The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence received at the final hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At approximately 9:30 A.M. on February 10, 1984, petitioner, a black female, telephoned a number listed in the newspaper to inquire about a duplex for rent. She was informed that an apartment was available and that she would need to bring $410.00 which included $200.00 for a security deposit and a monthly rental fee of $210.00. Petitioner informed the lady on the telephone that she would be there to see the apartment around 11:30 A.M. Petitioner went to the bank to get the $410.00 and then drove to the Highlands Apartments rental office. When she drove up in the driveway, a lady came running out and introduced herself as Evelyn Massey. According to the petitioner, Ms. Massey said "I told you on the phone that I had an apartment for you, but I don't have." She went on to explain that another lady had previously paid a deposit on the apartment and had not come back; but, between the time of talking to petitioner that morning and then, the lady had come back and paid the rest of the money and thus had the apartment. Ms. Massey also informed the petitioner that that unit was the only apartment available and that she had no other vacancies. After this incident, petitioner telephoned Laurie J. Turner between 12:30 and 1:00 P.M., told her what had happened and requested her to call the same telephone number petitioner had called and to inquire about an apartment. Ms. Turner, a white female, did call the number given her by petitioner, a gentleman answered the telephone, she inquired about the availability of the apartment in the newspaper and he told her, according to Ms. Turner, that it was still available. Ms. Turner then related this information to petitioner. In response to petitioner's contact with the EOO on February 10, 1984, Jeanette Fenton, the Equal Opportunity Assistant/Fair Housing Administrator, began her investigation and made several telephone calls to the Highlands Apartments on that same day. According to Ms. Fenton, "various responses, contradictory responses, were received as to the availability of apartments there." Ms. Fenton also decided to send a black female and a white female as testers to determine the type of treatment that would be received at the Highlands Apartments. On February 10, 1984, Ms. Fenton called Jeanese Wells, a black female, explained that she had a complaint of discrimination against the Highlands Apartments and requested her to go out there and inquire about an apartment. Ms. Wells telephoned the Highlands Apartments on February 11, 1984, spoke to a woman who did not identify herself and inquired if there was a unit available for rent. The woman indicated that there was and gave Ms. Wells directions to the apartments. When Ms. Wells arrived, a woman named Evelyn showed her an apartment and told her that the charges and terms would be a $350.00 deposit, a $35.00 application fee and a one-year lease. Ms. Wells was also informed that her credit references and previous residences would be checked. When Ms. Wells inquired as to whether anyone else was interested in the apartment, Evelyn replied that she had had several phone calls on it, but no firm commitments. According to Ms. Wells, Evelyn showed no reluctance to lease the apartment to her and "there was no negative interaction between the two of us." Ms. Wells did not describe the apartment she inspected. On the same day, February 11, 1984, Ms. Fenton, a white female, telephoned the number listed in the newspaper, spoke with a female named Evelyn, was informed that a unit was available and was given directions to the Highlands Apartments. Ms. Fenton drove out there and inspected a one-bedroom unit, accompanied by Evelyn. According to Ms. Fenton, Evelyn informed her that the requirements for renting the unit would be a $200.00 deposit, rental payments in the amount of $60.00 a week or $210.00 a month, and a six month's lease. No application fee would be required, but there was an application form which required information regarding employment, credit references and landlord references. Ms. Fenton was told, however, that she could move into the unit that day if she wished, that there were no other apartments that were vacant and that the one-bedroom apartment she was viewing was the one that was advertised in the newspaper. Petitioner submitted her formal housing discrimination complaint to the EOO on February 15, 1984. By letter dated March 1, 1984, the EOO informed Roy Hansen that a complaint involving the Highlands Apartments had been filed and transmitted a copy of the complaint to him. The EOO continued to investigate the matter, found probable cause that a violation of the Fair Housing Ordinance had occurred and attempted conciliation. Petitioner Shorter left Hillsborough County for six to eight months between February 15, 1984 and June of 1985. During the conciliation process, petitioner no longer wished to lease a unit at the Highlands Apartments and desired to settle her complaint for an amount of $10,000.00 in damages as compensation. Mr. Hansen was willing to settle the complaint for $200.00 to avoid the expense of attorney's fees. Petitioner rejected Mr. Hansen's counter- offer and requested a hearing by letter dated June 19, 1985. Ms. Evelyn Massey left the State of Florida shortly after the events which occurred on February 10 and 11, 1984. She did not testify in this proceeding and her whereabouts are unknown. Mr. Ron Massey left Florida around November of 1984 and his whereabouts are likewise unknown. Roy Hansen is a professor of sociology at the University of South Florida, a private consultant and a part- owner of the Highlands Apartments, which contains several complexes and includes 104 separate units. He employed a manager, Ron Massey, to care for the apartments on a day-to-day basis and to handle rentals. One of the reasons Mr. Massey was hired was because he had had prior experience in managing a predominantly black rental complex. In February of 1984, Ron Massey was married to Evelyn Massey and they lived together in one of the Highlands Apartment units which was also utilized as the rental office. While Evelyn Massey did answer the telephone in that office and did show apartments to potential tenants, only Ron Massey was employed as the manager and only he received a salary therefor. Mr. Hansen instructed the Masseys to apply equal criteria to all potential tenants. Out of 104 units, approximately 17 are rented to minorities. The normal deposit required at the Highlands Apartments was $200 or $350 if the tenant had a pet.