Findings Of Fact On or about March 29, 1988, Applicants filed their application for conditional use approval for on premises consumption of beer and wine at 1218 Cleveland Street, Clearwater, Florida. The property is located at the northeast corner of Cleveland Street and Jefferson Avenue, and a restaurant and lounge known as "Sandpiper's" is located on the subject property. The property is zoned urban center - eastern corridor (UC-E). The subject property also uses the mailing address of 1214A and 1214 Cleveland Street, but the property and business operated thereon is the same as described in Finding of Fact 1. At all times material hereto, Applicant Kallivokas has owned the subject real property. On or about March 31, 1988, Applicant McCabe acquired ownership of Gulf Coast Rathskeller, Inc., and all assets pertaining to the restaurant and lounge known as "Sandpiper's" located on the subject property. Gulf Coast Rathskeller, Inc., has been the lessee of the premises, and has operated the Sandpiper at all times material hereto, both before and after the transfer of ownership to Applicant McCabe on March 31, 1988. This transfer was accomplished through a 100 percent sale of stock in Gulf Coast Rathskeller, Inc., to the Applicant McCabe. This sale and stock transfer constitutes a "change of business ownership" as that term is used in the Land Development Code. The Planning and Zoning Board considered this application on April 19, 1988, and by a 5-2 vote approved the application with the following conditions: That the occupational license be obtained by the current owner (McCabe) within 6 months; That the closing hours be 10 p.m. on week nights, and midnight on Friday and Saturday nights; That the kitchen remain open until closing; That no outside speakers be permitted and That the doors be kept closed during live entertainment. Although the Applicants timely appealed all conditions, at hearing only the hours of closing were in dispute, and Applicant McCabe stated he is complying with all other conditions without any adverse impact on his business. He is not complying with the condition on hours of closing, pending this appeal. He estimates that the closing condition would reduce his business by 40 percent. John W. Homer, the owner of commercial property across Jefferson Avenue from the subject property, has also timely appealed the action of the Planning and Zoning Board, but he urges that the application be denied in its entirety, notwithstanding the conditions placed upon its approval by the Board. The City's Planning Director, Paula Harvey, testified without contradiction, and it is therefore accepted as fact, that the location of "Sandpiper's" was specifically approved by an ordinance adopted by the City Commission pursuant to designation procedures set forth in former Section 72.01, Code of Ordinances. As such, the subject property, and the alcoholic beverage establishment known as "Sandpiper's" have been grandfathered under the separation requirements set forth in Section- 136.024(d), Land Development Code, as enacted by Ordinance Number 4420 on January 21, 1988. Although "Sandpiper's" has closed from time to time, and was specifically closed for a period of time between October, 1987 and April, 1988, when it was reopened by Applicant McCabe, it has never been closed for a continuous period of one year or more. It is, therefore, uncontroverted that "Sandpiper's" has been an "existing alcoholic beverage establishment" at all times material hereto. No other restaurant and lounge is currently operating in the City subject to the same closing hour condition as was imposed on this Applicant by the Planning and Zoning Board. Such businesses are allowed to, and do in fact, stay open until 2:00 a.m. on all days, except Sunday. The City's Traffic Engineering and Police Departments have expressed no opposition to this application. The City's Planning Director supports the approval of this application. Public testimony and evidence in opposition to this application is primarily directed to the operation of this establishment by its former owner, prior to October, 1987. Numerous police reports involving incidents at the Sandpiper occurring prior to October, 1987 while the business was operating under prior ownership are irrelevant to this application. Applicant McCabe has made improvements in the Sandpiper, and is now attracting a higher class clientele than under the former owner. Outside litter has been reduced. No outside speakers are used, the door is closed during live entertainment, and the kitchen stays open each night until the Sandpiper closes. There has been only one police report of any incident at the Sandpiper since April, 1988, while under McCabe's ownership.
The Issue The issue to be determined by this Order is whether the Petition for Formal Proceedings filed with the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) on February 4, 2009, was timely 1/ and, if so, whether Petitioners have standing to challenge the DEP?s issuance of the Minor Modification to FDEP Operation Permit 171331-002-UO for IW-1 under 171331-003-UC (the Permit Modification).
