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BROOKLYN LUNCHEONETTE, LLC, D/B/A DEL TURA PUB AND RESTAURANT vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, 09-001218 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 09, 2009 Number: 09-001218 Latest Update: May 04, 2010

The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141(2)(a)2., and its directive that the square footage making up the licensed premises of a special restaurant (SRX) license be “contiguous,” constitutes a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, and, if so, whether Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Adjudication should be denied.

Findings Of Fact The following findings of facts are determined: The State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Respondent) is the state agency responsible for adopting the existing rule which is the subject of this proceeding. Under the provisions of Section 561.02, Florida Statutes, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, within the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, is charged with the supervision and enforcement of all alcoholic beverages manufactured, packaged, distributed and sold within the state under the Beverage Law. The Division issues both general and special alcoholic beverage licenses. Petitioner, Brooklyn Luncheonette, LLC, d/b/a Del Tura Pub and Restaurant is the owner/operator of a restaurant located in North Fort Myers, Florida. It is seeking issuance of a special restaurant license (SRX) pursuant to Subsection 561.20(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes, from the Division. Therefore, Petitioner is substantially affected by the challenged rule. Petitioner operates a restaurant on a leased parcel of property consisting of two buildings with a dedicated pathway between the two buildings. Petitioner’s restaurant premises consist of two buildings which contain a minimum of 2,500 square feet in the aggregate of service area. Petitioner’s restaurant facility is equipped to serve 150 patrons full course meals at tables at one time. The sole reason asserted by Respondent for denial of Petitioner’s application is the alleged noncompliance with the “contiguous” requirement of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141(2)(a)2. The provision of general law, applicable to Petitioner, which sets forth the specific criteria for an SRX license, is Subsection 561.20(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes. To these statutory criteria, Respondent has, by Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141(2)(a)2., added an additional criteria: “The required square footage shall be contiguous and under the management and control of a single establishment.” Respondent has interpreted the provision to mean that the buildings containing the square footage must physically touch. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141 reflects that the sole law implemented is Subsection 561.20(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes. Susan Doherty is the chief of Respondent’s Bureau of Licensing, whose duties include determining “if a license will be issued based upon the qualifications of the applicant [and] whether the premises meets all requirements based on the type of license applied for.” Ms. Doherty, whose deposition was taken on May 12, 2009, testified in pertinent part: Q. All right. If I can direct your attention to Subsection (2)(a)(2) of Rule 61A-3.0141, it says, “The required square footage shall be contiguous and under the management and control of a single licensed restaurant establishment.” What does “contiguous” mean? A. Touching, actually connected, touching. * * * Q. Do you see anything in the statute that prohibits a licensee from qualifying if the square footage is in two buildings that the applicant leases and they’re connected by a pathway which the applicant leases? Do you see anything in the statute that precludes that? A. In the statute, no. Q. Do you see anything in the rule that precludes that? A. In my opinion, Section (2)(a)(2), the contiguous would. Deposition of S. Doherty, pp. 15 and 18. Chief Doherty conceded, however, that she could not point to any provision of the relevant statute that imposes a “contiguous” requirement regarding the square footage. Chief Doherty further noted that for special licenses issued for hotels pursuant to Subsection 561.20(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, she was aware that there were numerous non-contiguous buildings licensed pursuant to such section. The deposition of Respondent’s agency representative, Major Carol Owsiany, was taken on May 13, 2009. Major Owsiany testified: Q. . . . Isn’t it correct that there’s 2,500 square feet of service area located in the two buildings that are currently the subject of the [Petitioner’s] temporary SRX license? A. Yes, sir. Q. Can you point to me any provision of Section 561.20(2)(1)(4) that precludes the petitioner from having the requisite square footage in two buildings? A. One second, sir. Not in the statute, but I can in the rule. Deposition of C. Owsiany, p. 8. For purposes of this rule challenge case, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute.

Florida Laws (10) 120.52120.536120.54120.56120.57120.68497.380561.02561.11561.20 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61A-3.0141
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. ELBERT B. POPPELL, D/B/A THE KNIGHT OUT, 75-001745 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001745 Latest Update: May 23, 1980

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent, doing business as The Knight Out, was the holder of alcoholic beverage license number 72-79, series 1-COP. Prior to the hearing . . . in this cause, Respondent had turned in his license to the Petitioner. To the rear of the licensed premises, Respondent operated a bottle club known as The Knight Club. The Knight Club is attached to and shares restroom facilities with The Knight Out. On March 27, 1975, Respondent was served with a "Notice to show cause why beverage license should not have civil penalty assessed against it or be suspended or revoked" on the grounds that on Sunday, January 26, 1975: his employee, Vicki Lynn Williamson, at approximately 2:00 am., did sell at the licensed premises, an alcoholic beverage, a can of Budweiser beer, to beverage officer L. E. Williams during the time that the sale and consumption of alcoholic beverages is prohibited, in violation of City of Perry Ordinance 394 enacted pursuant to F.S. s. 562.14; at approximately 4:00 a.m., he sold at the licensed premises an alcoholic beverage, one can of Budweiser beer, to beverage officer Williams in violation of City of Perry Ordinance 394; at approximately 5:00 a.m., he sold at the licensed premises an alcoholic beverage, one can of Budweiser beer, to beverage officer Williams in violation of City of Perry Ordinance 394; at approximately 6:05 a.m., he refused to admit to the licensed premises beverage officer Jack Garrett, while in the performance of his official duties, contrary to F.S. s. 562.41; and at approximately 6:05 a.m., he had in his possession, custody and control, at the licensed premises a partially full 4/5 quart of Smirnoff Vodka, an alcoholic beverage not authorized to be sold by him, in violation of F.S. s. 562.02. Beverage officer L. E. Williams went to The Knight Out the weekend of January 24, 1975, in order to conduct an undercover investigation of the licensed premises. He observed the Respondent, between 11:30 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. on January 24th, remove four cases of beer from The Knight Out and place them into a small room in The Knight Club portion of the premises. At about 1:00 a.m. on January 25th, Williams paid a $2.00 cover charge, entered The Knight Club and remained there until 6:00 a.m. On Saturday night, January 25th, beverage officer Williams again went to The Knight Out and, at about 11:30 p.m., again observed Respondent moving five cases of beer from The Knight Out to the rear portion, The Knight Club. Williams entered The Knight Club during the early hours of January 26, 1975, carrying a can of beer with him. He left at approximately 2:30 a.m., met with other beverage agents, and returned to The Knight Club at about 3:45 a.m., paying the cover charge of $2.00. At 4:00 a.m. and again at 5:00 a.m. on January 26, 1975, Williams purchased from Respondent Poppell cans of Budweiser beer at seventy-five cents per can. Williams retained control of the two beer cans and at about 6:30 a.m. he tagged them as evidence. They were admitted into evidence at the hearing as Exhibits 4 and 5. At approximately 6:05 a.m. on January 26, 1975, beverage officer Jack Garrett, along with several other law enforcement agents, knocked on the front door of The Knight Club seeking entrance thereto. Respondent told Garrett to get in front of the peephole on the door so that he could see who was there. Garrett, who had known Respondent for some fifteen years, testified that he showed his identification card to Respondent through the peephole, whereupon Respondent replied that he would not let him in. Beverage officer T. A. Hicks, present with Garrett at the time, confirmed these events. Respondent and two other witnesses present at the scene testified that Respondent asked the persons at the front door to identify themselves, but that no response was received. Shortly thereafter, Officer Garrett, along with other law enforcement officers, went around to the other side of The Knight Club and entered, without knocking, the ladies rest room which led to the inside of The Knight Club. Once inside, they met Respondent leaving a small room with a handful of liquor bottles. One such bottle was seized - - a partially filled bottle of Smirnoff Vodka - - and was received into evidence at the hearing as Exhibit 6. Shirrell Woodalf testified that she had come to The Knight Out on the morning in question with another couple. When the other couple left, they gave her their bottle of Smirnoff Vodka. She then gave the bottle to Respondent to keep for her in his office. Woodalf identified Exhibit 6 as being the same bottle as that left with her and given to Respondent. Four witnesses who often frequented The Knight Club testified that patrons of the Club always brought their own beer or other alcoholic beverages into the Club. Respondent would cool their beer for them and keep their bottles in his office if they so desired. Respondent sometimes charged a small fee for cooling the beer and he sold setups for mixed drinks. These four witnesses never saw Respondent sell either beer or other alcoholic beverages in The Knight Club.

Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that: Paragraphs 1 and 5 of the notice to show cause be dismissed; Respondent be found guilty of violating F.S. ss. 562.14 and 562.41, as set forth in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the notice to show cause; and Respondent's alcoholic beverage license be revoked. Respectfully submitted and entered 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Charles Nuzum Director Division of Beverage 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida Charles Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street, Room 210 Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Conrad C. Bishop, Jr., Esquire Weed & Bishop P.O. Box 1090 Perry, Florida 32347

Florida Laws (4) 561.01562.02562.14562.41
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. P R OF BREVARD COUNTY, INC., D/B/A SHARK LOUNGE, 84-002049 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-002049 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondent P R of Brevard County, Inc., doing business as Shark Lounge, was the holder of Florida Alcoholic Beverage License Series 4-COP No. 15-00177 for the Shark Lounge, located at 411 North Orange Avenue, Cocoa Beach, Florida. On March 15, 1984, Terry A. Altman, a special agent for the U.S. Treasury Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF), in an undercover capacity and in the company of Investigator Gloria Smith of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (DABT), also in an undercover capacity, entered the Shark Lounge at approximately 2:00 a.m. They had been there before on March 12, 1984, when an employee of the Respondent, the bouncer Harry Haynes, had offered to sell marijuana to Smith. On this March 15th visit, they spoke with an employee by the name of Sherry, and Smith asked if Haynes was there. When Haynes showed up, Smith asked him if he had been able to obtain any of the marijuana he had mentioned previously, whereupon Haynes told her that cocaine was easier to get than marijuana. However, Haynes made some telephone calls and shortly thereafter requested that Altman come outside with him. Altman complied, at which time Haynes requested $30. Altman paid the $30 to Haynes and then went back inside the bar. A little later, Haynes came in and motioned Altman and Smith to come outside, where Haynes handed Altman a plastic envelope containing a green leafy substance. Upon subsequent laboratory analysis, this substance was determined to be marijuana. On March 22, 1984, Altman and Smith went back to Respondent's lounge, where Smith saw Haynes behind the bar. At this time, she asked Haynes if she could get cocaine, and Haynes indicated that he had already ordered some for her. At approximately 2:00 a.m., Haynes came in and told Altman to go outside with him. Haynes quoted a price of $50 a half gram for the substance. Altman paid Haynes the $50 and went back inside, while Haynes went someplace else. A few minutes later, Haynes came back into the bar and requested that Altman again come outside. When he did so, Haynes handed him a small plastic bag of a white powder, suspected to be cocaine, which Altman took back into the lounge and gave to Smith. Sitting at the table and making no effort to conceal her actions, Smith held the package up to the light, tapped the bag to get the substance to one corner, and then put it into her purse. Haynes at that time guaranteed the quality of the substance and offered to get them more in the future if they so desired. This substance was subsequently analyzed and determined to be cocaine. Thereafter, on March 24, 1984, Smith, in the company of undercover agent Jenkins, entered the lounge at about 9:30 p.m. She introduced Jenkins to Haynes and asked Haynes if he could get some cocaine for them. Haynes replied that he could do so but that his source would not be in until later in the evening. At approximately 3:30 the following morning, while Haynes was busy attempting to break up a fight which had just started, an individual identified as Haynes' source entered the bar, and Haynes pointed out Smith to him. This source, identified as Ric, came to Smith and gave her what was subsequently identified as cocaine in a plastic bag, for which she paid him $50. By this time, the lights, which had previously been turned out in an attempt to help stop the fight, were back on, and there was no attempt on the part of Ric to conceal the transaction. Later in the evening, Haynes asked Smith if she had been taken care of. Again, on April 8, 1984, Altman entered the Shark Lounge at approximately midnight. He approached Haynes, who was acting as a bouncer at the entrance, and asked to buy a half gram of cocaine. Haynes asked Altman to step outside and agreed to procure the cocaine for Altman if he would front the money for it. Altman paid Haynes $60 in cash at the Shark Lounge, and, pursuant to the agreement between the parties, the cocaine was subsequently delivered later that afternoon at the Canaveral Pier. The transfer of money from Altman to Haynes took place near the door in front of an independent security guard hired by Respondent. Haynes explained the transfer as being a payoff of a bet. On April 17, 1984, at approximately 9:00 p.m., Smith and Altman again entered the Shark Lounge and engaged Haynes in conversation, at which time Smith indicated that she wanted some more cocaine. Haynes replied he would get it, and Altman gave him $40 to purchase a half gram of cocaine. It was understood between them that Smith and Altman would be back the following evening to pick up the cocaine. When they did come back at approximately 11:45 p.m. on April 18, Haynes, who was out in the parking lot, motioned Altman to get into an Oldsmobile car, which Altman did. Haynes then removed the package of cocaine from the car's ashtray and attempted to give it to Altman, saying that it was good stuff. Altman, however, indicated that Smith had paid for it and that Haynes should give it directly to her. The two men then got out of the car and approached Smith, who was standing near the outside of the door to the lounge. Haynes attempted to give Smith the cocaine at that time, but she would not accept it and instead went into the lounge to use the restroom. As Haynes and Altman followed Smith into the lounge, Haynes pressed the cocaine onto Altman, indicating that he wanted to get rid of it. When Smith came back from the restroom a few moments later, Haynes told her he had already given the cocaine to Altman, who took it out of his pocket and put it in Smith's lap. She examined the cocaine and put it in her purse in full view of the other patrons of the bar. This substance, delivered by Haynes to Aliman and in turn to Smith, was subsequently identified as cocaine. Neither agent went back to the bar until April 26, 1984, at approximately 1:30 a.m., when Altman and Smith, in the company of Special Agent Eslinger of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), entered the bar. They contacted Haynes, who was working as a bartender at the time, and Smith asked him to get a half gram of cocaine for her. Haynes agreed to do this and told her to check with him the next day to see if he had procured it. At the time of her request, Smith gave Haynes $50 for the cocaine. No further contact was had until late in the evening of April 30, 1984, when Altman, Smith, and an unidentified confidential informant entered the lounge. Smith asked Haynes at that time if he had obtained the cocaine she had paid for on April 26, and Haynes said that he had. This conversation took place near the door, where Haynes was working as a bouncer. Haynes took a plastic envelope containing a white powder from his right front pocket and gave it to Smith, who brought it back to the table and showed it to Altman. Later, pursuant to Smith's invitation, Haynes came to their table and said that over the weekend he had obtained some sensinilla, some speed, and another substance. Smith said she would like to have some speed, and Haynes said he could get 30 capsules of it for $15, which she gave to him. At this point, Haynes showed Smith a package of a black substance which he identified as hashish and offered to sell to her for $5. Smith did not buy any, however, and she, Altman, and the informant departed the lounge after telling Haynes they would be back for the speed the next night. The white powdery substance that Smith obtained from Haynes that night was subsequently tested and found to be cocaine. When Smith went back to the lounge on May 4, 1984, at 11:00 p.m., this time with Eslinger alone, she contacted Haynes, who was working as the bouncer. Haynes told her he had the speed which she had paid for previously on April 30 and told them to go sit down. Shortly thereafter, Haynes motioned for Smith to come over to the door area, and, when she did so, he briefly stepped outside the lounge and then immediately came back. When he returned, Haynes put a package inside Smith's purse, which she saw and which he stated was only 25 capsules instead of the 30 she had paid for. At this point, Smith asked Haynes if she could pay him $50 in advance for a half gram of cocaine, which Eslinger would pick up the following day at the Canaveral Pier. When Haynes agreed, Smith gave him the $50 while they were inside the bar. Thereafter, she and Eslinger left. The capsules which Smith received from Haynes that night in the lounge did not contain amphetamines or any other determinable controlled substance. When Altman and Smith next returned to the bar on June 3, 1984, they found Haynes standing by the entrance. About a half hour after they went in, Smith asked Haynes if he had any cocaine and, when he replied in the affirmative, gave him $50 in advance for a half gram of cocaine. The arrangements made at that time were that the cocaine would be picked up on June Somewhat later, when Altman and Smith were leaving, Haynes told Smith not to leave yet, that his source was getting the cocaine out of his car. Altman and Smith waited, and a few minutes later Haynes came up to Smith at the bar and dropped into her purse a small plastic bag which contained a white powdery substance subsequently identified as cocaine. When Haynes