Conclusions This cause came on to be heard before the Pilotage Rate Review Board (Board) at regularly scheduled meetings held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida on April 29, 1998 and in Boca Grande, Florida on May 19, 1998, pursuant to a Recommended Order entered by ALJ Linda M. Rigot on February 94, 1998. Exceptions to the Recommended Order were filed by the Port Everglades Pilots' Association (PEPA). Responses to the Exceptions were filed by the South Florida Cargo Carriers Association, Inc. (SFCCA). Both PEPA and SFCCA appeared at the Fort Lauderdale meeting through counsel and extensive argument was heard on the Exceptions. The Board's rulings on the Exceptions, made after a review of the complete record (including the prehearing stipulation, the transcript, exhibits and the submissions of the parties), are set forth below. Preliminary Statement-The Standards to be Applied in Reviewing the Findings of Fact Contained in a Recommended Order It is a settled rule of administrative law in this state that the findings of fact of an administrative law judge may not be rejected or modified, "unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based on competent substantial evidence." Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes. Accord Belleau v. Dept. of Environmental Protection, 695 So. 2d 1305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Martuccio v. Dept. Of Professional Regulation, 622 So.2d 607 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993); Freeze v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 510 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). Florida case law holds that an agency reviewing a recommended order is not authorized to reevaluate the quantity and quality of the evidence presented as at DOAH final hearing beyond a determination of whether the evidence is competent and substantial. Brogan v. Carter, 671 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 1st DCA 19963. A reviewing agency may not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts therein, or judge the credibility of witnesses, as those are evidentiary matters within the province of the ALJ as the finder of the facts. Martuccio, supra, at 609; Heifetz v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277, 1281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Consequently, if the record of the DOAH Proceedings discloses any competent substantial evidence to support the findings of fact made by the ALJ in the Recommended Order, the Board is bound by such factual findings. Bradley. supra, at 1123. There is, however, a fundamental difference, first elucidated in McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So. 2d 569, 578-579 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), between evidentiary findings of fact, which involve resolving conflicts of perception, judging credibility of witnesses and drawing permissible inferences therefrom and those ultimate factual findings which are usually couched in terms of statutory or rule language and which resolve the legal issues between the parties.2 As the court in Mcdonald, supra, stated at 346 So. 2d at 579 an ALJ's findings as to credibility, weight and other matters which are susceptible of "ordinary methods of proof "should be accorded-great deference. However, the court went on to hold that an AlJ's findings regarding matters of opinion and issues which must be resolved by reference to agency expertise, because they are "infused by policy considerations," are entitled to agency deference but with "correspondingly less weight."3 The agency must be circumspect, however, in exercising its authority to reject an ALJ's findings even if they could be labeled as "ultimate findings of fact." If factual disputes underlying an ultimate issue of fact can be resolved by "ordinary methods of proof " then an agency may not reject or modify an ALJ's ultimate factual findings without finding that they also were not supported by competent substantial evidence and complying with the requirements of Section 120.57(1); see Harac v. Dept. of Prof. Reg. Board of Architecture, 484 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1986); Dunham v. Highlands County School Board, 652 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1995). If, in an appropriate instance, the question as to what legal standards should be applied to ultimately resolve the issues involves policy considerations (at least to the extent an agency has discretion to interpret its statutes and rules), it follows that an ALJ's findings as to such mixed questions of law and fact should be entitled to weight only to the extent they correctly apply the agency's interpretation of its statutory mandate, not simply the interpretation of that mandate by the witnesses at the hearing or even by the ALJ herself.4 The policy reason for not allowing an ALJ's ultimate findings of fact to always obtain practicable immutability and thus usurp an agency's ability to explicate its positions and interpretations of law in its own jurisprudence, is