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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs. GEORGE THOMAS DARBY, 83-000041 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000041 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent, George Thomas Darby, at all times relevant to these proceedings, was licensed as a professional bail bondsman and limited surety agent. The Respondent was previously licensed as an ordinary-combination life, including disability agent, but such license expired on March 30, 1981. On January 7, 1982, a grand jury indictment was issued in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Panama City Criminal Division, against the Respondent, George Thomas Darby. The indictment specifically charged that the Respondent: Did knowingly combine, conspire, confederate agree, and have a tacit understanding with other stated individuals to possess with the intent to distribute more than 1,000 pounds of the Schedule I control substance marijuana, in violation of Sections 841 and 846 of Title 21 of the United States Code. Did knowingly combine, conspire, confederate agree, and have a tacit understanding with other specified persons to import into the United States the Schedule I control substance marijuana in violation of Sections 952 and 963 of Title 21 of the United States Code. Did knowingly and intentionally import into the United States a Schedule I control substance in violation of Section 952 of Title 21 and Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States Code. Did knowingly and intentionally possess with the intent to distribute the Schedule I control substance marijuana in violation of Section 841 of Title 21 and Section 2 of Title 18 of the United States Code. On July 14, 1982, George Thomas Darby was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, Panama City Criminal Division, as follows: Defendant has been convicted as charged of the offense of from on or about January, 1975, until the date of the indictment, in the Northern' District of Florida and elsewhere, knowingly combining, conspiring, and agreeing with others to import marijuana into the United States, in violation of Title 21, U.S. Code, Sections 952 and 963, as charged in Count 111(3) of the indictment. Pursuant to the above conviction, the Respondent, George Thomas Darby, was sentenced to a term of five years imprisonment and fined $15,000. The Respondent, by answer, admitted and further, at the formal hearing by stipulation, accepted as true the following facts: That you, George Thomas Darby, on or about July 14, 1982, in the United States District Court of the Northern District of Florida, in Case No. MCR 82-00203-07, were found guilty of knowingly combining, conspiring and agreeing with others to import marijuana into the United States, in violation of Title 21, U.S. Code, Sections 952, and 953, as charged in Count 111(3) of a previous grand jury indictment, Criminal Case No. MCR82-00203. The violation of either of the aforementioned titles is a felony as defined by Title 18, U.S.C. Section I(1). The Respondent has been licensed as a professional bail bondsman since October, 1976. His primary business as a bail bondsman has been in Jackson County, Florida. The Respondent has had no prior criminal convictions and no complaints or other disciplinary actions by the Department of Insurance against any license held by him from that Department. The Respondent has voluntarily ceased writing bail bonds since February of 1982, to the date of the hearing. Prior to the above-referenced conviction, the Respondent enjoyed a reputation as an honest, hardworking, and law-abiding citizen in the Jackson County area. On January 31, 1983, Clyde M. Taylor, Jr., Esquire, counsel for the Respondent in the above-referenced criminal action, filed an appellate brief in the United States Court of Appeal for the Eleventh Circuit on behalf of George Thomas Darby, seeking to reverse the July 14, 1982, district court conviction. At the time of the formal hearing, this appeal was pending.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order dismissing its Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, George Thomas Darby. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of July, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Clark R. Jennings, Esquire Department of Insurance Suite 413-B, Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Clyde M. Taylor, Jr., Esquire 1105 Hays Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of July, 1983.

Florida Laws (8) 648.45775.08775.082775.083775.084777.04893.03893.13
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SIGNS OF ALL KINDS, INC., AND DAVID G. LENNARD vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 89-005974 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Nov. 01, 1989 Number: 89-005974 Latest Update: Sep. 13, 1990

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Signs of All Kinds, Inc., is a corporation duly organized and existing in the State of Florida with its principal place of business being in Miami, Florida. David G. Lennard is the president of Signs of All Kinds. (Signs of All Kinds, Inc. will be referred to herein as Petitioner. David G. Lennard will be referred to by his name.) Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida, created pursuant to Section 20.21, Florida Statutes, and is charged with the administration and enforcement of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Between January 1, 1988 and June 30, 1988, a taxpayer amnesty program, authorized by Section 48 of Chapter 87-6, Laws of Florida, as amended by Section 27 of Chapter 87-101, Laws of Florida, was put into effect by Respondent. Chapter 12-20, Florida Administrative Code, was adopted by Respondent to administer the amnesty program. Rule 12-20.002, Florida Administrative Code, describes the amnesty program, and provides, pertinent to these proceedings, as follows: 12-20.002. Description of the Tax Amnesty Program. the tax amnesty program is an opportunity for eligible taxpayers to satisfy their liabilities arising under included Florida revenue laws and to thereby avoid criminal prosecution and payment of penalties under such laws. The tax amnesty program is available to eligible taxpayers during the period January 1, 1988 through June 30, 1988. Eligible taxpayers have this period to resolve their liability for tax, interest, or penalties imposed under included Florida revenue laws and to file delinquent returns or reports, or to file amended returns or reports under such laws. Tax and interest owed by the eligible taxpayer must be paid in full during the amnesty period. ... * * * The term "eligible taxpayer" means any person liable for an amount of tax, interest, or