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the housing discrimination complaint filed by Julia M. Shorter on February 15, 1984, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 11th day of April, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Julia M. Shorter 8307 Bahia Street Tampa, Florida 33619 George W. Phillips P. O. Box 270504 Tampa, Florida 33688 Amelia G. Brown Assistant County Attorney P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Robert W. Saunders, Director Equal Opportunity Office P. O. Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601 APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by the respondent and the intervenor have been approved and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Respondent 3. Rejected, contrary to the evidence of record. Intervenor 1. No substantial evidence that Ms. Shorter applied for a "one bedroom apartment." 8. Rejected, not supported by competent substantial evidence.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice by the Respondent through the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the case, the Respondent operated an age-restricted mobile home park in Sarasota, Florida. With limited exceptions, residents of the mobile home park are 55 years of age and older. In September 2000, the Petitioner, a woman over 55 years of age, purchased a mobile home located within the Ridgewood Mobile Home Park. The mobile home was purchased through a real estate broker. The mobile home park apparently identifies itself through signage as a community for persons 55 years of age and older. Prior to the purchase the Petitioner had no communication with the Respondent and made no inquiry of the Respondent as to whether her son, who is under 55 years of age, would be allowed to live in the mobile home park. Within a few days of the purchase, the Petitioner was advised that residence in the mobile home park was limited, with certain exceptions, to persons 55 years of age and older. The Respondent advised the Petitioner that her son, who is under 55 years of age, could remain with her only for a period of up to two months to help her "settle in." By lease application dated October 1, 2000, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that her son would remain with her for a period of two months. In November 2000, after the two months had passed, the manager of the mobile home park (Mr. Cobb) informed the Respondent that her son would have to leave the residence. At that time, the Petitioner's son asserted that he was his mother's full-time, live-in caregiver. Prior to this point, the Petitioner had not indicated to the Respondent that she suffered from a handicap or required the services of a full-time, live-in caregiver The evidence fails to establish that, either at the time of the Petitioner's initial residence at the Respondent's mobile home park or by November 2000, the Petitioner suffered from a handicap or from any condition that substantially limited any major life activity, or that the Petitioner required the assistance of a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time the Petitioner moved into the Respondent's mobile home park, the Petitioner was able to accomplish all major life activities. Although diabetic, the Petitioner was able to walk, drive, and shop for food or other necessities. Her son assisted in house cleaning and in other routine activities, but there is no credible evidence that, prior to August 2002, such assistance was required for performing major life activities. In August 2002, shortly after a medical procedure on the Petitioner's carotid artery, the Petitioner suffered a stroke. She was hospitalized for a period of approximately ten days and then transferred into a rehabilitation hospital for a period of approximately six weeks. Letters submitted from medical professionals involved with the Petitioner's case at the time of her stroke suggest that assistance was needed during the period of incapacity related to the stroke. There is no credible evidence that, subsequent to rehabilitation, the Petitioner needed the services of a full- time, live-in caregiver. After rehabilitation, the Petitioner recovered from the stroke sufficiently to regain her ability to perform major life activities, including driving an automobile. A subsequent automobile accident wherein she ran down a stop sign in the mobile home park after going shopping suggests that driving at night may be inappropriate. Following post-stroke rehabilitation, the Petitioner's son continued to reside with his mother, to assist in household duties and in assuring that the Petitioner followed a medication regimen, but the evidence fails to establish that she currently requires a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time of the hearing, neither the Petitioner nor her son was residing in the Respondent's mobile home park. The evidence establishes that disabled or handicapped persons in the mobile home park who