Findings Of Fact In June, 1982, Florida East Coast Railway Company filed an Application for Development Approval for a Development of Regional Impact to be called "F.E.C. Park of Industry and Commerce" to be located in Dade County, Florida. On June 23, 1983, the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County adopted Resolution Z-114-83, a Development Order approving with conditions the development proposed by Florida East Coast Railway Company. A copy of the Development Order was transmitted to the Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners on July 7, 1983. By letter dated July 8, 1983, and received by the Department of Community Affairs on July 11, 1983, the Assistant Director of the Building and Zoning Department of Dade County advised that: In compliance with Section 380, Florida Statutes, we are enclosing , herewith, a copy of Resolution No. Z-114-83, adopted by the Board of County Commissioners on June 23, 1983, approving a development of regional impact applied for by Florida East Coast Railway Company to permit the development of the above-described property for an industrial park complex involving a district boundary change from GU (interim) to IU-C (Industry-Controlled) and an Unusual Use to permit two lake excavations. By letter dated July 19, 1983, the Department of Community Affairs responded to receipt of the copy of the Development Order as follows: We have received the copy of the Florida East Coast Railway Development Order you sent on July 8 in accordance with Chapter 380, Florida Statues[sic]. However, to fulfill the requirements of the law, the Development Order must he signed and include all exhibits. Therefore would you please he kind enough to provide the Department with a signed copy of Resolution #Z-114-83. . . . By letter dated July 27, 1983, and received by the Department of Community Affairs on August 1, 1983, Dade County advised that: In accordance with your letter of July 19, 1983, and our telephone conversation of this date, I am enclosing, herewith, a certified copy of Resolution Z-114-83; as I explained to you on the telephone, the Board of County Commissioners does not sign its resolutions. The only significant difference between the copy of the Development Order received by the Department of Community Affairs on July 11, 1983, and the one received on August 1, 1983, is a certificate signed by a Deputy Clerk in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Dade County certifying that the latter copy of Resolution No. Z-114-83 was a true and correct copy of the original of that document. Since at least 1946, Dade County has adopted and codified its zoning actions in the following manner. After the Board of County Commissioners acts on zoning applications at a regularly scheduled zoning meeting, zoning resolutions are prepared by Mr. Chester C. Czebrinski, who is in attendance at the meetings. Mr. Czebrinski is an attorney and is the Assistant Director of the Dade County Building and Zoning Department. He is also legal counsel to the Department and is a Deputy Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners. He has performed the functions described herein since 1946. While in attendance at the zoning meeting, Mr. Czebrinski records the action of the Board of County Commissioners on zoning applications noting any conditions adopted by the Board. In preparing the zoning resolution, he uses information obtained from the Clerk of the County Commission as to the resolution number, the names of the Commissioners who made and seconded the motion, and the vote on the resolution. When such resolutions are prepared, they are never re-submitted to the Board of County Commissioners for any further action or review. Copies of final zoning resolutions prepared by Mr. Czebrinski are sent to the Clerk of the County Commission (two original copies), other county departments, to the applicant, and to the attorneys of record. The purpose of transmitting the resolution to those departments and persons is to notify them of the official final action taken by the Board of County Commissioners. Additional copies of resolutions are also placed in the zoning hearing file. All such resolutions transmitted contain a transmittal date on the face of the resolution. The purpose of the transmittal date is to commence the appeal period within which an appeal may be taken to circuit court from the action of the Board of County Commissioners pursuant to the Code of Metropolitan Dade County. All such resolutions transmitted by Mr. Czebrinski are unstamped, uncertified copies of the final zoning resolution. Upon receipt of the transmittal of two copies of the resolution from Mr. Czebrinski, the office of the Clerk of the Board stamps both with the name of the deputy clerk, who for the past eleven years has been Raymond Reid. The letters on one stamp (the large stamp) are larger than the letters on the other, smaller stamp. The copies stamped with the large stamp are also stamped with the county seal. This copy is retained by the Clerk and is never certified. The other copy, stamped with a small stamp, is not stamped with the county seal. This copy is sent to Mr. Czebrinski with a separate certification by the Clerk on a separate page attached to the back of the resolution. Upon request, the Clerk's office will provide a copy of the zoning resolution retained by it. Such a copy is never certified, even for a state agency, unless a specific request for certification is made. An individual requesting certification is required to pay the Clerk a fee of one dollar. Section 2-1, Rule 1.05, Dade County Code, is interpreted and applied by Dade County not to require certification of the resolution physically retained by the Clerk and not to require certification of any copies of that resolution unless a specific request for certification is made. If Mr. Czebrinski receives a request for a copy of a zoning resolution, he provides one of the additional unstamped copies made prior to transmittal of the Clerk. If a certified copy of the resolution is requested, Mr. Czebrinski would make a copy of the resolution with the certification and then place a further certificate on it indicating that it was a copy on file with his office. The above procedures are for normal zoning actions of the Board of County Commissioners and differ from untypical procedures utilized for Zoning Appeals Board (ZAB) resolutions (which are certified by the Building and Zoning Director) and for resolutions pertaining to county airport matters, which are prepared by the County Attorney's office. Where a resolution encompasses an order of the Board of County Commissioners for a Development of Regional Impact, Mr. Czebrinski prepares a resolution in the manner described above and distributes it to all of the previously mentioned parties, and in addition to the Florida Department of Community Affairs and to the South Florida Regional Planning Council. Mr. Czebrinski has had responsibility for transmitting copies to the State Land Planning Agency pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, since the adoption of the state law. The resolutions transmitted have been blank, uncertified copies. Each copy is accompanied by a transmittal letter which is signed by Mr. Czebrinski. Although in a few instances the files of the Department of Community Affairs contain items where the typical County Commission zoning procedure was not applicable, this was because either the special procedure of the ZAB or airport zoning applied, because the Department has specifically requested a certified copy in an isolated case, or because the Department had received a transmittal from a non-county source. On September 12, 1983, the Department of Community Affairs filed a Notice of Appeal with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission objecting to various portions of the Development Order.