penalty under an included Florida revenue law, penalty under an included revenue law, except persons under criminal investigation, indictment, information, or prosecution. Delinquent taxpayers, taxpayers under audit, and taxpayers involved in administrative or judicial proceedings contesting their liability, are eligible to participate in the tax amnesty program for amounts for which amnesty is available. ... Eligible taxpayers who comply with the terms and conditions of the tax amnesty program will be granted amnesty from criminal prosecution for violation of included Florida revenue laws and will not be required to pay any penalty imposed under an included Florida Revenue law. Eligible taxpayers are required to pay any tax or interest due under an included Florida revenue law for which amnesty is granted. Brian Matlin is an accountant who performed accounting services for Petitioner between January 1986 and May 1987. These services did not include the preparation or the filing of sales tax returns. In May 1987, Mr. Matlin and Mr. Lennard had a disagreement which resulted in Mr. Matlin becoming disgruntled and in his services to Petitioner being terminated. In June of 1987 Mr. Matlin provided Respondent's investigators, Karen F. Johnson and Paul DeLesdernier, a sworn statement in which he alleged that Petitioner had underpaid its sales taxes. Mr. Matlin produced certain financial records of Petitioner that had come into his possession during the time he performed services for Petitioner which supported his contention that Petitioner was underpaying its sales taxes. As a result of the information that had been supplied to it by Mr. Matlin, Respondent began an investigation of Petitioner that was initially classified by Investigator Johnson as being both civil and criminal. Prior to the institution of the amnesty program, Respondent developed a procedure to designate and to handle those cases that were to be considered to be under criminal investigation, and therefore ineligible to participate in the amnesty program. On December 28, 1987, Investigator Johnson filled out a request that the investigation into Petitioner's underpayment be formally classified as a criminal investigation. This request was approved by Mr. David Skinner, Respondent's Chief of Enforcement, on December 29, 1987. The procedure followed by both Ms. Johnson and Mr. Skinner was consistent with the procedure Respondent had adopted. As of December 29, 1987, Petitioner was under a criminal investigation by Respondent for a possible violation of Section 212.12(2), Florida Statutes, for making a false or fraudulent return or willfully attempting to evade payment of tax. As of December 29, 1987, Respondent's records formally reflected that the investigation of Petitioner was classified as a criminal investigation. Respondent's first contact with Mr. Lennard occurred on February 9, 1988, at which time he was interviewed by Investigators Johnson and DeLesdernier at the Petitioner's offices. At this first meeting, Ms. Johnson gave to Mr. Lennard a statement of rights form that contained, in pertinent part, the following warning: As a Revenue Investigator for the Florida Department of Revenue, one of my functions is to investigate the possibility of criminal violations of Florida Tax Laws, and other related offenses. I am investigating tax matters which involve you or your business and would like to ask you some questions. I must advise you, however, that under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, you cannot be compelled to answer any of my question or submit any information which you feel might tend to incriminate you in any way. You are further advised that anything that you say and any documents that you may submit may be used against you in a criminal proceeding. ... Mr. Lennard denies that such a form was given to him at this meeting and that he was not advised that his company was under criminal investigation. Investigator Johnson's testimony is in conflict with Mr. Lennard's testimony in this regard. She contends that the form was given to Mr. Lennard, but that he refused to sign the form. She contends that Mr. Lennard took the form so that his attorney could review it. This dispute in the testimony is resolved by rejecting the testimony of Mr. Lennard and by accepting the testimony of Ms. Johnson because her testimony is found to be more credible. Subsequent to the February 9, 1988, meeting, Mr. Lennard was contacted on several occasions by Investigator Johnson to produce various records of the Petitioner. On each occasion, Mr. Lennard complied with the request and was asked to sign an Investigation Unit Property Receipt. Such receipts were signed on the following dates in 1988: February 16, March 2, March 16, March 23, April 8, May 9, and May 20. As of the formal hearing, Respondent had not referred this case to the office of the State Attorney for prosecution, and the State of Florida had not commenced any criminal proceedings against Petitioner. From May 1985 through December 1987, Petitioner underpaid the sales taxes it owed the State of Florida under the provisions of Part I of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, by the total amount of $58,584.00. On March 2, 1988, Petitioner and Mr. Lennard made a request for amnesty under the Florida Tax Amnesty Program for all Florida sales tax liabilities owed by them for the period May 1985 through December 1987. Petitioner paid the full amount of tax and interest assessed by Respondent for the period May 1985 through December 1987 prior to July 1, 1988. These payments were made as follows: Date Amount March 4, 1988 $10,000.00 May 16, 1988 $10,000.00 June 30, 1988 $50,680.01 On June 20, 1988, Respondent filed a "Notice of Assessment for Tax, Penalty and Interest Due" against Petitioner based on the alleged underpayment of sales taxes by Petitioner between May 1985 and December 1987. The total amount of taxes due was assessed as being $58,584.00. In addition to interest assessed pursuant to the provisions of Section 212.12(3), Florida Statutes, Respondent assessed penalties under the provisions of Section 212.12(2)(a), Florida Statutes, that are the subject of this proceeding. First, a late penalty was assessed in the amount of $4,634.01. Second, a specific penalty in the amount of $29,292.00 (50% of the assessed taxes) was assessed. This specific penalty was assessed on the premise that Petitioner had submitted a false or fraudulent return. Petitioner's application to participate in the amnesty program was denied by Respondent on the grounds that Petitioner was under a criminal investigation prior to the request being made and was, consequently, not eligible to participate in the amnesty program. At Petitioner's