dropped the bag into her purse, Smith took it out and examined it in plain view at the bar, which was well lighted, before putting it back into her right-hand pocket. Shortly thereafter, Altman and Smith left. The packages containing cocaine, which Smith held up to the light to examine, were approximately an inch and a half by an inch and a half in size. Although other employees were in the immediate area at the time that she held the packages up, and Altman does not know hew they could have avoided seeing what Smith was doing, Altman cannot say for sure that the employees did see it, nor can Smith. No other employees of the Respondent were involved in any of the drug deals except for Haynes. No other employees were in the immediate area when the sales were made. Neither Smith, Altman, nor Eslinger engaged in any discussion of drugs with any other employee of the bar on the numerous times they were in there. Smith contends that she first went into the bar on March 12, 1984, with Altman to pick up some drugs offered at another bar. She started talking to a male at her right and asked him if he knew where she could get some grass. This individual said yes and went to make a phone call. Later, he identified himself as Harry Haynes and said that he worked there as a bouncer but was not on duty on that particular night. The drugs were not delivered that night, either. On March 14, at 2:00 a.m., Altman and Smith again went into the lounge. Smith approached Sherry, the bartender, and asked for Haynes, who was not there. Smith told Sherry that Haynes was to get her some grass, and, in Smith's opinion, Sherry did not react to this disclosure at all. Sherry, on the other hand, denies any conversation with Smith about drugs. She indicated that Smith came to her frequently and asked for Haynes but never mentioned drugs in any capacity. Had Smith done so, Sherry states, she would have asked her to leave. This last comment stands to defeat Sherry's credibility, however. It is unlikely that the comment was made. It is also unlikely that an experienced bartender, as Sherry is, would react by asking a repeat patron to leave for mentioning that Haynes was to get marijuana. Sherry is the only one in the bar, except for Haynes, to whom Smith mentioned drugs, although she had a conversation about drugs with Haynes in front of Ric, who is apparently also a bouncer. When Smith asked about that, Haynes said that it was okay. There is a divergence of opinion regarding the reputation of the Shark Lounge as a source of drugs. Randy Arles, a Melbourne Beach police officer on loan to the Cocoa Beach Police Department Vice Squad since mid-March of 1984 and operating undercover, was contacted previously by a confidential informant who indicated there was cocaine traffic at the Shark Lounge. Based on that information, Arles and another officer went in to try to make a buy but were unsuccessful because, as it was explained to him, his identity as a police officer had been disclosed. Information reaching him from such street sources as confidential informants and prostitutes indicated that the Shark Lounge was known as a place to buy cocaine and that Haynes, the bouncer, was the seller. This latter information, however, is hearsay testimony and, with the exception of that relative to Haynes, cannot serve as the basis for a finding of fact. The identity of Haynes as the seller is corroborated by other independent admissible evidence, however. On the other hand, Officer Charles B. Autry, who has been with the Cocoa Beach Police Department for 14 years, has come into contact with the Shark Lounge and its owner on several occasions and has been inside the lounge four or five times. To his knowledge, it is a well-run establishment, and he has never in his 14 years been called there while on duty. The owner is very businesslike and very cooperative. He runs a tight ship and encourages the police to come inside both while on and off duty. In Officer Autry's opinion, considering today's morality, any place where crowds congregate has the potential for drugs, including the Shark Lounge, which he would not class as a nuisance. This opinion was also held by Major Gary Hummel, who has been with the Cocoa Beach Police Department for 14 years. He has been in the Shark Lounge on many occasions and knows the owner personally. He considers Mr. Autry to be an upright businessman who is not himself involved in drugs. The lounge in question here is one of only two lounges in Cocoa Beach that Hummel will patronize and take his wife. Both socially and professionally, he knows of no employees who sell drugs at the lounge, but the employees know he is a police officer, and this may have some bearing on their behavior in his presence. Hummel believes the owner is tough and knows that he will fire any employee for being drunk on duty. He also discharges employees for even the slightest infractions of rules. This bar is not a nuisance in his opinion but is a good clean place where many of the Cape workers go. These sentiments were reinforced by the proffered testimony of Officers William MacDonald and Al Otto of the Cocoa Beach Police Department, who both have been in the Shark Lounge frequently both socially and professionally. They have been encouraged to come in by the owner and find the lounge to be a clean, well-run, drug-free operation. Sharon LeVaugh (Sherry) has worked at the lounge as a bartender for six and a half years and runs the floor operation. Her immediate supervisor is the owner, Mr. Autry, who, to her knowledge, has a strict policy against drugs. Anyone using them, whether it be an employee or a patron, is immediately put out of the place. There is a low turnover of employees at the Shark Lounge, because it is a good place to work. During the six and a half years she has worked there, Sherry has never seen drugs used at the bar. She had no idea that Harry Haynes was dealing in drugs and doesn't think anyone else did. The Shark Lounge is dark inside like a normal lounge. The crowd which patronizes it is made up of regulars, both young and old, with repeat patronage common. A lot of business comes from Space Center employees, and police are encouraged to come in frequently. Friday and Saturday nights are quite busy, with 200 to 300 people in attendance. The bar offers live music seven nights a week, and the music is a noisy rock and roll band. Chad J. Milkint, the manager of the Shark Lounge, has worked there for a little over a year. Before that, he worked at another bar in the area for three years and has been in the lounge business both in Florida and outside the state for more than 11 years. When Milkint was hired, the owner was very clear about the "no drug policy," and he has followed it closely. He has, on occasion, thrown people out for being intoxicated either on drugs or alcohol. There is, he claims, a practical reason for this. If a patron is intoxicated, he is not buying drinks, and they are in business to sell drinks. Milkint did not know Haynes was using drugs or selling them. If he had, he would have fired him immediately. It was not at all unusual for Haynes to go outside as part of his job. In fact, Haynes' duties included a patrol of the outside area around the bar three or four times a night. Milkint admits he did no background check on Haynes except to check with his former employer, who gave Haynes a favorable recommendation. Haynes was a part-time employee who worked two or three days a week as a backup to the main barmen in addition to his duties as a bouncer. In a normal week, Haynes would work approximately 20 hours and had been employed sporadically by the bar for only five or six months. During the period of employment at the lounge, Haynes also worked at the Canaveral Pier. When Milkint checked with the beverage manager there, he was told that Haynes' performance was satisfactory. Milkint is frequently in the bar and observes what goes on. He denies ever seeing anyone check baggies by tapping or holding them up to the light, as described by Altman and Smith. He does not believe his employees saw that, either, because he feels that if they had seen it they would have reported it. The owner also supervises on a day-to-day basis, and in Milkint's opinion the operation is a good, ethical, well-run establishment. The employees are good, the entertainment is good, and the drinks are good and sold at fair prices. Milkint does not know how he could have prevented the sales by Haynes that took place there. Gary C. Autry, sole stock owner of the Shark Lounge, has owned the establishment for eight years. He used to work more in the bar than he does now, but a recent blood condition has developed that has made him curtail his activities. When Autry came down with this condition, he hired Milkint as a manager and an individual by the name of Mike Harris as an assistant. He has known both of them for years and knew both had previous lounge experience. When he hired them, Autry told them immediately that his policy was "no drugs whatsoever." Although he cannot spend as much time in the establishment as he used to, Autry is nonetheless there seven days a week and closely supervises his operation. His bouncers are trained to handle drugs and work with the police. Had Autry known Haynes was selling or using drugs, Haynes would have been dismissed immediately. When he hires employees, he asks them their habits. He believes that because of his policies his turnover of employees is as low as it is.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57561.20561.29817.563823.10893.13
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BROOKLYN LUNCHEONETTE, LLC, D/B/A DEL TURA PUB AND RESTAURANT vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, 09-001973RX (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Apr. 15, 2009 Number: 09-001973RX Latest Update: Nov. 10, 2009

The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141(2)(a)2., and its directive that the square footage making up the licensed premises of a special restaurant (SRX) license be “contiguous,” constitutes a valid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, and, if so, whether Petitioner’s Motion for Summary Adjudication should be denied.