require full-time, live-in caregivers are accommodated without regard to the age of the caregiver or to the mobile home park's age-related restrictions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint of Dona M. Burgess against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth M. Boyle, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services, Inc. 1750 17th Street, Building 1 Sarasota, Florida 34234 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly P. Walker, Esquire Kevin Bruning, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen 200 South Orange Avenue Sarasota, Florida 34236-6802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner has been subjected to an unlawful housing practice by Respondent, as alleged in the Housing Discrimination Complaint filed by Petitioner on April 9, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ruby Jewell Perl, moved into Grand Oaks Villas in October 1999. She signed a lease for a two-bedroom apartment. After moving into the apartment, she made application for and received public assistance in renting the apartment in April 2000. Grand Oaks Villas is an apartment complex located in Pensacola, Florida. Many of the residents are retired. The lease between Petitioner and Grand Oaks Villas, signed in April 2000, reflected that a portion of the rent would be paid by the Public Housing Assistance Program. The lease, which was for Apartment 13A, requires a 30-day written notice for termination of the lease after the initial year of the lease. The lease reflects that Petitioner paid a security deposit of $200 in April 2000. Respondent, Jabari Abdulsamad, took ownership of Grand Oak Villas in June 2001. He became the owner/manager of the apartment complex. At some point in early April 2002, Petitioner began discussions with Mr. Abdulsamad regarding the amount of rent she was paying for the two-bedroom apartment and the possibility of moving to a one-bedroom apartment. Petitioner was exploring these options because the amount of rent for the two-bedroom apartment was more than she could afford. Initially, Mr. Abdulsamad showed a one-bedroom apartment to Petitioner. There is conflicting evidence as to whether he actually made an offer to Petitioner to move into a one-bedroom apartment for $485 per month. There is no disagreement, however, that Mr. Abdulsamad insisted that Petitioner put her request to transfer to a one-bedroom apartment in writing. There is no evidence that Petitioner put such a request in writing. In late April 2002, Petitioner and Respondents entered into an amendment to the lease in which Petitioner’s portion of the rent for her two-bedroom apartment was to be $326 per month, and the remaining rent of $249 per month was to be paid by the Public Housing Assistance Program, effective May 1, 2002. In late October 2002, Petitioner gave Mr. Abdulsamad two written notices of intent to vacate the apartment in 30 days. One notice was handwritten; one notice was on a form. On November 5, 2002, Mr. Abdulsamad wrote to Petitioner demanding payment of her portion of the rent for November. The letter stated that the housing authority paid their part, in full, but that she owed the balance of $153.26. The letter notified Petitioner that he would file eviction papers the following day if the rent was not paid in full. An eviction action was filed resulting in court costs of $104.87. Petitioner paid the outstanding rent into the court registry and vacated the property. Mr. Abdulsamad deducted the court costs out of the $200 security deposit and refunded the difference of $95.13 to Petitioner. Despite the eviction and legal matters surrounding the eviction, Petitioner’s main complaint regarding her charge of discrimination apparently stems from her desire to move from a two-bedroom apartment to a one-bedroom apartment. She was very upset about Mr. Abdulsamad’s insistent requests that she put her requests in writing and felt she was not treated fairly. Additionally, there were disputes regarding pet deposits and the ownership of the washer and dryer in her apartment. However, these and many other matters raised in the hearing concerned business issues, rather than discrimination issues, and are outside the scope of this proceeding.2/ Miriam Lewis also resided at Grand Oaks Villas. When she initially moved into Grand Oaks Villas, she was shown a one- bedroom apartment and wished to move into it. She was told it was already rented to a tenant receiving public housing assistance. Consequently, she moved into a two-bedroom apartment. She eventually transferred into a one-bedroom apartment. She described Mr. Abdulsamad as very cooperative regarding her transfer from a two-bedroom to a one-bedroom apartment. From the weight of the testimony, it is apparent that there is a great deal of friction among residents of Grand Oaks Villas. However, the testimony in the record, while establishing that there are a number of disgruntled tenants at Grand Oaks Villas, did not establish that Mr. Abdulsamad discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her gender. There is insufficient evidence in the record that a male was offered a one-bedroom apartment at the time Petitioner desired to rent one or that a male was offered more favorable rent or other conditions of tenancy.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2004.
The Issue Whether the Applicant is entitled to compensation in the amount of $2,500, to pay for "fill dirt" which was installed on the Applicant's real estate in relocating his homestead, after his former homestead was bought as right-of-way for Interstate Highway 75. This claim is under the guise of a relocation appeal, in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Assistance And Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 USC, 4601 - 4655).
