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THOMAS J. CARPENTER vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 91-003826 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jun. 24, 1991 Number: 91-003826 Latest Update: Jan. 17, 1992

Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Petitioner was an employee of the state of Florida employed by the Department. On May 10, 1991 the Petitioner was arrested and placed in isolation without any outside contact except in the evenings by phone. By letter dated May 15, 1991, mailed to Petitioner's home address, the Department advised Petitioner that having been absence from work for three consecutive days without authorized leave of absence the Department assumed that the Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from career services. Additionally, this letter advised the Petitioner that he had 20 calendar days from receipt of the notice to petition the State Personnel Director for a review of the facts to determine if the circumstances constituted abandonment of position. The return receipt for this letter appears to be signed by Vickie Carpenter but does not indicate the date it was signed by her. A copy of this same letter was mailed by the Department to the Petitioner at the jail but no return receipt was ever received by the Department. However, the Petitioner testified at having received the letter around May 23, 1991. On May 23, 1991 the Respondent was released from jail and was available for work beginning on May 24, 1991. However, the Department had already terminated the Petitioner based on abandonment of position. By letter dated June 6, 1991 the Petitioner requested the State Personnel Director to review his case. By letter dated June 12, 1991 and received by Petitioner on June 14, 1991, the Department again advised Petitioner that the Department assumed that he had abandoned his position and again outlined the review process. On June 20, 1991 the Secretary of the Department of Administration entered an Order Accepting Petition and Assignment to the Division of Administrative Hearings. By letter dated August 27, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that it was withdrawing the action of abandonment of position, and that he was reinstated to his position effective August 30, 1991. However, by letter dated August 29, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that he was to report for work on September 3, 1991 rather than August 30, 1991, and that he was to report to Ft. Myers rather than to his old job in Punta Gorda. Additionally, Mark M. Geisler, Subdistrict Administrator, the author of the letter, advised the Petitioner that since the issue of back pay had been discussed with DeLuccia it was best for Petitioner to contact him in that regard. Petitioner was reinstated by the Department on September 3, 1991. Petitioner did not at any time agree to forego any back pay in order for the Department to reinstate him. The Petitioner has never received any back pay for the period beginning Friday, May 24, 1991 (the day he was able and ready to return to work) through Monday, September 2, 1991 (the day before Petitioner returned to work). Petitioner's wife, Vickie L. Carpenter was, at all times material to this proceeding, employed by the state of Florida, and because she and Petitioner both were employed by the state of Florida their health insurance was furnished by the state of Florida at no cost to them. Upon the Department terminating the Petitioner his wife was required to pay for her health insurance until Petitioner was reinstated on September 3, 1991. Petitioner was unable to report to work during the period from May 10, 1991 through May 23, 1991, inclusive, due to being incarcerated, and was on unauthorized leave of absence during this period. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any back pay for this period, and so stipulated at the hearing. However, Petitioner is entitled to receive back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish that the Department was aware of Petitioner's incarceration and that it was not Petitioner's intent to abandon his position with the Department.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order (1) confirming the action of the Department that Petitioner did not abandon his position with the Department, and (2) reimbursing Petitioner for back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive, and for any other benefit that Petitioner was entitled to during this period, including, but not limited to, health insurance benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Carpenter 1669 Flamingo Blvd. Bradenton, FL 34207 Susan E. Vacca, Qualified Representative Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 1415 Punta Gorda, FL 33951-1415 Augustus D. Aikens, General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Robert B. Williams, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Anthony N. DeLuccia, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 06085 Fort Myers, FL 33906

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NORMA PEDRAZA vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 13-003709 (2013)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 25, 2013 Number: 13-003709 Latest Update: Feb. 05, 2014

The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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ARTHUR G. SAHAGIAN, JR. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 89-003537 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-003537 Latest Update: Oct. 12, 1989