Findings Of Fact The following findings of facts are determined: The State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Respondent) is the state agency responsible for adopting the existing rule which is the subject of this proceeding. Under the provisions of Section 561.02, Florida Statutes, the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, within the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, is charged with the supervision and enforcement of all alcoholic beverages manufactured, packaged, distributed and sold within the state under the Beverage Law. The Division issues both general and special alcoholic beverage licenses. Petitioner, Brooklyn Luncheonette, LLC, d/b/a Del Tura Pub and Restaurant is the owner/operator of a restaurant located in North Fort Myers, Florida. It is seeking issuance of a special restaurant license (SRX) pursuant to Subsection 561.20(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes, from the Division. Therefore, Petitioner is substantially affected by the challenged rule. Petitioner operates a restaurant on a leased parcel of property consisting of two buildings with a dedicated pathway between the two buildings. Petitioner’s restaurant premises consist of two buildings which contain a minimum of 2,500 square feet in the aggregate of service area. Petitioner’s restaurant facility is equipped to serve 150 patrons full course meals at tables at one time. The sole reason asserted by Respondent for denial of Petitioner’s application is the alleged noncompliance with the “contiguous” requirement of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141(2)(a)2. The provision of general law, applicable to Petitioner, which sets forth the specific criteria for an SRX license, is Subsection 561.20(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes. To these statutory criteria, Respondent has, by Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141(2)(a)2., added an additional criteria: “The required square footage shall be contiguous and under the management and control of a single establishment.” Respondent has interpreted the provision to mean that the buildings containing the square footage must physically touch. Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141 reflects that the sole law implemented is Subsection 561.20(2)(a)4., Florida Statutes. Susan Doherty is the chief of Respondent’s Bureau of Licensing, whose duties include determining “if a license will be issued based upon the qualifications of the applicant [and] whether the premises meets all requirements based on the type of license applied for.” Ms. Doherty, whose deposition was taken on May 12, 2009, testified in pertinent part: Q. All right. If I can direct your attention to Subsection (2)(a)(2) of Rule 61A-3.0141, it says, “The required square footage shall be contiguous and under the management and control of a single licensed restaurant establishment.” What does “contiguous” mean? A. Touching, actually connected, touching. * * * Q. Do you see anything in the statute that prohibits a licensee from qualifying if the square footage is in two buildings that the applicant leases and they’re connected by a pathway which the applicant leases? Do you see anything in the statute that precludes that? A. In the statute, no. Q. Do you see anything in the rule that precludes that? A. In my opinion, Section (2)(a)(2), the contiguous would. Deposition of S. Doherty, pp. 15 and 18. Chief Doherty conceded, however, that she could not point to any provision of the relevant statute that imposes a “contiguous” requirement regarding the square footage. Chief Doherty further noted that for special licenses issued for hotels pursuant to Subsection 561.20(2)(a)1., Florida Statutes, she was aware that there were numerous non-contiguous buildings licensed pursuant to such section. The deposition of Respondent’s agency representative, Major Carol Owsiany, was taken on May 13, 2009. Major Owsiany testified: Q. . . . Isn’t it correct that there’s 2,500 square feet of service area located in the two buildings that are currently the subject of the [Petitioner’s] temporary SRX license? A. Yes, sir. Q. Can you point to me any provision of Section 561.20(2)(1)(4) that precludes the petitioner from having the requisite square footage in two buildings? A. One second, sir. Not in the statute, but I can in the rule. Deposition of C. Owsiany, p. 8. For purposes of this rule challenge case, there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute.

Florida Laws (10) 120.52120.536120.54120.56120.57120.68497.380561.02561.11561.20 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61A-3.0141
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ANGEL CREMEENS vs HP TAMPA, LC, D/B/A DAYS INN, 00-004432 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 27, 2000 Number: 00-004432 Latest Update: Jan. 09, 2002

The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Petitioner was discriminated against by Respondent in employment through sexual harassment; because of her age, sex, marital status, and handicap; and in retaliation for complaints made by her against management.

