Findings Of Fact Exhibit 3, a proposal of B & G Services, Inc. to perform work for Charles L. Deveny was admitted into evidence without objection. Therein B & G Services, Inc. contracted to perform work consisting of an addition to Deveny's residence and received as down payment for said work $351.44. This check was made payable to Don Clapp Industries. At the time of the execution of this contract Don Clapp Industries was the wholly owned subsidiary of B & G Services, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as B & G). Mr. Essex was President of B & G at this time and held the contractor's license for the company. Although he acknowledged that B & G had received the money from Deveny and no work had been performed under this contract, Mr. Essex stated that this was the first time he had ever seen the contract. When advised by the Board of the charges pending against him he repaid the $351.44 to Deveny. He stated that he paid this money from his own funds because he felt a personal obligation to the customer for the work that had been scheduled to be performed by B & G and had not been done. Exhibit 2, Petition for Bankruptcy, filed May 24, 1975 was also admitted into evidence without objection. Mr. Essex further testified that the petition for reorganization and for an arrangement under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act had been modified and that straight bankruptcy is being processed. B & G has been discharged as a creditor, however, the bankruptcy proceeding has not been terminated to date.
Findings Of Fact Arthur E. Culbreth is a registered General Contractor holding license number RG 0014618 and a registered Mechanical Contractor holding license number R 0018764. Both licenses are current. On June 14, 1977 Respondent filed a voluntary petition of bankruptcy in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida and was subsequently discharged. Since his discharge in bankruptcy Respondent has continued in the heating and air conditioning business which he has operated for some twenty years. He has operated generally on a cash basis since his bankruptcy proceedings but several suppliers have extended credit to him on a limited open account. Respondent currently employs 5 persons and has regularly met his payroll. He is considered to be a well qualified installer of hearing and air conditioning equipment as well as an excellent trouble shooter on this type equipment. His financial statement (Exhibit 2) shows that Respondent has operated at a profit since his discharge in bankruptcy and there is every indication he will be able to continue to do so. Several of those debts discharged in bankruptcy have been partially repaid by Respondent from profits and by performing work for these creditors.
Findings Of Fact On September 6, 2001, Petitioner Bowers filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) a Charge of Discrimination against Respondent, Big Red Waste, Inc. The Charge recited that the most recent or continuing date of discrimination was July 10, 2001, for a finite, one-time act of alleged unlawful employment practice, to wit: termination on the basis of race (Black) and in retaliation. One hundred and eighty days from the filing of Petitioner's Charge with the Commission would have been on or about March 5, 2002. On September 19, 2003, the Commission entered a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. On December 23, 2003, the Commission entered an Amended Dismissal and Notice of Rights. The Commission's Amended Dismissal and Notice of Rights (Amended Dismissal) recited that on May 14, 2002, the Commission had received notice that Respondent had filed a voluntary Chapter 7 Petition in Bankruptcy. Therefore, it is presumed that as of May 14, 2002, an automatic stay of proceedings before the Commission was in effect. The Commission's Amended Dismissal also stated: . . . It has been more than 180 days since Complainant's complaint was filed, and since no determination has been made due to the automatic stay that was issued in Respondent's bankruptcy case, and since Complainant has been previously notified by the Commission of his obligation to file a Notice of Claim [in the federal bankruptcy court], the Commission hereby dismisses this Charge of Discrimination and provides the following Notice to Complainant. Since the Commission did not make a determination of cause or no cause on your complaint within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, you may proceed as if the Commission determined there was reasonable cause. Section 760.11(8), Florida Statutes; Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 2002). You must initiate a civil lawsuit within 1-year from the date of this dismissal, or an administrative action with the Division of Administrative Hearings within 35 days of the date of this dismissal, provided neither date has exceeded a total of four (4) years from the initial date of the violation. Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes; Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So. 2d 432 (Fla. 2000). If more than four (4) years have passed once the automatic stay is lifted on Respondent's bankruptcy case, you must file your civil lawsuit, or your administrative action within 30 days of the lifting of the automatic stay. Morsani v. Major League Baseball, 739 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1999). If the Respondent has not emerged from bankruptcy, and if you determine you do not want to wait until Respondent emerges from bankruptcy, you may file a Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay, and present your argument and authorities to the bankruptcy judge assigned to Respondent's bankruptcy case. The Commission does not assist Complainants with filing the Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay. You must consult an attorney on your own for that purpose. [Bracketed material added for clarity.] One year from the Commission's December 23, 2003, Amended Dismissal will be December 22, 2004. Thirty-five days from the Commission's December 23, 2004, Amended Dismissal would have been January 27, 2004. Four years from July 30, 2001, the initial date of the violation, will be July 29, 2005. On February 12, 2004, Petitioner sent a letter to the Commission stating that the Commission's "right to sue" letter did not include a blank Petition for Relief. However, the referral packet from the Commission to the Division included no "right to sue letter." The Commission's response to the Order of the undersigned dated May 3, 2004, does not contain a "right to sue" letter. On February 17, 2004, the Commission entered an Order to Show Cause Why Case Should Not Be Closed Because of Bankruptcy Proceedings (Commission's Order to Show Cause). The Commission's Order to Show Cause noted that Respondent had filed a Voluntary Petition for Bankruptcy, Chapter 11, on October 9, 2001, and that the same case was converted to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding on May 7, 2002. The Commission's Order to Show Cause also noted that a letter advising Petitioner of the bankruptcy was sent on May 20, 2002, and that a final order distributing all assets and dismissing the bankruptcy case was entered on September 9, 2002. The Commission ordered the parties to show cause, before March 19, 2004, why the discrimination case before the Commission should not be closed. The referral packet from the Commission to the Division included a Response to the Commission's Order to Show Cause, filed with the Commission by the trustee in bankruptcy, on or about March 8, 2004. That Response recites that Respondent's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding was dismissed by a September 9, 2002, Order and that "upon the dismissal order becoming final all of the assets of Big Red Waste, Inc., reverted to that corporation and the automatic stay was terminated and vacated as to all creditors and claimants against Big Red Waste, Inc." The bankruptcy court docket was provided to the Division by the