The Issue Whether the respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated December 19, 1995, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission is the state agency responsible for certifying and revoking the certification of correctional officers. Section 943.12(3), Florida Statutes. Ms. Davis was certified by the Commission on May 18, 1993, and was issued Corrections Certificate Number 137735. She is currently certified as a corrections officer. Incident at the Royal Palm Beach K-Mart. In the Administrative Complaint, the Commission charged that On or about September 16, 1994, the Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did knowingly obtain, use, or did endeavor to obtain or to use a bread maker and a breadmixer of the value of $300.00 or more, the property of K-Mart, with the intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of a right to the property to her own use. On the morning of September 16, 1994, Timothy Meyers, a K-Mart employee of 16 years, was working as manager of the Royal Palm Beach K-Mart. Mr. Meyers observed Ms. Davis in the kitchen appliance aisle of the store with a shopping cart containing a Black and Decker bread maker and a Kitchen Aide mixer. The bread maker was priced at about $160.00 and the mixer at about $200.00. Moments later, Mr. Meyers observed another woman and a man push a shopping cart into the kitchen appliance aisle and, without looking at the various models available, put into their cart the same model Black and Decker bread maker and the same model Kitchen Aide mixer that Ms. Davis had in her cart. Mr. Meyers found it unusual that a shopper would choose these items without looking at the prices or at the other models available because the items were so expensive. Consequently, he followed the couple to the front of the store, where he observed them pay for the two items with cash. Mr. Meyers observed the couple leave the store by the front exit and put the bread maker and the mixer into a blue Ford Bronco. The man handed the woman what appeared to be the sales receipt for the bread maker and the mixer, and he then got into the Bronco and drove to the west side of the shopping center parking lot. Mr. Meyers observed the woman return to the store. She located Ms. Davis and handed her a piece of paper which Mr. Meyers believed was the receipt for the bread maker and the mixer. Mr. Meyers observed Ms. Davis push the cart containing the Black and Decker bread maker and the Kitchen Aide mixer toward the garden center, which is located on the east side of the store and has a separate exit and check-out register. He asked another store employee to follow Ms. Davis, and he went out the front exit to a location where he could observe the garden center exit but could neither see inside the garden center nor be seen by someone inside the store. When Mr. Meyers saw Ms. Davis push the cart containing the bread maker and the mixer through the garden center exit and onto the ramp leading into the parking lot, he stepped out and stopped her. He asked her if she had paid for the items in her cart at the front register, and she said yes and handed him a receipt for items of the same make and model as those she had in her cart. Mr. Meyers looked at the receipt, told Ms. Davis that she had not paid for the items, and told the cashier in the garden center to call the police. At this point, Ms. Davis left the cart on the sidewalk and walked away. Although Mr. Meyers told her to stop, she continued walking until she reached the Taco Bell restaurant located on the east side of the parking lot, about two hundred feet from the K-Mart store, where she waited until the police arrived. The K-Mart cash register detail tapes, which are the records of every transaction at the store, were checked and showed that, on the morning of September 16, 1994, only one Black and Decker bread maker and one Kitchen Aide mixer were sold. The evidence presented is clear and convincing that, on September 16, 1994, Ms. Davis took property belonging to K-Mart out of the store without paying for it. The property was valued at more than $300. These acts fall within the definition of grand theft found in section 812.014(1) and (2)(c)1, Florida Statutes, which constitutes a third degree felony pursuant to section 812.014(2)(c)1. Incidents involving Sandra Carey. In its Administrative Complaint, the Commission alleged that On or about October 18, 1994, Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did unlawfully commit a battery upon Sandra Carey, by actually touching or striking her or intentionally causing bodily harm to her against her will. On or about October 26, 1994, Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did unlaw- fully commit an assault upon Sandra Carey, by threatening by word or act to do violence to said person, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and by doing an act which created a well- founded fear in Sandra Carey that said violence was imminent, by swerving toward her with deadly weapon, to wit: a motor vehicle. On or between October 20 and October 26, 1994, Respondent Dorothy B. Davis, did unlawfully commit an assault upon Sandra Carey, by threatening by word or act to do violence to said person, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and by doing an act which created a well-founded fear in Sandra Carey that said violence was imminent, by throwing at her or in her direction a deadly weapon, to wit: beer bottles. On or between October 20 and October 26, 1994, Respondent Dorothy B. Davis, did knowingly use intimidation or physical force, threats, or attempts thereto, or offered pecuniary benefit or gain to Sandra Carey with intent to influence that person’s testimony or to cause or induce that person to withhold testimony from an official proceeding or be absent from an official proceeding to which such person has been summoned by legal process. On or between October 20 and October 26, 1994, Respondent, Dorothy B. Davis, did unlawfully, with intent to place Sandra Carey in reasonable fear of death or bodily injury, willfully and maliciously, follow or harass said person and make a credible threat, by assaulting her with a motor vehicle, throwing beer bottles at her, and/or making verbal threats of bodily harm, which caused said person substantial emotional distress and served no legitimate purpose. (The allegations in the Administrative Complaint are set out in paragraph form for clarity.) On October 18, 1994, in Belle Glade, Florida, a fight took place in or near a grocery store parking lot in the 400 block of Southwest Avenue B Place between an unidentified man and a woman named Shirkia Webb. Ms. Webb was apparently not the winner of this fight, and the fight apparently ended when Ms. Webb was knocked to the ground. Ms. Davis drove into the parking lot at about the time Ms. Webb was knocked to the ground. She was driving her Ford Bronco, and her children, including her seven- month-old baby, were in the back seat. When Ms. Davis stopped the car and opened the door, Ms. Webb ran over to her and began talking to her. Ms. Davis then left her children in the vehicle and walked into the grocery store, leaving the keys in the ignition. While Ms. Davis was in the grocery store, Ms. Webb got into the Bronco and ran it into the vehicle owned by the unidentified man with whom she had been fighting. This vehicle was apparently parked in the grocery store parking lot at the time. When Ms. Davis came out of the grocery store, a crowd of people had gathered. She saw that her Bronco had been involved in an accident, and she learned that Ms. Webb had been driving the vehicle. She spoke with one of the police officers on the scene and told him that Ms. Webb had stolen her Bronco with her children inside. She later filed grand theft charges against Ms. Webb. Ms. Carey either overheard Ms. Davis telling the police officer that Ms. Webb had stolen her Bronco or someone told Ms. Carey that Ms. Davis had done so. Ms. Carey then went to one of the police officers and told him that Ms. Davis had given Ms. Webb her Bronco knowing that Ms. Webb intended to use it to hit the man’s vehicle. Someone in the crowd told Ms. Davis what Ms. Carey told the police officers. Ms. Davis was upset at the time because her children were in the Bronco when Ms. Webb hit the other vehicle. When she learned that Ms. Carey told the police that she had given Ms. Webb