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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. MILTON I. MARKOWITZ, 81-002537 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002537 Latest Update: Oct. 29, 1982

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Milton I. Markowitz, was a licensed real estate broker doing business in the State of Florida. Respondent acted as the individual broker for Ford Realty, Inc. At some time, apparently in 1979, Respondent and Jack Arias discussed the possibility of forming a corporation to be known as Miltjack Investments, Inc., for the purpose of acquiring a piece of property (the property) in Pompano Beach, Florida, owned by Richard F. Brohamer. By Deposit Receipt dated December 10, 1979, an offer to purchase the property was submitted by Miltjack Investments, Inc. to the seller through Cronan Realty, another real estate broker. Respondent signed the Deposit Receipt as president of Miltjack Investments, Inc. The Deposit Receipt, by its terms, indicated that the sum of $10,000 had been placed in escrow with Ford Realty, Inc. as a deposit on the purchase price of $567,000. In fact, Respondent knew when he signed the Deposit Receipt and forwarded it to the seller that Miltjack Investments, Inc. was a non-existent corporation. In addition, Respondent also knew that he had been given a $10,000 check by Jack Arias, his coinvestor, with the knowledge that the check could not be covered by sufficient funds, and that it would not be placed in escrow by Ford Realty, Inc. At no time during the negotiations involved in this proceeding did Respondent ever communicate to the seller, or Cronan Realty, that the $10,000 deposit was not being held in escrow or that Miltjack Investments, Inc. was not an existing corporation. After the aforementioned Deposit Receipt was forwarded to the seller, the seller made a counter offer by Deposit Receipt Contract dated January 11, 1980. This instrument contained several changes, but was, in fact, at some point signed on behalf of Miltjack Investments, Inc. by Jack Arias, as secretary-treasurer, and Mr. Arias' signature was witnessed by Respondent. Like the initial Deposit Receipt, this latter agreement also recited that the $10,000 deposit was in escrow with Ford Realty, Inc. Unlike the initial agreement, however, the agreement of January 11, 1980, indicated that Cronan Realty, Inc. was to act as escrow agent. Pursuant to this agreement, Cronan Realty, Inc. made demand upon Ford Realty, Inc. for the $10,000 deposit, so that it could fulfill its obligation under the last mentioned agreement. Upon receipt of this demand, Jack Arias made demand upon Respondent to return the $10,000 check to him, which Respondent did, and apparently Mr. Arias destroyed the check some time thereafter. For reasons not clear from the record in this cause, the transaction involving the sale of the property never closed.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. A. KEITH ELLIS, 87-000228 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-000228 Latest Update: Mar. 22, 1988

