 effective February 1, 1996. To receive this benefit, you need to [submit an application and provide certain information.] If we may be of further assistance, please call us at (904)488-5207. After receiving this letter, Hoffman was uncertain about whether she should accept the benefit immediately or, alternatively, postpone the benefit commencement date until nearer her own retirement, so she called the Division for assistance. Following a telephone conversation with an FRS counselor, Hoffman was left with the impression that she would be better off waiting until she reached the age of 59.5 years to begin receiving the monthly benefit, for the benefit, she believed, would then be higher.1 The Division sent a second letter to Hoffman, which was dated April 26, 1996, and provided: Please refer to our letter dated March 8, 1996. Before we can finalize [your] account, we need [to receive] the following [items and information from you.] Hoffman did not respond to this letter. Four months later, the Division sent a third letter to Hoffman regarding her benefit eligibility. Dated August 28, 1996, this letter provided in relevant part as follows: We have not received a response from our letters dated March 8, 1996 and April 26, 1996. If we have not heard from you within thirty days of the date of this letter, the file will be placed on inactive status. It will then be your responsibility to contact us to apply for a monthly benefit. The benefit will be effective the first of the month following contact from you. By this "warning letter," the Division intended to communicate its decision that, unless Hoffman submitted an application for benefits on or before September 27, 1996, she would forfeit the right to receive an "early retirement-death benefit"2 based on an effective date of retirement ("EDR") closely tied to her husband's date of death and be deemed to have elected a "deferred monthly benefit"3 based on a post-mortem EDR tied to the Division's receipt of her application for benefits. (EDR is a critical date because that is when the benefit accrues. See § 121.021(41), Fla. Stat.4) The parties dispute whether, in fact, the warning letter reasonably notified Hoffman of the Division's decision; the issue will be taken up below. Hoffman did not take the warning letter to mean what the Division had intended to convey. Thus she had no idea that she was in jeopardy of forfeiting the right to an early retirement-death benefit. Further, she did not deliberately elect to forego receipt of an early retirement-death benefit in favor of a deferred monthly benefit. Rather, being unfamiliar with the details regarding benefits payable under the FRS, Hoffman believed that, without any present action on her part, the benefit to which she was entitled had begun upon her husband's death to accrue for her use and benefit and would continue to accumulate until she was ready to begin receiving the benefit in monthly installments. Consequently, Hoffman made no reply to the warning letter, and at some point after September 27, 1996, the Division placed her file on inactive status. For the next eight-and-a-half years, nothing relevant to this case occurred. Then, in January 2005, Hoffman met with a financial planner for advice concerning her retirement. She was 57 at the time and told the planner about the benefit she expected to receive in a couple of years as her late husband's joint annuitant. The financial planner recommended that she contact the Division straightaway. On January 31, 2005, Hoffman called the Division and was informed that, having failed to apply for an early retirement-death benefit by September 27, 1996, in accordance with the warning letter dated August 28, 1996, she had forfeited nine years' worth of retirement income, and that her only remaining option was to request a deferred monthly benefit based on an EDR of February 1, 2005, at the earliest. The Division followed this telephone conversation with a letter dated February 16, 2005, which made clear that the only benefit for which Hoffman could apply would commence no earlier than February 1, 2005. Being given no choice, Hoffman applied as instructed, with the result that the FRS began paying Hoffman approximately $2,011 per month, which it was continuing to do as of the final hearing. Thereafter, by letter dated March 1, 2005, Hoffman petitioned the Division to pay her a retirement benefit "retroactive" to February 1, 1996, the date which, had she applied for an early retirement-death benefit on or before September 27, 1996, would have been her husband's EDR, without controversy.5 The Division denied Hoffman's request, by letter dated March 15, 2005. Relying on Section 121.091, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035, which will be examined below, the Division determined that it could not "pay benefits retroactive to 1996 because [Hoffman had] not compl[ied] with the Rule requiring that the application be filed timely." Hoffman requested a hearing on this determination, giving rise to DOAH Case No. 05-3200. Hoffman also petitioned the Division, pursuant to Section 120.542, Florida Statutes, to waive——or grant her a variance from——the provisions of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c) upon which the Division intended to rely in rejecting her claim for an early retirement-death benefit. The Division denied Hoffman's petition for waiver or variance in an order dated August 15, 2005. Thereafter, Hoffman timely requested a hearing on the matter, which led to the commencement of DOAH Case No. 05-3679. Factual Analysis The parties sharply disagree about whether the Division reasonably notified Hoffman of the important decision (see paragraph 6, supra) that it made in late August 1996 respecting her eligibility to receive a benefit, which decision the Division intended to communicate to Hoffman via the warning letter. To recapitulate, the warning letter told Hoffman that