clear. Agencies, such as the Board, are appointed to oversee and implement the police power of the state and have obtained expertise in doing so. The agency is well aware of its own history and policy, as well as the legal positions set forth therein. ALJ's are likely not to have this intimate familiarity with the policy issues that comes with enforcing a regulatory scheme on a regular basis. Bearing the aforementioned principles in mind the Board hereby renders its rulings on the Exceptions. B Rulings on Exceptions Rejection of PEPA's Exceptions The Board hereby rejects PEPA's Exceptions 1, 2, 4, 5, 9 10, 12, and 13 insofar as the ALJ's findings are supported by competent substantial evidence. Exception 7 was withdrawn Exceptions 16-20 and 22-23 are addressed to the ALJ's Conclusions of Law, were treated as legal argument, and thus require no rulings by the Board. Exception 21 to the ALJ's proposed Conclusion of Law 89 was addressed by the Board as an exception to a proposed finding of fact insofar as COL 89 is actually a factual finding. After properly recasting COL 89 as a finding of fact, the Board determines that the finding is supported by competent substantial evidence and the Exception is rejected. The Board's rejection of Exception 5 is based upon its reading of the ALJ's findings to mean that the amount of time spent by pilots on clerical and administrative tasks, while "extensive" was not suffciently documented as to place a numerical amount (hourly, daily or monthly) upon the time spent. The reason for this separate discussion is that the Board finds that the ALJ's finding, while correct, could be somewhat misleading. The Board also sets forth its reasoning below on several of the legal issues raised by PEPA as part of those Exceptions which were rejected by the Board. PEPA asserted, as the basis for several of its Exceptions, that the Board had made certain legal conclusions in earlier rate cases that may have been contradicted by the analysis of the ALJ in the Recommended Order. PEPA argued that certain of the ALJ's findings are thus erroneous because they contradict other, earlier, conclusions of the Board. While it is true that stare decisis and a respect for precedent are recognized in administrative law (albeit to a lesser degree than in traditional judicial fore), there must be an order of the Board that has precedential value before these principles may be invoked. Here PEPA points to various "orders" of the Board which were entered in previous rate application review proceedings in support of its position. Where PEPA's argument misses the point is that none of these previous "orders" ripened to Board precedent due to the fact that no Section 120.569 and 120.57 proceedings-ever occurred in those previous rate proceedings. Thus the findings of the Board in those previous proceedings were based only upon the untested-in an evidentiary sense-material submitted to the Board by the applicants and their opposition at a Board meeting- see Section 310.151(3), Florida Statutes. Until the Board has the benefit of a record which has gone through the crucible of a evidentiary proceeding under Chapter 190 and a judicially reviewable final order is entered, the holdings of the Board in unchallenged rate orders are only persuasive and not precedential in nature. The Board further agrees with PEPA (Exception I ) that the determination as to what constitutes a "reasonable operating expense" as that term is used in Section 310.15 l (5)(b)3, Florida Statutes, is a legal conclusion which requires the Board to interpret the statute and apply it to the pilot lobbying and political expenses found by the ALJ; Schnmsher v. School Board of Palm Beach County, 694 So. 2d 856, 860-862 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1997), Macpherson v. School Board of Monroe County, 505 So. 2d 682, 683-684 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1987). To the extent that the ALJ placed the determination of what is a "reasonable operating expense" in her findings of fact her Recommended Order is erroneous. Here, however, although the ALJ erroneously found that lobbying expenses and political contributions by pilots are not "reasonable operating expenses" as a finding of fact, the Board finds that they should be so treated as a matter of law. Thus the ALJ's findings, while erroneously labeled, reached the correct result. Therefore the Exception was properly rejected. As has been long held by the Public Service Commission, lobbying expenses as well as political and charitable contributions are not to be considered as reasonable operating expenses for purposes of determining the rate base for rate setting purposes, PSC Docket # 950495-WS, Order # PSC-96-1320- FOF-WS at 150-153; PSC Docket # 960234-WS, Order # 97-0847-FOF- WS at 66-71. The rationale for such a decision is based upon the fact that, while for tax and accounting purposes such expenses are appropriately classified as ordinary business expenses and/or may be deductible from taxable income, to place the burden of paying for