The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Petitioner abandoned his position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the Hearing Officer makes the following Findings of Fact: Respondent was formerly employed as a Tax Auditor II in Respondent's Fort Lauderdale office. In May, 1987, Petitioner filed a charge against Respondent with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The charge was docketed as Charge No. 150871115. Eleven months later, Petitioner filed a second charge against Respondent with the EEOC. This second charge was docketed as Charge No. 150881243. By letter dated May 3, 1988, Petitioner requested that he be granted leave without pay "until both EEOC investigations [were) over." Petitioner's request resulted in a memorandum of understanding and agreement between Petitioner and the Acting Director of Respondent's Division of Audits, Glenn Bedonie. The memorandum was signed by Bedonie on May 9, 1988, and by Petitioner the following day. It provided in pertinent part as follows: This memorandum will confirm our agreement that the Department is granting your request for leave without pay until such time as the two Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) investigations are completed and the findings or conclusions are rendered and final. This action is based upon your voluntary request dated May 3, 1988 attached herein. You will remain on approved leave without pay commencing at 8:00 a.m., Wednesday, May 11, 1988 for (12) twelve calendar months or until a finding or conclusion has been rendered and becomes final by the EEOC in both of the above EEOC investigations. If a finding is not so rendered in both investigations within (12) calendar months, and if you make a timely request to this office the Department agrees to request an extension from the Department of Administration of your leave of absence without pay under Rule 22A- 8.016(2), F.A.C. Such extension is to last until such time as an investigative finding or conclusion is rendered and becomes final in both investigations. On May 10, 1988, the same day he signed the foregoing memorandum of understanding and agreement, Petitioner advised his supervisor in writing that the following were "two addresses where mail will reach me:" P.O. Box 22-2825, Hollywood, Florida 33022 and 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33016. Petitioner did not indicate any other manner in which he could be contacted. By letter dated August 31, 1988, Petitioner and Respondent were informed that the EEOC's Miami District Director had determined, with respect to Charge No. 150871115, that the evidence obtained during the investigation [did] not establish a violation of the statute." The letter also contained the following advisement: This determination does not conclude the processing of this charge. If the charging Party wishes to have this determination reviewed, he must submit a signed letter to the Determination Review Program which clearly sets forth the reasons for requesting the review and which lists the Charge Number and Respondent's name. Charging Party must also attach a copy of this Determination to his letter. These documents must be personally delivered or mailed (postmarked) on or before 09-14-88 to the Determinations Review Program, Office of Program Operations, EEOC, 2401 E. Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20507. It is recommended that some proof of mailing, such as certified mail receipt, be secured. If the Charging Party submits a request by the date shown above, the Commission will review the determination. Upon completion of the review, the Charging Party and Respondent will be issued a final determination which will contain the results of the review and what further action, if any, the Commission may take. The final determination will also give notice, as appropriate, of the Charging Party's right to sue. Petitioner requested review of the Miami District Director's determination in Case No. 150871115. By letter dated April 28, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent were notified of the results of that review. The body of the letter read as follows: The Commission has reviewed the investigation of this charge of employment discrimination and all supplemental information furnished. Based upon this review, we agree with the determination issued by our field office and hereby issue a final determination that the evidence obtained during the investigation does not establish a violation of the statute. Therefore, the Commission dismisses and terminates its administrative processing of this charge. As the charge alleged a Title VII violation, this is notice that if the Charging Party wishes to pursue this matter further, (s)he may do so by filing a private action in Federal District Court against the Respondent(s) named above within 90 days of receipt of this Determination. IF CHARGING PARTY DECIDES TO SUE, CHARGING PARTY MUST DO SO WITHIN 90 DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THIS DETERMINATION; OTHERWISE THE RIGHT TO SUE IS LOST. By letter dated March 8, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent were informed that the EEOC's Miami District Director had determined, with respect to Charge No, 150881243, that the "evidence obtained during the investigation [did) not establish a violation of the statute," The letter further advised: If the Charging Party does not request a review of this determination by March 22, 1989 this determination will become final the following day, the processing of this charge will be complete, and the charge will be dismissed. (This letter will be the only letter of dismissal and the only notice of the Charging Party's right to sue sent by the Commission.) FOLLOWING DISMISSAL, THE CHARGING PARTY MAY ONLY PURSUE THIS MATTER FURTHER BY FILING SUIT AGAINST RESPONDENT(S) NAMED IN THE CHARGE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN 90 DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE DISMISSAL. Therefore, in the event a request for review is not made, if a suit is not filed by June 21, 1989 the Charging Party's right to sue will be lost. Petitioner did not request review of the District Director's determination in Case No. 150881243. Therefore, this determination became final on March 23, 1989. On May 5, 1989, Respondent's Personnel Officer, William P. Fritchman, sent Petitioner a letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, directing Petitioner to report to work immediately. The letter was mailed to P.O. Box 22- 2825, Hollywood, Florida 33022. The body of the letter provided as follows: This letter is to notify you that your tax auditor II position in Fort Lauderdale, Florida is ready for you to return to work. Your return to work will be effective immediately upon your receipt of this letter. The Department of Revenue agreed to your request for a leave of absence without pay for 12 months or until EEOC in Miami had concluded its investigation of your EEOC charges, numbers 150-88-1234 [sic] and 150-87-1115. As you know, EEOC has now concluded its investigations and issued its findings in both cases. The Department considers the reason for granting the leave of absence to be expired. Please contact Mr. Bill Hammock, Chief of Audit Activity or Mr. Howard Maxwell, Field Audit Supervisor, immediately upon receipt of this letter concerning your intentions regarding your actual reporting to work in Fort Lauderdale. Their phone number is (904) 488-0310. Your immediate supervisor will be Ms. Mary Jane Myscich. Please report to her concerning any necessary details surrounding your reporting to work. If you do not contact either of the above individuals as instructed in this letter within three workdays from the date you receive this letter, the Department will consider that you have been on unauthorized leave without pay for that three workday period. Such unauthorized leave will be considered to be abandonment of position and a resignation from the Department of Revenue as outlined under Rules 22A- 7.010(2) and 22A-8.002(5). Please contact me at (904) 488-2635 if you have any questions concerning this matter. Efforts to deliver the letter to Petitioner were unsuccessful. It therefore was subsequently returned to Fritchman as "unclaimed." By letter dated May 7, 1989, but not mailed until May 10, 1989, Petitioner requested "an extension of leave without pay status for six additional months."/1 In support of his request, Petitioner erroneously stated the following in the letter: Findings and conclusions of both EEOC Charge Nos.:150871115 dated 5/13/87 and 150881243 are as EEOC has informed you are rendered but not final. The former charge is still under appeal. Petitioner's May 7, 1989, letter, as well as the envelope in which it had been sent, reflected that Petitioner's current mailing address was 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33316. Accordingly, on May 12, 1989, utilizing a next- day delivery service, Fritchman sent to that address the following letter informing Petitioner of the denial of his leave request: I am in receipt of your letter sent May 10, 1989 to Mr. Bedonie. In your letter you request the Department to seek an extension of your leave without pay for an additional six months. For the reasons expressed in my letter to you dated May 5, 1989, copy attached, your approved leave of absence is concluded. Under the written agreement between you and the Department the two EEOC investigations have concluded; therefore the reason for your leave no longer exists. A copy of my letter to you dated May 5, 1989 is attached to this letter and incorporated by reference as if fully set forth. If you have already received a copy of that letter, then your return to work is effective on that date of your receipt. You are expected to resume your duties as a Tax Auditor II. Please contact me at (904) 488-2635 if you have any questions concerning this matter. The next-day delivery service unsuccessfully sought to deliver this letter and attachment to Petitioner at 8311 Dundee Terrace, Miami Lakes, Florida 33316. On May 18, 1989, the letter and attachment were returned to Fritchman. Later that same day, Fritchman attempted to contact Petitioner by telephone, but was unable to reach him. As of May 18, 1989, Petitioner had not yet returned to work, notwithstanding that he had not received authorization to be absent at any time subsequent to the expiration of the leave he had been granted pursuant to the May, 1988, memorandum of understanding and agreement. In view of Petitioner's failure to report to work, Fritchman sent to Petitioner's Hollywood post office box a letter dated May 19, 1989, informing Petitioner that, because he had been absent without authorized leave for three consecutive workdays, he was deemed to have abandoned his Tax Auditor II position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. Fritchman further explained in the letter as follows: You did not report to work on May 11, 1989 under the terms of your agreement with the Department. You were therefore on unauthorized leave without pay effective May 11, 1989 or on receipt of the May 5, 1989 letter, whichever occurred first. You have not reported to work as agreed in the May 11, 1988 agreement. You are not entitled to rely on a unilateral request for an extension of leave without reporting to work. Rule 22A-8.002(5)(b), F.A.C. states: "If an employee's request for leave is disapproved and the employee takes unauthorized leave, the agency head shall place the employee on leave without pay and after an unauthorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall consider the employee to have abandoned the position and resigned from the Career Service." You did not report to work on May 11, 1989 nor any day after that. The Department considers you have been on unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays. The Department considers that effective certainly no later than 5:00 p.m., Thursday, May 18, 1989 you have abandoned your position and resigned from the Career Service. The Department's records will indicate that this is a voluntary resignation from employment with the Department. It is this determination that Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service which is the subject of the instant controversy.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order sustaining Respondent's determination that Petitioner abandoned his Tax Auditor II position with Respondent and resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of October, 1989. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of October, 1989.