request, the initial determination was reconsidered by Respondent. Following the reconsideration, the initial determination that Petitioner was not eligible to participate in the amnesty program was confirmed. This proceeding followed Petitioner's request for a formal administrative hearing. The parties stipulated that the penalties that were assessed against Petitioner were properly assessed unless Petitioner is eligible to participate in the amnesty program. On June 20, 1988, Respondent filed a separate "Notice of Assessment for Tax, Penalty and Interest Due" in the amount of $58,584.00 against Mr. Lennard, in his individual capacity. This assessment, pursuant to Section 213.29, Florida Statutes, was premised on Mr. Lennard's status as president of Signs of All Kinds, Inc. The principal amount of the tax and the interest thereon were paid by Petitioners in 1988. As a consequence, the lien that had been filed by Respondent against Mr. Lennard was discharged and the separate assessment has been rendered moot.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order which determines that Petitioner, Signs of All Kinds, Inc., is not eligible to participate in the tax amnesty program because it was under criminal investigation and which upholds the assessment of the subject penalties against Petitioner, Signs of All Kinds, Inc. It is further RECOMMENDED that the assessment that was separately made against Petitioner, David G. Lennard, be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE 89-5974 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioners: The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3, 5-7, 9, 12, 15, 18, and 19 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 4 and 8 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are rejected because the proposed finding implies that the decision to classify the case as a criminal investigation was based solely on the contact with Mr. Matlin. Consequently, the proposed finding is contrary to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 11 and 14 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 13 and 17 are rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence or to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 20-22 are rejected as being conclusions of law. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 20, 21, 23, and 29 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 2, 8, 12, 16, 13 (this is the second of two paragraphs numbered 13 and is found on page 6 of the proposed recommended order), 18, and 19 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact contained in the first two sentences and in the last sentence of paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in the remainder of paragraph 5 are rejected in part as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 7 and 11 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order, and are rejected in part as being the recitation of testimony. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 13-15, 17, 22, and 24-28 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached or as being subordinate to the findings made. Copies furnished: Lynn C. Washington One CenTrust Financial Center 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 Kevin J. O'Donnell, Esquire Joseph C. Mellichamp, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 William D. Moore, Esquire Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (5) 120.5720.21212.12213.29606.02
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FRANCIS J. FERRIS vs DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 01-000849 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Mar. 01, 2001 Number: 01-000849 Latest Update: Jul. 15, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a yacht and ship salesperson’s license pursuant to Section 326.006, Florida Statutes, and Rule 61B-60.003, Florida Administrative Code.

Findings Of Fact By application dated June 23, 2000, Petitioner applied to Respondent for licensure as a yacht and ship salesperson. Respondent received the application on July 5, 2000. Consistent with its practice, Respondent issued to Petitioner a temporary license for the period beginning July 11, 2000, and ending October 11, 2000. On his application, Petitioner answered “YES” to question 14, which is as follows: CRIMINAL HISTORY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld. Immediately below question 14 was the following note: This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. The following appeared on the application following question 16: If your answer to question 14, 15, or 16 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the date, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending. Petitioner attached to the application a list describing 20 arrests beginning in 1984 and ending in 1998. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol following arrests on June 8, 1984; on August 20, 1991; on September 1, 1994; and on December 13, 1997. Following the entry for the arrest of September 1, 1994, Petitioner reflected that he had been sentenced to 365 days in BCJ, which was a reference to the Broward County Jail. Following the entry of the December 13, 1997, arrest, Petitioner wrote in hand "ADJ- 270 Days DCJ." Petitioner testified that he meant this to reflect that he had been adjudicated guilty and had served 270 days in the Dade County Jail. On the upper left corner of the attachment to the application, Petitioner typed his name and, without explaining its meaning, the following: 97-12341CF. 2/ Consistent with its practice when an applicant responds in the affirmative to question 14, Respondent obtained a Florida Criminal History Report (History Report) from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) which revealed Petitioner's arrest history and the disposition of those arrests. The History Report confirmed the information Petitioner had supplied. In addition, the History Report reflected that Petitioner had been incarcerated beginning January 26, 1999, on a felony conviction of DUI. The History Report reflected that this was Petitioner's fourth DUI conviction and advised that the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) may have additional information in a Florida Inmate Release Status Report (Status Report). Respondent next obtained a Status Report for Petitioner from DOC. This report reflected that Petitioner was incarcerated for the felony offense of DUI from January 26, 1999, until his release on March 17, 2000. The Status Report also reflected that the case number assigned to the felony charges in Broward County for which Petitioner was subsequently convicted and incarcerated was 97-12341. Petitioner asserts that he disclosed his felony conviction and incarceration by placing that case number on the attachment to the application. That assertion is rejected because no reasonable person would have known what that series of numbers and letters meant without an explanation. Petitioner did not reveal the felony conviction and incarceration on his application. Petitioner was not candid with Respondent or fully forthcoming as to his conviction and incarceration on his application. Petitioner's civil rights have not been restored. Petitioner still owes several hundred dollars in outstanding fines from his prior convictions. The only evidence presented that may be viewed as relating to the issue of Petitioner's rehabilitation was that he had completed his term of incarceration.