The Issue The issues in these cases are whether the Respondent, Kindred, Inc., d/b/a Raceway Café, should be disciplined for: in Case No. 98-5046 (DBPR Administrative Action Case No. CL-62- 980016), alleged failure to maintain a bona fide restaurant as required of special restaurant (SRX) licensees by Section 561.20(2)(a)(4), Florida Statutes (1997), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.0141; and, in Case No. 98-5515 (DBPR Administrative Action Case No. CL-62-9800159), alleged failure to produce records as required of SRX licensees by Florida Administrative Code Rule 61A-3.014.
Findings Of Fact On or about June 26, 1998, the Respondent, Kindred, Inc., applied for a series 4-COP (consumption on premises) special restaurant alcoholic beverage (SRX) license and obtained a temporary 4-COP SRX license (number 62-09319) for the Raceway Café, located at 12670 Starkey Road, Largo, Pinellas County, Florida. The Respondent opened for business on July 2, 1998. On July 13, 1998, at approximately 1:30 p.m., DABT Special Agent Paul Cohen entered licensed premises to inspect and verify compliance with SRX license requirements. It was Cohen's impression that the Raceway Café had adequate service area (over 2,500 square feet) but that there were not enough seating and table settings to serve 150 diners at one time and that the Raceway Café was not a bona fide restaurant. Cohen left and returned at approximately 4:00 p.m. with an intern and a camcorder to video the premises and inspect in detail--i.e., count tables, chairs, plates, and eating utensils. The Respondent's sole owner, Marouane Elhajoui, was present in the premises at the time of the detailed inspection. The evidence was clear that Elhajoui knew the purpose of Cohen's inspection and completely understood the SRX requirements. (He had another SRX license for other premises.) Cohen first videotaped the outside and inside of the licensed premises. Cohen and the intern then counted tables and chairs and found that the licensed premises contained seating for a maximum of 122 people. Of these seats, approximately 80% were bar stools, and there was not enough table space to serve full- course meals at all 122 seats. Several of the bar stools were at the bar counter, which was cluttered with video game machines, and several cocktail tables were too small to accommodate full- course meals for all four or five bar stools placed at those tables. Elhajoui told Cohen about a grand opening celebration that had taken place on the premises on July 11 and 12, 1998. Elhajoui explained that restaurant tables and chairs had been removed from the premises and stored in an adjacent, empty storefront to accommodate a live band and dance floor for the grand opening. Elhajoui told Cohen that, if Cohen would wait, Elhajoui could replace the tables and chairs and have adequate seating in a matter of minutes. Cohen did not dispute Elhajoui's claim or ask to see the stored tables and chairs. He declined the request to wait a few minutes and Elhajoui's offer to replace the tables and chairs. Cohen testified to having no recollection of any conversation with Elhajoui concerning a grand opening, the removal of tables and chairs, or their storage in an empty storefront next door. While raising a question as to Cohen's truthfulness on this point, it could be that Cohen did not recall the conversation because he did not attach great importance to the circumstances explaining why there was inadequate seating at the time of his inspection. After Elhajoui told Cohen that there were more than 150 place-settings in the restaurant, Cohen and the intern were able to count only approximately 75 forks, 96 spoons, and 75 plates. Elhajoui testified that Cohen and the intern did not count either baskets or wooden plates also used to serve meals and did not count eating utensils in boxes in a cabinet under a counter in the kitchen. But Cohen specifically asked Elhajoui to show him all of the plates and eating utensils in the restaurant so that his count would be accurate and fair to the Respondent, and Cohen and the intern counted everything Elhajoui showed them. When Cohen told Elhajoui that he did not have enough plates and utensils, Elhajoui pointed to the "line" and asked if Cohen had counted what was there; Cohen indicated that he had counted those items. Elhajoui never specified any utensils in boxes in the cabinet under the counter. If they were there at the time, it is inexplicable that Elhajoui would not have made sure they were counted. Instead, upon completion of the inspection, Elhajoui read and signed without explanation or excuse an inspection report indicating that there were inadequate plates and eating utensils. It is found that Cohen's count was accurate. It can be inferred based on the facts on July 13, 1998, that the Raceway Café did not have capacity to serve 150 meals at one time at any time between opening on July 2 and July 13, 1998. No such inference can be drawn from the evidence after July 13, 1998. Besides alleging inadequate seating and place settings, Cohen also alleged that the Respondent was not operating a bona fide restaurant. The question whether the Raceway Café is a bona fide restaurant cannot be answered simply by counting tables and chairs and place settings. This allegation raises the more nebulous question of when can a bar be a restaurant, and when does a restaurant become a bar? Cohen based his allegation of "bad faith" on several factors. Starting from the outside, there was a temporary sign advertising drink specials but no food. (Elhajoui explained that the sign was owned and controlled by the shopping center and was advertising for the grand opening; he stated that it usually displayed meal specials.) A sign on the building seemed to describe the Raceway Café as a "Sports Lounge," but being (or having) a "sports lounge" may not necessarily turn a restaurant into a bar. There were neon beer signs in the windows, but they also are not uncommon in bona fide restaurants. Inside the building, there is a rather large bar, and Cohen perceived it to be especially prominent on entering the premises; but there are two other entrances that are not so close to the bar. Cohen was not greeted by a host or hostess or, he thought, any instructions regarding restaurant seating, which he considered normal in a bona fide restaurant; but Cohen overlooked a theme-sign incorporated in a parking meter which stood near one of the other entrances and invited customers to seat themselves. Cohen also overlooked a "chalkboard" used to advertise daily specials common in restaurants. Cohen also noted that there were three dart boards in the bar area, juke boxes, and more theme decorations (a Harley Davidson motorcycle in a corner of the licensed premises, and plans to hang a race car--or at least the side panel of a race car body--from the ceiling), but none of those things in themselves are incompatible with a bona fide restaurant. Finally, Cohen only observed food consumption on one of his visits. But his only extended visit was at 4:00 p.m. on July 13, 1998, and none of the other visits were during normal meal times. Cohen made no mention of the full meal menu that has been used at Raceway Café since its opening. In truth, Cohen's allegation of "bad faith" probably was influenced by his finding of inadequate numbers of tables and chairs and place settings. Cohen returned to the licensed premises on July 14, 1998, to serve DBPR Administrative Action Case No. CL-62-980016. He made no observations on July 14, 1998, that he could recall. Elhajoui and his witness testified without contradiction that the Respondent had enough seating and place settings to serve at least 150 meals at one time on and after July 14, 1998. They also testified without contradiction that the signage advertised meal specials. Cohen returned to the licensed premises on September 2, 1998, to serve a notice to produce all records documenting gross sales of alcoholic beverages and food and non-alcoholic beverages (including source documents--i.e., guest checks) for July and August 1998. Production was required to be made by September 12, 1998, at DABT offices in Clearwater, Florida. Cohen made no observations on September 2, 1998, that he could recall. Elhajoui testified that he attempted to deliver the records on Monday, September 7, 1998, but that the DABT offices were closed for Labor Day. The next day, he telephoned DABT to advise that he had attempted to deliver the records and was told that DABT would be mailing him something he understood to be another administrative complaint. It is doubtful that such a conversation took place since there still were four days in which the Respondent could comply with the notice to produce. The Respondent never produced the requested documentation, and on September 30, 1998, returned to the licensed premises, to serve DBPR Administrative Action Case No. CL-62-9800159. Cohen made no observations on September 30, 1998, that he could recall. The Respondent produced documentation at final hearing establishing that 51.63% of its gross sales in July 1998 and 51.28% of its gross sales in August 1998 were food and non- alcoholic beverages. Based on all the evidence presented, it is found that DABT failed to prove that Raceway Café is not a bona fide restaurant except to the extent that its meal service capacity was inadequate from July 2 through July 13, 1998.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order imposing a $1,000 fine and revoking the Respondent's temporary SRX license without prejudice to obtain any other type license, but with prejudice to obtain the same type of special license for 5 years. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Miriam S. Wilkinson Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1999. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Joseph N. Perlman, Esquire Belcher Place 1101 Belcher Road, South Largo, Florida 33771 Joseph Martelli, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 William Woodyard, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
The Issue The question presented in this cause concerns the necessity that the Petitioner pay an additional $1,000 fee which is purportedly required by the conditions of Subsection 565.02(1)(g), Florida Statutes, if it is determined that the Petitioner has more than three permanent separate locations serving alcoholic beverages for consumption on its licensed premises, Store No. 126. This alleged fee requirement is associated with the Petitioner's application to the Respondent for an "increase in series" of its alcoholic beverage license from a Series 3-PS, which permits "package sales" for off-premises consumption only, to a Series 4-COP, which permits consumption of alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises. The Petitioner claims that the arrangement in the licensed premises does not exceed the limit of three permanent separate locations for serving alcoholic beverages and the Respondent claims that there are four permanent separate locations for serving alcoholic beverages for consumption on the licensed premises, thereby exceeding by one the allowable limit and causing the imposition of the $1,000 additional license tax set forth in Subsection 565.02(1)(g), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On March 24, 1977, the Petitioner, ABC Liquors, Inc., made an application with the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, for an "increase in series" of its alcoholic beverage license for Store No. 126, located at 3427 Southwest Archer Road, Gainesville, Alachua County, Florida. The increase requested was a change from a Series 3-PS license, which permitted "package sales" for off-premises consumption only, to a new Series 4-COP license, which permits consumption of alcoholic beverages on the licensed premises. For reference purposes, a copy of the front sheet of the application is attached to this Recommended Order and incorporated by reference as Attachment "A". In compliance with the procedures of the Respondent, T. L. Ewing, the Respondent's employee, drew a sketch of the premises on the reverse side of the application referred to in Attachment "A", and a copy of that sketch is attached to this Recommended Order and incorporated by reference as Attachment "B". That sketch is an accurate representation of the interior floor plan of the licensed premises. The floor plan is further depicted in the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 5, specifically 5E, which is a sketch of the "as-built" plans of the portion of the licensed premises which is the subject of this dispute. This Exhibit 5E, which was admitted into evidence, depicts the deployment of the bar area which is utilized under the terms of a Series 4-COP license applied for. Additionally, Petitioner's Exhibit 1 is a photographic depiction of the type bar arrangements and accessways between certain portions of the bar arrangement; however, this photograph is taken of a similar lounge area and is not the actual area in question. This depicts another one of the Petitioner's lounges, located in a separate licensed premises. As described in the issue statement of this Recommended Order, the controversy presented for consideration involves a characterization of the bar areas shown in Attachment "B" and Petitioner's Exhibit 5E on the question of whether there are more than three permanent separate locations for serving alcoholic beverages for consumption on the licensed premises. The significance of having more than three permanent separate locations for serving alcoholic beverages for consumption on the licensed premises is revealed by a reading of Subsection 565.02(1)(g), Florida Statutes, which states: 565.02 License fees; vendors; clubs; caterers and others.