The Issue There are two issues raised in this case: Whether the transaction evidenced by the written instrument is taxable-under provisions of Sections 201.08, F.S., 201.01 and 201.08(1), F.S.; and Whether the amendment to the note and mortgage involved in this case is a promissory note taxable pursuant to Section 201.08(1), F.S.
Findings Of Fact There are two issues raised in this case: Whether the written document which evidences the transaction is taxable under the provisions of Sections 201.01 and 201.08(1), F.S.; and Whether the amendment to the note and mortgage involved in this case is a promissory mote or written obligation to pay money and taxable pursuant to Section 201.08(1), F.S. The facts are that on February 28, 1974, the Petitioners, except for Joe R. Hughes, III, and W. Comer Cherry, executed a promissory mote to Lewis State Bank for $405,000 with interest at 10 percent per annum, payable monthly, beginning March 1, 1974, with the entire amount of the principle ($405,000) due on or before February 28, 1975. Said Petitioners executed a mortgage to Lewis State Bank as security for said loan. On April 8, 1975, the due date of the principle was extended to August 28, 1975. The Lewis State Bank then assigned the note and mortgage to Thomas County Federal on July 7, 1975. On July 2 and July 7, 1975, the Petitioners including Hughes and Cherry, but not Rainey, signed the instrument in Tallahassee, Florida, upon which the tax being challenged is assessed. Rainey took the instrument which appears on its face to be an Amendment to the aforementioned Note and Mortgage dated February 28, 1974, to Thomas County Federal Savings and Loan, Thomas County, Georgia. The Amended Note and Mortgage was signed by Rainey and accepted by Thomas County Federal as assignee of said original note and mortgage in Thomas County, Georgia, on July 7, 1975. The other obligors who were jointly and severally liable had signed in Florida. See R-16-21. The purpose of the amendment to the note and mortgage was to refinance the Jefferson Towers Apartments project located in Tallahassee, Florida. See R-14. Thereafter, the money was tendered under the Amendment to Note and. Mortgage, in Georgia, by Thomas County Federal to the agent of the borrowers [Petitioners] Rainey. R-14. The Petitioners, on July 8, 1975, in Leon County, recorded the amendment to note and mortgage, the only instrument reflecting the new outstanding obligation of $412,000 and the only instrument setting forth the Petitioner's promise to pay this new obligation in O. R. Book 724, page 24, et. seq. The Petitioners affixed documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $10.50 on the amendment to the note and mortgage. (See R-21) Whether the instrument entered into between the Petitioners and Thomas County Federal is considered a new obligation or an amendment of the assigned note and mortgage, the essential factors are that the execution and delivery of the instrument, and exchange of the funds therefor occurred in Georgia. Based on the foregoing facts, the Department of Revenue finds as a matter of law that: To be taxed there must be a Florida transaction evidenced by a promissory note or written obligation to pay money. Sec. 201.08(1), F.S. The Amendment to Note and Mortgage involved in this case was made, signed and executed, in the State of Florida, save one signature of the multiple obligors, who were jointly and severally liable and the loan was used in Florida to refinance a Florida project which had been originally financed in Florida. The Amendment to Note and Mortgage, the only instrument reflecting the outstanding obligation of $412,000 and evidencing the Petitioners' promise to pay this new obligation, was recorded in Leon County, Florida, and has all essential factors of a Florida transaction percent thus subject to documentary stamp tax provided for in Sections 201.01 and 201.08(1), F.S. The Amendment to Note and Mortgage clearly evidences a transaction between the Petitioners and Thomas County Federal pursuant to which the Petitioners are obligated to pay suns of money to Thomas County Federal. Such a written obligation to pay money may be exempt if it meets the criteria of Sec. 201.09, F.S. The document in question does not meet the criteria of Sec. 201.09, F.S., because it did not extend or continue only the identical contractual obligations of the original promissory note but there was a substantial change in the principle amount. No documentary stamps have been affixed to the document which was recorded nor is there any notation on the document that said stamps were placed on any other document, except affixing of documentary stamps in the amount of $10.50; therefore, the document in question is subject to tax under Sec. 201.08(1), F.S., in the amount of $607.50 plus penalty at $607.50. Section 201.08(1) and Section 201.17(2), F.S. Regarding the issue of whether the document would have been taxable as an amendment to the original note and mortgage, the Department concurs with the findings of the Hearing Officer that the document does evidence a transaction in which the taxpayer would have been obligated to pay money to the lending institution. Because the principal amount was increased from $406,000 to $412,000 there was a substantial change in principal amount. Therefore, the exemption provision of Section 201.09, F.S., would not apply.