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for a yacht and ship salesperson's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2001.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57326.004326.006 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61B-60.003
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ELZIE COOK vs. PAROLE AND PROBATION COMMISSION, 81-002549RX (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002549RX Latest Update: Dec. 18, 1981

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an inmate incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution near Bushnell, Florida. The Petitioner was convicted for sexual battery and robbery in proceedings before the Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, State of Florida. On April 23, 1976, he was sentenced to serve 20 years for robbery and five years for sexual battery. Petitioner is presently incarcerated in accordance with these commitment orders. On December 19, 1979, Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Parole and Probation Commission for the purpose of recommending a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under the Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the gravity of the offense for which the Petitioner was sentenced, establish a "salient factor score" and consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The examiner classified the offense as "greatest (most serious II)." He set the salient factor score as one. The examiner recommended setting the PPRD at the top of the appropriate range given the offense characteristic and salient factor score, and further recommended aggravating this period because of the concurrent conviction for robbery. The examiner recommended a PPRD of September 7, 1982. The Parole and Probation Commission reviewed the recommendation and considered the robbery conviction as being a greater aggravating factor than applied by the examiner. The Commission set the PPRD for February 25, 1986. Petitioner sought further review of the PPRD by the Commission and was unsuccessful. Petitioner has also been unsuccessful in pursuing judicial relief in connection with the PPRD. Commission Rule 23-19.01(5), Florida Administrative Code, as applied to the Petitioner, provided: If present offense of conviction involved multiple separate offenses, the severity level shall be based on the most serious of the offenses, and the other offenses may be used as aggravating factors. This shall be applied to both consecutive and con- current sentences. In adopting its rules, the Commission sought to develop criteria to predict the likelihood of successful parole. An inmate's history is the most reliable predictive device. Statistically, an inmate who has been convicted for more than one offense is a greater parole risk than an inmate who has been convicted for only one offense. The Commission's rule is thus a reasonable device for predicting the likelihood of successful parole.

Florida Laws (4) 120.56921.16947.002947.165
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RICHARD E. PARKER vs FLORIDA LAND SALES, CONDOMINIUMS, AND MOBILE HOMES, 97-000809 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Feb. 18, 1997 Number: 97-000809 Latest Update: Jan. 30, 1998

The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a 47-year old resident of Hollywood, Florida. He is married and has a five-year old step-daughter. His wife's father is the minister of the First Methodist Church in Hollywood. Petitioner is an active member of his father-in-law's church. In recent years, he has volunteered a significant amount of his time to perform tasks on behalf of the church. Petitioner is now, and has been since June of 1997, employed as a salesperson by Rex Yacht Sales (Rex) in Fort Lauderdale. As a salesperson for Rex, he sells new boats and he also sells used boats that are 32 feet or less in length.3 Approximately, 75 percent of the sales he makes are of used boats. Petitioner specializes in the sale of sailboats. He possesses a considerable amount of knowledge concerning sailboats as a result of the years (since he was a young child) that he has devoted to sailing. Petitioner owned, lived aboard, and captained a sailboat named the "Wave Dancer" from 1975 until the late 1980's. He acquired the "Wave Dancer" in return for his participation in an illicit drug smuggling operation. In 1975, when he was still living in his hometown of Port Washington, New York, Petitioner was approached by a childhood friend, Dan Locastro. Locastro advised Petitioner that he (Locastro) and his associates wanted to buy a sailboat to use to transport marijuana from St. Thomas in the Virgin Islands to the New England coast. Locastro promised Petitioner that, if Petitioner were able locate a sailboat for them to purchase and if he thereafter successfully captained the newly purchased sailboat on its journey to and from the Virgin Islands, Petitioner could keep the sailboat. Approximately a month later, Petitioner notified Locastro that he had located a sailboat for Locastro and his associates. The sailboat was the "Wave Dancer." Locastro and his associates subsequently purchased the "Wave Dancer." They purchased the boat in the name of Richard Harrison. Following the purchase of the "Wave Dancer," Petitioner, accompanied by Locastro, sailed the boat to an island near St. Thomas. There, 500 pounds of marijuana were loaded onto the "Wave Dancer." Petitioner then sailed the boat to the New England coast, where he delivered the marijuana. Petitioner participated in this illicit smuggling operation because he wanted his own sailboat. He was neither arrested, nor charged, for having participated in this operation. As promised, Petitioner was allowed by Locastro and his associates to keep the "Wave Dancer" after the conclusion of operation. The boat was subsequently titled in Petitioner's name. For approximately 12 or 13 years, Petitioner (who was then single) lived in the Caribbean aboard the "Wave