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the licensure and real estate brokerage and sales practice standards embodied in Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is a licensed real estate broker, licensed under that chapter. The Respondent, Keith Ellis, while engaged in the business of real estate development, entered into a contract whereby he would purchase a parcel of land adjacent to U.S. Highway 90, the "Scenic Highway," in Pensacola, Florida. That agreement was entered into in February, 1985, with the Respondent's purpose being to commence development of the property, consisting of eight residential lots, into a single-family residential subdivision. Mr. Ellis, in embarking upon his development plan, after entering into the contract for purchase of the subject lots, found that he lacked capital necessary to finance construction of certain infrastructure for the subdivision. He sought additional funding and ultimately was referred to Robert Tegenkamp as a potential investor. He entered into discussions with Mr. Tegenkamp and ultimately the two agreed that Tegenkamp would invest $25,000 in the project. In return, as consideration, Mr. Ellis agreed to repay the $25,000 investment to Tegenkamp within six months. He also agreed to pay Tegenkamp a $25,000 profit within twelve months. He prepared a written agreement to that effect, executed March 1, 1985. The Respondent also proposed to give Mr. Tegenkamp an option on one lot, Lot Number 8, in the planned subdivision, as further consideration for Tegenkamp investing the necessary capital. This option was executed February 28, 1985. The subdivision totaled eight lots, all of equal value, as established by the opinion of the Respondent himself, who is experienced in appraising real estate, and by M. Eugene Presley, a licensed M.A.I. appraiser. It was the intent of both Ellis and Tegenkamp, at the time of the signing of the agreement, that Ellis would seek to sell all the eight lots, including the lot on which Tegenkamp held an option. Both those parties also understood that Tegenkamp could not be repaid unless the lots were sold. Tegenkamp had no desire to take title to any lot in the subdivision and understood from the outset that he would be entitled to Lot 8, (or any lot), only if Ellis was otherwise unable to repay him. The Respondent arbitrarily chose to indicate Lot 8 on the option contract, but Tegenkamp had no special desire to acquire any interest in that particular lot. The true intent of the parties was simply that Tegenkamp have an option on a lot in the subdivision to secure him, in the event the debt was not repaid by Ellis. In view of the fact that the value of each lot was identical, it did not matter to Tegenkamp on which lot he had an "option," or other form of security interest. He never expected to get title to a lot and was never told that he would, by the Respondent or any other person. The Respondent has always acknowledged that he owes the money in question to Mr. Tegenkamp and that he was obligated under the "option" to convey one of the lots to Tegenkamp, if he could not repay him. Ellis borrowed the funds for acquisition of the property, and for coverage of most development costs, from the First National Bank of Escambia County. Before the agreements between Ellis and Tegenkamp were signed, he told Mr. Tegenkamp, who also did his banking business at the same bank, of the bank's involvement in financing the project. The Respondent suggested that Tegenkamp contact the loan officers involved to reveal his interest in the project. This Tegenkamp failed to do, nor did he ever record his option agreement. Consequently, the bank acquired a first priority lien on the eight lots by the execution and recording of the mortgage from Ellis to the bank, for financing the purchase, installation of the infrastructure and payment of other development costs. When Mr. Ellis obtained the $25,000 capital from Mr. Tegenkamp, he proceeded with his development plans. He negotiated a sale of all the lots in the subdivision to Ray Lemon, a general contractor. On May 10, 1985, he entered into a written sales contract with Mr. Lemon as to all eight lots. This contract required Ellis to proceed to complete all improvements, such as paving and drainage provisions, as well as to obtain approval of the plat of the subdivision by the City of Pensacola. Mr. Ellis informed Mr. Tegenkamp of this agreement with Mr. Lemon. Thereafter, on May 28, 1985, Mr. Ellis closed the loan with First National Bank of Escambia County, giving that bank a first priority mortgage lien on the entire subdivision. Shortly thereafter, the plat of the subdivision was accepted by the City of Pensacola. Most of the improvements installed by Ellis were complete by late July, 1985. Mr. Lemon then indicated to Ellis that he was having financial difficulties and needed to delay the closing of his purchase of the eight lots. If Lemon had been able to complete his planned purchase of all eight lots on time, Mr. Ellis could have paid Tegenkamp the agreed upon $50,000 and still netted about $10,000 profit himself. In any event, shortly after Ellis learned of the delayed Lemon closing, he was approached by Dr. and Mrs. Tousignant, who were interested in purchasing Lots 7 and 8. Dr. Tousignant owned a neighboring parcel of property and wanted to preserve his view of Escambia Bay by acquiring ownership of Lots 7 and 8. The Respondent obtained Mr. Lemon's approval to sell Lots 7 and 8 to the Tousignants and also informed Mr. Tegenkamp of the proposed sale to the Dr. and his wife, as Mr. Tegenkamp himself admitted. Mr. Tegenkamp approved of Ellis selling the lots in question, and on August 25, 1985, Ellis entered into a written agreement to sell Lots 7 and 8 to the Tousignants. The sale was closed on September 17, 1985, but did not produce enough money for Ellis to pay off Tegenkamp. Tegenkamp had not demanded payment at this time anyway and the final time limit for repayment had not elapsed. Thereafter, Ray Lemon encountered more financial problems and for several months was unable to close the planned purchase of the remaining six lots. Eventually, Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 were sold to Ray Lemon and K. C. Hembree. These closings took place between January and March, 1986. The sales did not produce enough funds to pay off Tegenkamp because of development expenses which had to be covered, mortgage release amounts and interest attributable to each lot, which had to be paid to the bank holding the first mortgage. The Respondent thus retained ownership of only Lots 1 and 2 by the end of March, 1986. His ownership of these two lots was subject to the first mortgage to the bank, the principal balance of which remained at approximately $20,600. That mortgage was subsequently assigned to Ray Lemon who had payed off the bank. Lemon now holds that mortgage. The Respondent has attempted, without success, to sell the remaining two lots. Because of economic conditions prevailing, the value of each of the two remaining lots declined from an estimated $59,000 in March, 1985, to about $50,000 by April, 1986. Because Ellis did not timely pay the $25,000 required by the original agreement, Mr. Tegenkamp retained an attorney to represent him in seeking repayment. Attorney Miles Davis entered into various discussions with Ellis from November, 1985 through April, 1986. In December, 1985, Ellis had proposed to Davis that he deliver to Tegenkamp a quit claim deed conveying his interest in Lot 1 to Tegenkamp. Ellis could not give a warranty deed because title was then encumbered by the above-mentioned mortgage held by Lemon, as assignee of the bank, and because of a potential claim of lien by the paving contractor for $7,000 to $8,000. The contractor since failed to pursue and perfect his claim of lien. In February, 1986, Attorney Davis wrote to Ellis expressing a willingness to accept a quit claim deed on behalf of Tegenkamp. In April, 1986, Ellis delivered the quit claim deed to Davis, conveying his interest in Lot 1 to Tegenkamp. It was recorded in the public records of Escambia County. Davis then filed a civil suit against Ellis in May, 1986, on behalf of Tegenkamp. The parties since arrived at a settlement of that litigation whereby Tegenkamp is to receive approximately $25,000 and Lot 1 will be re-conveyed to Ellis. Tegenkamp's attorney, Miles Davis, testified that Ellis never denied owing the money to his client and every indication was that the Respondent was trying to sell the property as soon as possible to pay his obligation to Tegenkamp. Mr. Tegenkamp himself testified and acknowledged that the Respondent was not trying to take advantage of him, but was simply "someone who had gotten himself into a bad deal."