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Conservation Alliance is a Florida not-for-profit corporation in good-standing, with its corporate offices currently located at 5608 Eagle Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida. The Conservation Alliance has approximately 200 members. Elaine Romano is a resident of St. Lucie County, Florida. The DEP is an agency of the State of Florida having jurisdiction for permitting UIC facilities and the waste-streams being discharged to such facilities, pursuant to chapter 403, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Pursuant to that authority, the DEP issued the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding. FPUA provides utility service to the City of Fort Pierce, Florida. FPUA owns and operates a Class I industrial injection well (IW-1), discharges to which are the subject of the Permit Modification. Allied owns and operates a chlorine bleach manufacturing facility which produces a brine waste-stream that is proposed for disposal to IW-1. Issuance of the Permit Modification On December 19, 2008, the DEP issued a Notice of Permit, Permit Number 171331-002-UO (FPUA operation permit), which authorized the operation of IW-1 at the Gahn wastewater treatment plant. The Gahn wastewater treatment plant and IW-1 are owned and operated by the FPUA. The FPUA operation permit authorized the disposal of concentrate and water treatment by- product from FPUA?s reverse-osmosis water facility at a permitted rate of 2.8 million gallons per day. FPUA also owns and operates water production wells that serve the City of Fort Pierce potable water supply system. IW-1 was constructed within 500 feet of three of the FPUA production wells, which required FPUA to obtain a variance from setback requirements. On July 17, 2008, prior to the issuance of the FPUA operation permit, Allied submitted an application for a major modification of the FPUA operation permit. The application proposed the disposal to IW-1 of up to 21,600 gallons per day of a brine waste-stream that is a by-product of the production of chlorine bleach. The application cover letter provides that “[w]hile we have been notified that this project is only a Minor Permit Modification, we feel by submitting for a Major Permit Modification that the Department will have the ability to review the application and downgrade the application to a Minor Permit Modification, if needed.” On December 30, 2008, the DEP issued the Permit Modification as a minor modification of the FPUA operation permit. The Permit Modification allowed a maximum of 21,600 gallons of brine to be received at the FPUA facility and disposed of in IW-1. Notice of the Permit Modification On or about September 12, 2008, a paralegal for Ruden McClosky, Lucinda Sparkman, requested information from the DEP regarding the procedure for receiving notification of permit applications and DEP action thereon. Her request was subsequently refined to request notice regarding two permits, those being “injection Well Construction, application #171331- 003,” and the other being “Water-Industrial Wastewater, application #FLA017460-004.” DEP File No. 171331-003 is that pertaining to the Permit Modification. At the time of the request, Ruden McClosky represented Odyssey Manufacturing Company (Odyssey), an economic competitor of Allied.3/ On September 24, 2008, Ms. Sparkman asked to be “put on the distribution list for the URIC permit for Fort Pierce.” From September 24, 2008 through December 15, 2008, Ms. Sparkman made periodic requests for information, and received periodic updates from the DEP. On December 19, 2008, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an e- mail indicating that the FPUA operation permit had been issued, and later that same day sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the permit. On December 19, 2008, Ruden McClosky made a public records request to FPUA for, among other items, records pertaining to the disposal of brine to the Gahn Water Plant underground injection well, and any agreements between FPUA and Allied regarding the disposal of brine. The request was made on behalf of Florida Tire Recycling, Inc. (Florida Tire). On December 22, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman a copy of the notice of intent for the FPUA operation permit. There is no record evidence of further communication or inquiry between Ruden McClosky and the DEP from December 22, 2008 to January 14, 2009. On January 9, 2009, notice of the Permit Modification was published in the Fort Pierce Tribune. The notice was prepared and publication arranged by counsel for Allied. The published notice provides the information required by rule 62-110.106(7)(d), and stated that any challenge to the Permit Modification was required to be received by DEP within 14 days of publication or, for persons that requested actual notice, within 14 days of receipt of such actual notice. On January 14, 2009, Ms. Sparkman called her contact person at the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. That call was not returned. On January 21, 2009, Ms. Sparkman again called the DEP to inquire about the Permit Modification. In response to Ms. Sparkman?s inquiry, the DEP sent Ms. Sparkman an electronic copy of the Permit Modification. Ms. Sparkman made further inquiry on January 21, 2009, as to whether the notice of the Permit Modification had been published in a newspaper. On January 22, 2009, the DEP replied that “[e]verything was noticed as required.” On January 22, 2009, the Fort Pierce Tribune prepared an affidavit of publication of the notice. The affidavit of publication was received by counsel for Allied on January 28, 2009, who sent the affidavit to the DEP by certified mail on January 29, 2009. Alleged Defects in the Notice of Permit Modification Petitioners have alleged a number of procedural defects that they contend render the published notice ineffective to establish a deadline of 14 days from the date of the notice to file a challenge to the Permit Modification. Late Proof of Publication Petitioners allege that Allied filed the proof of publication with the DEP more than seven days from the date of publication, and that delay made such publication ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Although the proof of publication was provided to the DEP on or shortly after January 29, 2009, the evidence demonstrates that Allied provided the proof of publication to the DEP immediately upon receipt from the Fort Pierce Tribune newspaper. The delay in filing was not within the control of Allied, or anyone else associated with the Permit Modification. As established by rule 62-110.106(9), proof of publication is required by the DEP to provide assurance to the DEP that required notice has, in fact, been published, with the sanction being the delay or denial of the permit. The rule does not suggest that a delay in providing proof of publication to the DEP serves to alter or extend the time for filing a petition. There is little case law construing the effect of a delay in providing proof of publication on the petition rights of a person challenging the proposed agency action. However, the undersigned agrees with, and adopts, the following analysis of the issue provided by Administrative Law Judge P. Michael Ruff: . . . the purpose of requiring an applicant to publish notice of agency action is to give substantially affected persons an opportunity to participate in an administrative proceeding. See Section 403.815, Florida