Florida Laws (1) 110.201
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RICHARD HALL vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 95-005896 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 30, 1995 Number: 95-005896 Latest Update: Jan. 22, 1997

Findings Of Fact On or about November 18, 1994, Petitioner submitted a state employment application for a position as a Detention Care Worker II (DCW II), position number 40756 with the Department of Juvenile Justice. A DCW II is responsible for the care and custody of juvenile offenders and for providing counsel and advise to these offenders. Respondent submitted the application to Alexander Wynn, who was at that time superintendent for the Orlando Regional Juvenile Detention Center. It was the responsibility of Superintendent Wynn to review all the applications submitted for the open position, interview the candidates and submit a recommendation to his superiors for hire in the position. At the time of submission, Petitioner had not answered the questions regarding his background which appear in the first block on page 3 of the application. Petitioner informed Superintendent Wynn during the interview that he was not sure how to answer the questions as he was not aware of the degree of one offense in his background and because his record had been cleared of the charges. Superintendent Wynn instructed Hall to provide him with documents from the court which indicated the nature of the offense and its disposition. Petitioner was asked on his state application whether he had ever pled guilty or nolo contendere to a crime which is a felony or first degree misdemeanor. Petitioner responded to this question in the negative. Petitioner was also asked on his state application whether he had ever had the adjudication of guilt withheld on a crime which is a felony or first degree misdemeanor; again Petitioner responded in the negative. Petitioner was charged in February of 1994 with one court of violating Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes, battery. A violation of Section 784.03(1)(a), Florida Statutes, is a first degree misdemeanor. The information which was filed on Petitioner specifies that the battery charge resulted from the fact that Petitioner, "on or about the 9th day of November 1993, within Volusia County, Florida, did actually and intentionally touch or strike Lucretia Hall against her will by squeezing victim around the neck and/or forcing victim onto the bed." At the time of the battery, Petitioner was married to and living with Lucretia Hall. The court withheld adjudication of guilt pending Petitioner's successful completion of probation. Petitioner was placed on probation for one year, ordered to participate in marriage counseling, and pay court costs or perform 25 hours of community service. Petitioner successfully completed probation. Probation was terminated and the case was closed. Petitioner provided Wynn with a document indicating his judgment and sentence and his release from probation. Wynn stated that he was satisfied that the documents cleared Petitioner and, accordingly, Petitioner followed Superintendent Wynn's instructions and answered the questions per his direction. Wynn informed Petitioner that he would file the documents in Petitioner's personnel file, and if anyone had any questions regarding the charge to refer them to him. By letter of September 30, 1994, Petitioner was offered a permanent position as a Detention Care Worker II at the Orlando Regional Detention center. He began work on or about November 27, 1994. Petitioner was subsequently fingerprinted and a background screening was conducted. Following the completion of a background screening, Petitioner was notified that he was not eligible for employment in a caretaker's position and was terminated by Respondent on June 14, 1995, pursuant to allegations that he had plead guilty to domestic battery and was the subject of a confirmed abuse report. This was the only allegation of domestic abuse in his nine-year marriage to Lucretia Hall. Petitioner has remarried since the incident and has never exhibited any violent tendencies towards his current wife or his stepchildren. Sufficient time has lapsed since the incident and he has demonstrated rehabilitation. Petitioner has demonstrated that he is a reliable person of good moral character. There is not, nor has there been, any evidence of a confirmed abuse report against the Petitioner.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order granting an exemption to Petitioner, Richard Hall. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5896J To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1995), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 (in part) 5 (in part), 6, 7, 8 (in part), 9 (in part), 10 (in part), 11 (in part), 12 (in part), 13, 14 (in part), 15, 16 (in part), and 17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (in part), 12 (in Preliminary Statement), 13 (in Preliminary Statement), 14 (in Preliminary Statement). Rejected as hearsay or immaterial and irrelevant: paragraphs 4, 5, 11 (in part). COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth W. Williams, Esquire Irvin Williams and Associates 1103 W. Willow Run Drive Port Orange, Florida 32119 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100

