Findings Of Fact 6. The factual allegations in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 2"4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and the 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-283-1A, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On October 8, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-283-1A to CHARLES M. EIDENS, JAMES A. HABAN , RITA ZARNIK, AND RICHARD E. EIDENS, d/b/a PAINT BUSTERS OF THE EMERALD COAST, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND PAIN T BUSTERS OF THE EMERALD COAST, INC. (“PAINTBUSTERS”). The Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached as “Exhibit 1” and fully incorporated by reference. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on October 8, 2009, on PAINTBUSTERS. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein PAINTBUSTERS was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 2. On November 13, 2009, the Department served by certified mail an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment on PAINTBUSTERS. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit 2” and fully incorporated herein by reference. The penalty assessed on PAINTBUSTERS was $98,242.15. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a i Notice of Rights wherein PAINTBUSTERS was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 3. On November 24, 2009, PAINTBUSTERS submitted a Request for F ormal Hearing (“Petition”). The Petition was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) and assigned DOAH case number 09-6634. 4. On January 8, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge granted the Department’s Motion to Amend Order of Penalty Assessment. The 2°4 Amended Order of Penalty Assessment superseded the original Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and increased the penalty to $98,336.87. A copy of the 2"! Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit 3” and fully incorporated by reference. 5. On March 25, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File in Case No. 09-6634 as a result of PAINTBUSTERS failing to comply with DOAH’s request for a Status Report. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit 4” and fully incorporated herein by reference.
Findings Of Fact 11. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on March 26, 2010, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on April 15, 2010, attached as “Exhibit A, and ” “Exhibit B,” respectively, and fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the request for administrative hearing received from CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATI’S ITALIAN RESTAURANT, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On March 26, 2010, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 10-081-D7 to CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATI’S ITALIAN RESTAURANT. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATI’S ITALIAN RESTAURANT was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 2. On March 26, 2010, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATIS ITALIAN RESTAURANT. A copy of the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On April 15, 2010, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATIS ITALIAN RESTAURANT. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $9,580.76 against) CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATI’S ITALIAN RESTAURANT. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATI’S ITALIAN RESTAURANT was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes, and must conform to Rule 28-106.2015, Florida Administrative Code. 4. On April 21, 2010, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by certified mail on CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATIS ITALIAN RESTAURANT. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On May 3, 2010, CHANARON ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A FRASCATIS ITALIAN RESTAURANT filed a request for administrative hearing with the Department. The petition for administrative review was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 13, 2010, and the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 10-2568. A copy of the petition is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. On May 24, 2010, the Department served its First Interlocking Discovery Request (“discovery requests”) on Respondent by overnight courier, to which Respondent was required to serve its answers upon the Department within 30 days of service, pursuant to Rules 1.340(a), 1.350(b), and 1.370(a), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The discovery request included requests for admissions, interrogatories, and requests for production. 7. On June 30, 2010, the Department filed a Motion to Compel Discovery after having not received any answer from Respondent to the Department’s discovery requests. 8. On July 15, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Granting the Department’s Motion to Compel Discovery, ordering Respondent to serve responses to all of the Department’s discovery requests within 15 days of the date of the Order. The Order further stated that the Respondent’s failure to furnish responses to the Department’s discovery request would “be deemed to indicate that the Respondent has withdrawn the request for administrative hearing and will result in entry of an order relinquishing jurisdiction to the Petitioner ...”. 9. On August 3, 2010, the Department filed a Unilateral Status Report informing the Administrative Law Judge that Respondent had not responded to discovery. 10. On August 10, 2010, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Closing File, relinquishing jurisdiction of the matter to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit D” and incorporated herein by reference.