Statutes, and Rule 17- 103.150(4), Florida Administrative Code. Consequently, the crucial element in the Department's publication requirement is that the notice be published to trigger the commencement of the time for affected persons to request a hearing. The requirement that proof of publication be provided to the Department does nothing to affect the rights of third parties, but merely is a technical requirement which allows the Department to determine whether a third party has timely exercised its rights to contest a published notice of intended agency action. If an applicant publishes notice of intended agency action, but fails to timely provide the Department with proof of that publication, the deficiency is one which is easily cured. No harm will occur because the permit will not be issued until proof of publication is received by the Department, in any event, because of Rule 17-103.510(4), Florida Administrative Code. Bio-Tech Tracking Systems, Inc. v. Dep?t of Envtl. Reg., Case No. 90-7760, ¶32 (Fla. DOAH Apr. 3, 1991; Fla. DER May 17, 1991). The filing of the notice beyond the seven-day period in rule 62-110.106(5) was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Notice Prepared by Counsel Petitioners allege that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel, rather than the DEP, and that the notice was therefore ineffective to establish a deadline for filing the petition. Publication of the notice of the Permit Modification was not required, since it was a minor modification. Thus, publication was at Allied?s option. Rule 62-110.106(10)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that: Any applicant or person benefiting from the Department?s action may elect to publish notice of the Department?s intended or proposed action . . . in the manner provided by subsection (7) or (8) above. Upon presentation of proof of publication to the Department before final agency action, any person who has elected to publish such notice shall be entitled to the same benefits under this rule as a person who is required to publish notice. The most logical construction of rule 62-110.106 is that the DEP is responsible for preparing required notices pursuant to rule 62-110.106(7)(c), but that non-required notices may be prepared and published at the applicant?s or beneficiary?s option without direct DEP involvement. In this case, the notice was prepared by an authorized agent of the corporate “person” that benefitted from the Permit Modification. The more salient point regarding the preparation of the notice is whether it contained all of the information required by rule. The evidence demonstrates that it did, and that the notice was sufficient to provide a meaningful and complete point of entry to the public of the Permit Modification and the rights attendant thereto. The fact that the notice was prepared by Allied?s counsel was, at most, harmless error, did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to Petitioners, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Actual Notice Petitioners allege error in the notice process because actual notice of the Permit Modification was not provided to Petitioners. The basis for the alleged deficiency was that Mr. Stinnette had, in 2003, asked to be placed on the DEP?s UIC mailing list, but did not receive the notice of the Permit Modification. Rule 62-110.106(2) provides that published notice establishes the point of entry for the public to challenge proposed agency action “except for persons entitled to written notice personally or by mail under Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, or any other statute.” Section 120.60(3) provides that a notice of proposed agency action shall be mailed “to each person who has made a written request for notice of agency action.” The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Stinnette was acting solely as an agent of Indian Riverkeeper when he requested to be placed on the UIC mailing list. He was not requesting notices in his personal capacity, or as an agent of the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano. Thus, Indian Riverkeeper was entitled to notice of the Permit Modification. Indian Riverkeeper is not a party to this proceeding. The undersigned is not willing to attribute a request for actual notice to any person other than the person requesting such notice. The DEP?s failure to provide written notice of the Permit Modification to Indian Riverkeeper did not adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, and does not affect the fairness of this proceeding. Lack of Information Pursuant to Rule 62-528.315(7) Finally, Petitioners argue that the published notice was ineffective because it did not include the name, address, and telephone number of a DEP contact person, citing rule 62- 528.315(7)(d). The provision cited by Petitioners involves DEP notices that are required when the DEP has prepared a draft permit, draft consent order, or has scheduled a public meeting as identified in rule 62-528.315(1). The notice requirement in rule 62-528.315(7) does not apply to a notice of proposed agency action, which is governed by rule 62-528.315(10), and which provides that: “[a]fter the conclusion of the public comment period described in Rule 62-528.321, F.A.C., and after the conclusion of a public meeting (if any) described in Rule 62- 528.325, F.A.C., the applicant shall publish public notice of the proposed agency action including the availability of an administrative hearing under Sections 120.569 and 120.57, F.S. This public notice shall follow the procedure described in subsection 62-110.106(7), F.A.C. (emphasis added). The published notice of the Permit Modification was consistent with the notice described in rule 62-110.106(7), and therefore complied with rule 62-528.315(10). For the reasons set forth herein, there were no defects in the published notice of proposed agency action that serve to minimize the effect of that published notice on the time for filing a petition challenging the Permit Modification, that adversely affect any rights or remedies available to the Conservation Alliance or Ms. Romano, or that affect the fairness of this proceeding. Representation of Petitioners by Ruden McClosky Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding FPUA. Petitioners were not represented by Ruden McClosky at the time Ruden McClosky requested actual notice of any DEP agency action regarding Allied. The parties stipulated that an attorney-client relationship was formed between the Petitioners and Ruden McClosky on or after January 1, 2009. No further specificity was stipulated. On February 3, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to the Conservation Alliance regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. The engagement was accepted by Mr. Stinnette on behalf of the Conservation Alliance on February 4, 2009. The Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named the Conservation Alliance as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 4, 2009. On February 10, 2009, Ruden McClosky sent an engagement letter to Ms. Romano regarding governmental and administrative challenges to the Permit Modification. There is no evidence that the engagement was accepted by Ms. Romano. Ms. Romano testified that she has never spoken or corresponded with anyone from Ruden McClosky, and had no knowledge that she was being represented by Ruden McClosky. Ms. Romano had no input in drafting any of the petitions filed on her behalf, and had no recollection of having ever read the petitions. The Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, which named Ms. Romano as a party, was filed with the DEP on February 12, 2009. Both of the Ruden McClosky engagement letters reference an “Other Client” that had an interest in challenging the Permit Modification, which “Other Client” would be responsible for paying all fees and costs, and would be involved in the approval of all work performed by Ruden McClosky. The parties stipulated that the “Other Client” was Odyssey. The date of an engagement letter is not dispositive as to the date on which an attorney-client relationship is established. It is, however, evidence that can be assessed with other evidence to draw a conclusion as to the date that the relationship commenced. The preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that requests for notice made prior to January 21, 2009, regarding the FPUA operation permit and the Permit Modification that is the subject of this proceeding were made on behalf of Odyssey or Florida Tire, existing clients of Ruden McClosky. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of the Conservation Alliance with regard to the instant case no earlier than January 21, 2009, the date on which Ruden McClosky received notice that the Permit Modification had been issued. The preponderance of the evidence leads the undersigned to find that Ruden McCloskey commenced its representation of Ms. Romano with regard to the instant case after January 21, 2009, if at all. Filing of the Petitions The 14th day after publication of the notice of the Permit Modification fell on January 23, 2009. On February 4, 2009, the initial Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed challenging the DEP issuance of the Permit Modification. The Petition named the Conservation Alliance as a party. On February 12, 2009, an Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings was filed that, among other things, added Ms. Romano as a party. Allegations of Standing - Conservation Alliance The Conservation Alliance is a non-profit, Florida corporation incorporated in 1985. It has at least 100 members that reside in St. Lucie County. It was formed for the general purpose of protecting the “water, soil, air, native flora and fauna,” and thus the environment of St. Lucie County. In the Petition for Formal Proceedings, as it has been amended, the Conservation Alliance made specific allegations as to how the issuance of the Permit Modification may affect its substantial interests. Those allegations are related, first, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the FPUA public water supply that serves members of the Conservation Alliance and, second, to the effect of the Permit Modification on the ability of the members to recreate and enjoy the waters of St. Lucie County. FPUA Water Service In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “[m]embers of the Alliance own real property or otherwise reside within the service area of FPUA, and are, in fact, serviced by FPUA.” As a result, the members “will be adversely affected by the injection of the Allied waste stream into IW-1, which is located within 500 feet of three potable water supply sources, from which . . . Romano and the Alliance?s members are provided with potable water,” resulting in “a potential for those contaminants and hazardous materials to get into Petitioners? source of potable water.” Mr. Brady, the Conservation Alliance?s president, does not receive water service from the FPUA. Mr. Brady did not know how many members of the Conservation Alliance received water service from the FPUA. Persons living in unincorporated areas of Fort Pierce do not receive potable water from the FPUA. A mailing address of “Fort Pierce” does not mean that the person lives in the incorporated City of Fort Pierce. Mr. Brady “assumed” many of the members lived in the City of Fort Pierce, but offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support that assumption. Mr. Stinnette testified that he was “confident that we have members that receive water from [FPUA]” but was not able to quantify the number of said members. As with Mr. Brady, Mr. Stinnette offered no admissible, non-hearsay evidence of any kind to support his belief. Recreational and Environmental Interests In its Second Amended Petition for Formal Proceedings, the Conservation Alliance alleged that “. . . Romano and the Alliance?s members utilize and protect the waters of St. Lucie County. Petitioners? recreational and environmental interests will be adversely affected if the Allied waste stream leaves the injection well area and flows into the rivers, streams, and or ocean.” Mr. Brady understood that one member of the Conservation Alliance, George Jones, fished in the C-24 canal, although Mr. Brady had not personally fished there for 25 years. Mr. Brady otherwise provided no evidence of the extent to which members used or enjoyed the waters in or around St. Lucie County. Mr. Stinnette has recreated in various water bodies that are tributaries of the Indian River Lagoon system. He indicated that he had engaged in recreational activities in and on the waters of St. Lucie County with “dozens” of people over the past 16 years, some of whom were members of the Conservation Alliance. There was no evidence offered as to how many of those persons were members of the Conservation Alliance, as opposed to members of other organizations or of no organization at all, or whether they were current members during the period relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Stinnette testified that the previously mentioned Mr. Jones said that he kayaked in the waters of St. Lucie County but, as to the recreational activities of other members, testified that “I don't know, I don't keep up with their day-to-day activities to that extent.” Although Mr. Jones testified at the hearing, he provided no information as to the nature or extent of his recreational uses of the waters of St. Lucie County. The only evidence of Mr. Jones? use of the waters of St. Lucie County is hearsay. Thus, the only finding that can be made as to the recreational use of the waters of St. Lucie County by current members of the Conservation Alliance is limited to the recreational use by a single member, Mr. Stinnette. Petitioner, Elaine Romano Ms. Romano is a member of the Conservation Alliance. The allegations regarding Ms. Romano?s substantial interests in this proceeding were the same as those of the Conservation Alliance as set forth above. FPUA Water Service Ms. Romano has her primary residence at 3436 Roselawn Boulevard, Fort Pierce, Florida. Her residence is not served by FPUA. Ms. Romano is the executor of the estate of her mother, Marion Scherer. The estate owns a residence at 1903 Royal Palm Drive, Fort Pierce, Florida that is currently vacant. That residence is served by FPUA. The estate is not a party to this proceeding. Recreational and Environmental Interests Ms. Romano attends certain meetings and functions of the Conservation Alliance, but offered no testimony of her use or enjoyment of any natural resources that could be affected by the Permit Modification. In that regard, her interest in this case was precipitated by a desire to support her mother?s interest in ecology.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection, enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Formal Proceeding as amended. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2013.