permission to drive the Bronco, she rushed up to Ms. Carey and struck her in the chest, yelling at her to stop telling lies. This incident was observed by several police officers, and Ms. Davis does not deny that she struck Ms. Carey on this occasion. On October 20, 1994, Ms. Davis was driving her Bronco down 5th Street in Belle Glade, and she speeded up when she saw Ms. Carey crossing the street ahead of her. Ms. Carey was carrying her child, whom she had just picked up from the baby sitter, and she hurried across the street because she believed Ms. Davis would hit her if she did not move out of the way of the Bronco. Ms. Carey reported this incident to the police on October 20. In a second incident, Ms. Carey was at the Glades Wash House when Ms. Davis pulled up in her Bronco and told Ms. Carey she was going to “mess her up” for telling the police that she had given Ms. Webb permission to drive her Bronco during the altercation which took place on October Ms. Carey reported this incident to the police on October 21, 1994. On October 26, 1994, Ms. Davis was driving her Bronco on 4th Street in Belle Glade and she swerved toward Ms. Carey as she was walking along the side of the road. Ms. Carey moved out of the way to avoid being hit; Ms. Davis was laughing as she drove past Ms. Carey. Ms. Carey reported this incident to the police on October 26, 1994. Ms. Carey feared that Ms. Davis would hurt her or her baby, and she experienced some emotional distress until after the October 26 incident. After this incident, she did not think about it anymore and went on with her life because she had no further contact or problem with Ms. Davis. The evidence presented is clear and convincing that Ms. Davis struck Ms. Carey in the chest on October 18, 1994. This act falls within the definition of battery found in section 784.03(1), Florida Statutes, which constitutes a first degree misdemeanor pursuant to section 784.03(2). The evidence presented is clear and convincing that Ms. Davis threatened Ms. Carey with bodily harm both by trying to run her down on the street on October 20 and October 26 and by her words at the wash house on October These threats fall within the definition of assault found in section 784.011(1), Florida Statutes, which constitutes a second degree misdemeanor pursuant to section 784.011(2).1
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, issue a final order finding that Dorothy B. Davis has failed to maintain good moral character and revoking her certification as a corrections officer. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
The Issue Whether a railroad crossing located at Florida East Coast Line Railroad Mile Post 175.49 should be closed.
Findings Of Fact The City of Rockledge, Florida is constructing a road in the incorporated limits of the city, known as Rovac Parkway. The road has not been completed, but when completed, it will consist of two ten foot driving lanes running east and two ten foot driving lanes running west with a twelve foot median strip and fourteen foot shoulders. This road is scheduled to intersect the Florida East Coast Line Railroad at Mile Post 175.57, and would cross the railroad with the same given dimensions as described above. After crossing the railroad, the Rovac Parkway would intersect with U.S. 1, also known as State Road 5. There is pending with the State of Florida, Department of Transportation, an application far driveway permit from the Rovac Parkway into U.S.1 (State Road 5), and a copy of the application for permit is found in the City's Exhibit #4 entered into evidence in this hearing. The area for which the application for at-grade crossing pertains is zoned R-2. In the general area of the proposed crossing it is intended that a industrial plant be built by Rovac, Inc., a firm from Maitland, Florida. The Florida East Coast Line Railroad which runs through the City of Rockledge is a single track line which runs roughly north and south and 66 percent of the population of the City of Rockledge, is located west of the Florida East Coast Line Railroad, with the remaining 34 percent found east of the Florida East Coast Line Railroad. The population in the City of Rockledge at the time of the hearing was 11,467 people. If the subject railroad crossing was open and the Rovac Parkway completed, approximately 35 percent of the 66 percent of the population lying west of the Florida East Coast Line Railroad would be using the at-grade crossing. The nearest at-grade crossing with signalization is found 1/2 mile north of the proposed crossing at Barton Road, and the implementation of an at-grade crossing at the subject location would releave the traffic at Barton Road and promote safe crossing of the Florida East Coast Line Railroad found in the City of Rockledge. Immediately north of the proposed at-grade cressing and identified as Nile Post 175.49 is an unprotected at-grade crossing. This crossing services a roofing company which services the public and also services a number of homes in the immediate vicinity of the existing crossing. If the new at-grade crossing at Mile Post 175.57 were permitted, the people who utilize the crossing at Mile Post 175.49 would be serviced by the new crossing. This service would be affected by an extension of an existing road known as Edwards Drive, from its present location to intersect with Rovac Parkway at right angles immediately west of the intersection of the proposed crossing with the Florida East Coast Line Railroad. The land that is necessary for the extension of Edwards Drive has been deeded to the City of Rockledge but has not been dedicated, A and public hearings have been held on the question of the service of those persons in the vicinity at the present at-grade crossing, in addition to public hearings on the extension of Edwards Drive. The location of the proposed crossing and the existing crossing at Mile Post 175.49, and their relationship to other landmarks in the area can be seen through the City's Exhibit #13, admitted into evidence. At the time of hearing, eight north and south bound freight trains and two local freight trains operated in the vicinity of the present crossing at Mile Post 175.49 and the contemplated crossing at Mile Post 175.57. The time schedule for the northbound freight trains is 3:00 A.M., 4:00 A.M., 5:00 A.M., 9:00 A.M., 2:00 P.M., 3:00 P.M., 4:00 P.M. and 7:00 P.M. The time schedule for the south bound freight trains is 10:45 A.M., 3:45 P.M., 7:00 P.M., 8:00 P.M. 9:00 P.M., 10:45 P.M., 11:45 P.M. and 6:30 A.M. The two local freight trains run at approximately 4:00 A.M. and 12:00 noon. The speed limit in the area of the crossing at Mile Post 175.49 and the proposed crossing at Mile Post 175.57 is 60 WH for the railroad. There is a left curve approximately 1,550 feet south of the proposed crossing. All parties to the hearing feel that it is necessary to have signalization at the proposed at-grade crossing. The witness for the City acknowledged the need for such an arrangement. The spokesman for the Railroad felt that the crossing should be controlled by an automatic system with flashing lights, ringing bells, and gates, which was train activated, and the witness of the Department of Transportation felt that the safety equipment at the proposed at-grade crossing should be a Type IV, with cantilevered flashing lights, ringing bells and gates. The some witnesses stressed that the existing crossing at Mile Post 175.49 was not signalized and therefore was much more dangerous than a signalized crossing, such as the proposed crossing at Mile Post 175.57. Exhibits which were offered in the course of the bearing which address the propriety of opening a crossing at Mile Post 175.57 and closing the crossing at Mile Post 175.49 were as follows: Exhibit #1, by the City, is a map of the City of Rockledge; Exhibit #2, by the City, is a comprehensive land use plan of the City; Exhibit #3, by the City, is a resolution of the City Council, City of Rockledge, proposing the opening of the crossing at Mile Post 175.57; Exhibit #6, by the City, a traffic count at the Barton crossing; Exhibit #11, by the City, a resolution of the Brevard Economic Development Commission concerning the impact of such a development; and Exhibit #12, by the City, a drawing of the extension of Edwards Drive and the construction of the Rovac Parkway, together with the present crossing and the proposed crossing.