Findings Of Fact 1. At the time in issue, the facility in question in this hearing was owned by HP Tampa, LC (HP Tampa) and was operated by Mr. James Rogers under a contract with his management company. After Mr. Rogers' contract was terminated, the facility was operated by Cornerstone Hospitality Group Cornerstone. Management 's duties included employee relations. As manager, Mr. Rogers had almost free rein to hire and fire and was responsible for employee policies. HP Tampa did not oversee these details. 2. Petitioner had been employed at the Respondent's property in Tampa for approximately 18 years when she was terminated on November 27, 1995. During the period of her employment, Petitioner was recognized at least once as employee of the year and was asked to take over management of the facility's bar, which she initially refused because she had several children to raise. Finally, after six years, she took the position and served as manager of the hotel bar, the Silver Dollar Saloon, for the last 12 of the 18 years she worked there. Petitioner contends she worked without any problems until Mr. Lloyd was hired in April 1995, and asserts she has never filed a discrimination complaint against any employer until this one. 3, Mr. Lloyd was hired as comptroller at the facility in April 1995. It was announced that his job was to get control of the audits of the operation, and he was to work with the Petitioner to implement controls to reduce costs in the lounge. Petitioner understood, however, that she was to continue to report directly to the Manager, Mr. Rogers, and that she was on a parallel level of authority to Mr. Lloyd. 4. Petitioner alleges that during June and July 1995, Mr. Lloyd began making sexually oriented comments to her. He mentioned her breasts -- jokingly, she believed because she was so slim at the time and had small breasts. Petitioner was not amused by Mr. Lloyd's attempts at humor and complained to him directly. 5. Petitioner also claims that Mr. Lloyd began to drink More and more while on the job. On one occasion, she contends, he came into the liquor room while she was there and grabbed her from the back. She resisted and, afterwards, complained to Mr. Rogers and his assistant both orally and in writing. She received no feedback. 6. According to Petitioner, sometime during either July or August 1995, Mr. Lloyd called her into his office to go over the bar's operating figures. After a period of business conversation, Mr. Lloyd reportedly stated it was a shame she was married. Petitioner demurred to that comment, and when she got up to leave, she claims Mr. Lloyd grabbed her and kissed her. When she slapped him in response, he replied that he always got what he wanted. After this incident, Petitioner wrote another memo to Mr. Rogers and asked to see him. He finally did see her quite a while later, she claims, but treated the incident lightly. She wanted him to speak to Mr. Lloyd with her because she was uneasy working with him, but this did not happen. 7. On another occasion, when she was supposed to go to Las Vegas with her husband, she gave up her trip to work, letting her husband go by himself. While her husband was gone, she contends, Mr. Lloyd asked her to meet him at an off-premises location, a request which she refused. At this point, she also told him what she thought of him. She also claims he had touched her on two. occasions, which resulted in a heated argument between them. 8. On November 3, 1995, an employee of the bar came to Ms. Cremeens and advised her that Mr. Lloyd had said that she, the reporter, and another employee would be terminated. Ms. Cremeens confronted Mr. Lloyd and asked him by what right he had told employees under her supervision they would be terminated. Mr. Lloyd became loud and threatening, which scared Ms. Cremeens. She immediately tried to call Mr. Rogers, but he was out of town. As a result, she left messages for Mr. Rogers and his assistant that she wanted to see them as soon as possible. 9. Ms. Cremeens finally got to talk with Mr. Rogers with his assistant present and told him how frightened of Mr. Lloyd she was. She told Mr. Rogers she would try to get a restraining order against Mr. Lloyd and at that point, Mr. Rogers told her he would talk to Mr. Lloyd and get back to her. Mr. Rogers did not do so, however, until he found out that Mr: Cremeens' husband had tried to call mr. Morris, Mr. Rogers' boss. Ms. Cremeens also told Mr. Rogers she would talk to Mr. Morris about what was going on even if it cost her her job. 10. Some time thereafter, Ms. Cremeens was called in and terminated. She was told at the time her termination was necessitated because of a drop in business and because, due to the effect on the working atmosphere caused by the dissention between her and Mr. Lloyd, one of them had to go. At that time, Mr. Rogers told Ms. Cremeens that she would receive four weeks vacation pay, but she never got it. Her termination threw her into a state of shock as a result of which she became extremely depressed and cut herself off from family and friends. She claims she has never been right since. The irony of this situation, she contends, is the fact that in January 1995, she was offered a job at the High Point Resort. At that time, Mr. Rogers came to her and begged her not to leave because she was doing such an excellent job. If this is the case, she queries, why was she let go for cause less than a year later? 11. Ms. Cremeens has sought other employment since her termination and worked part time as a waitress and bartender. However, she was let go after a short while because of mutual dissatisfaction. She claims she has never been able to bring herself back to the status she occupied while manager of the bar at the Days Inn. She has been to counseling in an effort to help herself, but she finally realized that the only way to get this trauma out of her system was to file her complaint. As it is, it has taken four years for the state to reach a determination of cause. Much of this time, she believes, was due to the failure of the Respondent to provide the information required by the Commission. 12. The Respondent sought to make much of the fact that Ms. Cremeens has been married four times and filed bankruptcy with her third husband in 1993. Her fourth husband filed bankruptcy in 1999, but she was not a party to that action. Neither her multiple marriages nor her bankruptcy have been shown to have any bearing on the instant issue, however, and are disregarded. 13. Petitioner admits, however, to having failed to report all tips she received when she manned the service bar from time to time. The facility had a requirement that all bar employees report tips for consolidation and sharing and contends Petitioner's failure to do this is identified as a basis for her termination. 14. Mr. Rogers was manager of the facility in question during the entire time in question. He contends that the basis for Petitioner's termination was a continuing decline in the profitability of the bar operation under her Management from a significant profit in 1991 to a loss of $1,048 in 1995. Ms. Cremeens was already working as bar Manager at the hotel when Mr. Rogers began overall management. The Silver Dollar was a local bar primarily for local people which was also used by hotel patrons. The bands, which Played in the evening, were mostly country and western. 15. As general manager, Mr. Rogers had as Support staff an assistant Manager, a comptroller, a beverage/lounge Manager (Ms. Cremeens), a restaurant manager, an executive housekeeper, a chief engineer, and a director of sales and marketing. Each of those department heads had a staff. The department heads were Salaried, but the Majority of the employees were hourly employees. 16. Petitioner was the only salaried lounge employee. Her staff included bartenders, Servers, and bar backs, who were hourly employees and also received tips. Tips were to be reported to the comptroller for tax purposes, and, though Petitioner was a salaried employee, she also received tips which should have been reported. As was noted previously, Petitioner admitted she did not always do this. The band was contracted for and band members were not hotel employees. 17. Because of a downturn in revenues and profits over the years starting in 1990, cutbacks in all departments (not just the lounge) were Mandated by a memorandum dated December 20, 1993, Mr. Lloyd was hired as comptroller by mr. Rogers sometime in 1995 because profits at the hotel, including the lounge, were declining so rapidly a real potential for closure of the hotel existed. Mr. Lloyd had a degree in auditing and was a Certified Public Accountant who had experience in hotel and restaurant Management. 18. Revenues in all departments of the hotel were declining, but not as badly as in the lounge upon which revenues management relied for a large portion of the cash flow. The lounge had previously been a "cash cow" for many years, and when the revenues declined, the hotel's owners started putting pressure on Mr. Rogers. His job was at stake, and since he was paid a portion of profits, so was his income. 19. Historically, the lounge manager had the authority to hire and fire employees, to schedule employee work hours, to supervise employees and bartending, to hire all bands and entertainment, to purchase all liquor and bar supplies, to prepare for all inspections, to provide for bar security, and to insure harmonious guest relations. 20. Petitioner, as lounge manager, had total responsibility for the lounge operation, including financial responsibility for that profit center, and to insure the facility operated within budget constraints for entertainment, advertising, and drinks. She was to report to Mr. Lloyd as comptroller on accounting matters, and Mr. Rogers asked Mr. Lloyd to work with Petitioner to bring lounge expenses under control and to increase sales. According to Mr. Rogers such a relationship is common in the industry. 21. At the time Mr. Rogers hired Mr. Lloyd, he claims he had some personal concerns about the hotel operation. Because of declining sales and profits, particularly in the lounge, and as the result of the negative reports of comparison shoppers, he wanted the lounge operation looked at with regard to service levels (were servers attentive and courteous?), portion control, and accounting for sales to tell him how the customers were being served. He also claims he had heard complaints of rudeness and lack of courtesy by employees, and most of these reports had been passed on to Petitioner. Though they had had an open communication for nine years, he found that usually on negative reports Petitioner denied the problem or became defensive. 22. Nonetheless, Mr. Rogers instructed Mr. Lloyd to work with Petitioner and come up with proposed controls in the bar to decrease expenses. Mr. Lloyd came up with the controls and he and Mr. Rogers met with Petitioner about them. Some of Mr. Lloyd's proposals were not acceptable to Petitioner. One of these was the proposal to close the service bar, which was where Petitioner often worked and from which she derived tips. Mr. Lloyd wanted to close it because of the inability to control what went on there. The proposals were put into effect, but even so, there was little improvement in the operation. Mr. Lloyd wrote a memorandum to Mr. Rogers to this effect on November 1, 1995, and sometime after receiving it, Mr. Rogers made, he 10 claims, a business decision to terminate Petitioner for her failure to perform adequately and to implement proposed internal controls and increase profits. 23. According to Mr. Rogers, Petitioner assumed a proprietary interest in the lounge operation. She had built up profits during the late 1980's and the early 1990's, but from 1993 on, business dropped. He claims he gave her five years to turn the operation around and make it profitable again, but she failed to do so, and he considered letting her go even before Mr. Lloyd was hired. In addition, her salary as bar manager was based on her prior performance, and she was not performing up to that level. Therefore, he believed he could save money by terminating her and having a bartender do the work. After Petitioner was terminated, another bar manager was not hired. Instead, one of the bartenders was promoted to head bartender, with a slight hourly wage increase, and was assigned some of Petitioner's former duties. 24. Concerning the complaints allegedly made by Ms. Cremeens regarding sexual harassment by Mr. Lloyd, Mr. Rogers contends he never received any complaints from her about it or reports from Petitioner or anyone else that Mr. Lloyd was harassing her or had asked her out. He admits that she complained to him that she was afraid of Mr. Lloyd because of an incident which occurred in the kitchen. On the whole, there is insufficient evidence to support finding that Ms. Cremeens 11 complained to Mr. Rogers about Mr. Lloyd sexually harassing her, and it is so found. on the other hand, there is sample evidence that she complained to Mr. Rogers about Mr. Lloyd's rudeness, threats, and verbal abuse, but these do not constitute actionable misconduct in this forum. 25. With regard to the kitchen incident, both Petitioner and Mr. Lloyd came to mr. Rogers upset with each other. As he’ recalls, Petitioner came to see him first contending that she and Mr. Lloyd had had an argument and she was afraid of him due to his size and his temper. At the time, Mr. Rogers asked her if Mr. Lloyd had touched her and she said no. She indicated that Mr. Lloyd had started the altercation, but she admitted she took part. Mr. Rogers claims he took care of the incident, but apparently not to Petitioner's satisfaction. 26. It appeared to Mr. Rogers that Petitioner felt she owned the bar and could ignore instructions she didn't like. He recalls she complained about Mr. Lloyd constantly for various things, but he cannot recall it ever being for harassment or assault. In each case he claims he looked into her complaints and could not find any misdeeds by Mr. Lloyd. It was evident to Mr. Rogers that Petitioner wanted Mr. Lloyd out of the bar which she apparently felt was her territory. However, he also received complaints about Mr. Lloyd from the director of sales and Marketing and from his own son, who has a learning disability. Both indicated that mr. Lloyd yelled at them and was abrupt, but 12 neither complaint was of a sexual nature. Mr. Rogers received a total of four complaints about Mr. Lloyd, for each of which Mr. Lloyd was reprimanded. 