Findings Of Fact Both parties filed proposed findings of fact. Except as noted below, I have incorporated the substance of these proposed findings into my findings of fact. Rejected DOT Proposed Findings of Fact The following proposed findings are rejected because they are not facts but only recitations of testimony: Rule 22I-6.006 - proposed finding 1 - second and third sentence. Rule 22I-6.037 - proposed finding 1 - second sentence. proposed finding 2 - first and second sentence. The following proposed findings are irrelevant to the resolution of this case: Rule 22I-6.006 - proposed finding 4 and 5 because the proposed rule applies to other agencies than DOT. proposed finding 6 because whether another method of notifying all bidders is more efficient is not the standard to determine validity of the rule. Rule 22I-6.037 - proposed finding 3, 5, and 7. Rejected DOAH Proposed Finding of Fact The following proposed finding of fact are rejected because these are more in the nature of legal argument or conclusions of law rather than findings of fact: Proposed finding 5 - sentences 5 and 6. Proposed finding 6 - second paragraph, sentences 1 and 2; third paragraph, sentence 4 and 5; and fourth paragraph Proposed finding 7 - second paragraph; third paragraph; and fourth paragraph, fifth sentence Proposed finding 8 - fourth paragraph; fifth paragraph; and sixth paragraph The follow proposed findings are rejected as being irrelevant to the resolution of the issues presented in this case. Proposed finding 1 - fourth sentence Proposed finding 6 - second paragraph, sentence 5 and 6 Proposed finding 7 - fourth paragraph, sentence 1 through 4 The following proposed finding is rejected as not supported by the record evidence: Proposed finding 6 - fourth paragraph, sentence 4 fifth paragraph, sentence 4 ANALYSIS Standing The first issue that must be addressed is DOT's standing. DOAH asserts that Dot lacks standing to challenge Proposed Rules 22I-6.035 and 22I-6.037. DOT has the burden to establish that it would be substantially affected by the proposed rules should they be adopted by DOAH. Section 120.54(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1985); Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045, 1052 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). In order to resolve whether DOT has met its burden, a review of the pertinent decisions on standing is appropriate. 5/ The case cited most often on standing is the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Florida Department of Corrections v. Jerry, 353 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 359 So.2d 1215 (Fla. 1978). The court held that an inmate who had been confined for committing an assault while in prison lacked standing to challenge an existing rule concerning disciplinary confinement and forfeiture of gain-time. Because the inmate was no longer confined under the rule and had not lost any gain-time when he filed the rule challenge, the court reasoned that the inmate had not suffered an injury in fact at the time of the challenge, end therefore, was not substantially affected by the existing rule. Whether the inmate would be subject to the rule again depended on the likelihood he would commit another infraction. The court deemed this too speculative and subject to conjecture to grant standing. 353 So.2d at 1236. In a later case, the Florida Supreme Court overruled Jerry to the extent it required associations to demonstrate a specific injury to the organization itself rather then to some of its members. Florida Home Builders' Association v. Department of Labor and Employment Security, 412 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1982). In reaching its decision, the court warned against an overly restrictive application of the concept of standing in the rule challenge cases by noting: "Expansion of public access to activities of governmentally agencies was one of the major legislative purposes of the new Administrative Procedure Act." 412 So.2d at 352-53. Standing to challenge proposed agency rules was addressed in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Alice P., 367 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). There, the court held that all women of child bearing age who received medicaid benefits were not substantially affected by a proposed rule denying medicaid payments for abortions except under limited circumstances. In denying standing to a woman who was not pregnant at the time of the rule challenge, the court specifically rejected the argument that standing to challenge a proposed rule under Section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes (1985), is less restrictive than standing to challenge an existing rule under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes (1985), by stating: There is no difference between the immediacy and reality necessary to confer standing whether the proceeding is to challenge an existing rule or a proposed rule. 367 So.2d at 1052. In Professional Fire Fighters of Florida v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 396 So.2d 1194 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court held that a group of paramedics had standing to challenge rules establishing additional requirements for renewal of a paramedical certification. There was no showing on any of the individual paramedics had attempted to comply with the new rules or that anything in the new rules would disqualify them from retaining their certification. In rejecting the hearing officer's ruling that these individuals could not claim an injury because they had not yet applied for certification under the new rules, the court stated: The order below would preclude a challenge by anyone who had not first complied with a rule