Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Council 79 is a labor organization whose business is to represent employees in matters involving public employers concerning contractural negotiations and the administration of bargaining agreements. Council 79 employed 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks during 1987 and 1988. Council 79 has elected officers. Blondie P. Jordan, a black female, is the elected president and chief executive officer of Council 79. Jordan has the authority to employ persons to assist her in carrying out the duties of Council 79. Until the fall of 1988, Cox, a white male, was one of those employed by Council 79, under Jordan. Cox was employed as the Regional Director of Region III (also referred to as Tampa Region) of Council 79, and reported to Jordan. Council 79, under Jordan, also employed several other white males in positions of authority. Those included: Charles Brannon, employed in March, 1988, as the Assistant to the President, who in the absence of Jordan ran the day to day operations of Council 79 Headquarters; Ted Buri, Regional Director in Tallahassee; John Crosby, Business Manager; Mark Neimeisser, lobbyist; and Ben Patterson, Chief Attorney. Council 79 has an Executive Board over which Jordan presides, but through which the Council is governed and operated. During 1987 and 1988, Nancy Serrano, Jimmy Newell, Wesley Leon and Craig Lehning were members of the Executive Board from Region III. Serrano, Leon and Lehning belonged to a group referred to as the "Solidarity Group" that opposed Jordan. During 1987 and 1988, Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning at Executive Board meetings complained to Jordan about the operation of Cox's office in Tampa, particularly about the office staff and Cox not being responsive to the membership of the local unions. However, during this same period of time there were presidents of local unions who complained to Jordan about how these same Executive Board Members were not being responsive to the local union, specifically in regard to how these Executive Board members were attempting to close the Regional Director's Office in Tampa, and advised Jordan that Cox and his staff were working well with the local unions. Also, one member of Cox's staff complained to Jordan about having to drive Cox to meetings and run the office while Cox absence attending to personal business. There was no written documentation that Jordan ever discussed these complaints with Cox or any of his staff, and even though Cox admitted to having heard these complaints, although not from Jordan, he dismissed them as being political because there were coming from the Solidarity Group that opposed Jordan. Notwithstanding Jordan's testimony to the contrary, there is insufficient evidence to show that Jordan discussed any of these complaints with Cox or that Jordan counseled or advised about correcting the problems before November 3, 1988. Apparently, Jordan left the day to day operation of Region II, including the Regional Office, to the discretion of Cox, and expected Cox to correct problems in the Region without being counseled or advised by Jordan unless Cox determined that Jordan's intervention was necessary or appropriate. Likewise, there was no documentation that Cox had ever been reprimanded or counseled about his performance. In fact, the only written documentation concerning Cox's performance (other than an incomplete report by Linoria Anthony which was not received as evidence) of any problems with Cox's performance was the report written by David McGhee to Jordan on November 1, 1988, after McGhee replaced Cox, having been appointed Acting Regional Director of Region III on September 14, 1988 by Jordan. On September 12, 1988, Cox was scheduled to attend a meeting with employees from the City of Fort Myers which McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero were also to attend. Cox was to meet privately with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero before meeting with the employees from Ft. Myers. Before the meeting, Cox was observed around the pool area by Neimesser. Cox did not attend the private meeting with McGhee, Neimesser and Escudero but did attend the meeting with the Ft. Myers employees. On September 13, 1988, Neimesser reported to Jordan that Cox had failed to attend the private meeting. On September 14, 1988, as instructed by Jordan, Brannon informed Cox that he was relieved of his duties as Regional Director. Cox was not given an opportunity to explain his failure to attend the private meeting in Ft. Myers, Florida before relieving him of his duties as Regional Director. Although Cox was relieved of his duties as Regional Director, he continued in the employment of Council 79 assisting McGhee in negotiating contracts and other matters. By letter dated September 14, 1988, Jordan appointed David McGhee Acting Regional Director of Region III. McGhee, a black male, employed by the International which Council 79 was affiliated. McGhee was the Assistant Area Director for International and its staff person with responsibility for Region III. McGhee assumed the responsibilities of Acting Regional Director for Region III on September 14, 1988.. McGhee is not now nor has he ever been on the payroll of Council 79. McGhee is continues to be the Acting Regional Director for Region III, and in addition to reporting to Jordan, reports to Gilbert Escudero, a Hispanic male, Area Director for the International and to Gerald McEntee, a white male, president of the International. On September 19, 1988, Cox voluntarily entered Horizon Hospital for treatment. Upon entering Horizon, Cox described his condition as being depressed and unable to function. Cox also described a previous history of excessive alcohol intake to the point of intoxication every weekend since his early twenties. However, there was insufficient evidence to show that Cox was suffering from alcoholism. Cox did not advise Jordan or McGhee or anyone else in authority with Council 79 that he was entering Horizon for treatment, or more specifically that he was being treated for alcoholism. Although Jordan and other employees of Council 79 may have known that Cox consumed alcohol, even to the point of intoxication on occasions, there is insufficient evidence to show that either Jordan or any other employee of Council 79 were aware that Cox had a problem with alcohol, or more specifically that Cox was suffering for alcoholism. As requested by Jordan, McGhee, by letter dated November 1, 1988, reported the problems he had encountered in the Regional Office since assuming the duties of Acting Regional Director. The report basically advised Jordan of the the problems that had been reported earlier by Serrano, Newell, Leon and Lehning. Additionally, McGhee reported on Cox's failure to negotiate contracts with the city of North Port and Local 167, Hillsborough County before they expired on September 30, 1988. As requested by Jordan, Linoria Anthony prepared a report concerning Cox's failure to negotiate contracts for several local unions in Region III with their employers. However, this report, initially offered as evidence, was withdrawn because Council 79 was unable to furnish a complete copy. On November 3, 1988, Charles Brannon was instructed by Jordan to secure Cox's resignation or to terminate his employment with Council 79. Cox resigned after being given the choices by Brannon. Upon resigning, Cox was to be given certain concessions, including one month's severance pay. Council 79 failed to honor this agreement with Cox, and he obtain a judgment in the County Court of Hillsborough County which was eventually satisfied. While Jordan's decision to effectively terminate Cox's employment (discharge) without first counseling or advising Cox on the problems in Region III as reported to her, and giving him an opportunity to correct those problems may not have been the correct or morally right decision, there is sufficient competent, substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Jordan did not terminate Cox's employment because of his race (white) or alleged handicap (alcoholism).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner, Robert Cox, was not discharged due to his race or alleged handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be Dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statute, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the Respondent in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner The Petitioner did not file any Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent The following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding(s) of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3(3); 4(4); 5(4); 6(5); 7(6&7), 9(6); 10(9); 11(10); 12(11); 13(12); 14(13); 16(16&17); 17- 18(18); 19-20(14) and 21(19). Proposed finding of fact 8 is rejected as not being supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record, except for thesecond phrase, that complaints did not stop, which is adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Proposed finding of fact 15 is neither material nor relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 125 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Robert Cox, Pro se 8514-#3, Daffodil Drive Hudson, FL 34667 Ben R. Patterson, Esquire Patterson and Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, FL 32315