27. Kristi Carroll, formerly administrative assistant to Mr. Rogers when he was manager of the Days Inn, worked there at the same time Mr. Lloyd did. At no time did she ever see Mr. Lloyd engage in any sexual misconduct on duty, nor did she ever hear any complaints of such even from Petitioner. She knows of no sexual advances by Mr. Lloyd to any hotel employee. There is evidence to the contrary, however. 28. When Mr. Rogers left the management of the hotel in early 1997, he claims he was not aware of Petitioner's complaint and was not made aware of it until January 2001. Petitioner worked under his supervision for approximately nine years and was equal to Mr. Lloyd in the chain of command. He considers the two memoranda which Mr. Lloyd wrote concerning her performance to be warnings to her but neither was placed in her personnel record after she signed acknowledgement of it. , . 29. Mr. Rogers admits that during the time in issue, 1991 through 1995, room income and beverage income both dropped radically. He includes in the reasons therefor in the bar area as being increased competition; the cessation of band entertainment, a decision of his; a lack of air conditioning; and crime in the immediate area. All these factors contributed to a reduction in patronage, but he considers Petitioner's performance 13 to be the Major cause. In 1994, due to a decline in restaurant business, mr. Rogers considered Closing the restaurant and making the whole area a lounge however, he did not do so. 30. Ms. Carroll, while assistant general manager during 1995, looked into the causes of the lower hotel and lounge revenues, which had declined from good levels in 1993 and 1994, Her investigation showed that increased competition from new Ybor City clubs substantially impacted revenue in the Silver Dollar. Ms. Carroll immediately noticed tension between Mr. Lloyd and the Petitioner due to Mr. Lloyd's new Procedures and his interference with Petitioner's authority. He was given input into areas wherein Petitioner had previously had free reign, and this was obviously difficult for Petitioner to accept. 31. Mr. Rogers ultimately concluded that Petitioner might have to be terminated, When it finally occurred, Petitioner's removal was based on a financial decision that a lounge Manager was not needed. After a thorough review of lounge advertising, entertainment, the need for a back bar, and the size of the staff, it was deemed beneficial to replace the salaried Manager position with a current bartender paid hourly. ms. Carroll admits that management knew the decline in income in the bar was not due solely to Petitioner's Management. There was a definite increase in competition, and Petitioner's being laid off was a cost cutting decision. 32. At the time of Petitioner's removal, neither 14 Ms. Carroll nor mr. Rogers knew of Petitioner's complaint nor diq Petitioner's age play any part in the decision. Ms. Carroll 33. Ms. Carroll was present when Petitioner was terminated Mr. Rogers about vacation time. She cannot recall the Particulars of the discussion, however, but it is found that Petitioner was promised four weeks vacation time for which she was not compensated. 34. Ms. Carroll also substantiates Petitioner's claim that Mr. Lloyd was argumentative and abusive in his work relations with subordinate employees. She knew there was tension between Petitioner and mr. Lloyd and that Petitioner complained to Mr. Rogers, but she cannot recall the specific complaints. She is of the Opinion that mr. Lloyd had a temper and is aware that Mr. Lloyd had altercations with several staff members. Notwithstanding all the bad language between Petitioner and Mr. Lloyd, Ms. Carroll cannot recall ever hearing Petitioner use foul language or curse customers. 35. Several employees of the lounge were aware of the conduct of both Petitioner and mr. Lloyd. Several claimed Mr. Lloyd was loud and abusive in language to employees. Several i5 recalled he made a Sexually oriented comment regarding at least one female employee. Further it is clear that Mr. Lloyd dated at least two female employees of the lounge, one of whom was made head bartender when Petitioner was terminated. 36. On the other hand, while at least one employee described Petitioner as seductive and flirtatious, the majority claimed otherwise, and while her detractors described her as loud and abusive, the Majority of her employees did not. At no time did any of the lounge employees, save those aligned with Mr. Lloyd, describe Petitioner as having lost interest in the lounge operation before she was terminated. 37. According to Sadie Strickland, a long-time co-worker of Petitioner in the lounge, Mr. Lloyd would talk to lounge employees about Petitioner and her performance and he espoused opinions and suggestions which he wanted implemented in the bar without seeking or obtaining Petitioner's participation. Nevertheless, Petitioner remained supportive. When on one occasion Ms. Strickland threatened to quit because of problems with Anna-Marie Genco, another lounge employee, Petitioner talked Anna-Marie out of it. Petitioner was, in her opinion, a good employer/manager who gave her best without any support from upper Management. Rather than help, Mr. Rogers took away the bar's advertising budget and refused to act on Petitioner's suggestions. 38. To be sure, there was tension between Petitioner and 16 Mr. Lloyd and between Petitioner and some other lounge employees. For example, on November 8, 1995, Petitioner is alleged to have called in Ms. Carla Genco and her sister, Anna-Marie, and yelled at them because of their refusal to talk to Ms. Strickland. on that occasion, Petitioner is alleged to have said she'd like to stomp Anna-Marie's "f---ing butt." As a result, Ms. Genco prepared a letter to Mr. Rogers recounting the incident. Ms. Genco does not know what, if any, action was taken, but she enjoyed working at the hotel because both Mr. Lloyd and Mr. Rogers were good to her. 39. Mr. Lloyd's account of the situation differs substantially from that of the Petitioner. When he first started working at the hotel as comptroller, he was instructed to initiate internal controls in several areas, one of which was the bar. Before doing anything, he analyzed the situation for about two and a half months and came up with proposals which he coordinated with Mr. Rogers. 40. Mr. Lloyd found a lack in internal controls. Bar stock was not being maintained appropriately, inventory was too high, requisitions were not being done on a regular basis, bar tabs were not being rung up timely, and guest checks were not being accounted for. He also felt there was not enough business to justify keeping the service bar open. Labor costs were too high relating to sales, and costs were higher than industry standards due to the pouring of too many free drinks. 17 41. Mr. Lloyd gave a copy of his analysis to both Mr. Rogers and the Petitioner, and discussed his analysis with Ms. Cremeens. Her reaction to the memo was that she would try to comply with the suggestions. Somewhat later, in November 1995, Mr. Lloyd prepared a follow-up memorandum, which he gave to Mr. Rogers and which pointed out those suggestions which were not being followed by Petitioner and identified additional deficiencies for review. The memo identified a continuing problem with free drinks; a failure to ring up sales at the time of sale; a failure to monitor promotion drinks; a failure to properly punch time cards; and a failure to properly declare tips. 42. Mr. Lloyd's analysis of Petitioner's performance indicated to him that she had lost interest in her job. This conclusion was based on his determination that she had failed to provide relevant cost information as required; failed to be on site for an appropriate time on busy nights; and demonstrated a temper and used foul language at inappropriate times. He observed some instances wherein Petitioner would get mad at people working behind the bar and would start yelling and swearing at them. Other similar instances were reported to him. This is not supported by the majority of lounge employees, however. 43. When Petitioner was terminated in November, 1995, she 18 was not replaced with a salaried bar manager. Instead a position was developed as head bartender for operations, and Mr. Lloyd assumed responsibility for inventory and cash payments. Anna Genko was promoted to head bartender on an hourly wage basis as a joint decision of Mr. Rogers, the assistant Manager, and Mr. Lloyd. According to Mr. Lloyd, there was no immediate change in profitability as a result of these changes, but over the succeeding year, there was a considerable increase which he claims was due to the implementation of innovations designed to attract customers. 44. Mr. Lloyd contends that Petitioner's age had nothing to do with her termination. He repeatedly asserted that the decision to terminate Petitioner was based on her performance. He claims to have discussed the problem areas with her and explained her weaknesses. However, he contends, she failed to modify her performance to comply with the directives of management. 45. Mr. Lloyd also denies having sexually harassed the Petitioner. He denies having suggested she meet him at another place while her husband was out of town. He denies having ever touched her or kissed her. He denies having told her he gets what he wants, and he denies ever having made a comment to her about her breasts. He also denies drinking on the property though the evidence indicates he did. Mr. Lloyd had a very selective memory at the hearing, however, he does admit to having 19 a temper and to having yelled at Petitioner from time to time. Taken as a whole, however, there is insufficient evidence of record to support a conclusion that Mr. Lloyd sexually harassed Ms. Cremeens. To be sure, he did not always behave like a gentleman toward her, but it cannot be said his conduct constituted sexual harassment, and it is so found. 46. Once Petitioner was terminated, she became despondent and withdrawn and pushed family and friends away. Petitioner was terminated on November 27, 1995, but did not file her claim for discrimination until September 1996, almost ten months later. She delayed filing her complaint because she was in shock and embarrassed. She lost self-esteem and self-confidence and was afraid her marriage would be jeopardized if her husband found out the particulars of the termination. 47. Dr. Glenn D. King, a clinical psychologist whose specialty is forensic psychology, reviewed the materials relevant to Petitioner's claim against HP Tampa and did his own personal evaluation of the Petitioner relating to her claim of psychological harm resulting from her termination. 48. One of Dr. King's major opinions was that Petitioner had a longstanding psychological disorder stemming from childhood resulting in demonstrated histrionics, flirtatiousness, and a misperception of the motives of others. She has had an extraordinary number of chaotic events throughout her life that makes her no different after her discharge than before. Her 20 previous psychiatric history is lengthy reflecting professional mental health care at age 28 because of physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by her husband which caused her to leave home and Move to Tampa. The significance of this is that the psychological difficulties which she claims were caused by her discharge existed years before this incident and have resulted in her being in counseling for years prior to the termination. Her medical records indicate she has been taking psychotropic medications for years. 49. Dr. King also notes that though Petitioner mentioned her termination in the first counseling session she had after that incident, the major thrust of her complaints dealt with Marriage and family problems. 50. After Petitioner was terminated at the Silver dollar, she got a job at another lounge for about two months earning $10 per hour before she was fired. She then took another job for eight months before being hired at a Golden Corral for two years. She was let go from that job in August 1997 and drew unemployment compensation at $100 per week for five months. She opened another lounge, Angel's Place, in October 1997. This position lasted only a short time, after which she went to work for Old JR's Steak House where she earned $400 per week from January 5, 1998 to March 1, 1998. She then worked for the Old Florida Pub in Naples for five months before starting at Target stores and is currently employed by Target Stores. 21 51. Petitioner is seeking back wages for the period from when she was terminated in 1995 to the present and for five years forward at the rate she was getting less what she earned in the interim. In addition to the sums she earned from the various jobs she held, she also sold off household goods and had between $30,000 and $40,000 in gambling income, a part of which went into the costs of opening Angel's Place. All of this income was reported to the IRS. 52. Petitioner also seeks payment of $50,000 which represents the equity in her home which was lost to foreclosure in 2000, almost five years after her termination by HP Tampa. Some time after her termination by HP Tampa, Petitioner was declared eligible on her husband's insurance, yet she seeks to have HP Tampa also pay for her medical insurance. 53. According to Melissa Mancini, human resources director for Cornerstone Hospitality Group, Petitioner was never an employee of Cornerstone, but her office prepared the response to the Commission on Human Relations regarding Petitioner's claim. It would appear that there was some confusion as to who was responsible for the response, but ultimately, the requested information was forthcoming. When the Petition for Relief was received, it was sent to the corporate office of Cornerstone because Cornerstone was handling the sale of the property. Cornerstone admits to no liability regarding Petitioner's claim. 22