and suffered injury, no matter how clear the rule's applicability to, or substantial its effect on, the challengers... The APA permits prospective challenges to agency rulemaking and does not require that an affected party comply with the rule at his peril in order to obtain standing to chal- lenge the rule. A party may demonstrate standing by showing that a rule has a real and immediate effect upon his case as well as by proving injury in fact. 396 So.2d at 1195-96 (citations omitted) see also 4245 Corp., Mother's Lounge Inc. v. Department of Beverage, 345 So.2d 934 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The court distinguished Jerry and Alice P. on the grounds that the petitioners in the case before it were immediately subject to the rule which rendered their continued employment as paramedics unlawful without compliance with the rule. The individuals were presently affected by the rule because they worked in the area to be regulated. 396 So.2d at 1196. In Village Park Mobile Home Association v. Department of Business Regulation, 506 So.2d 426, 412 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), the court on rehearing emphasized under the test for standing set forth in Fire Fighters that a party may show "that a rule has a real and immediate effect upon his case, as well as injury in fact." Standing was not found in Village Park for certain mobile home owners to challenge agency approval of the prospectus for a mobile home park because the prospectus only disclosed the method for raising rents and reducing services in the future. It was up to the landlord to implement the prospectus at some unspecified date in the future. 6/ Thus, no standing was found because the alleged injury was contingent upon the future actions of a third party. 506 So.2d at 433-34; see also Boca Raton Mausoleum v. Department of Banking, 511 So.2d 1060 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). In this case, DOT has not alleged that it has suffered an injury in fact by Proposed Rules 22I-6.035 and 22I-6.037. That is not surprising with respect to Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 since it is a new rule that has not been implemented. However, with respect to the proposed amendments to Rule 22I-6.035, dealing with attorney's fees and costs, most of DOT's challenges concern portions of the rule that were not substantially changed in the proposed rule. For example, DOT objects to the provisions requiring an agency to file a response or affidavit and the provisions which allow for a waiver of the right to an evidentiary hearing when one is not affirmatively requested by either party. Rule 22I-6.035 presently contains such provisions. Therefore, the injury in fact test would be applicable. However, DOT has not presented any facts indicating that a prevailing small business party has ever filed a petition seeking costs and attorney's fees from DOT under Florida Equal Access to Justice Act. Consequently, no injury exists. The alternative test for standing is whether the proposed rules would have a "real and immediate effect" upon DOT. With respect to Proposed Rule 22I- 6.035, DOT has not met this test merely by demonstrating that it is a party to pending cases involving small business parties. In order for DOT to be affected by Proposed Rule 22I-6.035, a small business party would first have to prevail against DOT and then file a petition for costs and attorney's fees based upon its belief that DOT was not "substantially justified" in bringing the administrative action. Whether these contingencies, which are controlled by a third party, will occur in the future is open to conjecture and speculation. The type of immediacy envisioned by the court in the Fire Fighters case does not appear to be present with respect to Proposed Rule 22I-6.035. Therefore, DOT does not have standing to challenge this proposed rule. On the other hand, I conclude that DOT has standing to challenge Proposed Rule 22I-6.037. DOT presently has at least nine pending cases involving administrative complaints. The proposed rule on voluntary dismissals would be immediately applicable to DOT's ability to take a voluntary dismissal on those cases without being contingent upon the acts of a third party. Such a real and immediate effect on pending cases involving DOT is sufficient to provide DOT with the requisite standing. DOT does not have to invoke the rule by seeking a voluntary dismissal in order to have standing to challenge the rule as suggested by DOAH. See Professional Fire Fighters of Florida, 396 So.2d at 1195. Invalidity of Proposed Rules 22I-6.006 and 22I-6.037 The Florida Legislature has recently defined what constitutes an invalid exercise of Legislative authority. Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-385, Section 2, Laws of Florida, provides: (8) "Invalid exercise of delegated legisla- tive authority" means action which goes beyond the powers, functions, duties delegated by the Legislature. A proposed existing rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority if any one or more of the following apply: (a ) The agency has materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedure set forth in s. 120.54; The agency has exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7); The rule enlarges, modifies, or con- travenes the specific provisions of law implemented, citation to which is required by s. 120.54(7); The rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency; or The rule is arbitrary or capricious. These standards are similar to those used by the courts in Florida to test the validity of agency rules. See e.g., Agrico Chemical Co. v. Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (Fla. 1979); Humana Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 469 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). In Agrico Chemical Co., the First District Court of Appeal stated: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within that grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its author- ity; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without though or reason or irration- ally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or is despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evi- dence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reason- able person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The requirement that a challenger has the burden of demonstrating agency action to be arbitrary or capricious or an abuse of administrative discretion is a stringent one. 365 So.2d at 763. In this case DOT has the burden to demonstrate that adoption of Proposed Rules 22I-6.006 and 22I-6.037 would constitute an invalid exercise of legislative authority. Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 DOAH is statutorily authorized "to adopt reasonable rules to carry out the provisions of this act [Chapter 120]." Section 120.65(7), Fla. Stat. (1985). Regarding bid protests, an agency is required to forward a protest to DOAH for an evidentiary hearing in accordance with Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1985), whenever there is a disputed issue a material fact. Section 120.53(5)(d)2, Fla. Stat. (1985). Section 120.57(1) sets forth certain procedures for conducting evidentiary hearings and proceedings where the substantial interests of a party are determined. In light of these statutory provisions, DOAH proposes to amend Rule 6.006 by requiring that an agency send a copy of the notice of hearing to all bidders, other than the protesting bidder, and attempt to telephonically notify these bidders of the date, time, and place the hearing. The purpose of this requirement is to give notice of the deadline to file a motion to intervene in the protest proceeding to the successful bidder, as well as all other bidders who had not filed a timely protest. Motions to intervene must be filed within five days prior to start of an evidentiary hearing. Fla. Admin. Code Rule 6.010. DOT persuasively argues that this portion of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 requires an agency to do a useless act because any bidder that has not flied a timely protest is precluded from gaining party status in a bid protest proceeding by filing a motion to intervene. I agree. Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes (1985), requires an agency to provide notice of its decision, or intended decision, concerning a bid solicitation. The notice must contain the following statement: "Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in s. 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120, Florida Statutes." Paragraph (b) of Section 120.53(5), provides: Any person who is affected adversely by the agency decision or intended decision shall file with the agency a notice of protest in writing within 72 hours after the posting of the bid tabulation or after receipt of the notice of the agency decision or intended decision and shall file a formal written protest within 10 days after the date he filed the notice of protest. Failure to file a notice of protest or failure to file a formal written protest shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under chapter 120. The formal written protest shall state with particularity the facts and law upon which the protest is based. These statutory provisions are clear and unequivocal. An unsuccessful bidder must file a protest within the 72 hour limitations period in order to participate in further Chapter 120 proceedings. Xerox Corp. v. Florida Department of Professional Regulation, 489 So.2d 1230 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); see also Capelletti Brothers v. Department of Transportation, 499 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)(72 hour deadline applies to protest challenging bid specifications). An adversely affected bidder cannot, and should not be allowed to, gain a back door point of entry to obtain party status in a bid protest proceeding by filing a motion to intervene when the bidder has already waived its right to participate in the proceeding. The only substantially effected entity that would be entitled to intervene in a bid protest proceeding is the successful bidder. Therefore, there would be a valid purpose in adopting a rule that required the successful bidder to receive the notice of hearing so that it would be aware of the deadline for filing a motion to intervene. However, as to all other non-protesting bidders, there is no statutory basis for providing the notice of hearing to them in light of what appears to be a clear prohibition against allowing those bidders to obtain party status after failing to file a timely protest pursuant to Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). DOAH argues that the need for subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 is dramatized by the case of Spillis Candella and Partners, Inc. v. School Board of Dade County, No. 86-3002 Bid. There, the hearing officer determined that the agency never complied with the notice requirements triggering the 72 hour limitations period. Therefore, the protest filed in that case was determined to be timely since the 72 hour time limit had not expired. This single case does not provide justification for requiring agencies to give notice of the evidentiary hearing to all unsuccessful bidders in all bid protest cases. No evidence was adduced indicating that the failure to provide the requisite statutory notice issue raised in the Spillis Candella case had ever occurred in any other bid protest proceeding that had come before a DOAH hearing officer. Even if this had been a recurring problem, subsection (b) of the Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 could have been more closely tailored to remedy issues similar to that raised in Spillis Candella. The rule should have limited an agency's responsibility to provide a notice of hearing to all unsuccessful bidders if the agency had not previously complied with the notice requirements of Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes (1985). 