Florida Laws (4) 435.07447.207741.28784.03
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RHONDA K. LENFEST vs. ORANGE COUNTY EMERGENCY SERVICES DEPARTMENT, INC., 83-001216 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001216 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Rhonda K. Lenfest, was hired by respondent, Orange County Emergency Services, Inc., on June 13, 1979, in the position of emergency medical services communicator. Her employer is under the control and supervision of the Orange County oar of County Commissioners. Lenfest received a gunshot wound to the abdomen in late 1974 or early 1975. As a result, she is paraplegic and required to use a wheelchair. Lenfest was one of seven communicators employed by respondent. The duties of a communicator included communication by radio to emergency vehicles and hospitals from respondent's headquarters in the Orange County Courthouse. The communications center was staffed twenty-four hours per day, seven days per week. Those employees with the most seniority got the best shifts, and any last minute changes in shifts caused by illness or vacation were generally filled by those with the least seniority. The seniority basis was fully explained to Lenfest when she was initially hired. When first hired, Lenfest was under the impression that her supervisor would schedule her shift work so that twice a week therapy sessions could be continued, and arrangements made to provide care for her seven year old child. She was initially assigned to the 9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m. shifts. However, during the last four months of her employment she was frequently required to man the 1:00 a.m. - 7:00 a.m. shift when she was the only employee manning the communications center. This as due to a number of shift schedules caused by vacations, illnesses and schedule changes requested by other employees, and Lenfest having the lowest seniority. At various times, Lenfest was observed sleeping on the job. This was confirmed by several independent witnesses. She attributed this to bad shift hours, lack of sleep, and an "understanding" that napping at work was permissible. According to activity logs introduced by petitioner, she was late to work seventeen times between June 13 and November 10, 1979, which was more than any other employee in her section. She attributed this to a difficulty in finding a parking place around the courthouse. On each occasion that she was late, the on-duty employee could not leave his or her shift until Lenfest reported to her station, was briefed as to any existing problem areas, and actually assumed her duties. County personnel policy provides that "(e)xcessive, or habitual lateness will not be tolerated", and that "if such occurs, disciplinary measures . . . will be implemented." Lateness is defined as "not being able to start duty on time." On Saturday, November 10, 1979, Lenfest's immediate supervisor, John Spurlock, presented her with a supervisor counseling form dated October 30, 1979. It indicated she was being counseled for "sleeping on the job, security of building, not paying attention to records and logs, on county phones long periods of time for personal use, being late for work and attitude". At the bottom of the form, Spur lock noted that "(i)f these problems listed above can be solved Rhonda will be the same good worker that she was in the beginning." This was the sixth or seventh occasion on which Lenfest had been counseled. After being presented with the form, Lenfest called her supervisor "a damn liar, immature", "no good", and "lower than a snake's belly". The comments were loud enough for other persons in the area to hear. Spurlock attempted to calm Lenfest, but after these efforts were unsuccessful, he told her she could go home for the day. He then asked her to sign the counseling form. Lenfest said "you make me sick" and tore up the form into four pieces. Spurlock then told her "unless you can prove otherwise, you (can) consider yourself fired." On November 11, 1979, Lenfest was informed by telephone that she should contact her overall supervisor prior to returning to work. She failed to contact him the next working day (November 12) and did not report to work. On November 14, 1979, Lenfest was formally terminated by her manager with such termination to be effective on November 13. Under the Orange County personnel policy manual, a temporary employee is always on probation. Once an employee achieves permanent status he or she is on probation for the first six months. While on probation, an employee can be terminated without any notice or cause. Lenfest became a permanent employee on October 27, 1979, but still was on probation when she was terminated less than a month later. Therefore, Lenfest had no recourse to the grievance procedures afforded permanent status employees of the County. Her reclassification to permanent status had been made two days earlier than another employee so that she would have seniority over that employee. A non-handicapped employee, Ralph S. Bailey, was fired by respondent in 1979 for excessive tardiness. After talking with the personnel department and explaining what had occurred, he was rehired within a few days. Another non-handicapped employee, Brady Parsons, was counseled in 1979 for sleeping on the job. Respondent received no federal funds for the purpose of providing, aiding, assisting in or defraying the expenses of employment.

Recommendation Wherefore, in consideration of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Rhonda K. Lenfest be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Homero Leon, Jr., Esquire Greater Orlando Area Legal Service, Inc. P. O. Box 1790 Orlando, Florida 32802 John A. Gehrig, Jr., Esquire P. O. Box 3068 Orlando, Florida 32802 Robert Woolfork, Executive Director The Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. ALDRIDGE MCMAHAN, 77-002076 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-002076 Latest Update: Aug. 03, 1978

The Issue Consideration of the matter set forth in the September 22, 1977, letter of suspension served on Respondent, for events which allegedly transpired from September 13 through September 20, 1977, concerning the Respondent's fitness for duty and duty performance in the job position Pharmacist II, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.