Conclusions The assessment of the Department of Revenue in the amount of $607.50 under Section 201.08(1), F.S., for delinquent documentary stamp taxes on the amendment to Note and Mortgage and the assessment for penalty under Section 201.17(2), F.S., in the amount of $607.50 are valid. CERTIFICATION I certify that the foregoing is the Final Order of the Department of Revenue adopted by the Governor and Cabinet on July 20, 1976. J. Ed Straughn, Executive Director State of Florida Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Dated this 21st day of July, 1976
Recommendation The Hearing Officer recommends based on the foregoing findings fact and conclusions of law, than neither the tax or penalty be assessed. Done and ordered this 10th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Attorney for Respondent Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Edgar M. Moore, Esquire Attorney for Petitioner Smith and Moore, P.A. P.O. Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE I. RAINEY, JR., et al., Mortgagors; THOMAS COUNTY FEDERAL, Thomasville, Georgia, Mortgagee, Petitioners, vs. CASE NO. 75-1899 DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact Paragraph 3 of the Petitioner's petition for administrative hearing provides: "That the Petitioners accepted a conveyance of certain real property in Brevard County, Florida in lieu of foreclosure of a mortgage held by them. The Department of Revenue contends that the documentary surtax should be paid on the deeds based on the amount of the outstanding mortgage at the time of the conveyances. It has served notice of the proposed assessments against each of the Petitioners in the following amounts, to wit: Jesse Jackson Parrish, Jr., tax - $187.00, penalty - $187.00, interest - $5.61, total due to date - $379.61; Ralph Bernard Parrish, tax - $187.00, penalty - $187.00, interest - $5.61, total due to date - $379.61; J.J. Parrish & Company, Inc., tax - $374.55, penalty - $374.55, interest - $11.24, total due to date - $760.34, and Pauline Bryan, tax - $187.00, penalty - $187.00, interest - $5.61, total due to date - $760.34, and Pauline Bryan, tax - $187.00, penalty - 187.00, interest - 5.61, total due to date - $379.61. That the statutes, Florida Statutes, 201.02, does not require payment of the documentary sur tax in such a case. The condition of this statute, by the court, in Leadership Housing, Inc., a Delaware corporation vs. Department of Revenue of the State of Florida, Fla. App. 336 So 2d 1239, holds that the statute should be strictly construed in favor of the tax payer and against the Government." In its answer the Respondent admitted the allegations contained in the first three sentences of the above quoted paragraph. In response to the last sentence of Paragraph 3 of the petition, the Respondent answered as follows: "Respondent denies the following allegations contained in the fourth sentence of paragraph three, if Petitioners are refering to section 201.021 Florida Statutes, and asserts that the conveyance which is the subject of this cause is subject to the imposition of documentary surtax stamps pursuant to section 201.021, Florida Statutes. Respondent, with respect to the allegations contained in the last sentence of Paragraph 3, admits to the existence of the decision in the Leadership Housing Inc., a Delaware corporation v. Department of Revenue of the State of Florida case, but asserts that such decision is not applicable in the instant cause." Since the allegations of the first three sentences of Paragraph 3 of the petition have been admitted by the Respondent, the allegations will be accepted as facts, and are intended to be construed as findings of fact herein. In Paragraph 2 of their petition, the Petitioners alleged: "There are no issues of material fact." In its answer the Respondent did not admit this allegation, but rather asserted that it was without knowledge with respect to it. The position taken by the Respondent at the final hearing clearly indicates that the Respondent is in agreement that there are no issues of fact to be determined in this case. On or about December 23, 1975, Alexander H. Clattenberg, Jr. and John Lowndes, Trustees, executed warranty deeds granting to Jesse Jackson Parrish, Jr., Ralph Bernard Parrish, and Pauline Parrish Bryan three separate parcels of land located in Brevard County, Florida. These warranty deeds were received in evidence respectively as Respondent's Exhibits 4, 2, and 3. On or about July 8, 1976, Alexander H. Clattenberg, Jr. and John F. Lowndes, Trustees, executed a warranty deed granting to J. J. Parrish & Company, Inc., certain real property located in Brevard County, Florida. A copy of this deed was received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 1. On or about December 29, 1976, the Respondent issued notices of proposed assessment against Jesse Jackson Parish, Jr., Ralph Bernard Parrish, and J. J. Parrish & Company, Inc. based upon Respondent's Exhibits 4, 2, and 1. Copies of these notices of proposed assessment were received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 5. A copy of a proposed assessment against Pauline Parrish Bryan was neither offered into evidence nor received. It is alleged in the Petitioners' petition, and admitted in the Respondent's answer, however, that a notice of proposed assessment was served upon Pauline Bryan. Except insofar as the pleadings contain undisputed allegations respecting the consideration for the warranty deeds that were received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibits 1 through 4, there was no evidence presented at the final hearing from which any findings can be made respecting the consideration for the deeds.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent assess documentary surtaxes, interest, and penalties against the Petitioners in the amounts set out in Paragraph 3 of the Petitioners' petition for administrative hearing. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Harry L. Coe Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Edwin J. Stacker, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Joe D. Matheny, Esquire Henderson, Matheny & Jones P. O. Box 6536 Titusville, Florida 32780