Recommendation It is recommended that the application for closing the Florida East Coast Line Railroad crossing at Mile Post 175.49 be granted, contingent upon the opening of a signalized railroad crossing at Florida East Coast Line Railroad Mile Post 175.57. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Walter C. Sheppard, Esquire City Attorney, for Rockledge 115 Harrison Street Cocoa, Florida 32922 Charles B. Evans, Esquire Florida East Coast Line Railroad One Malaga Street St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Philip Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operation Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue in the instant case is whether the Department had notified the owner of the subject sign of the alleged violations as required by Rule 14- 10.05, Florida Administrative Code. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS The facts presented show that the Department of Transportation failed to notify the owners of the subject sign. In the absence of notice to the owners of the sign, a final order cannot be entered taking action against the sign because an indispensable party under the Department's rules did not receive notice and therefore was denied due process.
Findings Of Fact Subject sign was a nonconforming sign which had been allowed to remain in place as provided by Rule 14-10.07. The sign was replaced with a completely new structure. The name of the owner was not affixed to the sign. AGENCY CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Complete reconstruction of the sign removed its status as a nonconforming sign under Rule 14-10.07. The sign is subject to removal as violating the spacing requirements of Rule 14-10.06 adopted pursuant to Section 479.02, Florida Statutes. Section 479.17, Florida Statutes, requires that the Department remove, obliterate, or abate the sign. No prior notice of Department action need be given the sign owner in the absence of the owner's name being affixed to the sign. Section 479.17, Florida Statutes. It is accordingly, ORDERED that the subject sign be removed forthwith. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of June, 1981. JACOB D. VARN SECRETARY STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION HAYDON BURNS BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen F. Dean, Esquire Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jay D. Schwartz, Esquire 901 NE 125th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patrick D. Calvin, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Section Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions . . . In the absence of notice to the owners of the subject sign, the Department has not complied with the requirements of Rule 14-10.05, Florida Administrative Code. Without notice to the owners there is no jurisdiction to enter a final order in this cause taking action against the sign. To take action without the required notice would vio- late the rights of the owners of the sign to pro- cedural due process.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the agency head of the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing this cause for lack of jurisdiction over the owner(s) of the sign. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jay D. Schwartz, Esquire 901 NE 125th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 80-1704T COURTELIS COMPANY, Respondent. /
The Issue The issues in this case are whether the Respondent, Robert Dugger, committed the violations alleged in an Amended Administrative Complaint, DPBR Case Number 2002-007094, filed by the Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation on April 11, 2006, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of community association management pursuant to Chapters 455 and 468, Florida Statutes. (Stipulated Fact). Robert Dugger, is and was at the times material to this proceeding a licensed Florida Community Association Manager (hereinafter referred to as a “CAM”), having been issued license number CAM 1148. (Stipulated Fact). At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger’s address of record was 7401 Beach View Drive, North Bay Village, Florida 33141. Miramar Gardens. At the times material to this proceeding, Mr. Dugger was employed by Timberlake Group, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as “Timberlake”). In his capacity with Timberlake, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for 30 homeowners’ associations. In particular, Mr. Dugger served as the CAM for Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the “Association”). (Stipulated Fact). The Association is made up of approximately 350 homeowner members. The Association was initially created by the Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc., Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions adopted on or about December 16, 1975. By-Laws for the Association were also adopted on December 16, 1975. Article X of the By-Laws provides the following homeowners’ rights concerning the books and records of the Association: The books, records and papers of the Association shall at all times, during reasonable business hours, be subject to inspection by any Member. The Declaration, the Articles and these By-Laws shall be available for inspection by any Member at the principal office of the Association, where copies may be purchased at reasonable cost. Prior to 2001, the Association, along with Vista Verde Townhome Homeowners Association (hereinafter referred to as “Vista Verde”), an adjacent community association, had been placed in receivership and was managed by a civilian board. These events came about due to the dismal state the two communities were in. Crime was rampant, there were no street signs or lights, common areas and alleys were unkempt, there were abandoned vehicles, and the associations for both areas were essentially non-existent. Miami-Dade County had taken over ownership of many homes in the community by foreclosure. Mr. Dugger became involved early with the reorganization and revitalization of the Association and Vista Verde. In 1997, Mr. Dugger was appointed by the receiver as the CAM for the Association and Vista Verde. At the end of 2000, the Association was ready to govern itself. Toward that end, on or about December 21, 2000, the Association and Timberlake, entered into a Management Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the “Management Agreement”). Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Timberlake was designated as the “Exclusive Managing Agent” for the Association commencing January 1, 2001. Among the duties assumed by Timberlake, are the following: 2) MAINTENANCE OF ASSOCIATION FILES: The Manager will collect, organize and maintain in the office of the Manager, all Association information, including but not limited to the Articles of Incorporation, By-Laws, Declaration of, [sic] Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, site plans, owner lists, correspondence, rules and regulations, blue prints, specifications, corporate minutes, all maintenance and service contracts in effect and the necessary administrative financial information related to the Association. 