if she failed to contact the Division by September 27, 1996, then (1) her file would become "inactive"; (2) it would be her responsibility to initiate further contact with the Division; and (3) her "benefit" would be "effective" starting the month after she contacted the Division. Yet, in fact, the Division had decided that if Hoffman did not contact the Division by September 27, 1996, then (1) she would forfeit the right to receive an early retirement-death benefit based on an EDR closely proximate to her husband's date of death; (2) the Division would treat her inaction as an affirmative election to receive a deferred monthly benefit; and (3) her benefit would be based on an EDR related to the Division's receipt of her application for benefits. It is striking, in reading the warning letter from the standpoint of a reasonable recipient, that no mention was made therein of the different types of benefits available to a surviving spouse, no explanation regarding the distinction between an early retirement-death benefit and a deferred monthly benefit was given, and no information concerning a beneficiary's right to elect the latter as an alternative to the former——much less why one might do so——was imparted. (The same can also be said of the two letters that preceded the warning letter.) It is striking, too, that neither the warning letter nor the two earlier ones mentioned EDR or its significance. Instead, the warning letter spoke of an effective date of "benefit," which, at least without more information than was contained in the letter, could be understood to refer to the date on which the benefit payments would commence as opposed to when benefits would start to accrue. The undersigned finds, therefore, that, as a matter of fact, the warning letter itself did not reasonably communicate that Hoffman was at risk of forfeiting the early retirement- death benefit and being deemed to have elected a deferred monthly benefit based on a future EDR to be determined. Put another way, although the warning letter clearly established a deadline (September 27, 1996) for making contact with the Division, its description of the consequences of letting the deadline pass without contacting the Division did not fairly match the consequences the Division actually had decided would follow such inaction. Of course, as the Division points out, the warning letter was not the only source of information about retirement benefits available to Hoffman. There were, in addition, the governing statutes and rules. Hoffman did not actually avail herself of these references, but, as the Division argues, she is presumed to know the contents of the applicable laws.6 Perhaps, armed with such knowledge, she would have——and hence should have——understood what the Division was trying to tell her in the warning letter. If Hoffman had consulted the relevant statutes, she would have learned that she was entitled to receive an early retirement benefit pursuant to Section 121.091(3), Florida Statutes, which provides as follows: EARLY RETIREMENT BENEFIT.--Upon retirement on his or her early retirement date, the member shall receive an immediate monthly benefit that shall begin to accrue on the first day of the month of the retirement date and be payable on the last day of that month and each month thereafter during his or her lifetime. Such benefit shall be calculated as follows: * * * (b) If the employment of a member is terminated by reason of death subsequent to the completion of 20 years of creditable service, the monthly benefit payable to the member's beneficiary shall be calculated in accordance with subsection (1), but shall be based on average monthly compensation and creditable service as of the date of death. The benefit so computed shall be reduced by five-twelfths of 1 percent for each complete month by which death precedes the normal retirement date specified above or the date on which the member would have attained 30 years of creditable service had he or she survived and continued his or her employment, whichever provides a higher benefit. There is no dispute that Hoffman was entitled to an early retirement benefit under Section 121.091(3)(b) when her husband's employment was terminated by reason of death after completing nearly 27 years of creditable service. The parties agree as well that, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the statute, the benefit would have been reduced by five percent per year for each of the approximately three years by which Professor Hoffman's death preceded the date on which he would have attained 30 years of creditable service. See also Fla. Admin. Code R. 60S-4.005(2)(c)(describing benefits payable upon early retirement brought about by death). If Hoffman had read Section 121.091(7)(b), Florida Statutes, she would have learned the following: If the employment of an active member who may or may not have applied for retirement is terminated by reason of his or her death subsequent to becoming vested and prior to his or her effective date of retirement, if established, it shall be assumed that the member retired as of the date of death in accordance with subsection (1) if eligible for normal retirement benefits, subsection (2) if eligible for benefits payable for dual normal retirement, or subsection (3) if eligible for early retirement benefits. Benefits payable to the designated beneficiary shall be as follows: 1. For a beneficiary who qualifies as a joint annuitant, the optional form of payment provided in accordance with [option 3] shall be paid for the joint annuitant's lifetime. Clearly, under the plain language of Section 121.091(7)(b), Hoffman was entitled to receive death benefits in the form of an early retirement benefit, for which latter her husband was eligible at the time of his death. As just mentioned, however, Professor Hoffman satisfied the conditions set forth in Section 121.091(3)(b) for an early retirement