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was overpaid in the amount of $809.46; and, if so, whether she should be required to repay that amount to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this matter, Petitioner was a career service employee of Respondent until her separation in October 2018. Petitioner went into labor unexpectedly in December 2017, and as a result, she began maternity leave. Petitioner was not present at work and did not submit a timesheet for the timeframe of December 29, 2017, through July 2, 2018. Petitioner testified that she was unable to submit her timesheets electronically and for this reason, someone else submitted them on her behalf. The evidence presented at hearing did not show who submitted her timesheets. By May 23, 2018, Petitioner had exhausted all of her annual, sick, and donated leave. Once an employee of Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages of sick leave. An employee may use donated leave to cover any shortages. Once an employee has exhausted annual, sick, and donated leave, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time during leave is considered “leave without pay” (“LWOP”). Petitioner was placed on LWOP from March 23, 2018, through July 2, 2018, because she had exhausted all of her leave. Although Petitioner was on LWOP during the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, a pay warrant for 80 hours of work was inadvertently issued on May 25, 2018, for that pay period. Consequently, Petitioner was overpaid $809.46. Petitioner was not responsible for the overpayment. She did not submit her timesheets and, thus, did not falsify them. Petitioner testified that her supervisor verbally advised her that she had received donated leave, but she could not recall the amount. Petitioner also did not offer any written representation from her supervisor or otherwise regarding her leave. The overpayment resulted because Petitioner's timesheet for LWOP for the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, was not timely approved. Upon discovery of this error, Respondent’s human resources office conducted a manual audit of Petitioner’s leave. Ms. Anderson completed the leave audit and discovered that Petitioner had been overpaid for the May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, pay period. On May 30, 2018, the Department sent Petitioner a certified letter requesting the overpaid amount of $809.46. Petitioner became aware of the error when she received the Department’s letter. Petitioner’s pay was transmitted to her bank account electronically via direct deposit. However, she was not monitoring her bank account closely and did not immediately realize that she had been erroneously overpaid. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner had not paid the overpayment. Petitioner stated she could only pay $40 per month to repay the overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final Order requiring Shanace Isaac to repay Respondent $809.46. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Shanace Isaac Post Office Box 101 Hastings, Florida 32145 (eServed) Riley Michelle Landy, Esquire Department of Health Bin A-02 5052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Shannon Revels, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 (eServed) Louise Wilhite-St Laurent, Interim General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Duval News Management Company, d/b/a Newsouth Distributors, has its main office in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent has been in the wholesale magazine, book and news distribution business in Jacksonville for the past 80 years. The Ocala, Florida branch where Petitioner was employed has been in operation since approximately 1974. Respondent employed 15 or more employees at all times pertinent to this proceeding. Christine Rios is the Petitioner. She was hired on September 20, 1974 in the book return department of Respondent's Ocala operation. In 1977, Petitioner was promoted from that position to an office job as accounts receivable clerk in the Ocala office. As the result of an automobile accident on October 14, 1992, Petitioner suffered a dislocated shoulder, cracked ribs and a cervical sprain. She returned to work part-time on December 17, 1992. Petitioner resumed full-time work duties on February 18, 1993, subject to the restriction that she not lift over 20 pounds. Her duties as accounts receivable clerk did not require lifting weights greater than 20 pounds. On April 14, 1993, Gil Brechtel, President of Newsouth Distributors, met with all employees of the Ocala branch that worked inside the facility. Excluded from the meeting were route salesmen. At the meeting, Brechtel announced that non-supervisory employee jobs within the facility were to be eliminated. Each employee, inclusive of Petitioner, was given the opportunity to transfer to the Jacksonville office or, in lieu of transfer, accept severance pay and other benefits. Each employee was given a letter confirming this announced reduction in the work force. Subsequently, all employees who worked inside the facility, except the office manager, were laid off at various times between May 1, 1993 and May of 1994. Petitioner was laid off on September 27, 1993, at which time she was given a termination letter with an attached summary of benefits and a severance pay check. Petitioner's check was in the total gross sum of $5,722.34 minus deductions for a net sum of $3,980.93. At the time of her layoff, Petitioner was performing essential functions of her job without any accommodations by Respondent. After the announced reduction in work force, Respondent employed one part-time employee to handle warehouse duties requiring lifting up to 60 pounds plus some clerical duties that were formerly performed by Petitioner. Although she had stated to others that she needed to work full-time, Petitioner asked Ron Nichols, the Ocala branch manager, if she could be considered for the position. Nichols told her that she could be considered if the lifting restrictions imposed by her physician were removed. No further inquiry was made of Nichols by Petitioner and she never attempted to explain at any time to Nichols how she might be able to perform the job with reasonable accommodation. Several different employees at different times filled the part-time receiver/stocker job until the consolidation and reduction in work force had been fully carried out. At that time, the office manager assumed the duties of receiver/stocker and some of the clerical functions formerly performed by the accounts receivable clerks, although the bulk of account receivable clerk tasks were transferred to the Jacksonville office. No one was hired to replace Petitioner following her termination on September 27, 1993. No new accounts receivable clerks were employed in the Ocala branch following Petitioner's termination. As a result of the reduction in work force, 18 employees were laid off. The only person currently performing any warehouse duties or office clerical work at the Ocala branch is the office manager, MaeDean Crabtree. At the time of Petitioner's employment, Respondent had in effect an employee handbook containing a policy prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of handicap. The same handbook also provides a complaint resolution procedure. If an employee has a complaint, the employee is directed to contact the supervisor or manager to discuss the matter. At no time prior to her termination or filing of her charge of discrimination did Petitioner contact her supervisor, Crabtree, or the manager, Nichols, with any allegations of job discrimination or failure to provide reasonable accommodation. At the final hearing, Respondent's stated non-discriminatory reason for the elimination of Petitioner's position, consolidation of operations with a resultant reduction in work force, was not disputed or negated by Petitioner. Petitioner's contention was that she should have been allowed to work part-time in the receiver/stocker position and was not given reasonable accommodation by Respondent in that regard. Petitioner provided no evidence demonstrating that she requested the position subject to reasonable accommodation. Petitioner failed to demonstrate at the hearing that she could perform the duties of the part-time position which required the ability to lift up to 60 pounds. Currently, Petitioner is employed with a temporary job agency performing office/clerical work.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition For Relief. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 19th day of April, 1995. DON W. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-4. Adopted in substance, not verbatim. 5.-6. Subordinate to HO findings. 7. Adopted by reference. 8.-9. Rejected, weight of the evidence. 10. Rejected, relevance. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-10. Adopted in substance, not verbatim. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael B. Staley James P. Tarquin Attorneys At Law 2045 Northeast Second St Ocala, FL 33470 Allan P. Clark Attorney At Law 3306 Independent Square Jacksonville, FL 32202 Sharon Moultry Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Rd, Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Ste. 240 Tallahassee, Fl 32303-4149
