Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1984, Richard Herring, the Petitioner, became a member of the Senior Management Service Personnel System within the State of Florida. He remained in that personnel system until March 2, 1987. His employer while a senior manager was the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Respondent in this cause. Petitioner determined to leave the position held with the Respondent based upon a concern that he might be dismissed from that position by the incoming secretary to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In fact, the new secretary deemed it appropriate to make some personnel change in senior managers within his agency in the early part of 1987. On March 3, 1987, Petitioner undertook his new employment with the Florida House of Representatives. With this timing, Petitioner effectively transferred from one state agency to another. The new employer, the Florida House of Representatives, operated under a separate personnel system from that associated with senior managers. This meant that the treatment of annual leave credits by the Respondent agency and as addressed by the Florida House of Representatives was unique to those employers and that Petitioner, if he was entitled to the payment for any annual leave hours within his account upon his resignation from Senior Management with the Respondent, must be paid by the Respondent. Conversely, any annual leave hours which he transferred to an account with the Florida House of Representatives must be in accordance with that agency's personnel rules or policies. From the inception of his association with the Senior Management Service, Petitioner saw the annual leave hours he earned and the flexibility afforded him in their use as an important factor in his employment circumstance. When Respondent recruited the Petitioner he was led to believe that as many as 480 annual leave hours could be converted into payment upon the resignation from the Senior Management Service, without regard for whether that resignation led to a transfer to another state agency or the outright termination as a state employee. In confirmation of his understanding when recruited, a letter was addressed to the Petitioner on August 3, 1984, referring to the ability to cash- in accrued annual leave that did not exceed 480 hours. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. It is addressed to Petitioner from Vivian Pyle, the central personnel officer for the Respondent. The remarks made to him in the recruitment phase and as confirmed in the correspondence are a correct depiction of the rights which the Petitioner had at the beginning of his employment as a senior manager. These rights were established in Rule 22SM-1.112(3), Florida Administrative Code. That rule became effective on March 16, 1981. It called for the payment of unused annual leave upon separation, not to exceed the amount of 480 hours. Separation meant the resignation from the position of a senior manager to transfer to another state agency or to terminate from state government entirely. At the time that the Petitioner took his appointment as a senior manager, the rule pertaining to attendance and leave while still employed by the Respondent agency was Rule 22SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code. It called for the accumulation of 176 hours per year of annual leave upon the appointment and upon each anniversary date beyond that initial appointment. It also described the retention and credit of leave brought with the new appointee at the time of appointment, subject to the approval by the employer or agency head. It allowed for the payment of the leave time which the new appointee brought into the system when the ultimate decision was made by that employee to terminate from Senior Management. Termination in this instance refers to leaving Senior Management, not leaving state government. In accordance with Rule 22SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner was allowed to bring into the system a balance of 205 annual leave credits and was assigned 176 additional annual leave credits on July 30, 1984, giving him a total of 381 annual leave hours at that point in time. On his anniversary date of July 30, 1985, he received an additional 176 hours which brought his total annual leave hours at that point to 470. In those instances wherein the annual leave hours had been granted to the Petitioner upon his appointment, existing hours brought with him had been credited and upon the first anniversary date of his employment as a senior manager, additional hours had been granted, those annual leave credit hours were available for use by the Petitioner from that date forward or as a cash holding that could be exercised upon his separation from Senior Management. On May 29, 1986, the personnel rules of the State of Florida, Department of Administration, as described in the preceding paragraphs, changed. A new Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, did not carry forward provisions which allowed for the payment upon separation of leave brought into Senior Management and leave earned while a senior manager. This finding pertains to those senior managers, like the Petitioner, who were already employed with the advent of the change in rules on May 29, 1986. The new rule chapter did continue to allow for the accumulation of 176 hours of annual leave upon the anniversary date of an appointment, pertaining to existing senior managers at the point at which the new rule became effective. The new rule chapter by its language described a circumstance pertaining to appointees who came into the position of senior manager upon the effective date of the new rule chapter or thereafter, discussing the payment for an annual leave balance above 240 hours which had been transferred to the Career Service. This speaks to a transfer from Senior Management to Career Service and the idea of transferring 240 hours to the Career Service Personnel System and paying for the balance of annual leave over 240 hours. It also called for the proration of this payment of annual leave upon appropriate accrual rates for Career Service. It spoke to the payment of annual leave upon termination of a senior manager who had come into the System on May 29, 1986, or thereafter, termination meaning someone who had left the state payroll for at least 31 calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. See Rule 22SM- 3.007(6)(c), Florida Administrative Code (May 29, 1986). By contrast, Chapter 22SM-3 effective May 29, 1986 does not describe in any fashion what happens to annual leave credits for those persons who had been senior managers prior to the effective date of the rules chapter when the senior manager decides to separate from Senior Management Service. The Petitioner had 371.5 annual leave hours upon his anniversary date of July 30, 1986, and was given an additional 176 hours of annual leave credit as contemplated by Rule 22SM-3.007(2), Florida Administrative Code (May 29, 1986). On February 1, 1987, amendments to Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, were enacted. Unlike the May 29, 1986, version of this chapter, the amended rule specifically addressed the circumstance of all Senior Management employees, those who were in that personnel system before February 1, 1987, and those who would be appointed from that date forward. This speaks to the issue of disposition of annual leave credits held by senior managers upon their separation from employment as a senior manager. At Section 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), senior managers who transfer to a state government position outside of the Senior Management Service were not entitled to be paid for annual leave credits, they could only transfer those hours subject to the rules governing the system into which the member may transfer. In addition, that provision indicated that the transfer of annual leave credits would be prorated dating back to the most recent anniversary date for service. A companion section, Rule 22SM-3.007(6), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), indicated that if the employee terminated from state government, that is the employee was not on any state payroll for at least 31 calendar days following the separation from Senior Management Service, then the annual leave credit held at the point of separation would be cashed. At Rule 22SM-3.007(3), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), the language was to the effect that upon the appointment and on each anniversary date after that time there was an increase in credit hours assigned to each Senior Management employee from 176 hours to 240 hours per annum. When the Petitioner determined to leave his position, he had prepared material pertaining to his termination, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 admitted into evidence. In the form authorization for disposition of his annual leave was called for by K. Davis, the Deputy Assistant Secretary within the Respondent agency. This form indicates the election on the part of the Petitioner to gain payment for all unused annual leave, excepting 24 hours. A subsequent audit of his employment records revealed that the Petitioner had 432 hours of annual leave upon his separation from Senior Management, without regard for any proration of the July 30, 1986 - 176 annual leave hours installment. Payment for annual leave hours was not forthcoming and after making some attempts at ascertaining the reason why and gaining no satisfaction in these discussions, the Petitioner wrote to Vivian Pyle, the director of the central personnel services for the Respondent agency, on April 23, 1987 to inquire about this matter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 3. In the course of the correspondence the Petitioner indicates that his new employer, the Florida House of Representatives, had given him a computer print-out effective April 17, 1987, in which it was indicated that a substantial number of hours had been transferred to the Florida House of Representatives as opposed