-- (g) Vendors operating places of business where consumption on the premises is permitted and which have ,more than three permanent separate locations serving alcoholic beverages for consumption on the licensed premises shall pay in addition to the license tax imposed in paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f), $1,000. However, such permanent separate locations shall not include service bars not accessible to the public or portable or temporary bars being used for a single occasion or event. Golf club license holders may operate service bars or portable or temporary bars on the grounds contiguous to their licensed premises and shall pay $100 for a certified copy of the club license, which shall be posted on the bar. The area contiguous to the licensed premises shall be considered an extension of the licensed premises upon payment of the fee, posting of the certified copy of the license, and notation of such extension upon the sketch accompanying the original license application. In reviewing the license application for "increase in series", the Respondent has taken the position that there are within the room which constitutes the lounge area, four separate locations and those four locations are made up of the rotating bar, and the perimeter bar areas which show three sections broken up by the east and west ramps separating those portions of the perimeter bar area. It is the contention of the Respondent that the word "location" is equivalent to the bar areas shown in the lounge room and, counting the rotating bar and the three separate perimeter sections, there would be four locations. Consequently, under the Respondent's theory, the Petitioner is required to pay an additional license tax in the amount of $1,000 for the extra location in excess of the allowable three locations. The Petitioner asserts that the meaning of the word "location" as found in the subsection calls for more definitive separation than is found between the sections of the perimeter bar operation and that the design of the perimeter bar which allows for entrance and exit ramps through the center of the horseshoe shaped device which is the perimeter bar area, does not create the type definition contemplated by the law. To the Petitioner, separate rooms would be more in keeping with the legislative intent in drafting the requirement in Subsection 565.02(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Moreover, the Petitioner argues that the rampways which divide the perimeter bar into three sections were installed primarily for the purposes of safety and convenience and those efforts to allow for safety and convenience should not be used to unfair advantage by the Respondent in claiming that there are four locations as opposed to a maximum of two locations; those two locations being constituted of the rotating bar and a perimeter bar. The Petitioner claims that certain local ordinances require that exits be available within a specified number of feet of the position a patron might be found in during the course of an emergency and the Petitioner alludes to the fact that the rampways aid in the evacuation through the exits. The Petitioner did not demonstrate that the removal of the passageways would cause a violation of the ordinances dealing with emergency exit accessibility. Petitioner also states, and the facts reveal, that within the room proper there are six serving stations in the perimeter bar area, constituted of case registers, soda heads, sinks and other necessary structures to the service of patrons. These soda heads, waterlines, and drainage systems have common origins or terminus. Other relevant facts presented in the case include the facts that the bar structure in terms of the shell of the various positions within the lounge area, are permanent installations, although the soda heads for mixed drinks may be moved around within the shell. There are swinging doors on the northern and southern fingers of the various sections of the perimeter bar area. The rampway is unobstructed unless one of those swinging doors is opened when a person is attempting to use the rampways. The dimensions and measurements within the lounge may be discerned by an examination of the other aspects of the Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 5, with the caveat that these design sheets must be considered in view of the "as-built" sketch found in Petitioner's Exhibit 5E. This statement is made because there were design changes made from the original proposal which relocated the dance floor in the lounge area and made other changes which may be seen in this review.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, ABC Liquors, Inc., be required to pay an additional license tax of $1,000 in all applicable periods for its place of business located at 3427 Southwest Archer Road, Gainesville, Alachua County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of October, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F.X. Purnell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James E. Foster, Esq. 170 East Washington Street Orlando, Florida 32801 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent's pronouncement that special restaurant licenses issued prior to January 1, 1958, that have not remained in "continuous operation" are thereby (as a result of their lack of "continuous operation") rendered invalid pursuant to Section 561.20(5), Florida Statutes, and therefore not subject to delinquent renewal pursuant to Section 561.27, Florida Statutes (Challenged Statement) is a rule that violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged by Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: There are various types of DABT-issued licenses authorizing the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. Among them are quota licenses, SRX licenses, and SR licenses. All three of these licenses allow the licensee to sell liquor, as well as beer and wine. Quota licenses, as their name suggests, are limited in number. The number of quota licenses available in each county is based upon that county's population. SRX and SR licenses are "special" licenses authorizing the retail sale of beer, wine, and liquor by restaurants. There are no restrictions on the number of these "special" licenses that may be in effect (countywide or statewide) at any one time. SRX licenses are "special restaurant" licenses that were originally issued in or after 1958.2 SR licenses are "special restaurant" licenses that were originally issued prior to 1958. For restaurants originally licensed after April 18, 1972, at least 51 percent of the licensed restaurant's total gross revenues must be from the retail sale of food and non- alcoholic beverages.3 Restaurants for which an SR license has been obtained, on the other hand, do not have to derive any set percentage or amount of their total gross revenues from the retail sale of food and non-alcoholic beverages. DABT-issued alcoholic beverage licenses are subject to annual renewal.4 License holders who have not timely renewed their licenses, but wish to remain licensed, may file an Application for Delinquent Renewal (on DABT Form 6015). Until recently, it was DABT's longstanding policy and practice to routinely grant applications for the delinquent renewal of SR and other alcoholic beverage licenses, regardless of the reason for the delinquency. DABT still routinely grants applications to delinquently renew alcoholic beverage licenses other than SR licenses, but it now has a "new policy" in place with respect to applications for the delinquent renewal of SR licenses. The "new policy" is to deny all such applications based upon these SR licenses' not having been in "continuous operation," action that, according to DABT, is dictated by operation of Section 561.20(5), Florida Statutes, a statutory provision DABT now claims it had previously misinterpreted when it was routinely granting these applications. Relying on Section 561.20(5), Florida Statutes, to blanketly deny all applications for the delinquent renewal of SR licenses was the idea of Eileen Klinger, the head of DABT's Bureau of Licensing. She directed her licensing staff to implement the "new policy" after being told by agency attorneys that this "was the appropriate thing [from a legal perspective] to do." As applicants applying to delinquently renew their SR licenses (which were both originally issued in 1956), Petitioners are substantially affected by DABT's "new policy" that SR licenses cannot be delinquently renewed because they have not been in "continuous operation," as that term is used in Section 561.20(5), Florida Statutes. Their applications for the delinquent renewal of their licenses would have been approved had the status quo been maintained and this "new policy" not been implemented. Abkey filed its application (on DABT Form 6015) for the delinquent renewal of its SR license (which had been due for renewal on March 31, 2005) on February 21, 2007. On the application form, Abkey gave the following "explanation for not having renewed during the renewal period": "Building was sold. Lost our lease." On April 2, 2007, DABT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Abkey's application. DABT's notice gave the following reason for its intended action: The request for delinquent renewal of this license is denied. Florida Statute 561.20(5) exempted restaurant licenses issued prior to January 1, 1958 from operating under the provisions in 561.20(4) as long as the place of business was in continuous operation. This business failed to renew its license on or before March 31, 2005, therefore it did not comply with the requirements and is no longer valid. Amy Cat filed its application (on DABT Form 6015) for the delinquent renewal of its SR license (which had been due for renewal on March 31, 1999) on December 6, 2006. On the application form, Amy Cat gave the following "explanation for not having renewed during the renewal period": "Building was closed." On June 8, 2007, DABT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Amy Cat's application. DABT's notice gave the following reason for its intended action: The request for delinquent renewal of this license is denied. Florida Statute 561.20(5) exempted restaurant licenses issued prior to January 1, 1958 from operating under the provisions in 561.20(4) as long as the place of business was in continuous operation. This business failed to renew its license on or before March 31, 1999, therefore it did not comply with the requirements and is no longer valid. SR licenses will not be allowed to be moved from the location where the license was originally issued.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of unlawful discrimination in the terms, conditions, privileges, or provision of services in connection with the rental of a dwelling from Respondent, based on her race, in violation of section 804(b) or 804(f) of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, Part II, Florida Statutes (2011).
Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and manages the Country Club Woods residential community in Starke, Florida. Country Club Woods is a racially-mixed community. The current residential mix includes 29 African-American families and 6 white families. County Club Woods receives low-income housing subsidies in the form of tax credits through the Florida Housing Finance Corporation. Some residents qualify for federal Section 8 housing subsidies. Petitioner is African-American. On February 4, 2011, Petitioner signed a lease agreement for a home in Country Club Woods. Rent was $698.00 per month. The home was vacant, and power and water had been turned off. Respondent asked Petitioner to activate power and water so that repairs and unit preparation could be performed, and she did so. Petitioner?s rent for February was partially prorated to account for the period during which she did not occupy the unit. The lease agreement required that all occupants of the house be listed, and provided that “[n]o other occupants are permitted.” Guests were limited to stays of no more than 14 consecutive days. Due to the status of Country Club Woods as an affordable housing community, it is subject to restrictions on the income and criminal history of its residents. Therefore, all permanent occupants are required to undergo income and background screening to ensure that the low income housing tax credit rules are being met. The failure to do so could jeopardize the tax credits. When she signed the lease, Petitioner knew what the lease required regarding the occupancy of the house. Petitioner listed Aulettia Russ and Aarian Russ, her daughter and son, as occupants with her in the home. After the lease contract was signed, Respondent performed a few repairs and updates to prepare the unit for Petitioner. Mr. Sam Baker, who performed maintenance services for County Club Woods, fumigated the house and painted some of the interior walls. He performed a minor repair to the roof, which consisted of applying tar around the cracked rubber boot of the roof drain vent. Mr. Baker moved a stove into the house from another unit because there was no stove when the lease was signed. He also replaced the toilet with a new one. Petitioner moved into the unit on February 16, 2010. She was joined by her fiancé, Kevin Sampson, and her older son, Kelsy Roulhac, neither of whom were listed as occupants. Mr. Sampson was on probation for several felony offenses. Both Mr. Sampson and Mr. Roulhac were residents for the entirety of Petitioner?s tenancy. At no time during the tenancy did Petitioner seek to add Mr. Sampson or Mr. Roulhac to the lease. Petitioner testified that Rebekkah Baker, the property manager, knew that Mr. Sampson was a permanent occupant, but had no objection. Ms. Baker denied that she consented to his occupancy, given that it would have been a violation of Country Club Woods policy against leasing to persons with a criminal history in the past seven years. Given the consequences of failing to meet the occupancy and background screening requirements, Ms. Baker?s testimony is credited. When Petitioner moved in, there were still problems with the unit. Problems noted by Petitioner included a broken dishwasher, mildew on a number of surfaces, dead insects -- likely from the fumigation -- in the cabinets, a hole in the foyer wall caused by the adjacent door?s doorknob, a ceiling stain from the roof leak, a missing shower head, a broken light fixture, and a missing smoke alarm. In addition, the carpet was stained and in generally very poor condition. Petitioner resolved the mildew problem by cleaning the affected surfaces with Tilex. Petitioner?s son, Mr. Roulhac, got rid of the dead insects and cleaned the cabinets. Petitioner replaced the showerhead on her own. Shortly after she moved in, Petitioner notified Respondent that her roof was leaking. Mr. Baker went to the house, advised Petitioner?s daughter that he was there to fix the roof, and went onto the roof. He determined that the leak was occurring at the location of his previous repair. He completed the repair by re-tarring the roof drain vent boot. Petitioner testified that the roof continued to leak after heavy rains. She indicated that she made a subsequent complaint via a message left on Ms. Baker?s telephone answering machine. Ms. Baker testified that she received no subsequent complaints, and there is no other evidence to suggest that Respondent received any subsequent complaints regarding the roof. Mr. Baker performed no further repairs. Petitioner complained that the dishwasher was holding water. She testified that Respondent never came to fix the dishwasher. Both Mr. Baker and Ms. Baker testified that Mr. Baker was tasked to repair the dishwasher, but upon arriving at the house was denied entry, with the explanation that the dishwasher had been fixed by a friend, and the problem resolved by removing a plastic fork that had clogged the drain. From the time Petitioner moved in, until the time she vacated the home, Mr. Baker fixed the hole in the foyer wall and the broken light fixture. In addition, Mr. Baker came to the house to fix the refrigerator, which was a problem that was not on the original list. From the beginning of her tenancy, Petitioner complained of the carpet. The carpet was badly stained and worn. In addition, the carpet contained a dye or some other substance that aggravated Aarian Russ?s asthma. It was Petitioner?s desire to have the carpet replaced before the time of her daughter?s graduation. Respondent agreed to replace the carpet, and had employees of a flooring company go to Petitioner?s house to measure for new carpet. The flooring company employees were allowed entry to the house by Petitioner?s daughter. They measured the rooms, except for Petitioner?s bedroom, which was locked. Respondent advised Petitioner that the measurements of the bedroom of an identical unit could be provided to the carpet company. It is not known if that was done. Due to difficulties on the part of the flooring company, the new carpet was not installed before Petitioner vacated the unit. There was no evidence offered to suggest any relationship between the failure to install new carpet and Petitioner?s race. Petitioner complained that she had not been given notice that the flooring company employees were coming, and complained that Respondent had not performed a background check on the workers. She argued that she was entitled to have a background check done on anyone providing services before she would have to allow them into her home. There is no relationship between Petitioner?s complaints regarding the lack of a background check on the workers and Petitioner?s race. The lease agreement provides that “[m]anagement will make repairs . . . after receipt of written notice.” Respondent occasionally prepared work orders describing the nature of the problem at a unit, and the work done to resolve the problem. However, the evidence demonstrates that written work orders were likely the exception rather than the rule. It appears that most problems were reported by verbal requests, and resolved by Mr. Baker?s maintenance and repairs. Most of Petitioner?s requests for repairs and maintenance were made verbally. At some point, due to the number of items, Petitioner provided Respondent with a list of items for repair. There is no evidence that any repairs at Petitioner?s home were documented with a work order. In any event, there was no evidence that the failure to document the work, which was common, was the result of Petitioner?s race. Petitioner did submit seven work orders in evidence. Six of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to the homes of African-American families upon verbal requests. One of the work orders reflected repairs made by Respondent to the home of a white family upon a verbal request. Petitioner questioned why none of her repairs were memorialized in work orders. The work orders do not substantiate that Petitioner was discriminated against on account of her race, and in fact serve to indicate that Respondent provided maintenance services equally, without any consideration to the race of the person requesting such services. Petitioner complained that Mr. Baker did not have “credentials,” and questioned him regarding any education or licenses that qualified him to perform maintenance, including electrical work. Whether qualified to do so or not, Mr. Baker performed maintenance for all of the residents of Country Club Woods, regardless of their race. There is no relationship between Petitioner?s complaints regarding Mr. Baker?s credentials and Petitioner?s race. Beginning in April, 2011, Petitioner began to fall behind on her rent. Petitioner was paid bi-weekly, though how that affected her ability to plan for monthly rental payments was not clearly explained. On April 21, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the $279.60 balance of the April rent payment be made. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. However, the copy of the notice put in evidence includes the notation from Ms. Baker that “[p]romised to pay balance w/ May 2011?s rent.” On May 9, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the rent payment be made. The amount in arrears was calculated to be $1,077.60, which included a late fee. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. However, the copy of the notice put in evidence includes the notation from Ms. Baker that “pd. $698 on 5/11/11.” On June 1, 2011, Ms. Baker posted a notice on Petitioner?s door demanding that the rent payment be made. The amount in arrears remained at $1,077.60. Petitioner denied having seen the notice. On July 27, 2011, Respondent provided a notice to Petitioner indicating that due to unauthorized occupants and $1,975 in unpaid rent, Petitioner had until August 1, 2011, to vacate the premises, or Respondent would commence eviction proceedings. Petitioner admitted to having received that notice. Respondent?s resident history report indicates that by the time Petitioner vacated the home on August 31, 2011, her rent was $2,075.60 in arrears. Some of that was due to assessed late charges, but the majority reflected unpaid rent. When Petitioner vacated the unit, Petitioner?s security deposit was applied, the remaining arrearage was assigned to a collection company, and Respondent?s books were cleared. Ms. Sheila Palmer and Ms. Tynesha Epps testified at the hearing. They have been residents of Country Club Woods for 16 years and for 1 year and 3 months, respectively. Both are African-American. Both testified that they had never been refused maintenance at their homes, and that Respondent was responsive to their requests for maintenance which were generally verbal. Neither Ms. Palmer nor Ms. Epps was aware of any instance in which management of Country Club Woods had discriminated against any tenant due to their race, though neither personally knew Petitioner. Ms. Headrick, Ms. Baker, and Mr. Baker each testified that they never denied or limited repair and maintenance services to any resident of Country Club Woods account of their race. They each testified convincingly that race played no factor in their duties to their tenants. Ultimate Findings of Fact There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing that Respondent failed or refused to provide services to Petitioner under the same terms and conditions that were applicable to all persons residing in the Country Club Woods community. There was not a scintilla of evidence that, in providing services to Petitioner, Respondent deviated from its standard practice of providing maintenance services to all residents of Country Club Woods regardless of their race, income, or any other reason. The evidence does support a finding that Petitioner materially breached the terms of the lease agreement, both by allowing undisclosed persons to reside at the house, and by failing to timely pay rent. Petitioner?s race had nothing to do with the timing or manner in which maintenance and repair services were provided to her by Respondent, and it is expressly so found. The evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her race. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2012H0004. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Eulinda M. Russ Post Office Box 902 Starke, Florida 32091 Sean Michael Murrell, Esquire Murrell Law, LLC 4651 Salisbury Road South, Suite 503 Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondents were licensed real estate salesmen in the State of Florida, with Mr. Blanc's license being 0406481 and Ms. Kirkland's license being 0399466. The Division of Real Estate is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of real estate in this state. In November, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. William A. McKie were owners of Week 43 in Unit 1 of a time share condominium located at the Anchorage Resort and Yacht Club in Key Largo, Florida. About that time, they received a card issued by the Florida Bay Club to visit a time share condominium there. Because they were somewhat disappointed in the condition of their Anchorage unit, they went to see the Florida Bay Club facility and met with Respondent Kirkland who took them on a tour of the facility and the model apartment. Mrs. McKie was quite impressed with it, but indicated she could not afford it, because she and her husband already owned a time share unit at the Anchorage. When told that, Ms. Kirkland introduced the McKies to Respondent Blanc, who in the course of his sales presentation, suggested that the McKies use their ownership at the Anchorage as a trade-in worth $4,000 off of the in excess of $11,000 price of the Florida Bay Club unit. The McKies agreed and signed certain documents incident to the purchase including a worksheet, purchase agreement, disclosure agreement, and settlement statement, all prepared by Respondent Blanc. The worksheet reflected that the unit being purchased by the McKies, Week 44 in Unit A-5, had a purchase price of $6,500 toward which the McKies made a down payment of $650 by three separate charges to their Master Card and Visa cards, two for $300 each and one for $50. This left a mortgage balance to be financed of $5,850 payable for 7 years at 15 1/2 percent with monthly payments of $114.54. No reference was made in the worksheet to a trade in of the Anchorage unit. The purchase agreement also signed by the McKies and by Respondent Kirkland for the Florida Bay Club reflects a purchase price of $6,500 with a down payment of $650. The truth in lending form reflects that the amount financed would be $5,850 at 15.5% resulting in a finance charge of $3,771.36 with a total monthly payment amount of $9,621.36 which, when added to the $650 deposit, showed a total sales price of $10,271.36. The settlement statement signed by the McKies reflects a sales price of $6,500 with a $650 deposit. At no place, on any of the documentation, is the $4,000 trade-in for the Anchorage unit reflected. As a part of the transaction and at the suggestion of Respondent Blanc, the McKies were to sign a quitclaim deed to him as the representative of the seller to receive credit for the $4,000 trade-in. The documents, except for the quitclaim deed, were signed by the McKies on their first visit to Florida Bay Club on November 17, 1985. Mrs. McKie does not recall either Respondent signing the documentation, but there is evidence that Ms. Kirkland signed the purchase agreement and the worksheet and Mr. Blanc approved the worksheet. Neither the disclosure statement, the settlement statement nor the quitclaim deed, which was prepared by Respondent, Blanc, and furnished to the McKies on their second visit, was signed by either Respondent. The McKies went back to Florida Bay Club approximately a week later to sign for the prize they had been notified they had won and to sign the quitclaim deed, which had not been ready for them on their first visit. Respondent Blanc explained what the quitclaim deed was for and according to both McKies, they would not have purchased the property at Florida Bay Club had they not been able to trade-in their Anchorage unit. They definitely could not afford to pay for both units, a fact which was repeatedly explained to Respondents on both visits. Mrs. McKie believed that when she signed the quitclaim deed to the Anchorage unit, she would no longer be responsible for making payments there and in fact, the McKies notified the Anchorage Resort Club that Respondent Blanc had assumed their Week at the Anchorage, a fact which was confirmed by the Anchorage to Mr. Blanc by letter dated February 13, 1986. It is further noted that on January 30, 1986, Ms. Berta, general manager of the Florida Bay Club, by letter of even date, notified Mr. Blanc who was no longer an employee of Florida Bay, that the McKies' payment book, invoices for taxes due on the Anchorage property, and the quitclaim deed were being forwarded to him as evidence of the change of ownership of the Anchorage Resort unit from the McKies to Respondent Blanc. In this letter, Blanc was requested to notify the Anchorage of the change so the McKies would not be dunned for continuing payments. At the closing of the Florida Bay unit, when Mrs. McKie and her husband signed the quitclaim deed, Respondent Blanc told her she would continue to get payment notices from the Anchorage while the transfer was being processed, but she should bring those payment notices to him at the Florida Bay Club and he would take care of them. When Mrs. McKie received the first notice, she brought it to the Florida Bay Club to give to Mr. Blanc, but he was no longer located there. On this visit, she spoke to Ms. Berta, who advised her that the Florida Bay Club did not take trades. Ms. Berta called Respondent Blanc at his new place of business by phone in Mrs. McKie's presence and Respondent indicated at that time that he would buy the Anchorage unit himself and assume the payments. As a result, Mrs. McKie sent the delinquent notices to him at his new place of business, Gulf Stream Manor. In the meantime, she continued to make her new payments at the Florida Bay Club. Notwithstanding Respondent Blanc's agreement to assume payments, Mrs. McKie continued to receive mortgage payment delinquent notices from the bank for the Anchorage unit. During later negotiations with the bank regarding this, Mrs. McKie was told that she would still be responsible for making the payments even if Respondent Blanc took over and didn't pay and as a result, in order to relieve herself from this impending burden, she made arrangements to pay off the entire amount due for the Anchorage unit. After that she made several efforts to get Respondent Blanc to pay her back for the amount paid. Respondent Blanc agreed to make the payments and said he would pay the taxes on the unit, but he never reimbursed the McKies for any of the amount they had to pay. The McKies now own the Anchorage unit and have worked out a settlement agreement with the Florida Bay Club to get out of the responsibility for the unit there. Review of the quitclaim deed in question, prepared by Respondent Blanc and signed by the McKies, reflects that the McKies are both the grantors and grantees of the property and that Respondent Blanc's name nowhere appears on the document. It is of no force and effect. Respondent contends that when the McKies indicated they were unable to purchase a new unit since they still had a prior unit to pay for, relying on his understanding that the marketing organization selling the Florida Bay Club units had in the past taken a unit in trade, he discussed the matter with his supervisor who advised that he could offer up to $4,000 in trade on the unit. In order to do this, Respondent Blanc had to price the new unit at $10,500 and credit the McKies with $4,000. However, none of the documentation shows this was ever done. At no place on any of the documentations is the $4,000 trade-in referenced. It is clear the offer of a trade-in was a sham to induce the McKies to purchase a unit at Florida Bay Club. Ms. Berta, who was manager at Florida Bay Club at the time in question, indicated that no trade-ins were ever taken by the club. The prior trade-in referenced by Mr. Blanc was a unit which was completely paid for as opposed the McKies' which still had a substantial outstanding balance on it. Respondent Kirkland who was not a party to any of the negotiations subsequent to her initial interview with the McKies indicates that she "probably" quoted the McKies a price of $10,500. When Mrs. McKie indicated that they could not afford such a high price, she turned them over to Mr. Blanc who thereafter handled the entire transaction. Respondent Blanc tells a somewhat different story about the reaction of the McKies when his failure to assume responsibility for the trade-in unit at the Anchorage Bay Club came to light. He indicates that it was never intended that he would take title to this unit at first. The trade in was to be absorbed by the marketing company, Resort Sales International, for whom he worked, and he assumed, when he left the following week to go to a different facility, the company would follow through with its agreement to assume the McKie's Week at the Anchorage. He was quite surprised, he contends, to learn that this had not been done and since he wanted a unit in the Key Largo area anyway, he agreed to then assume it personally after first offering Mrs. McKie the opportunity to back out of the purchase. When she said that she wanted to be at Florida Bay Club, he was sent the payment books and the deed. He called the bank to notify them that he was going to assume responsibility for the loan, but the bank would give him no information regarding it and the bank official, Ms. Brown, was adamant in her representation that the McKies could not quitclaim deed the property to him. No reason was given for this, however. Mr. Blanc claims he made a series of telephone calls between January 30 and March 31, 1986, in an attempt to straighten out the difficulty involved. These included sixteen calls to Ms. Berta, eight calls to his former supervisor at Resort Sales, four calls to the Anchorage, three calls to the bank and three calls to Mrs. McKie. Mrs. McKie denies receiving calls from the Respondent and contends that her numerous calls to him remained unanswered. In a call he made after she paid off the loan on the Anchorage and settled with Florida Bay Club for approximately $2,183, Mrs. McKie advised Blanc to forget about it, that they were tired of messing with him and with the property. As a result, he admittedly gave up and did and heard nothing more regarding the property until he was contacted by a DPR investigator. On January 30, 1988, Mr. Blanc offered to buy Mrs. McKie's unit at the Anchorage for $2,900 which was exactly the amount owed on the property when she paid it off. She refused to accept that offer since she had paid $6,800 for the unit initially.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent Sandra Kirkland be dismissed and that Respondent Blanc's license as a real estate salesman in Florida be suspended for six months. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee this 19th day of April, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Darlene F. Keller Department of Professional Acting Executive Director Regulation DPR, Division of Real Estate Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Orlando, Florida 32801 Sandra S. Kirkland Post Office Box 9264 Panama City, Florida 32407 John G. Blanc 17501 West Highway 98 Panama City, Florida 32407