such discretionary expenditures upon the user of the regulated service is inappropriate. The Board accepts this reasoning. The Board's ruling when rejecting PEPA's Exception 2 is based upon an identical analysis. Once again, the Board determines for rate setting purposes, as a matter of law, that the present value of the unfunded portion of PEPA's pilot retirement program must be considered as a "book" component of pilot income if, as was found by the ALJ, its value can be reasonably quantified-see Sections 3] 0.151 (5)(b) 2 and 9, Florida Statutes. A similar position has been taken by the PSC- see Rule 25-14.012, F. A. C. Acceptance of PEPA's Exceptions The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 3. The Exception addresses Proposed Findings of Fact 25 and 49-52. The Board finds that the ALJ's finding in the first sentence of Finding of Fact 25 is not supported by competent substantial evidence and, to the extent that the final sentence of Finding of Fact 25 and Findings of Fact 49-52 are based upon that specific finding, they are not accepted by the Board.5 Nevertheless PEPA does not dispute that the ALJ's a projected range of increase in annual revenue growth from 5.9% and 7.3% at the port is reasonable and is supported by the facts. As a result, the Board, based upon the remaining testimony and data, accepts the ALJ's projected range for the growth of revenue at the port. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 6 to Finding of Fact 33 to the extent that it objects to the ALJ's findings that the examination and licensing process of a deep-sea deck officer is comparable to that of a Florida licensed pilot. While the findings of the ALJ in the other areas of "comparability" are accepted by the Board, there was no evidence from any source as to the examination and licensing procedures of pilots and deep- sea officers from which the ALJ could have drawn her conclusion. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 8 to Finding of Fact 39 to the extent that it objects to the "explicit" recognition of the similarity of "deep-sea masters and harbor pilots'' (E.S.) in 33 CFR Part 407. While the Board would agree that the provision of the CFR compares "deep-sea masters and Great Lakes pilots"(E. S.) it does not, on its face, generally address "harbor pilots." The remainder of the Finding of Fact appears to be simply a discussion of the CFR provision which7 as a provision of law, speaks for itself. The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 11 to Findings of Fact 56-58. The ALJ's conclusory statement in the first sentence of FOF 56 that "the job of piloting does not present any serious physical risks" is simply not supported by the record. While the Board accepts the ALJ's other findings, it is clear (and not disputed by any of the experts in navigation and seamanship) that there are serious risks in piloting in periods of heavy weather and/or at night. The remainder of the Finding is accepted by the Board. Similarly, the second sentence in FOF 57 regarding embarkation and disembarkation is flawed because of its categorical finding that such actions are not particularly dangerous. Once again, had the ALJ qualified her finding with a reference to "under normal circumstances" or "in fair weather" the statement would be unexceptional and would be supported by the record. The rest of the Finding is accepted by the Board. The Board also finds that the ALJ's conclusion in the last sentence of FOF 58 that the Board members were not engaged in a strenuous act when they boarded a vessel at Port Everglades during the initial rate hearing is not supported by any evidence adduced at the hearing. The remainder of FOF 58 is accepted by the Board. The Board accepts PEPA's Exception 14 to Findings of Fact 72-74. There was competent substantial evidence in the record to sustain the ALJ's findings. The findings are, however, struck because the ALJ has failed to give effect to a stipulation (Pre- Hearing Stipulation at p. 9 ¶20) contained in the Pre-Hearing Stipulation entered into between the parties.6 In the Pre-Hearing Stipulation the parties agreed that to certain facts contained in various tables in the Investigative Report did not require proof at the hearing. Notwithstanding this fact, the ALJ found a revised "handle" time in her Recommended Order which was different (1 hour per vessel as opposed to 1.5 hours) than that contained in the stipulation. The Board finds that, as asserted by PEPA, this was error, Schrimsher, supra at 694 So. 2d 856, 863; Coq v. Fuchs Baking Company, 507 So. 2d 138, 140 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987).7 The Board accepts in part PEPA's Exception 15. The evidentiary findings in FOF 75-76 are supported by the evidence in this proceedings and are unexceptional. Nevertheless, the provisions of Section 310.151(5)(c), Florida Statutes, specifically grant to the Board the discretion to apply the CPI or other economic indicators to a rate change request. Thus the ALJ's statement that "the CPI and employment cost index (sic) are not suitable bases of comparison for measuring pilotage rates" does appear to "read out" this discretionary statutory factor from consideration in all rate cases. The Board can not agree with this position as a matter of law The Board does find, however, that while not the sole factor in determining the rates in these proceedings that the CPI is of material value in the consideration of the rates to be established at Port Everglades. C Conclusion With the foregoing amendments, the Board accepts the Findings of Fact of the ALJ and the same hereby become the Findings of Fact of the Board. II