to having been paid to the Petitioner as he requested. By way of response, Ms. Pyle wrote to the Petitioner on April 28, 1987, and she referenced Rule 22SM- 3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), pertaining to the fact that the Respondent did not believe that the Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his annual leave and that the leave could be transferred subject to the rules within the receiving agency. In this instance, that refers to the Florida House of Representatives. Having been disappointed in the attempt to gain the payment for his annual leave credits, excepting the 24 hours which he wanted to have transferred, the Petitioner filed a petition for formal administrative hearing with the Respondent agency, received by the Respondent on May 15, 1987. That case was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of the hearing which has led to the entry of this recommended order. The Petitioner also challenged rules within Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, in its May 29, 1986 language and its February 1, 1987 language. See DOAH Case No. 87-2172R supra. The outcome of that challenge was to the effect that the language within Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), which prohibits the payment for annual leave credits upon the transfer from Senior Management Service to another position in state government was stricken as an invalid enactment. The State of Florida, Department of Administration has appealed that decision. The State of Florida, Department of Administration has also enacted a Rule 22SM-3.0l3(1), Florida Administrative Code, which corresponds to the most recent amendments to Chapter 225M-3, Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987). Rule 22SM-3.013, Florida Administrative Code, indicates that Senior Management Service employees who were on board on January 31, 1987 will keep their anniversary dates and shall be credited additional amount of annual leave credits, as well as sick leave credits. The rate of that annual leave credit is 5.333 hours monthly or 2.46 hours biweekly for each pay period or portion thereof. When the July 30, 1986 annual leave credits are prorated for the partial service year completed by the Petitioner in the full months of August, 1986 through February, 1987 and the portions of July, 1986 and March, 1987, as envisioned by Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), they total 141.85 annual leave credits. When the prorated formula described in Rule 22SM-3.013(1), Florida Administrative Code, is applied for the full month of February, 1987 and the two days within March, 1987 during which time the Petitioner was still employed an additional 5.505 annual leave credits are assigned. With these adjustments, that makes the annual leave credit balance for the Petitioner upon his transfer 403.355 annual leave hours. Within this figure, of the credits assigned on July 30, 1986, Petitioner's anniversary date, following the proration adjustment, there remained only 26.35 hours which had not been used as annual leave during the period July 30, 1986 through March 2, 1987.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent John E. LeMieux (Respondent LeMieux) was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license numbers 051596 and 0266128 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last licenses issued were as a broker in care of Retco Realty, Inc., 5942 SW 73rd Street, South Miami, Florida 33143, and as a broker in care of Retco Kassner, Inc., 7311 SW 59th Court, Miami, Florida 33143. At all times pertinent hereto, the Respondent Retco Realty, Inc. (Respondent Retco) was a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0141149 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued was at the address of 5942 SW 73rd Street, South Miami, Florida 33143. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent LeMieux was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Retco. Kenneth and Regina Davis have been married for 12 years and have four children. Both are high school graduates, but neither had been involved in a transaction to purchase real estate prior to the one involved in this proceeding. Ms. Davis is a housewife. Mr. Davis repairs and restores wrecked automobiles. Prior to their dealings with Respondents, the Davises and their four children lived in a rented, two bedroom duplex. In February 1990, Mr. and Mrs. Davis began looking for a house to purchase after their landlord threatened to evict them. The landlord objected to the number of children living in the duplex and to Mr. Davis's practice of parking several cars at the duplex. Because of the threatened eviction, the Davises were anxious to find alternative housing. Mr. and Mrs. Davis saw an advertisement in the Miami Herald for a house located at 14700 South West 104th Place, Miami, Florida. They went to the house on Sunday, February 18, 1990, and, after looking at the house from the outside, decided that they liked the house and called the telephone number listed in the ad on February 18, 1990. In February 1990, Investor's Choice International, Inc., a corporation that was owned and operated by Respondent LeMieux at all times pertinent to this proceeding, owned the house that interested the Davises. Investor's Choice had first acquired the property in 1985 and had subsequently sold the property to Marva Pitter. Respondent LeMieux assisted Ms. Pitter in obtaining a first mortgage on the premises from Savings of America and his corporation took a second mortgage on the premises. Investor's Choice reacquired the property after Ms. Pitter defaulted on the second mortgage and executed a deed to Investor's Choice in lieu of an action to foreclose the second mortgage. Investor's Choice continued to pay the first mortgage to Savings of America, but there was no formal assumption of that first mortgage by Investor's Choice. Respondents had placed the ad for the house, and the number listed was the office of Respondent Retco. Barbara Couret, the Respondents' secretary, answered the Davises's telephone call and promised to have Respondent LeMieux return the call. Later that day Respondent LeMieux talked with Mrs. Davis by telephone, at which time Mrs. Davis gave Respondent LeMieux her and her husband's social security numbers so Respondent LeMieux could check their credit. Mrs. Davis and Respondent LeMieux agreed to meet the following day. The meeting on February 19, 1990, was cancelled when Respondent LeMieux failed to show up and the Davises went home after having waited for him at his office for approximately one hour. That evening Respondent LeMieux called the Davises, apologized for not being able to meet with them as scheduled, and arranged to meet them the following day at Respondent LeMieux's offices. On February 20, 1990, Respondent LeMieux called and changed the location of the meeting to the Pink Flamingo Restaurant on South Dixie Highway, Miami, a location that was mutually convenient. Mr. and Mrs. Davis met with Respondent LeMieux for the first time on February 20, 1990, in the parking lot of the Pink Flamingo Restaurant. At the meeting, Respondent LeMieux told the Davises that he had checked their credit and that he did not believe they would qualify for a FHA loan. Respondent LeMieux told the Davises that his company, Investor's Choice, owned the property and that he would sell it to them for the price of $52,000. The purchase price would be paid as follows: the Davises would pay $2,000 down; they would assume payment of the first mortgage held by Savings of America of approximately $43,000; and they would execute in favor of Respondent LeMieux's corporation a purchase money second mortgage of $7,000. Respondent LeMieux told the Davises that they would have to make an additional payment on the second mortgage of $2,000 around May 1, 1990, when they received their income tax refund. The monthly payment on the first mortgage was to be $367 and the monthly payment on the second mortgage, which was to bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum, was to be $150. One monthly check, in the aggregate amount of $517, was to be paid by the Davises to Respondent Retco Realty. Respondent LeMieux viewed the financing arrangements as a temporary solution to the Davises's credit problems, and he structured the transaction to accommodate those problems. Pursuant to their agreement, the Davises were to live in the house until permanent financing could be arranged. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent LeMieux was familiar with the terms of the Savings of America first mortgage. He knew that the mortgage was an assumable, variable rate mortgage that provided the borrower with the option of negative amortization in the event the interest rates increased and the borrower wanted to keep his or her monthly payments at a constant level. He knew that the interest rate was tied to an established index and could fluctuate on a monthly basis. He knew that the first mortgage was assumable if the borrower qualified, but otherwise had a "due on sale" clause. The amount of the monthly payment was important to the Davises because of their budgetary constraints. They knew that they would have difficulty paying the $367 first mortgage and the $150 second mortgage, but they felt they could comfortably pay the first mortgage once the second mortgage was paid off. Respondent LeMieux estimated during the meeting of February 20, 1990, that the second mortgage would be paid off around July 1993, assuming that the Davises made the payments to which they agreed, including a payment of $2,000 around May 1, 1990. There is a dispute in the testimony as to what was said about the first mortgage at the meeting between Respondent LeMieux and the Davises on February 20, 1990. From the conflicting testimony, it is found that Respondent LeMieux informed the Davises that the first mortgage was assumable, but that their credit report would not qualify them to assume the mortgage. Respondent LeMieux told them that they would have to clear up their credit problems during the time they were paying off the second mortgage so that they could qualify for a FHA mortgage or, in the alternative, formally assume the Savings America first mortgage, and that title would not be conveyed to them until permanent financing was arranged. As a result of the meeting with Respondent LeMieux on February 20, 1990, Mr. and Mrs. Davis's understanding of the transaction was that the first mortgage payment was fixed, that the interest rate was fixed, and that they would be able to assume the first mortgage (or secure their own mortgage) after they cleared up their credit problems. They would not have entered into the transaction had they known that the interest rate on the first mortgage was variable. Respondent LeMieux asserts that he told the Davises that the mortgage had a variable rate of interest that could fluctuate monthly, and that, because the mortgage permitted negative amortization, the monthly payments could remain constant. This testimony is rejected based on the testimony of Mr. and Mrs. Davis and that of Petitioner's investigator, Hector F. Sehwerert, who testified that Respondent LeMieux told him that he could not specifically recall whether he told the Davises that the first mortgage contained a variable rate. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondent LeMieux failed to explain to the Davises that the first mortgage contained a variable interest rate which could cause the monthly payment to fluctuate. Respondent LeMieux knew or should have known that the Davises were relying on his explanation as to the terms of the first mortgage in deciding whether to enter into the subject transaction. He also was aware that the Davises were unsophisticated buyers who were most concerned with the monthly payments they would have to make. His explanation of the terms of the first mortgage misled the Davises into believing that the first mortgage was a fixed rate mortgage and that the payments would remain constant. The Davises did not sign a contract at the meeting of February 20, 1990, but Respondent LeMieux gave them a copy of a contract with the terms of the proposal they had discussed filled out. The Davises took this contract home to think over the transaction. On the evening of February 20, 1990, the Davises gave Respondent LeMieux a check in the amount of $1,000 as a down payment on the house. The following day, the parties executed the contract with the Davises signing as purchasers and Respondent LeMieux signing as president of Investors' Choice International, Inc., the seller, and as president of Respondent Retco Realty, the broker to whom a $2,000 commission was to be paid. The following language appears immediately above the signature line of this form contract: "REALTOR ADVISES BOTH PARTIES TO CONSULT AN ATTORNEY AND FOR THE PURCHASER TO SECURE TITLE INSURANCE." The Davises did not receive the services of an attorney because Ms. Couret told them that an attorney should not be necessary and because they trusted Respondent LeMieux. The contract required a down payment of $2,000 (the receipt of the sum of $1,000 was acknowledged) with the Davises assuming the first mortgage of approximately $43,000 and executing a purchase money second mortgage in the sum of $7,000. The following clauses are found in the contract: 2. ASSUMPTION OF FIRST MORTGAGE: The Purchaser, subject to the lending institution's requirement, including an interest rate of change, if any, agrees to assume an existing First Mortgage of approximately $43,000. Payable at approximately $367 monthly with Homestead Exemption which payment includes principal and interest at existing interest rate on mortgage held by Savings of America. ... * * * 7. NEW PURCHASE MONEY SECOND MORTGAGE: The Purchaser shall execute a purchase money second mortgage and note in favor of (sic) for $7,000.00 payable at $150.00 monthly until paid, including principal and interest at 12% per annum. Said mortgage shall be prepayable without penalty. Documentary stamps, intangible tax and recording mortgage shall be paid by Purchaser. * * * 13. SPECIAL CLAUSES: Purchaser to assume existing 1st mtg. (sic) with Savings of America of approx. (sic) $43,000. Seller to give Buyer a Purchase Money 2nd Mtg. (sic) of $7,000 at 12% per annum, payable $150./mo. (sic) with a $2,000 balloon pmt. (sic) due May 1, 1990. On March 2, 1990, the parties executed an addendum to the contract they had executed on February 21, 1990, which clarified that the Davises were to pay ad valorem taxes and insurance and which contained, in pertinent part, the following: It is understood and agreed that the seller is conveying title at such time as the Purchase Money Second Mortgage of $7,000 is retired; unless that sum is prepaid, the anticipated date of payment in full will occur on or about July 1993. Both parties agree that payment to the first and second mortgages must be made on time, and in the event that these payments or real estate taxes or insurance shall fall into default, that this contract shall be cancelled and all monies forfeited. As an additional incentive for the seller to extend these terms to the buyer, the buyer agrees to make the first and second mortgage payment to the seller's office at 5942 SW 73 Street, Miami, Florida 33143 on or before the first of each month. The aggregate total of these payments will be $517 per month effective April 1, 1990. Both parties understand that the March payment of $367 is now due. Also on March 2, 1990, the Davises paid the Respondents the sum of $1,000, representing the balance of the down payment, paid the sum of $367 representing the March 1990 payment on the first mortgage, and moved into the house. When the Davises received their income tax refund in April 1990, Mrs. Davis went to the Respondents' office to pay the sum of $2,000 on the second mortgage. (This was the payment contemplated by the Special Clauses paragraph of the contract executed February 21, 1990.) At that time Respondent LeMieux informed Mrs. Davis that the sum of $314 was due for insurance on the house and he agreed to accept the sum of $1700 as the lump sum payment on the second mortgage so Mrs. Davis could pay the insurance premium. In addition to the annual insurance premium in the amount of $314 paid by the Davises in April 1990, they paid the annual insurance premium in the amount of $314 in April 1991, and the ad valorem tax bill for 1990 in the amount of $605.89. From March 30, 1990 through April 30, 1991, the Davises made 14 monthly payments in the amount of $517 each by check payable to Respondent Retco Realty. These payments were hand delivered by Mrs. Davis and were always timely made. The Davises and their children liked the house and the neighborhood. During the time the Davises were in the house, they made repairs and improvements worth approximately $500. On May 29, 1991, Mrs. Davis went to Respondents' office to make a regular $517 monthly payment. At that time Respondent LeMieux met with Mrs. Davis and told her that the interest rate on the first mortgage was variable, that the payments on the first mortgage had gone up, and that his second mortgage was not making any money. Prior to this meeting, the Davises did not know that the first mortgage was not a fixed rate mortgage or that the first mortgage payments were subject to change and had changed. At the meeting on May 29, 1991, with Mrs. Davis, Respondent LeMieux prepared a document entitled "Letter of Understanding", and asked Mrs. Davis to sign it on her own behalf and on behalf of her husband. Respondent LeMieux was to sign the Letter of Understanding as president of Investor's Choice International. The Letter of Understanding provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Both parties acknowledge that the existing first mortgage of approximately $43, 500 (sic) held by Savings of America contains a variable interest rate, which is adjusted monthly, and therefore causes the monthly mortgage payments to either increase or decrease by a particular number. Currently the mortgage payment is $477.48. The mortgage also contains a "due-on-sale" clause, and that is why pursuant to the contract dated February 20th, 1990 between the Davises and Investor's Choice, no deed was ever conveyed so as to prevent triggering any "due-on-sale" clause that may cause the mortgage to go into default and subsequent foreclosure. To date, the Davises have made 13 payments of $517 each for a grand total of $6,721. To date, Investor's Choice has paid Savings of America $5,884.69; therefore the difference that was paid to Investor's Choice on that certain second mortgage of $7,000 pursuant to that contract of February 1990 is $836; of which $636 is interest and $200 is principal. Therefore, after the principal reduction that the Davises have made during the course of the last twelve months, namely $1,700 plus $200 by virtue of their monthly installments, the current mortgage balance is $5,100. The parties have agreed that Mrs. Davis will pay $100 toward the principal balance this month, May 1991, leaving a principal unpaid balance due Investor's Choice of $5,000. Said mortgage to be payable at the rate of 12% per annum, interest only monthly, or $50 per month. If Mr. and Mrs. Davis elect to make principal reduction in said mortgage, they will be receipted for same, and the interest payment per month would drop accordingly. Mrs. Davis refused to sign the "Letter of Understanding". After discussing the matter with her husband, the Davises obtained through legal aid the services of attorney Candis Trusty. Ms. Trusty negotiated an agreement with the Respondents' attorney, Robert Korschun, whereby the Davises would be reimbursed the sum of $3,899, they would vacate the premises by September 1, 1991, and they would deposit the sum of $500 into Ms. Trusty's trust account as security for damages to the premises. The Davises did not move out of the premises until September 8, 1991. Thereafter, Respondent LeMieux inspected the premises and informed Ms. Trusty that there were no damages to the premises beyond normal wear and tear, and that he would therefore make no claim on the damages deposit. Respondent LeMieux did assert a claim against the Davises in the amount of $166.67 for unpaid rent for the days they occupied the premises beyond September 1, 1991. Because of the dispute over rent, Ms. Trusty retained, as of the formal hearing, the sum of $166.67 in her trust account. At the formal hearing, Respondent LeMieux continued to assert his entitlement to the rent from the Davises in the amount of $166.67, but he acknowledged that the funds the Davises deposited in Ms. Trusty's trust account were not intended to secure rent and that he had no claim to that particular fund. In October of 1988, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondents which is unrelated to the present proceeding. That Administrative Complaint contained certain factual allegations which charged that Respondents were guilty of "fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust in a business transaction, all in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1988)." This Administrative Complaint was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 88-5771. Respondents settled that prior matter and executed a Stipulation which they neither admitted nor denied the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Respondents were reprimanded and fined in the amount of $400.