7/ In light of the foregoing, I conclude that subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 is arbitrary because it requires agencies to provide notice of a bid protest hearing to bidders who have waived their right to become parties in the proceeding. The rule also contravenes Section 120.53(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), which contemplates that only timely protestors may participate as parties in a bid proceeding. 8/ Subsection (3) is also invalid because it requires that an agency provide to the hearing officer proof that it has complied with subsection (2). DOT's remaining objections to Proposed Rule 22I-6.006 are without merit. The fact that all agencies involved in bid protests must adopt rules end procedures for the resolution of such protests, and that the Administration Commission shall also adopt model rules on the same subject, does not indicate a legislative intent to preempt DOAH from adopting rules pertaining to the procedures for conducting bid protest hearings. Section 120.53(5)(a) and (f), Fla. Stat. (1955). In addition, Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), does not prohibit non-parties from receiving notice of an evidentiary hearing. Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 DOT advances numerous arguments in support of its contention that subsections (2) and (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 constitute an invalid exercise of legislative authority. I am persuaded by two of these arguments that DOT's position has merit. First, with respect to subsection (2), the proposed rule provides a hearing officer with the discretion to grant a motion for voluntary dismissal "upon such terms and conditions as the hearing officer deems just and proper." This language fails to provide any guidance to a hearing officer or to the parties in an administrative complaint proceeding as to what conditions a hearing officer could impose for allowing the agency to withdraw its complaint without prejudice. Instead, the rule gives the hearing officer unlimited discretion to impose any condition the hearing officer subjectively believes is "just and proper." These words cannot be construed as words of limitation because it must always be presumed that a hearing officer will rule in a manner that he or she believes is just and proper. Thus the elimination of the "just and proper" language from the rule would not give any more discretion to a hearing officer than is presently granted by the proposed rule. The fact that Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.420(2) provides that a trial court may grant a voluntary dismissal filed after submission of a case to the court "upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper," does not provide a basis for concluding that subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 is valid. The Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted pursuant to the inherent power of the courts, a power that administrative agencies do not possess. Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Tampa Heart Institute, 472 So.2d 748, 753-54 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1985). Agency rules may not violate the standards set forth in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 57-325, Section 2, Laws of Florida. In this case, subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I- runs afoul of paragraph (d) of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, as amended, which provides that a rule is invalid if [t]he rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency." Therefore, subsection (2) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 is invalid. Subsection (3) of the proposed rule is also invalid but for a different reason. Unlike subsection (2), nothing is left to the parties' imagination as to the consequences an agency will encounter if it files a notice of voluntary dismissal of an administrative complaint containing nonjurisdictional allegations that were previously the subject of a voluntary dismissal. Those nonjurisdictional factual allegations contained in both complaints will be deemed dismissed with prejudice. The issue with regard to this rule provision is whether DOAH has the statutory authority to adopt a rule that requires dismissal of an administrative complaint with prejudice under these circumstances. Although no cases are directed on point, two district court of appeal decisions are instructive. In Great American Bank v. Division of Administrative Hearings, 412 So.2d 373 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the First District Court of Appeal revised a hearing officer's order imposing sanctions for a party's failure to make discovery and for a witness' failure to give responsive testimony. The court ruled that certain portions of the model rules, which purported to give such authority to a hearing officer, were invalid because they conflicted with the discovery enforcement provisions found in the Administrative Procedure Act. Section 120.58(3), Fla. Stat. (1981). The Legislature subsequently amended Section 120.58 to specifically grant hearing officers the authority to pose sanctions to