Findings Of Fact Respondent DeBellonia is president of Respondent CGFS, Inc. At all times material to these proceedings, the Respondents were business consultants who assisted their clients with the preparation and presentation of information for private lenders who were interested in making business loans. Their business offices were located at North Rocky Point Drive, Suite 800, Tampa, Florida. In late July or early August 1989, Constance J. Jones responded by telephone to an advertisement placed by Respondents in the Tampa Tribune newspaper. The ad communicated to her that the Respondent CGFS, Inc. was interested in providing business financing to new and established businesses. Upon receipt of the telephone call, a secretary at CGFS, Inc. scheduled an appointment for Mrs. Jones with Respondent DeBellonia for August 7, 1989. Mrs. Jones was excited about the appointment because the seller of commercial real property purchased by her and her husband had recently filed a foreclosure action to recover the property. The suit occurred because she and her husband had been unable to make the final balloon payment on the property. The seller had agreed to forebear the possibility of such a suit the year before when Mrs. Jones gave him twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) and the promise that she would obtain financing within a year's time and pay the outstanding balance in full. At the close of the year, Mrs. Jones had not been successful in her attempts to acquire the money to pay for the property. This appointment renewed her hopes that she could minimize her losses, settle the suit, and preserve her interest in the property. Prior to arranging her appointment with Respondent DeBellonia, Mrs. Jones had made applications for a loan at several banks. Her requests had been turned down because the banks had determined that the present value of the property was insufficient to provide the collateral needed for the secured loan she was seeking. When Mrs. Jones attended her meeting with Respondent DeBellonia, she voluntarily presented him with a copy of her agreement for deed, a property appraisal, and her owner's title insurance policy. Having submitted herself to a number of loan requests at various banks prior to this appointment, she assumed he would want to see the same documents that had been requested during those loan reviews. Respondent DeBellonia allowed Mrs. Jones to present her situation and her documentation to him in her own manner. He made copies of all of the papers offered to him and returned the originals. At the close of Mrs. Jones' presentation, Respondent DeBellonia agreed to be her business consultant and to assist her in her search for funding. Although Mrs. Jones originally stated that she needed to acquire $94,000.00, this amount was reduced to $20,000.00 when she was informed that the Respondents charge a professional service fee of ten percent of the loan amount ultimately accepted by the clients. To begin work on the funding project, the Respondents requested a non-refundable professional service fee of $1,900.00. Although Mrs. Jones did sign the business consultant agreement, she did not have the money with her to pay the non-refundable fee. When she informed Respondent DeBellonia that she did not have the money, he told her he needed the money as soon as possible so that he could go ahead and work on the transaction. He indicated that he could accomplish a fast transaction for the $20,000.00 in about three days time. According to Mrs. Jones, the seller of the commercial property was willing to forebear on the foreclosure for a while if she could give him $20,000.00 now and if she was actively pursuing a loan which would pay off the balance due. This proposal was another reason she changed her request from $94,000.00 to the $20,000.00 amount. Later that evening, Mrs. Jones telephoned Respondent DeBellonia and told him she needed a new document so that her husband could be on the agreement as well. When the second document was sent, the secretary mistakenly sent out the original agreement with a funding goal of $94,000.00 instead of the reduced request for $20,000.00. Mr. Jones' name had been placed on the document in order to obtain his signature. Both agreements given to Mrs. Jones clearly state that Respondent CGFS, Inc. is not a mortgage broker. Before Mrs. Jones returned a fully executed agreement to the Respondents with the non-refundable fee, she decided to call the Comptroller's Office in Tallahassee to get a business rating to see if this was a good-rated business for her own protection. Although nothing negative was stated by the Comptroller's Office, Mrs. Jones did not get the assurances she was seeking. After that, she decided not to retain the Respondents to provide their business consultant services. Without Mrs. Jones' presumption that the Respondents would eventually seek a mortgage on the real property she intended to purchase, there is no reliable circumstantial evidence which demonstrates that the Respondents were seeking to act as a mortgage broker under the set of facts presented at hearing. Even if the circumstantial evidence and ill-conceived presumptions were considered reliable, the evidence is outweighed by the clear statement within the consultant agreement that Respondent CGFS, Inc. is not a mortgage broker. In addition, if the Respondents had intended to see a mortgage for Mrs. Jones, they would have required her to have her husband sign the agreement because she was an equitable owner of the property in a tenancy by the entirety. Instead, it was Mrs. Jones who later requested that her husband's name be included on the agreement. Respondent DeBellonia clearly manufactured Respondents' Exhibit number E. If this proceeding had turned on his credibility versus the credibility of others, he would not have prevailed in the factual determination. Based upon the facts presented at hearing, the Department initially had reason to believe that the Respondents were violating or about to violate the law by acting as a mortgage broker and mortgage broker business without a license. However, the formal hearing process revealed that Mrs. Jones' impressions of what occurred during her meeting with Respondent DeBellonia were faulty. Documentary evidence prepared during the interview and Mrs. Jones' admissions during the cross-examination resolved the case in Respondent's favor. The actions taken by the Department in filing the Cease and Desist Order were proper, and were not harassment of the Respondents.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: That the cease and desist order issued by the Department on February 20, 1990, be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED IN CASE NO. 90-1720 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO number 1. Accepted. Reject the date of the interview. The rest is accepted. See HO number 2-number 6. Accepted. Accepted. See HO number 5. Accepted. See HO number 9 and number 10. Accept the first two sentences. See HO number 9. Reject the third sentence. Contrary to fact. Reject the fourth sentence. Irrelevant. 8. Accepted. See HO number 11 and number 12. 9. Accepted. See HO number 15 and number 18. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen M. Christian, Esquire Office of the Comptroller Regional Service Center 1313 North Tampa Street, Ste. 615 Tampa, Florida 33602-3394 Michael C. Mone, Esquire 111 Eighth Street Belleair Beach, Florida 33535 Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, Esquire General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issue to be determined in this proceeding is whether Respondents Wilson and Son Sales, Inc. (Wilson), and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company, as surety, are indebted to Petitioner for certain Florida-grown agricultural products.