Dancer." He earned a living by taking tourists (usually one couple at a time) out in the water on his boat. In the late 1980's, Petitioner decided to return to the United States to live with and care for his parents, who, because of their advanced age, required his assistance. Before moving back to the United States, Petitioner put the "Wave Runner" up for sale. He was unsuccessful in his efforts to sell the boat. He discussed with a friend of his, Ken Fish, the possibility of Fish purchasing the boat for $50,000.00, but no sale was consummated. Petitioner was still the owner the "Wave Runner" when he flew to the United States and moved in with his parents (in their home). He left the "Wave Runner" behind in the Virgin Islands in the care of his friend Fish. Approximately nine months after he left the Virgin Islands, Petitioner received a telephone call from Fish, who indicated that he was having financial difficulty and that he wanted to use the "Wave Runner" in a "marijuana scheme." Approximately six months later, Fish again telephoned Petitioner. This time he told Petitioner that he wanted "to do a cocaine smuggling venture with [the "Wave Runner]." At first, Petitioner told Fish that he (Fish) was "out of his mind." Later during the conversation, however, Petitioner relented and agreed to allow Fish to use the "Wave Runner" in the proposed "cocaine smuggling venture." Petitioner gave his permission without receiving any promise from Fish that he (Petitioner) would receive anything in return. The "cocaine smuggling venture" was unsuccessful. The "Wave Runner" was seized by authorities in Martinique. In the spring of 1991, in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR- HIGHSMITH, Petitioner was criminally charged by the United States government for his role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" with conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. Petitioner's role in the "cocaine smuggling venture" was limited to permitting Fish to use the "Wave Runner" to transport cocaine into the United States. After his arrest in May of 1991, Petitioner agreed to, and he subsequently did, cooperate with federal authorities by participating in federal undercover drug enforcement operations under the supervision of federal agents. At times during these operations, he was required to place himself in situations where his personal safety was compromised. In or around January of 1994, pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91- 349-CR-HIGHSMITH to one count of conspiracy to import cocaine. On January 30, 1995, Petitioner was adjudicated guilty of said crime and, as punishment, placed on probation for five years and fined $17,500.00. Such punishment constituted a substantial downward departure from the range provided in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. At the sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge explained that he was "constrained to substantially modify the sentence in this case downward" because of the risks Petitioner had taken to assist federal authorities in their drug-fighting efforts. Although under no legal obligation to do so, Petitioner continued to provide similar assistance to federal authorities (at a substantial personal risk) after his sentencing. In September of 1996, Petitioner filed with the Department an application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. Question 13 on the application form read as follows: CRIMINAL HISTORY: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the law of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. Yes No The application form instructed those applicants whose answer to Question 13 was "Yes" to "attach [their] complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or [were] pending." On the application form that he submitted to the Department, Petitioner answered "Yes" to Question 13, but he did not attach the required signed statement. He merely appended to the application form a copy of the judgment entered in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On or about October 1, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioner: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Section of General Regulation is in receipt of your application for a yacht Salesman. A review of your application has disclosed the following deficiencies: You answered Yes to question 13 which asked "Have you been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendre (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld?" The paragraph under question 15 further states "If your answer to question 13, 14, 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." You will need to submit a signed statement of the charges and facts, within twenty-one (21) days to this office before your application can be checked for form. Should you have any questions, please contact me. After receiving the Department's October 1, 1996, letter, Petitioner telephonically requested additional time to respond. By letter dated December 13, 1996, Petitioner's attorney, John J. Lynch, Esquire, responded on Petitioner's behalf to the Department's October 1, 1996, letter. Lynch's letter, which was received by the Department on December 17, 1996, read as follows: I represent the Applicant, Richard E. Parker. In response to concerns raised by Richard Parker's application's disclosure of charges and crimes and the results thereof, please consider the following as part of the application process: The subject matter was limited to involvement in a conspiracy to import controlled substances. Mr. Parker voluntarily entered a guilty plea in the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Miami, Florida, in an action entitled, "United States v. Richard Parker" Criminal No. 91-349-CR- Highsmith. Upon being aware of potential liability, he cooperated fully with the U.S. Government. During a four-year period, he provided extensive assistance to the U.S. Government in ongoing investigations and provided training and resources to special agents. Mr. Parker's participation as a Government agent put him at considerable risk. His case remains under court seal to protect information which may be used by the Government in future criminal prosecutions. I cannot provide a complete transcript of the court proceedings without jeopardizing Mr. Parker's safety. To appreciate Mr. Parker's significant assistance to the U.S. Government, a portion of the Honorable Judge Highsmith's sentencing comments has been enclosed. Pages 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the sentencing memorandum specify the efforts made by Mr. Parker, and recognized by the Court to rectify his prior conduct. (Note: All individuals, other than Mr. Parker, have been redacted