Findings Of Fact In November, 1974, the Florida Department of Transportation paid the Applicant $32,500 in a negotiated purchase for the Applicant's property which was located in the line of construction for Interstate Highway 75. This price was for a mobile home 24' wide and 40' long, with appurtenances to the mobile home, to include a screen room, privacy paneling and carport. Prior to the November, 1974 sale of the property to the Department of Transportation, the Applicant had purchased another parcel of land in late 1973 or early 1974. It was on this parcel of land that was purchased at that time, that the Applicant relocated his home. The amount of payment for the new lot was between $2,800 and $2,900. In order to comply with certain standards of the DeSoto County, Florida Health Department, ten inches of "fill dirt" were required to be implaced to have the septic tank meet requirements for a drain field. The cost of the application of the "fill dirt" was $2,500. The expenditure of $2,500 for "fill dirt" is the item of controversy between the Applicant and the Respondent. The Applicant is claiming that the $2,500 should be reimbursed to him as part of a relocation assistance payment. The Respondent denies that the $2,500 is a proper item of compensation under the governing law on relocation assistance payments. The Respondent's denial is based upon the fact that it believes that "fill dirt" is not a compensable item. More specifically, the Respondent regards the selection of this piece of property by the Applicant as being a matter of choice, which did not have to be made. The Respondent is persuaded that other parcels of property were available, which did not require "fill dirt" to be brought in, in order to comply with health requirements and the Applicant failed to purchase such a parcel, therefore, the Applicant must defray the expense of his selection, in terms of the $2,500 which was spent to bring the property up to health standards. The history of the payments that were made by the Respondent can be derived by the application of the formula utilized. The Respondent looked at three comparable pieces of land , one for $32,500, a second for $28,500 and a third for $32,900. The closest comparable to the home that the Applicant sold, was the comparable listed at $32,500. The Respondent compared these comparable figures with the so called, "carve out" figure of a typical mobile home with equipment, on a typical mobile home site, which would have been a price of $25,721. Based upon this figure for a "carve out", and taking the figure for the closest comparable $32,500, the amount of maximum relocation reimbursement would have been $6,779. This figure is arrived at by subtracting the amount of the "carve out" figure from the closest comparable. In fact the Respondent spent $27,372 for the land purchased and other compensable items, thus entitling him to $1,651 in relocation reimbursement, according to the Respondent's calculations. Although, in the course of the hearing the Applicant was questioned about taking $1,651 as settlement. The Applicant said that he was only interested in the $2,500 figure. It should be stated that the $1,651, is an amount which does not contemplate the payment for "fill dirt". It is in fact a figure arrived at for payment of other items considered to be compensable. The question then becomes one of whether or not the Applicant is entitled to a $2500 payment for "fill dirt" which is not associated with the $1,651 which the Respondent claims the Applicant is entitled to. One final factual comment should be made. That comment is that the Respondent's acquisition and relocation assistance officer, David Nicholson, saw the Applicant's new property after the twenty five hundred dollars worth of fill dirt had been installed. At that time, Mr. Nicholson said that the property appeared to meet the criteria for a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling. The witness, Nicholson had not seen the property prior to the installation of the "fill dirt". Consequently, the Respondent can not challenge the statement by the Applicant to the effect that the "fill dirt" was necessary in order to achieve a decent, safe and sanitary dwelling.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Respondent deny the payment of $2,500 to the Applicant for installation of "fill dirt" at the Applicant's present homesite. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Herman A. Beyer Post Office Box 382 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact By letter dated May 31, 1979 Respondent notified Petitioner that it was acquiring part of the property on which Petitioner's office was located and that it would be necessary for him to relocate. At the time Petitioner worked as a real estate appraiser in the office of the Pickens Agency owned by Philip Pickens. Pickens provided work space, telephones, secretary, data bank and supplies. The data bank contained data on real property throughout Florida and was invaluable to the appraisers in getting comparables to use for appraising like property. Due to the acquisition of additional property for the U.S. 90 right-of- way, it was necessary to move the two-story building in which Petitioner's office was located. This required moving out of this building into different quarters. In the building Petitioner's office, located on the second floor, comprised approximately 800 square feet in which he had desk, telephone and work space. The data bank was also located on the second floor. Philip Pickens owned another building in the Immediate vicinity into which Petitioner moved. The data bank was left in the original building which was jacked up in preparation for its move. Thee data bank remained available for use albeit less convenient for those using it. Petitioner had less space in the one-story building into which the Pickens Agency moved and Petitioner's office was located near the back door through which clients visited the Pickens Agency. He shared a telephone with another appraiser and had a smaller desk and less work space. He also experienced interruptions from visitors entering the office through the back door which opened into Petitioner's office space. During the two years immediately