Findings Of Fact At about 4:00 o'clock on the afternoon of May 8, 1979, petitioner's officers David William Shomers and Muriel Snipes Waldmann, entered respondent's place of business. At that time, Sherry Ann Armetto was behind the bar. When Officers Shomers and Waldmann asked Ms. Armetto for a meal she told them that the cook had not yet arrived. Officer Shomers and Officer Waldmann then each ordered a Scotch and soda, and both were served. At about 5:00 o'clock, the cook was still nowhere to he found. Officer Shomers counted the places available for people to sit down and eat, including seats in the bar, and determined that there were only 161 such places. Even though Ms. Armetto had worked for respondent as a bar tender for five or six months before the inspection on May 8, 1979, she had never been advised to refrain from selling alcoholic beverages when the kitchen was closed. She was so advised, however, after the events of May 8, 1979. Ricardo John Gutierrez had worked for the business four or four and one half years as of May of 1979. He was never told not to sell alcoholic beverages while meals were not sold. Petitioner initiated the present proceedings on or about July 3, 1979. In May of 1979, respondent Pete Rose Corporation held license number 16-790 SRX, an "ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LICENSE FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 1, 1970, THRU SEPTEMBER 30, 1979." Petitioner's exhibit No. 1. Respondent has not renewed the license since. As a condition of this beverage license, respondent was required to maintain at least 4,000 square feet, sufficient tables, chairs, china, other equipment and personnel to serve food to 200 persons, Officer Shomers testified.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the notice to show cause, thereby terminating these proceedings and allowing respondent's license to expire; and then cancel respondent's license. DONE and ENTERED this 15th day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Pete Rose Corporation d/b/a Fat Cats 2590 S. State Road 7 Miramar, Florida
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent's beverage license, Series 14BC, No. 39-03729, should be disciplined because of the matters outlined in the Notice to Show Cause filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Division was the state agency responsible for the licensing of establishments for the dispensing and sale of alcoholic beverages and enforcement of the beverage laws of the State of Florida. McKown's, Inc., a corporation whose sole stockholders are Duncan and Gloria McKown, holds 14ABC license number 39-03729, located at The Cabin, an establishment situated at 8205 North Dale Mabry Highway in Tampa. This license is a license to operate a bottle club on the premises, and allows patrons to bring their own bottles into the club to drink from. Patrons may either bring their bottle each time they come, or they may leave it at the club to be used each time they visit. Patrons must drink from their own bottle or as the guest of another bottle holder, but cannot buy alcoholic drinks from the licensed establishment. The establishment may sell only ice, setups and food - no alcohol. Mr. McKown is Secretary-Treasurer of McKown's, Inc., the licensee in issue here. He has been in the restaurant and service business since 1937. He opened a large restaurant and lounge in Dunedin, Florida in the early 1960's, and opened The Cabin approximately fifteen years ago with a county bottle club license. When state licensure became required, approximately three years ago, he secured one of those as well. Mr. McKown claims he was open every day from 2 to 7 AM. His clientele was mostly made up of people in the service industry - people who work at night and get off early in the morning. These are people such as waitresses, cooks, restaurant and bar managers. Many of his patrons work at or manage high quality restaurants, and the interior of The Cabin is decorated with T-shirts from many of them. He believes that as a general rule, his clientele is of good quality and is law abiding. The Cabin is made up of one building and a patio. It has one front door, which is manned by a security guard, and there is a sign posted on the inside of the front door which indicates the facility is a private club, non- members of which must pay a service charge. Though it once was private, it is now open to anyone of legal age. If the door is closed, an individual approaching from the outside can not see the sign. Security is designed to keep out minors and to insure that persons admitted have a bottle with them or already inside. The two Messrs. Bailey are the security guards. They wear uniforms similar to those worn by law enforcement people and carry firearms. McKown claims this i s because a firearm was discharged on the premises some time ago and the guards' firearms and uniforms tend to dissuade drunks. Many companies have bottles for their employees. It is Mr. McKown's policy, which he believes is consistent with state law, that two or more people can come into a bottle club and drink from one bottle. It is also a practice of his to allow people to leave their bottles on the premises for future use. Many of his customers are repeat customers who are recognized by security and other employees. If the patron is known to the security guard, he or she might not be checked. Each entrance requires the payment of a $7.00 service fee which authorizes the patron two setup chips. When the patron comes in with a bottle, the cashier puts the patron's name on it using a role of waterproof tape on which is marked the name in color-coded pen, depending on what month it is. Bottles are discarded after three months, whether empty or not. Once a bottle is brought in and given to the bartender, it is kept on the service island behind the bar. At one time, the licensee maintained a membership list. The practice was abandoned when it was decided to seek patrons from the service industry. The inside of the bar is lighted but dark. Music is provided by a jukebox which plays continuously. If patrons do not put money in, the machine comes on automatically after twelve minutes, and the volume is loud, though Akins did not think so. There are speakers both at the jukebox and in the ceiling. The men's room has one stall and two urinals. Mr. McKown removed the door to the stall to keep illegal activity, such as drug sales or homosexual activity, from going on inside. By removing the door, he can readily check to determine that nothing improper is going on inside the stall. The ladies' room has two stalls with cafe doors. He put that type of door in at the same time he removed the men's stall door for the same reason. Both restrooms are to be checked periodically by the manager, by Mr. McKown or the cashiers, as available. The Cabin is busier on weekends than during the week and the staff is adjusted accordingly. On the weekends, there are two cashiers as opposed to one during the week. By the same token, on the weekend, three bartenders are on duty as opposed to two during the week. A maintenance man is also employed. At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Special Agent Jennifer Akins was a special agent with the Division and had been since December, 1989. She was a certified law enforcement officer and, prior to May, 1994, had been involved in between fifteen and twenty undercover operations, of which at least ten involved narcotics. She was trained in the identification of narcotics and street level narcotics activities by the Drug Enforcement Agency, and has taken other professional courses in the subject. Prior to the institution of this undercover operation, Akins had been in The Cabin four or five times. S/A Murray is also an experienced agent with twenty-five to thirty undercover investigations to her credit. At least half involved narcotics. She, too, had been at The Cabin prior to the onset of this investigation. On January 12, 1994 Akins went to The Cabin where she was stopped outside the door by the security guard, Mr. Bailey. He advised her it was a bottle club and inquired if she had a bottle. When she said she had, he also told her that her name would be placed on it and it would be kept behind the bar and drunk from when she was there. She gave over the bottle of rum she had brought. She was not required to fill out an application form nor to pay a membership fee. Akins went back to The Cabin with S/A Murray at approximately 5:15 AM on May 10, 1994. They were met at the door by Mr. Bailey and paid a $7.00 per person cover charge to Mr. Sparks, an employee, who was stationed inside the door. This cover charge entitled them to two drink chips which they would exchange for setups. Additional chips could be bought at $3.50 each. Once inside, they gave their bottle of rum to Mr. Sparks who, after placing a piece of tape with Murray's name on it on the bottle, gave it to the bartender. Akins asked where the bottle of rum was she had brought in on January 12, 1994, and was told it was gone. Bottles are disposed of after ninety days if not consumed first. Consequently, the only bottle the agents had on May 10, 1994 was the bottle they brought that visit. That night, Akins and Murray sat at the bar and were served one or two drinks each from the bottle they had brought in. Later on that evening, Akins was served a drink made with vodka by Mr. Strauss, a bartender. Akins saw Strauss make the drink and knows he did not use the bottle they brought in. Besides, when she tasted it, she recognized it was vodka, not rum. She paid for the drink with one of the chips she got upon entering. She drank only a small part of the drink in order to comply with Division policy that undercover