to preserve a measure of safety since the matter remains under court seal). In recognition of [his] assistance, Mr. Parker was placed on probation for five years and fined on January 30, 1995. The fine was paid and probation has commenced. I trust this supplemental response answers concerns regarding this unfortunate episode in Mr. Parker's life. As his attorney asserted in the foregoing letter, as of the date of the letter, Petitioner had paid the $17,500.00 fine imposed in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH. On January 17, 1997, the Department issued its Notice of Intent to deny Petitioner's application for licensure. On February 12, 1997, Petitioner requested a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the matter. On August 12, 1997, Petitioner filed a motion in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 91-349-CR-HIGHSMITH requesting that "his period of probation [be reduced] from a term of 60 months to a term of 32 months thereby terminating his probation on September 30, 1997." In support of his motion, he stated the following: On January 30, 1995, Richard Parker was sentenced by this Court to five years probation for his participation in a cocaine conspiracy. The Court imposed this lenient sentence because of the extraordinary cooperation Richard Parker had rendered (a transcript of the sentencing is attached hereto as Exhibit A). As part of his cooperation Parker had gone to Columbia in a sailboat, at great personal risk and with no protection from law enforcement, and developed a case involving significant arrests, convictions, and seizure of cocaine. Since sentencing Parker has remarried and complied with all terms of probation. Parker had promised the agents and the Court that his cooperation would continue regardless of the sentence imposed by the Court. True to his word, following sentencing, at the request of the DEA, Richard Parker traveled alone to Columbia and negotiated the location in the Caribbean Sea for an air drop of 300 kilos of cocaine. Parker then captained a sailboat and traveled to Dominica and Barbados, St. Kitts and the British Virgin Islands with DEA agents on board and participated in the recovery of the 300 kilos of cocaine as it was dropped from a plane in 50 kilogram packages. Parker received no payment for this cooperation. Parker rendered substantial assistance to the Government after sentencing because of his moral commitment to cooperation as a form of restitution, because of his sense of obligation and gratitude, and because he had given his word to the Government and this Court. It is now over 2 1/2 years since Parker was sentenced. Parker has complied fully with all conditions of probation. Parker has committed himself to building a productive law-abiding life. The Count may well recall that Parker's marriage ended during his cooperation and sentence. Parker has recently married again becoming the father of a four-year old in the process. Parker has spent his life working on and sailing boats. Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a license to be a yacht salesman. The issuance of these licenses in Florida is regulated by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR). The DBPR has denied Parker's request for a license citing Parker's conviction as irrefutable proof of moral turpitude as a basis for denial. Parker has petitioned for review and a hearing before an administrative law judge is scheduled for October 14, 1997. Undersigned counsel has been advised that the hearing scheduled for October 14, 1997, will be the final hearing regarding Parker's petition for a license to sell boats in the State of Florida. Regarding this issue, undersigned counsel has become aware of an administrative decision where an application for a license as a yacht and ship salesman was granted by DBPR to an applicant who had been convicted of a drug felony, sentenced to probation and had been terminated from probation. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes v. Orr, Docket No. YS95025 (Final Order No. BPR-95-03991, 7/20/95). It is respectfully submitted that evidence of successful completion of probation by Parker prior to the time of final hearing on October 14, 1997, will either result in the DBPR rescinding their denial of Parker's application or a reversal of DBPR's denial by the administrative law judge. Assistant United States Attorney John Schlessinger has conferred with the United States Probation Officer Anthony Gagliardi regarding this motion and has authorized undersigned counsel to state that the United States has no objection to a reduction of probation from 60 months to 36 months. Richard Parker has applied to the State of Florida for a yacht salesman license so that he can support himself and his family. Richard Parker, through his cooperation, has rebutted any presumption of moral turpitude that attached to his conviction and has affirmatively and courageously demonstrated good moral character; Richard Parker has honored and will continue to honor his pledge to the United States and to this Honorable Court never to break the law again. . . . The Final Order in the Orr case, which was referenced in Petitioner's Motion to Modify Probation, contained the following "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law":

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1997.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57326.004326.00690.405 Florida Administrative Code (3) 61B-60.00261B-60.00361B-60.004
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ALFONSO BACH, 81-001397 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001397 Latest Update: Dec. 11, 1981

Findings Of Fact CASE HISTORY This case arises based upon an Administrative Complaint brought by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation against one Alfonso Bach setting forth allegations as established in the Issues portion of this Recommended Order. The date of the Administrative Complaint is May 6, 1981. Following a request for formal hearing the matter was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings on May 13, 1981. After assignment, a formal hearing was held on July 21, 1981, in keeping with Subsection 120.57(l), Florida Statutes. In the course of the hearing no testimony was presented by either party; the Petitioner offered a series of exhibits, 1-3. These exhibits are discussed in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order. MATERIAL FACTS After reviewing the Petitioner's proffered Exhibits 1-3 and upon consideration of argument in support of and in opposition to the admission of these exhibits, the exhibits have not been admitted. Consequently, there being no other basis for determining facts, no material facts are found.