preceding the relocation of the office, Petitioner's appraisal work was performed exclusively for DOT. Part of this work was assigned him by the Pickens Agency and in some cases he was contacted directly by DOT for the appraisal . When employed directly by DOT, Petitioner received 50 percent of the appraisal fee and the Pickens Agency received 50 percent. When assigned work by the Pickens Agency, Petitioner received 45 percent of the appraisal fee. During the five months following Petitioner's move into the new quarters his income dropped substantially from what it had been before the relocation. Petitioner filed application for relocation benefits as soon as he moved his office and before any change in income occurred. Normally, there is a lag of three to six months between tile Line the appraisal work is done and payment is received. Petitioner's income during the first nine months of 1980 (January - October) we $10,622.97. For similar periods in 1979, 1978, and 1977 his income was $29,750, $26,382.50 and $22.252.50, respectively. Petitioner testified that he believes the loss of income was due to his inability to turn out as much work in the more restricted space and less privacy in the one-story building than he had before the move. Petitioner moved some 30 yards from his original location kept the same mailing address and the same telephone number. During the latter half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, the Lake City District of DOT had fewer relocation claims than in comparable periods of the two previous years. Relocation claims are related to appraisals which would indicate fewer appraisals were ordered by DOT in Lake City in 1979-80 than in the two previous years. During the period in question, most of Petitioner's work for DOT was generated by the Bartow office. This would require most of Petitioner's appraisal time out of Lake City with the use of the office primarily for the preparation of his appraisal report. No evidence was submitted to show the effect, if any, on the Pickens Agency's business resulting from the move or the business done by the other appraisers who also moved. During the period 1977-1980 the Pickens Agency employed between two and five appraisers and at the time of the relocation employed two appraisers, one of whom was petitioner. (Tr. p. 31). The number of appraisers employed varied with the volume of business coming into the agency. The appraisal work done by the Pickens Agency was statewide and not concentrated in the vicinity of Lake City.
The Issue Whether applicant is eligible for relocation assistance monetary benefits pursuant to Public Law 91-646 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970. Although notice of hearing was provided to Mr. and Mrs. Limegrover on March 26, 1976, they did not appear at the time of hearing. Upon telephonic inquiry on June 8th by a representative of the Department of Transportation, Mr. Limegrover advised that he had received the notice and although he had intended to call the Department of Transportation concerning the matter, he had forgotten to do so. He stated that he desired a continuance of the case. His request was objected to by counsel for the Department of Transportation. The request for continuance was denied as being untimely and good cause not having been shown therefor. The hearing was conducted as an uncontested proceeding.
Findings Of Fact By letter of October 20, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Richard Limegrover of Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park, Hialeah Gardens, Florida, were advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that it was in the process of acquiring right-of-way for State Road #25 (U.S. 27) in their area, and that the mobile home lot the Limegrovers occupied as tenants would be required for construction of the facility. The letter provided the Department's assurance that they would not be required to move until at least 90 days had elapsed from the date of receipt of the letter, and that they would receive a further notice specifying the actual date by which the property must be vacated at least 30 days prior to the date specified. The letter concluded by an expression of the Department's desire to assist in relocation and to answer any questions concerning such matters. On December 8, 1975, a further letter was sent to the Limegrovers by the Department of Transportation assuring the addressees that the prior letter had not been a notice to move and that no one at the Courtly Manors Mobile Home Park would be required to move until negotiations with the owner had been completed or monies placed with the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Dade County by court order. It further stated that in the interim period relocatees living within Courtly Manors who were eligible and decided to move on their own initiative would be assisted by the Department in their relocation. Limegrover called Mr. Carl Moon, Right-of-Way Agent, Department of Transportation, Ft. Lauderdale, on December 11, requesting assistance in arrangements for moving his mobile home. Moon discovered that Limegrover wanted to move before January 1, 1976, as he had reserved a lot in another mobile home park. However, Limegrover told him that when he advised his current landlord on December 11 of the projected move on December 30, the landlord stated that in the absence of 30 days notice, Limegrover must forfeit his $90.00 security deposit. Limegrover told Moon that he felt the Department of Transportation should pay the $90.00 security deposit since he was being forced to move by that agency. Moon told him that he was not required to move that soon, but Limegrover was unwilling to wait, fearing that he would not be able to find a satisfactory place later on. Accordingly, Moon assisted him in his moving arrangements and Limegrover was paid for his moving expenses in the amount of $640.00 and smaller sums for reinstallation of his telephone and disconnection and reconnection of his gas equipment. Inasmuch as the Department of transportation declined to pay the $90.00 representing alleged forfeiture of the security deposit, Limegrover filed this relocation appeal. (Testimony of Moon, Exhibits 1 & 2).