effect discovery. Ch. 84-173, Laws of Florida. In Hillsborough County Hospital Authority v. Tampa Heart Institute, 472 So.2d 748 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), the Second District Court of Appeal declared Model Rule 28-5.211 invalid to the extent the rule authorized a hearing officer to impose sanctions, including dismissal, to enforce procedural orders. The court rejected the argument that the same general rulemaking authority relied upon by DOAH as authority for Proposed Rule 22I-6.037, Sections 120.53 and 120.65(7), Florida Statutes (1985), authorized the model rule. Rather, any rule that provides a sanction in the form of a penalty must be based upon explicit statutory authority such as that found in Section 120.58(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), or Section 120.57(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1986). 9/ 472 So.2d at 747-48. Subsection (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037 imposes the sanction of dismissal with prejudice. However, in contrast to the specific saction authority granted to hearing officers in Sections 120.58(1)(b) and 120.57(1)(b)5, no provision in Chapter 120 specifically authorizes DOAH to impose a sanction under the circumstances set forth in subsection (3) of Proposed Rule 22I-6.037. Therefore, while I find the purpose of adopting subsection (3) of the proposed rule, to ensure failness, is laudable, this portion of the rule is invalid because DOAH does not possess the requisite legislative authority to adopt such a rule. Section 120.52(5)(b), Fla. Stat., as amended by Ch. 87-358, Section 2, Laws of Florida.
Findings Of Fact 8. The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 23, 2009, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on February 25, 2009, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or her designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-047-D7-09-WC, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On February 23, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-047-D7-09-WC to BEBEE ROOFING, INC. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein BEBEE ROOFING, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 2. On February 23, 2009, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service on BEBEE ROOFING, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On February 25, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Case No. 09-047-D7-09-WC to BEBEE ROOFING, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $86,762.54 against BEBEE ROOFING, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein BEBEE ROOFING, INC. was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 4. On February 25, 2009, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served by personal service to BEBEE ROOFING, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. On March 12, 2009, BEBEE ROOFING, INC. filed a petition for administrative review with the Department. The petition for administrative review was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on March 27, 2009, and the matter was assigned DOAH Case No. 09-1604. 6. On August 25, 2009, BEBEE ROOFING, INC. filed a motion with the Division of Administrative Hearings requesting cancellation of the hearing. 7. On August 26, 2009, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File which relinquished jurisdiction to the Department for final agency action. A copy of the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference.
Findings Of Fact 1. The Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact are hereby approved and adopted and incorporated herein by reference. 2. There is clear and convincing evidence to support the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact.
Conclusions THIS MATTER came before the Construction Industry Licensing Board (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”) pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(k), F.S., on November 9, 2000, in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, for consideration of the Recommended Order issued by the Administrative Law Judge in the above styled cases, Petitioner's Exceptions to the Recommended Order, and Petitioner’s Motion for Entry of Order of Restitution (copies of which are attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference). The Petitioner was represented by John J. Matthews, Esq. The Respondent was not present and he was not represented by counsel at the Board meeting. Upon consideration of the Administrative Law Judge’s Recommended Order, the Exceptions filed thereto, the Motion for Entry of Order of Restitution, the arguments of the parties and after a review of the complete record in this matter, the Board makes the following findings:
Findings Of Fact 11. The factual allegations in the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on July 14, 2009, and the 4" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on January 26, 2010, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the 4" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment served in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-190-D3, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On July 14, 2009, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 09-190-D3 to Farthing Motor Sports, d/b/a Star Drywall, Inc. (Farthing). The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of rights wherein Farthing was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop- Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 2. On July 16, 2009, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was served on Farthing via certified mail. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On July 27, 2009, Farthing timely filed a Petition for formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The Petition was subsequently forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 18, 2011 and was assigned Case No. 11-2561. 4. On September 18, 2009, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Farthing in Case No. 09-190-D3. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $228,409.49 against Farthing. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein Farthing was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 5. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on Farthing by personal service on September 22, 2009. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 6. The Department subsequently issued a 2™ Amended Order of Penalty Assessment and a 3" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Farthing. On January 26, 2010, the Department issued a 4" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment to Farthing in Case No. 09-190- D3 which lowered the assessed penalty to $82,807.83. 7. The 4" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was served on Farthing through its counsel on March 17, 2010. A copy of the 4" Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit C” and incorporated herein by reference. 8. On June 13, 2011, the Department served its First Interlocking Discovery Requests on Farthing in DOAH Case No. 11-2561. Farthing’s Responses to the Department’s First Interlocking Discovery Requests were due on or before July 13, 2011. 9. On July 15, 2011, the Department filed its Motion to Compel Responses to First Interlocking Discovery Requests. On July 15, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Claude B. Arrington entered an Order Granting Motion to Compel, directing Farthing to respond to the Department’s First Interlocking Discovery Requests within 10 days. A copy of the Order Granting Motion to Compel is attached hereto as “Exhibit D.” 10. On July 27, 2011, the Department filed a Motion to Deem Matters Admitted and to Relinquish Jurisdiction Pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, based upon Farthing’s failure to respond to the Department’s First Interlocking Discovery Responses. On August 10, 2011, Administrative Law Judge Arrington entered an Order Closing File, relinquishing jurisdiction to the Department. A copy of the Order Closing File is attached hereto as “Exhibit E.”
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: On August 31, 1988, Respondent was authorized by the Board Of Medicine (Board) to provide respiratory care services in this state under license number TU C000050, a license she still holds. Respondent did not take a licensure examination. She was granted her license based upon her pre-October 1, 1987, respiratory therapy work experience pursuant to Section 468.357(3)(a), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87- 553, Laws of Florida. In December, 1990, Respondent sought to renew her license. As part of the renewal process, she submitted to the Board a signed Affirmation of Eligibility for License Renewal, which read as follows: I HEREBY AFFIRM THAT I HAVE MET ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LICENSE RENEWAL SET FORTH BY THE DEPARTMENT OF REGULATION AND/OR THE PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD INDICATED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF THIS NOTICE. I UNDERSTAND THAT WITHIN THE UPCOMING RENEWAL PERIOD, IF MY LICENSE NUMBER IS SELECTED FOR AUDIT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION AND/OR PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD, I MAY BE REQUIRED TO SUBMIT PROOF THAT I HAVE MET ALL APPLICABLE LICENSE RENEWAL REQUIREMENTS. I UNDERSTAND THAT PROOF MAY BE REQUIRED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION AND/OR PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD AT ANY TIME AND THAT IT IS MY RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN ALL DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING MY AFFIRMATION OF ELIGIBILITY FOR LICENSE RENEWAL. I FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SUCH REQUIREMENTS IS IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES AND STATUTES GOVERNING MY PROFESSION AND SUBJECTS ME TO POSSIBLE DISCIPLINARY ACTION AND FURTHER, THAT ANY FALSE STATEMENT IS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 455.227, FLORIDA STATUTES, SUBJECTING ME TO DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS WELL AS THOSE PENALTIES PROVIDED BELOW. I AFFIRM THAT THESE STATEMENTS ARE TRUE AND CORRECT AND RECOGNIZE THAT PROVIDING FALSE INFORMATION MAY RESULT IN DISCIPLINARY ACTION ON MY LICENSE AND/OR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AS PROVIDED IN SECTION 455.2275, FLORIDA STATUTES. At the time she made the foregoing affirmation, Respondent believed that she had met all of the requirements for the renewal of her license, including those relating to continuing education. She did not intend to deceive or mislead the Board regarding her eligibility for license renewal. Based upon her review of the copies of the statutory and rule provisions with which the Board of Medicine had previously provided her, Respondent was under the impression that she needed to have earned only 24 hours of continuing education credit biennially in order to be eligible for license renewal. She had earned 31 hours of such credit, 15 in 1989 and 16 in 1990, and therefore thought that she had met the continuing education requirement for eligibility for license renewal. She was unaware that Chapter 468, Part V, Florida Statutes (1987), had been amended by Chapter 87-553, Laws of Florida, to require licensed respiratory care practitioners in her situation to complete 20 contact hours of approved continuing education courses each year. Notwithstanding that she had completed less than 20 contact hours of approved continuing education courses in both 1989 and 1990, Respondent's license was renewed based, in part, upon the representations made in her Affirmation of Eligibility for License Renewal. The Board subsequently selected Respondent for audit and asked her to submit documentation establishing her compliance with the continuing education requirements referenced in her Affirmation of Eligibility for License Renewal. Due to illness and other extenuating circumstances, Respondent was initially unable to provide any documentation in response to this request, however, she ultimately provided certificates of completion for each of the continuing education courses she had taken in 1989 and 1990.