The Issue Whether the subject assessment of taxes, interest and penalties should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact By "Notice of Assessment and Jeopardy Findings" dated July 31, 1989, Respondent assessed Petitioner with taxes, interest, and penalties in the total amount, as of the date of the notice, of $161,724.75. This assessment was made pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, following an incident on February 4, 1988. The parties stipulated that this assessment was properly issued, that notice thereof was properly given to Gary Wayne Chitty, and that the mathematical calculations contained therein are accurate and correct. The following findings are made as to Petitioner, Gary Wayne Chitty, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. His full name is Gary Wayne Chitty. His social security number is 261-17-0682. His date of birth is April 27, 1953. His present residence is 6840 S.W. 12th Street, Miami, Florida. He has never declared himself a citizen of any country other than the United States. On, or before, February 1988, he knew Rafael Silvio Pena. On February 4, 1988, he held a valid multi-engine pilot's license which was issued to him by the Federal Aviation Authority. On, or about February 4, 1988, he and Rafael Silvio Pena boarded and flew an aircraft designated N6726L. He and Mr. Pena planned to fly a multi-engine aircraft (N6726L) from a point outside of the United States and to enter the airspace of the United States near Cedar Key, Florida and travel within the airspace of Florida to Marathon, Florida. He filed, or caused to be filed, a flight plan for said trip with Mr. Pena in advance of the trip. He loaded or caused to be loaded marijuana on the aircraft (N6726L) prior to its departure. On, or about, February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena flew said airplane (N6726L) from a point in the vicinity of Cedar Key, Florida, to Marathon, Florida. During said flight, the aircraft made no other landings. During the entire flight on February 4, 1988, he and Mr. Pena were the sole occupants of said aircraft. During said flight he was the pilot of N6726L. He flew this aircraft on February 4, 1988 with the full knowledge and/or consent of the airplane's owners and/or official lessees. When he took off from the aircraft's departure point on February 4, 1988, it was loaded with a large quantity of marijuana. When he took control of said aircraft and took off, he knew it was loaded with said marijuana. He discussed his plans to transport the marijuana with Mr. Pena. When he took control of the aircraft, the aircraft (N6726L) contained nineteen (19) bales of marijuana which weighted six hundred ninety-nine (699) pounds. He and Mr. Pena flew this airplane along a course towards Marathon, Florida in a manner which took it over or near Lake Okeechobee, Florida. At a point along his route, he and/or Mr. Pena caused the bales of marijuana to be jettisoned from the aircraft. The marijuana was jettisoned as part of a conscious plan or design. The marijuana that was jettisoned from N6726L during its flight on February 4, 1988, weighed a total of 699 pounds. He did not know that during this flight of February 4, 1988, his aircraft was being observed by law enforcement officers. As part of his original plan, he piloted this aircraft to Marathon, Florida, where he landed. AA. During this entire flight the aircraft performed adequately and experienced no mech- anical difficulties. BB. Upon his landing at Marathon, he and Mr. Pena were arrested. CC. He knew the estimated retail value of the marijuana on board his aircraft (N6726L) was $600 per pound.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered which upholds the subject Jeopardy Findings and Assessment. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 28th day of January, 1991. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: James McAuley, Esquire Mark Aliff, Esquire Assistant Attorneys General Department of Revenue Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Mel Black, Esquire 2937 S.W. 27th Avenue Miami, Florida 33133 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahasseee, Florida 32399-0100 William D. Moore General Counsel 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact In the Spring of 1978, Roach purchased 1965 Piper aircraft No. 3406W from an out-of-state broker. On the assumption that sales tax had been collected, and not being familiar with Florida's Sales/Use tax laws, Roach took no other action. This aircraft was sold in August of 1978 and 1972 Piper No. 5309T was purchased in September of 1978; this aircraft was purchased under the same circumstances. No records were kept of the purchase price of either aircraft. DOR wrote Roach in August and September of 1978 regarding 3406W, without result. Thereafter, DOR used the average book value of $19,000 to arrive at a tax due of $760.00 Roach paid $720 tax on July 15, 1979; he contended that 3406W had $1000 less equipment than the average book valued aircraft. Prior to this time Roach became aware that tax was due but indicated he was financially unable to pay. On July 18, 1979, DOR sent Roach the proposed assessment for $40.00 tax, $190.00 penalty and $83.60 interest. Meantime, DOR was writing Roach regarding the second aircraft, 5309T, with no response being received until August 8, 1979. A proposed assessment was issued for $1500 tax, $375 penalty and $394.93 interest on September 10, 1979. During the subsequent informal conference, Roach advised that the tax due was in fact $1520, which was paid on October 4, 1979. Revised assessment dated October 22, 1979, was for $380 penalty and $400.20 interest. DOR's witness, Assistant Area Supervisor, Collection and Enforcement Division, received the matter from higher headquarters in December of 1979. He merely indicated that someone else in DOR used the "blue book" to determine value; he presented no evidence contrary to Roach's estimated value of $18,000 for the first aircraft or regarding the imposition of the penalty.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, David E. Rabren was licensed as a Tampa Bay state pilot and was president of the Tricounty Pilot's Association (TRICO). At the time the movement of the OCEAN LORD occurred, there was only one state licensed pilot who was a member of TRICO. That was David E. Rabren. Other members held only federally issued pilot's licenses. Prior to the movement of the VOMAR, a second state licensed pilot joined TRICO. At present, there are four licensed state pilots and one deputy pilot associated with TRICO. The vessel OCEAN LORD arrived in Tampa Bay February 18, 1986, and was piloted by Captain Rabren to its berth at C. F. Industries (CFI). After taking on cargo, the OCEAN LORD was moved the same date to Gadsden Anchorage. During this move, Captain Murphy, a federally licensed, but not state licensed, pilot was on board. Captain Murphy is associated with TRICO. On February 21, 1986, the OCEAN LORD was moved from Gadsden Anchorage to the CSX Transportation dock at Rockport. Again, Captain Murphy was the pilot. On September 21, 1986, the vessel VOMAR was moved from Rockport to a dock at Big Bend with Captain Murphy as the pilot. Anita Rabren determined that the movement could be accomplished with a federally licensed pilot on board. On October 5, 1986, the vessel ASPEN, an American flag vessel, arrived at Tampa Bay, and the ship's agent requested TRICO provide a pilot. Due to a misunderstanding of the agent's statement that the ASPEN was coming from the west coast, Anita Rabren assumed this was from the west coast of the United States. Actually, the ASPEN's last port of call was in Korea. Had the vessel come from a west coast of the United States port, the voyage would have been a coastwise trip, and a federally licensed pilot would be required. A federally licensed pilot was assigned to pilot the ASPEN. The last port of call of the ASPEN was ascertained after the pilotages up Tampa Bay commenced, and the fact that an improperly licensed pilot was used was reported forthwith. TRICO paid a double pilot fee to the Tampa Bay Pilot's Association. Tampa Port Authority has jurisdiction over all of Hillsborough County and establishes rules and regulations for that area. They do not regulate pilotage of vessels. Many of the terminals in Hillsborough County are owned by the Port Authority, but some are privately owned such as Big Bend and Rockport, both of which are in the port of Tampa. The Port Authority controls the allocation of berths at all terminals owned by the Port Authority, but does not control the berths at privately owned terminals. The CFI terminal is owned by the Port Authority who establishes wharfage rates and docking rates at this terminal. The berths at Rockport and Big Bend are privately owned, and tariff rates are not set by the Port Authority. CSX Transportation owns a dock at Rockport where phosphate is loaded onto vessels. No wharfage or dockage charge is levied, but such charges are included in charges for the commodity loaded. Ships can clear customs at any of the terminals above noted. The Big Bend facility is under the jurisdiction of Gulf Coast Transit Company. Vessels bring coal to Big Bend for use by Tampa Electric Company. The AGRICO terminal at Big Bend is used for loading phosphate rock. All of these privately owned terminals are licensed by the Tampa Port Authority to whom they pay a fee and submit reports of their activities. The Tampa Port Authority charges a