Findings Of Fact On December 27, 1976, Petitioner entered into an Assumption Agreement and Release of Seller, a copy of which is appended to this recommended order as Exhibit "A". The agreement contains, in writing, the obligation of Flagler Hospital, Inc., to pay Petitioner the sum of $238,464,52. The document is not a renewal of an existing obligation. On April 25, 1977, Respondent gave Petitioner notice that a penalty and interest under Section 201.08, Florida Statutes, had been assessed against it in the amount of $729.42 because the agreement constituted a note or written obligation to pay money. The agreement was executed in the State of Florida. No documentary stamp taxes have been paid regarding the agreement. The mathematical computation of the tax, penalty and interest is correct. The agreement represents the assumption of an existing debt between Petitioner and Inter-Medic Health Centers, Inc., by Flagler Hospital, Inc. The original debt is evidenced by a note and mortgage dated February 11, 1976. Documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $360.00 were paid as to the original note. No additional indebtedness was created by the agreement, but the agreement releases the original obligor, Inter-Medic Health Centers, Inc., from liability.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the assessments made by respondent for additional documentary stamp surtaxes and the corresponding penalties be upheld. Respectfully submitted and entered this 27th day of February, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. J. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida Steve Fine, Esquire Fine & Knight, P.A, 3890 West Commercial Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 Samuel C. Ullman, Esquire Smathers & Thompson 1301 Alfred I. duPont Building Miami, Florida 33131 Patricia S. Turner Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact This case comes on for consideration based upon the request of the Petitioner, Fanpac Corporation, for a formal administrative hearing on the question of the propriety of the December 8, 1976 assessment, A-54, of the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Revenue. The claimed assessment pertains to an assignment of lease, recorded at Book 4182, Page 562, Public Records, Duval County, Florida. The assessment states that documentary stamp tax is owed in the amount of $5,404.50, together with accrued interest and a penalty in the amount of the claimed documentary stamp tax. The assessment also states that documentary surtax is owed in the amount of $370.15, together with accrued interest and a penalty in the amount of the claimed documentary surtax. In furtherance of the consideration of the case, the parties have submitted a factual stipulation to be examined by the undersigned in arriving at the terms of the recommended order. Quoting from the stipulation it states:
Recommendation It is recommended that the compromise agreement entered into by the parties, that the Petitioner pay documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax and interest on those amounts in the aggregate of $6,519.06 be accepted. It is further recommended that penalties in the amount of 25 percent of $5,404.50, documentary stamp tax, together with a penalty in the amount of 25 percent of $370.15 documentary surtax, be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Paul M. Harden, Esquire Smith, Davenport, Peek and Bloom 2601 Gulf Life Tower Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Revenue The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On January 15, 1975, Gerardo Benesch, Jitka Benesch, H. Albert Grotte, Regina Grotte, Milorad Dordevic, Catalina Dordevic, Milodrag Savovic and Marina Savovic executed an agreement associating themselves in a general partnership, Andean Investment Company. The stated purpose of the partnership was to engage in the business of real estate development, selling, renting, and dealing generally in real estate of all kinds. It was recited in the agreement that, by forming the partnership, the parties wished to reduce their prior expense of managing separate properties through separate managerial agreements. To this end, they transferred certain real estate by quit-claim deed to the partnership, and these properties represented its capital. The agreement provided in Article IV that the net profits or net losses of the partnership would be distributed or chargeable, as the case might be, to each of the partners in percentage proportions based on the amount of their investment in the partnership. The property consisted of warehouses located in Deerfield Beach and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, from which rentals were derived (Petition and Exhibits thereto). All of the properties were encumbered by mortgages of varying amounts and all but two of the quit-claim deeds transferred title subject to the mortgage thereon. Two deeds provided specifically that the partnership assumed the existing mortgage. Although Petitioner's counsel states that this was not intended and was a "scrivener's error", Petitioner partnership has, in fact, made the mortgage payments on all of the properties since their transfer under the aforesaid deeds (Composite Exhibit 1, Stipulation). Petitioner paid only minimal documentary stamp tax on the deeds. Respondent thereafter issued four proposed Notices of Assessment of Documentary Stamp Tax, Surtax, and Penalty against the Petitioner on January 6, 1976, in the total amount of $3,797.00. The tax was computed under Rule 12A-4.13(10)(c), F.A.C., based on transfers of realty (Composite Exhibit 2, Testimony of Dahlem). At the hearing, Petitioner disputed the manner in which Respondent had computed the documentary stamp tax in that each assessment dealt with a husband and wife who held individual percentage interests in the net worth of the partnership. Respondent's computation did not take into consideration the double interest in each assessment. The parties therefore agreed that a recomputation would be made by Respondent and submitted as a late-filed exhibit. This was done and the new computation reflects a total tax liability, including surtax and penalty, in the total amount of $4,053.40 (Composite Exhibit 3).