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be DISMISSED in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0228 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of facts. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-41 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Danny L. Kepner SHELL, FLEMING, DAVIS & MENGE Seventh Floor, Seville Tower Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32598 Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Senior Attorney Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25782.07
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. E. TED GILES, 76-001119 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001119 Latest Update: Aug. 24, 1992

Findings Of Fact By contract dated March 13, 1974 Frederick W. and Judith P. Shaw placed $500 as earnest money to purchase property from Comfort Builders, Inc. represented by Giles Realty. The $500 was duly placed in escrow. The contract provided that seller would furnish title insurance and buyer could take posession on April 1, 1974. Buyer occupied the house as per the contract and delayed the initially intended closing to require the builder (seller) to correct defects. Shortly after the contract was executed buyer paid seller an additional $3,000 of the purchase money. This payment did not go through Giles. At the first closing session on May 15, 1974 a subcontractor's lien was discovered and the closing did not occur. At a second scheduled closing additional liens against the property were discovered. The $500 check representing buyers' deposit that had been forwarded by Giles to First Federal Savings and Loan Association, who was to loan the mortgage money, was returned to Giles by letter of October 10, 1974 advising that they were unable to make the mortgage. Subsequently the bank, which had also provided the construction mortgage money, foreclosed on the mortgage and took title to the property. Thereafter on March 21, 1975 the bank sold the property to Shaw who had occupied the premises since April, 1974. After the property had been conveyed by the bank to Shaw, Giles prepared a Release of Deposit Receipt which was executed by Comfort Builders, Inc., the original seller, to allow the $500 deposit to be retained by Giles. When asked to execute this release Shaw declined. Whether Giles told Shaw that she had asked the FREC for an advisory opinion respecting the $500 as Shaw testified or only that she would ask for an advisory opinion as testified to by Giles is immaterial as no advisory opinion was requested by Giles. Thereafter Shaw filed a complaint with FREC which led to the charges here under consideration. When this complaint was being investigated by Kimmig, Giles asked Kimmig for an advisory opinion and she was told she would have to request same from the Commission. Several years earlier Giles had obtained an advisory opinion by submitting a written request to the Commission, but no such request was submitted by Giles respecting the disposition of the $500 deposit of Shaw. The $500 has not been disbursed from the escrow account. Mrs. Giles has been registered with the FREC for some 20 years and these are the first disciplinary proceedings ever brought against her. Exhibit 10 contains numerous achievements and recognitions received by Mrs. Giles showing an excellent reputation in the community.

Florida Laws (2) 120.60475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT MARRIOTT, 82-003337 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003337 Latest Update: Jul. 09, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Robert Marriott has been a licensed real estate broker/salesman under the laws of the State of Florida, trading as Marriott Realty. In February of 1980, in his capacity as a real estate broker/salesman, Respondent obtained an offer to purchase commercial property in Miami from Orlando Villacis, a resident of Ecuador, as purchaser, for a total purchase price of $500,000. In conjunction with the offer, Villacis paid a $20,000 earnest money deposit to be held by Marriott Realty in escrow under the terms of the offer. Villacis' deposit check in the amount of $20,000 was deposited into the Marriott Realty escrow account on February 22, 1980. By March 11, 1980, Villacis' $20,000 had been withdrawn, leaving an escrow account balance of $40. This fact was never reported to Villacis. Having heard nothing definite from Respondent with regard to the offer, and because he spent most of his time out of the country, Villacis engaged the services of attorney Rafael Penalver. Prior to July 1980, Penalver contacted the Respondent and inquired as to the status of the offer. Each time, Respondent told him that the seller was still considering the offer. In July of 1980, Respondent told Penalver that the $500,000 offer had been rejected by the seller and recommended that Villacis present an offer for $570,000. Penalver prepared the offer in the amount of $570,000, again calling for a $20,000 earnest money deposit, which Penalver and Villacis assumed was still in the Marriott Realty escrow account. Receiving no response from Respondent on the second offer, Penalver attempted to contact Respondent by telephone on numerous occasions. When Penalver was successful, Respondent told him that the seller was reviewing the offer. In early September 1980, Respondent advised Penalver that the $570,000 offer had been rejected by the seller. By letter dated September 11, 1980, Penalver raised the offer to $600,000, set a deadline of September 19 for the acceptance of the offer, and directed Respondent to return the $20,000 immediately should the offer not be accepted. After September 19, having heard nothing from the Respondent, Penalver called him, at which time Respondent advised that the offer was being considered by the seller. Penalver then wrote a letter dated October 7, 1980, to Respondent demanding that Respondent deposit the $20,000 into Villacis' account. Again hearing nothing from Respondent, Penalver on numerous occasions attempted to contact him by telephone in order to again demand the immediate return of the $20,000 deposit. Being unsuccessful, Penalver wrote the Respondent on November 20, 1980, and January 22, 1981, both times demanding the return of the $20,000 earnest money deposit. After the letter of January 22, 1981, Respondent agreed to meet with Penalver in Penalver's office. On February 2, 1981, the Respondent and his wife met with Penalver. During that meeting, Respondent advised Penalver that the $20,000 was no longer available and that he and his wife had used the money to make mortgage payments and cosmetic improvements on their personal residence. Respondent challenged Penalver to sue him to get the money back. After discussing Respondent's position with Villacis, Penalver filed a civil action for return of the $20,000. In his Answer to the Complaint filed in that litigation, Respondent admitted that he had used the $20,000 deposit for mortgage payments and other personal household expenses and for payment of his IRS tax deficiency. Villacis obtained a Final Judgment in the civil action in the amount of $20,000 plus interest and costs on October 6, 1982. Respondent testified that he did not return the $20,000 earnest money deposit because, in approximately October 1980, Villacis verbally agreed to loan the $20,000 to Respondent. Villacis strongly denied making any offer of a loan to Respondent. The purported loan agreement would have occurred after Penalver had twice written Respondent regarding immediate return of the $20,000 and seven months after the $20,000 had disappeared from the escrow account. Further, after Penalver sent his November demand letter, Respondent wrote Villacis in December of 1980 asking that Villacis consider loaning Respondent the $20,000 in exchange for an unrecorded mortgage on Respondent's personal residence. Clearly, Respondent's testimony is not credible. As of the date of the formal hearing in this cause, the Final Judgment in favor of Villacis and against Respondent remained unpaid and Respondent had still not returned to Villacis the $20,000 earnest money deposit.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained within the Administrative Complaint filed against him and revoking his license as a real estate broker/salesman. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of April, 1984, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 David I. Schlosberg, Esquire 525 North 27th Avenue, Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33125 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERTS AND GILMAN, INC., AND DELAIR A. CLARK, 76-000012 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000012 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1977