Commission in response to the May 3, 2004, Order herein. Assuming a 30-day appeal period, the dismissal by the Bankruptcy Court became final, at the latest, as of October 8, 2002. Therefore, the latest date the automatic stay was lifted would also have been October 8, 2002, although the September 9, 2002, date of the Bankruptcy Court's Order would be reverted-to, absent an appeal, and there is no evidence of an appeal. According to the Commission's response to the May 3, 2004, Order herein, the Petition for Relief in the instant discrimination case was "inadvertently dated March 13, 2004," but was filed with the Commission on March 9, 2004. The Petition for Relief recites repeatedly, "see attached complaint." There was no complaint attached to the Petition in the packet referred by the Commission to the Division, and none was provided in response to the May 3, 2002, Order herein. Therefore, pursuant to the terms of the May 3, 2004, Order herein, it is presumed that the "complaint" referred to in the Petition for Relief is the September 6, 2001, Charge of Discrimination, and it may further be presumed that no continuing pattern of discrimination continued after the finite termination date of July 1, 2001. However, by the Petition for Relief, Petitioner attempted to add as a party Respondent, Respondent's president, Yvonne Kiawtkowski. Petitioner has as yet demonstrated no good cause to add Respondent's president, in her individual capacity, to this administrative discrimination case when she was not individually charged in the original Charge before the Commission. The copy of the Petition for Relief and Attachments sent to the most recent address in the Commission file for Respondent's Corporation apparently were returned to the Commission. The same has occurred with regard to all papers mailed by the Division to that address. Therefore, no Notice of Hearing can be sent by the Division to Respondent's Corporation. Telephone calls by the undersigned's secretary to Big Red Waste, Inc.'s last known phone number, which was provided in the Commission's referral packet, have resulted in an oral response that the party at that phone number is not Big Red Waste, Inc. Recently, the Commission determined that Ms. Kiawtkowski has a new personal address. On June 21, 2004, the Petition for Relief and Attachments were returned to the Commission from that address too. The Commission has stated it cannot determine whether Ms. Kiawtkowski ignored the certified mail receipt for this mailing or whether she no longer resides in that area.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wayne N. Bowers 10951 Laureate Drive, Apartment 601 San Antonio, Florida 78249 Yvonne Kwiatkowski, President Big Red Waste, Inc. Post Office Box 549 Alachua, Florida 32615 Yvonne Kwiatkowski, President Big Red Waste, Inc. Post Office Box 730981 Ormond Beach, Florida 32173
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a limited surety agent (bail bondsman), a life and health agent and a general lines agent. Respondent has been licensed as an insurance agent for more than eleven years. He has been a licensed limited surety agent for more than ten years. Pursuant to Section 648.442(3), Florida Statutes, all collateral received by Respondent or others acting under his supervision or control in transactions under his surety agent license constituted trust funds received in a fiduciary capacity. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been doing business as Protective Insurance Center, Jenkins Bail Bonds. Until early February of 1991, Respondent's general agent was Banker's Insurance Company. However, in early February, Respondent's relationship with that company was terminated. Respondent's current general agent is American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida. Russell Faibish, Respondent's general agent with American Bankers since February of 1991, has expressed via affidavit that Respondent is in good standing with that company and the company has been satisfied with his performance to date. On January 25, 1991, Respondent, while acting in his capacity as a limited surety agent for Banker's Insurance Company, posted a surety bond, No. 339658, (the "Bond") in the amount of $752.00 to obtain the release of Kim Reinhold Whitford from custody in Clay County, Florida. In connection with the posting of the Bond, Respondent received from Earnest R. Justice (the "Indemnitor") a $75.00 premium payment and a $350.00 cash collateral payment. At the time the Indemnitor arranged with Respondent for the issuance of the bond, the Indemnitor was advised that his collateral would be returned within twenty one days of the receipt of written notice of the discharge of the bond. Respondent was provided with a notice from the Clerk of Court that Ms. Whitford was scheduled for a court appearance on April 3, 1991 for a "plea." Respondent never made any inquiry as to the results of that April 3, 1991 hearing. On April 3, 1991, the Bond was discharged and the obligation of the surety, Banker's Insurance Company, was released in writing by the County Court of Clay County, Florida. Respondent contends that he never received notification of the discharge of the Bond. While the Court document indicates that a notice of the discharge of the Bond was sent to Respondent at the time the requirements for the discharge were satisfied on or about April 3, 1991, no conclusive evidence was presented to establish that the notice of discharge was actually sent to or received by Respondent. Respondent denies ever receiving that document. After Ms. Whitford was released from jail, the Indemnitor contacted Respondent's office several times in April and May of 1991 trying to arrange the return of his collateral. Respondent denies receiving any messages from the Indemnitor. The failure to receive the messages may have been due to office staff turnover. In any event, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the Indemnitor attempted to arrange for the return of his collateral on numerous occasions without success. On August 9, 1991, the Petitioner filed the Administrative Complaint which is the basis for this proceeding against Respondent alleging that he failed to return the Indemnitor's collateral. Upon receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Respondent contacted the Clerk of Court, in Clay County, Florida to determine the status of the bond. On August 30, 1991, the Clerk of Court, Clay County, Florida, sent Respondent a certified copy of the bond discharge. Respondent claims that he first became aware of the discharge of the Bond and the Indemnitor's right to the return of the collateral when he received the August 30 certification from Clay County. Because an Administrative Complaint had already been filed, Respondent did not immediately refund the collateral for fear that such action could be construed as an attempt to influence a witness in the case. In order to avoid the appearance of attempting to influence a witness, Respondent waited until the day of the hearing to arrange to make a refund of the collateral available to the Indemnitor. On January 14, 1992, Respondent sent a Western Union Money Transfer, control no. 7395574746, payable to the Indemnitor in the amount of $350.00 as return of the collateral. Although the Indemnitor did not receive the return of his collateral until approximately eight to nine months after it was due, the collateral was ultimately returned and there is no other evidence in this case of any other financial loss to any member of the public. On average, Respondent has between 100 to 150 active bond cases per month. Most of those bonds are written in Palm Beach County, where Respondent's business is located. In this case, Respondent arranged for a "teletype bond" whereby the arrangements for the bond were made in Palm Beach County and notification of the posting of the bond and authorization for the release of the prisoner were transmitted via teletype to Clay County. Respondent contends that he reviews his active