Recommendation That Petitioner's request for relief from tax liability be denied, and that Petitioner's liability for documentary stamp tax, surtax, and penalties in the total amount of $4,053.40 be sustained. DONE and ORDERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Allan F. Meyer, Esquire Suite 1500 Post Office Box 14310 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Zayle A. Bernstein, Esquire Post Office Box 14310 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral argument of the parties and the evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the pleadings, the following pertinent facts are found: On June 30, 1973, an agreement for purchase and sale was executed between Bayshore 21, Inc., as purchaser, and Arthree, Inc., as seller, for the purchase and sale of real estate commonly known as the Carriage House. This agreement was executed by Bayshore 21, Inc. in its corporate name, and not as a trustee or other representative capacity. The provisions of this agreement were individually guaranteed by Marvin Glick, the president and sole stockholder of Bayshore 21, Inc. The purchase and sale agreement discloses that the total purchase price of the property is $19,500,000, payable by taking subject to a first mortgage held by the Prudential Insurance Company with the remainder, subject to certain prorations, to be paid in cash. An earnest money deposit in the amount of $500,000.00 was placed in escrow by Bayshore at the time of execution of the purchase and sale agreement. Bayshore 21, Inc. represented and warranted in said agreement that it was a corporation duly organized and in good standing with full capacity to make and execute the agreement and to consummate the transaction embodied therein. Further, Bayshore warranted that there was no provision in its charter or bylaws, nor was it a party to any agreement, which would limit or prevent its consummation of the agreement. Also, Bayshore reserved the right to assign it's interests to any other party upon the assignee's assumptions of Bayshore's obligations or to direct Arthree, Inc. that the deed or other closing instruments would run in favor of a designated grantee other than Bayshore. Pursuant to the agreement for purchase and sale described above, Arthree, Inc. conveyed the Carriage House to Bayshore 21, Inc. by warranty deed dated August 17, 1973. There was evidence that the transaction was not closed until August 23, 1973. Bayshore 21, Inc. took title in its own corporate name, and not as a trustee or in a representative capacity. Proper documentary stamps were attached to this document. On either August 22 or 23, 1973, Bayshore 21, Inc. executed a $1,300,000.00 note and mortgage to Commercial Trading Company, Inc. and a $5,000,000.00 note and mortgage to Security Mortgage Investors. These notes and mortgages were in the corporate name of Bayshore 21, Inc. but were guaranteed by the petitioner and Marvin Glick. These guarantees contain language that the mortgagee may proceed directly against the guarantors in the event of default. There was evidence that utilization of Bayshore 21, Inc. to effectuate the loans from Commercial Trading Company and Security Mortgage Investors was required by said mortgagees because of the fact that the then prevailing interest rate levels were in excess of the noncorporate statutory interest limit. On August 23, 1973, a joint venture agreement was entered into between petitioner and Marvin Glick. This joint venture agreement provided that "The parties acknowledge that BAYSHORE 21, INC. has taken title to certain property as trustee for ZUCKERMAN-VERNON CORP. and MARVIN GLICK and, upon completion of the financing arrangements, will convey the property to ZUCKERMAN-VERNON CORP. and MARVIN GLICK, a fifty (50 percent) percent interest being conveyed to each party. The property that is the subject of this joint venture is the CARRIAGE HOUSE, located at 54th Street and Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, each party to this agreement having a fifty (50 percent) percent interest in said property." On August 27, 1973, title to the Carriage House was conveyed by quitclaim deed from Bayshore 21, Inc. to Marvin Glick and petitioner, each to have an undivided fifty percent interest. Minimal stamps were affixed to this document, which bore the notation "No documentary stamps are required on this Deed inasmuch as the Grantor took title solely as Trustee for the Grantees herein." Thereafter, the respondent Department of Revenue assessed the parties to this August 27, 1973 deed for the documentary stamp taxes due, based upon the $18,550,000.00 existing mortgages on the property at the time of the conveyance ($12,250,000.00 to Prudential, $5,000,000.00 to Commercial Trading Company and $5,000,000.00 to Security Mortgage Investors). The delinquent documentary stamp taxes were assessed in the amount of $55,649.70, and a penalty was assessed in a like amount, making the total amount due $111,299.40.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that petitioner be assessed the taxes and penalties set forth In the proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax and Penalty under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, dated April 23, 1975. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Paul R. Lipton, Esquire 17071 West Dixie Highway North Miami Beach, Florida Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida
The Issue The issue in this unadopted-rule challenge is whether Respondent, in connection with the administration of the stamp tax, has formulated a statement of general applicability for allocating undifferentiated, lump-sum payments made in purchase- and-sale transactions involving joint real estate/personal property transfers; which meets the statutory definition of a rule but has not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedure; and, as used by Respondent, has the effect of creating an entitlement to collect tax on 100% of the undifferentiated consideration.