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner has suffered an injury protected by the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, when the Respondent, the superintendent of education of Escambia County, acting pursuant to his statutory authority, Section 1012.22(1)(a)(3), Florida Statutes, refused to re-nominate the Petitioner for employment.1/
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Jim Paul served as the superintendent of Schools for Escambia County. Joe Bernard was the director of risk management for Escambia County Schools, supervised by Superintendent Paul. Mr. Bernard began working for the school district in 1986. In January 2000, he began serving as the risk manager. AON Consulting is a firm involved in arranging for and inaugurating employee benefit plans, such as medical and dental benefits. It consulted in such an effort for the School Board and had a contract with the Escambia County School District designed to help the district contract with various health care insurers concerning medical and dental benefits for district employees. Under its arrangement with the Escambia County School District, AON Consulting (AON) would bill the school district by the hour for its consulting services and additionally would charge for costs involved for travel, food, and lodging. The bills were submitted in total amounts without being itemized. When Mr. Bernard became the risk manager for the School Board and the superintendent, the AON contract was under his budgetary supervision. He was the administrator of that contract and was charged with ensuring that bills were authorized when submitted by AON and that services performed by AON and paid for by the school district were within budgetary requirements and guidelines. Mr. Bernard did not request or require that AON bills be itemized. When Mr. Bernard became the director of risk management, AON already had the consulting contract with the school district. For the fiscal year 2002-2003, the contract was awarded through a bidding process. Several vendors bid on securing the contract. Mr. Bernard served on the evaluation committee that reviewed all bids. Other members of the committee were Dr. Garber, Barbara Luker, and Gary Moyer. The evaluation committee interviewed the final two vendors/bidders and then recommended that the superintendent award the contract to AON. Mr. Bernard was the superintendent's expert with regard to insurance matters and the superintendent relied on him a great deal in determining who would be awarded the contract. Mr. Bernard recommended AON and the contract was awarded to AON. Thereafter, in February 2003, at a School Board meeting, Mr. Bernard arranged for an agenda item for the Board to consider regarding an increase he proposed to AON's "purchase order" so as to provide AON an additional $25,000. Ms. Stidham, an Escambia County School Board member had questions and concerns about the non-itemized billing received from AON. She wanted a detailed itemization on all AON invoices. Because of her concern, the issue she raised was referred to Sam Scallan, the Board's Director of Internal Auditing. Mr. Scallan conducted an analysis of invoices for AON Consulting and sent his findings to Superintendent Paul. The Scallan analysis indicated that AON was not billing for reimbursements in accordance with Florida Statutes. It indicated that expenses reimbursed by the district included some exorbitant meal expenses for district employees and their guests. It also indicated that the director of risk management (Mr. Bernard) and his guest, had been furnished with substantial meals on three different occasions and that other expenses reimbursed by the district to AON, included business dinners, a retirement gift, and cigars. Superintendent Paul ordered an investigation of the matter because of Mr. Scallan's analysis. Dr. Doug Garber, the assistant superintendent of Human Resources was appointed to conduct the investigation. Dr. Garber interviewed Mr. Bernard and took a recorded statement from him during his investigation. Mr. Bernard stated that he was familiar with the Florida Statute regarding gifts and gratuities, as well as the School Board policy and knew that "[Y]ou're not supposed to [accept gifts]." Mr. Bernard had developed a business and personal relationship with Chris Clark, the AON consultant, whereby each would purportedly take turns paying for each other's meals. When Mr. Clark was in town, he and Mr. Bernard would sometimes have breakfast, lunch or dinner together. They would take turns buying meals at McGuire's Restaurant and the Pensacola Yacht Club. They had a $400.00 meal expense at Sandor's Restaurant in South Walton County (for four people). Mr. Bernard maintains that he paid his share of that bill by giving Mr. Clark $200.00 in cash on that occasion. They also attended Atlanta Braves baseball games in Atlanta and three NASCAR races. Mr. Bernard maintains he paid Mr. Clark for the NASCAR racing tickets in cash. When on the Atlanta trips, they would have dinner at Bones Steakhouse in Atlanta. Mr. Clark would typically pick up the tab for the meal and Mr. Bernard and his guest would pay the tab for the remainder of the weekend (lodging, cab fare, drinks, etc.). Mr. Bernard stated that he did not know that Mr. Clark was billing improperly because the bills were never itemized. Mr. Bernard contends that Mr. Clark charged the school district for bills that Mr. Bernard had already paid for himself. Mr. Bernard testified that he always reciprocated when dealing with vendors. The reason he states he reciprocated or took turns in paying the restaurant and other bills is that he did not want to create the appearance of an impropriety. Cynthia Craig is an Escambia County school district vendor. She testified that she and Mr. Bernard would take turns buying lunches for each other but they would occasionally lose track of who's turn it was to pay. She also stated that she and Mr. Bernard would sometimes consume alcohol during business lunches. Dr. Garber provided Mr. Bernard with a number of opportunities to clear the matter up concerning the allegations. Mr. Bernard provided Dr. Garber with the names of two witnesses that he wanted to be contacted and interviewed who he felt had information favorable to him. Dr. Garber attempted multiple times to contact those witnesses but was unable to reach them. Dr. Garber told Mr. Bernard on two or three occasions that he had not been able to reach the witnesses and requested that Mr. Bernard get verification from his witnesses so their information could be included in Dr. Garber's report. Dr. Garber was prepared to give credence to the witnesses identified by Mr. Bernard and attempted to contact them, but was unable to subpoena them or otherwise force them to testify. Dr. Garber completed his investigation and issued a report on April 30, 2003. The report to the superintendent concluded that Mr. Bernard had not violated the Code of Ethics provided in Section 112.314(h), Florida Statutes, but that he did violate School Board Rule 3.08, which essentially prohibits employees from taking anything of value from vendors of the school district. As a result of the investigation AON reimbursed the school district $5,700.00, for expenses improperly billed by Mr. Clark. Mr. Bernard only provided receipts for $900.00 of such expenses. Mr. Bernard had not provided any additional receipts as of the time of the hearing, although he possibly could have obtained receipts from his credit card company or through cancelled checks obtained from his bank. Dr. Garber stated that he was prepared to consider any additional information shedding light on the subject matter of the investigation that Mr. Bernard could have provided, and gave him an opportunity to do so. Before taking any action regarding Mr. Bernard's future with the School Board and the superintendent's office, Superintendent Paul waited for the investigation to be completed. After the investigation was completed the superintendent decided not to re-new Mr. Bernard's contract. Superintendent Paul decided not to renew the contract because he believed that Mr. Bernard's effectiveness in negotiating future health insurance rates and plans for 10,000 employees, dependents, and retirees had been damaged. The superintendent had lost confidence in Mr. Bernard's judgment. On May 9, 2003, the superintendent sent Mr. Bernard a letter advising him that his employment contract would not be re-newed. He was allowed to serve-out the end of his existing contract, however, and then left the school district in May 2003 on administrative leave. His contract actually expired June 30, 2003. It was an annual employment contract. He had received all the pay he was entitled to under the contract and according to the terms of the contract, Mr. Bernard did not possess any expectancy of continued employment beyond the end of the 12- month term of the contract. Paragraph 9 of Mr. Bernard's contract of employment provided as follows: "It is expressly understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that neither the Employee nor the School Board owes any further contractual obligation to the other after June 30, 2003, and that no expectancy of re-employment may be derived from the execution or performance of this agreement."