Findings Of Fact Robert & Gilman, Inc. at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate broker by the State of Florida. Delair A. Clark at all times herein involved was registered as a real estate salesman by the State of Florida. Residential property owned by William L. and Frances Crummett was listed with J.B. Steelman, Jr. real estate broker and put on Multiple Listing Service. On June 17, 1972, immediately after the For Sale sign was erected, Respondent, Delair A. Clark, presented an offer to the sellers on this property which was accepted by sellers on the same date presented (Exhibit 9). This contract provided the purchase price of $28,500 with a $300 earnest money deposit, the usual clauses in a form contract for sale and purchase, and two special clauses to wit: "A. Subject to: Buyer being reassigned to central Florida prior to June 22, 1972. In the event the assignment does not materialize by June 23, 1972 deposit will, be returned in full and contract will be null and void. B. Subject to: Buyer obtaining a 90 percent conventional loan for a period of 25 years or an FHA loan for 30 years." By telegram dated 6/20/72 (Exhibit 8) buyer confirmed re-assignment to Orlando, thus satisfying condition A in the contract. Buyers thereafter asked for earlier occupancy than originally called for. Since special arrangements would have to be made by sellers, Mr. Crummett asked for an amendment to the contract to increase the earnest money deposit to $1,000 of which $500 would be non-refundable if contract was not consummated. This amendment was duly executed by the buyers on July 15, 1972 and by the sellers. A copy thereof was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 11 which provides: "SPECIAL CLAUSE" "C. An additional deposit of $700 will be made on July 17, 1972, of which $500 will be non-refundable in the event the referenced contract is not consumated (sic)." This amendment was forwarded to the sellers by Respondent's Roberts & Gilman letter of July 17, 1972 which amendment was executed by the sellers upon receipt and mailed back to Roberts & Gilman. The July 17, 1972 letter was signed by Judy L. Rostatter of the sales processing department. A copy of the check received from the buyers was not enclosed although the letter stated it was enclosed. Prior to receipt of this amendment Crummett was advised by Richter, the buyer, that he had mailed a $700 check to Roberts & Gilman made payable to Crummett. Crummett was also advised by Respondent Clark that the check had been received. Since closing was scheduled to be held within a couple of days Crummett requested Clark to hold the check and he would endorse same at closing. Crummett never saw the original check for $700. On the day originally scheduled for the closing (circa July 18, 1972) Crummett received a telephone call from Respondent Clark to the effect that the appraisal on the property had come in some $3,000 below the asking price and inquiring if Crummett would accept $26,000 for his property. The latter advised he would not and, after some heated words, Crummett hung up. At this time it was evident to Respondent Clark and the sellers that the sale would not be consummated. Clark put a memo in the file dated July 28, 1972 saying: "Return checks of $700 + $300 in estrow (sic) to Richter. Seller advised we had no contract." A few weeks later, on August 3, 1972, after making several phone calls to Roberts & Gilman without success, Crummett had the listing broker, J.B. Steelman, write a letter (Exhibit 7) to Gilman making demand for the $500 deposit refund. By letter dated August 11, 1972 (Exhibit 6) Roberts and Gilman replied that they considered the contract had been terminated by the seller and saw no "justification by the seller to claim any escrow that has been returned to the buyer". This letter was signed "Dan T. Gilman /b.c." Several months later, in the spring of 1973, Crummett went to the office of Roberts and Gilman and obtained a photostatic copy of the check dated 7/15/72 that had been made by J.A. Richter in the amount of $700. This was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 12. At the hearing Dan G. Gilman, President of Roberts & Gilman, Inc. denied any recollection of any part of this transaction or ever having heard of the incident prior to the investigator from the FREC coming to inquire about the incident. At the time of this transaction the realtor's office was very busy with several branch offices and some 120 salesmen handling transactions in eight or ten counties in central Florida. He has no recollection of dictating Exhibit 12 or anything about the incident but his secretary at that time was Beverly Cass. It was standard practice for a broker to review every contract before trust account money was disbursed or refunded. His initial testimony that numerous people in the office had authority to sign his name to letters going out of the office was recanted when he was recalled as a witness after the close of the Commission's case. He then stated he never authorized anyone to sign his name to a document having legal implication. Clark testified that the first time he ever saw Exhibit 11, the amendment to the contract, was when shown to him by the investigator for the FREC. Likewise he claims never to have seen or received the $700 check signed by Richter. With respect to the return of the deposit to Richter, (after being shown Exhibit 13) his recollection of the cancellation of the contract was that Richter was not re-assigned to the Orlando area. This was the only contract ever handled by Clark which involved the return of an escrow deposit. He has no recollection of talking to any member of the realty firm regarding clearing the return of the escrow deposit to Richter. Exhibit 5 is a photocopy of the check by which the $300 earnest money deposit was returned to Richter. It is obvious that the contract for the sale of the residential property herein involved was amended to provide for an additional deposit from the buyers and a clause which required the buyer to forfeit one half of his deposit in the event the transaction was not consummated. It is incomprehensible that such an amendment to the contract could be made without the knowledge of the salesman or the broker. It therefore appears that the Defendants either: (1) are not telling the truth; (2) have faulty memories; (3) allowed the duties normally performed by brokers to be carried out by secretaries; or (4) operated a realty company in a slipshod manner without due regard to the duties and responsibilities imposed upon brokers and salesman by the real estate license law.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. LEROY WILSON, 76-001450 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001450 Latest Update: Oct. 22, 1976