Recommendation It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the prosecution by Administrative Complaint referred to herein, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, PD 0005572, be dismissed. 1/ DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September 1981.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25777.04
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JOSE MIGUEL DELGADO vs DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER, 94-004893 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Aug. 31, 1994 Number: 94-004893 Latest Update: Nov. 12, 1996

Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the Final Hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: On March 3, 1994 Petitioner submitted to the Department an application for licensure as a Limited Surety Agent (Bail Bondsman). In a Denial Letter dated July 20, 1994, the Department notified Petitioner that his application for licensure was denied. The basis for the Department's denial of Petitioner's application was Petitioner's past felony convictions. The evidence established that on or about December 4, 1980, Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Case Number 80-105 (the "First State Case"), with trafficking in illegal drugs and the use of a firearm during the commission of a felony in violation of Sections 893.135 and 790.07, Florida Statutes. On June 5, 1981, Petitioner pled no contest in the First State Case to trafficking in excess of two thousand (2,000) pounds, but less than ten thousand (10,000) pounds of cannabis. Petitioner was fined and placed on probation for ten (10) years. On or about June 14, 1981, Petitioner was charged in the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case Numbers 83-6033-CR-EPS and 83-6038-CR-NCR (the "Federal Cases"), with five felony counts of possession with intent to distribute illegal drugs and conspiracy to import illegal drugs into the United States of America, in violation of Title 21, Sections 841(a)(1), 846, 952(a), 960(a), 963, and 843(b), United States Code. On or about November 5, 1981, Petitioner was charged in the Circuit Court for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit of Florida, Case Number 81-1191 CFG (the "Second State Case") with violation of the Florida Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act ("RICO"), Section 943.462, Florida Statutes. Although the exact timing is not clear, at some point after his arrest, Petitioner began cooperating with authorities which led to plea bargains and a sentence which did not include any jail time. On April 4, 1984, Petitioner pled guilty to one count in each of the Federal Cases to attempt and conspiracy to import marijuana and methaqualaudes into the United States of America. As a result of his plea in the Federal Cases, Petitioner was fined and placed on 5 years probation. On April 6, 1984, Petitioner pled guilty in the Second State Case, was fined $7,500.00 and placed on probation for fifteen (15) years. This plea was negotiated as part of the plea in the Federal Cases. Petitioner's probation from the First State Case was terminated May 20, 1988. Petitioner's probation from the Federal Cases was terminated on April 21, 1989 and September 11, 1989. Petitioner's civil rights were restored pursuant to Executive Orders of the Office of Executive Clemency dated May 19, 1989 and May 23, 1990. It is not clear from the record if the Executive Orders constitute a "full pardon" as suggested by counsel for Petitioner at the hearing in this matter. Petitioner down plays his role in the elaborate criminal scheme that led to his arrests and convictions. He suggests that all of the charges were related to the same scheme. Insufficient evidence was presented to reach any conclusions regarding the underlying criminal activity and/or Petitioner's exact involvement. Petitioner has been very active in community affairs since his convictions. He has apparently been a good family man and claims to have rehabilitated himself. Subsequent to his conviction, Petitioner and three other investors started a bail bond business. Petitioner claims he did not play an active role in the business. However, when the Department learned of his involvement, it required Petitioner to terminate any affiliation with the company. Petitioner's wife currently owns a bail bond company. Petitioner operates a "court services" business out of the same building where his wife's bail bond business operates. No evidence was presented of any improper involvement by Petitioner in his wife's business.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a Final Order denying Petitioner's application for licensure as a Limited Surety Agent. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4893 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Subordinate to findings of fact 4 through 10. Subordinate to findings of fact 13. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in the Preliminary Statement. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Subordinate to findings of fact 14 and 15. Subordinate to findings of fact 14 and 15. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Adopted in substance in findings of fact 1. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2. Adopted in substance in findings of fact 2 through 10. Subordinate to findings of fact 14. Rejected as argumentative and unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Dan Sumner Acting General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, FL 32399 Julio Gutierrez, Esq. 2225 Coral Way Miami, FL 33145 Allen R. Moayad, Esq. Florida Department of Insurance and Treasurer 612 Larson Building 200 E. Gaines Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300

Florida Laws (7) 112.011120.57648.34648.49790.07893.11893.135
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BRUCE ST. HILLAIRE vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 03-001741 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida May 15, 2003 Number: 03-001741 Latest Update: Jun. 03, 2004