Recommendation Having consideration the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the petition of Joseph Bernard be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2004.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner was employed by HRS at the Broward County Public Health Unit ("BCPHU") as a Fiscal Assistant II, a career service position. Petitioner began working for HRS in approximately August, 1973. From approximately July of 1986 through July of 1991, Petitioner's supervisor at BCPHU was Sylvia Villafana. During this time period, Ms. Villafana frequently counseled Petitioner regarding excessive absenteeism and tardiness which interfered with Petitioner's ability to meet necessary deadlines at work. Even before 1986, Petitioner's personnel record reflects excessive use of sick leave and problems with prompt and consistent attendance at work. These issues were discussed with Petitioner on several occasions. In March of 1991, Ms. Villafana scheduled a meeting for March 21, 1991, with Petitioner and Jeff Keiser, the personnel manager for BCPHU. At that meeting, Ms. Villafana intended to issue a written reprimand to Petitioner regarding excessive absenteeism. The March 21, 1991, meeting was scheduled to begin at 2:00. Petitioner left the BCPHU building at approximately 1:00 p.m. that day and did not attend the meeting. Petitioner contends that she was having chest pains and went to the hospital that afternoon. Petitioner did not advise her supervisor that she was leaving the premises. Petitioner did advise at least one co-worker at BCPHU that she was leaving. The next day, Petitioner's daughter called Ms. Villafana and told her that Petitioner was in the hospital. Ms. Villafana told Petitioner's daughter that documentation would be needed of Petitioner's medical problems. No records of Petitioner's hospitalization were ever presented to Ms. Villafana or any other HRS supervisor. Petitioner was apparently discharged from the hospital on the evening of March 22, 1991. Petitioner contends that she called Ms. Villafana on Monday, March 25, and told her that she was still under a doctor's care and that she would return to work as soon as he released her. Ms. Villafana contends that the telephone conversation did not occur until March 29, 1991. In any event, Petitioner did not ask for authorized leave. During the telephone conversation, Petitioner indicated that she had a doctor's appointment on April 2. Ms. Villafana told Petitioner that medical documentation of her problem would be necessary. On April 3, 1991, Petitioner did not return to work. At this point, Ms. Villafana had virtually no information regarding Petitioner's alleged illness and/or condition. Ms. Villafana inquired of other employees regarding Petitioner's condition, but was unable to learn anything more. On the afternoon of April 3, 1991, Petitioner contacted Ms. Villafana and indicated that she would be back to work on April 9, 1991. The April 3 conversation was acrimonious. Because there were several large project deadlines coming due, Ms. Villafana emphasized that medical documentation was needed to support Petitioner's claim of illness. Petitioner did not show up for work on April 9, 1991. On April 10, 1991, Petitioner called and told Ms. Villafana that she was mailing in notes from her doctors and then hung up. On April 11, 1991, Ms. Villafana found notes from two doctors on her desk. The notes were submitted into evidence at the hearing, but were not authenticated by the physicians who purportedly authored them. One of the notes was allegedly from Dr. Murillo, a cardiologist. This note indicated that Petitioner would be able to return to work on April 15, 1991. The second note was from Dr. Love, an orthopedic surgeon, who indicated that he was scheduled to see Petitioner again on April 24, 1991, and that Petitioner was "unable to return to work" until then. No explanation was given as to the nature of Petitioner's injuries. At the hearing in this case, Petitioner contended that she was seeing Dr. Love in connection with injuries supposedly received during an automobile accident on February 20, 1991. No persuasive evidence was presented as to the nature and extent of those injuries. The car accident occurred on the evening of February 20 and Petitioner reported to work the next day. No evidence was presented to establish that Petitioner missed any work as a result of the car accident prior to the time she left work on March 20, 1991, complaining of chest pains. Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that the doctor's notes submitted on April 11 did not provide adequate documentation of her medical condition and/or inability to work. Petitioner did not report to work on April 25, 1991, and did not contact her supervisor. Neither Ms. Villafana nor the personnel office had a home phone number or current residence address for Petitioner. One of Petitioner's friends gave Ms. Villafana a P.O. Box number which Petitioner was using as a mailing address. On April 30, 1991, Ms. Villafana prepared a letter which was sent to Petitioner at her last known address and by certified mail to the post office box. That letter advised Petitioner that as of the close of business on Monday, April 29, 1991, she was absent without authorized leave and was in jeopardy of being deemed to have abandoned her position. The letter noted that the last medical excuse from Dr. Love expired as of the end of the normal work day on April 24, 1991. The certified letter was not claimed. On April 30, 1991, Petitioner spoke with Jeff Keiser who advised her that she would be receiving a letter regarding the possible abandonment of her position. Petitioner did not request and was not given authorized leave. During one of their conversations over this period of time, Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that she should document in writing a request for leave. No such written request was ever received. Also during one of these conversations, Petitioner acknowledged that she had received the April 30, 1991 letter. On May 2, 1991, Ms. Villafana received two additional notes on Dr. Love's letterhead. One of the notes was dated April 24, 1991, and indicated that Petitioner was scheduled for a follow up visit on May 8, 1991. The second note was dated May 1, 1991, and indicated that Petitioner was unable to return to work for two weeks. The note on Dr. Love's letterhead dated May 1, 1991, included some information regarding Petitioner's alleged medical problems. However, Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that she needed additional information regarding her condition. On May 13, 1991, Petitioner provided Ms. Villafana with a note on Dr. Love's stationery dated May 8, 1991. This note indicated that Petitioner was unable to work for two more weeks and was scheduled for a follow up visit on May 22, 1991. Ms. Villafana spoke with Petitioner on May 23, 1991. During that conversation, Petitioner indicated that she was returning to the doctor on May 30 and hoped to be in the office on May 31. Petitioner did not show up for work on May 31, 1991. On June 3, 1991, Petitioner called Ms. Villafana and advised her that she was going to see the doctor and, if he released her, she would be back at work on Wednesday, June 5. Petitioner did not show up for work on June 5, 1991. On June 20, 1991, Ms. Villafana received a note on Dr. Love's office letterhead indicating that Petitioner visited his office on June 14, 1991, and was unable to return to work for one week. Around this time, another note was received which indicated that Petitioner had an office visit on June 7, 1991, and was unable to return to work for one week. In a letter dated June 21, 1991, Ms. Villafana advised Petitioner that her [C]ontinued actions have placed [her] employment with the HRS BCPHU in serious jeopardy. Leave of absence (sick leave and/or leave without pay) was never formally requested by you since your midday departure on 3/20/91 and was, therefore, not approved. Chapter 22A-8.002 of the State of Florida Career Service Personnel Rules and Regulations states that 'the granting of any leave of absence with our without pay shall be in writing and shall be approved by the proper authority within the agency.' This was not done. On various occasions, I requested that you inform me of your intentions in reference to your leave, which you did not communicate to me, your supervisor, of your plans. As of this date, you have been on unauthorized leave for three months... All avenues of communication to you have been exhausted; I am unable to call you because you state that you have no telephone; certified mailings to your P.O. Box and various addresses have been returned unclaimed; etc. On the few and far between telephone calls from you, I received the run around stating that medical notes are forthcoming in the mail. This practice will no longer take effect. You are therefore, Ms. Gray, to return to work on 8:00 a.m. on Monday, July 1, 1991... The June 21, 1991 letter was sent to Petitioner by certified mail. Copies were also sent to Petitioner's P.O. Box and last known address in unmarked envelopes. Petitioner did not show up for work on July 1, 1991. During the hearing, Petitioner contended that she did not receive the June 21 letter until July 3, 1991. Petitioner contends that Dr. Love did not release her to return to work until July 10, 1991. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she spoke to Ms. Villafana and Mr. Keiser on July 3, 1991. Neither of these supervisors gave her authorization for any additional leave. Petitioner contends that she told them that she would not return to work until released by her physician. There is no evidence that either Ms. Villafana or Mr. Keiser granted her leave to remain absent for any additional time. On July 10, 1991, Petitioner contacted her supervisor about returning to work, but was told that she was deemed to have abandoned her position. At the hearing Petitioner produced two typewritten notes on the stationary of Dr. Love dated June 21, 1991, and July 10, 1991 (Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 2). Neither of these notes were properly authenticated and there is no evidence to establish who wrote them or when. As noted above, Dr. Love did not testify at the hearing. These alleged records of Dr. Love's treatment of Petitioner were not provided to Ms. Villafana or the BCPHU Personnel Office until after Petitioner as deemed to have abandoned her position. Petitioner contends that she provided the Personnel Office and/or her supervisors with a copy of Dr. Love's reports prior to receiving the June 21, 1991 certified letter. However, the more credible evidence established that from June 20 through at least July 10, neither Ms. Villafana nor the Personnel Office was provided with any documentation from any physician that Petitioner was unable to work. The evidence established that from June 21, 1991, until July 10, 1991, Petitioner did not show up for work, did not provide any additional documentation regarding her absences and was not granted authorized leave. During the time she was employed at BCPHU, Petitioner was presented with a copy of the HRS Employee Handbook. That Handbook advised employees that they could be deemed to have abandoned their position if they were absent for three consecutive work days without authorization. Ms. Gray should have been aware of the requirements regarding sick leave and leaves of absence and her need to provide documentation regarding her course of treatment to the BCPHU Personnel Office. By certified letter dated July 25, 1991, Respondent advised Petitioner that she was deemed to have abandoned her career service position.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order finding that Inez Gray abandoned her career service position with HRS and is not eligible to be reinstated or to receive any back pay. DONE and ENTERED this 7 day of August 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7 day of August 1992. APPENDIX Only Petitioner submitted a proposed findings of fact. The following constitutes my rulings on those proposals. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 3. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 24. Rejected as not supported by the weight of the evidence. This subject matter is addressed in Findings of Fact 24. The last note submitted was dated June 14, 1991 and indicated that Petitioner was unable to return to work for one week. This last note was received by Petitioner's supervisors on June 20, 1991. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 19-22. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 33. The first sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 25 and 27. The second sentence is subordinate to Findings of Fact 26. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Slye, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Larry Strong, Acting Secretary Department of Management Services 2737 Centerview Drive, Knight Building Koger Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Management Services 2737 Centerview Drive, Knight Building Koger Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Ben Patterson, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 1215 Thomasville Road P.O. Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315 Judith C. Engelberg Acting District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 513 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-1885
The Issue Whether the petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact 2. On April 14, 1983, petitioner received a copy of the "Employee Handbook" published by the Department of Transportation. Job abandonment is explained in the Employee Handbook as follows: After an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. It is very important that you coordinate any personal absences with your immediate supervisor, in accordance with our current policy. The petitioner was absent without authorized leave on April 13, 14 and 15, 1987. Petitioner did not appear for work on those days and did not call the office to explain or report his absence. On April 16, 1987, petitioner called the office at approximately 8:00 a.m. to say that no one had come to pick him up. A fellow employee sometimes furnishes petitioner's transportation. By the time petitioner called in to work, he had been absent three consecutive days without authorization. Petitioner had previously been warned about his absenteeism. On March 17, 1987, petitioner was placed on unauthorized leave without pay due to his failure to report to work or notify his supervisor. On March 18, petitioner was sent a letter notifying him that he had to report by March 24, 1987, or he would be dismissed. Thus, petitioner was well aware that he had to notify his supervisor of any absences.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered sustaining the action of the Department of Transportation and finding that Fred P. Noble abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Mr. Fred P. Noble 2516 Queen Street South St. Petersburg, Florida 33705 Pamela Miles, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis M. Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) when she submitted the DROP paperwork to her employer, but that paperwork was not submitted to Respondent within the timeframe set forth by statute or administrative rule. PROCEDURAL HISTORY On March 10, 2021, Respondent, the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (the Division), issued a letter to Petitioner, Celeste Lyons (Ms. Lyons or Petitioner), denying her application to participate in DROP because the Division did not receive her application to participate within the required time, pursuant to section 121.091(13)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2020), and no provision in Florida law would allow the Division to approve her for participation in DROP after the eligibility period.1 On April 7, 2021, Ms. Lyons filed an Amended Request for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Division. The Division transferred the matter to DOAH, where it was assigned and set for hearing. On June 28, 2021, Petitioner moved to amend her Request after discovering the Division was also relying on Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-11.002(2) and (3)(a) to deny her participation in DROP. Petitioner was granted leave to amend her Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, and this matter proceeded on the Second Amended Request for Formal Hearing submitted July 13, 2021 (Second Am. Req.). After three continuances, the final hearing was held on September 16, 2021. Petitioner presented her own testimony and the testimony of Kathy Gould, Bureau Chief of Retirement Calculations for the Division. Petitioner's Exhibits P1 through P34 and P36 were admitted into evidence. 