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a producer of several vegetable crops in Hardee County. Wilson is a dealer in agricultural products. More specifically, Wilson operates an agricultural broker business in Plant City. Wilson’s surety is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company. Although Wilson has written contracts with some producers, Wilson does not have written contracts with all producers. In the absence of a contract, the terms of Wilson’s broker services are almost always the same; that is, Wilson gets a commission of 10 percent on the sale of the produce and $.35 per box for palletizing and pre-cooling the produce, in return for which Wilson makes a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Wilson in January 2007, about bringing flat beans to Wilson to sell. Wilson expressed interest and informed Petitioner about Wilson’s standards terms as described above. These terms were agreeable to Petitioner and he brought the beans to Wilson later that month. Although Petitioner and Wilson had no written contract, the parties’ mutual understanding of the terms of their agreement created an enforceable oral contract. Wilson sold Petitioner’s beans and no dispute arose from this first transaction. The parties’ subsequent transactions for other produce were undertaken pursuant to the same oral contract terms. Because Wilson works on a commission basis, it is generally in Wilson’s self-interest to sell growers’ produce for the best price. Petitioner contacted Robert Wilson, Wilson’s owner, by telephone in February 2007, and informed Wilson of his plans to grow wax beans and “hard squash.” It was not stated in the record whether all three varieties of hard squash later grown by Petitioner, butternut squash, acorn squash, and spaghetti squash, were discussed by Petitioner and Robert Wilson during their February 2007 telephone conversation. A major dispute in the case was whether the parties’ February discussion about hard squash created some obligation on the part of Wilson beyond the oral contract terms described above. Petitioner claims that Wilson encouraged him to plant the squash and that Petitioner would not have planted the squash otherwise. Petitioner never made clear, however, what additional obligation was created by Robert Wilson’s encouragement beyond the obligation to accept delivery of and make good faith efforts to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price. Petitioner did not use the word “guarantee,” but his claim seems to be that Wilson became obligated to guarantee that the squash would be sold for a price close to the price published in the Columbia (South Carolina) Market Report, a periodic publication of produce prices. Such an obligation on the part of a broker is contrary to the general practice in the trade. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove more than that Robert Wilson thought he could sell Petitioner’s squash and had a genuine interest in acting as broker for Petitioner’s squash. The evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a contractual guarantee that Wilson would obtain a certain price for Petitioner’s hard squash or do more than was promised with regard to the beans that Wilson had sold for Petitioner; that is, to try to sell the produce for the best price. When Petitioner’s wax beans were picked in late April, he brought them to Wilson to sell. No dispute arose regarding the sale of the wax beans. Petitioner brought squash to Wilson in five deliveries between May 12 and May 29, 2007. Petitioner said that on one of these deliveries, he had to leave the boxed squash in the parking lot of Wilson’s facility because there was so much cantaloupe that had been delivered ahead of him. Petitioner says he was told by a Wilson employee that the squash would not be put in the cooler. Petitioner thinks Wilson was more interested in moving the cantaloupe than the hard squash. Petitioner thinks his squash was not put in the cooler or was put in too late. Wilson denies that Petitioner’s squash was not put into the cooler or was put in late. Robert Wilson claims that he made many calls in an effort to sell Petitioner’s squash, but he could not find interested buyers for all of the squash because (1) the demand for hard squash dried up, (2) some of Petitioner’s squash was of low quality, and (3) the squash began to spoil. Petitioner denied these allegations. Petitioner received invoices and other paperwork from Wilson showing that Wilson sold Petitioner’s first delivery of 490 boxes of acorn squash for $10.18 per box. It sold Petitioner’s second delivery of 519 boxes of acorn squash for $2.08 per box. For Petitioner’s third delivery of 110 boxes of acorn squash and 240 boxes of spaghetti squash, Wilson “dumped” the acorn squash by giving it to away for free to the Society of St. Andrews food bank, and sold the spaghetti squash for $5.15 per box. Wilson sold petitioner’s fourth delivery of 279 boxes of butternut squash for $.55 per box.1 Competent substantial evidence in the record established that it is a regular occurrence for agricultural products awaiting sale to decay and become unsellable, and for the broker to dump the products in a landfill or give the products to a charitable organization and then provide the grower a receipt for tax deduction purposes. It was undisputed that Wilson did not notify Petitioner before disposing of his squash. Petitioner claims he should have been notified by Wilson if the squash was beginning to spoil. However, Petitioner did not prove that prior notification was a term of their oral contract. Petitioner claims further that the federal Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act required Wilson to notify Petitioner before dumping the squash and to have the squash inspected to determine whether, in fact, it was spoiled. As discussed in the Conclusions of Law below, this federal law is not applicable. Competent substantial evidence in the record established that the market for agricultural products fluctuates and, at times, can fluctuate rapidly. For hard squash, which is normally prepared in an oven, the market demand can drop dramatically due to the onset of warm weather simply because people tend not to cook hard squash dishes in warm weather. Petitioner’s squash was being marketed in May, which means the beginning of warm weather for most areas of the United States. This fact supports Wilson’s claim that the demand for hard squash had been good, but fell rapidly just at the time Wilson was trying to sell Petitioner’s squash. The problem with the claims made by Petitioner in this case is simply one of insufficient proof. It is not enough for Petitioner to offer theories about what he thinks happened or to raise questions which are not fully answered. Petitioner had no proof that his squash was not put in Wilson’s cooler, that his squash did not begin to decay, that the demand for hard squash did not fall rapidly, that Wilson did not make reasonable efforts to sell the squash, that Wilson had willing buyers for Petitioner’s squash at a better price, or that Wilson sold squash from other growers at a better price. Petitioner’s evidence for his claims consisted primarily of market price reports that he contends show the approximate price Wilson should have gotten for the hard squash. Market price reports have some relevance to the issues in this case, but competent evidence was presented that the prices quoted in the publications are not always reliable to indicate the price a grower can expect to get on any given day, because there are factors that cause the published market price to be an inflated price (and applicable to the highest grade of produce) and because the market price can change rapidly with a change in demand for the product. The oral contract between Petitioner and Wilson required Wilson to try to get the best price for Petitioner’s squash, not some particular price appearing in a particular market price report. Petitioner did not show that Wilson got a better price for hard squash of equal quality, or that other brokers in the area got a better price for hard squash of equal quality at the times relevant to this case. Petitioner’s evidence was insufficient to prove that Wilson did not make a reasonable and good faith effort to sell Petitioner’s squash at the best price.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s amended claim. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BRAM D. E. CANTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2008.