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, I make the following: The Defendant, Leroy Wilson, is a registered real estate broker with the Commission and during January 1, 1975 to November 5, 1975, Defendant was registered as trading as Overpass Real Estate. On April 27, 1975, Defendant was the owner of residential property located at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. On April 28, 2/ Robert English and his wife Mazie English in response to a "for sale" sign posted at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, went to the real estate brokerage office maintained by the Defendant at room 201 Romark Building, 3521 West Broward Boulevard, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Defendant and Mr. and Mrs. English discussed and negotiated a deposit receipt contract dated April 28, 1975, between the Englishes as purchasers and Defendant as seller for the purchase and sale of property owned by Defendant located at 291 N.W. 29th Terrace. Mrs. English testified that they put up an earnest money deposit of $300 acknowledged by Defendant, however, Defendant executed the deposit receipt contract reflecting an earnest money deposit of $600. (See FREC Exhibit number 2). Mrs. English testified that part of the terms of the contract was that she would apply for a mortgage loan but when it was determined that her daughter who was to participate with her in the purchase, was not able to stay with her, she and her husband decided not to apply for a mortgage loan. She explained to Defendant and he agreed to return the $300 deposit that she had submitted along with the deposit receipt contract. When the Englishes demanded the return of their deposit, Defendant advised them that "it was the law that the deposit must be kept for 6 weeks, and thereafter, he would have to keep the deposit another ten days." After the expiration of the six week period, the Englishes called the Defendant's office and was advised that he no longer lived there and other efforts by the Englishes to contact the Defendant were fruitless. Thereafter on or about August 20, 1975, the Englishes filed a complaint with the Commission. Approximately two days after the Commission initiated its investigation, the Defendant returned the $300 deposit to the Englishes. (See FREC Exhibit number 3). N.B. Wolf an employee of Gulf Atlantic Mortgage Brokers testified that she was familiar with the document received into evidence as Exhibit number 2 which is the deposit receipt contract entered into by the Defendant and the Englishes. She testified that she did not recall ever having taken a credit application for the Englishes to apply for a mortgage loan. Roy E. Conner, the operations officer for Plantation First National Bank testified that he caused to be gathered the bank records as they relate to the escrow account maintained by the Defendant at that bank. An examination of those bank records revealed that the Defendant's escrow bank account maintained at Plantation First National Bank had a shortage of $5 as of September 16 and that on August 14, his escrow bank account showed a balance of $65 when it should have reflected a balance of $300 in earnest money deposits. See FREC Exhibit number 4 received into evidence. Pruyn investigated Defendant's brokerage office on September 16, at 2951 N.W. Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Based on an official inspection, Pruyn noted a number of inadequacies in that there were no letterheads, no desks, no chairs, no business mail, no diary of witnesses or any official sign as required and set forth in Commission Rule 21V-10.07 and 10.09, Florida Administrative Code and Section 475.22, Florida Statutes. See FREC Exhibit number 5 received into evidence. As previously stated, the Defendant did not appear at the hearing nor did he have a representative present to present any defense to the charges made by the Commission in the administrative complaint.

Florida Laws (2) 475.22475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. JEFFREY ROBERT HORNE, 88-002547 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-002547 Latest Update: Oct. 20, 1988

The Issue The Administrative Complaint alleges the following: Count I alleges that Respondent is guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, and the like, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by failing to notify a seller's agent that the earnest money deposit he received was a check with contingencies on its face preventing its deposit in a trust account. Count II alleges that Respondent is guilty as a salesman of violating Section 475.256(1)(k), Florida Statutes, by failing to place with his employer a deposit check entrusted to him. Count III, admitted to by Respondent, alleges that he violated Sections 475.42(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by acting as a broker while licensed as a salesman, or by operating as a salesman for a person not registered as his employer. The issues are whether these violations occurred and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.