1 All references to the Florida Administrative Code Rules and Florida Statutes are to the 2020 codifications. The Division presented the testimony of Garry Green, Policy Administrator for the Division. Respondent's Exhibits R2 through R5, R6-1, R6-2, R7, R10 through R13, R15, and R16 were admitted into evidence. At the outset of the hearing, the parties agreed to submit a joint stipulation of facts regarding the timeline of events. The Stipulation of Facts was filed on October 4, 2021, and is incorporated into this Recommended Order when appropriate. The Transcript of the hearing was filed on October 4, 2021. Both parties timely filed proposed recommended orders, which have been considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ms. Lyons, is a Fiscal Administrator for the Office of the State Attorney, Twentieth Judicial Circuit (SAO-20). Respondent, the Division, is a part of the Department of Management Services (Department). The Division is responsible for administering the retirement plans and programs under the Florida Retirement System (FRS). DROP is a retirement benefits program that entitles an eligible member of FRS to defer receipt of retirement benefits while continuing employment with the employer. § 121.091(13), Fla. Stat. The deferred benefits accrue with FRS on behalf of the member, with interest compounded monthly, for the specified period of DROP participation. Id. After the member terminates employment with the employer, the member receives the total DROP benefits and begins to receive the previously determined normal retirement benefits. Id. SAO-20 has been Ms. Lyons' employer for more than thirty years. Employees of SAO-20 participate in FRS and, if eligible, can choose to participate in DROP. SAO-20 obtained administrative services through the Justice Administrative Commission (JAC). JAC is a statutorily created "central state office" that provides "administrative services and assistance when possible to and on behalf of the state attorneys and public defenders of Florida, the capital collateral regional counsel of Florida, the criminal conflict and civil regional counsel, and the Guardian Ad Litem Program." § 43.16(5), Fla. Stat. These services include accounting, payroll, benefits, and retirement assistance to the above cited entities that participate in FRS. Although JAC was not Ms. Lyons' employer, it did have access to employees' personnel files. Moreover, the Division had trained JAC personnel on FRS and DROP, and the Division authorized JAC to accept DROP paperwork from various employers and submit it to the Division. JAC, however, was not part of the Department or the Division. Rather, JAC served as a conduit between SAO-20's human resources office and the Division for the processing of all the retirement benefit paperwork. MS. LYONS' DROP ELIGIBILITY AND PAPERWORK Ms. Lyons' normal retirement date was January 1, 2020. Ms. Lyons' 12-month eligibility window to elect to participate in DROP was between January 1 and December 31, 2020. § 121.091(13)(a)2., Fla. Stat. Before this date, in February and August 2019, Ms. Lyons requested estimates of her retirement benefits from the Division. These estimates were generated by the Division and sent directly to Ms. Lyons' home address. In the "Comments" section of the estimates created by the Division, it explicitly states, "If the DP-ELE is not received in our office by 12/31/2020, your eligibility to participate in DROP is forfeited." The August 2019 estimate projected that after 60 months, Ms. Lyons would have received $113,826.03 if she entered (or began participation in) DROP during her first month of eligibility, January 2020. In January 2020, Ms. Lyons continued to work for SAO-20 but filled out the Division's paperwork for participating in DROP with the help of Rosemarie Mitchell, Director of Human Resources for SAO-20. These forms included the following: Notice of Election to Participate in [DROP] and Resignation of Employment (DP-ELE); Application for Service Retirement and [DROP] (DP-11); Option Selection for FRS Member (FRS-11o); [FRS] Pension Plan Spousal Acknowledgment Form (SA-1); and [FRS] Pension Plan Retired Member and DROP Participant Beneficiary Designation Form. (FST-12). On these forms, Ms. Lyons certified she elected to participate in DROP and would resign her employment on the date she terminated from DROP. Ms. Lyons listed "January 1, 2020," as her DROP start date and "December 31, 2024," as her DROP termination resignation date. Petitioner's employer, SAO-20, also certified that Ms. Lyons would "be enrolled as a DROP Participant" on January 1, 2020, and that Ms. Lyons would "terminate ... her employment" on December 31, 2024. All of the above forms were filled out, signed by Ms. Lyons, and notarized on January 9, 2020. On January 9, 2020, Ms. Lyons submitted the above forms to Ms. Mitchell. On that same day, Ms. Mitchell emailed Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork to the JAC Retirement Coordinator. Jessica Estes (formerly known as Jessica Liang), a Senior Human Resources Coordinator for JAC, acknowledged JAC's receipt of Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork and requested two new FST-12 forms and more documentation verifying Ms. Lyons' date of birth. The requested information was not required to be eligible or participate in DROP. Ms. Estes' normal procedure was to forward DROP paperwork to the Division before the end of the month in which it was received. If she had followed this practice, she should have sent in Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork to the Division on or before January 31, 2020. She did not. In fact, no one in SAO-20 or JAC forwarded Ms. Lyons' DROP paperwork to the Division before December 31, 2020. This mistake was not discovered until more than a year later. On February 25, 2021, JAC discovered it had failed to submit the DROP paperwork for Ms. Lyons to the Division. On February 26, 2021, after JAC contacted the Division, Ms. Estes emailed Petitioner's DROP paperwork, including Forms DP-ELE and DP-11, to Kathy Gould, Chief of the Bureau of Retirement Calculations at the Division. Again, there is no dispute this was outside of Ms. Lyons' 12-month eligibility window. On March 5, 2021, SAO-20 notified Ms. Lyons of JAC's failure to submit her DROP paperwork to the Division within the eligibility period. On March 10, 2021, the Division issued an Administrative Notice to Ms. Lyons denying her participation in DROP and informing her that she was not eligible to participate in DROP because the application and election were received outside her 12-month eligibility window (and past the December 31, 2020, deadline). Relying on sections 121.091(13)(a)2. and 121.021(29)(a), the Division informed Ms. Lyons that a member must "submit a form DP-ELE ... to the Division ... within twelve months of the date you first bec[o]me eligible to participate," and because the Division "received [Ms. Lyons'] DP-ELE after the end of [her] eligibility period, [she was] not eligible to participate in DROP." The denial letter did not reference any administrative rule. The testimony established that the Division has accepted DROP paperwork after the eligibility period when there is a dispute about whether the paperwork has been received by the Division within the 12-month eligibility window. In these cases, the Division has, after an investigation, discovered that there was a technical mistake on the Division's end that prevented submission of the DROP paperwork within the statutory deadline. For example, in the past, the Division has accepted DROP paperwork as timely received when an FRS member submits DROP paperwork via facsimile, but it does not print out on the Division's end because of a technical issue; or where an email with DROP paperwork attached was sent by the member to the Division within the eligibility period, but did not upload or arrive in the Division's inbox until after the end of that period. That is not the case for Ms. Lyons. Her documentation was not sent to the Division within the statutory timeframe, and there was no technical (or human) error on the Division's end of the communication. Any error was on the part of JAC or SAO-20.