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the Respondents guilty of having violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which assesses an administrative fine in the aggregate amount of $500 against the Respondents, and which places the licensure of both Respondents on probation for a period of six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1906 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 22 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent the proposed findings are contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 12 and 20 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent the proposed findings are unnecessary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 21 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondents. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 2 are rejected as being contrary to the findings made. The findings of fact in the last sentence of paragraph 2 are rejected as being unnecessary to the findings made. The remaining proposed findings of fact contained in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order or they are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in the first sentence of paragraph 3 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence or as being unnecessary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in the second sentence of paragraph 3 are adopted to the extent that the Respondents's standard form contract contains the advice for the parties to seek the services of an attorney. The proposed findings of fact in the third sentence of paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the fourth sentence of paragraph 3 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, but are rejected to the extent that said proposed findings state that Respondent LeMieux was acting to accommodate the Davises. The proposed findings of fact in the fifth sentence of paragraph 3 are rejected since the Davises appeared to understand why the payments on the first mortgage went up after Respondent LeMieux informed Mrs. Davis that the mortgage had a variable interest rate. The proposed findings of fact in the last sentence of paragraph 3 are adopted in part and are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order or are subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 7 and 8 are rejected as being contrary to the evidence or as being unnecessary to the findings made. Both Mr. and Mrs. Davis understood the explanation of the transaction Respondent LeMieux made to them before they signed the contract. That they became confused on cross examination is unnecessary to the conclusions reached in this proceeding. Her confusion as to the meaning of a fixed rate mortgage and the assumability of the mortgage is subordinate to the findings made that Respondent LeMieux did not lie to them about the status of the interest rate on the first mortgage. The statements made by the attorney they consulted during the settlement negotiations are also unnecessary to the conclusions reached in this proceeding. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 consists of argument and are unnecessary as findings of fact. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order with the exception of the last sentence, which is rejected as being argument and unnecessary as a finding of fact. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore R. Gay, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Jorge Gaviria, Esquire 2222 Ponce de Leon Boulevard Mezzanine 200 Coral Gables, Florida 33134-6193 Darlene F. Keller, Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Respectively on September 20 and September 9, 1988, the Petitioner and the Respondent submitted to the Hearing Officer their proposed Findings of Fact. In the Appendix To Recommended Order the Hearing Officer submitted recommending rulings thereon. The following constitutes the rulings in this Final Order on those proposed Findings of Fact. The petitioner's proposed Findings of Fact numbers 1 and 5 are hereby accepted and adopted in that they are supported by competent substantial, evidence. The petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 2 is hereby rejected in that the petitioner did not terminate her position on August 17, 1987, and she was not reemployed on September 29, 1987, for the reasons stated above in paragraphs numbers 1 through 12. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 3 is hereby rejected upon the grounds and for the reasons stated in paragraphs No. 7 and 8 above. The Petitioner's proposed Finding of Fact No. 4 is rejected as phrased, for the reasons and upon the grounds set forth in paragraph No. 4 above. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact numbers (1) through (7) are each hereby accepted and adopted in that they are each based upon competent, substantial evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner became a member of the Florida Retirement System in September 1987 and allowing Petitioner to transfer her previously-earned Teachers' Retirement System credits to the Florida Retirement System. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 1st day of November, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-0673 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-5 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-4 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 5 has been rejected as being contrary to the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 6 and 7 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Patricia Ann Ash, Esquire Harold N. Braxton, Esquire One Datran Center, Suite 406 9100 South Dadeland Boulevard Miami, Florida 33156 Burton M. Michaels, Esquire Department of Administration 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Hughlan Long, was employed by the Florida Industrial Commission from 1946 to 1952, during which time he was a member of the State and County Officer and Employee Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner was employed as a state attorney from 1953 to 1956. Again, during that time he was a member of SCOERS. During the period 1962 to 1964, Petitioner was a member of the Dade County Commission, at which time he was a member of SCOERS. On this occasion, as on each of the above occasions, the Petitioner obtained a refund of all contributions to SCOERS when he terminated his employment. In October of 1969, Petitioner became Public Defender for Dade County and was a member of SCOERS. From this position he was appointed a judge of industrial claims. He has stayed in that position since his appointment on December 28, 1970. Several days prior to his appointment as a judge of industrial claims, on December 1, 1970, Petitioner voluntarily transferred from SCOERS to the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner based his decision to transfer upon his reading of the statutes and the data available from the Division of Retirement upon the benefits available under the two systems. At the time he transferred to FRS, Petitioner was not eligible to purchase past service credit in SCOERS. Petitioner corresponded with Respondent and was advised he could receive two percent credit for his 10.18 years prior SCOERS service. The Division erroneously advised him that he would receive two percent credit for his past service, although at the time Petitioner was a member of FRS and only eligible for 1.6 percent credit for such service. Based upon the information provided to him, the Petitioner purchased his prior service credit of 10.18 years and paid the required interest, a total of $4,092.27. In 1975, the Division discovered its error and sent a letter to Petitioner. See Petitioner's Exhibit #11. This letter advised Petitioner that his purchase had been incorrectly computed based upon Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, because he did not have three years service prior to the time he transferred to FRS. The letter further stated, "therefore, after you completed the three continuous years you must claim prior service in this system (FRS)." This was the only reference or correction made by the Division to Petitioner until 1981. In 1981, Petitioner requested data on his retirement credit and was advised he would get 1.6 percent rather than two percent for his past service credit. No credible evidence was received that Petitioner was induced to purchase his past service by the erroneous information provided him. Petitioner filed a timely request for a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the decision of the Division of Retirement to deny the Petitioner two percent service credit be upheld. However, because Petitioner was misadvised he should receive the option of accepting the benefit as provided by law or receiving his purchase price back with interest of six percent per annum. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerold Feuer, Esquire 19 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Nevin G. Smith, Secretary 2639 North Monroe Street Department of Administration Suite 207C - Box 81 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for resolution in this proceeding is whether Respondent's lottery prize should be withheld to be applied against an unpaid student loan.