Recommendation That the appeal of Richard and Jane Limegrover, in the amount of $90.00, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Room 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida Richard S. and Jane E. Limegrover Lot F4, Haven Lakes Mobile Home Park 11201 S.W. 55th Street Miramar, Florida 33025
The Issue Whether respondent should refund sales tax petitioners paid on account of their purchase of a manufactured home?
Findings Of Fact On September 12, 1984, petitioners made a $160 down payment on a 75 x 150 foot lot in High Ridge Estates in Bay bounty by a check drawn in favor of Ed Franklin. They wanted the lot in order to put a manufactured home on it. After acquiescing to a request by personnel of the Bay County building department that they pay $21.00 for a mobile home permit, the Baileys improved the property in anticipation of placing a manufactured home on it. They put in a septic tank and poured a concrete pad. On November 21, 1984, the Baileys signed a form "FHMA SALES CONTRACT" as buyers. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 2. Jack Lee signed as seller on behalf of "DD&L Joint Venture." Id. Petitioners gave Lee a down payment of $13,400; DD&L undertook to procure from Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, Inc., a manufactured home to be placed on the High Ridge Estates lot. The form contract, which purported to obligate the Baileys for $53,000, describes the lot, but makes no mention of the manufactured home. In December of 1984, the manufactured home arrived at High Ridge Estates, borne by temporary axles and wheels, which were unbolted after its arrival, and left with the truck that had brought it. Statewide of Florida, Inc., placed it on its new foundation. With an exterior of wood siding and an asphalt-shingled roof, the 25.7 by 54 foot structure met VA and FHA materials requirements for standard housing. Carpet was laid over plywood subflooring. Wall joists stand 24 inches apart. The Baileys added a carport, a driveway, three decks and a separate storage shed. On March 13, 1985, Mr. and Mrs. Bailey borrowed money from Peoples First Financial Savings and Loan Association of Panama City (Peoples) to pay the balances they owed for the lot and home. Of the loan proceeds, $6,100.00 went to "C. Ed Franklin and wife, Frances P. Franklin," Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 1, to pay for the lot on which the manufactured home stood; and $23,328.80 went to "ITT Comm. Finance." Id. To secure repayment of its loan to the Baileys, Peoples took a mortgage from the Baileys encumbering the lot and the manufactured home affixed to it. Petitioners' Exhibit No. 1. Apparently the payment to "ITT Comm. Finance" retired indebtedness the Baileys incurred in acquiring their 1985 Fleetwood Chadwick 3523D. Mrs. Bailey executed a retail buyer's order for their manufactured home in December of 1986, although the form, which showed Best Home Center, Inc., as the "DEALER," was dated March 22, 1985. Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 2. The form reflects a total price for the manufactured home of $29,045.87, the sum on which sales tax was computed at $1,452.53. The Baileys paid tax in this amount to Best Home Center, Inc., "upon the sales (sic) of tangible personal property." Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 2. Best Home Center, Inc., forwarded the taxes they collected from the Baileys, along with other taxes collected in March of 1985, to the Florida Department of Revenue. Hearing Officer's Exhibit No. 2. At the time the Baileys purchased the manufactured home it had no license tag. It never had a license tag and, at the time they purchased it, had never been assessed as real property. Best Home Center, Inc., made a written assignment to the Baileys of its rights, if any, to recover the sales tax the Baileys paid.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny petitioners' application for refund. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX The second sentence of respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 1 and respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to the first sentence of respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 1, it is not entirely clear who sold the Baileys the manufactured home. The documentation reflected a sale by Best Home Center, Inc., for $29,045. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 2, Ed Franklin and his wife conveyed the lot. The down payment was $160 and a $6,100 balance was paid in March. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5, the Peoples Mortgage originated in March, with indebtedness secured by lot and home. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the Bay County Building Department required them to purchase a permit on September 20, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0305 Charles Stutts, Esquire General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0305 Mr. and Mrs. Bailey 22012 High Ridge Drive Lot 24 Panama City Beach, Florida 32407 D. Alan Burns, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