Findings Of Fact Aldridge M. McMahan is a Career Service employee with the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. His specific employment is as a Pharmacist II, permanent status. This case concerns the action by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in which the Petitioner by letter of September 22, 1977, suspended the Respondent, Aldridge M. McMahan, for a period of thirty (30) days without pay, effective September 21, 1977. The suspension without pay was subject to being lifted upon receipt by the Petitioner of a satisfactory report prior to the end of the thirty (30) day suspension, on the question of the Respondent's fitness for duty. It was further stated in the letter of suspension that if such a satisfactory report was forthcoming, the Respondent would be afforded necessary sick leave to attend to his health needs, thus taking the amount of remaining time in the thirty day suspension out of the category of a disciplinary action without pay and placing it into sick leave status with pay, if the Respondent had earned sufficient sick leave time. The Respondent has disagreed with the conclusions drawn by the Petitioner and has appealed the action of suspension. To clearly understand the steps taken by Petitioner, it is necessary to consider the events of late 1976 and early 1977 pertaining to the Respondent's employment status. Beginning in October, 1976, the Respondent had occasions when he appeared to be groggy, was unable to speak intelligibly and had problems in filling prescriptions which was his primary duty within his employment position. Several alternatives were considered to assist Mr. McMahan with those difficulties including possible psychiatric counselling. In the beginning of 1977 the problems of Mr. McMahan intensified and he was required to see a psychiatrist. Eventually, Mr. McMahan was treated by David Hicks, M.D., a psychiatrist in Jacksonville, Florida. The contact began in earnest in March, 1977, and on April 19, 1977, Mr. McMahan was admitted to St. Luke's Hospital for assessment. At that point, Mr. McMahan was asking for tranquilizing medication for his condition. Mr. McMahan was discharged from the treatment with outpatient follow-up. The discharge occurred on May 3, 1977. On May 18, 1977, McMahan saw Dr. Hicks again and Mr. McMahan appeared very tired. Some of the tests that were performed in April of 1977 indicated that Mr. McMahan had been showing declining levels of long-acting barbiturates, specifically between April 19 and April 26, 1977. Dr. Hicks felt that the taking of barbiturates was consistent with the mannerisms of slurred speech and problems of communication. During the treatment with Dr. Hicks, and particularly from April 18, 1977, the Respondent by agreement with his employer was allowed to take sick leave to be treated for his condition and in fact took 160 hours of sick leave. When the Respondent returned, his work performance improved and there was no difficulty with his ability to perform his job, until September, 1977. The events in September, as stated before, give rise to the current action. Beginning in the middle part of September, 1977, identified as being September 13 through September 20, 1977, excluding the intervening weekend, McMahan was observed to have been hesitant in his walking and wavering in his walking, to have run into walls; to have evident slurred speech, to have appeared to have been dozing while sitting in the chair in his office, to have taken a number of pills and to have been extremely difficult to communicate with in the context of his job. All these matters occurred in the aforementioned period, September 13 through September 20, 1977, while Mr. McMahan was at work. He also evidenced a poor physical appearance in the sense of being gray in appearance, in terms of skin coloring. One of his coworkers who is a pharmacist in the same office felt that Mr. McMahan was rushing the prescriptions too quickly during this time sequence and it was also stated at the hearing that some complaints had been received about filling the prescriptions. Those complaints were rendered from outside sources other than by the Petitioner. It is significant that the symptoms observed by a number of employees who work with Mr. McMahan were the same symptoms that they had observed in April, 1977, when Mr. McMahan took leave to be treated for a problem with meprobamate. During the course of events between September 13 and September 20, 1977, no specific discussion was had with the Petitioner other than one occasion in which Embry Coalson, Chief of the Consumer Drugs and Devices Control Section of the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, made inquiry about why the Respondent had come to work on September 16 after his wife had called in saying that Respondent was ill. The Respondent had shown up for work looking very ill on that date. Nonetheless, after gathering all the facts and details of the events of September 13 through September 20, 1977, Mr. Coalson called the Respondent in to apprise him that he was being placed on suspension under the terms that are discussed above. Respondent indicated in the course of the discussion that was held on September 21, 1977, that he felt it was unfair treatment because he had been sick with diarrhea and had been taking Dramamine and Lomotil for this condition. In Respondent's mind this would appear to make him drowsy. Coalson suggested that a medical evaluation be made of the Respondent's condition and the Respondent suggested that he would be willing to have a blood test to show that there were no inappropriate drugs in his system. The conversation of September 21, 1977, ended with the Respondent being told that he could have a medical evaluation and blood test done and that of the report was satisfactory to the employer, the Respondent would be reinstated. The Petitioner was not willing to go with the Respondent on the date of the actual interview, i.e., September 21, 1977, to have tests done in the presence of the employer's representative. Coalson took the position that the responsibility to clear the matter resided with the Respondent and not the Petitioner. The attitude by the employer's representative was premised on the idea that the performance during the period of September 13 through September 20, 1977, on the part of the Respondent showed him to be unfit for duty and below standards in the duty performance; however, it allowed the punishment to be mitigated upon a satisfactory explanation of the Respondent's condition during the period in question. Beginning September 26, 1977, the Respondent went to see Dr. Hicks, the psychiatrist, who in his deposition in the course of the hearing indicated that he was convinced that McMahan's drowsiness was part of the physical ailment associated with nausea and diarrhea and not due to any drug-related problem. Dr. Hicks was of this persuasion although he administered no test for drugs and even though he had not observed Mr. McMahan's demeanor during the period of September 13 through September 20, 1977. A letter was written from Dr. Hicks to Mr. Coalson which was dated October 10, 1977, expressing the opinion of Dr. Hicks on the question of whether or not Mr. McMahan was suffering sensorial disturbance or other physical or psychiatric phenomenon suggesting any use of any chemical at the time of the initial interview with Dr. Hicks which took place on September 26, 1977. Mr. Coalson found this letter and explanation sufficient to reinstate the Respondent in is job position and Respondent remains in that position today. After analyzing all the facts in this cause, it is uncertain whether or not Mr. McMahan was truly ill at the time of September 13 through September 20, 1977, while he was at his work station. However, it is apparent that Mr. McMahan was unfit to perform duties of his position and performed those duties at such a substandard level that he was subject to the suspension that was entered against him, and not entitled to any reinstatement until the employer's representative received Dr. Hicks' letter and accepted it for purposes of establishing the reinstatement.