8) ASSISTANCE TO THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS: The Manager will provide administrative support services to the Board of Directors, to include notifying Directors of Board meetings, circulating minutes of the preceding meeting, as prepared by the Secretary . . . . Timberlake has continued to provide the services of Mr. Dugger as CAM since 2001. During his tenure, street signs and lights have been installed, the common areas have been cleared, and the community has greatly improved. Proposed findings of fact 14 through 19 of Mr. Dugger’s Proposed Recommended Order generally describe Mr. Dugger’s efforts as CAM, the improvement of the community, and Mr. Dugger’s reputation as CAM. Count I: Criminal Violations. During 2003, Mr. Dugger served as a city commissioner for the City of North Bay Village, Florida (hereinafter referred to as the “Village”). On or about December 12, 2003, Mr. Dugger was charged with eight criminal violations in an Information issued in case number F03-33076, in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida. The alleged violations arose out of Mr. Dugger’s activities as a city commissioner for the Village. Two of the criminal charges, Counts 2 and 8, are of pertinence to this matter: (a) Count 2 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(d), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes; and (b) Count 8 alleges a violation of Section 2-11.1(i), Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. As to Count 2 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about April 08, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a member of THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did vote on a matter presented to said COMMISSION, to wit: ITEM 7A, AN ORDINANCE AMENDING SECTION 152.029 OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE CODE OF ORDINANCES (FIRST READING), when said defendant would or might, directly or indirectly, profit or be enhanced by this action of said COMMISSION on said matter, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s.2.11.1(d) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . As to Count 8 of the Information, it was more specifically alleged, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . ROBERT A. DUGGER SR., on or about July 01, 2003, in the County and State aforesaid, being a MUNICIAL OFFICAL to wit: MEMBER OF THE NORTH BAY VILLAGE COMMISSION, in Miami-Dade County, did fail to comply with the financial disclosure requirements of Chapter 112 (Part III) of the Florida Statutes by failing to DISCLOSE ALL LIABILITIES IN PART E. OF FORM 1 STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL INTERESTS FOR 2002, filed with the City Clerk of THE CITY OF NORTH BAY VILLAGE, in violation of Miami-Dade County Code s. 2-11.1(i) and s. 125.69, Fla. Stat. . . . Counts 2 and 8 were based upon the following allegations of the Complaint/Arrest Affidavit: Robert A. Dugger was elected Village Commissioner for the City of North Bay Village on November 19, 2002. On September 21, 2002, Mr. Robert Dugger filed his Statement of Financial Interest for the calendar year 2001, as required by Miami- Dade County ordinance. In Part E of the Statement of Financial Interest (this section is designated for Liabilities – major debts-and asks for the name and address of creditor), Mr. Dugger marked N/A in this section. Commissioner Robert Dugger has substantial indebtedness to Al Coletta that was incurred when Al Coletta assumed the mortgage on one of Dugger’s properties and paid off the mortgage on another. Rachael Dugger admitted these debts under oath during her sworn statement. Commissioner Dugger failed to report these debts on his Statement of Financial Interest. Additionally, on March 15, 2001, a Summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure was ordered and adjudged on behalf International Financial Bank, against Tomin Incorporated, and Robert Dugger and Rachael Dugger personally, in the amount of $1,154,427.50. Following the Judgement on March 15, 2001, title of the property in question was acquire by International Finance Bank on Mary [sic] 2, 2001 and sold to a third party on June 1, 2001. The sale amount of the property was $750,000. A short fall of $404,427.50 remained after the sale and is still unpaid. Commissioner Dugger also failed to report this debt on his Statement of Financial Interest for the year 2001. . . . . Based on Commissioner Robert Dugger’s indebtedness to Al Coletta, he had a Conflict of Interest by voting on matters involving Al Coletta, that came before the North Bay Village Commission, each vote is a separate violation of the Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second [degree] misdemeanor. Commissioner Dugger violated the aforementioned Section 2-11.1(d), of the Miami-Dade Code on the following occasions: April 8, 2002, Item 7A, Page 7 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes: A zoning amendment concerning property owned by Al Coletta. Page 14 of the Regular City Commission Meeting Minutes, Commissioner Dugger voted – yes, for approval of the ordinance. . . . . . . . . This action is in violation of Miami-Dade Code, Section 2-11.1(d), a second-degree misdemeanor . . . . Additionally, Commissioner Dugger is in violation of Section 2-11.1(i)(3), Miami- Dade County Conflict of Interest and Code of Ethics Ordinance. This Section required that candidates for County and municipal office must comply with the filing requirements, under Chapter 112, Florida State Statutes. This is a second-degree misdemeanor. . . . Section 2-11.1(d) of the Miami-Dade County Code, prohibits, in pertinent part, the following: Additionally, no person included in the term defined in subsection (b)(1) shall vote on or participate in any way in any matter presented to the Board of County Commissioners if said person has any of the following relationships with any of the persons or entities which would be or might be directly or indirectly affected by any action of the Board of County Commissioners: (i) officer, director, partner, of counsel, consultant, employee, fiduciary or beneficiary; or (ii) stockholder, bondholder, debtor, or creditor, if in any instance the transaction or matter would affect the person defined in subsection (b)(a) in a manner distinct from the manner in which it would affect the public generally. . . . Section 2-11.1(i)(3), of the Miami-Dade County Code, requires that candidates for County and municipal elective office meet the filing requirements of Chapter 112, Part III, Florida Statutes, “at the same time that candidate files qualifying papers.” Section 125.69, Florida Statutes, which provides procedures for the prosecution of county ordinances, states that they are to be prosecuted “in the same manner as misdemeanors are prosecuted.” On July 29, 2005, Mr. Dugger entered a plea of nolo contendere to Counts 2 and 8 of the Information, in case number F03-33076, both second-degree misdemeanor violations of Section 2-11.1 of the Miami-Dade County Code, and Section 125.69, Florida Statutes. (Stipulation of Fact). Mr. Dugger was adjudicated guilty of the violations alleged in Counts 2 and 8, and was ordered to pay $468.00 in fines and costs. Mr. Dugger was, therefore, adjudicated guilty of having voted on a matter in which he had a conflict of interest because the matter involved an individual to whom he was indebted; and of having failed to fully disclose liabilities on financial disclosure forms he was required to file pursuant to Florida law at the time he qualified to run for public office. Neither of the convictions directly involved Mr. Dugger’s practice as a CAM. Nor has the Department