fee to vessels who load or unload cargo at the Gadsden Anchorage which is also in the port of Tampa. Section 310.002(4), Florida Statutes, defines "port" to mean, any place in the state in which vessels enter and depart. For Tampa Bay, this section lists Tampa, Port Tampa, Port Manatee, St. Petersburg and Clearwater as ports. Of those listed ports, Tampa and Port Tampa are in Hillsborough County and come under the jurisdiction of the Tampa Port Authority. No evidence was submitted showing the areas encompassed by the Port of Tampa and Port Tampa. The Port of Tampa's Terminal and Facilities Map (Exhibit 5) showing the port facilities at Tampa, Florida, does not show the facilities at Port Tampa; it shows only those facilities on the east side of the Tampa peninsula, and does not reach as far south as Big Bend. Presumably, if there are only two ports in Hillsborough County that portion of Hillsborough County west of the Tampa peninsula would comprise Port Tampa, and that portion of Hillsborough County east and south of the Tampa peninsula would comprise the Port of Tampa. If so, all of the movements here complained of occurred in the Port of Tampa. Exhibit 5 supports this conclusion. Finally, no credible evidence was presented that Respondent assigned a federally licensed, but not a state licensed, pilot to the OCEAN LORD, VOMAR and ASPEN as alleged, except Exhibit 3 which states the assignment of a federally licensed pilot to the Aspen was due to an error on the part of Captain Rabren. The direct testimony presented in this regard is that Anita Rabren assigned federally licensed pilots to those ships. Further, this determination that use of a federally licensed pilot for those movements of foreign flag vessels within the Port of Tampa was proper was made by Anita Rabren after receiving legal advice regarding the in-port movements of foreign flag vessels that can be piloted by a federally licensed pilot.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation doing business and having its principal place of business in Broward County, Florida. It holds an operating certificate as an air taxi/commercial operator issued by the Federal Aviation Administration on April 4, 1977. The certificate states that Petitioner has met the requirements of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and the rules prescribed thereunder for issuance of the certificate. The operating certificate was issued by the F.A.A. under 14 CFR 135. Petitioner is also registered as an air taxi operator with the Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) under 14 CFR 298. (Testimony of Jackson, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Stipulation) Respondent's auditor conducted an audit of Petitioner's records for the period June 1, 1975 through July 31, 1978, and, on August 15, 1978, issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment of tax, penalties and interest under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, in the total amount of $1,629.35 for alleged delinquent sales and use tax incurred during the audit period. The proposed assessment was based upon audit findings that Petitioner had purchased fuel, aircraft parts and repairs from a firm called Hansa Jet located at the Fort Lauderdale Hollywood Airport on which sales tax was allegedly due, but not paid thereon. Petitioner was not chartered as a corporation until March, 1977, and purchases prior to that time were made by Andy Jackson Yacht and Aircraft, Inc., which was a registered dealer under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Although the audit was based upon invoices in the possession of Petitioner, no effort was apparently made to check the records of the supplier, Hansa Jet, to ascertain whether it took tax exemption certificates from either firm. Several of the invoices reflected the sales tax number of Andy Jackson Yacht and Aircraft, Inc. Petitioner was not a registered dealer under Chapter 212, during the audit period. It was originally a division of Andy Jackson Yacht and Aircraft, Inc. and since 1977 has been a wholly owned subsidiary of that firm. (Testimony of Bravade, Jackson, Petitioner's Exhibit 7) By letter of September 12, 1978, Petitioner asked Respondent for an interpretation as to the applicability of the partial tax exemption of Section 212.08(9), Florida Statutes, to its operations. By letter of September 19, Respondent's audit bureau chief advised Petitioner that the exemption applied only to carriers holding certificates of convenience issued by the C.A.B. that establish routes, rates, and reports on operations on such routes. Petitioner thereafter requested a Chapter 120 hearing. (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) Prior to obtaining federal authorization to operate as an air taxi carrier, Petitioner was obliged to meet such preliminary requirements as acquisition of aircraft, insurance coverage, and the preparation of a detailed operations manual for the F.A.A. specifying the structure of the firm, and detailed provisions relating to personnel and operations. Its