Findings Of Fact Application No. 76-00493 is for an existing consumptive use permit for five wells located in the Peace River Basin, Polk County on 608.6 acres. The permit seeks a total average annual withdrawal of 7.2 million gallons per day and a maximum daily withdrawal of 14.97 million gallons per day. Ninety-five percent of the water withdrawal will be used for industrial purposes and five percent will be used for irrigation. The Southwest Florida Water Management District's staff recommends issuance of the permit with the following conditions: That the applicant shall install totalizing flow meters of the propeller-driven type on all withdrawal points covered by the application except that well located at Latitude 28 degrees 03' 13", Longitude 81 degrees 47' 54". That the applicant shall record the pumpage from the above meters on a weekly basis and submit a record of that pumpage quarterly to the district beginning January 15, 1977. That the permit shall expire on December 31, 1980
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that a consumptive use permit be granted in the amounts applied for in Application No. 76-00493 subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 2 above. ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Coca Cola Company Post Office Box 247 Auburndale, Florida 33823
The Issue Whether the Respondent's beverage license should be revoked or suspended?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the State of Florida, Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. (Stipulated Fact). The Respondent is John Timmons, Jr., d/b/a Harold's Grocery. (Stipulated Fact). The Respondent, at all times relevant to this proceeding, operated a grocery store where beer and wine was sold under beverage license number 23-1197, Series 2-APS. (Stipulated Fact). The Respondent's licensed premises is located at 17347 Homestead Avenue, Miami, Dade County, Florida. (Stipulated Fact). On September 21, 1962, the Respondent applied for a transfer of the subject beverage license to its current location. Included with the transfer application was a "Sketch of Licensed Premises." In pertinent part, the licensed premises was identified as follows: Based upon the Sketch of the Licensed Premises submitted by the Respondent to the Petitioner, the licensed premises consisted of only a portion of the building located in the northern part of the building. The southern portion of the building consisted of a pool hall which was not identified as a part of the licensed premises. The Respondent owned the entire building. The pool hall is identified above by the dotted lines. The dotted lines were not a part of the Sketch of the Licensed Premises. The Respondent agreed as an incidence of filing the transfer application that any alterations or additions to the licensed premises could be inspected in the same manner as the portion of the licensed premises identified- on the Sketch of the Licensed Premises. The Respondent subsequently made substantial alterations to the building. The portion of the building formerly used for the pool hall has been incorporated, at least in part, into the portion of the building used by the Respondent in his business. The building and its uses during the period of time at issue in this proceeding consisted of the following: The portion of the building to the south of the dotted line is the area where the pool "all was located. That area is now used as a storeroom, the Respondent's living quarters and as a part of the store. The area of the building identified as a part of the store and the storeroom are part of the licensed premises. The area of the building identified as the Respondent's living quarters is not a part of the licensed premises. This area is used exclusively by the Respondent as his personal residence. Although there is access through a door from the living quarters into the store, the living quarters were not readily accessible by anyone except the Respondent and his personal guests. Employees of the Respondent and patrons did not go into the Respondent's living quarters. No business was conducted in the living quarters. On or before February 10, 1983, the Metro-Dade Police Department (hereinafter referred to as "MDPD") began an undercover narcotics investigation of the Respondent. On February 10, 1983, MDPD Sergeant Ed Howett searched a confidential informant, gave the informant $10.00 and watched him enter the licensed premises. `When the informant left the licensed premises, the informant was in possession of marijuana and did not have the $10.00 given to him or her. The informant had purchased the marijuana from someone in the Respondent's building. Based upon the sworn affidavits of two MDPD officers as to the reliability of the confidential informant and the events of February 10, 1983, a search warrant for the Respondent's building was issued on February 11, 1983, by the Honorable Judge Alan Kornblum. On February 15, 1983, MDPD Detective Ricky Smith entered the licensed premises. (Stipulated Fact). Detective Smith was not in uniform. Detective Smith approached Mary Williams, an employee of the Respondent, who was behind the counter on the licensed premises. Detective Smith purchased $2.00 worth of marijuana (2 marijuana cigarettes) from Mary Williams. (Stipulated Fact). Shortly after Detective Smith's purchase of marijuana, MDPD officers entered the licensed premises to execute the search warrant issued on February 11, 1983. (Stipulated Fact). The search warrant applied to the entire building. At the time of the search Mary Williams, Henry Timmons and the Respondent were present on the licensed premises. (Stipulated Fact). Henry Timmons was behind the counter on the licensed premises. (Stipulated Fact). Henry Timmons is the Respondent's brother and was an employee of the Respondent. Located at the cash register closest to the front door was Mary Williams. (Stipulated Fact). The Respondent