Findings Of Fact In 1986 and 1987, at all times relevant to the complaint, Jeffrey Robert Horne was licensed as a Florida Real Estate salesman, holding license number 0433763. At that time he was employed by Realtyline, Inc., Post Office Box 800, Sebastian, Florida 32958. Jeffrey Horne is currently licensed as a real estate broker, c/o The Peoples Realty, Inc., 951-C Fellsmere Highway, Sebastian, Florida 32958. On June 6, 1987, Jeffrey Horne, while employed at Realtyline, Inc., obtained from John F. Baer, Jr., as trustee for Colonial Realty Trust, eleven written offers to purchase eleven lots in an unrecorded subdivision in Brevard County. The lots had various owners, although the owner of one of the lots was unknown at the time. On that same date John F. Baer gave Jeffrey Horne a check in the amount of $5,000, payable to "Realtyline c/o Jeff Horne," representing a $500 earnest money deposit for each of the lots. The face of the check bears this lengthy notation: This check to be held by Jeff Horne pending notification that all contingencies have been satisfied on Parker Rd. offers. At that time it will be replaced with a check for 2500 for each contract negotiated and then deposited to escrow. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) The contingencies, described in an addendum to the contracts, included the provisions that all eleven contracts be accepted for the same offer and that certain permits and local development approvals be obtained. At the hearing, John Baer explained that he wanted the check held by Jeffrey Horne because he had been dealing with Horne on the property. He knew that the realty company was in transition and did not want the deposit stuck in an escrow account if the firm "went under." Furthermore, he had operated in this manner in the past with other firms. Peter S. Tarbell was the qualifying broker for Realtyline, Inc. During this time Jeffrey Horne was attempting to get a partner and purchase the company from Tarbell. The negotiations were acrimonious and both men were dealing through attorneys. Tarbell was aware of the Baer offers on June 6, 1987, and read one of the contracts with the addendum. He vehemently denies that he was aware of the deposit check with its restrictions. Horne just as strongly insists that he told Tarbell about the check. It is uncontroverted, however, that Tarbell instructed Horne to hold on to the contracts until he got the deposit money. Horne went back to Baer and asked to have the restrictions removed from the check. Baer refused and told him to get the contracts changed to reflect the restrictions on the check. The contracts, as executed, provided for $500 deposit each, to be held in escrow by Realtyline, Inc. On six of the contracts Jeffrey Horne signed as escrow agent, under the following preprinted statement: "Deposits under 1.(a) received. (If check, subject to clearance.)" Rhoda Swiger, a broker with Atha and Swiger Real Estate, Inc., had the listing to sell the lots. When Baer was in Horne's office executing the contracts, Horne called her to find out if there were prior offers on the lots. Horne told her that Baer was getting ready to make his offer. Horne became nervous holding the contracts. He knew that Rhoda Swiger was expecting them but he also knew that Tarbell had told him to hold them. He could not get another deposit from Baer. He admits that he committed an error in judgment, but contrary to Tarbell's instructions, he took six of the contracts to Rhoda Swiger after they had been in his desk drawer for several days. He told her he had the deposit check but did not tell her about the restrictions on the check. Sometime later Rhoda Swiger called Realtyline to say that the offers were accepted. Tarbell took the call and found out that Horne had released some of the contracts against his wishes. Tarbell obtained the check and remainder of the contracts from Horne and terminated his employment. In Baer's words, the deal then "fizzled." The record does not disclose any past violations by this licensee, either as a salesman or a broker. He cooperated fully with the investigation and readily admitted, in his affidavits and at the hearing, his participation in the events which led to this proceeding.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMEND that a final order be entered finding Jeffrey Robert Horne guilty of violations of Subsections 475.25(1)(a), (b) and (k); that he be reprimanded and fined $500 per count, for a total of $1,500. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 20th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 George B. Turner, Esquire Gateway Business Center 1333 Gateway Drive Suite 1025 Melbourne, Florida 32801-2623 Darlene F. Keller Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Bruce D. Lamb, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

Florida Laws (5) 120.57455.225455.227475.25475.42
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. C. H. CHAPMAN AND CHAPMAN REALTY CORPORATION, 80-001037 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001037 Latest Update: Jun. 11, 1981