agents will not drink enough to become impaired. Akins and Murray left The Cabin about 6:50 AM without taking the rum bottle they had brought, but while there, Akins observed a white male she recognized as Victor near the women's restroom talking with a white couple. Victor received money from the male in the couple, counted it, and gave the man something in return. This procedure is consistent with what she had observed in other drug transactions. Later on that evening, she again saw Victor near the men's restroom. Victor approached a black male who, after entering and exiting the restroom, handed Victor a small package and received something in return. While this was going on, both were furtively looking around. Akins didn't see what was transferred. Even later, Akins saw Victor exchange something with a black male near the front door. Again, she could not see what it was. S/A Murray also observed this activity and it appeared to be drug activity to her as well. Akins and Murray went back to The Cabin about 5:00 AM on May 11, 1994. As they approached the door they were met by two employees who let them in, and they paid a white female cashier upon entry. On this occasion they did not have a bottle with them. When asked, they said they had a bottle there from the previous visit and were allowed in. Akins ordered two or three drinks from Mr. Sparks, who was behind the bar that evening. The first drink she had was rum, but she does not know from which bottle it was poured. She later ordered a vodka drink which Sparks poured without asking if she had a vodka bottle there. She paid for the vodka with a chip. Later that evening, Mr. Leal, also an employee of The Cabin, offered her a drink. He had called out that the police were outside and that everyone had to stay inside. He sweetened the call by saying he would buy a drink for everyone. At this time, Akins asked for a Zambuca, which they did not have, and they gave her Amaretto instead. Though she saw Mr. Sparks make the drink, she could not tell if there was a name on the bottle or not. Leal offered Murray a drink as well. All this time, Mr. McKown, whom she knew, was present in the facility, going in and out from the back office talking to people. He had done this the previous night as well. Akins left the premises at 7:00 AM and returned again at 5:00 AM the following day, May 12, 1994, accompanied by S/A Murray. They did not bring a bottle this time because they had not taken their bottle with them the previous night. They went through the usual routine of passing the guard, who asked what bottle they would be drinking from. When they said they had one inside, the guard went to check and thereafter allowed them. After paying the cover charge, they were admitted. Inside, Akins saw two black males and a white male exchanging something outside the men's restroom. They were looking around and speaking quietly, and she did not see what was exchanged. That evening, she spoke with the Bartender, Lee, and with Mr. McKown. She also spoke with a patron, Mr. LaRuso, who approached her and commented that she was either a cop or seeking cocaine. In response, she said she wasn't a cop. The two agents both ordered rum from the bartender who poured the drinks from a bottle with their name on it. The rum ran out while the drinks were being poured, so the bartender finished pouring from another bottle which was not theirs. Mr. McKown was in and out of the back office all during this period and would stop and talk with patrons. He appeared quite normal and was not drinking at the time. They returned on May 17, 1994 at 5:20 AM. Mr. Bailey was the security guard who admitted them. On this occasion they had a bottle of rum with them and paid the cover charge. Their bottle was marked by the bartender and Akins ordered a drink from him which was made from their bottle. Later on she also ordered and was served a vodka drink by the bartender who did not inquire from whose bottle he should pour it. S/A Murray was also served a vodka. Akins paid for the vodka drink with a chip even though neither she nor Murray had ever brought a bottle of vodka to the establishment. That evening, she spoke with Mr. Sparks, Mr. Mille and Mr. McKown. Sparks and Mille were both employees. Sparks said he had been divorced because he used too much cocaine. Mille said he had been arrested for cocaine. These discussions took place at the bar or at the cashier stand and were carried on in a normal tone of voice. The agents went back to The Cabin on May 24, 1994 at 4:45 AM with a confidential informant, (CI). They were met at the door by a white male who allowed them to enter. When they did, they paid the cover charge to Mr. Sparks. They brought a bottle of scotch with them even though they had previously brought in at least two bottles of rum. At that point, Akins did not know if the last rum bottle they had brought on May 17, 1994 was still there, so they brought the scotch to be sure they would be admitted. The bottle of scotch was marked and placed behind the bar by Mr. Sparks. Mr. Strauss and a white female were tending bar. Akins approached Strauss who asked if she wanted what she had just brought in or rum instead. When she replied she preferred rum, Strauss went to look for some in the back. When he came back, he said he could find none, but would give her vodka instead. Akins agreed and Strauss made a vodka drink for her. It was, in fact, vodka, and she paid for it. She also had another vodka drink that evening, made for her by Mr. Strauss, who did not use any of the bottles the agents had brought in. Agent Akins, in a conversation with Mr. Sparks that evening, asked him if he had any more cocaine like that which she had purchased on May 17, 1994. This conversation took place near the juke box which was playing, but not loudly. Their conversation was in a normal tone. Strauss walked away after her question and she went up to the cashier's booth and was talking with some people when Sparks returned. He handed her a small package in front of Mr. Bailey and Agent Murray. It consisted of a small cellophane wrapper containing a white powder for which Sparks would not take any money. Akins put the package in her pocket and it was later analyzed at the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, (FDLE), laboratory and determined to be cocaine. After that purchase was made by Akins, the CI purchased a substance from a lady known as Michelle, who Akins described as an employee of The Cabin. Mr. McKown denies this, however, and it is found that she was not an employee. Prior to the purchase, the CI had informed the agents he thought he could make a purchase and Agent Murray searched him before he approached Michelle. Determining he had no cocaine on his person, he was released to make the buy, which he did, on the premises. Michelle gave him a package of a substance, later determined to be cocaine, for which he paid with $30.00 given him previously by Murray. He then delivered the substance to Murray who in turn gave it to Akins for evaluation. It was later tested and determined to be cocaine. That same evening, Akins also saw three white males in a corner of the bar making what she considered a suspicious transaction. They were looking around and acting furtively. There was a big crowd in the bar that evening - at least 35 people. The lighting was good and Akins had no problem seeing. Mr. McKown was also in and out that evening. The two agents returned to the Cabin on June 27, 1994 at about 3:50 AM. When they arrived, they were met at the door by the security guard who asked them who they were, where they worked, and other similar questions. Akins got the impression that he did not want to let them in even though she had indicated that they had a bottle of scotch inside. While this was going on, Mr. Sparks came out and vouched for them and they were admitted. After paying the cover charge, Akins ordered a scotch. The drink was poured from her bottle by the bartender, Ms. Hart, but she noticed at the time that the bottle was almost empty even though she and Agent Murray had had few drinks from it. Akins paid for the drink with one of her chips. Because Akins did not drink the scotch, she was offered another drink by Ms. Hart and asked for a rum drink. The bottles of rum which she and Murray had brought in on May 10 and 17, 1994, had previously been used up, and she noted that there was no ownership label on the bottle from which her drink, and that for Murray, were poured. In any event, they paid for the drinks and when they tasted them, determined they were made from rum. That same morning, Akins saw a black male enter the bar without paying the cover charge. He bypassed the cashier and went toward the restrooms where he was approached by Mr. Strauss, to whom he passed something and got something in return. At this point, Akins was approximately 12 feet away, and though she could not see what was actually passed, she saw Strauss put what he had received into his pocket. Strauss then went back to the bar and the black male left. Shortly thereafter, Mr. McKown entered the bar. He seemed normal and walked around, talking with his customers. Akins left soon thereafter without taking her bottle of scotch. On July 27, 1994, Akins and Murray arrived at The Cabin at approximately 3:30 AM and were admitted by Mr. Bailey. This time they brought a bottle of rum. The scotch, which they had brought previously, was gone even though neither agent had had more than one or two drinks out of it. At this time, a female bartender asked her what she wanted and Akins ordered a peppermint schnapps. Without any questions regarding whose bottle it should be poured from, the bartender poured the requested drink from a bottle which bore a name that Akins could not see. It was not hers, however. She tasted the drink and found it was, in fact, peppermint schnapps. That same evening, Akins and Murray were approached at the bar by a white female, Ronnie, who asked them to split an 8-ball of cocaine. An 8-ball is one eighth of an ounce. No effort was made by Ronnie to hide her solicitation. In response, Akins said she didn't have any cocaine with her, but if Ronnie could find some, she, Akins, would go in with her. With that, Ronnie spoke with several customers but did not come back that evening. Mr. McKown was present but was not a participant in the conversation. When Akins left the bar that morning, she did not take the bottle of rum she brought in with her. The agents went back to The Cabin on August 9, 1994, at approximately 3:05 AM, and met three men, Beltran, Ramos and Encena, in the parking lot. As the five approached the door, they were met by Bailey and Sparks and were admitted, even though they did not have any alcohol with them. Once inside, Akins ordered from Ms. Hart a tequila drink which was poured from a bottle with no name on it. She had first asked for rum, but all that was available was spiced rum. When she tasted the drink, she found that it was tequila. Later on, she ordered a Kamikaze, which contained vodka, from Ms. Hart. Hart did not ask her whose bottle she should pour it from