pilots have the same training and meet the same basic qualifications as those employed by other airlines, and its aircraft are periodically inspected by the F.A.A. under federal standards. Petitioner's place of business is located at the Fort Lauderdale- Hollywood International Airport and it maintains gate and counter space at the terminal. Its aircraft carry both passengers and cargo at published rates. Although it formerly flew scheduled routes to the Bahama Islands, it found these to be unprofitable and discontinued them. Approximately 95 percent of its business is in interstate and foreign commerce, and all of the purchases for which the taxes are presently asserted were for flights in such commerce. Petitioner is listed in the local telephone directory under the heading "Airline Companies." The listing shows destinations in the Bahama Islands and further states "Charter rates on request to all Caribbean and U.S. cities." It accepts passengers without discrimination who are willing to pay the specified rate for passage. It is a member of the Warsaw Pact on limitation of liability for international carriers. Petitioner will quote specific charter rates to a group to a particular place but gives the same rate to any other group desiring transportation to the same destination. Its operations are controlled by the F.A.A. in accordance with Petitioner's plan of operations. It aircraft fly twenty-four hours a day throughout the week. It has no continuing contracts for cargo or passengers. Although it has printed passenger tickets, these are not customarily used. Fares are paid in cash or through national credit cards. Petitioner is free to decline to fly passengers and cargo to a particular destination and exercises its discretion in this respect. It files regular annual reports to the C.A.B. on all of its revenue operations. (Testimony of Jackson, Petitioner's Exhibits 3, 6) Although Petitioner, as an air taxi operator, does not hold a C.A.B. certificate of public convenience and necessity under Section 401 of the Act, it is nevertheless viewed as a "common carrier" by that agency. The C.A.B. does not issue "licenses" to any category of air carrier but construes registration with it to be the same as a license. (Testimony of Untiedt, Petitioner's Exhibit 1)
Recommendation That Respondent revise its proposed assessment against Petitioner to encompass only those transactions occurring after Petitioner's date of incorporation, and enforce the same in accordance with law. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Gaylord A. Wood, Jr. 603 Courthouse Square Building 200 South East 6th Street Fort Lauderdale,, Florida 33301 Maxie Broome, Jr. Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John D. Moriarty Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact On November 15, 1982, Petitioner applied to Respondent to take the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination for the Port of Miami. Prior to that time, Petitioner had served as an apprentice pilot in the Port of Miami from January 1, 1967, through January 1, 1971. Petitioner was terminated from his position as an apprentice pilot with the Port of Miami in 1971, and has not piloted any ships in the Port of Miami or any other port in the state since that time. At the time of his application to take the pilot's examination, Petitioner was over 18 years of age, had been awarded a high school diploma, and was in good physical and mental health. Petitioner had also obtained a valid first class unlimited pilot's license issued by the United States Coast Guard in 1971. In addition to Petitioner, three other persons, William A. Arata, Stephen E. Nadeau, and Robert K. Brownell, also applied to take the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination for the Port of Miami. Arata submitted his application to sit for the examination on November 19, 1982. At that time, Arata had been licensed as a deputy pilot for the Port of Miami since January 28, 1980. In addition, he possessed an unlimited first class pilot'S license for the Port of Miami and had successfully completed the deputy pilot training program for that port. On November 24, 1982, Nadeau submitted his application to sit for the January 31, 1983, pilot's examination. Nadeau had been licensed as a deputy pilot in the Port of Miami since July 23, 1980, possessed an unlimited first class pilot's license for the Port of Miami, and had successfully completed the Port of Miami deputy pilot training program. Brownell applied on November 29, 1982, to sit for the same pilot's examination. At that time, Brownell had been licensed as a deputy pilot for the Port of Miami since July 31, 1980, also possessed an unlimited first class pilot's license for the Port of Miami, and had successfully completed the Port of Miami deputy pilot training program. In accordance with the provisions of Section 310.071, Florida Statutes, the applications of Petitioner, Arata, Nadeau, and Brownell were submitted to the Department of Professional Regulation which, in turn, submitted