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent did not violate Section 468.365(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; (2) dismissing said charge; (3) finding that Respondent violated Section 468.365(1)(j), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and (4) disciplining Respondent for having violated Section 468.365(1)(j), Florida Statutes, by placing her on probation for a period of one year during which she must, in addition to meeting the 20 contact hour per year continuing education requirement prescribed by Section 468.357(3)(a), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-553, Laws of Florida, complete 9 extra contact hours of approved continuing education course offerings and provide the Board with documentation, in the form of receipts, vouchers, certificates or other like papers, verifying her completion of these additional 9 contact hours. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 20th day of April, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 1992. 1/ See Chino Electric, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 578 So.2d 320, 323 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Nagashima v. Buck, 541 So.2d 783, 784 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). 2/ That Respondent was not aware of the 20 contact hour per year continuing education requirement prescribed by Section 468.357(3)(a), Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 87-553, Laws of Florida, does not excuse her failure to have complied with this requirement. See Moncrief v. State Commissioner of Insurance, 415 So.2d 785, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)(licensed bail bondsman could be found guilty of employing an unlicensed runner, notwithstanding his belief that "he was not required to have [the runner] licensed;" "the courts universally recognize that ignorance or mistake of law will not excuse an act in violation of the laws so long as the laws clearly and unambiguously proscribe the conduct alleged"). COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur B. Skafidas, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Pamela Sue Morgan 7324 S.W. 25th Court Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33317-7005 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The factual allegations contained in the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment issued on April 1, 2011, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued on April 19, 2011, which are fully incorporated herein by reference, are hereby adopted as the Department’s Findings of Fact in this case.
Conclusions THIS PROCEEDING came on for final agency action and Jeff Atwater, Chief Financial Officer of the State of Florida, or his designee, having considered the record in this case, including the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment, and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, hereby finds that: 1. On April 1, 2011, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (hereinafter “Department”) issued a Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 11-110-1A to LYNDA AGUAYO, DBA, LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC. The Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment included a Notice of Rights wherein LYNDA AGUAYO, DBA, LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC was advised that any request for an administrative proceeding to challenge or contest the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of receipt of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment in accordance with Section 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. 2. On April 1, 2011, the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment was personally served on LYNDA AGUAYO, DBA, LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC. A copy of the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit A” and incorporated herein by reference. 3. On April 19, 2011, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in Division of Workers’ Compensation Case No. 11-110-1A to LYNDA AGUAYO, DBA, LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC. The Amended Order of Penalty Assessment assessed a total penalty of $12,985.36 against LYNDA AGUAYO, DBA, LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC. 4. On April 29, 2011, the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment was. personally served on LYNDA AGUAYO, DBA, LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC. A copy of the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is attached hereto as “Exhibit B” and incorporated herein by reference. 5. LYNDA AGUAYO, DBA, LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC., A DISSOLVED FLORIDA CORPORATION AND LA FRAMING CONTRACTOR, INC failed to answer the Stop-Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment or request a proceeding in accordance with Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes.