but poured from a bottle with no name tag on it. The drink was vodka. She paid for both drinks she ordered that evening with chips purchased at the door. During the morning, Akins spoke with Mr. Beltran, one of the men she had come in with, who was a patron at the bar. While they were still outside, however, before entering, Beltran had asked the two agents if they used cocaine. When they replied that they did, he said he would have to go inside to get it. When Akins later spoke with him at the bar, he told her to get her friend and that he had obtained the cocaine. Beltran and Ramos had the two agents follow them outside and to Beltran's car where the substance, later tested and identified as cocaine, was produced by Beltran and Ramos and given to the two agents. After Ramos ingested some of the substance, they went back inside and Akins put the substance she had received into her purse for later testing. After the parties went back inside to the bar, the men were ejected because they annoyed Ms. Hart. Mr. McKown was there at the time. After the men were ejected, Akins and Murray had a discussion with a patron named Guinta who said Akins had white stuff under her nose. Akins wiped her nose and denied the allegation. Guinta then asked Murray and Akins if they had any cocaine. Akins said she did not but would see if she could get some. She spoke with Mr. Sparks who said he had none available. All this was in a regular tone of voice, and all during this conversation, Mr. McKown was within three to five feet of them. Later on, there was a quite loud conversation between Guinta and another individual about cocaine. Afterwards, the parties went outside to Murray's car where Guinta gave them a substance later tested and identified as cocaine. Both agents went back to The Cabin on August 16, 1994 at approximately 3:30 AM. On this visit they had no alcohol with them. Mr. Bailey was on duty as the security guard and Strauss and Hart were the bartenders. Akins ordered a vodka Kamikaze from Hart. Later on, Hart asked her if she wanted another drink. When Akins agreed, Hart offered to make it with tequila instead of vodka. She made the drink from a bottle not marked with an owner's name, and when Akins tasted the drink, she found it was tequila. Murray also had two rum drinks which were poured from a bottle with no name on it. Akins spoke with Charles Bailey that evening at the bar. She asked him for some cocaine, and he said he could give her a "bump", (a small amount of cocaine), but could not sell her any. Akins and Murray went back to The Cabin on August 26, 1994. On that occasion, again, they had no alcohol with them. The bottle of scotch and the rum they had brought on two separate prior occasions was gone. They met three other patrons outside. Mr. Bailey, the security guard, let them in and after paying the cover charge, Akins spoke with Mr. Mille and thanked him for the cocaine she had received previously from Mr. Guinta. At first Mille seemed confused, but when she explained, he seemed to understand, but denied he had any more available. Akins had several drinks that evening. The first was made with tequila which she got from Ms. Hart. Neither Akins nor Murray had ever brought tequila to the bar. The tag on the bottle said "Killian's", but Akins did not know anyone by that name or where the bottle came from. Nonetheless, she paid for the drink, tasted it, and determined it was tequila. She also had a drink made with Amaretto that evening which she bought from Mr. Strauss. In this case, also, she was served a drink made with a beverage she had not brought in. Murray was served a rum drink from a bottle marked "hooters". She did not work for or know anybody from Hooters. Apparently, that same evening, Akins was looking quite tired as she sat at the bar. She was approached by Julio Pabone who said he could get her something that would wake her up. He then spoke with Mr. Leal, after which he came back to Akins and asked for money. She gave him $20.00 to add to what he already had, and he returned to Leal, gave him the money, and received a baggy with white powder in it in return. Returning to Akins, Pabone gave the baggy to her. The substance in the bag was later tested and identified as cocaine. Leal is an employee of the licensee. That same evening, Murray saw two women in the restroom use what appeared to her to be cocaine near the sink. On September 9, 1994, the agents again went to The Cabin and were admitted by Charles Bailey. After paying the cover charge, and while sitting at the bar, Akins saw a patron identified as Manuel pull out a wrapper containing a white substance and give it to another male who gave him money in return for it. At the time of this transaction, Mr. McKown was standing approximately five feet away. Later on, a male identified as Julio approached Akins and said he needed $30.00 for cocaine. She gave him the money and he went into the men's room followed by Leal and another individual. When Julio came out, he gave Akins a package with white powder in it which was subsequently tested and identified as cocaine. Mr. McKown was present in the bar at the time, but Akins cannot say whether he observed this transaction. On the evening of September 30, 1994, Sergeant Woodrow A. Ray, a longtime employee of the Division, was the supervisor of the raid conducted at The Cabin. When he arrived, he entered the establishment to insure that all other agents were in place. Sometime thereafter, Agent Miller, also a long time employee of the Division, arrived to serve an Emergency Order of Suspension on the licensee. Miller contacted Mr. McKown, read the Search Warrant and the Emergency Order of Suspension to him, and advised him of his rights against self-incrimination. While this was being done, Mr. McKown expressed surprise regarding the narcotics allegations but admitted he may have sold some alcohol. He stated this four times in different ways. He stated, "We may have sold some alcohol but no drugs"; "Maybe my people sold liquor, but I don't know about drugs"; "We sell a few drinks to help the guys, but no drugs"; and "If drugs were sold, I never knew it - maybe drinks but no drugs." Agent Miller helped with the ensuing search, in the course of which he went into the office to seize the license. He also searched the adjoining storage area in which he discovered a black bag. He asked McKown if the bag was his, which McKown denied. McKown indicated that only himself, Mr. Leal, and Charles Bailey had access to this room. Miller then went to get Bailey, who had been detained on the patio, advised him of his rights, and asked if the bag was his. Bailey acknowledged it was. Miller took Bailey back inside where he placed him in a chair under guard. Miller had Bailey identify the bag and when he did, Miller asked if there was anything in it he should know about. Bailey thereafter gave his permission to search the bag. Before the bag was opened, however, Miller had it taken outside to be sniffed by the narcotics detection dog on the scene who alerted on it. Miller then opened the bag, and inside, in an ammunition box, found drug paraphernalia and approximately 98.6 grams of a white powder which was subsequently tested and identified as cocaine. On or about February 4, 1993, Gene Leal, who was the manager of The Cabin, cashed a check there for Julio Pabone in the amount of $120.00 which was subsequently dishonored. When contacted about this, Pabone agreed to pay off the check in periodic cash payments, and in fact, did so, making a payment of $20.00 on August 26, 1994. The payment which Leal received on that date was not for cocaine but in repayment of a portion of the dishonored check. Company policy regarding illegal drugs is simple. If seen going on, the activity is to be stopped and the individual expelled from the facility forever. Mr. McKown recalls this as having happened at least six times in the year prior to closing. He claims he has no use for drugs and never has. He has a "no tolerance" policy for any drug activity he knew about, and his employees knew that. This policy is not in writing, however. Mr. McKown has not had any of his employees trained in drug identification, and even though he is aware of the state's responsible vendor program, neither he nor any of his employees have participated in it. Mr. Leal has worked for The Cabin for approximately eight years, as has Mr. Sparks. Both were instructed regarding the company's drug policy. Most of The Cabin employees have been on staff for between eight and fifteen years. Mr. McKown claims he would have periodic meetings with employees to inform them of his policy and to solicit reports of illegal activity. In addition to these instructions, employees are furnished with trespass warning slips which are to be issued when patrons are expelled for drug use. Two of these were introduced into evidence. Byron L. Bailey, one of the security guards, confirms this. Though usually stationed at the front door, he would make between four and five checks per night of the restrooms to be sure they were not being used for drug activity or for drinking. He did not, however, look to see what was going on in the lounge. Kathryn Katz, also formerly an employee of The Cabin, was instructed in the company's policy when hired. Not only was the use or transfer of drugs prohibited but so was the sale of alcohol. She was told that only those individuals who had a bottle with them or already inside could be admitted. It is possible that some people lied about this, but she had to take their word. If they said they had a bottle inside, she would admit them. She also checked the ladies' restroom periodically. The Cabin welcomes law enforcement officers as patrons. When deputies from the sheriff's office periodically come out and park in the lot of the neighboring Steak and Ale, they are always welcome. Approximately a year prior to the hearing, Mr. McKown was reportedly told that a van was in his lot from which drugs were being sold. He claims he called 911 and an arrest was made. However, over the fifteen years he's operated The Cabin, Mr. McKown claims there has never been an arrest made inside the club. Concerning the "admissions" he made to Agent Miller at the time of the service of the warrant and the Order of Suspension, Mr. McKown was reading a copy of the affidavit as Miller was reading it to him. As he read it, he was shocked to discover that his own people, whom he felt were family, were doing such things. He admits that perhaps his employees made a mistake in selling drinks. He does not condone it and he definitely does not condone any sales of illegal drugs. His admissions were not meant to specific dates or incidents but were rhetorical more than actual. He admitted his employees had the opportunity to sell unlawful drinks. He does not believe, in his heart, however, that they made any drug sales. He is wrong. No bottles of alcohol were seized by law enforcement officials at the time of the raid. Approximately two weeks after the closing, Mr. McKown conducted an inventory of the bottles on the premises. At that time, there were