The Issue The issues in these consolidated cases are: (1) whether the decision by Respondent, Department of Transportation, to reject all bids for the contract at issue was illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and (2) if so, whether Respondent's actions in cancelling the notice of intent to award the contract at issue to Cyriacks Environmental Consulting Services, Inc., ("CECOS") and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.2/
Findings Of Fact The Parties Respondent is the state agency that issued the RFP to procure the Contract for Respondent's District IV. CECOS is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB is an environmental consulting and services firm that submitted a response to the RFP, seeking award of the Contract. DB was granted party status to DOAH Case No. 16-0769 by Order dated February 29, 2016, and by Order dated March 9, 2016, was determined to have standing in that case as a party whose substantial interests were affected by Respondent's decision to reject all proposals. Overview of the Procurement Process for the Contract Respondent issued the RFP on or about October 1, 2015. The RFP sought to obtain support services related to environmental impacts review for projects in Respondent's District IV work program; wetland mitigation design; construction, monitoring, and maintenance; permitting of mitigation sites; exotic vegetation control and removal in specified locations; relocation of threatened, endangered, or rare flora and fauna; permit compliance monitoring; and other services specified in the RFP. The RFP stated Respondent's intent to award the Contract to the responsive and responsible proposing vendor6/ whose proposal is determined to be most advantageous to Respondent. The responses to the RFP were scored on two components: a technical proposal, worth a total of 60 points, that addressed the proposing vendor's experience, qualifications, and capabilities to provide high-quality desired services; and a price proposal, worth a total of 40 points, that addressed the proposed price without evaluation of the separate cost components and proposed profit of the proposing vendor, compared with that proposed by other vendors. The price proposal evaluation was based on the following formula: (Low Price/Proposer's Price) X Price Points = Proposer's Awarded Points. The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 3, stated in pertinent part: In accordance with section 287.057(23), Florida Statutes, respondents to this solicitation or persons acting on their behalf may not contact, between the release of the solicitation and the end of the 72- hour period following the agency posting the notice of intended award, . . . any employee or officer of the executive or legislative branch concerning any aspect of this solicitation, except in writing to the procurement officer or as provided in the solicitation documents. Violation of this provision may be grounds for rejecting a response. The period between the release of the solicitation and the 72-hour period after posting of the intended award is commonly referred to as the "cone of silence." The Special Conditions section of the Advertisement portion of the RFP, paragraph 19, informed vendors that Respondent reserved the right to reject any or all proposals it received. Exhibit B to the RFP, addressing compensation, limited compensation for all authorizations for work performed under the Contract to a total of $5,000,000. Exhibit B stated that the schedule of rates listed in the Price Proposal Form C (i.e., the rates submitted for the sections comprising Exhibit C to the RFP) would be used for establishing compensation. On October 7, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 1 to the advertised RFP. Addendum 1 revised Exhibit A to the RFP, the Scope of Services; and also revised Exhibit C to the RFP, the Bid Sheet, to provide it in Excel format. As revised by Addendum 1, Exhibit C consists of an Excel spreadsheet comprised of six sections, each of which was to be used by the responding vendors to propose their rates for the specified services being procured in each section of the Bid Sheet. Section 6 of the Excel spreadsheet, titled "Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover, consists of eight columns and 258 rows, each row constituting a plant item on which a price proposal was to be submitted. The columns are titled, from left to right: No.; Scientific Name; Common Name; Unit; Estimated of [sic] number of Unites [sic]; Rate; Extension (Unit X Rate); and Multiplier 2.5 (Price X 2.5). Each row of the spreadsheet in Section 6 identified, as a fixed requirement for this portion of the proposal, the specified type of plant, unit (i.e., plant size), and estimated number of units (i.e., number of plants). For each row of the Section 6 spreadsheet, only the cells under the "Rate" column could be manipulated. Vendors were to insert in the "Rate" cell, for each row, the proposed rate for each plant item. The cells under all other columns for each row were locked, and the RFP stated that any alteration of the locked cells would disqualify the vendor and render its proposal non-responsive. The instructions to Exhibit C, Section 67/ stated: Trees, Schrubs [sic], and Ground Cover Price of plants shall include project management, field supervision, invoicing, installation, mobilization of traffic, water throughout the warranty period, fertilizer and [sic] six (6) month and demobilization, minor maintenance guarantee. Installation of plant material shall be per the Scope of Services. All planting costs shall include the cost to restore area to pre-existing conditions (i.e., dirt, sod, etc.). On October 20, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 2, and on October 29, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 3. Both addenda changed Respondent's schedule for reading the technical proposal scores, opening the sealed price proposals, and posting the intended awards. Addenda 1, 2, and 3 were not challenged. However, a key dispute in these consolidated proceedings is whether the Addendum 1 Bid Sheet in Section 6 and the instructions for completing that Bid Sheet were ambiguous, or whether Respondent reasonably believed them to be ambiguous. The vendors were to submit their responses to the RFP, consisting of their technical proposals and price proposals, by October 16, 2015. CECOS, DB, and four other vendors timely submitted responses to the RFP. On November 2, 2015, the scores for the technical proposals submitted by the vendors were presented to the Selection Committee ("SC") at a noticed meeting. DB received the highest number of points on the technical