made such an argument. Instead, the Department presented expert testimony in support of its position that at least one of the convictions relates to Mr. Dugger’s ability to practice as a CAM. That testimony was convincing. All CAMs are involved in a fiduciary relationship with the associations they manage. It takes little expert testimony to support a finding that such a fiduciary relationship requires trust and integrity. CAMs must be trusted to handle association money, maintain the records of the association, and to deal on behalf of the association with potential and existing vendors. The association must be able to assume that a CAM will fully disclose any possible conflict the CAM may have with the association’s vendors. Mr. Dugger is responsible for billing, writing checks, paying insurance premiums, and maintaining a payment book for the Association. Paragraph 10 of the Management Agreement specifically provides that Timberlake “shall provide financial management services to the Association . . . .” Paragraph D(11)(a) authorizes Timberlake to “solicit and analyze bids for necessary insurance coverage.” Mr. Dugger has similar responsibilities with Vista Verde. Clearly, the Association must be able to trust that Mr. Dugger will carry out all these duties without having any conflict of interest. The Association must be able to assume that Mr. Dugger is acting in its best interest and not his own. In his defense as to the voting of interest conflict charge, Mr. Dugger, prior to the pertinent vote, made disclosure of his relationship with Mr. Coletta, the owner of the property which was the subject of the vote, to the attorney for the City of the Village. The Department failed to prove that Mr. Dugger did not make full disclosure. Mr. Dugger was advised that no conflict existed. Mr. Dugger cast his vote after receiving this advice. Subsequent to the vote, Mr. Dugger sought an opinion from the Miami-Dade County Commission on Ethics & Public Trust (hereinafter referred to as the “Commission”). The Commission, like the city attorney, opined in writing that no conflict of interest existed. Mr. Dugger entered his plea on the two charges in order to avoid the cost of litigation. The evidence, however, failed to prove why prosecutors agreed to accept a plea on only two of the eight counts. Count IV: Alleged Denial of Access to the Records of the Association. During 2003, Miryam Ruiz lived in Miramar Gardens Township and was a member of the Association. While she had been in arrears for 2001 and 2002, presumably in her association dues, she became current when she paid all outstanding dues in March 2003. On March 14, 2003, during normal business hours, Ms. Ruiz went to the office of Timberlake and requested that she be allowed to inspect certain records of the Association. She made her request verbally and in writing, leaving Petitioner’s Exhibit 13 with a Timberlake employee, apparently the receptionist, which listed the documents she wanted to inspect. She was told by the receptionist that she could not see the documents until she had made an appointment to do so. By letter dated Thursday, March 27, 2003, Ms. Ruiz was informed by Mr. Dugger’s wife, Rachel, that Ms. Ruiz could review the documents. She was also told that, “[i]f you would like, call us to make an appointment at your convenience.” On the morning of Monday, March 31, 2003, not having received Ms. Dugger’s March 27th letter, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by facsimile to Timberlake stating that she would be at the office at 11:00 a.m. that morning to “pick up” the documents. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office at 11:00 a.m. she was again told that she could not review the documents because she had no appointment. Ms. Ruiz left the office. Later that day, Ms. Ruiz sent a second facsimile letter addressed to Ms. Dugger. Ms. Ruiz ended the letter by informing Ms. Dugger that she would be at the office the next day, April 1, 2003, “for the inspection and copying of records at 9:30 a.m.” On April 1, 2003, Ms. Ruiz returned to the Timberlake office and was again told that the records were not available because no appointment had been made. Ms. Ruiz told the receptionist that she would return on Friday, April 4, 2003, at 9:30 a.m. to inspect the documents. In a letter to Ms. Dugger dated April 1, 2003, she stated that she was confirming the date and time. The evidence failed to prove whether the letter was received prior to April 4, 2003. When Ms. Ruiz arrived at the Timberlake office on April 4, 2003, she was again denied access to the documents and was told by Ms. Dugger that she had no appointment because the date and time suggested by Ms. Ruiz had not been confirmed by Timberlake. Ms. Ruiz left the office. The following day, April 5, 2003, Ms. Ruiz sent a letter by certified mail addressed to Mr. Dugger describing the events leading up to that moment and asking what it would take for her to be allowed to inspect the records. Mr. Dugger did not respond to this letter. In response to Ms. Ruiz’ April 5th letter, a letter dated April 22, 2003, was sent by Ms. Dugger. That letter indicated that the records would be available for inspection at 1:00 p.m. on Tuesday, May 6, 2003. The letter, which was postmarked May 2, 2003, ten days after the date of the letter, was not received by Ms. Ruiz prior to May 6th. Sometime during the month of May 2003, approximately two months after first attempting to review the records of the Association, Ms. Ruiz was finally allowed to inspect the records. Ms. Ruiz, without doubt, had the right to review the records of the Association she had requested. Pursuant to the Management Agreement, Mr. Dugger was required to collect, organize and maintain the records of the Association. The Management Agreement also required that Mr. Dugger was to assist the Board of Directors in their enforcement of the provisions of the “Association documents and rules and regulations ” Pursuant to Article X of the By-Laws of the Association, also quoted, supra, gives Association members the right to inspect and copy all Association documents The right to inspect association documents is not an unfettered one. In light of the duty and responsibility of a CAM to “maintain” records, it is not unreasonable for a CAM to set reasonable safeguards for a member’s review of those records. The Department did not produce evidence to refute the evidence presented by Mr. Dugger concerning the reasonableness of a CAM insisting on being present during the inspection of documents. The evidence also failed to prove that, given the fact that Mr. Dugger is the CAM for as many as 30 associations, he is not always available at his office to supervise a review of documents. The procedure followed with regard to reviews of the Association’s had been announced at an Association meeting. Members were told that anyone who wished to review records could contact the Timberlake office and make an appointment so Mr. Dugger could be present during an inspection, or that a copy of a document could be obtained upon payment for the document. It is clear that not all of the requests to Timberlake made by Ms. Ruiz were totally reasonable: (a) her first request on April 14, 2003, was without any notice; (b) her notice of March 31, 2003, gave only three hours notice; (c) her request for review on April 1, 2003, gave only one day notice; and (d) her request for review