The Issue Whether Petitioner suffered retaliation and reverse discrimination committed by the Department of Corrections in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male who was a probation officer at the Department. He worked in the Fourteenth Judicial Circuit for the first ten years of his career and then transferred to the Seventh Judicial Circuit, based in Daytona Beach, Florida, where he had been employed for about eight and one-half years at the time of the hearing. The Department, in accordance with Section 20.315, Florida Statutes, is the state agency charged with protecting the public through the incarceration and supervision of offenders and the rehabilitation of offenders through the application of work, programs, and services. In early July 1999, Petitioner was working in the Department's probation office on Palmetto Avenue, in Daytona Beach, Florida. He was living with a woman named Tanya Folsom who worked for the Department in its probation program, but not in the same office. He was also romantically involved with a woman named Frances Fredericks, who he later married. At this time, Ms. Fredericks was married to one Mr. Anderson, and was known as Frances Anderson. This triangular relationship became known in the office in which Petitioner worked. Someone in Petitioner's office, who has never been identified, wrote a letter to Ms. Folsom, revealing to Ms. Folsom Petitioner's ongoing relationship with Ms. Frances Fredericks. The letter was written on stationery that was the Department's property, placed in an envelope that was the Department's property, and transmitted to Ms. Folsom via the Department's internal mailing system. Using Department resources for personal business, is contrary to Department policy. When Ms. Folsom received the letter a number of ugly consequences ensued. Ms. Folsom reacted with extreme hostility to the information she received, even though Petitioner claimed that their relationship had devolved into a mere friendship. She evicted Petitioner from the quarters they had been sharing. At a subsequent time, one Mr. Anderson, then Ms. Frederick's husband, confronted Petitioner in the parking lot adjacent to the office in which Petitioner worked, and in the presence of Petitioner's office supervisor, Mr. Seltzer, socked Petitioner in the jaw. The probation officer community, in which Ms. Folsom and Petitioner worked, suffered disruption. Morale amongst the workers was impaired. Petitioner blamed the occurrence of these unpleasant events, not on himself, but on Officer Michael Gallon, a probation officer who worked directly in the court system, and Ms. Velma Brown, his immediate supervisor. He attributed blame to them because he believed that they had rifled his desk and found gifts destined to be given to Frances Fredericks, and believed that one or both of them were responsible for the letter to Ms. Folsom. Both Officer Gallon and Ms. Brown are black. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Department demanding an investigation into the use of the Department's stationery that was of a value of about a "half cent," according to Petitioner. He also complained that court officers, both black and white, were underemployed, and suggested that black court officers were afforded advantages not given to white officers. He asked his superiors to investigate the complaint regarding both the letter and the court officer matter. He prevailed upon the office manager to take action and when the office manager declined to open an investigation, he brought the matter to the attention of the circuit administrator, Robert Gordon, and ultimately to the attention of those in the chain- of-command all the way to the Department's Inspector General. Mr. Gordon, in response to the turmoil precipitated by the letter, reassigned Petitioner to DeLand, Florida, a distance of about 30 miles, for 60 days. Petitioner, who referred to his new post in the pejorative, "Dead Land," believed that officers who were moved there, "never came back." Mr. Gordon told Petitioner that he moved him because Petitioner needed a "change of venue." This reassignment occurred the end of July, 1999. Article 9, Section 3, of the Agreement between the State of Florida and Florida Police Benevolent Association (Agreement) states that a transfer should be affected only when dictated by the needs of the agency and only after taking into consideration the needs of the employee, prior to any transfer. Mr. Gordon complied with that requirement, and in any event, did not transfer Petitioner. The Agreement states at Article 9, Section 1 (C), that a move is not a "transfer" unless an employee is moved, " . . . in excess of fifty (50) miles." Petitioner was "reassigned" as that term is defined in Article 9, Section 1 (C), of the Agreement. In any event, Mr. Gordon did not move Petitioner because he was white. He moved him to a different post because Petitioner had created turmoil in the probation officer community in Daytona Beach. In any event, as will be discussed below, whether or not Mr. Gordon complied with the Agreement is immaterial to this case. Notwithstanding Petitioner's beliefs with regard to the outcome of his move to DeLand, he was reassigned back to the Daytona Beach area at the end of 60 days and resumed his regular duties. This occurred around early October, 1999. Petitioner continued to press for an investigation into his allegations. He brought the matter to the attention to Harry Ivey, the regional administrator for the Department and above Mr. Gordon in the chain-of-command. He discussed the matter with a Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Ivey's deputy and believed subsequent to that conversation, that an investigation would occur. In fact, no one in the Department displayed any interest in Petitioner's allegations about the de minimis use of the Department's time and property in the preparation and transfer of the letter, or in his beliefs about the workload problems of the court officers, or his claims of favorable treatment in the case of Officer Gallon and Ms. Brown. In December 2000, Petitioner was assigned to the Ormond Beach Office, which was about six miles from the Palmetto Avenue Office. The Ormond Beach Office had lost a supervisor position due to reorganization and it was determined that Petitioner possessed the skill and experience to replace that senior leadership. The decision to relocate Petitioner was made by Mr. Gordon. In February 2001, Petitioner was transferred back to his old office. A few months later he was promoted to Correctional Probation Senior Officer and moved to another office. Between February 2000 and February 2001, the operative period, over 30 Correctional Probation Officers, Correctional Probation Supervisor Officers, and Correctional Probation Supervisors in the Seventh Circuit, were reassigned. Of these, six were black, four were Hispanic, and 20 were white. Although the four reassignments experienced by Petitioner may have inconvenienced him, Petitioner presented no evidence of any damages. The facts reveal that Petitioner's misfortunes were precipitated by his unwise amorous activities within his workplace. They were not the result of any effort by the Department to retaliate against him or to discriminate against him because he was white.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Amended Charge of Discrimination be dismissed because it was not timely filed. Dismissal on its merits if the June 25, 2001, Charge of Discrimination is determined to have been timely filed. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gayle S. Graziano, Esquire 244 North Ridgewood Avenue Daytona Beach, Florida 32114 Ernest L. Reddick, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 120.5720.315760.01760.10760.11
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