proposal portion of the RFP. The SC met again on November 3, 2015. At that time, Respondent's Procurement Officer, Jessica Rubio, read the total awarded points for each vendor's price proposal, as well as each vendor's total combined points——i.e., total points for technical proposal and price proposal. CECOS received the highest number of points for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and also received the highest total combined points. Respondent recommended, and the SC concurred, that Respondent should award the Contract to CECOS. At 10:00 a.m. on November 3, 2015, Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation, constituting its notice of intent that CECOS would be awarded the Contract.8/ CECOS submitted a price proposal of $4,237,603.70. DB submitted a price proposal of $9,083,042.50. The other four vendors' price proposals ranged between $4,540,512.90 and $5,237,598.55. The "cone of silence" commenced upon Respondent's posting of the Proposal Tabulation, and ended 72 hours later, on November 6, 2015, at 10:00 a.m. As discussed in greater detail below, after the Proposal Tabulation was posted, Respondent discovered an apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, regarding the instructions to that section and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column on the Bid Sheet. After an internal investigation, Respondent decided to cancel its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, Respondent posted a notice that it was cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. On November 5, 2015, DB filed a Notice of Protest, stating its intent to challenge the award of the Contract to CECOS. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, DB contacted Respondent by electronic mail ("email") to withdraw its Notice of Protest.9/ Due to the apparent ambiguity in Exhibit C, Section 6, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4 to the RFP. Addendum 4 required the responding vendors to submit new price proposals for all sections (i.e., sections 1 through 6) of Exhibit C to the RFP. Addendum 4 also established a new timeline for a mandatory pre-bid conference to be held on November 12, 2016; set a sealed price proposal due date of November 19, 2016; and identified new dates for opening the price proposals and posting the Notice of Intended Award of the Contract. On November 12, 2015, Respondent conducted a mandatory pre-bid conference to address Addendum 4. The participating vendors expressed confusion and posed numerous questions regarding the submittal of new price proposals and their technical proposals. Immediately following the pre-bid conference, Respondent issued Addendum 5, which consisted of a revised Exhibit A, Scope of Services; revised Exhibit C, Bid Sheet in Excel format for all six sections; and responses to the questions posed at the pre-bid conference.10/ The Addendum 5 Bid Sheet comprising Exhibit C, Section 6, was substantially amended from the version that was published in Addendum 1. Specifically, the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit"; the "Extension (Unit X Rate)" and "Multiplier 2.5" columns were deleted; and a new column titled "Proposed Cost (Rate per Unit X Est. No. of Units)" was added. Additionally, the instructions for Section 6 were substantially amended to read: "'Rate Per Unit' must include all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, travel, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, mobilization and demobilization, staking and guying, maintenance of planting site throughout the 180[-]day plant warranty." These amendments were intended to clarify that the proposed rate for each plant unit was to include all overhead costs associated with performance of the Contract with respect to that particular unit. On November 13, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest to Respondent's issuance of Addendum 4, requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 23, 2015, CECOS filed the First Petition challenging Respondent's decision, announced in Addendum 4, to require the responding vendors to submit new proposals for the price proposal portion of the RFP, and its decision to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS.11/ Once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest on November 13, 2015, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. On December 17, 2015, Respondent posted notice that it was rejecting all proposals and that the Contract would be re- advertised through issuance of a new RFP. On December 22, 2015, CECOS filed a Notice of Protest, and on January 4, 2016, filed its Second Petition challenging Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and re-advertise the Contract. Bases for Respondent's Actions Shortly after Respondent posted the Proposal Tabulation noticing its intent to award the Contract to CECOS, Christine Perretta, owner and president of DB, sent an email to Respondent, then called Rubio to inquire about Respondent's decision to award the Contract to CECOS. The evidence shows that these contacts occurred sometime on or around November 3, 2016.12/ In her telephone discussion with Rubio, Perretta inquired about how to file a notice of protest13/ and also asked whether Respondent had reviewed the vendors' price proposals for correctness or accuracy, or had simply chosen the lowest price proposal. In the course of the discussion, Perretta informed Rubio that DB had submitted a "loaded" rate for each plant unit ——meaning that DB's rate proposed for each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet consisted not only of the cost of the plant item, but also the cost for all associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 and in the RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), plus compensation.14/ Rubio could not clearly recall whether, in the course of their discussion, Perretta had inquired about the use of the 2.5 multiplier, and there is conflicting evidence as to whether Perretta related her view that CECOS may not be able to perform the Contract based on the price proposal it had submitted. In any event, as a result of Rubio's discussion with Perretta, Rubio determined that she needed to review Exhibit C, Section 6. In the course of her investigation, Rubio called Wendy Cyriaks, owner and president of CECOS.15/ Cyriaks confirmed that CECOS had submitted an "unloaded" rate for each plant item—— meaning that it had included only the cost of each plant item in the "Rate" column on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, and had not included, in the proposed rate for each plant item, the cost of the associated overhead services listed in the instructions to Section 6 or RFP Advertisement, paragraph 18(v), or compensation. Cyriaks told Rubio that CECOS expected that its overhead costs and compensation for each item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier. Also in the course of her investigation, Rubio asked Bogardus whether he had intended the 2.5 multiplier to be used to cover all costs, including vendor compensation, associated with obtaining, installing, and maintaining the plant items listed in Section 6. Bogardus initially confirmed that his intent in including the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet was to cover all of the overhead costs and compensation. However, the persuasive evidence establishes that Bogardus subsequently agreed with Rubio that the 2.5 multiplier should not have been included in Section 6. Pursuant to her discussions with Perretta and Cyriaks, Rubio realized that the wide discrepancy between DB's and CECOS' price proposals was due to their differing interpretations of