Conclusions For Petitioner: Angel Cremeens, pro se 5351 Hemingway Lane, West Apartment 506 Naples, Florida 34116 For Respondent: David P. Thatcher, Esquire Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams and Martin 191 Peachtree Street, Northeast Ninth Floor Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1747

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 27 Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order reflecting a determination of No Cause regarding Petitioner's claim of discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this & day of July, 2001, in eel Jha NOLD POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Tallahassee, Leon County, Fl Filed with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this be aay of July, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Angel Cremeens 5351 Hemingway Lane, West Apartment 506 Naples, Florida 34116 David P. Thatcher, Esquire Chamberlain, Hrdlicka, White, Williams and Martin 191 Peachtree Street, Northeast Ninth Floor Atlanta, Georgia 30303-1747 Azizi M. Dixon, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 28 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

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DIVISION OF LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES vs. GRANADA LAKES DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, D/B/A GRANADA LAKES ADULT RV RESORT, 85-004267 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-004267 Latest Update: May 22, 1987

The Issue The issue is whether Granada Lakes Development Corporation should be fined for alleged violations of the Florida Condominium Act, Chapter 718, Florida Statutes?

Findings Of Fact General Findings Pertaining to the Condominium Granada Lakes Adult RV Resort Condominium is located in Fort Myers, Florida. It consists of 151 units; about 70 have been sold. It was to be developed in three phases. Each Unit is a parcel upon which the purchaser may place a dwelling unit. Granada Lakes Development Corporation is the developer of the condominium. The declaration of condominium for Granada Lakes Adult RV Resort Condominium was recorded in the public records of Lee County on March 11, 1982. The Respondents did not include in the original declaration of condominium which submitted Phase I to condominium ownership the time period within which Phases II and III would be completed. The developer owned all condominium units during 1982. Sale contracts for the first units were executed in 1982. The first sales did not close until early 1983. No units have been offered for sale at the Granada Lakes Adult RV Resort Condominium for approximately eighteen months preceding the day of the hearing. Respondents ceased to be the developer of Granada Lakes RV Resort Condominium at the end of July 1985. Granada Lakes Development Corporation was involuntarily dissolved by the Department of State on about November 1, 1985. Distribution of Statements of Receipts and Expenses for 1983 and 1984 Morgan Lloyd closed the purchase of his unit in February 1983. He served as treasurer for the condominium association from February 1983 until approximately February 1984. Mr. Lloyd prepared a financial statement showing receipts and expenditures for the calendar year 1983. Although this statement is for calendar year 1983, the association's fiscal year for 1983 ended October 31, 1983. The statement of income and expenses for the year 1983 was prepared more than 60 days after the close of the fiscal year. The account balance was determined as of December 31, 1983, so the statement had to have been prepared after that date. It was distributed to unit owners at the first annual meeting of the unit owners, which occurred on February 23, 1984. (This disregards, for the moment, the unit owners meeting held by the developer when it was the sole owner of the units, see Finding of Fact 15, post.) The annual financial report of the association for, fiscal year 1984 was not distributed earlier than March 1985. Proposed Budgets for 1982 through 1984 Proposed annual budgets for the years 1982 and 1983 had been prepared by the developer and were distributed with the prospects for the condominium units. The proposed budget for 1982 (which was included in the prospectus) contained as line item 13 for operating expenses a reserve account for roof replacement, equipment replacement, building painting and pavement resurfacing. It called for an annual reserve funded by all 151 units of $3,415. Copies of the 1985 proposed annual budget of common expenses were mailed to unit owners 13 days prior to the meeting at which the 1985 budget was to be considered. Reserves After the developer began conveying out units in 1983, there was never a meeting of the condominium association at which the membership voted to waive or reduce the funding of reserves shown in the estimated budget in the prospectus of $1.88 per condominium unit per month. These reserve monies were placed in the reserve account quarterly as they were paid by unit owners. The developer did not pay any reserves in 1983 or 1984 for units owned by the developer because, in the developers view, those payments were not due under the resolution passed during the January 5, 1983 membership meeting of Granada Lakes Adult RV Resort Condominium Association, Inc. That meeting had been held at a time when the developer owned all of the units that made up the association. The meeting occurred after distribution of the prospectus, which disclosed the reserve account and showed all units contributing to the payment of common operating expenses, including reserves. That resolution states: the President of the Association then brought up for consideration the proposal by the developer, Granada Lakes Development Corporation, that it guarantee the maintenance fee during the two-year period commencing January 5, 1983. Upon a motion duly made and adopted, the Association agreed that in lieu of the developer paying its maintenance assessments on unsold units that the developer could and did agree to guarantee that for the two-year period stated above the maintenance fee charge to unit owners other than the developer would not exceed the [sic] $31.61 per month and that any shortage that might be incurred in the maintenance of the Association during such period shall be covered by the developer. Such agreement was accepted by all concerned, including the Development Corporation, which is as of the time of this meeting the sole unit owner in the Condominium. The matter of the reserves was also discussed and the Development Corporation, as sole unit owner, agreed with the association to the waiver of the funding of reserves for the same two year period. Based on the payment of $1.88 per unit per month the amount of money which should be in the reserve account from the date of recording of the declaration of condominium until the date the respondent was no longer the developer is $11,554. As of July 1985 the reserve account contained $3,227.35, having a deficit of $8,326.65. Since units began to be sold, there have been no withdrawals made from the reserve account. Mr. Sharp, the president of the developer, testified that he spent approximately the $2,400 for reserve-type expenses but had sought no reimbursement from the reserve account because he wanted the reserve account going. No receipts verifying such expenditures were introduced into evidence. This attempt to offset developer expenses against amounts the developer should have paid into the reserve account of the Association is rejected as unpersuasive. Association Records While he served as Association treasurer, Morgan Lloyd asked on several occasions to see the bills for Association expenses. Mr. Sharp would only tell him the amount of the association's bills, and refused to let Mr. Lloyd see the original bills.