Conclusions For Petitioner: George T. Levesque, Esquire James Timothy Moore, Esquire Patrick Hagen, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 For Respondent: Gayla Grant, Esquire Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Whitney Rebecca Hays, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Celeste Lyons from participation in DROP. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HETAL DESAI Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: George T. Levesque, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gayla Grant, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Patrick Hagen, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David DiSalvo, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 James Timothy Moore, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A 301 South Bronough Street, Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Whitney Rebecca Hays, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Kristen Larson, Interim General Counsel Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner is eligible to transfer from the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System (SCOERS) to the Florida Retirement System (FRS), and thereby retire under FRS as opposed to SCOERS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which dismisses petitioner's request for formal hearing, and denies petitioner's request to transfer from the State and County Officers and Employees Retirement System to the Florida Retirement System. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 11th day of February 1993. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February 1993.
The Issue Whether Respondent properly secured the payment of workers' compensation insurance coverage, as delineated by Subsection 440.107(2), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and, if not, what penalty for such failure is warranted. Whether Respondent conducted business operations in violation of a stop-work order, and, if so, what is the correct penalty for such violation, pursuant to Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for enforcing the statutory requirement that employers secure the payment of workers' compensation for the benefit of their employees. § 440.107, Fla. Stat. Respondent is a corporation domiciled in Florida and engaged in the business of roofing, which is a construction activity. On December 21, 2004, Petitioner's investigator, Hector Vega, visited 951 North Park Avenue, Apopka, Florida, the site of a church, on a referral from his supervisor. Five men were observed engaged in roofing work. William Sims, Respondent's president, agreed to meet at the worksite. Sims, upon inquiry, informed Petitioner's investigator that he had not secured the payment of workers' compensation for the workers. However, Sims testified that for Respondent to re-roof the Apopka Church of God, Sims had to calculate the amount of roofing shingles needed, which proved to be difficult due to the architecture of the church's specialty roof. The amount of shingles needed for the job was overestimated in order to avoid running out of shingles during the job. As of December 21, 2004, the Apopka Church of God roofing job was done, so Respondent sold the extra, unused shingles to D&L Trucking, owned and operated by David Lorenzo, who was paying the five men found working on the roof on December 21, 2004. A check of Petitioner's Compliance and Coverage Automated System ("CCAS") database, which contains information on all workers' compensation insurance policy information from the carrier to an insured, determined that Respondent did not have a State of Florida workers' compensation insurance policy to provide workers' compensation coverage of the five workers. Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, allows an individual to apply for an election to be exempt from workers' compensation benefits. Only the named individual on the application is exempt from carrying workers' compensation insurance coverage. Petitioner, which maintains a database of all workers' compensation exemptions in the State of Florida, found a current, valid exemption only for William R. Sims in December 2004. On December 21, 2004, Petitioner issued and served on Respondent a stop-work order for failing to obtain coverage that meets the requirements of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, and the Insurance Code. Also at that time, a Request for Production of Business Records was issued to Respondent. Employers employing workers on job sites in Florida are required to keep business records that enable Petitioner to determine whether the employer is in compliance with the workers' compensation law. At the time the Stop Work Order was issued, and pursuant to Subsection 440.107(5), Florida Statutes, Petitioner had in effect Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.015, which requires employers to maintain certain business records. Respondent failed to comply with the Request for Production. Florida law requires that an employer who has employees engaged in work in Florida must obtain a Florida workers' compensation policy or endorsement for such employees which utilizes Florida class codes, rates, rules, and manuals that are in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, as well as the Florida Insurance Code. See § 440.10(1)(g), Fla. Stat. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-6.019(2) requires that in order for an employer to comply with Subsections 440.10(1)(g) and 440.38(7), Florida Statutes, any policy or endorsement used by an employer to prove the fact of workers' compensation coverage for employees engaged in Florida work must be issued by an insurer that holds a valid certificate of authority in the State of Florida. 12. Subsections 440.107(3) and 440.107(7)(a), Florida Statutes, authorize Petitioner to issue stop-work orders to employers unable to provide proof of workers' compensation coverage. Failure to provide such proof is deemed "an immediate serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare " § 440.107(7)(a), Fla. Stat. Following the follow-up efforts by Sims that extended until February 2005, Respondent believed that the Stop Work Order had been lifted by February 2005. Later in 2005, after Sims understood the Stop Work Order to be lifted, he pulled some permits from Orange County. The permits were called "a permit to work" and this supported, in Sims' mind, the conclusion that the Stop Work Order had been lifted. On November 1, 2005, Petitioner received a referral to investigate Respondent. Petitioner's investigator visited Respondent's worksite on November 1, 2005, and observed six men engaged in roofing work. Sims, upon inquiry, informed the investigator that he secured the payment of workers' compensation coverage for the workers through Emerald Staffing Services, an employee leasing company. Chapter 468, Part XI, Florida Statutes, governs employee leasing companies. Respondent contracted with Emerald Staffing for its services in October 2005 and became the client company of Emerald Staffing. Respondent paid invoices for its employees, thus indicating that it was engaged in business activities in October 2005 and November 2005. On November 2, 2005, Petitioner issued a Request for Production of Business Records to Respondent. The request was for business records from December 21, 2004, through November 2, 2005. Respondent remained under the belief that the Stop Work Order had been lifted until Sims was approached by Petitioner's inspector, Robert Cerrone, on November 4 or 5, 2005, and was told by Cerrone that Respondent was still under the Stop Work Order. Respondent thereafter stopped working at Cerrone's request. Although Respondent asserts it did not know the Stop Work Order was in place between December 21, 2004, and December 19, 2005, and therefore Respondent believed it appropriate to continue working during that time, Sims testified there was a health problem in his immediate family that slowed down his business from working in 2005. His wife was diagnosed with cancer, and this made him very distracted from work. Although Sims pulled a few permits in 2005, he reviewed all those permits in his testimony, and it became clear to him that all those permits were for work previously done during the hectic clean-up from the hurricanes. This testimony is not credible. Respondent acknowledges the issuance and receipt of the Stop Work Order, but alleges in its petition that the Stop Work Order should never have been issued because the men at the worksite were not performing roofing work. On November 10, 2005, however, Sims provided a statement to Petitioner's investigator wherein he admitted to having employed four individuals on December 21, 2004, without securing the payment of workers' compensation for any of them. However, Respondent admitted, through its president, by letter, dated November 10, 2005, and signed in the presence of Cerrone that four of the persons observed on the Apopka Church of God work site on December 21, 2004, were Petitioner's employees and they were not covered by workers' compensation insurance. Sims' testimony that he was forced to sign the letter or that he was tricked or mislead into signing it, is not credible. From the evidence presented, the four identified men found on the roof of the Apopka Church of God on December 21, 2004, were the employees of Respondent, and Respondent had not complied with the requirements of the workers' compensation law. Therefore, the Stop Work Order was not erroneously issued against Respondent on December 21, 2004. After learning from Cerrone that the Stop Work Order was in place, Respondent worked with Petitioner to come into compliance and agreed to the Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order that Cerrone signed on December 19, 2005, under it, Respondent has been making payments to Petitioner to satisfy the penalty Petitioner has levied against Respondent. On November 16, 2005, Petitioner issued a Request for Production of Business Records for Penalty Assessment, in which Petitioner requested business records from Respondent for the period of December 21, 2001, through December 21, 2004. Respondent complied with the records requests and provided Petitioner with tax ledgers and documents for the years 2002 through 2004, along with permits. Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes, provides: "The department shall assess a penalty of $1,000 per day against an employer for each day that the employer conducts business operations that are in violation of a stop-work order." Documentation specifically showed Respondent was engaged in business activities after December 21, 2004. The Orange County building department records indicate that a number of roofing permits that had been pulled by Respondent after December 21, 2004, the date the Stop Work Order was issued. Sims also stated that he was aware of the need to pull permits as part of his job as a roofer in Orange County, Florida. He alluded at the hearing that Orange County should have informed him of the existing Stop Work Order. Darlene Elaine Talley, contractor certification coordinator with the Orange County building department, testified that Respondent, through Sims, pulled a number of permits after December 21, 2004. Some of the permits were pulled for work performed prior to December 21, 2004. Although Respondent alleges that much of the actual roofing work was done prior to pulling permits and, thus, prior to the issuance of the Stop Work Order, the act of pulling a permit is considered "conducting business operations," which is prohibited by Subsection 440.107(7)(c), Florida Statutes, when a stop-work order is in effect. A-1 Construction ("A-1"), a Georgia company, performed roofing services for Respondent in Orlando, Florida, from September 2004 to November 2004, and was paid remuneration for those services. Although Respondent sought to prove that A-1 had Florida workers' compensation coverage through its Georgia workers' compensation and should not be included in the penalty calculation, the credible evidence showed that Georgia workers' compensation coverage, with Key Risk, did not extend to Florida, nor did A-1 purchase extra Florida coverage. Subsection 440.10(1)(c), Florida Statutes, states, "A contractor shall require a subcontractor to provide evidence of workers' compensation insurance." Respondent did not request evidence of workers' compensation coverage from A-1, and Respondent was not aware whether A-1's Florida workers' compensation coverage was purchased or not. Under the Workers' Compensation Law in effect during the penalty period, a subcontractor becomes an "employee" if the subcontractor has not validly elected an exemption as permitted by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, or has not otherwise secured the payment of compensation coverage as a subcontractor. § 440.02(15)(c)2., Fla. Stat. The entities listed on the Amended Order's penalty worksheet, including the employees of A-1, were Respondent's employees during the relevant period, all of whom Respondent paid, and all of whom had neither valid workers' compensation exemptions nor workers' compensation coverage. To determine the number of days that Respondent was in violation of the Stop Work Order, the payroll records for Respondent were obtained from Emerald Staffing, and the permits pulled by Respondent were gathered. The investigator further discussed the matter with Respondent to determine the number of days Respondent worked in violation of the Stop Work Order. It is determined that Respondent worked for 10 days in violation of the Stop Work Order. Utilizing the records provided, in evidence, the penalty is calculated for Respondent by assigning a class code to the type of work utilizing the SCOPES Manual, multiplying the class code's assigned approved manual rate with the wages paid to the employee per one hundred dollars, and then multiplying all by 1.5. The penalty for violation of the Stop Work Order is $1,000.00 per day for each day of violation, which for 10 days amounts to $10,000.00. The Amended Order, which assessed a penalty of $49,413.18, was personally served on Respondent on December 19, 2005. Sims was not personally calculated into the penalty because he had a current valid workers' compensation exemption. On December 19, 2005, Respondent entered into a Payment Agreement Schedule for Periodic Payment of Penalty and was issued an Order of Conditional Release from Stop-Work Order by Petitioner. Respondent made a down payment of 10 percent of the assessed penalty; provided proof of compliance with Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, by securing the payment of workers' compensation through Emerald Staffing; and agreed to pay the remaining penalty in 60 equal monthly payment installments.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the Stop Work Order and Order of Penalty Assessment and the Amended Order of Penalty Assessment; and that assesses a penalty of $49,413.18. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th of November, 2006.
The Issue Whether Respondent, John R. Blum (Mr. Blum), violated the re-employment provisions set forth in section 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes (2013), and, therefore, must repay his Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) distribution and subsequent monthly retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with the responsibility of administering the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Mr. Blum was employed as a highway patrol officer with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV). He made the decision to enter DROP, and, for the last five years of his employment with DHSMV, he participated in DROP. Prior to ending his DROP participation, Mr. Blum completed a Deferred Retirement Option Program Termination Notification, confirming he would terminate employment on May 31, 2013. The notification was also signed by the retirement coordinator for DHSMV confirming Mr. Blum’s employment termination date, and reads in pertinent part: In order to satisfy your employment termination requirement, you must terminate all employment relationships with all participating FRS employers for the first 6 calendar months after your DROP termination date. Termination requirement means you cannot remain employed or become employed with any FRS covered employer in a position covered or non-covered by retirement for the first 6 calendar months following your DROP termination date. This includes but is not limited to: part-time work, temporary work, other personal services (OPS), substitute teaching, adjunct professor or non-Division approved contractual services. * * * If you fail to meet the termination requirement, you will void (cancel) your retirement and DROP participation and you must repay all retirement benefits received (including accumulated DROP benefits). The form has been incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-11.004(9). Mr. Blum terminated his employment with DHSMV on the agreed termination date of May 31, 2013. In July 2013, Mr. Blum began to work once again with DHSMV. He had applied and was hired to return as a reserve officer to work security at Florida turnpike stations. The Florida Highway Patrol provided Mr. Blum with access to the online system for payroll, and he was paid for his work through direct deposit from DHSMV, an FRS employer. Mr. Blum was under the mistaken impression that, when he worked the security for the turnpike stations, he was working for a private vendor. He had no intention of violating the termination of employment provisions. In September 2013, after working for almost three months, Mr. Blum was notified that he had violated the termination of employment provisions of DROP, and he ceased working as a reserve officer. On May 8, 2014, the Division sent a letter to Mr. Blum, notifying him that his DROP participation and retirement had been voided and that he must repay all retirement benefits, including his DROP accumulation. The total amount paid is $227,755.51, which the Division seeks to recover. He was also informed that his retirement account would be credited to reflect membership from March 2009 through May 2013. Mr. Blum has returned to work as a highway patrol officer, and his DROP application has been approved effective May 1, 2014.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order finding that Mr. Blum violated the re-employment provisions of section 121.091(13)(c)5.d., Florida Statutes, and, therefore, must repay retirement payments in the amount of $227,755.51 to the Division. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Blum 5050 Southwest Eleventh Place Margate, Florida 33068-4060 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Dan Drake, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Post Office Box 9000 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-9000 Bruce Conroy, Interim General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