the instructions in Section 6 regarding plant item rates and the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet. Rubio testified, persuasively, that the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column rendered Exhibit C, Section 6, of the RFP ambiguous. To that point, the RFP does not contain any instructions or discussion on the use of the 2.5 multiplier. Therefore, to the extent the multiplier was intended to be used by the vendors to build overhead costs and compensation into their price proposals, the RFP fails to explain that extremely important intended use——leaving the significance and use of the multiplier open to speculation and subject to assumption by the vendors in preparing their price proposals. Rubio reasonably viewed DB's and CECOS' divergent interpretations of the instructions and the inconsistent use of the 2.5 multiplier as further indication that Section 6 was ambiguous. She explained that in order for Respondent to ensure that it is procuring the most advantageous proposal for the State, it is vitally important that the RFP be clear so that responding vendors clearly understand the type of information the RFP is requesting, and where and how to provide that information in their price proposals. Rubio persuasively testified that in her view, the instructions in Section 6 had, in fact, called for a loaded rate, but that CECOS had erroneously assumed, based on the inclusion of the "2.5 Multiplier" column in the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that overhead and compensation for each plant item would be covered through use of the 2.5 multiplier, and that as a consequence, CECOS incorrectly proposed unloaded rates for the plant items. In Rubio's view, CECOS' error was due to the ambiguity created by the unexplained and unsupported inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. Rubio testified that CECOS had been awarded the Contract because it had submitted the lowest price proposal, but that its proposal was based on an unloaded rate for the plant items, contrary to the instructions for Section 6. In Rubio's view, CECOS' price proposal was unresponsive, and CECOS should not have been awarded the Contract. Rubio also testified, credibly and persuasively, that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 for compensation purposes rendered the RFP arbitrary. Respondent's District IV historically has not used a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes for commodities contracts, and no data or analyses exist to support such use of a 2.5 multiplier.16/ This rendered the RFP both arbitrary and unverifiable with respect to whether it was structured to obtain the most advantageous proposal for the State. To this point, Rubio credibly explained that Respondent's existing environmental mitigation services contract with Stantec was procured through the "Invitation to Negotiate" ("ITN") process. In that procurement, Respondent negotiated to obtain the best value for the State. The ITN bid sheet contained a 2.5 multiplier that was used only for weighting purposes to evaluate and determine which firms would be "short- listed" for purposes of being invited to negotiate with Respondent for award of the contract. Importantly——and in contrast to the RFP at issue in this case——the multiplier in the ITN was not used to determine the final prices, including compensation, to install trees, shrubs, and ground cover under that contract. Rubio also testified, credibly, that the Bid Sheet was structurally flawed because it did not allow the vendor to clearly indicate the "unit price" inclusive of all overhead costs, and that this defect would result in Respondent being unable to issue letters of authorization to pay invoices for the cost of installing the plant items or compensating for work performed. For these reasons, Respondent determined that it needed to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS. As noted above, Respondent posted the cancellation of the intent to award the Contract on November 5, 2015. At a meeting of the SC conducted on November 9, 2015, Respondent's procurement staff explained that the intent to award the Contract had been cancelled due to ambiguity in the instructions and the Bid Sheet for Exhibit C, Section 6. Ultimately, the SC concurred with Respondent's cancellation of the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and agreed that the vendors should be required to submit new price proposals. Thereafter, on November 9, 2015, Respondent issued Addendum 4, announcing its decision to solicit new price proposals from the responding vendors. Respondent conducted a pre-bid meeting with the vendors on November 12, 2015, and immediately thereafter, issued Addendum 5, consisting of a revised Scope of Services and a substantially revised Bid Sheet for all six sections of Exhibit C. As previously discussed, the Section 6 Bid Sheet issued in Addendum 5 was revised to, among other things, delete the "2.5 Multiplier" column and the column previously titled "Rate" was changed to "Rate Per Unit." Also as discussed above, the instructions to Section 6 were revised to clarify that the "Rate Per Unit" provided for each plant unit must contain all costs associated with the purchase, installation, watering, fertilization, project management, field supervision, invoicing, labor, maintenance of traffic, and other costs specified in the instructions——i.e, constitute a loaded rate. All of these changes were made in an effort to clarify, for the benefit of all vendors, the specific information that Respondent needed to be provided in the price proposals. Rubio testified, credibly, that in requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C, Respondent did not give, or intend to give, any vendor a competitive advantage over any of the other vendors, nor did Respondent place, or intend to place, CECOS at a competitive disadvantage by requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals pursuant to revised Exhibit C. As noted above, once CECOS filed its Notice of Protest, Respondent ceased all procurement activity directed toward awarding the Contract. Consequently, the vendors did not submit new price proposals and the scheduled meetings at which the new price proposals would be opened and the intended awardee announced were cancelled. On December 17, 2015, Rubio briefed the SC regarding the problems with the RFP and described her concerns about proceeding with the procurement. She explained that Respondent's procurement staff was of the view that the instructions in Section 6, as previously published in Addendum 1, were ambiguous because they did not clearly provide direction on how to complete the Bid Sheet for that section. Additionally, the Section 6 Bid Sheet, as structured in Addendum 1, did not allow the vendors to provide a plant unit rate that was inclusive of all overhead costs. To this point, she noted that unless the vendors provided a loaded rate——i.e., one that included all overhead costs——Respondent would not be able to issue work orders for any plant items in Section 6.17/ She explained that these flaws constituted the bases for Respondent's decision, announced on November 9, 2015, to require the submittal of new price proposals. Rubio further explained that in Respondent's rush to issue a revised Scope of Services as part of Addendum 5, mistakes had been made18/ and Respondent's Environmental Office needed more time to carefully review the Scope of Services and Bid Sheet, to ensure the RFP was correctly drafted and structured so that the Contract could be accurately solicited and procured. Additionally, the vendors——including Mark Clark of CECOS——had expressed confusion regarding