Findings Of Fact On February 23, 2015, Petitioner 1701 Collins (Miami) Owner, LLC ("Taxpayer"), a Delaware limited liability company, entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Agreement") to sell a going concern, namely a hotel and conference center doing business in Miami Beach, Florida, as the SLS Hotel South Beach (the "Hotel Business"), to 1701 Miami (Owner), LLC, a Florida limited liability company ("Purchaser"). Purchaser paid Taxpayer $125 million for the Hotel Business. The Hotel Business comprised two categories of property, i.e., real estate ("RE") and personal property ("PP"). The PP, in turn, consisted of two subcategories of property, tangible personal property ("TPP") and intangible personal property ("ITPP"). It is undisputed that the property transferred pursuant to the Agreement included RE, TPP, and ITPP. The sale closed on June 5, 2015, and a special warranty deed was recorded on June 8, 2015, which showed nominal consideration of $10. Pursuant to the Agreement, Taxpayer was responsible for remitting the documentary stamp tax and the discretionary surtax (collectively, "stamp tax"). Stamp tax is due on instruments transferring RE; the amount of the tax, payable per instrument recorded, is based upon the consideration paid for RE. Stamp tax is not assessed on consideration given in exchange for PP. The Agreement contains a provision obligating the parties to agree, before closing, upon a reasonable allocation of the lump-sum purchase price between the three types of property comprising the Hotel Business. For reasons unknown, this allocation, which was to be made "for federal, state and local tax purposes," never occurred. The failure of the parties to agree upon an allocation, if indeed they even attempted to negotiate this point, did not prevent the sale from occurring. Neither party declared the other to be in breach of the Agreement as a result of their nonallocation of the consideration. The upshot is that, as between Taxpayer and the Purchaser, the $125 million purchase price was treated as undifferentiated consideration for the whole enterprise. Taxpayer paid stamp tax in the amount of approximately $1.3 million based on the full $125 million of undifferentiated consideration. Taxpayer paid the correct amount of stamp tax if the entire consideration were given in exchange for the RE transferred to Purchaser pursuant the Agreement——if, in other words, the Purchaser paid nothing for the elements of the Hotel Business consisting of PP. On February 6, 2018, Taxpayer timely filed an Application for Refund with Respondent Department of Revenue (the "Department"), which is the agency responsible for the administration of the state's tax laws. Relying on a report dated February 1, 2018 (the "Deal Pricing Analysis" or "DPA"), which had been prepared for Taxpayer by Bernice T. Dowell of Cynsur, LLC, Taxpayer sought a refund in the amount of $495,013.05. As grounds therefor, Taxpayer stated that it had "paid Documentary Stamp Tax on personal property in addition to real property." Taxpayer's position, at the time of the refund application and throughout this proceeding, is that its stamp tax liability should be based, not on the total undifferentiated consideration of $125 million given in the exchange for the Hotel Business, but on $77.8 million, which, according to the DPA, is the "implied value" of——i.e., the pro-rata share of the lump-sum purchase price that may be fairly allocated exclusively to——the RE transferred pursuant to the Agreement. Taxpayer claims that, to the extent it paid stamp tax on the "implied values" (as determined in the DPA) of the TPP ($7 million) and ITPP ($40.2 million) included in the transfer of the Hotel Business, it mistakenly overpaid the tax.1/ On February 23, 2018, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Refund Claim Changes, which informed Taxpayer that the Department planned to "change" the refund amount requested, from roughly $500 thousand, to $0——to deny the refund, in other words. In explanation for this proposed decision, the Department wrote: "[The DPA] was produced 3 years after the [special warranty deed] was recorded. Please provide supporting information regarding allocation of purchase price on or around the time of the sale." This was followed, on April 2, 2018, by the Department's issuance of a Notice of Proposed Refund Denial, whose title tells its purpose. The grounds were the same as before: "[The DPA] was produced 3 years after the document was recorded." Taxpayer timely filed a protest to challenge the proposed refund denial, on May 31, 2018. Taxpayer argued that the $125 million consideration, which Purchaser paid for the Hotel Business operation, necessarily bought the RE, TPP, and ITPP constituting the going concern; and, therefore, because stamp tax is due only on the consideration exchanged for RE, and because there is no requirement under Florida law that the undifferentiated consideration exchanged for a going concern be allocated, at any specific time, to the categories or subcategories of property transferred in the sale, Taxpayer, having paid stamp tax on consideration given for TPP and ITPP, is owed a refund. The Department's tax conferee determined that the proposed denial of