on April 4, 2003, gave only 3 days notice. While Ms. Ruiz eventually was allowed to review the documents, it took approximately two months after her initial request had been made. It is also clear that, although she did not always give reasonable notice for appointments she announced, Mr. Dugger (and his employees) could and should have done more to remedy the situation. Mr. Dugger first became aware of the request on March 14, 2003. It took 13 days to respond to that request. When Ms. Ruiz mailed a certified letter to Mr. Dugger dated April 5, 2003, it was not until May 2, almost a month later that a letter in response to that letter was post-marked. Based upon the foregoing, while neither Ms. Ruiz nor Mr. Dugger did much to ameliorate the situation, for at least part of the two months it took Ms. Ruiz to obtain access to the records of the Association, Mr. Dugger “denied” Ms. Ruiz access to the records of the Association. Count VI: Alleged Failure to Maintain Association Records. Pursuant to the Management Agreement entered into by Mr. Dugger with Miramar Gardens, at paragraph D(2), quoted, supra, Mr. Dugger agreed to collect, organize, and maintain all Association documents in the offices of Timberlake. Beginning in 2001, the minutes of meetings of the Association (held jointly with the meeting of Vista Verde) were usually taken by Claudette Brinson, president of the Association. On occasions, they were taken by others. Minutes taken by Ms. Brinson were written by hand and, after the meeting, were taken home with her. On some occasions, Ms. Brinson would ensure that her hand-written minutes were typed at various locations, including Mr. Dugger’s office. When typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, a copy was retained by Mr. Dugger and maintained with the records of the Association. Ms. Brinson’s testimony at hearing as to whether Mr. Dugger was given a copy of all minutes was in conflict. She initially testified that she had provided him with a copy of all minutes. When recalled by Mr. Dugger, she testified that on some occasions, when she did not have the minutes typed at Mr. Dugger’s office, while maintaining a copy at her home, she did not always provide him with a copy. While the latter testimony was more convincing and has been credited, the bottom line is that Mr. Dugger did not maintain a copy of the minutes from all meetings of the Association. At hearing, Mr. Dugger admitted that when he was served an Investigative Subpoena Duces Tecum issued by the Department on or about August 30, 2004, he realized that he did not have all the records the subpoena sought. In particular, Mr. Dugger did not have all of the documents requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “[t]he minutes of all meetings of the board of directors and of the members of Miramar Gardens Townhouse Homeowners Association, Inc.” Mr. Dugger, therefore, contacted Ms. Brinson and asked her if she could provide a copy of the minutes of Association meetings that he did not have. She was not able to do so within the time Mr. Dugger had to respond to the subpoena. In a letter to the Department dated September 17, 2004, Mr. Dugger indicted the following with regard to the minutes requested in item number 5 of the subpoena: “The Minutes in our possession. Original minute meetings are in the hands of the Receiver, which were retained for his records. Some additional minutes are in the hands of Board members, which we will attempt to locate.” During calendar year 2002, minutes had been kept for meetings held during February, March, April, May, June, July, October, and December. During calendar year 2003, minutes had been kept for meetings held during January, February, March, May, June, July, August, September, October, and November. Finally, during calendar year 2004, minutes were kept for meetings held in January, February, March, April, July, August and September. Mr. Dugger at the time of responding to the Department’s subpoena did not have minutes for all of these meetings. For example, for 2002 he only had minutes for the meetings held in February, March, and June, and for 2003, he only had minutes for the meetings held in January and December. While Ms. Brinson adequately explained why she was not always able to provide a copy of meeting minutes to Mr. Dugger, Mr. Dugger did not provide an adequate explanation as to why he had not made sure that he obtained a copy of all minutes so that he could fulfill his obligation under the Management Agreement. No evidence was presented to suggest that Mr. Dugger’s failure to maintain all minutes was the result of bad faith or any intent on the part of Mr. Dugger to circumvent the rules of the Department or the requirements of the Management Agreement. Prior Discipline Against Mr. Dugger’s CAM License. Mr. Dugger’s CAM license was disciplined in DBPR Case Number 00-02226, pursuant to a Stipulation entered into by the Department and Mr. Dugger which was accepted by Final Order entered on April 9, 2001. The Stipulation provides that Mr. Dugger “neither admits or denies the . . . facts alleged in the Administrative Complaint ”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding that Mr. Dugger committed the violations described in this Recommended Order and imposing the following penalties: A stayed suspension of his license for six months, with the stay being lifted should Mr. Dugger be found to have committed any additional violation with regard to his CAM license within two years of the issuance of the final order in this case; An administrative fine in the amount of $1,500.00; Attendance at continuing education classes in records maintenance in an amount to be determined by the Department; and Payment of the costs of this matter. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Philip F. Monte, Esquire Department of Business & Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 42 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 E. Gary Early, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Anthony B. Spivey, Executive Director Regulatory Council of Community Association of Managers Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue for disposition is whether Respondent violated Article II, Section 8(e), Florida Constitution, by personally representing his private employer for compensation before the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority while serving as a State Senator. After admissions and stipulation of the parties, the single issue of law and fact is whether the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority is a "state agency" for purposes of Article II, Section 8(e), Florida Constitution.