was located on a patio with Cary Lou Harris. The patio was outside the Respondent's living quarters and was accessible from the living quarters. The Respondent and his brother have similar facial hair. People have confused the Respondent and his brother. Detective Smith and MDPD Detective Preston Lucas, however, were able to distinguish the Respondent from his brother. Detective Smith grew up in the area where the Respondent's store is located and was familiar enough with the Respondent to recognize him. During the execution of the search warrant, approximately 100 marijuana cigarettes and several separate bags of marijuana were found in plain view on the counter on the licensed premises. (Stipulated Fact). Marijuana was also found in Henry Timmons' back pocket. (Stipulated Fact). The Respondent was surrounded to the area of the licensed premises where the police officers had entered. After discovering the marijuana on the counter, the Respondent was asked by the police if that was all of the marijuana. The Respondent replied "yeah, that should be all of it." (Stipulated Fact). Henry Timmons accompanied police officers to the storeroom at the back of the licensed premises. Although Henry Timmons worked in the storeroom, he lied when he indicated that he was unable to find the light switch. Therefore, the Respondent went to the storeroom and turned the light on. Additional bags of marijuana were found in the storeroom (Stipulated Fact). "Then these additional bags were found the Respondent stated that "well, now you really got it all." (Stipulated Fact). Based upon the Respondent's statements to police during the execution of the search warrant, it is clear that the Respondent knew that marijuana was located on the licensed premises. On three separate occasions (March 2, 4 and 28, 1983) MDPD officers entered the licensed premises in an attempt to purchase marijuana from an employee. (Stipulated Fact). On each of the occasions, the employee referred the officers to Larry Wilcox, an individual who was standing outside the licensed premises. (Stipulated Fact). On each of the occasions, the officer purchased marijuana from Larry Wilcox, who retrieved it from a brown paper bag which was stored behind an ice machine in front of the licensed premises. (Stipulated Fact). On March 2, 1983, Detective Smith entered the licensed premises and asked Mary Williams, who was still employed by the Respondent, if he could buy marijuana. Mary Williams pointed to Larry Wilcox, who was standing outside the licensed premises. The Respondent did not witness this event. Detective Smith left the licensed premises and approached Larry Wilcox. Wilcox, who was never employed by the Respondent, sold marijuana to Detective Smith. The marijuana was obtained from a bag retrieved by Larry Wilcox from behind the tee machine which "`as located outside of the licensed premises. No evidence was presented as to who owned the ice machine. On March 4, 1983, Detective Smith and Detective Lucas returned to the licensed premises. They drove up to the curb of the street in front of the licensed premises. The evidence does not show which employee (as stipulated to by the parties) referred Detective Smith to Wilcox on this occasion. Detective Smith approached Larry `Wilcox who was standing on the sidewalk in front of the licensed premises. Detective Smith again purchased marijuana from Larry Wilcox. The marijuana was retrieved from behind the ice machine. The Respondent and Henry Timmons were present on the sidewalk in front of the licensed premises during the March 4, 1983 purchase. The Respondent was close enough to witness the transaction. On March 28, 1983, Detective Smith returned to the licensed premises. He entered the licensed premises and approached the Respondent and Larry Wilcox, who were standing inside the licensed premises. Mary Williams was behind the counter. Detective Smith announced to no one in particular that he wished to buy some marijuana. Again, the evidence does not prove which employee referred the officer to Larry Wilcox. The evidence does prove that the Respondent pointed to Larry Wilcox in response to Detective Smith's question. Larry Wilcox and Detective Smith then left the licensed premises. Detective Smith again purchased marijuana from Larry Wilcox which was obtained from behind the ice machine. On March 29, 1983, upon sworn affidavit, another search warrant was obtained from the Honorable Judge Alan Kornblum for the Respondent's building (Stipulated Fact). The search warrant was executed on the same day. It applied to the entire building. During the execution of the search warrant, Larry Wilcox was arrested on the licensed premises. Upon searching Larry Wilcox, marijuana and quaaludes were discovered. (Stipulated Fact). Marijuana and quaaludes were also found in a trash can located outside the front door of the licensed premises. (Stipulated Fact). No evidence was presented as to who owned the trash can. Two cigar boxes, a metal can, a plastic container and three strainers, all of which contained marijuana residue, were discovered in the living quarters. The Respondent was not present during the March ?9, 1983 search of the licensed premises or his living quarters. On April 28, 1984, MDPD Sergeant Louis Battle and Investigator Lou Terminello entered the licensed premises to conduct a license inspection (Stipulated Fact). The Respondent was located behind the counter on the licensed premises when Sergeant Battle and Investigator Terminello entered. A burnt marijuana cigarette was found in plain view on the counter. (Stipulated Fact). During questioning, the Respondent stated that he smoked marijuana in his living quarters and that he no longer sold marijuana. Marijuana residue was found in the living quarters. During the April 28, 1984, search, a loaded, stolen firearm was found underneath the counter on the licensed premises. It was not proved whether the Respondent was