Findings Of Fact In an application and promissory note dated June 30, 1987, Respondent, Ms. White, applied for an auxiliary student loan in the amount of $2,000 to attend school at Orlando College in Orlando, Florida, for the loan period June 1987 through June 1988. The loan was issued by Florida Federal Savings and Loan Association (lender) in one disbursement on or about September 2, 1987. Interest accrues on the loan at a variable rate which is currently 10.27 percent per year. This loan is Loan Number AL00010400 (loan 10400) which was guaranteed by the federal government through the DOE. In an application and promissory note dated December 9, 1987, Respondent applied for a second auxiliary student loan in the amount of $2,000 to attend the school for the same loan period. That loan was made by the lender in one disbursement on or about March 8, 1988. Interest accrues on that loan at a variable interest rate which is currently 10.27 percent per year. That loan is Loan Number AL00014434 (loan 14434) which was guaranteed by the federal government through DOE. As auxiliary loans, each of Respondent's loans accrued interest from the date of disbursement. For auxiliary loans, the borrower is required to make loan payments even while attending school. However, a borrower may request a deferment or forbearance from payment for several reasons, including attending school on a minimum part-time basis. While an auxiliary loan is in deferment/forbearance status, interest still accrues on the loan. In an application dated January 4, 1988, Respondent requested a deferment of repayment because she was attending school on a full-time basis. That application was approved for any payments due between June 22, 1987, through June 20, 1988. Following the deferment period, Harper-Smith and Associates, Inc., the lender's loan servicer (herein referred to as HSA) sent Respondent a repayment disclosure letter dated August 31, 1988. The letter outlined the terms and conditions of the repayment schedule assigned to both of Respondent's loans. As of the date of the disclosure letter, Respondent owed $4,082.40 in outstanding principal and capitalized interest for both loans. Additionally, Respondent owed a total of $36.23 in accrued unpaid interest. The disclosure letter indicated that Respondent's first payment of $56.06 was due September 20, 1988. Respondent failed to make any payments on the loans and Respondent was declared in default by HSA. HSA filed a lender application for claim payment with DOE dated May 11, 1989. On November 23, 1989, DOE, as guarantor of the loans, paid HSA for both of Respondent's defaulted auxiliary student loans. When DOE acquired loan 10400 and loan 14434, the outstanding interest was capitalized, resulting in a balance of $4,680.86 ($4,082.40 in claim principal and $598.46 in claim interest). This sum is subject to a variable interest rate which is currently 10.27 per cent per year. Since DOE acquired Respondent's loans, payments received from the Respondent's federal income tax returns (herein referred to as IRS offsets) have been applied to Respondent's outstanding balance as follows: 4/09/91 $1,082 3/30/92 $1,628 10/04/93 $1,140 5/08/95 $ 614 5/08/95 $ 727 After applying each IRS offset payment according to federal regulations (outstanding interest first, then principal), Respondent's account had a net balance of $1,445.43 in principal due on May 8, 1995, and all interest was paid through that date. DOE's earlier certification of amount owed was based on DOE's records which did not include the 1993 and 1995 IRS offsets. Ms. White provided the evidence of those and DOE verified that those should be applied against her debt. On June 30, 1995, Respondent filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection. The filing occurred less than seven years after Respondent's loans went into repayment on September 20, 1988. On October 17, 1995, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division, issued a "Discharge of Debtor" order in Respondent's case, number 95-03350-687. That order provides in pertinent part, "The above-named debtor is released from all dischargeable debts . . . . . . [including] debts dischargeable under 11 U. S. C. [Section] 523." On April 28, 1996, the Department subrogated (sold) loan 10400 to the United States Department of Education (USDOE). DOE still owns loan 14434. On May 8, 1995, the day the last IRS offset payment was applied, Respondent owed $722.72 in principal on loan 14434 which currently accrues interest at the rate of 10.27 percent per year. No other payment was received between May 8, 1995, and the time the DOE received Respondent's lottery winnings which are the subject of this action. Ms. White produced evidence that an additional $941.69 was withheld in an IRS offset, but that was after her lottery winnings were withheld. By letter of February 12, 1999, the DOE notified the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) that Respondent owed DOE $2,811.88, in principal and interest, as a consequence of her outstanding defaulted student loan. That amount has been amended as explained in paragraph 8, above. Pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted Respondent's $800 lottery prize to the DOE. By letter of February 25, 1999, DOE notified Respondent that it was in receipt of her $800 lottery prize in accordance with Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes. DOE applied Respondent's lottery winnings to her outstanding balance on the remaining loan, number 14434, held by DOE in accordance with federal requirements.2 DOE's letter also advised Respondent of her right to request a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, to contest the action. This proceeding arose when Respondent made her request for formal hearing. DOE has demonstrated that even when the five IRS offsets noted above were properly applied to both loans, there remained a balance due on loan 14434 of $722.72 in principal as of May 8, 1995, plus interest accruing since that date, plus $585.11 in collection costs. DOE also demonstrated that loan 14434 was not discharged in bankruptcy, because it was not in repayment for more than 7 years when the bankruptcy petition was filed, the minimum time required in order for a student loan to be eligible for discharge.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DOE enter a final order which authorizes Respondent's lottery prize of $800 be applied toward her outstanding debt for a defaulted student loan. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is entitled to retirement service credit for the time period in which he was not employed with the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Management Services (DMS) is responsible for the administration of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. The Department of Transportation (DOT) is an agency of the State of Florida whose employees qualify for membership in FRS. Petitioner Richard L. Duley is an honorably discharged veteran. He began employment with DOT in 1991. At the same time, he became a member of FRS. Prior to 2001, then-Governor Jeb Bush directed state agencies to reduce their workforce by 25 percent over a five- year period beginning in 2001. The directive was known as the "Service First Initiative." In response to the Governor’s directive, DOT developed an Agency Organizational Efficiency Plan. On January 18, 2005, Petitioner was notified that his position was designated to be deleted under the Agency’s Organizational Efficiency Plan; his position was abolished on June 30, 2005. As a result, Petitioner was dismissed from state employment and was no longer receiving retirement service credit for FRS. However, Petitioner did not receive a clear point of entry to challenge either his termination or whether he was entitled to a veteran's preference by DOT. After his dismissal, Petitioner was hired by a private firm who had contracted with the State to perform the functions that Mr. Duley had previously provided as an employee of the state. The contract terminated in June or July of 2007, and was not renewed. As such, Mr. Duley became unemployed. On July 30, 2007, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs (DVA) alleging that DOT had denied him veteran’s preference in retention during the 2005 layoff. The DVA found that Petitioner's complaint had merit. On November 19, 2007, Petitioner filed a complaint with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), which held an evidentiary hearing on the complaint. PERC is the administrative body that has jurisdiction to determine issues and remedies under the veteran's preference statute. In its Final Order issued April 8, 2007, PERC found that Petitioner was an honorably discharged veteran and was entitled to preferential treatment in employment. PERC also found that DOT violated the veteran’s preference law by not affording Petitioner special consideration in finding alternative employment after the layoff. As a remedy for its violation of the veteran's preference law, PERC ordered DOT to make Petitioner an offer of employment to an existing position comparable to that which he held prior to his layoff. PERC also awarded Petitioner attorneys’ fees and costs. However, and most importantly, PERC did not reinstate Petitioner to his former position because it had been abolished. Similarly, PERC did not rescind Petitioner's termination. Finally, PERC did not award back pay or benefits to Petitioner. As a consequence of the Final Order, neither Petitioner nor DOT paid contributions towards the Retirement Systems Trust Fund for the period that Petitioner was not employed with the State. Additionally, Petitioner was offered and hired into a new position by DOT and again began to accrue retirement service credit in FRS when he was hired by DOT in May of 2008. The PERC Final Order was not appealed and became res judicata on the issues litigated therein. Therefore, since Petitioner's termination was not rescinded and Petitioner was not reinstated by PERC and did not pay contributions into FRS, he is not entitled to receive credit for the time he was not employed by the State and this action should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order dismissing this action. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard L. Duley 5432 Pinderton Way Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kristin M. Klein, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 John Brenneis, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent improperly rejected Petitioner's application during the threshold check of applications for bond funds in the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond Program. The case requires the identification of the requirements of a threshold check.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a public corporation generally responsible for the administration of the programs previously administered by the Florida Housing Finance Agency. Among these programs is the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond Program (Program). This case involves Petitioner's application for an allocation of mortgage funds for 1999. The Program provides construction and permanent mortgage loans to developers of rental housing. Respondent offers submarket interest rates if the developers reserve rental units for lower-income tenants. As is relevant to this case, Respondent funds the loans through the sale of tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds. The allocation process is competitive because the demand for mortgage funds exceeds their supply. The allocation process consists of several parts. Respondent's staff first conducts a completeness review. Respondent's staff assigns each application that passes the completeness review to an independent underwriter, which conducts a threshold check. Respondent's staff comparatively ranks the applications that pass the threshold check, and the staff submits the rankings to Respondent's Board of Directors. After finalizing the rankings, the Board sends the applications within the funding range to final credit underwriting, at which point credit underwriters closely examine each application. The underwriters make funding recommendations to the Board, which accepts, rejects, or modifies the recommendations in making the final funding decisions. According to the 1999 Developer's Handbook (Handbook, which is Joint Exhibit 1), the first event in the closing schedule is the real estate closing. Joint Exhibit 1, p. F-3. After the real estate closing, Respondent and other parties negotiate the bond prices and mortgage interest rates. The final event in the closing schedule is the bond closing, at which point Respondent delivers the bonds to the bond purchasers in exchange for the bond proceeds, which Respondent lends in the form of a mortgage loan to the developer. The Handbook also reprints Chapter 67-21, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 67-21.008(12), all references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code, provides that the developer shall, "prior to the requested date for funding," provide Respondent with, among other things, a commitment for mortgagee title insurance subject only to the standard exceptions and evidence as to the status of liens so as to reflect only those liens that Respondent has permitted to remain recorded against the mortgaged property. At the start of the application process, Respondent supplied each prospective applicant with the Handbook. The Handbook lists numerous evaluation criteria that apply to the overall process by which Respondent decides which applications to fund. These criteria, of course, include "[e]vidence of economic feasibility of the Development and repayment of the loan." Joint Exhibit 1, p. B-3. However, this case involves only the threshold check, which is clearly both preliminary to, and less comprehensive than, final credit underwriting. In a general discussion of the preliminary reviews that precede final credit underwriting, the Handbook warns that the completeness review is "quantitative" and the threshold check is "qualitative." Joint Exhibit 1, p. E-1. The Handbook adds: "Credit Underwriters will be looking at each Application for thoroughness and quality of information." Id. Part H of the Handbook addresses credit underwriting and identifies nine factors, such as the value of the security, feasibility, costs, and marketability, that are part of the "Credit Underwriting review." Although Part H mentions the threshold check, the text is not explicit as to whether "Credit Underwriting review" is meant to include the threshold check. A close reading of the penultimate paragraph on page H-1 of the Handbook suggests that "Credit Underwriting review," as used on page H-1, does not include the threshold review. This paragraph of the Handbook notes that developers may be required to submit additional documentation during final credit underwriting. As noted below in the discussion of the rules, developers are prohibited from providing additional documentation during the threshold check. Given this important distinction between these two stages in the credit-underwriting process, the final sentence of the penultimate paragraph reveals that "Credit Underwriting reviews" are limited to final credit underwriting. The sentence states: "The time required for completing Credit Underwriting reviews is directly related to the completeness and timing of submission of required items to the Credit Underwriter." The Administrative Law Judge thus determines that the identification of these nine underwriting criteria stated on page H-1 of the Handbook apply only to final credit underwriting. However, the Handbook clearly addresses the threshold check at pages H-3 and H-4. These pages list 25 items applicable to the threshold check. These items include statements of the experience of the attorney and consultant, preliminary plans and specifications, a preliminary site plan, evidence of site control, a survey, a statement of permitting status, evidence of infrastructure availability and concurrency, and general construction contracts. Among the items with more direct financial impact are "[15-]year Pro Formas: sources and uses, and income, expense and occupancy projection; a "[c]over letter outlining terms of financing requested"; and a "[s]yndication commitment letter outlining participants and the basic terms of the agreement, if Housing Credits are required during construction phase." Several of the rules contained in the Handbook apply to the threshold check. Most importantly, Rule 67-21.002(63) defines the "threshold check" as the "required documentation verification and review" by the underwriter before the Board may submit an application to final credit underwriting. Rule 67-21.003(5) provides that the Board shall rank applications that receive a "satisfactory" threshold check, but the rule fails to specify what is necessary to earn "satisfactory" threshold check. Rule 67-21.003(8) refers to a "favorable" threshold check, but also fails to specify what is necessary to earn a "favorable" threshold check. Rule 67-21.014 explains the credit underwriting procedures. Rule 67-21.014(1) describes the threshold check, and Rule 67-21.014(2) describes final credit underwriting. Rule 67- 21.014(1)(b) requires that a prerequisite to final credit underwriting is a "positive recommendation as to compliance with the Threshold Check," but the rule does not specify what is necessary to comply with the threshold check. By contrast, Rule 67-21.014(2)(b) identifies clearly the overriding criterion of final credit underwriting: "The Credit Underwriter shall review the proposed financing structure to determine whether the Loan is feasible." Rule 67-21.003(1) adopts by reference the application form, which also addresses the threshold review. The front page of the application cautions: "If the necessary backup information is not accurately provided the Credit Underwriter will not unable to process your application during the Threshold Check." The front page of the application adds that applicants may not supplement their applications during the completeness review conducted by Respondent's staff or the threshold check conducted by the underwriters. Page 13 of the application states: III. Development Financing: Please respond to the requested information below. Attach and label the appropriate exhibits. Failure to respond to the requested information and provide the necessary backup information will result in the determination that the application is incomplete during the Florida Housing's Staff Application Review. If the necessary backup information is not accurately provided the Credit Underwriter will be unable to process your application during the Threshold Check. All information must be clear and directly related to your proposed development. No additional information can be received by Florida Housing and the Credit Underwriter during the Application Review and Threshold Check. Financing Cover Letter: Include a letter describing any anticipated sources of financing other than Bonds for the proposed development. This letter must include all information available at the time of application submission (such as interest rates and any terms associated with these sources of financing). The letter must also include how the applicant intends to fund construction. The letter can be found behind Exhibit . Sources and Uses of Funds: Include sources and uses of funds consistent with all intended financing. The Sources and Uses of Funds must be prepared in a format similar to the one found behind this Application. The