Recommendation It is recommended that the appeal of the Respondent be denied and that the suspension of September 22, 1977, be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Eisenberg, Esquire Post Office Box 2417F Jacksonville, Florida 32231 Thomas E. Crowder, Esquire 1320 Barnett Bank Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Dorothy Roberts Appeals Coordinator Career Service Commission 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

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KENNETH BOWE vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 77-002077 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-002077 Latest Update: Mar. 09, 1978

Findings Of Fact Respondent employs petitioner as a youth counselor II in Ft. Pierce, Florida. Petitioner attained permanent career service status in May of 1972. In addition to "carrying a normal caseload," i.e., supervising 85 to 88 youngsters in the customary fashion, petitioner met four times weekly with children who had been referred by courts or school authorities for intensive counseling. These groups counseling sessions began at six o'clock in the evening and lasted from one to one and a half hours. John B. Romano became petitioner's immediate supervisor on March 18, 1977. With the acquiescence of Mr. Romano's immediate predecessor, Ben Robinson, petitioner ordinarily reported for work between half past nine and half past ten in the morning. The week Mr. Romano started as petitioner's supervisor, he noticed that petitioner arrived for work between half past nine and ten in the morning. When he spoke to petitioner about this, petitioner told him of an accommodation that had been reached with Mr. Robinson, on account of petitioner's staying at work late to conduct group counseling. Mr. Romano told petitioner that he should report for work at half past eight in the morning, until a youth counselor's vacancy that then existed in the office could be filled. Subsequently, on at least one occasion before May 31, 1977, Mr. Romano spoke to petitioner about being late for work. On May 31, 1977, by which time another counselor had been hired, petitioner reported for work at approximately half past ten. On June 7, 1977, after petitioner had been suspended, Mr. Romano issued a written reprimand to petitioner, characterizing petitioner's arrival at half past ten on May 31, 1977, as "an insubordinate offense." Respondent's exhibit No. 5. One Harry Greene told Earl Stout, a service network manager for respondent and Mr. Romano's superior, that a boy whom petitioner had supervised had accused petitioner in open court of selling drugs and smoking marijuana. Messrs. Greene, Stout and Romano visited the facility at which petitioner's accuser was incarcerated and interrogated him. On May 13, 1977, a Friday, Mr. Romano told petitioner to meet him at nine o'clock the following Monday, but did not explain why. Present at the meeting on May 16, 1977, were petitioner, Mr. Romano, Mr. Greene and Mr. Stout. Petitioner was told of the accusations against him, but the accuser's identity was withheld. Mr. Stout gave petitioner the choice of resigning his position or taking annual leave for the duration of a formal investigation. Petitioner refused to resign. Mr. Stout instructed petitioner to tell no one that he had been asked to take leave or that he would be the subject of an investigation. When petitioner left this meeting he promptly told his fellow youth counselors that the had been suspended. For this petitioner received a written reprimand dated June 7, 1977. Respondent's exhibit No. 6. Petitioner subsequently availed himself of grievance procedures to raise the question whether he should have been permitted to take administrative leave instead of annual leave; and it was decided that he was entitled to take administrative leave. On June 8, 1977, Earl Stout wrote petitioner a letter which began "On June 1, you were advised by me that effective June 2, you were being suspended for insubordinate acts . . . ." This letter was sent to petitioner by certified mail. Mr. Stout testified without contradiction that blanket authority had been delegated to him to suspend employees under him.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the suspension be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Wayne Jennings, Esq. 2871 Forth-Fifth Street Gifford, Florida 32960 Mr. K.C. Collette, Esquire Forum 3, Suite 800 1665 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33401

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HELEN L. CHAPPELL vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 89-004183 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Winter Haven, Florida Aug. 03, 1989 Number: 89-004183 Latest Update: Dec. 06, 1989

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment in the career service system of the State of Florida.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Helen L. Chappell, a career service employee of Respondent with the Polk County Public Health Unit at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Petitioner worked sporadically in Respondent's employment during the month of March, 1989. She was credited with a total of 28 hours of work during that month. Respondent's records reflect that Petitioner did not actually work any hours in the months of April or May, 1989. On May 5, 1989, Respondent received notification from personnel of the Division of Risk Management of the Department of Insurance that Petitioner, a recipient of workers compensation benefits, had reached maximum medical recovery from a previous injury. Shortly thereafter, the Division provided Respondent with a copy of a medical report documenting the extent of Petitioner's recovery. The medical report, while noting Petitioner's recovery, also restricted her employment activities to preclude activities involving "a lot of head and shoulder movement." By certified letter dated May 11, 1989, the acting administrative director of the Polk County Health Unit informed Petitioner of the receipt of the medical report and the medical restrictions contained in the report. Further, the letter set forth Respondent's position that such restrictions would not interfere with Petitioner's performance of her duties as a clerk specialist. The letter concluded by directing Petitioner to return to work immediately to avoid the presumption that she had abandoned her position of employment with Respondent. The letter's certified mail return receipt reflects that Petitioner received the letter on May 15, 1989. In the course of a telephone conversation with the acting administrative director on May 25, 1989, Petitioner was informed that she must return to work no later than June 2, 1989. Petitioner did not return to work on June 2, 1989, or at any time thereafter. On June 15, 1989, the acting administrative director notified Petitioner by certified mail that Petitioner was presumed to have abandoned her career service employment position with Respondent as a result of the failure to report to work within three days of the June 2, 1989 deadline. The certified mail return receipt documents delivery of the letter on June 20, 1989. On August 1, 1986, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a copy of Respondent's employee handbook. Employees are placed on notice by contents of the handbook that any employee who is absent without authorization for three consecutive workdays may be considered to have abandoned his or her employment position.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration concluding that Petitioner abandoned her position in the career service due to her failure to report to work, or request leave for the period June 2-June 15, 1989. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4183 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. None submitted. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-5. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire HRS District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Fifth Floor, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33514 Helen L. Chappell Post Office Box 109 Lake Wales, Florida 33859 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aletta L. Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES vs. SHERMAN MERRILL, 83-002064 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-002064 Latest Update: May 05, 1991