benefit, payable to his beneficiary, without reference to Section 121.091(7)(b). Moreover, because Professor Hoffman was, at the time of his death, closer to attaining 30 years' service than reaching age 62, Hoffman's early retirement benefit would be highest if calculated under Section 121.091(3)(b). Nevertheless, as Section 121.091(7)(b) is not inconsistent with Section 121.091(3)(b), there is no reason to treat them as mutually exclusive. Thus, bowing to the interrelatedness of these statutes——Section 121.091(3)(b)(early retirement benefits upon termination of employment by death) and Section 121.091(7)(b)(death benefits)——the undersigned has chosen to use the term "early retirement-death benefit" to refer to that benefit, available thereunder, which is based on an EDR in close proximity to the member's death. As an alternative to the early retirement-death benefit, Section 121.091(7) makes available to beneficiaries such as Hoffman another option, namely the "deferred monthly benefit." Had Hoffman studied the statute, she would have discovered that [t]he designated beneficiary who is the surviving spouse or other dependent of a member whose employment is terminated by death subsequent to becoming vested, but prior to actual retirement, may elect to receive a deferred monthly benefit as if the member had lived and had elected a deferred monthly benefit, as provided in paragraph (5)(b), calculated on the basis of the average final compensation and creditable service of the member at his or her death and the age the member would have attained on the commencement date of the deferred benefit elected by the beneficiary, paid in accordance with option 3 of paragraph (6)(a). § 121.091(7)(h); see also Fla. Admin. Code. R. 60S-4.008(2)(b). The deferred monthly benefit allows a surviving spouse to postpone the deceased member's EDR, thereby reducing or eliminating the early retirement penalty of five percent per annum for each year the EDR precedes the member's normal retirement date.7 Postponing the EDR would make sense, most obviously, when, because of the number of years between the member's date of death and his or her normal retirement date, the survivor's early retirement-death benefit would be substantially consumed by the penalty. Because Professor Hoffman met the criteria for an early retirement benefit under Section 121.091(3)(b), however, his wife's benefit was subject to a relatively light penalty. Thus, it is unlikely that Hoffman intentionally would have made an election under Section 121.091(7)(h) for a deferred monthly benefit, had she been aware of the statute. The Division has promulgated a rule that specifies how the EDR will be determined in certain circumstances. Rule 60S- 4.0035(3)(c) was available to inform Hoffman as follows: For a member who dies prior to an effective retirement date established pursuant to paragraph (a) or (b), the effective retirement date shall be the first day of the month following the month in which the member died, provided the joint annuitant makes timely application for benefits; or, for a deferred monthly benefit, the first day of the month following the month in which the Division receives the joint annuitant's application for benefits, or the first day of a later month specified by the joint annuitant. Significantly, the Division has not established by rule a method of determining whether an application is "timely" for purposes of Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c). Rather, it determines timeliness on a case-by-case basis. Had Hoffman been aware of Rule 60S-4.0035(3)(c), she might have surmised, upon reading the warning letter, that the Division had decided that her application for benefits would be "timely," for purposes of the Rule, only if received on or before September 27, 1996. She might also have reasoned that if her application were untimely, then the applicable EDR might not be February 1, 1996 (i.e. the first day of the month following the month in which her husband had died). At that point, she might have concluded that unless her application were received by September 27, 1996, she would forfeit the early retirement- death benefit, as the Division would deem her delay an election to receive a deferred monthly benefit. Maybe Hoffman would have connected all these dots. The undersigned finds, however, as a matter of fact, that a reasonable person could not have figured out what the Division had decided and what it intended to do, even if armed with the statutes and rules, because ascertaining the true nature of the Division's determination entails more analytical, indeed legal, reasoning than an ordinary layperson should be expected to employ. In fact, it is determined, the warning letter was inadequate to put even a well-informed person, cognizant of the applicable laws, on notice of the Division's decision regarding Hoffman's potential forfeiture of the early-retirement death benefit and "deemed election" of the deferred monthly benefit. While the warning letter was deficient in that it failed reasonably to tell Hoffman what the Division actually had determined with regard to her substantial interests, it was defective in yet another consequential way: the warning letter failed to notify Hoffman of her right to request a hearing to determine the substantial interests affected by the Division's establishment of an application deadline and the consequences of noncompliance therewith. The warning letter, in other words, did not afford Hoffman a clear point of entry into an adversarial proceeding, where the Division would be required to substantiate its determination with competent substantial evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order determining that Hoffman shall receive an early retirement-death benefit based on an EDR of February 1, 1996, and establishing the form in which Hoffman shall be paid the benefits that have accrued, but not been paid, from the EDR to the present, as well as the benefit going forward.10 In the event that one or more factual disputes arise over the amount of the unpaid accrued benefits or the method of paying them, the amount or form of the benefit going forward, or some combination of these, then Hoffman should be afforded the right to request a hearing to determine the disputed issue(s).11 DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 2006.