cases on a quarterly basis to confirm the status of the bonds. Nevertheless, it took almost six months for Respondent to determine that the requirements of the Bond in this case had been fully satisfied. No justifiable excuse was given for this delay. However, in mitigation, it does appear that the long distance nature of the transaction, the change in Respondent's general agent and office staff turnover all contributed to the delay in refunding the Indemnitor's collateral. Respondent has had three Administrative Complaints filed against him since 1985. The first Administrative Complaint was filed on June 26, 1985 and alleged that Respondent failed to provide required documentation of his assets to the Department. Pursuant to a Consent Order entered on August 6, 1985, Respondent was fined $200 and placed on probation for one year as a result of this charge. The most serious and pertinent prior administrative proceeding against Respondent was commenced by an Administrative Complaint dated November 17, 1987. That complaint alleged, among other things, that Respondent failed to return collateral to at least two clients. In April of 1989, the parties entered into a settlement stipulation regarding these charges pursuant to which Respondent was suspended for one year and fined $1,000.00. He was also required to make resitution to several individuals who had not been identified in the Administrative Complaint in that case. No explanation has been provided regarding the "restitution" required to be made to those individuals. The third case involved an Emergency Suspension Order entered on March 16, 1988. That Order was dissolved on September 20, 1988 when the underlying criminal charges were nolle prosequi. Respondent has had several IRS liens filed against him and there is currently a foreclosure action pending against his house. However, no specific information was provided regarding the status of those cases. Respondent contends that he is vigorously contesting all of those matters and he believes they will be favorably resolved. The evidence in this case suggests that Respondent is currently involved in disputes with some other customers regarding the return of collateral. The evidence did not establish the exact number or the facts surrounding those disputes. Respondent contends that all of those disputes are related to problems with or caused by his prior General Agent. No conclusions as to the merits of those complaints can be drawn from the evidence presented in this case. Gerald Michael Sandy, a licensed bondsman in the State of Florida and the current president of the Florida Surety Agents Association, testified on behalf of the Respondent in this matter. He indicated that on approximately 40% of the bonds that are executed, the Courts do not provide written notice of the discharge. However, Mr. Sandy conceded that even if written notification from a court is not received, the bail bondsman is primarily responsible for determining whether a bond has been discharged and a bail bondsman must immediately respond to the inquiries of an indemnitor regarding the return of collateral.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered suspending Respondent's licenses for three months, placing him on probation for two years and assessing an administrative fine in the amount of $500. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of March, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-6302 Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 2. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. Findings of Fact 5. 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Subordinate to Findings of Fact 13 and 14 and addressed in the Preliminary Statement. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 6 and 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 18. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 20. The Respondents's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in the Findings of Fact of Fact Number in the Recommended Order Where Accepted or Reason for Rejection. 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 2. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. 3. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7. 4. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 5. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. 6. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11. 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 12. 8. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14. 9. Addressed in the Preliminary Statement. 10a. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 10b. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9. 10c. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 10d. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 10. 10e. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. 10f. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 13. 10e.[sic] Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 17. 10f.[sic] Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 16. 10g. Rejected as unnecesdsary. 11a. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. 11b. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. 11c. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21. 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 4. COPIES FURNISHED: David D. Hershel, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasury Larson Building, Room 412 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Franklin Prince, Esquire Northbridge Centre, Suite 300-P 515 N. Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil Deputy General Counsel Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' applications for reimbursement from the Securities Guaranty Fund should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: These cases involve claims by Petitioners, Clyde and Patti Gallo (Case No. 98-3765) and Richard and Belinda Morin (Case No. 98-3766), for payment from the Securities Guaranty Fund (Fund) for monetary damages suffered as a result of violations of the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act by William Anthony McClure (McClure). When the violations occurred, McClure was a registered associated person employed by Schneider Securities, Inc. (Schneider), a Colorado corporation registered as a securities dealer in the State of Florida. The Fund is administered by Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance (Department), which must approve all applications for payment from the fund. Undisputed Facts Regarding the Gallo's Claim McClure served as manager for Schneider's branch office in Gainesville, Florida. On February 26, 1993, the Gallos deposited the sum of $213,978.10 with Schneider to open an account for investment purposes. McClure executed a Letter of Authorization dated March 18, 1993, for the transfer of $30,000.00 from the Gallo's brokerage account without the Gallo's authority. This money was then transferred to Buddy Miller, who paid McClure $5,000.00 for the delivery of the money. McClure subsequently obtained ratification of the transfer of monies from the Gallo's account by representing to Mr. Gallo that the transaction was a "factoring arrangement" and that the investment of monies would be "secure." McClure made the foregoing representations at a time when he knew that Miller was insolvent, that he was paying him a kickback, and that the money had already been transferred from the Gallo's account. McClure did not disclose this information to the Gallos. The Gallos lost the entire $30,000.00 appropriated by McClure from their account with Schneider. In February 1995, the Gallos filed a five-count complaint with the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit against McClure and Schneider. They also served a treble damage notice to McClure under Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. McClure did not make restitution within 30 days from receipt of notice in order to avoid liability for treble damages. In April 1996, the Gallos received the sum