Taxpayer's refund request should be upheld because, as he explained in a memorandum prepared on or around December 27, 2018, "[t]he taxpayer [had failed to] establish that an allocation of consideration between Florida real property, tangible personal property, and intangible property was made prior to the transfer of the property such that tax would be based only on the consideration allocated to the real property." The Department issued its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial on January 9, 2019. In the "Law & Discussion" section of the decision, the Department wrote: When real and personal property are sold together, and there is no itemization of the personal property, then the sales price is deemed to be the consideration paid for the real property. [2] Likewise, when the personal property is itemized, then only the amount of the sales price allocated for the real property is consideration for the real property and subject to the documentary stamp tax. The first of these propositions will be referred to as the "Default Allocation Presumption." The second will be called "Consensual-Allocation Deference." The Department cited no law in support of either principle. In its intended decision, the Department found, as a matter of fact, that Taxpayer and Purchaser had not "established an allocation between all properties prior to the transfer" of the Hotel Business. Thus, the Department concluded that Taxpayer was not entitled to Consensual-Allocation Deference, but rather was subject to the Default Allocation Presumption, pursuant to which the full undifferentiated consideration of $125 million would be "deemed to be the consideration paid for the" RE. Taxpayer timely requested an administrative hearing to determine its substantial interests with regard to the refund request that the Department proposes to deny. Taxpayer also filed a Petition to Determine Invalidity of Agency Statement, which was docketed under DOAH Case No. 19-3639RU (the "Rule Challenge"). In its section 120.56(4) petition, Taxpayer alleges that the Department has taken a position of disputed scope or effect ("PDSE"), which meets the definition of a "rule" under section 120.52(16) and has not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedure prescribed in section 120.54. The Department's alleged PDSE, as described in Taxpayer's petition, is as follows: In the administration of documentary stamp tax and surtax, tax is due on the total consideration paid for real property, tangible property and intangible property, unless an allocation of consideration paid for each type of property sold has been made by the taxpayer on or before the date the transfer of the property or recording of the deed. If the alleged PDSE is an unadopted rule, as Taxpayer further alleges, then the Department is in violation of section 120.54(1)(a). The questions of whether the alleged agency PDSE exists, and, if so, whether the PDSE is an unadopted rule, are common to Taxpayer's separate actions under sections 120.57(1) and 120.56(4), respectively, because neither the Department nor the undersigned may "base agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule." § 120.57(1)(e)1., Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the Rule Challenge was consolidated with Taxpayer's refund claim for hearing. It is determined that the Department, in fact, has taken a PDSE, which is substantially the same as Taxpayer described it. The undersigned rephrases and refines the Department's PDSE, to conform to the evidence presented at hearing, as follows: In determining the amount stamp tax due on an instrument arising from the lump-sum purchase of assets comprising both RE and PP, then, absent an agreement by the contracting parties to apportion the consideration between the categories or subcategories of property conveyed, made not later than the date of recordation (the "Deadline"), it is conclusively presumed that 100% of the undifferentiated consideration paid for the RE and PP combined is attributable to the RE alone. According to the PDSE, the parties to a lump-sum purchase of different classes of property (a "Lump—Sum Mixed Sale" or "LSMS") possess the power to control the amount of stamp tax by agreeing upon a distribution of the consideration between RE and PP, or not, before the Deadline.2/ If they timely make such an agreement, then, in accordance with Consensual-Allocation Deference, which is absolute, the stamp tax will be based upon whatever amount the parties attribute to the RE. If they do not, then, under the Default Allocation Presumption, which is irrebuttable, the stamp tax will be based upon the undifferentiated consideration. The Department has not published a notice of rulemaking under section 120.54(3)(a) relating to the PDSE. Nor has the Department presented evidence or argument on the feasibility or practicability of adopting the PDSE as a de jure rule. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that the PDSE has the effect of law because the Department, if unchecked, intends consistently to follow, and to enforce compliance with, the PDSE. Because, in the Department's hands, the PDSE creates an entitlement to collect stamp taxes while adversely affecting taxpayers, it is an unadopted rule.