The Issue Prior to convening the hearing, a short prehearing conference was held in which it wad developed that the Division of Retirement controverted Jones' eligibility for in-line-of-duty disability retirement on the basis that Jones' disability did not arise totally from his injury suffered while a member of FRS.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Baker was called by the Petitioner and testified that his associate, Dr. Willis, had initially treated Mr. Jones in 1969 for an injury to his back. Dr. Baker testified from Dr. Willis' medical records, Dr. Willis having died since the date of Jones' treatment. Dr. Willis had treated Jones for low back sprain. Jones recovered and returned to work after the 1969 injury. On August 11, 1970, Jones again sought treatment from Doctors Baker and Willis for pain in the lower back. At this time, the trouble was again diagnosed as low back sprain (lumbar sacral sprain). Jones was treated and returned to work. On August 25, 1970, Jones was seen as a result of an ankle injury suffered in a tractor accident which did not affect his back. In February 1973, Jones injured his back stepping out of a truck. This was diagnosed as a sprain of the lower back with possible disc disease. Jones was eventually hospitalized by Dr. Baker, and Jones recovered slowly from acute muscle spasm. He returned to work in May 1973 and was told to wear a brace. However, Jones continued to have problems with his back up until June 1973 when the spasm ceased. He then reported no more difficulty until May 1974, when he injured his back lifting a can of fuel. After being injured on May 3, 1974, Jones was treated by Dr. Baker for acute muscle spasm, acute lower back sprain which affected the sciatic nerve. Dr. Baker prescribed bed rest, a bed board, and muscle relaxants. On May 10, 1974, Dr. Baker hospitalized Jones and a myelogram was done which did not reveal any rupture of the disc. Various treatments were tried and after July 23, 1974, a discogram was done which revealed the degeneration of three disc in the lower back. The condition placed pressure on the nerve roots and spinal cord. Dr. Baker said that the periods of recuperation in 1969 and 1970 were within normal limits and expressed his opinion that Jones recovered from these injuries. Dr. Baker expressed his medical opinion that the accidents that Jones suffered in 1973 and 1974 had disabled Jones by placing pressure on the affected disc which had been weakened by disease and a curvature of Jones' spine. Because of Jones' recovery from the 1969 and 1970 injuries to his back, Dr. Baker was of the opinion that these incidents had not contributed to Jones' ultimate disability. The Division of Retirement has not controverted the disability status of the Petitioner, Jones, as evidenced by its approval of regular disability benefits. As stated above, the matter in controversy was whether Jones' disability arose totally from accidents suffered while Jones was a member of FRS. The uncontroverted testimony of the medical expert, Dr. Baker, was that Jones' disability arose solely from injuries to his back occurring in 1973 and 1974, after Jones had become an FRS member. To the extent Jones' back may have been diseased in 1969, 1970 or other times prior to his entry into FRS, the record is clear that he worked and contributed to the retirement system regularly from December 1, 1970, until February 1973. Therefore, he was not "disabled," having performed his job duties for over three years. It was only after being injured in 1973, after which he had an extended recuperative period, and again in May 1974, that Jones was unable to return to his duties because of his disabilities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, Jones' disability was suffered in line of duty and after he was covered by FRS; therefore, Jones is entitled to and it is recommended that he receive in-line-of-duty disability benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November 1975. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Matthews, Esquire Suite 210, 101 Wymore Road Altamonte Springs, Florida L. Keith Pafford, Esquire Division Attorney Division or Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Waltraud E. Paehler, was a classroom teacher in the Clay County public school system until 1993, and says she had a total of nineteen years of service. During that time period, she participated in the Florida Retirement System, which is administered by respondent, Division of Retirement (Division). In 1992, petitioner was suffering from a number of illnesses, including chronic kidney failure and congestive heart failure, which impaired her ability to continue working as a teacher. She also suffered from depression. These conditions continued into 1993. During this time period, she was hospitalized on at least two occasions. Because her work was very stressful, and tended to exacerbate her medical condition, petitioner accepted her physician's advice and decided to resign her teaching position effective April 14, 1993. On April 21, 1993, or a week later, she executed her application for retirement and opted to take early retirement effective May 1, 1993, when she was fifty-four years of age. Even though the local school board had periodically distributed information booklets to all teachers, including petitioner, concerning early, normal and disability types of retirement, and the various retirement options were discussed annually at each school's in-service