Findings Of Fact On May 18, 1978, the Respondents, C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation (hereafter Respondents or Chapman) through a registered real estate salesman in the employ of the Respondents, negotiated and obtained a sales contract between Gerry and Ada Ball, as buyers or purchasers and Joseph Winston, as seller, for the sale of property located at 305 Ben Avon Drive, Tampa, Florida. Pursuant to the terms of the sales contract, the Respondents' salesman received a $1,000.00 deposit from the purchasers which was placed in the Respondents' trust account on May 5, 1978. Prior to the date of the scheduled closing, the purchasers inspected the property and requested the seller to make certain repairs and/or replacements to rectify defects which included wood borer damage, structural roof problems and an inoperable pool heater. The seller refused to make the repairs and/or replacements demanded and the offer was formally withdrawn by the purchasers on July 28, 1978, via letter to Chapman Realty requesting return of their $1,000.00 earnest money deposit. Prior to formal withdrawal of the offer, verbal demands were made by Mr. Hall upon Chapman Realty for the return of his deposit. The demand for repairs and/or replacements and withdrawal of the offer was predicated on a provision of the sales contract which provided: Buyers themselves, or at their expense may have property inspected to ensure that there are no structural, electrical or plumbing defects. If any are found, buyers have the right to withdraw their offer and have all of their earnest deposit refunded to them. Thereafter, Respondent Chapman disbursed the $1,000.00 as follows: $350.00 via check dated September 6, 1978, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell, an attorney-at-law in Florida. $500.00 via check dated January 9, 1979, made payable to purchasers Hall. $150.00 via check dated January 10, 1979, made payable to Robert A. Carbonell. Prior to any disbursal the Respondent Chapman discussed with Mr. Hall the possibility of placing the escrowed funds with the Clerk of the Circuit Court. Respondent Chapman contacted his attorney, Robert Carbonell, regarding the conflicting demands of the parties. Mr. Carbonell was introduced to Mr. Hall by the Respondent over the telephone. The Respondent met with Mr. Carbonell on a regular basis since Mr. Carbonell was employed by the Respondent to handle real estate transactions involving Chapman Realty. Respondent was never authorized by the purchasers to pay a fee to Mr. Carbonell directly from the $1,000.00 deposit held in trust. The $500.00 was paid directly by the Respondent to Attorney Carbonell from the Chapman Realty escrow account without oral or written authorization of the seller or the purchasers and in the absence of a settlement agreement between the Hall's and Mr. Winston. Although Mr. Carbonell and the Respondent Chapman believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing Mr. Hall, neither Mr. Hall nor the seller, Mr. Winston, were under the same impression. Both Mr. Hall and Mr. Winston believed that Mr. Carbonell was representing the Respondents rather than Mr. Hall. Such an impression was reasonable in light of Mr. Carbonell's regular employment by the Respondent, the absence of a written agreement between Mr. Hall and Mr. Carbonell coupled with the lack of discussion or agreement concerning fees and the potential conflicting positions which existed between the parties and the Respondents. If any fee were due to Attorney Carbonell for his efforts in securing the return of the $1,000.00 deposit, this was a matter between Mr. Carbonell and Mr. Hall. Neither Mr. Carbonell nor the Respondent Chapman discussed the amount of the fee with the Halls. Mr. Carbonell arrived at the amount he thought was reasonable, $500.00, and Respondent Chapman diverted such amount to Mr. Carbonell from the Respondent's escrow account.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondents', C. H. Chapman and Chapman Realty Corporation licenses to practice real estate be suspended until restitution is made to Gerry and Ada A. Hall, as follows: $500.00 plus interest at 12 percent accrued since July 28, 1978, and Interest on $500.00 accrued at 12 percent for the period from July 28, 1973 until January 9, 1979. Respondents' licenses to be reinstated upon submission and acceptance by the Board of Real Estate of satisfactory evidence of payment. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Staff Attorney 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale W. Vash, Esquire DIXON, LAWSON & BROWN 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. STEVEN R. MYER, 76-001451 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001451 Latest Update: Jun. 22, 1977

Findings Of Fact Steven R. Myer is a registered real estate broker and at the time relative to the complaint was a registered real estate salesman. Jerome Myer, the brother of Steven Myer, became interested in purchasing real property described as Lot 31, Block 7, Royal Palm South, Section 2, Broward County. Jerome Myer entered into negotiations with Mort Lynn as representative for Mark Builders, Inc., owners of the property. As a result of negotiations between Jerome Myer and Mort Lynn, Jerome Myer negotiated the purchase of the aforesaid property for $51,600. Mort Lynn advised Jerome Myer that because he (Jerome Myer) had not been in Florida for a long time, he would more easily obtain mortgage financing if he and his brother Steven Myer joined in the contract for the purchase of the aforesaid property. Thereafter, Steven and Jerome Myer contracted to purchase the aforesaid property for $51,600. When Jerome Myer applied for mortgage financing on the aforesaid property at Chase Federal Savings and Loan, he was advised that his credit was good enough that his brother, Steven Myer, would not have to be included in the transaction. At this point the brothers, Steven and Jerome, agreed that Steven Myer would not participate in the transaction, and that Jerome Myer would obtain title to the property in his name alone. Jerome Myer notified Mort Lynn of Mark Builders of his intentions in this regard and contacted his attorney regarding whether it would be necessary for Steven Myer to assign his interest in the Contract for Purchase to him. The attorney advised Jerome Myer that this was unnecessary unless for some reason Jerome questioned his brother's integrity. Because Jerome was close to Steven and did not have any doubts about his brother's involvement in the transaction, an assignment was not made. Jerome Myer was contacted by Cloys and Vena Kerbo subsequent to a home being built on the aforesaid property. The Kerbos were interested in seeing the home; and because Jerome Myer was unable to leave his work at the time, he asked his brother Steven to show the Kerbos the home. Steven showed the Kerbos the home but the Kerbos did not evidence an interest in the home. Steven advised the Kerbos that as salesman for Berg Agency he knew of other homes which he could show them; and pursuant toe their request, they were shown homes brokered by Berg Agency. Jerome's home was not brokered by the Berg Agency for whom Steven was a salesman. Subsequently, the Kerbos contacted Jerome Myer and a price fob the home was eventually negotiated. Jerome Myers acquired blank forms for a contract to buy and a deposit receipt from an office supply house and his wife typed the agreement between the Kerbos and Jerome on these forms as dictated by Jerome. The executed Contract to Buy and deposit receipt, Exhibit 1, was executed by the Kerbos and Jerome Myer. While the Kerbos and Jerome Myer met at the office of Berg Agency to execute the contract, neither Steven Myer nor Berg Agency participated in the transaction. Cloys Kerbo made and delivered a check in the amount of $1,000 to Jerome Myer as an earnest money deposit on the aforesaid Contract to Buy. This check was deposited by Jerome Myer into his personal account. Beyond the initial showing of the home to the Kerbos, there is no evidence that Steven Myer participated in the negotiation of, preparation of, or execution of the Contract for Purchase between the Kerbos and his brother, Jerome Myer. All negotiations and preparation of the Contract for Purchase were handled by Jerome Myer as owner of the property in question.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Steven Myer. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of October, 1976 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 George R. Moraitis, Esquire Post Office Box 11104 Suite 208 2631 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33339 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION UPTON B. MACKALL, Plaintiff, vs. PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 2845 BROWARD COUNTY STEVEN R. MYER, DOAH CASE NO. 76-1451 Defendant. /