aware of the fact that the firearm was stolen. Administrative charges were brought against the Respondent based upon alleged violations of the controlled substance statute within the beverage statute. Specifically, the Respondent was charged with possession of marijuana on the premises, conspiracy to sell marijuana, possession of marijuana by his employees on the premises, sale and conspiracy to sell marijuana by one of his employees on the premises and public nuisance. The Respondent usually worked on the licensed premises until 4:00 p.m. After 4:00 p.m. the Respondent normally retired to his living quarters. All of the events involved in this proceeding occurred after 4:00 p.m. Although there was testimony to the contrary, it is concluded that the Respondent did not take steps to prevent the possession or sale and/or delivery of marijuana on the licensed premises. The Respondent made statements which indicated that he was aware that marijuana was kept on the licensed premises, he admitted smoking marijuana in his living quarters, marijuana was found in his living quarters on several occasions and he did not fire his brother or Mary Williams after the execution of the first search warrant on February 1, 1983. The Respondent was negligent in supervising the operation of his business. The Respondent entered into a Stipulation on October 7, 1974, whereby he agreed to pay a civil penalty of $250.00 in settlement of charges that the Respondent sold alcoholic beverages for food coupons.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of a violation (possession of marijuana) within Section 561.29(1)(a) and (b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count 1. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of a violation (possession of marijuana) within Section 561.29(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count 2. The Respondent should, however, be found not guilty of a violation within Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count 2 and that portion of Count 2 should be dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of a violation within Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes (possession of marijuana on the licensed premises but not the marijuana found in his 1iving quarters), and a violation within Section 561.29(1)(b), Florida Statutes (possession of marijuana on the licensed premises and in the living quarters), as alleged in Count 3. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found not guilty of conspiracy as alleged in Count Count 4 should he dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of a violation (possession of marijuana by an employee) with Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count It is further RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of a violation (sale and/or delivery of marijuana by an employee) within Section 561.29(1)(a) , Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count 6. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of a violation (possession of marijuana by an employee) within Section 561.29(1)(a), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count 7. It is further
Findings Of Fact On or about September 23, 1986 Garth DuQuesnay, lessee, filed an application for conditional use approval with Respondent for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages (4-COP) at 735 South Bayway Boulevard, Clearwater Beach, Florida. (Bayside Shores, Block C, Lots 1-10). The property in question is zoned beach commercial, "CB", and this application was numbered CU-86-83. Donna and William Kebort are owners of the real property in question, and at the time of this application DuQuesnay was their lessee, as well as the owner and operator of a business known as Dock of the Bay located on the subject real property. DuQesnay sought the conditional use approval which is the subject of this appeal because he had not been able to maintain at least 51 percent food sales at Dock of the Bay. He was operating at the time with a 4-COP-SRX approval which requires at least 51 percent food sales. The 4-COP approval sought herein does not require at least 51 percent food sales. The property in question is separated from residential property on two sides by streets. This residential area includes condominiums and residential motels. On the two remaining sides, the subject property is separated by streets from hotels, a Pick-Kwick Store, and a small shopping area. Some of the hotels have lounges and bars. The subject property lies generally between these hotels and the residential area such that the subject property is closer to the residential area than the hotels which have lounges and bars. The subject property is within two hundred feet of the residential area. The Planning and Zoning Board denied Petitioners' application for conditional use approval on October 14, 1986 on the grounds of incompatibility with residential areas. The evidence establishes that at the time this application was considered by the Board, noise, unruly customer behavior, hours of operation and the proximity of Dock of the Bay to the residential area made this business incompatible with these residential uses. Shortly after the October 14, 1986 meeting of the Planning and Zoning Board when Petitioner's application for 4-COP approval was denied, DuQuesnay sold his interest in Dock of the Bay Restaurant to Adriano Battaglini, and DuQuesnay has no present interest in the subject property, fixtures, equipment or inventory thereon, except as a secured creditor. On October 26, 1986 Battaglini applied for conditional use approval to maintain a family restaurant on the subject property, with at least 51 percent food sales (4-COP-SRX), and the application was approved by the Planning and Zoning Board on November 18, 1986. Battaglini's application and conditional use approval was numbered CU-86-94. Donna Kebort was shown as property owner on Battaglini's application.