the revised Bid Sheet and submitting new price proposals, and some vendors had inquired about submitting new technical proposals. Further, under the revised procurement schedule issued as part of Addendum 4 on November 9, 2015, the vendors had a very compressed timeframe in which to prepare and submit their new price proposals, heightening the potential for mistakes to be made. Because of these substantial problems and concerns with the RFP, Rubio recommended that Addendum 5 be rescinded, that all vendor proposals (both technical and price) be rejected, and that the entire procurement process be re-started. The SC concurred with her recommendation. As noted above, on December 17, 2015, Respondent rejected all proposals and announced that the Contract would be re-solicited in the future through issuance of another RFP. CECOS' Position CECOS takes the position that the RFP and the Section 6 Bid Sheet published in Addendum 1 were not ambiguous. Specifically, CECOS contends that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 clearly indicated that Respondent was seeking an unloaded rate for the plant items listed on the Section 6 Bid Sheet. In support of this position, CECOS notes that all of the vendors other than DB had submitted unloaded rates for the plant items in Section 6. CECOS contends that this shows that Section 6 was not ambiguous, and that DB simply did not follow the RFP instructions——of which it was fully aware——in preparing and submitting its price proposal.19/ CECOS also contends that Rubio's failure to contact the other vendors to determine if they found the instructions or use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 ambiguous evidences that Rubio's conclusion that Section 6 was ambiguous lacked any factual basis, so was itself arbitrary. CECOS asserts that Bogardus' intent to use a 2.5 multiplier for compensation purposes was evidenced by its inclusion on the Section 6 Bid Sheet, that its use on the Section 6 Bid Sheet did not render the RFP flawed, and that Bogardus' intent to compensate using the multiplier should control the structure of compensation paid under Section 6.20/ CECOS also notes that the use of the 2.5 multiplier on the Section 6 Bid Sheet mirrors the 2.5 multiplier in the existing environmental mitigation support services contract with the current contractor.21/ CECOs further contends that there was no material difference, with respect to structuring compensation for the plant items, between the ITN process used for procuring the existing contract and the RFP process used to procure this Contract. As additional support for its argument that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 was valid, CECOS points to a request for proposal for environmental mitigation services issued by Respondent's District VI. In that contract, a 2.5 multiplier was used for compensation purposes, albeit for specific plant items that were not contained in the original list of specific plant items for which rate proposals had been solicited in the request for proposal. CECOS further contends that Respondent——and, most particularly, Rubio——did not conduct a thorough investigation into the historic use of 2.5 multipliers in Respondent's commodities contracts. CECOS argues that as a consequence, Respondent's determination that the use of the 2.5 multiplier rendered the Section 6 Bid Sheet structurally flawed and arbitrary was unsupported by facts, so was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that cancelling the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals placed CECOS at a competitive disadvantage and was contrary to competition because once the Proposal Tabulation was posted, the other vendors were informed of the price that CECOS had bid, so knew the price they had to beat when the Contract was re-solicited. CECOS also points to what it contends are procedural irregularities with respect to Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS and DB once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS. Specifically, CECOS contends that Respondent did not respond to its calls or email asking why the intent to award the Contract to CECOS had been cancelled. CECOS also contends that Respondent communicated with DB on substantive matters during the "cone of silence." CECOS further notes that Respondent did not convene a resolution meeting within the statutorily- established seven-day period after CECOS filed its First Petition, but instead held the meeting over 60 days later, on January 28, 2015, and that even then, Respondent did not engage in good faith negotiation to resolve the challenge. Finally, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions (discussed above) that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. CECOS asserts that it followed the instructions in the RFP in preparing its price proposal, submitted the lowest price proposal, and is ready, willing, and able to perform the Contract at the rates it proposed in its response for Section 6. On that basis, CECOS contends that it is entitled to the award of the Contract. Findings of Ultimate Fact CECOS bears the burden in this proceeding to prove that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals was arbitrary, illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.22/ Even if CECOS were to meet this burden, in order to prevail it also must demonstrate that Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract and requiring the submittal of new price proposals were clearly erroneous, arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to competition. For the reasons discussed herein, it is determined that CECOS did not meet either of these burdens. The Multiplier Rendered Section 6 Ambiguous, Arbitrary, and Structurally Flawed As discussed in detail above, Respondent decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the submittal of new price proposals by the vendors only after it had conducted an extensive investigation that included a careful review of numerous provisions in the RFP and the instructions to Section 6 and had analyzed the structure of Section 6 in relation to other provisions in the RFP. That investigation showed that nowhere in the RFP was the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6, discussed or explained. Thus, to the extent the multiplier was to be used in determining reimbursement for overhead costs and compensation, the RFP failed to explain this extremely important point, leaving the multiplier's purpose, use, and significance open to speculation and assumption by the vendors in submitting their price proposals. This rendered the multiplier's use in Section 6 ambiguous. This ambiguity is further evidenced by DB's and CECOS's widely divergent price proposals for Section 6, and the credible testimony of Perretta and Cyriaks regarding their differing views of the purpose of the 2.5 multiplier. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that the ambiguity in Section 6 caused the vendors to have differing interpretations of the manner in which they were to propose plant unit rates in Section 6; that the vendors submitted plant price proposals predicated on differing assumptions; and that this resulted in Respondent being unable to fairly compare the price proposals for purposes of obtaining the most advantageous proposal for the State. On these bases, Respondent reasonably concluded23/ that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6, rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. As extensively discussed above, the credible, persuasive evidence also establishes that Respondent concluded, based on its investigation and review of Section 6, that inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier rendered Section 6 both arbitrary and structurally flawed.24/ The credible, persuasive evidence further establishes that Rubio investigated Respondent's use of multipliers in commodities procurements and contracts to the extent necessary and appropriate for her to reasonably conclude that the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6 rendered this portion of the RFP ambiguous, arbitrary, and structurally flawed.25/ In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent engaged in a thorough and thoughtful investigation before concluding, reasonably, that the inclusion of the 2.5 multiplier in Exhibit C, Section 6 rendered that portion of the RFP ambiguous. Respondent's Actions Were Not Contrary to Competition Although the evidence shows that CECOS may suffer some competitive disadvantage because competing vendors were informed of the lowest "bottom line" price they would have to beat, it does not support a determination that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require the vendors to submit new price proposals were contrary to competition. To that point, in Addendum 5, Respondent substantially restructured the Section 6 Bid Sheet and also amended the Bid Sheet comprising the other price proposal sections in Exhibit C, so that CECOS' and the other vendors' price proposals submitted in response to Addendum 5 may have substantially changed from those submitted in response to Addendum 1. In any event, it cannot be concluded that Respondent's decisions to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals are contrary to competition such that they should be overturned in this proceeding. Procedural Irregularities CECOS also points to certain procedural irregularities in Respondent's treatment of, and communication with, CECOS once Respondent decided to cancel the notice of intent to award the Contract to CECOS and require submittal of new price proposals. CECOS apparently raises these issues in an effort to show that Respondent's actions were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. The undisputed evidence establishes that Rubio communicated with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" following the posting of its intent to award the Contract to CECOS. The undersigned determines that the "cone of silence" applied to Rubio and her communications with DB and CECOS within the 72-hour period following Respondent's posting of the intent to award the Contract. Specifically, she is an employee of Respondent's District IV Office, so is an employee of the executive branch of the State of Florida. Further, the evidence shows that her communications with both DB and CECOS during the "cone of silence" period dealt specifically with substantive, rather than "administrative" issues regarding the RFP and the vendors' price proposals. Accordingly, it is determined that these communications did, in fact, violate the "cone of silence." However, this does not require that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS be overturned. The credible, persuasive evidence shows that while DB's conversation with Rubio may have spurred Rubio to decide she should investigate the Section 6 instructions and use of the 2.5 multiplier, it was not the reason why Respondent ultimately determined that the intent to award the Contract should be cancelled. Rather, Respondent's discovery of the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, through Rubio's investigation, was the reason that Respondent determined that the intent to award the Contract to CECOS should be cancelled. In sum, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that notwithstanding Rubio's communications on substantive matters during the "cone of silence" with both DB and CECOS, the integrity of the procurement process was not undermined such that Respondent's decision to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. CECOS failed to present persuasive evidence establishing that other procedural irregularities rendered Respondent's actions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decisions to Cancel Intent to Award the Contract and Require Submittal of New Price Proposals Based on the foregoing, it is determined that CECOS did not meet its burden to show that Respondent's decisions in cancelling the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and requiring the vendors to submit new price proposals were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. Respondent's Decision to Reject All Proposals As noted above, CECOS contends that Respondent's decision to reject all proposals and start the procurement process anew was predicated on a series of arbitrary and erroneous decisions that created confusion, so that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all proposals was itself arbitrary and capricious. However, the credible, persuasive evidence shows that Respondent's ultimate decision to reject all bids was factually supported and was reasonable. As discussed above, Respondent initially decided to cancel the intent to award the Contract to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals after it discovered the ambiguity and structural flaws resulting from the use of the 2.5 multiplier in Section 6. At that point, rather than rejecting all proposals, which would require the vendors to go to the time and expense of preparing completely new proposals, it decided to instead only require the vendors to submit new price proposals. Due to the interrelated nature of the six sections of Exhibit C comprising the complete price proposal for the RFP, Respondent determined revision of Section 6 would also require revision of the other five sections of Exhibit C, in order to ensure that they were internally consistent with each other. At the mandatory pre-bid meeting preceding the issuance of Addendum 5, the participating vendors had numerous questions about the sweeping revisions to all six sections of Exhibit C, and they expressed confusion about the revisions and their effect on preparation of new price proposals. Some vendors also expressed concern that they may have to change their personnel in order to be able to accurately prepare new price proposals, raising the question whether the technical proposals needed to be revised. As a result of vendor confusion and concern, and also because Respondent's Environmental Office needed additional time to carefully review and revise the RFP as needed, Respondent decided to reject all proposals and to start the procurement process anew. Respondent's decision to reject all bids was made after fully considering all of the pertinent information regarding the ambiguity and structural flaws in Section 6, vendor confusion and concern caused by Respondent's revisions to Exhibit C needed to address the ambiguity and flaws in Section 6, and Respondent's need for additional time to ensure that its RFP accurately and clearly solicited the needed environmental mitigation support services. Accordingly, Respondent did not act arbitrarily in deciding to reject all bids. Further, no persuasive evidence was presented to show that Respondent's decision to reject all bids was illegal, dishonest, or fraudulent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation: Issue a final order in Case No. 16-0769 finding that the rejection of all proposals in response to Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM was not illegal, arbitrary, dishonest, or fraudulent; and Issue a final order in Case No. 16-3530 finding that the decisions to cancel the award of the Contract for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM to CECOS and to require the vendors to submit new price proposals for Request for Proposal RFP-DOT-15/16-4004PM were not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2016.