approximately one hundred fifty bottles, all of which, he insists, had patrons' names on them. Of that number, thirty to forty were establishment bottles. The balance were owned by individuals. Several prominent restaurant owners and managers who patronize The Cabin have known Mr. McKown for several years. None has ever observed any illegal drug activity inside the establishment and had they done so, would have left and not returned. Mr. Caballero, a former Tampa City Councilman, has patronized The Cabin since it was opened. Because of his public position, he was very sensitive to any possibility of illegal activity in his presence, and though he would be at the club once or twice a month, never saw any such conduct. All of these individuals claim to be friends of Mr. McKown. Dr. Poritz and Mr. Queen, a chiropractor and private investigator, respectively, have also patronized The Cabin periodically for several years. Neither has ever seen any illegal activity in there. Mr. Queen, while a member of the Tampa Police Department's Narcotics Division, would patronize the establishment periodically and was always comfortable there. Had he seen any illegal activity on the premises, he would taken appropriate action as a law enforcement officer and would have reported what he saw. A previous Administrative Complaint was filed against the Respondent in 1993 for violation of liquor sales laws. At that time, the Respondent and the Division entered into a Consent Agreement which called for Respondent to pay a civil penalty of $500.00 plus investigative costs of $14.50, and to provide a letter of corrective action. This letter, dated July 31, 1993, and signed by Mr. McKown and several of his employees, such as Mr. Bailey, Mr. Leal, Mr. Strauss and Ms. Hart, all of whom are referenced in the instant action, indicated the signatories had come up with a good system "to keep people without a bottle from coming in" which should "tighten it up and not break down as it did." From the evidence presented, it appears they were wrong and that their system did not work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's alcoholic beverage license No. 39-3729, Series 14BC, be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 94-5882 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein, except that the evidence indicates the January 12, 1994 visit occurred prior to the commencement of the instant investigation. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 10. & 11. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 12. - 14. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 15. & 16. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 17. - 21. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 22. - 24. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 25. & 26. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 27. - 29. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 30. & 31. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. 32. - 34. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. - 37. Accepted and in substance incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 40. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not probative of any material issue. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 45. Accepted and incorporated herein. 46. & 47. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 J. Thomas Wright, Esquire Suite A 2506 Tampa Bay Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33607 Linda Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 John J. Harris Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
Findings Of Fact Petitioner operates a food and beverage concession on the beach at North Shore Open Space Park in Miami Beach, Florida. Pursuant to a Management Agreement between the City of Miami Beach and the State of Florida, the City pays to the Florida Department of Natural Resources 25 percent of all monies the City collects from private concessionaires operating on that beach. The City has issued a permit to Petitioner for the sale of beer and wine (in addition to food and other beverages) at this location contingent upon licensing by the State of Florida. Petitioner's concession is operated from trailers loaned to it by the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Miami. Each trailer is approximately 14 feet by 6 feet in size and is mounted on four rubber tires. Each trailer is hauled to its location each morning by a 4 x 4 International truck and is disconnected from the truck at the location of a 4" x 4" post embedded in concrete in the sand. The post contains a socket which provides telephone service for the trailer upon insertion of a plug. The posts were installed for the sole purpose of allowing Petitioner's employees at the trailers to call Petitioner's commissary for additional supplies to be delivered. The City of Miami Beach requires each trailer to be located within 15 feet of its post when operating and further defines its hours of operation. The service area granted to Petitioner under its concession agreement with the City covers 888,300 square feet of beach. At the end of each day, the trailers are picked up by the tow vehicle and are hauled to Mr. Coney Island restaurant, approximately 1.5 miles from the beach site, where they are stored overnight and restocked each morning. On June 2, 1983, Beverage Officer Francisco R. Oliva inspected the proposed business premises. At the address shown on Petitioner's application, 7929 Atlantic Way, Officer Oliva found only beach-front property with no address numbers. He located two trailers bearing Pepsi-Cola Company markings between the 80th and 81st blocks of Atlantic Way. The poles from which the trailers obtain telephone service were not present on that date. The business address Petitioner provided on its application for licensure, 7929 Atlantic Way, Miami Beach, is the address the City uses for the building which houses the Beach Patrol and the Dade County sanitation equipment for sanitation of the beach.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for a Series 2-COP beverage license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard W. Wasserman, Esquire 420 Lincoln Road Miami Beach, Florida 33139 Louisa E. Hargrett, Esquire. Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard M. Rasmussen, Director Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco 725 South Hronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether or not on or about May 25, 1976, Leroy Francis, a licensed vendor, or his agent or employee, to wit: Lela Mae Caldwell, did have in her possession, on his licensed premises, alcoholic beverage to, wit: a one half pint bottle of Seagram's Extra Dry Gin, not authorized by law to be sold under his license, contrary to s. 562.02, F.S. Whether or not on or about June 2, 1976, Leroy Francis, licensed under the beverage laws, or his agent or employee, to wit: Lela Mae Caldwell, did sell a one half pint of Seagram's 7 Crown Whiskey, on his licensed premises to a Guy William, said sale not permitted by his license, contrary to s. 562.12, F.S. Whether or not on or about June 7, 1976, Leroy Francis, licensed under the beverage laws, or his agent or employee, to wit: Lela Mae Caldwell, did have in her possession, certain alcoholic beverages, to wit: 185 assorted bottles of tax paid whiskey and 13 assorted bottles of wine, with the intent to sell said alcoholic beverages without a license, contrary to s. 562.12, F.S.
Findings Of Fact From May 25, 1976, up to and including the date of the hearing, Leroy Francis, t/a Palm Beer Garden was the holder of license no 30-71, series 1-COP with the State of Florida, Division of Beverage. The license was for a premises located at 22 South Adams Street, Quincy, Florida. On May 25, 1976, Officer Garry Sands and Officer John Harris of the State of Florida, Division of Beverage went to the aforementioned licensed premises. Officer Sands went to the rear and Officer Harris went to the front. Officer Sands observed a black female leave the licensed premises from the back and go to a white 1969 Chevrolet car, open the trunk and remove a bottle of whiskey, place it in her shirt and return to the premises. He then entered the bar together with Officer Harris and retrieved a one half pint bottle of Seagram's Extra Dry Gin from the same female, while in the licensed premises. This bottle is Petitioner's Exhibit number 4, admitted into evidence. The woman was identified as Lela Mae Caldwell who on another occasion had signed an inspection paper as being an employee in the licensed premises. The series 1- COP license does not allow sale of said alcoholic beverage on the premises. On June 20, 1976, Officer Sands returned to the premises with one Guy William. Guy William is an undercover informant for the Petitioner. This trip was made around 8:30 P.M. Officer Sands checked to see that Guy William did not have any liquor or money on his person and then gave Guy William $5.00 to attempt to purchase liquor from within the licensed premises. Guy William left Officer Sands and was observed going directly through the rear door of the licensed premises. While in the licensed premises Guy William asked Lela Mae Caldwell for a half pint bottle of alcoholic beverage and made such a purchase from Lela Mae Caldwell. Agent Sands, while at the rear of the building, observed a person go to the same white 1969 Chevrolet and remove a bottle of alcoholic beverage and return to the licensed premises Guy William saw a similar person leave the building and return with a bottle of alcoholic beverage. The alcoholic beverage which was purchased was admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit number 5. This alcoholic beverage was not allowed for sale under the series 1- COP license for the premises. Based upon the information supplied by the informant, Guy William, a search warrant was secured to allow a search of the 1969 white Chevrolet. On June 7, 1976, around 12:00 A.M. officers of the State of Florida, Division of Beverage returned to the licensed premises and served a search warrant on Lela Mae Caldwell, who was working at that time. Leroy Francis, the licensee was also seen in the area of the bar at that time. The officers went to the white 1969 Chevrolet and Leroy Francis returned to the car and gave them the key which unlocked the trunk, in which was found an assortment of alcoholic beverages to include 185 assorted bottles of tax paid whiskey and 13 assorted bottles of tax paid wine. These bottles constitute Exhibit number 6, admitted into evidence. After being advised of his rights, Leroy Francis, the licensee, admitted that he had keys to the car as well as Lela Mae Caldwell, his common law wife.
Recommendation It is recommended, based upon the facts as shown in the Rules to Show Cause, that the license of Leroy Francis to sell alcoholic beverages be suspended for a period of 60 days. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Winson, Esquire Staff Attorney Division of Beverage 725 Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Leroy Francis 22 South Adams Street Quincy, Florida