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, George Stuart, served as State Senator from District 14, the Orlando area, from 1978 until November 1990. On September 22, 1986, Respondent was hired by the brokerage firm, Drexel Burnham Lambert, to serve in the company's municipal bond finance division. He served as vice president of the division until December 29, 1989. Respondent was compensated for his services, which services included calling on clients to explain how Drexel Burnham could assist in their bond issues and to urge the issuer to select Drexel Burnham as an underwriter. The Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority (OOCEA, or Authority) was created in 1983 by section 348.753, F.S. It has five members, three of whom are appointed by the Governor; the fourth member is chair of the Orange County Board of County Commissioners, and the fifth member is the district secretary for the Department of Transportation for the district which includes Orange County. OOCEA is limited in its operation to Orange County. Its budget has no legislative oversight and it is not operated with state funds appropriated to meet its budget. Tolls collected by the Authority are used for construction, financing and operation of its expressway system. Once built, the roads are operated and maintained by the Department of Transportation. OOCEA members are required to file financial disclosure statements. OOCEA participates in the Florida Retirement System. Bonds issued by the OOCEA are tax exempt. The Authority's General Counsel, J. Fennimore Cooper, advised that the Florida Constitution requires legislative approval for revenue bond issues; and in 1986, he sent a letter to Respondent seeking assistance in obtaining the necessary appropriations proviso language to approve various projects of the Authority. In 1988 when OOCEA decided to issue bonds to finance its Central Connector Project, legislative approval was again required and the necessary language was provided by its General Counsel to its registered lobbyist, Bobby Hartnett. The OOCEA received the legislative approval for the project during the Special Session on June 8, 1988. Chapter 88-557, Laws of Florida, containing appropriations act proviso language, includes this section: Section 59. The Orlando-Orange County Ex- pressway Authority is hereby authorized to construct the Central Connector and the Southern Connector of the Expressway System as part of the authority's 20-year capital projects plan. These extensions shall each be financed with revenue bonds issued by the Division of Bond Finance of the Department of General Services on behalf of the author- ity pursuant to s. 11, Art. VII of the State Constitution and the State Bond Act, ss. 2156.57-215.83, Florida Statutes. Respondent met with the chairman of the OOCEA to express Drexel Burnham's interest in serving as a co-managing underwriter for the issue and to ask for a request for proposal to which Drexel Burnham could respond. Respondent made a similar visit to the executive director of the Authority. A September 23, 1988 contact by Respondent was specifically regarding the Central Connector bond issue. On August 12, 1988, Respondent, as vice president of the Municipal Bond Finance Division and Ander Crenshaw, as first vice president, submitted Drexel Burnham's "Proposal to Serve as Co-Managing Underwriter for the Central Connector Project" to the Authority. Respondent received compensation for all representations he made for Drexel Burnham, including this one. The Authority received twenty-two proposals and ultimately selected nine co-managers, one of which was Drexel Burnham. Drexel Burnham co-managed a small percent of the issue and received $59,940 total compensation. The total amount of the bond issue was $140,600,000.00. The Department of General Services, Division of Bond Finance, served as agent for the OOCEA's 1988 bond issue. In his contacts with OOCEA, Respondent did not consider there was any ethical proscription. He avoided Cabinet-level bond issues and called on cities, hospital districts, or airport authorities. He considered OOCEA a similar local agency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Ethics issue its Final Order and Public Report finding that Respondent, George Stuart, violated Article II, Section 8(e), Florida Constitution, by representing Drexel Burnham Lambert before the Orlando-Orange County Expressway Authority for compensation while serving as State Senator. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of August, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, PL-01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Dexter Douglass, Esquire Post Office Box 1674 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1674 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue Whether a public at-grade railroad crossing in the vicinity of the Florida East Coast Railway Company Mile Post 16.58 and Southwest 66th Street in Miami, Florida should be closed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner filed an application to close a crossing at the intersection of the Florida East Coast Railway Company tracks and S.W. 66th Street, Miami, Florida. The Respondents, Metropolitan Dade County and the Department of Transportation, concurred that the crossing was unsafe and that it could be closed without undue convenience to the public. The Hearing Officer finds: That there were no letters of objection to the closing of the subject crossing and no one appeared at the public hearing opposing the closing; That the crossing is relatively unsafe because of the general location among trees and other shrubs in the vicinity; and That the public may use alternative routes which are convenient and less hazardous.
Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings has entered an Order Closing File in this proceeding. A copy of the Order is attached to this Final Order as Exhibit A. Filed January 21, 2011 10:24 AM Division of Administrative Hearings DCA Order No. DCA11-GM-007
Other Judicial Opinions OF THIS FINAL ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 120.68, FLORIDA STATUTES, AND FLORIDA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.030(b)(1)(C) AND 9.110. TO INITIATE AN APPEAL OF THIS ORDER, A NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT'S AGENCY CLERK, 2555 SHUMARD OAK BOULEVARD, TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2100, WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DAY THIS ORDER IS FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE SUBSTANTIALLY IN THE FORM PRESCRIBED BY FLORIDA RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.900(a). A COPY OF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL AND MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY THE FILING FEE SPECIFIED IN SECTION 35.22(3), FLORIDA STATUTES. YOU WAIVE YOUR RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW IF THE NOTICE OF APPEAL IS NOT TIMELY FILED WITH THE AGENCY CLERK AND THE APPROPRIATE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL. MEDIATION UNDER SECTION 120.573, FLA. STAT., IS NOT AVAILABLE WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES RESOLVED BY THIS ORDER. CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that the original of the foregoing has been filed with the undersigned Agency Clerk of the Department of Community Affairs, and that true and correct copies haye been furnished by U.S. Mail or Electronic May to each of the persons listed below on this day of January, 2011. / a Paula Ford Agency Clerk By U.S. Mail The Honorable Bram D. E. Canter Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 By Electronic Mail Amy Taylor Petrick, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Palm Beach County 300 North Dixie Highway, Suite 359 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Gary K. Hunter, Esquire Vinette D. Godelia, Esquire Hopping Green & Sams 123 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 33301 Richard Grosso, Esquire Robert N. Hartsell, Esquire Everglades Law Center, Inc. Shepard Broad Law Center 3305 College Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 DCA Order No. DCA11-GM-007