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Petitioner, Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board, was the agency in Pinellas County, Florida responsible for the county-wide certification of contractors and the regulation of the contracting profession in Pinellas County. Respondent was certified as a building contractor in Pinellas County under license C-1804, and was the qualifying contractor for C&H Custom Homes, Inc., with which the complainant entered the contract in issue. On May 5, 1994, John H. and Katherine L. Buntrock and Diane M. DiBiccari entered into a purchase agreement with C&H Homes for the construction of Model 1523 with extended den, a residence to be erected at Lot 5, Maximo Moorings Bayview Addition in St. Petersburg, for a contract price of $130,000. The purchasers put $100.00 down at the time the agreement was signed, with the remaining balance of $129,900 to be paid through subsequent cash payments and a mortgage. The contract, which was signed by Respondent for C&H Homes, Inc., provided for the project to be completed within 150 days from the start of construction. Mr. Buntrock made subsequent arrangements with his bank for future draws by the contractor for the cost of construction. Somewhat later, Respondent drew $8,040 pursuant to those arrangements from the Barnett Bank, Mr. Buntrock's bank. After several weeks went by without any work being done, Mr. Buntrock contacted the bank and was told about the Respondent's initial draw. Buntrock then contacted the Respondent who said he was busy on a project and would start work on Buntrock's project when he finished his current project. Respondent indicated he had had fill dirt placed on the lot in anticipation of commencement of construction which, in fact, he did not do. He did have dirt delivered to the general area, but it cannot be determined if that dirt was for this project or other projects Respondent was working on. Respondent, however, did not pay the subcontractor for any dirt. Mr. Buntrock later paid the subcontractor the sum of $1,718.20 for the dirt. Respondent also arranged with an architect to modify plans for this particular unit for a price of $500.00 which he also did not pay. The plans were modified as requested, but no permits were ever pulled by Respondent or the architect for this project. After some time had passed without any work beginning on the property, Mr. Buntrock consulted his attorney who wrote to Respondent demanding an explanation. Aside from phone calls from the Respondent in response and many promises by the Respondent to start the project, no work on it was done by Respondent or anyone on his behalf. Finally, on October 21, 1994, more than five months after the contract was signed, when no construction had been started by the Respondent, Mr. Buntrock's attorney advised the Respondent not to do any work pursuant to the contract. Mr. Buntrock then hired Jeff Adams, another contractor, to do the work originally called for under the contract with the Respondent. When Mr. Adams was contacted with regard to taking over this project, he was told by Buntrock's attorney and the bank that the site work and the fill dirt had been paid for. This was not true. All Respondent had done was to push debris from two adjoining lots, on which he had been building, onto the Buntrocks' lot. No sitework other than scraping and clearing was done. No survey had been done and no pad building had been done. The architect's plans were merely a stock set of plans with annotations of what the Buntrocks wanted placed on them. No drawings were done specifically for this construction. The $500.00 previously paid was for making prints of the plans which had been ordered by the Respondent and which, incidentally, were not correct. Mr. Adams had to obtain additional dirt for the building site because much more was needed than what had been procured. He contacted the same subcontractor used by Respondent and was told that the dirt that was on site had not been paid for. The subcontractor threatened to file a lien on the property if it was used. Mr. Buntrock thereafter authorized Adams to pay for the dirt for which he would be reimbursed. Mr. Adams also contacted the architect who refused to release a good set of plans for this project until he was paid for those he had already provided. Once Mr. Adams started work, he finished the project within ninety days. The more than five months that Respondent consumed without working on the project was neither justified nor normal practice within the trade.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of the offenses alleged and imposing an appropriate penalty which may include revocation of Respondent's license and imposition of an administrative Fine of $5,000.00. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: William J. Owens Executive Director Pinellas County Construction Licensing Board 11701 Belcher Road, Suite 102 Largo, Florida 34643-5116 William H. Howell C & H Homes, Incorporated 7542 Cumberland Court Largo, Florida 34647 Howard Bernstein Senior Assistant County Attorney City Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34616-5165
The Issue Whether or not the agency may, pursuant to Section 525.06 F.S., assess $390.04 for sale of substandard product due to a violation of the petroleum inspection laws and also set off that amount against Petitioner's bond.
Findings Of Fact Coleman Oil Co., Inc. d/b/a Shell Oil Co. at I-75 and SR 26 Gainesville, Florida, is in the business of selling kerosene, among other petroleum products. On November 15, 1990, Randy Herring, an inspector employed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and who works under the direction of John Whitton, Chief of its Bureau of Petroleum, visited the seller to conduct an inspection of the petroleum products being offered for sale to the public. Mr. Herring drew a sample of "1-K" kerosene being offered for sale, sealed it, and forwarded it to the agency laboratory in Tallahassee where Nancy Fisher, an agency chemist, tested it to determine whether it met agency standards. The testing revealed that the sampled kerosene contained .22% by weight of sulfur. This is in excess of the percentage by weight permitted by Rule 5F- 2.001(2) F.A.C. for this product. A "Stop Sale Notice" was issued, and on the date of that notice (November 20, 1990) the inspector's comparison of the seller's delivery sheets and the kerosene physically remaining in his tanks resulted in the determination that 196 gallons of kerosene had been sold to the public. Based on a posted price of $1.99 per gallon, the retail value of the product sold was determined, and the agency accordingly assessed a $390.04 penalty. The agency also permitted the seller to post a bond for the $390.04 on November 21, 1990. The assessment is reasonable and conforms to the amount of assessments imposed in similar cases.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the $390.04 assessment and offsetting the bond against it. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED TO: CLINTON H. COULTER, JR., ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 510 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800 MR. RANDAL W. COLEMAN COLEMAN OIL COMPANY POST OFFICE BOX 248 GAINESVILLE, FL 32602 HONORABLE BOB CRAWFORD COMMISSIONER OF AGRICULTURE THE CAPITOL, PL-10 TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0810 RICHARD TRITSCHLER, GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES 515 MAYO BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0800