Recommendation A civil penalty for each violation the condominium act, not to exceed $5,000.00 per offense may be imposed under section 718.501(1)(d)4., Florida Statutes (1983). The Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes may also take affirmative action to carry out the purposes of Chapter 718. Section 718.501(1)(3)2., Florida Statutes (1983). Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: For its multiple violations of the condominium act, Granada Lakes Development Corporation shall pay to the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes within thirty (30) days of the entry of a final order civil penalty in the total amount of $5,000.00 by certified check payable to the director of the Division. Within thirty (30) days of the issuance of a final order the developer shall pay to the Granada Lakes Adult RV Resort Condominium Association the sum of $8,276.65 representing its liability for reserves from the recording of the date of a. declaration of condominium through July 1985. DONE AND ORDERED this 22nd day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY,JR., Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Robin H. Conner, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1927 Norman A. Hartman, Esquire GOETZ & HARTMAN Post office Box 6844 Fort Myers, Florida 33911-6844 Granada Lakes Development Corporation C/O All America RV Sales U.S. 41 South Box 806S, Route 13 Fort Myers, Florida 33908 James Kearney, Secretary Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-100 Thomas A. Bell, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985), on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner l(a). Covered in Finding of Fact 2. l(b). Covered in Finding of Fact 13. l(c). Covered in Finding of Fact 4. 2(a). Covered in Finding of Fact 8. 3(a). Covered in Finding of Fact 1. 3(b). Sentence 1, covered in Finding of Fact 3. Sentence 2, covered in Finding of Fact 7. 3(c). Covered in Finding of Fact 6. 3(d). Rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. 3(e). Covered in Finding of Fact 9. 3(f). Covered in Finding of Fact 9. 3(g). Covered in Finding of Fact 10. 3(h). To the extent relevant, covered in Finding of Fact 5. The date on which witnesses moved into the condominium prior to the date they closed the purchases of their unit is irrelevant. 3(i). Rejected as recitations of testimony, not proposed findings of fact, also irrelevant. 3(j). Rejected as inconsistent with the evidence I find more credible, i.e., that an owners meeting was held by the developer on January 5, 1983. 3(k). Sentence 1, covered in Finding of Fact 11. Sentences 2 and 3, rejected as irrelevant. 3(1). Covered in Finding of Fact 18. 3(m). Generally rejected as a recitation of testimony, not a finding of fact. Covered, however, in Finding of Fact 14. 3(n). Covered in Finding of Fact 12. 3(o). Covered in Finding of Fact 15. 3(p). Covered in Finding of Fact 16. 3(q). Covered in Finding of Fact 17. Rulings on Proposed Finding of Fact Submitted by Respondent 1. No ruling necessary. 2(A). Evidence that meetings of unit owners were held in 1982 and 1983 have been accepted in Findings of Fact 9 and 15. 2(B). Rejected because there is no evidence that for fiscal or calendar year 1982 the reserve requirement had been waived. The only evidence of any meeting of the condominium association in 1982, joint exhibit 5(a) does not show any waiver of reserve requirements for that year. It is inconceivable that the developer, at a meeting where it is the sole owner of all units, may waive reserve requirements when the budget distributed with the prospectus to potential purchasers shows reserves in the estimated operating budget it distributed. See joint exhibit 1. The resolution recorded in the minutes of the meeting of the Condominium Association of January 5, 1983, which purports to waive funding of reserves for two years is ineffective for the reasons discussed in Conclusions of Law 7. ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS AND MOBILE HOMES, Petitioner, DBR DOCKET NO. 85224MVC DOAH CASE NO. 85-4267 GRANADA LAKES DEVELOPMENT CORP., d/b/a GRANADA LAKES ADULT RV RESORT CONDOMINIUM, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68718.111718.112718.116718.403
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. BOSTON`S, INC., T/A BOSTON`S, 83-003656 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003656 Latest Update: May 02, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, the Respondent, Boston's, Inc., was the holder of Beverage License No. 53-123, Series 6-COP SR. This license is issued to the premises known as Boston's, located at 100 Monterey Road, Stuart, Florida. The license held by Respondent is a Special Restaurant License originally issued in August 1957 to Frank and Mary Novacasa. By transfer of the license, Boston's, Inc., became the licensee on December 4, 1981. At the time of this transfer of the license to the Respondent, its president, A. Gerard Beauchamp, acknowledged by notarized Affidavit that the license required accommodations for serving 200 or more patrons at tables at all times. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1). On February 22, 1983, Beverage Officers White and Young conducted a routine inspection of the licensed premises. The officers discovered that the premises had been remodeled and that a new bar had been added, thereby reducing the available seating. By count, only 121 seats were available at tables, with an additional 18 to 20 stools being available at the bar. The manager on the premises also advised that an additional 10 to 15 chairs were located in a storage shed. On February 23, 1983, Beverage Officer White issued an official notice to the Respondent advising that it was required to maintain seating capacity at tables for 200 or more patrons. A compliance date of April 13, 1983, was indicated. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2). Officers White and Young conducted a compliance inspection on June 7, 1983. The physical layout of the premises remained as it had been on the earlier visit. A count of the seats available at tables revealed 114 chairs. An additional 24 stools were placed at the bar. At that time, Officer White issued an official notice to the Respondent, which was signed for by the manager, Norm Spector. That notice advised Respondent that the Division intended to file administrative charges against its license. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking Respondent's Special Restaurant License No. 53-123, Series 6-COP SR. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Louisa E. Hargrett, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Shumaker, Esquire 1775 NE Fifth Avenue Boca Raton, Florida 33432 J. Reeve Bright, Esquire Florida Coast Bank Building, Suite 500 551 SE Eighth Street Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Gary R Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard N. Rasmussen, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (3) 120.57561.20561.29
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BOARD OF PHARMACY vs. HOTEL PHARMACY AND HARRY CARTUN, 82-002104 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002104 Latest Update: May 17, 1983

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Hotel Pharmacy was a pharmacy permit holder having been issued permit number 0006529. At all times material hereto, Respondent Harry Cartun was a licensed pharmacist. having been issued license number 0011093. At all times material hereto, Respondent Harry Cartun was the owner and manager of Respondent Hotel Pharmacy, located at 1201 Lincoln Road, Miami Beach, Florida. Pursuant to a search of Respondent Hotel Pharmacy's Schedule II files, Petitioner seized the following prescriptions written for a patient named Edward Metzer, which prescriptions were filled by Respondents: DATE PRESCRIBED BY MEDICATION March 17, 1982 Elliot Trevian, M. D. Dilaudid, 4 mgs. No .36 March 25, 1982 Sol Colsky, M. D. Dilaudid, 4 mgs. No .40 March 31, 1982 Gustavo L. Arias, M. D. Dilaudid, 4 mgs. No .40 April 05, 1982 Gustavo L. Arias, M. D. Dilaudid, 4 mgs. No .40 None of the foregoing prescriptions were written by the physicians whose names appear on the prescription. No medical doctor named Elliot Trevian has ever been licensed in the State of Florida. The two prescriptions bearing Dr. Arias' name indicate that he is a psychiatrist--Children and Adolescents. Neither Respondent Harry Cartun nor Respondent Hotel Pharmacy verified the validity of any of the foregoing prescriptions.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents Hotel Pharmacy and Harry Cartun not guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaints and dismissing the Administrative Complaints against them. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of March, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Moody, Jr., Esquire 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Vincent J. Flynn, Esquire 1414 Coral Way Miami, Florida 33145 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hinton F. Bevis, Executive Director Board of Pharmacy Post Office Box 3355 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57465.016465.023
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