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are derived from the exhibits submitted into evidence at the hearing and the testimony of petitioner H.R. Thornton, Jr. The pertinent documents show that a portion of a lot located in the toxin of St. Cloud, Florida, owned by Garold D. Doak, Sr. and Susan E. Doak, his wife, was mortgaged by the Doaks to Peachtree Mortgage Corporation on December 28, 1972, in the amount of $16,850.00. On January 4, 1973, Peachtree Mortgage Corporation assigned the Mortgage to the Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan association of Brooklyn, New York. On February 6, 1976, a lis pendens was filed against the property by the assignee of the mortgage in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Osceola County, Florida, incident to an action to foreclose the mortgage. On March 15, 1976, the Doaks executed quitclaim deeds on the property to Stephene J. Houseman. On April 6, 1976, a final judgement of foreclosure was entered in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in favor of Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan Association of Brooklyn, New York. (Exhibit 1-6) On April 27, 1976, Houseman executed a quitclaim deed on the property to petitioners. On April 30, 1976, the Thorntons conveyed their interest in the property by warranty deed to Jaiies Francis Wiczorek and Shirley Lillian Wiczorek, his wife. The deed recited that it was subject to the outstanding mortgage to Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan Association with a principal balance of sec. 16,224.52 which the grantees agreed to assume and pay. The deed further recited a consideration of $4,000.00 and documentary stamp tax in an appropriate amount was paid based on a consideration which included the cash payment and the mortgage amount. On July 30, 1976, the mortgage in question was satisfied. (Exhibits 8-10) Only minimal documentary stamp tax of thirty cents was paid on the quitclaim deed from Houseman to petitioners. Respondent issued a notice of proposed assessment of additional documentary stamp tax in the amount of $48.60, surtax in the amount of $17.60, penalties in like amounts, and interest thereon, for a total of $158.51, on March 21, 1977. The proposed assessment was based on consideration stated to be the existing mortgage on the property in the amount of $16,224.52. On April 29, 1977, petitioners filed their petition for an administrative hearing, challenging the proposed assessment on the grounds that there was no evidence to show the taxable consideration as found by respondent. By an amended and revised notice of proposed assessment, dated April 29, 1977, the amount for documentary surtax, penalty and interest thereon was deleted leaving only the sums relating to documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest in the amount of $102.30. (Exhibit 8) Petitioner H.R. Thornton, Jr. took the quitclaim deed in question to cancel a $100.00 debt owed him by Houseman. He had no intent to make the mortgage payments or payments or pay any other consideration for the transfer. (Testimony of Thornton)
Recommendation That petitioners be held liable for payment of documentary stamp tax, penalty and interest under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, as modified herein with respect to the penalty. Done and Entered this 29th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 H. R. Thornton, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 345 St. Cloud, Florida 32769
The Issue The sole issue posed herein is: Whether or not the transfer to Petitioner by individuals Hugh P. Conser, Stewart L. Krug and Sidney Barbane1 of certain real property located in Pinellas County, Florida, on or about October 26, 1974, constitutes a conveyance subject to the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 26, 1974, the Petitioner received title to certain real property located Pinellas County, Florida, from Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser, the principals in KBC Development Corporation, which was recorded in Official Records Book 4229, page 1052, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. The only consideration, as evidenced by the deeds filed in the case, is that the conveyance was for "good and valuable consideration and ten dollars". This other good and valuable consideration, according to Petitioner and the other record evidence, consisted of the issuance of all one hundred shares of the authorized stock of KBC Development Corporation, Petitioner, as evidenced by the Minutes of the Shareholders Meeting of such corporation which was held on July 18, 1973. (See the minutes reflected in an attachment to Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1.) The issued stock had a par value of $5.00. The corporate entity, KBC, as Petitioner, was formed for the purpose of taking title to the property in question and, as evidenced by the record, had no other assets when the subject property was conveyed. On May 6, 1975, the Florida `Department of Revenue, Respondent, recorded in the office of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, a warrant for collection of delinquent documentary stamp taxes in connection with the above-referenced transaction in the amount of $27,599.70, plus an identical amount of penalty, for a total sum of $55,212.40. Said warrant is recorded in O.R. Book 4286, page 31, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. Following a conference with the Department of Revenue, the taxes were paid by the Petitioner under protest. That payment set the stage for the Petitioner's filing of the claim for refund with the Respondent, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 215.26. The Petitioner argues that the only taxable consideration resulting from the subject conveyance was the par value of the stock, of which amount sufficient documentary stamps were affixed to the deeds in question. In support of this position, the Petitioner cites the fact that there are no income tax returns filed by the corporation, FIG; no business activities pursued by the corporation; no bank account of the corporation; and no assets held by the corporation, except as agents for the three individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, all of which were acknowledged by all of the mortgagees. Additionally, the Petitioner urges that the bank and lending institutions involved regarded and held each individual personally liable for the indebtedness in connection with the loans advanced for the property in question. Finally, the Petitioner urges that, based on the conveyance in question, there was no shift in the economic burden to the corporation and, therefore, no taxable transaction occurred when the property in question was conveyed from the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, to FIG Development Corporation.