of $40,000.00 from Schneider in a mediated settlement. This amount covered their loss of principal. On August 19, 1996, an Amended Final Judgment awarded the Gallos the sum of $30,000.00 in compensatory damages. This amount was then trebled to $90,000.00 pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. The Amended Final Judgment subtracted the sum of $40,000.00 received from Schneider from the $90,000.00 in trebled damages for a total of $50,000.00 plus statutory interest of $9,999.00, or a total of $59,999.00 against McClure. On December 4, 1996, a Final Judgment awarded the Gallos the sum of $20,878.50 in attorney's fees and the sum of $1,312.06 in court costs against McClure. The parties agree that these amounts are not recoverable from the Fund. On July 11, 1998, the Gallos submitted a claim to the Department seeking to recover $10,000.00 of the treble damages they were awarded pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. This claim was denied by the Department on July 28, 1998, on the ground that a claimant cannot recover treble damages from the Fund. Undisputed Facts Regarding the Morin Claim In January 1993, Richard and Belinda Morin deposited the sum of $231,862.59 with Schneider to open an account for investment purposes. McClure was the account executive for Schneider who handled the Morin's brokerage account. In mid-March 1993, McClure contacted Mr. Morin to suggest an investment that he represented as being "secure" and "short-term." McClure described the investment to Morin as a "factoring security" of an account receivable of a major manufacturing concern that was secured by the guaranteed payment of the invoice. The investment suggested by McClure to Morin was really an unsecured loan to a small outdoor furniture manufacturer in Central Florida known as Cypress Originals (Cypress). Cypress was then in severe financial distress which fact was not disclosed to Morin by McClure. On March 5, 1993, or prior to the above discussion, McClure had forged Morin's signature on a Letter of Authorization for the transfer of $25,000.00 from the Morin's brokerage account with Schneider and forwarded the money to Cypress. In June 1993, McClure appropriated an additional $20,000.00 from the Morin's brokerage account into his own personal account or to an account owned and controlled by him. The Morins lost the entire $45,000.00 appropriated from their account. In February 1995, the Morins filed a five-count complaint in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit against McClure and Schneider. They also served a treble damage notice to McClure under Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. McClure did not make any restitution within thirty days after receipt of the notice in order to avoid liability for treble damages. In February 1997, the Morins received $45,000.00 from Schneider in a mediated settlement. This amount covered their loss of principal. On July 2, 1997, the Morins were awarded the sum of $45,000.00 in compensatory damages. This amount was trebled to $135,000.00 pursuant to Section 772.11, Florida Statutes. The Final Judgment awarded the Morins the sum of $90,000 ($135,000.00 in trebled damages less $45,000.00 received from Schneider), prejudgment interest of $48,397.20, court costs of $9,001.67, and attorney's fees of $32,410.00 against McClure. The parties agree that the court costs and attorney's fees are not recoverable from the Fund. On June 11, 1998, the Morins submitted a claim with the Department seeking to recover $10,000.00 of the prejudgment interest award. On July 28, 1998, the Department issued its proposed agency action denying the claim on the ground that prejudgment interest cannot be recovered from the Fund. The Department's Interpretation and Practice The Department interprets the term "actual or compensatory damages," as used in Section 517.141(1), Florida Statutes, to mean only the principal amount of the loss by the investor. The Department has never approved a claim against the Fund for any damages other than the actual loss of principal. Under the Department's interpretation of "actual or compensatory damages," prejudgment interest and trebled damages would be excluded from being recovered from the Fund.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a Final Order denying the applications of Clyde and Patti Gallo and Richard and Belinda Morin for reimbursement from the Securities Guaranty Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Steven D. Spivy, Esquire 230 Northeast 25th Avenue Suite 200 Ocala, Florida 34470-7075 Margaret S. Karniewicz, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Suite 526, Fletcher Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry L. Hooper, III, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Division), is the state agency charged with administering the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund (fund) codified in Sections 494.042 through 494.045, Florida Statutes (1987). Among other things, the Division processes claims for payment from the fund by persons who were parties to a mortgage financing transaction and who have suffered monetary damages as a result of a violation of the law by a licensed mortgage broker. In this case, the perpetrator was Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation (Stackhouse), which held mortgage brokerage license number HB-0006527 from September 19, 1976 through August 31, 1986 and operated at least part of that time in the Brevard County area. In order to perfect a successful claim and be assured of participating in the distribution of moneys from the fund, a person must satisfy a number of statutory criteria within a specified time period after the first notice is filed. This proceeding involves a number of claims by various parties who suffered monetary damages as a result of the illicit acts of Stackhouse. The principal factual issues are whether petitioners, Robert Motes, Machiko Motes, Madge Chesser and Christiane E. Driscoll, all claimants, satisfied the required statutory criteria within the specified time period, and whether the first valid and complete notice of a claim was filed on January 20, 1987 as maintained by the Division, or occurred on a later date as urged by petitioners. These issues are crucial to petitioners' interests since the amount of money to be distributed from the fund for all claimants (on a pro rata basis) is $100,000, and all of that money has been proposed to be distributed to intervenors and other claimants because of the alleged untimeliness of petitioners' claims. The Stackhouse matter first came to the Division's attention on January 20, 1987 when it received by certified mail a letter containing a copy of a complaint filed against Stackhouse by intervenors, Richard S. and Althea M. Rucki, in the circuit court of the eighteenth judicial circuit in and for Brevard County. This filing constituted the first valid and complete notice of the matter. As such, it triggered a two year time period in which other claimants had to file such notice with the Division and then satisfy all statutory criteria in order to share in the first, and in this case the only, distribution of moneys from the fund. Intervenors eventually obtained a summary final judgment against Stackhouse on January 10, 1989 in the amount of $27,200 plus $1,972 in interest, $76 in court costs, and $2,000 in attorney's fees. Copies of the judgment, unsatisfied writ of execution and affidavit of diligent search were filed with the Division on January 19, 1989, or within two years from the date the first notice was filed. After the Rucki notice was filed, a number of claimants, including the other intervenors, filed their notices with the Division within the two year time period and thereafter satisfied all pertinent statutory criteria. Their names, dates of filing their final claims with the Division, and amounts of final judgment, including costs and fees, are listed below in the order in which the claimants filed their first notice with the Division: Claimant Date of Filing Claim Amount of judgment Roberts January 19, 1989 $84,562.30 Rucki January 19, 1989 31,248.00 Gantz January 19, 1989 15,634.28 Carman January 19, 1989 48,767.87 Thomas July 21, 1988 40,103.22 Hahn January 19, 1989 14,165.14 Ulriksson January 18, 1989 14,497.00 Choate January 18, 1989 28,994.00 Anderson December 22, 1988 84,443.20 Resnick December 22, 1988 32,912.22 It is noted that each of the foregoing claimants satisfied all statutory requirements prior to the date of the filing of their respective final claims with the Division. This included the obtaining of a judgment against the debtor, having a writ of execution issued upon the judgment which was later returned unsatisfied, and thereafter having made a reasonable search and inquiry to ascertain whether the judgment debtor possessed any property or other assets to be used in satisfying the judgment. Based upon the judgments obtained by the above claimants, those persons are entitled to distribution from the fund in the following pro rata amounts: Anderson claim - $10,950.00 Resnick claim - 10,950.00 Carman claim - 10,950.00 Thomas claim - 10,950.00 Ulriksson claim - 7,937.83 Choate claim - 10,950.00 Roberts claim - 10,950.00 Gantz claim - 7,697.63 Hahn claim - 7,714.54 Rucki claim - 10,950.00 $100.000.00 On July 27, 1988 petitioners, Robert and Machiko Motes and Madge Chesser, filed their notices with the Division. On August 2, 1988, they were advised by the Division that "the first time period for payment of the Guaranty Fund claims is `two years after the first claim.'" Even so, petitioners did not complete all required statutory steps and file their final claims with the Division until March 1, 1989, or after the two year period had expired. Petitioner, Christiane E. Driscoll, filed her notice, copy of complaint and final judgment on January 23, 1989. Thereafter, she completed all required statutory steps and filed her final claim with the Division on June 6, 1989. As a consequence, none of petitioners are entitled to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund. An attorney who once represented Driscoll, Rafael A. Burguet, made inquiry by telephone with a Division employee in either late December 1988 or early January 1989 concerning the steps required to process a claim on behalf of his client. It was his recollection that the Division employee did not advise him that the two year period for perfecting claims was triggered in January 1987. On January 20, 1989, Burguet sent a letter to the Division with a copy of the complaint and final judgment against Stackhouse. In the letter, he requested the Division to "please advise as to what further requirements you may have to file this claim." On January 23, 1989 a Division employee acknowledged by letter that the Division had received the complaint and judgment. The letter contained copies of the relevant portions of the Florida Statutes and advice that "claims for recovery against Stackhouse Mortgage Corporation are currently being forwarded to our Legal Department for the drafting of a Notice of Intent to either grant or deny payment from the Fund." There is no evidence that the Division made any positive representations to Burguet that either mislead him or caused him to delay in filing his claim. Similarly, the Division responded on August 2, 1988 to the initial filing of the Motes and Chesser notices with advice that the time period for complying with the statutory criteria was "two years after the first claim." Although there were subsequent telephone conversations (but no written communications) between their attorney and the Division, there was no evidence that the Division made any positive representations that would mislead petitioners or otherwise cause them to delay processing their claims. Petitioners Motes and Chesser contend that the first valid and complete notice was not received by the Division until May 20, 1987 when intervenor Carman filed a complaint against Stackhouse in circuit court and also filed her claim and copy of the complaint with the Division the same date. Under this theory, the two year period would not expire until May 19, 1989. This contention is based on the fact that the Rucki complaint was filed in circuit court on January 9, 1987 but the claim and copy of the complaint were not filed with the Division until January 20, 1987. Petitioners contend that subsection 494.043(1)(e) requires both acts to be accomplished the same date. However, this construction of the statute is contrary to the manner in which it has been construed by the Division. According to the stipulated testimony of an employee of the Brevard County sheriff's office, if the property to be levied on is not listed on the instructions to levy, the sheriff's office requires a court order prior to filing a return nulla bona. In this case seven claimants obtained such a court order directing the sheriff to furnish a return nulla bona as to the writ of execution. However, petitioners Motes and Chesser did not do so until after the two year time period had expired. The records received in evidence reflect that the initial inquiry made by Robert and Virginia R. Enteen was never pursued and therefore their claim should be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order distributing the moneys from the mortgage brokerage guaranty fund in a manner consistent with its proposed agency action entered on June 21, 1989. The requests of petitioners to share in the first distribution of moneys from the fund should be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1989 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1989.
The Issue The issue presented for decision herein is whether or not Respondent's real estate salesman's license should be disciplined because he engaged in acts and/or conduct amounting to fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence and breach of trust and for failure to account and deliver monies entrusted to him while acting as a salesman in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) and (d), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received including a review of the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant factual findings. During times material herein, Respondent was, and is, a licensed real estate salesman in Florida and has been issued license number 0128100. (Petitioner's Exhibit 1) Augustin Leon Padron is a resident of Caracas, Venezuela and is a part- time resident of Miami, Florida. During 1978, Leon was interested in purchasing property in the Miami area so he contacted a distant cousin, the Respondent, to help in the acquisition and management of any property be purchased. On November 9, 1978, Leon executed a power of attorney appointing the Respondent as his attorney-in-fact in regard to the acquisition and management of properties that Leon may purchase. (Petitioner's Exhibit 5) On November 17, 1978, Leon wired to the Pespondent $20,000 to be held for the acquisition of property by Leon. (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) On August 31, 1979, Leon, through the assistance of Respondent, purchased a duplex located at 43-45 NW 44 Avenue, Miami, Florida. Of the $20,000 sent to Respondent by Leon, $17,194.35 was used for the purchase of the duplex, leaving a balance of $2,805.65. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4 and 6) The balance of $2,805.65 was never accounted for by Respondent or delivered to Leon. Pursuant to the power of attorney, Respondent assumed the duties of manager of the duplex for Leon, which duties included the collection of rent, making repairs and the payment of the monthly mortgage to Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On or about April 1, 1981, Leon gave a $10,000 check to the Respondent for the purpose of making certain repairs and additions to the duplex. (Petitioner's Exhibit 7) Respondent never made repairs or additions as requested and has failed to account for or deliver, to the present time, any of the $10,000, although demands have been made by Leon for the return of the money. On or about May 24, 1981, Leon issued two checks, each in the amount of $10,000. One check was issued to Arango and Galarraga, a law firm, as a deposit towards the purchase of the Kasbah Bar. The second check was issued to the Respondent to he used as a deposit on the purchase of property in Kendall. (Petitioner's Exhibit 8) Both of the above-referred transactions bailed to materialize. On July 7, 1981, the law firm of Arango and Galarraga issued a check payable to Leon in the amount of $10,000 representing a return of the deposit. (Petitioner's Exhibit 9) This check was tendered to the Respondent. Respondent took this check plus the $10,000 deposit as to the Kendall property and had a $20,000 certified check drawn and made payable to Leon. (Petitioner's Exhibit 10) On November 19, 1981, at Leon's request, Respondent issued a check to Leon in the amount of $10,000 representing a part payment of monies owed to Leon by Respondent. (Petitioner's Exhibit 11) Leon attempted to cash this check hut was told that there were insufficient funds in the Respondent's bank account to cover such an amount. (Petitioner's Exhibit 12) Leon has made numerous demands upon Respondent for the payment of the $10,000 but Respondent has failed to pay over to Leon the $10,000 or to make good on the check he issued. During 1980 and 1981, Respondent failed to make at least five (5) mortgage payments causing the mortgage loan on the duplex, referred to above, with Atlantic Federal Savings and Loan Association to become delinquent and foreclosure proceedings were instituted. (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The evidence is undisputed that Atlantic Federal notified Respondent on at least two occasions that the loan was delinquent and, if not brought current, foreclosure proceedings would result. (Petitioner's Exhibits 15, 16, 17, and Respondent's Exhibit 1) Respondent failed to advise of the nonpayment of the mortgage and the impending foreclosure. Additionally, at no time did Respondent advise Leon that be did not have sufficient funds to make the mortgage payment as scheduled. On November 19, 1981, Leon discovered through the public records of Dade County and Atlantic Federal, that his duplex was about to be foreclosed. Leon brought the mortgage payments current and paid the attorneys fees and costs involved amounting to $5,281.47. (Petitioner's Exhibit 13) Based on the above-referred events, Leon revoked the Respondent's power of attorney effective that day, November 19, 1981. (Petitioner's Exhibit 14) Subsequent to November 19, 1981, Leon attempted to work out arrangements whereby Respondent would repay to Leon all monies owed by Respondent to Leon. These attempts failed and Leon filed suit against Respondent in Dade County Circuit Court for $26,065. On July 24, 1992, Leon secured a final judgment against Respondent for the amount requested, i.e., $26,065 plus interest and costs. (Petitioner's Exhibit 2) To this day, Respondent has failed and refused to satisfy the judgment and Leon has been unsuccessful in his attempted collection on that judgment. Respondent contends that the $10,000 check that gas issued him by Leon was for the payment of services performed on behalf of the Respondent. Evidence in that regard reveals that Respondent was not charging Leon a commission on any real estate transactions. A review of Respondent's testimony herein reveals that in addition to the acquisition and management of the duplex referred to herein which is located at 43-45 NW 44 Avenue in Miami, Respondent only picked up and forwarded goods and merchandise to Respondent in Caracas, Venezuela which had either been purchased by or shipped to Respondent from New York and other places. Apart from the time involved in the reshipping of those goods and merchandise, Respondent only paid nominal shipping charges. It is true that Respondent attempted to negotiate for the sale and purchase of the Kasbah Bar for Leon; however, his efforts in that regard were unsuccessful. Based on all of the evidence herein, including the testimony of Leon and the documentary evidence received, Respondent's contention that Leon owed him in excess of $10,000 is not credible and is rejected. This is especially so in view of the fact that Respondent issued a check in the amount of $10,000 to Leon which was returned for insufficient funds. For all these reasons, Respondent's testimony is incredible and is rejected in those instances wherein it differs from the version offered by the deposition testimony of Augustin Leon Padron.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, Ignacio Dulzaides', license as a real estate salesman (number 0128100) be revoked. DONE and ORDER of this 11th day March, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1985.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of a violation of bail bondsmen disciplinary statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed in the State of Florida as a bail bondsman. He operates Freedom Bail Bonds in Orlando, Florida. On May 28, 1988, law enforcement officers of the Orange County Sheriff's Office arrested John P. Moody and placed him in the Orange County jail. Mr. Moody had never previously been arrested. After he was arrested, Mr. Moody contactedRespondent about obtaining a bail bond in order to get out of jail. Respondent agreed to come to the jail and interview Mr. Moody to determine if Freedom Bail Bonds could provide him a bond. When Respondent arrived at the jail on the evening of May 28, he was informed by an officer of the three charges that were pending against Mr. Moody. The bond was $1000 per charge, and the premium was 10% of the bond. Respondent met with Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had any assets to secure the bond. Mr. Moody explained that he had no assets such as a car, cash, or cash equivalent. However, he said that he owned jointly with his mother some land in Orange County. At the conclusion of the interview, Respondent had decided to write the bond. Respondent then learned from the booking officer that another charge had been added. Following a brief conversation between Respondent and Mr. Moody concerning the new charge, Respondent learned from the booking officer that a fifth charge had been added. After another conversation with Mr. Moody, Respondent learned in this manner that a sixth, and final, charge had been added. In all, Mr. Moody was charged with one count of failing to return a hired automobile and five counts of fraudulent bank deposits. Each charge carried a $1000 bond, so Mr. Moody now required a total bond of $6000, which in turn required a total premium of $600. Due to the increased amount of the bond, Respondent informed Mr. Moody that he would have to secure the bond with a mortgage on the property jointly held with his mother. Mr. Moody agreed, but asked Respondent not to contact Mr. Moody's mother immediately. It was the middle of the night, and Mr. Moody's mother is an invalid. Respondent agreed to allow Mr. Moody to contact his mother later and obtain her signature on a mortgage. Because Mr. Moody lacked the funds, a friend, Marion Reed Johnson, agreed to pay the premium. Knowing that Mr. Moody would not be able to obtain that evening his mother's signature to a mortgage, Respondent insisted on some interim security and agreed to accept six $1000 promissory notes from Mr. Johnson. These notes were payable on demand, but, according to their terms, became void if Mr. Moody appeared in court when ordered to do so and discharged all of the obligations of the bail bond. Respondent gave Mr. Johnson receipts for the $600 premium and six $1000 notes as soon as Respondent received these items. At the same time, also on the evening of May 28, Respondent completed a bail bond application and indemnity form, on which Mr. Moody provided certain background information. Mr. Moody and Mr. Johnson also signed indemnifications in favor of the surety. The application form states that the surety: shall have control and jurisdiction over the principal during the term for which the bond is executed and shall have the right to apprehend, arrest and surrender the principal to the proper officials at any time as provided by law. The application form also provides: In the event surrender of principal is made prior to the time set for principal's appearances, and for reason other than as enumerated below is paragraph 3, then principal shall be entitled to a refund of the bond premium. It is understood and agreed that the happening of any one of the following events shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations to the Surety hereunder, and the Surety shall have the right to forthwith apprehend, arrest and surrender principal, and principal shall have no right to any refund of premium whatsoever. Said events which shall constitute a breach of principal's obligations hereunder are: If principal shall depart the jurisdiction of the court without the written consent of the court and the Surety or its Agent. * * * If principal shall commit any act which shall constitute reasonable evidence of principal's intention to cause a forfeiture of said bond. * * * The application and indemnities were signed. Mr. Johnson paid the $600 premium and executed and delivered the six $1000 demand notes. Respondent then caused Freedom Bail Bond to issue the bond. Mr. Moody was released from the jail during the evening of his arrest (actually during the predawn hours of May 29). May 28 was a Saturday. The following Monday, Respondent gave one of his employees a copy of the warranty deed from Mr. Moody's mother to herself and Mr. Moody. Mr. Moody hadgiven a copy of the deed to Respondent during their initial interview in order to allow Respondent to prepare the mortgage that Mr. Moody had agreed to provide. Respondent instructed the employee to use the legal description from the warranty deed to prepare a mortgage and send it to Mr. Moody for execution by his mother and him. The employee did as instructed and promptly mailed the mortgage to Mr. Moody with instructions for execution, witnessing, and notarization. After about a week, Respondent asked the employee if she had received the executed mortgage. She replied that she had not and proceeded to telephone Mr. Moody. When she asked him about the mortgage, Mr. Moody did not express any unwillingness to sign it, but said that he had not received it. Confirming the mailing address, the employee agreed to send him another mortgage and did so on June 6, 1988. Several times after mailing the second mortgage, the employee contacted Mr. Moody and discussed the need to get the document fully executed and delivered to Freedom Bail Bonds. On one occasion, Mr. Moody agreed to return the executed mortgage on June 22. But on the last of these conversations, Mr. Moody informed the employee, for the first time, that he had no intention of providing the mortgage. The employee told Respondent what Mr. Moody had said and returned the file to Respondent for further action. At about the same time that Respondent's officehad sent the mortgage to Mr. Moody the second time, Mr. Moody's sister telephoned Respondent. Estranged from her brother, she was concerned that Mr. Moody, whom she believed had misused funds of their invalid mother in the past, might try to obtain their mother's signature on a mortgage to secure a bond in order to get out of jail. Mr. Moody's sister informed Respondent that her brother was not authorized to obtain their mother's signature on the mortgage. She said that her brother was not to be trusted, had improperly removed money from their mother's trust in the past, and had defaulted on at least one debt so as to require the creditor to lien the jointly held property in order to be repaid. At about the same time, a different employee of Respondent received an anonymous telephone tip that Mr. Moody was about to depart, or had already departed, on a trip to Alabama with another man. The informant described what turned out to be a vehicle owned by Mr. Johnson, with whom Mr. Moody had been living since his release from jail on May 29. Several attempts by Respondent's employees to reach Mr. Moody over the next two to four days were unsuccessful. In fact, Mr. Moody had gone to Alabama, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Orange County Circuit Court. On July 18, 1988, one of Respondent's employees contacted the Clerk of Court's office and learned that Mr. Moody had not qualified for the services of a Public Defender. In addition, the employee had been notified on or about July 6, byreceipt of a notice of hearing on a Determination of Counsel, that Mr. Moody had not been diligent in obtaining counsel. After determining that other Determination of Counsel hearings had been and were being set by the Court, the employee reasonably concluded that Mr. Moody was not diligently trying to obtain counsel or independently resolve the pending criminal matters. The employee communicated this information to Respondent on July 18. Respondent contacted Mr. Moody by telephone on July 18 and asked when he was going to supply the executed mortgage. Mr. Moody responded that he had determined that Respondent did not need the additional security and was not going to provide it. At this point, Respondent concluded that it was likely that Mr. Moody had in fact left the state without permission. Respondent also concluded that Mr. Moody no longer represented an acceptable risk. Respondent thus directed another employee to join him to arrest Mr. Moody and surrender him to the Orange County Sheriff's Office. Respondent and his employee immediately visited Mr. Moody and asked him whether he had left the state. Mr. Moody admitted doing so. Respondent and the employee then arrested Mr. Moody and returned him to jail. Mr. Moody remained in jail for 63 days until he pleaded guilty to the charges. He was sentenced to the time served, placed on probation for four years, and required to makerestitution, which he has done so far in accordance with the schedule. Following his release from jail, Mr. Moody returned to live with Mr. Johnson and gradually repaid him the $600 that he owed him. Although Mr. Moody demanded return of the $600, he never offered any proof of payment to Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson never demanded the return of the money. Respondent has retained the $600 premium. The six $1000 notes were automatically voided when Mr. Moody was arrested on July 18.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399 (904) 488 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Bill O'Neil, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney David D. Hershel Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399 Attorney Alan B. Robinson 56 East Pine Street Orlando, FL 32801
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent, who is a limited surety agent, is guilty of violating Section 648.571(1), Florida Statutes, by failing to return the collateral within 21 days after the discharge of the bail bond; Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, by demonstrating lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the bail bond business; Section 648.45(2)(g), Florida Statutes, by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the conduct of business under the license; and Section 648.45(2)(j), Florida Statutes, by willfully failing to comply with, or willfully violating any proper order or rule of the department or willfully violating any provision of Chapter 648, Florida Statutes, or the Insurance Code. If guilty of any of these violations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been a licensed surety agent, holding license number A134458. Respondent is the president and owner of Big Larry Bail Bonds in Fort Lauderdale. Mark Blackman, who is 45 years old, is a licensed mortgage broker and sophisticated in business matters. He has been convicted four times of driving under the influence over the past 20 years. The arrest that resulted in