training seminar, petitioner says she was still unaware of the disability retirement option. Thus, she elected to take early retirement on April 21, 1993. Because of her age, her retirement benefits were reduced by forty percent, or five percent for each year under the normal retirement age of sixty-two. Assuming she was qualified, had she elected to take disability retirement, there would have been no penalty because of her age. At or about the time petitioner decided to resign her teaching position, her daughter, who was assisting petitioner in her personal affairs, telephoned the local school board in an effort to ascertain potential retirement options for her mother. She spoke with an unknown individual in the school personnel office who the daughter says was not "very knowledgeable." The two discussed "in general what (her) mother could do" with respect to retirement, but the daughter says she received no specifics other than the fact that her mother would be "entitled to partial pay." She also requested that an application for service retirement form be mailed to her mother. The daughter then relayed this sketchy information to her mother. Because of financial constraints, and in order to receive her benefits immediately, petitioner decided to take early retirement rather than wait until normal retirement age. After selecting the option 1 benefit, which entitled her to benefits for her lifetime only, petitioner carried the form to her school's personnel office where she executed it on April 21, 1993, before the principal's secretary, a notary public. Although the secretary could not recall the specific event, she affirmed that she would not allow anyone to sign a document who did not appear to be competent. In selecting option 1, which gave the highest monthly benefits for early retirement, petitioner acknowledged she understood the ramifications of making that choice when she did so on April 21, 1993. Thus, on that date she possessed sufficient mental capacity to know that these benefits would last only during her lifetime, and her daughters would not receive any benefits after her death. At final hearing she confirmed that, prior to executing the form, she had reviewed the various options under early retirement and selected the first option since she "figure(d) (she had) done enough for them all (of her) life, they can take care of themselves." In June 1994, petitioner read an article in a teacher trade publication and learned that a number of states offered disability retirement as an option and did not penalize retirees for early retirement due to a disability. This article prompted petitioner the following month to write a letter to the Division. When petitioner made inquiry with the Division in July 1994 concerning a change from early (service) to disability retirement, she was told that under Rule 60S-4.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, she could not do so after cashing her first check. By then, petitioner had long since cashed the first retirement check mailed to her at the end of May 1993. That advice prompted her to eventually challenge the Division's rejection of her claim on the theory that she was "incapacitated" when she made her decision to take early retirement. In support of her contention that in 1993 she lacked the necessary mental capacity to make a reasoned decision concerning her retirement, petitioner presented the testimony of three health professionals from whom she was receiving care in 1993. Their deposition testimony is found in petitioner's exhibits 1-3 received in evidence. Dr. Hardin, a family physician, was petitioner's primary treating physician from February 1992 until April 1993. In the spring of 1993, he recalled petitioner as being "confused," "in an imbalanced state," suffering "mental duress," dependent on explicit instructions for appointments, and taking a variety of prescribed medications for tobacco cessation, chronic renal failure, congestive cardiac condition, high blood pressure, cardiomyopathy, tremors, anxiety and migraine headaches. Because of these conditions, Dr. Hardin found it difficult to believe that she could "handle" a more complicated matter such as choosing a retirement option. Dr. Hardin acknowledged, however, that during the spring of 1993, he had little chance "to follow her" since another physician, Dr. Stoneburner, was managing petitioner's most important illness, renal failure. Dr. Stoneburner, a nephrologist and internist who has treated petitioner for a kidney disease since 1985, felt that in the spring of 1993 she "was not in a very good position to make a competent decision based on her emotional state." Just prior to her retirement, he observed petitioner as having "significant depression" and "a lack of desire to work." She was also taking as many as six or seven medications at one time which could "possibly" cause "someone to be confused." Based on these circumstances, Dr. Stoneburner opined that petitioner was not competent to make a rational judgment. However, Dr. Stoneburner conceded that if petitioner had been given retirement options explained in layman's terms, and had someone to assist her in explaining the various options, she could have made an intelligent decision. Kristina Crenshaw, a licensed mental health counselor, met with petitioner on four occasions between February 18 and April 12, 1993. Ms. Crenshaw found petitioner to have "significant difficulty with depression," in an "agitated, very stressed, (and) overwhelmed" condition, and with a "strong sense of uncertainty about her future." While the witness believed that petitioner would have understood a pamphlet describing her retirement options, she would not have "necessarily understood all the implications to her own personal life." The witness agreed, however, that once petitioner made a decision to resign her job, she seemed more "upbeat" and "positive." Further, petitioner