Conclusions The documentary stamp tax provided by Florida Statutes section 201.02 is an excise tax imposed on particularly described transactions, and in the case of instruments relating to realty, is based upon the total consideration involved in the transfer or conveyance. Thus, the key point in determining whether documentary stamps are to be affixed to an instrument transferring an interest in realty is in the presence or absence of consideration for the transfer. Rule 12A-4 .14, Florida Administrative Code, describes conveyances not subject to the documentary stamp tax as those "conveyances of realty without consideration, including. . .a deed to or by a trustee not pursuant to a sale . . . ." The facts of this case clearly do not illustrate an express or resulting trust relationship between KBC Development Corporation and its principals, Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser. When KBC took title to the property from Krug, Conser and Barbanel, the consideration was $10.00 and other valuable consideration and, based on the face of the instrument, the conveyance was not made to KBC subject to payment of any mortgages, etc., by KPC (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1). Section 201.02(1), Florida Statutes (1975). See Florida Department of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1976). Additionally, the facts herein reveal that the banks and lending institutions involved in the transaction required the personal guarantees of the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser. No evidence was introduced indicating that Petitioner, KBC Development Corporation, was anything more than an entity whereby the lending institutions had advanced funds for the primary mortgages to Continental Investment and Development Company, which was in no way related to the present corporation, KBC, and that the corporate entity was used to protect the lending institutions from any possible violations of usurious transactions. As stated, the personal endorsements and/or guarantees of the individuals, Barbanel, Krug and Conser, were required by the lending institutions before the primary mortgagee, Continental Investment and Development Company, would be released. Krug, Barbanel and Conser were no more nor less obligated to pay and perform under the obligation, after the conveyance than before. Although there was a change in the form of the obligation, there was no change in the substance. See e.g., Straughn v. Story, 334 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) cert. discharged 348 So.2d 954 (1977). (See Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.) For all of these reasons, it is the considered opinion of the undersigned that the Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the consideration for the conveyances in question were anything more than the par value of the stock and, accordingly, documentary stamp taxes should only be assessed in the amount of $4.10. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the excess assessments which Petitioner paid under protest be refunded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be refunded the amount of taxes and penalties it paid to the Respondent, Department of Revenue, under protest, over and above the amount it should have paid on the par value of the stock of KBC Corporation when the abovedescribed conveyance was made during October, 1974. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road Clearwater, Florida 33518 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA KBC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1596 GERALD LEWIS, as COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondents. / NOTICE TO: DONALD R. HALL, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER GOZA, HALL & PEACOCK, P.A. 100 NORTH BELCHER ROAD CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 33518 CECIL L. DAVIS, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL THE CAPITOL LL04 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet, acting as head of the Department of Revenue at its meeting on the 12th day of June, 1979, approved the Respondent's Substituted Order, in lieu of the Division of Administrative Hearing's Recommended Order dated April 3, 1979. A copy of the Respondent's Proposed Substituted Order is attached. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to Donald R. Hall, Esquire, Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road, Clearwater, Florida 33518, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, The Capitol LL04, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondents and James E. Bradwell, Esquire, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, Room 530, Carrolton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, this 14th day of June, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY Attachment STATE OF FLORIDA