the fourth conviction took place on December 7, 2003. Mr. Blackman's girlfriend at the time of his arrest, Tracy, suggested that he purchase a bail bond from Respondent. Tracy, who was addicted to crack cocaine, had previously purchased a bail bond from Respondent when she had been arrested for the possession of cocaine. Mr. Blackman instructed Tracy to visit Respondent's office and arrange for Respondent to post bond, which was $23,500. Respondent agreed to post bond, but only if Mr. Blackman paid the bond premium of $2350 and delivered, as security, a note for the entire bail bond, an indemnity agreement, title to his 2002 C32 Mercedes Benz, and the vehicle itself. With Tracy's help, Mr. Blackman complied with these conditions, and Respondent bailed him out of jail. At this point, the agreement between Respondent and Mr. Blackman, with respect to the car, was that Respondent would store the car in a safe place. Accordingly, immediately upon receiving the car, Respondent drove it to a body shop where it could be stored safely and without charge. Three or four days later, while out on bail, Mr. Blackman was arrested for felony possession of cocaine. The judge revoked the original bond and refused to set bond for the new offense. At this time, the vehicle no longer served as security because the bail bond that it had secured no longer existed. Thus, at this time, Mr. Blackman was entitled to the return of the vehicle. Neither Mr. Blackman nor Respondent was under any misimpression as to Mr. Blackman's status at the time of the second arrest. Both men knew that Mr. Blackman would not be able to be released from jail on bail for these alleged offenses. Mr. Blackman would remain in jail until February 2004, after which time, following a plea deal, Mr. Blackman began serving nights in jail. The day after his re-arrest, Mr. Blackman called Respondent from jail and asked him if he would help Mr. Blackman sell the vehicle. Mr. Blackman explained that he knew that he was going to lose his driver's license. He asked Respondent if he knew anyone who worked at an automobile auction. Eventually, Mr. Blackman asked Respondent if he wanted to purchase the car, but Respondent declined, at least initially. Within a day or two after speaking to Mr. Blackman the day after his re-arrest, Respondent removed the car from the body shop, so he could show it to a prospective buyer. Respondent did not return the car to the body shop, but instead kept the car at his office or home. The record does not establish that Respondent had driven the car for any reason prior to showing it two or three days after Respondent's second arrest. For several reasons, Mr. Blackman was content with Respondent's possession of the car after it no longer served as collateral for a bail bond. Although released from jail during days starting in February 2004, Mr. Blackman remained concerned about the car during the evenings, while he was in jail. As he explained to Respondent at the time, Mr. Blackman did not want his brother to have access to the car. As Mr. Blackman testified at the hearing, he was also concerned that a friend of Tracy not have access to the car. Mr. Blackman's concerns may have extended to Tracy, who he later determined stole $20,000 from Mr. Blackman while he was in jail. Unable to drive the car due to his loss of driving privileges, Mr. Blackman did not want the car parked in his crime-ridden neighborhood. Additionally, Mr. Blackman's auto insurance expired in January 2004. For these reasons, Mr. Blackman was in no hurry after his re-arrest for Respondent to give up possession of Mr. Blackman's car. The car was safer with Respondent than it would have been returned to Mr. Blackman. Mr. Blackman knew that he would not be charged storage and was hopeful that Respondent would sell the car for Mr. Blackman. At no time, though, did Respondent try to document the change from his holding the car as collateral for a bail bond to holding it for the convenience of Mr. Blackman. Specifically, Respondent never tried to obtain Mr. Blackman's signature on a collateral release, which would document that the car no longer secured a now-nonexistent bail bond. Respondent claimed that he could not obtain Mr. Blackman's signature while he was in jail, but it is customary for limited surety agents to visit inmates in jail to obtain their signatures on paperwork, such as a collateral release. Also, in February 2004, Respondent could have obtained Mr. Blackman's signature at anytime during the day. After showing the car the first time, two or three days after Mr. Blackman's second arrest, Respondent began to use the vehicle for his personal and business purposes, as well as occasionally showing it to a prospective buyer. After January 2004, Mr. Blackman's car was no longer insured. It is unclear whether the registration and license tag expired during this period. Before Mr. Blackman was released on days, Respondent produced offers of $28,000 and $29,000 from two different persons, but Mr. Blackman wanted $38,000 for the car and refused these offers. After being released on days, Mr. Blackman did not visit Respondent or ask for him to return the car. Mr. Blackman was likely preoccupied with other matters immediately after his release from jail in February. Failing to report to jail one night shortly after his release, Mr. Blackman violated one of the conditions of his sentence, took off, and was re-arrested and returned to jail in March or April 2004. Only after he was again incarcerated did Mr. Blackman re-address the issue of the car with Respondent. The first thing he did was tell Respondent to deduct $1200 from the price of the car for a bond forfeiture on a bond that Respondent had written on Tracy. The next thing, on April 13, 2004, Mr. Blackman entered into a written agreement with Respondent for the sale of the vehicle, on the same date, to Respondent for $35,000 cash. However, Respondent backed out of the deal. About six weeks later, in late May 2004, Mr. Blackman sent his sister to pick up the car. She had a power of attorney, but it did not apply to the car, so Respondent would not release the car to her. This was a reasonable action on Respondent's part, given his knowledge of Mr. Blackman's distrust of at least one other family member. A couple of weeks later, in early June, Mr. Blackman's sister returned with a proper power of attorney, and Respondent released the car to her. After taking the car from Respondent, Mr. Blackman's sister and her husband noticed that the car had considerably higher mileage than Mr. Blackman had said that it should have. Respondent had driven the vehicle 7,000 to 10,000 miles during the six months that he had possessed the car, but entirely after the second arrest in December. Respondent was cavalier about his use of the car, as he incurred numerous parking tickets, as well as tolls on Mr. Blackman's SunPass transponder that was in the car when it was delivered to Respondent--all of which charges were imposed on Mr. Blackman. After repeated demands, Respondent paid off only some of these charges. The additional mileage that Respondent put on the vehicle reduced the vehicle's fair market value by as much as $3000. On August 1, 2004, Mr. Blackman's sister, using her power of attorney and with her brother's approval, sold the car for $33,000 to a person other than Respondent.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order dismissing Counts I and III, finding Respondent guilty of violation Section 648.45(2)(e), Florida Statutes, in Count II, and imposing a six-month suspension and a $5000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg S. Marr, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Michael A. Levin, Esquire Law Offices of Michael A. Levin Global Commerce Center 1900 North Commerce Parkway Weston, Florida 33326 Larry Lorenzo Jones 1310 Sistrunk Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33331 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muñiz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