Findings Of Fact Mr. Sherman Merrill began his position at Sunland Training Center in Orlando, Florida, on March 27, 1981 as an employee of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. His last day on the job was August 7, 1982. As a behavioral program specialist, Mr. Merrill is responsible for supervising subordinate staff and for the behavior programming of HRS client residents in a residential living unit at the Sunland Training Center. He develops, monitors, and implements behavioral programs which are contained in each resident's habilitation plan. These plans are designed to eliminate inappropriate behavior and teach daily living skills. Mr. Merrill's responsibilities are professional and managerial. They do not require strenuous physical activity. On August ,12, 1982 Noel F. Windsor, the Superintendent of the Sunland Center, granted Mr. Merrill a temporary leave from his responsibilities without pay pending a diagnosis and prognosis from Dr. Robert C. Mumby on Respondent's physical ability to perform his responsibilities. Respondent asserted that he was no longer able to work due to back pain. An appointment with Mr. Mumby was scheduled for Respondent on August 17, 1982. On August 11, 1982 Mr. Merrill's immediate supervisor, Ms. Sharon Blume, limited Mr. Merrill's responsibilities to eliminate lifting any weight under any circumstances including emergencies. Prior to examining Mr. Merrill Dr. Mumby requested permission to see Mr. Merrill's x-rays which had previously been taken of his back. Mr. Merrill refused the request and as a result Dr. Mumby cancelled the examination appointment. The Sunland Center then scheduled an appointment for Mr. Merrill to be examined by Dr. Bott on August 19, 1982. Mr. Merrill did not keep this appointment and it was rescheduled for August 25, 1982. The August 25, 1982 appointment was kept and as a result of that appointment Dr. Bott reported in his findings that Mr. Merrill was able to return to work with restrictions. 1/ On October 15, 1982 HRS requested Respondent to return to work on October 19, 1982. He did not appear as requested. On October 25, 1982 Mr. Windsor wrote a letter to Respondent stating that he would continue to be carried in a leave without pay status until such time as Dr. Bott has evaluated the x-rays in relation to the examination conducted on August 25, 1982. The foregoing letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. It was later returned to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services as unclaimed after attempts to deliver it were made on October 26 and October 30. On November 19, 1982 a copy of the October 25, 1982 letter was sent to Respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested. HRS again requested a release of Respondent's earlier x-rays for review by Dr. Bott. On December 10, 1982 Mr. Windsor wrote to Respondent a letter which stated in part: In accordance with the recommendation by Dr. Paul Raymond, your family practice physician in Cresson, Pennsylvania, we have scheduled an appointment for you with Dr. William K. Bott, Orthopedic Surgeon, 87 West Underwood Street, Orlando, Florida 32806, on Tuesday, December 21, 1982 at 10:00 A.M. As you are aware, we made an appointment for you with Dr. Bott on August 19 which you did not keep, and again on August 25, 1982. After the examination of August 25, Dr. Bott advised this agency that you were able to return to work with restrictions. He also advised us that he would re-evaluate you after reviewing your x-rays. You refused to allow Dr. Bott to make x-rays, and you also refused to authorize the release of previously made x-rays. Enclosed for your information is a copy of Chapter 22A-8 of the Florida Personnel Rules and Regulations. Please be advised that all fees for this visit will be paid by Sunland Center. Mr. Merrill did not see Dr. Bott on December 21, 1982, but was examined by him on January 4, 1983. On February 15, 1983 Mr. Merrill was told to report to work on February 21, 1983. Mr. Merrill did not report as ordered, but instead requested another leave of absence without pay. This request was denied on February 22, 1983 on which date Mr. Merrill was notified that he was absent without leave and that if he did not report to work by February 23, 1983 he would be deemed to have abandoned his position and voluntarily resigned from the career service system pursuant to Section 22A-8.02, Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Merrill did not report for work within the time allowed, three consecutive days after February 21, 1983. Mr. Windsor wrote him a letter on February 25, 1983 which stated: As you were advised in our letter of February 22, 1983, your request for an additional six (6) months leave of absence has been denied. Further, you were notified in that letter that you were to report to your work station prior to 3:15 P.M., February 23, 1983. You were examined by Dr. William K. Bott on August 25, 1982 and released to return to restricted duty. You failed to do so. You were re-examined on January 4, 1983 by Dr. Bott, and again, released to return to your Behavioral Program Specialist duties with restrictions. He indicated that you are able to perform sedentary type duties, you should not do repeated activities, repeated lifting or pulling using the lift [(sic) should be "left"] upper extremity (copy of diagnosis attached). You were advised by our letter of February 15, 1983 to return to your duties at Sunland Center, February 20, 1983 at approximately 2:00 P.M., you telephoned Living Unit 1E and left the message that you would not be reporting to work on February 21. At approximately midnight on February 20, 1983, you presented yourself on the Living Unit 1E to review the Personnel Rules and Regulations. On February 21, 1983, you presented your immediate supervisor with a request for additional leave of absence and left the facility. On February 23, 1983 at 1:50 P.M., during a meeting with your supervisors, you advised Ms. Patricia L. Gleason, Resident Life Program Supervisor, and Ms. Sharon Blume, Resident Life Unit Supervisor and your immediate supervisor, that you would not be coming to work. As you have failed to report to work for three (3) consecutive days, we must assume that you have abandoned your position with Sunland Center.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order determining that Respondent Sherman Merrill has abandoned his position in the State Career Service System as a Behavioral Program Specialist. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 16th day of December, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of December, 1983.