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT W. BROWNING, 84-000322 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000322 Latest Update: Feb. 27, 1985

The Issue The issues in this case are those promoted by an Administrative Complaint brought by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, against Robert W. Browning, licensed real estate broker. In the Administrative Complaint, Browning is accused of having committed various offenses in a real estate transaction involving Salvatore and Minnie Dellaria, in violation of various provisions within Section 475.25, Florida Statutes. The details of those allegations are more specifically discussed in the Conclusions of Law.

Findings Of Fact Robert W. Browning is the holder of a real estate broker's license issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission, and at all times pertinent to this case, held that license. The number of the license is 0112998. Browning, during the relevant time period contemplated by the Administrative Complaint, which is the subject of this dispute, was optioning to buy certain property from Rutland Ranch Partnership, Sumter County, Florida. The property at issue was known as Rutland Ranch Subdivision, Phase I. In effect, Respondent was selling the property within the subdivision. J. W. Morton Real Estate, Inc., of Inverness, Florida, served as exclusive listing agent of the property. In March, 1982, a Mr. Dellaria looked at the property in the Rutland Ranch Subdivision, and an agreement was entered into, and which Salvatore Dellaria, and his wife, Minnie Dellaria, would purchase Lot 37 from R. W. Browning, the Respondent, as Seller. The transaction was to close on or before June 13, 1982. The property had been seen in March, 1982, and the Buyer executed the contract for sale and purchase on March 12, 1982. A copy of this contract for sale and purchase may be found as Respondent's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. A deposit of $1,000 was placed in the escrow account of J. W. Morton Real Estate. Dellaria hoped to use the property as a horse farm. Subsequently, after discussion with Morton Real Estate, it was determined that a purchase would be made of two lots in substitution for Lot 37. Dellaria asked that someone within the Morton group choose the two lets, and Lots 33 and 34 were chosen. Again these lots were in the Rutland Ranch Subdivision, Phase I. Copies of the contract for sale and purchase related to Lots 33 and 34 may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 respectively. Those lots are No. 33 as related to a contract between Respondent and Charles Dellaria, and Jennie Dellaria, his wife, and Lot 34, to the benefit of Salvatore Dellaria and Minnie Dellaria, his wife, with Browning being the Seller. The Buyer execution on Lot No. 33 was April 24, 1982, and the execution by the Buyer in Lot 34 was July 16, 182. The contemplated closing date for Lot 33 was on or before June 13, 1984, as had been the arrangement for Lot 37. The contemplated closing date for Lot 34 was October 1, 1982. Browning had acquiesced in the idea of the cancellation of the sale of Lot 37, and the substitution of Lots 33 and 34. From the point of view of the Morton real estate firm, the $1,000 security deposit for Lot 37 found in the escrow account of that firm would serve to secure the sale of both lots 33 and 34. This security is only shown on the contract for sale and purchase pertaining to Lot 33. There is an indication on the contract for sale and purchase pertaining to Lot 34 to the effect that 56,000 was held in R. W. Browning's escrow. No explanation was made in the course of the final hearing on the subject of whether this $6,000 was in fact placed in an escrow account with Browning. It was indicated that Dellaria received a refund of money invested in the purchase of the property in question. That evidence being unrefuted is accepted. More specifically, Morton, the principal within J. W. Morton Real Estate, Inc., established that the $1,000 amount which his firm held in escrow was refunded to Dellaria by Browning following a return of the money from the Morton Real Estate to Browning. The refund circumstance occurred because Dellaria refused to close the transactions envisioned in the purchase of Lots 33 and 34. At the point of refusal, the elder Dellaria and his wife were going to close on both Lots 33 and 34, whereas initially, the elder Dellaria and his wife were to purchase one of the two lots and Dellaria's son and wife were to purchase the second lot. (Having reviewed the testimony and examined the documents, it is unclear whether Salvatore or Charles is the father, so no specific reference is made to the father or son by name.) Dellaria, the father, asked that the closing dates for the two parcels be extended, and Browning accepted that extension. The father also desired the ability to either examine the property or have a member of his family look at the property before closing. In November, 1982, his daughter, inspected the two lots in question. In February, 1983, Dellaria indicated his intention to go forward to closing on the two lots and on February 3, 1983, arrangements were made for the closing. On April 19, 1983, Dellaria advised Morton that he did not wish to close the purchase of the two parcels because they were not suitable for his intended use, in the sense of not being "buildable" or "habitable". Dellaria was acting on information supplied ay another realtor who also had a building contracting business. This advice was erroneous in that the two parcels were suitable for habitation. Nonetheless, as stated before, the closing was not held as related to the two parcels, and earnest money or deposit money was returned to Dellaria. Browning did not attempt to avail himself of any of the default rights that might be pursued in keeping with the contract terms which allow the Seller to keep the escrow deposit as liquidated damages in the instance where the Buyer fails to perform the contract within the time specified.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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