Sources and Uses of Funds for the proposed development can be found behind Exhibit . Fifteen year income, expense, and occupancy projection: Include a fifteen year income, expense, and occupancy projection consistent with all financing commitments. It must demonstrate that the development meets debt service coverage requirements based on current interest rates. Please use a format similar to the one found behind this Application). The fifteen year income, expense and occupancy projection can be found behind Exhibit . The suggested forms for reporting the sources and uses of funds and 15-year income, expense, and occupancy projections are contained in the Handbook. The two forms are detailed. By contrast, the Handbook contains no suggested form for the financing cover letter. For sources of funds, the suggested form lists Respondent's loan, any tax credit equity, any deferred developer's fee, and any developer cash, as well as "other" sources. For uses of funds, the suggested form lists various acquisition costs, actual construction costs, general development costs, financial costs, and other development costs. The 15-year income, expense, and occupancy projection form is even more detailed, containing over 100 line items. Petitioner's application contains a financing cover letter, sources and uses of funds, and 15-year income, expense, and occupancy projections. Petitioner's financing cover letter states in its entirety: [Petitioner] (borrower) credit enhancer will be [Respondent's] Guarantee Program. The borrower's anticipated source of funds will be tax-exempt bonds through [Respondent's] Bond insurance prior to closing. The borrower plans to syndicate tax credits as additional sources of funds. The Pines development shall receive a Fair Share Impact Fee contribution from the City of Punta Gorda within the construction time frame. The Pines project "does not" anticipate other sources of financing other than tax exempt bonds, tax credit funds and a fair share impact fee contribution. We appreciate your consideration in this matter. Petitioner used the suggested form for sources and uses of funds. For sources of funds, Petitioner's completed form shows $12,375,800 from Respondent's loan; $7,400,000 from tax credit equity; $1,299,266 from the deferral of the developer fee; $347,904 from developer cash; and $559,800 from Charlotte County in the form of an impact-fee contribution. For uses of funds, Petitioner's completed form shows a total of $21,982,770. Petitioner's application also included a letter dated January 19, 1999, from Midland Equity Corporation to Petitioner. The letter constitutes a firm commitment from Midland Equity to purchase the project's tax credits, through the purchase of partnership interests, in three installments of $4,440,000, $1,480,000, and $1,480,000, respectively. The letter describes the due dates of the installments as follows: First Installment: At the later of: (i) admission of the Investment Partnership to the Operating Partnership; or (ii) closing of the construction loan and Project land acquisition; Second Installment: Within thirty (30) days of the later of: (i) completion of the Project; or (ii) receipt by the Investment Partnership of the cost and credit certification from the independent accountants. Third Installment: Within thirty (30) days of the later of: (i) closing of the permanent loan; or (ii) receipt of the Form 8609; or (iii) 90% physical occupancy for ninety (90) consecutive days; or (iv) 1.10 Debt Service Coverage for ninety (90) days. The commitment letter elaborates: With respect to the Second Installment, completion of the Project shall mean receipt of permanent certificates of occupancy or temporary certificates of occupancy with conditions/requirements for receiving the permanent certificates satisfactory to the Investment Partnership. Petitioner's application contained a copy of an agreement between Petitioner, as owner, and a general contractor. The contract is for $13,328,435 and calls for the payment of 95 percent of the total contract price upon the substantial completion of work. The value of the five percent retainage is thus $666,421. Substantial completion is the date on which the Building Department issues a certificate of occupancy for each building. City of Punta Gorda Ordinance 946-89 provides that a landowner shall pay impact fees. The ordinance authorizes landowners to pay the impact fee not later than the issuance of a certificate of occupancy. In conducting the threshold check, the underwriter completed a "threshold review checklist." This form states that the "threshold check" is the "review and verification of this information by the Credit Underwriter . . .." The form adds: "The following items must be satisfactorily addressed." In explanation, the form states: "'Satisfactory' means that the Applicant has met the minimum threshold requirements pursuant to the Application but the items will be further reviewed and analyzed during Final Credit Underwriting." The underwriter noted that Petitioner's application satisfied each of the 25 items required on pages H-3 and H-4 of the Handbook, except for the cover letter outlining the terms of the requested financing. As for this item, the underwriter noted: "The financing cover letter does not explain how the construction period will be funded. Based on the other information in the application, [the underwriter] calculates a $1,375,546 construction period funding gap." In determining that Petitioner's application contained a construction period financing gap, the underwriter constructed a table entitled "Construction Period Funding Analysis." For uses of funds, the underwriter inserted $21,982,770 for total development costs. The underwriter obtained this figure from the uses and sources of funds that accompanied Petitioner's application. For "construction sources of funds," the underwriter listed six items totaling $20,607,224, leaving a "construction funding gap" of $1,375,545. The six items were Respondent's loan of $12,375,800; the first installment of $4,440,000 from the syndicator of the tax credits; the deferred developer fee of $1,299,288; developer cash of $347,904; Charlotte County's impact fee contribution of $559,800; and an additional developer fee available for deferral of $1,584,454. As to the failure to include the second installment, the underwriter noted that the "second capital contribution is not paid until both construction and the final cost certification are complete." This was the first time that Respondent required a threshold check in the Program. Respondent arranged for several underwriters to conduct threshold checks. The underwriter who performed the threshold check of Petitioner's application testified at the hearing. His testimony was credible and established him as a capable credit underwriter with experience in projects of the type proposed in Petitioner's application. However, the underwriter was limited in his ability to explain the source of the requirements of the threshold check. Rather than rely on the available documentation, he explained that he relied on conversations with Respondent's staff and mostly common sense. As noted below, there is good reason why the underwriter did not rely on documentation of the contents of the threshold check. The underwriter did not clearly explain the objective of the threshold review, again understandably. However, he explained in detail his reasoning in determining that Petitioner's application left a construction-period financing gap of $1.375 million. He was not asked how this analysis differs from the construction financing analysis that presumably is part of final credit underwriting, but the available record permits no finding of such a difference. After examining the record, the Administrative Law Judge is unable to define adequately the scope of review entailed by the threshold review. Clearly, the threshold review requires more than the completeness review, but less than final credit underwriting. Although it is impossible to specify much more about what the threshold review requires, it is possible to find that nothing in this record informed Petitioner that its application would undergo a construction-period financing analysis, of the type performed by the underwriter in this case, during the threshold check, rather than during final credit underwriting. The finding that the analysis that resulted in the rejection of Petitioner's application exceeded the scope of the threshold check eliminates the necessity of findings concerning Petitioner's challenge to the conclusions of the underwriter who performed this analysis. In light of the adverse finding on the scope of the threshold check, Respondent would argue in the alternative that this Recommended Order should proceed to analyze the conclusions of the underwriter in the construction-period financing analysis. However, the record does not permit a finding that Petitioner's application does or does not provide adequate assurance that Petitioner would be able to deliver a lien-free project at the bond/mortgage closing, as is Petitioner's clear obligation. There are some complicated timing questions in terms of projecting, relative to the bond closing, the receipt of the second installment from the tax-credit syndicator, the payment of all of the impact fees, and the payment of the retainage allowed under the general contractor's contract. The second installment alone would eliminate the gap found by the underwriter, as would the impact fees and retainage together. The inability to make this finding at this time reinforces the prematurity of the analysis conducted by the underwriter. The process permits the developer to add new or explanatory information during final credit underwriting, but not the threshold check. A process as complicated and important as matching, prior to bond/mortgage closing, sources and uses of funds should be deferred until the stage in the process--i.e., final credit underwriting--at which the underwriter can obtain additional information from the developer. Given the state of the present