Florida Laws (2) 110.205120.57
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GEORGE NELSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION, 80-001925RX (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001925RX Latest Update: Dec. 19, 1980

The Issue This matter concerns the Petitioner's attack on Rules 22A-13.04 and 22A- 7.10(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, on the grounds that they are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority within the meaning of Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, George Nelson, was a permanent status Career Service employee on July 14, 1980, working for the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Division of Forestry. His specific employment was a firefighter. On the subject date, by correspondence directed to an official within the Division of Forestry, namely, Larry Wood, the Petitioner notified the Respondent of his intention to run for a School Board Seat, District IV, in Wakulla County, Florida. A copy of that notification may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. As stated in the correspondence, Nelson had made an attempt to determine the necessary steps to gain the approval of his agency before taking the oath of candidacy for the aforementioned position. (This request was made following a conversation with the same Larry Wood held on July 10, 1980, on the subject of Nelson's candidacy. On July 10, a letter was sent addressed only to "Larry" and at Mr. Wood's instigation the subsequent letter of July 14, 1980, was dispatched referring to Wood as "Mr. Larry Wood", for appearance sake.) As set forth in the Nelson correspondence, the last date for qualifying for the School Board position was July 22, 1980, at 12:00 Noon. Prior to that date, the Petitioner's request to run was forwarded through the decision-making channels within the Division of Forestry. At the time Nelson dispatched his letter of July 14, 1980, there was some concern expressed by Wood to the effect that there might be some scheduling conflict between Nelson's primary employment duties as a forest ranger and his duties as a School Board Member; however, Wood indicated that the scheduling matter could probably be accommodated. Wood offered no guarantee to the Petitioner that the request to run for office would be approved by the appropriate agency officials. On July 18, 1980, and again on July 21, 1980, officials with the Division of Forestry orally indicated to the Petitioner that he would not he allowed to run for the School Board. In view of the fact that the last day for qualifying was July 22, 1980, the Petitioner determined to offer his candidacy without the permission of his agency head and on that date he took the loyalty oath for public office for the School Board, District IV, Wakulla County, Florida, as may be seen by Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, which is a copy of the Loyalty Oath and the Oath of Candidacy and Statement of Candidacy. On July 23, 1980, Larry Wood, District Forester and supervisor to the Petitioner, contacted the Petitioner to inquire why the Petitioner had offered his candidacy without permission of the agency. The Petitioner responded that he did so because he did not feel that there was any conflict between school board duties and that of forest ranger. Wood informed him that he would hear from the Division of Forestry on the subject. Following the conversation with Wood, on July 24, 1980, the Petitioner received two items in response to his request. One of those items was dated July 21, 1980, from John M. Bethea, Director, Division of Forestry, addressed to Larry Wood, in which the subject of the Petitioner's candidacy was discussed and the indication given that it would not be approved due to scheduling problems and conflict and controversies "that are generated by any local governmental political body". The memorandum went on to say, "These controversies might affect the Forestry Division's ability to carry out the responsibilities with the very segments of the public." A copy of this memorandum may be found as petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. The second item received by the Petitioner on July 24, 1980, was dated on that date, and addressed to George Nelson from Larry Wood, indicating a denial of the petitioner's request to run for public office. This correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, a copy of which has been admitted into evidence. After the Petitioner had received the memoranda discussed herein, there ensued a series of meetings between the Petitioner and various officials within the agency in which the agency tried to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy in view of the fact that he had not gained their permission to run for the school Board. Throughout these discussions, the Petitioner continued to assert the conviction that unless some conflict of interest could be shown to him, he did not intend to withdraw as a candidate. In the discussions, the agency further stated that the choices open to the Petitioner were ones of resignation from his position as A Forest Ranger or withdrawal from the School Board race. They also stated that if he were caused to resign, there could be no rights to appeal beyond that point. In the course of the process, the Petitioner met with Director Bethea, who explained the Director's position on the Petitioner's right to run for office and reiterated his opposition, based upon his problems of scheduling to accommodate the needs of the Division of Forestry and the needs of the school Board of Wakulla County and also the concern of possible conflicts and controversies arising out of the necessity for forest rangers to go on the property of the citizens of the several counties in the State of Florida and the fact that this might create a problem in view of the nature of the functions of a school board member. Although the Director generally held the philosophy that employees in positions such as the Petitioner's should not normally be allowed to run for local office, he did not absolutely foreclose the possibility that someone might persuade him to the contrary and thereby cause him to allow them to seek a local office. Each case would be reviewed on its own merits. The matter was also presented before representatives of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services, who took the same position as had been taken by the other authorities within the department, and again the Petitioner indicated that he would decline to withdraw as a candidate. Following the meeting with the Department officials, Wood made one other contact to ascertain if the Petitioner had changed his mind about withdrawing his name as a candidate and the Petitioner indicated that the had not. Subsequent to that latter conversation with Wood, the Petitioner was hand-delivered a letter dated August 12, 1980, which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 5. This letter informed the Petitioner that he was deemed to have resigned his position as Forest Ranger effective August 15, 1990, and offered as a statement of authority Subsection 110.233(4)(a), Florida Statutes. After August 15, 1980, the Petitioner was removed as a permanent party Career Service employee with the Respondent. Following his dismissal, the Petitioner through his counsel in the subject case has attacked the Joint Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3 pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, by contending that those aforementioned exhibits constitute invalid rules for reason that they were not duly promulgated. The Petitioner continued to work beyond August 15, 1980, and was eventually reinstated as a probationary employee with the Division of Forestry and holds the position of probationary Forest Ranger at this time.

Florida Laws (14) 110.127110.201110.217110.227110.233112.011120.56120.57120.68286.0117.10775.082775.083775.084
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