The Issue This is an appeal from a resolution of the Monroe County Planning Commission ("Planning Commission") approving the Minor Conditional Use application of Ann and Gary Violet and Violet Communications for a radio tower and a transmitter equipment building to be constructed on Ramrod Key. The instant appeal was transferred from the Planning Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings pursuant to Article XIV, Monroe County Code, the Hearing Officer Appellate Article. The issue presented in this appeal is whether Resolution No. P13-99 of the Planning Commission should be affirmed, reversed, or modified.
The Issue Whether the Planning Commission deviated from essential requirements of law in denying Appellant's application for a special use permit to operate a car rental agency at 2576 Harn Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Manual Kastrenakes, d/b/a Pinellas Rent-A-Car, Appellant, purchased the property which is the subject of this appeal in 1989. Prior to this purchase, the property was the site of a Farm Store, which has been vacated. Appellant also owns a filling station in the vicinity of this property which is legally operated and is in compliance with all zoning requirements. The property is zoned CH (highway commercial). Within Highway Commercial Districts, outdoor retail sales, displays and/or storage are permitted as conditional uses. Section 135.129(11), City of Clearwater Land Development Code. Objections to the granting of this conditional use permit come from residents of multifamily residential buildings adjacent to and west of the property in issue. Many of those residents are retired and/or infirm and contend they will be disturbed by the operation of a rental car business "in their back yard." To counter some of these objections, Appellant agreed to conditions being imposed on this permit limiting hours of operation, lighting, paving, buffer zones, and parking. Protestants also contend that operating the business would depreciate the value of their property, but no credible evidence was presented to support this position. Appellant has further agreed that disabled or wrecked vehicles will not be stored on this property, and only fully operable rental automobiles will be stored and/or displayed on this property.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
Findings Of Fact The petitioner is a non-profit corporation consisting of individual members who are residents of Tallahassee and Leon County and organizational members who have chapters in Tallahassee and Leon County. The primary purpose of petitioner is to bring about a balanced transportation system in Tallahassee and Leon County taking into consideration certain criteria which include the following: the prevention of neighborhood disruption and deterioration; the prevention of environmental degradation; and the prevention of harm to historical sites. In conjunction with this purpose and these criteria, one of petitioner's primary concerns is the prevention of degradation of air quality in the Tallahassee, Leon County area. Some members of the petitioner use that part of Thomasville Road to be affected by the subject application. The project for which the Department of Transportation seeks a Complex Source Permit is the four-laning of Thomasville Road from Eighth Avenue to Interstate 10 in Tallahassee, Florida. The Complex Source Permit was originally submitted to the Department of Environmental Regulation on March 22, 1976. The Department of Environmental Regulation did not accept that application, however, due to unacceptable modeling and monitoring. Thereafter, two supplements to the application were submitted to the Department of Environmental Regulation. The first, dated September 21, 1976, and the second, dated November 16, 1976, contained additional monitoring and a repeat of the modeling effort. Because of allegedly incorrect counts and speeds, the Department of Transportation submitted yet another application with revised monitoring and modeling data on January 4, 1978. This latest revised application is the subject of this hearing. The Department of Transportation did not monitor for or project the concentrations of any pollutant listed in Section 17-2.05, F.A.C., except carbon monoxide. The Department of Environmental Regulation did not require the monitoring for or projection of concentrations of any pollutant listed in Section 17-2.05, F.A.C., except carbon monoxide. The evidence presented in this proceeding does not establish that construction of the project for which a Complex Source Permit is sought herein would result in or cause an increase in ambient pollutant concentrations of any pollutant listed in Section 17-2.05, F.A.C., with the exception of carbon monoxide. The evidence presented indicates that remaining pollutants listed in the foregoing section would be emitted in insignificant quantities having no effect on the ambient air quality standard for that pollutant. The Department of Environmental Regulation has not independently monitored for any of the pollutants considered by Section 17-2.04(8), F.A.C., but has relied entirely on data submitted by the Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation has based its carbon monoxide projections upon the use of the California Line Source Model, also known as Calair I, which is a mathematical computer model. It appears from the evidence presented that the Calair I computer model was used in a reasonable and proper manner and produced data which could be relied upon by the Department of Environmental Regulation. The Complex Source Permit application as finally submitted on January 4, 1978, projects the following concentrations for carbon monoxide: one-hour concentration for 1979, 6.7 ppm and for 1939, 4.8 ppm; for eight-hour concentrations in 1969, 2.8 ppm and for 1989, 2.0 ppm. The ambient air quality standard for carbon monoxide set forth in Section 17-2.05(1)(c), F.A.C., is 9 ppm maximum eight-hour concentration and 35 ppm maximum one-hour concentration, both not to be exceeded more than once per year. The testimony indicates that even if the calibration factor with the Calair I model were doubled, the projected carbon monoxide concentrations would not exceed the foregoing standard. No evidence was presented on the issues initially raised in this proceeding involving the Major Thoroughfare Plan, the Transportation Improvement Plan, and the Urban Area Transportation Plan. The testimony and evidence presented in this proceeding establishes reasonable assurance that the subject project will not cause a violation of the ambient air quality standards for the major pollutants to be emitted.