record, this process must await final credit underwriting because nothing adequately informed Petitioner that his application would be subjected to construction-period financing analysis during the threshold check. The 1999 allocation cycle is nearly complete. In August 1999, the Board reviewed the underwriters' funding recommendations and ordered the allocation of $162 million in mortgage funds, which, when added to a $5 million carryover from 1998, results in a total allocation of $167 million. Respondent has allocated all of this amount, except for about $8 or $9 million. However, the projects that have already been allocated funds must close by September 30, 1999, or the funds revert to the state pool, from which Respondent may make additional allocations at its November 1999 meeting. If mortgage funds become available due to unclosed deals, the Board will reconsider approximately 10 to 12 applications that were not initially funded, but which passed the threshold check. If Respondent issues a final order consistent with this Recommended Order, Respondent's Board would rank Petitioner's application among these unfunded 10 to 12 applications. It is unclear whether the 10 to 12 remaining applications have already undergone final credit underwriting. Clearly, Petitioner's application has not yet undergone final credit underwriting. The construction-period financing issues prematurely raised during the threshold check nonetheless require analysis during final credit underwriting. If the other 10 to 12 applications have already undergone final credit underwriting, and given the imminent year-end deadline on the 1999 allocation, Respondent should consider allowing Petitioner, at its financial risk, to apply for final credit underwriting, prior to the November 1999 meeting at which Respondent's Board will consider this Recommended Order.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a final order determining that Petitioner's application has passed the threshold check, directing that Respondent incorporate any additional information obtained by any additional review process undertaken pursuant to the recommendation contained in Paragraph 40 above, and directing that (subject to the outcome of final credit underwriting) Respondent reconsider Petitioner's application among the 10 to 12 remaining applications for any mortgage funds that remain in the Program after the September 30, 1999, closing deadline passes. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Brad Baker, Executive Director Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1329 Stephen M. Donelan, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1329 Robert S. Cohen Robert S. Cohen, P.A. 1435 East Piedmont Drive Suite 201-B Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Maureen McCarthy Daughton Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A. Post Office Box 11008 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1008
Findings Of Fact There are no disputed issues of material fact which would preclude entry of this summary recommended order of dismissal based on the undisputed facts and law involved. Petitioner was dismissed from his career service position with Respondent state agency. On appeal, the dismissal was reversed. Petitioner was off the state agency payroll and did not work for seven months. In backpay proceedings before the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC), Petitioner was awarded backpay for only one month. Petitioner was paid for the one month that pay was awarded, but not for the other six months. Petitioner received retirement credit, annual leave credit, and sick leave credit for that one month awarded and paid, but not for the other six months.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services enter a final order denying all claims of Petitioner and dismissing the Petition. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of April, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of April, 1993.
The Issue Whether Respondents acted as a loan broker by assessing or collecting advance fee payments from borrowers in violation of sections 687.14(4)(a) and (b) and 687.141(1), Florida Statutes, and, if so, the appropriate penalty to be imposed against Respondents.
Findings Of Fact OFR is responsible for the administration and enforcement of chapter 687, Florida Statutes. On December 13, 2010, First Solutions, Inc. (“First Solutions”), was incorporated in the state of Florida. At all times material hereto, Andrew Mangini has been the sole officer/director of First Solutions. The mailing address of First Solutions and Mr. Mangini are the same: 830 Hawthorn Terrace, Weston, Florida 33327. At all times material hereto, First Solutions has been the sole owner of the fictitious name, Credit One. Credit One was registered as a fictitious name with the State of Florida, Department of State, on December 22, 2010. The mailing address for the fictitious name of Credit One is 830 Hawthorn Terrace, Weston, Florida 33327. On July 20, 2010, Unsecured Loan Source II, Inc., was incorporated in the state of Florida. At all times material hereto, Michael Puglisi has been the sole officer/director of Unsecured Loan Source II, Inc. The mailing address of Unsecured Loan Source II, Inc., is 5340 North Federal Highway, Suite 201, Lighthouse Point, Florida 33064. On January 22, 2009, Internet Transaction Center, Inc., was incorporated in the state of Florida. At all times material hereto, Mr. Mangini and Mr. Puglisi have been officers/directors of Internet Transaction Center, Inc. The mailing address of Internet Transaction Center, Inc., is 830 Hawthorn Terrace, Weston, Florida 33327. During the time in which Mr. Puglisi was an officer/director of Internet Transaction Center, Inc., his mailing address was 5340 North Federal Highway, Lighthouse Point, Florida 33064. At all times material hereto, Respondents operated and conducted business as Unsecured Loan Source and Credit One Total. On December 24, 2010, Mr. Mangini opened a business bank checking account at TD Bank, N.A., in the name of First Solutions, Inc., d/b/a Credit One. In early 2012, Nicole Gentry sought to obtain an unsecured personal loan over the internet. Ms. Gentry’s internet search led her to Unsecured Loan Source. Ms. Gentry contacted Unsecured Loan Source by telephone and spoke with a representative named “Ed” about securing an unsecured personal loan. Ms. Gentry provided “Ed” with certain personal, credit, and bank account information to withdraw a loan fee of $499.00. Ms. Gentry paid the $499.00 loan fee in order to obtain a personal loan from Unsecured Loan Source. The $499.00 fee was debited from Ms. Gentry’s bank account shortly after she submitted her online application for the loan, and the fee was deposited directly into the TD business bank checking account of First Solutions, Inc., d/b/a Credit One. Subsequently, Ms. Gentry received an email requesting additional information, and she provided the information requested. However, Ms. Gentry never received a loan. In August 2011, Rosa Saenz of Taft, California, attempted to obtain an unsecured personal loan. Ms. Saenz’s internet search led her to Credit One Total. Ms. Saenz contacted Credit One Total and spoke with a representative named “Nick” about securing an unsecured personal loan in the amount of $5,000. Ms. Saenz completed a form titled “Credit One Total Payment by Check Authorization Form” and faxed it to Credit One Total. The form reflects that Credit One Total is located at “5340 North Federal Hwy #201 Lighthouse Point, FL 333064 Ph. 312-554-5980 Fax 954-531-1440.” In the form, Ms. Saenz provided Credit One Total with certain personal, credit, and bank account information, so that Credit One Total could withdraw an initial installment loan fee of $267.00. Ms. Saenz made the initial installment fee payment of $267.00, and, within a couple of weeks, she made a second installment fee payment to Credit One Total. Ms. Saenz did not specify the amount of the second installment. No direct evidence was presented that the two payments made by Ms. Saenz were, in fact, deposited into the First Solutions business bank checking account at TD bank. The bank records received in evidence do not include records from the year 2011, and begin with the year 2012. However, the business checking account of First Solutions was utilized by Credit One Total. The TD bank records reflect that checks made payable to Credit One Total were deposited directly into the business bank checking account of First Solutions, Inc., d/b/a Credit One. Both payments were made by Ms. Saenz as an advance fee in order that she would obtain the loan from Credit One Total, and so that Credit One would repair her credit report. The credit repair, however, was ancillary to Ms. Saenz’s principal reason for making the advance fee payments--to obtain a personal loan. Although Ms. Saenz paid the two installment fee payments to Credit One Total for a loan, she never received a loan. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondents assessed or collected advance fee payments from two borrowers, Ms. Gentry and Ms. Saenz. The clear and convincing evidence adduced at hearing establishes that Respondents acted as a loan broker by assessing or collecting advance fee payments from Ms. Gentry and Ms. Saenz. Respondents did not have an exemption from section 687.14 in order to be considered a loan broker. OFR failed to prove by persuasive, credible, and clear and convincing evidence that Respondents acted as a loan broker with regard to anyone other than Ms. Gentry and Ms. Saenz.2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Office of Financial Regulation, enter a final order finding Respondents operated as a “loan broker” by assessing or collecting advance fees in two instances in violation of section 687.141(1), Florida Statutes; imposing a total fine not to exceed $10,000; and ordering Respondents to cease and desist from all such activity. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of February, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 2016.