had told her by telephone on April 15, 1993, that she felt "much better" after retiring from her job. The counselor did not know if petitioner was mentally competent when she opted for early retirement a week later. Nothwithstanding the testimony of the health professionals, the findings in paragraph 7 are deemed to be more compelling on the critical issue of competency, and it is found that on April 21, 1993, petitioner understood the nature and consequences of her acts, and she was capable of binding herself by the retirement application. Therefore, her request to have rule 60S-4.002(4) waived, or to have her "contract" with the Division set aside, should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order determining that petitioner was mentally competent when she elected to take early retirement and that her request to have rule 60S-4.0002(4) waived so as to permit her to file a request for disability retirement be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-4841 Petitioner: Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 4-5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Covered in preliminary statement. 14-20. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 21-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 25-31. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 32-37. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 38-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 40. Covered in preliminary statement. 41-43. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: Rejected since the evidence shows that petitioner was employed by the Clay County School Board and not the Duval County School Board. Also, the only evidence of record as to years of service is the testimony of petitioner that she had nineteen years of service. However, this fact is not necessary to resolve the dispute. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. Partially accepted in findings of fact 8 and 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 6-7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 10-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a proposed finding of fact has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for the resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark H. Levine, Esquire 245 East Virginia Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1263 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement 2639-C North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560
The Issue The issue is whether the correct retirement date was established for Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Scurlock was employed as a secretary by the Public Defender of the 14th Judicial Circuit for 12 to 13 years, in Panama City, Florida. As such, and after becoming vested in the Florida Retirement System (FRS), she accrued certain rights under the FRS. The Division has over 900 employees and administers benefits for more than 700,000 members. The Division is charged with administering the FRS. Ms. Scurlock's performance while employed by the Public Defender deteriorated in 2004. As a result, she was discharged on October 27, 2004. She had been diagnosed as having multiple sclerosis prior to her discharge. She is currently medically unable to engage in gainful employment. Ms. Scurlock does not recall if the Public Defender provided her with information concerning retirement at the time of her discharge. Nevertheless, she was aware of the availability of disability retirement, and during February 2005 she completed Form FR-13, Application for Disability Retirement. She stated in the application that her disability was the result of multiple sclerosis, among other maladies. Ms. Scurlock was assisted in seeking disability retirement by her sister. Ms. Scurlock signed the FR-13 application, and it was sworn before a notary public on February 18, 2005. Ms. Scurlock believes her sister mailed the form. The FR-13 may have been addressed to the Florida Department of Health, but in any event, it was not received by the Division in 2005. Assisted by her sister, Ms. Scurlock telephonically contacted the Division on April 11, 2006, to inquire about her application for disability retirement. At that time, she avowed that the FR-13 had been sent in January 2005 to the Department of Health. Upon being advised that she needed to submit a new form in order to obtain benefits, she did so. An FR-13 was received by the Division on May 24, 2006. Attached to the application was a copy of the application sworn before the notary public on February 18, 2005. The Division found the FR-13 submitted on May 24, 2006, to be complete and sufficient to establish that Ms. Scurlock should be paid disability retirement benefits beginning June 1, 2006. Although Ms. Scurlock may have suffered some cognitive impairment as a result of being afflicted with multiple sclerosis, she was aided by her sister, who apparently has no cognitive impairment, when she first attempted to file in early 2005. Moreover, Ms. Scurlock adequately presented her case at the hearing, and to the extent that cognitive impairment might influence the outcome of this case, it is found that she is not so impaired that she could not timely file an application for disability retirement. For the reasons set forth below, whether she was physically or mentally able to file a FR-13, or whether the state or one of its agents failed to inform her of her rights, has no bearing on the outcome of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order affirming the establishment of June 1, 2006, as the beginning date of entitlement to disability retirement pay in the case of Marilyn Scurlock. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us COPIES FURNISHED: Marilyn Scurlock 3936 Scurlock Lane Panama City, Florida 32409 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2007. Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