those applications to Respondent for a determination of eligibility to sit for the licensing examination. Respondent ultimately determined and advised the Department of Professional Regulation that all four applicants were qualified to sit for the licensing examination. All four applicants took the examination on January 31, 1983, and each of them received a passing grade. In accordance with Rule 21-8.09, Florida Administrative Code, the Department of Professional Regulation ranked the grades received by the applicants from highest to lowest. Petitioner received the lowest grade of the four applicants. Accordingly, since Respondent had certified three openings to be filled for licensed state pilots in the Port of Miami, the Department of Professional Regulation, act some time between February 1, 1983, and May 6, 1983, issued state pilot licenses for the Port of Miami to Captains Arata, Nadeau, and Brownell. There is in force in the Port of Miami a Deputy Pilot Training Program which has been approved by Respondent. The minimum time required for completion of the program, which is a prerequisite for applying for a state pilot's license, is two years. One of the requirements of the program is that participants obtain a first class unlimited pilot's license from the United States Coast Guard. This license allows the holder to pilot coastwise vessels which sail under the American flag. A state pilot's license standing alone permits the holder only to pilot ships sailing under foreign flags. In order to acquire a first class unlimited pilot's license, an applicant must possess another maritime license, such as a master's or male's license, must meet age and sea experience requirements, and must pass an examination prepared and administered by the United States Coast Guard. In addition, a condition to obtaining a first class unlimited pilot's license is that the applicant must possess a radar observer's certificate. The Florida State Pilot's Association, Inc., is a nonprofit corporation composed of 59 licensed state pilots from every port in Florida with the exception of Jacksonville and Fort Pierce. Captains Arata, Nadeau, and Brornell are members of that organization. The purpose of the organization is to represent the interests of its members at local, state, and federal levels.
The Issue Whether American Airlines committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charges filed by Petitioners and, if so, what relief should Petitioners be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the extensive factual stipulations set forth in the parties' February 23, 2006, Corrected Joint Prehearing Stipulation2: Petitioners are both Hispanic. Hispanics represent a substantial portion of the workforce in American's maintenance department at Miami International Airport (MIA). Among these Hispanic employees in the maintenance department are those who occupy supervisory positions. American’s Vice-President for Maintenance, Danny Martinez, is Hispanic. As aviation maintenance technicians for American, Petitioners' job duties, as set forth in the written job description for the position, were as follows: In addition to the work specified for the Junior Aviation Maintenance Technician, an Aviation Maintenance Technician's responsibility also includes the following: troubleshooting, individually or with Crew Chief, management or professional direction, disassembly, checking and cleaning, repairing, replacing, testing, adjusting, assembling, installing, servicing, fabricating, taxing or towing airplanes and/or run-up engines, de-icing aircraft, required to maintain the airworthiness of aircraft and all their components while in service or while undergoing overhaul and/or modification. Certifies for quality of own workmanship, including signing mechanical flight releases for all work done on field work. In those work positions where stock chasers are not utilized and/or available at the time may chase own parts. May have other Mechanic personnel assigned to assist him/her in completing an assignment. Works according to FAA and Company regulations and procedures and instructions from Crew Chief or supervisor. Completes forms connected with work assignments according to established procedures and communicates with other Company personnel as required in a manner designated by the Company. Performs the following duties as assigned: cleaning of aircraft windshields; connection/removing ground power and ground start units; pushing out/towing of aircraft and related guideman functions, fueling/defueling, de-icing of aircraft. At all times material to the instant cases, Petitioners were members of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between American and the TWU (TWU Contract), which contained the following provisions, among others: ARTICLE 28- NO DISCRIMINATION, AND RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND COMPLIANCE The Company and the Union agree to make it a matter of record in this Agreement that in accordance with the established policy of the Company and the Union, the provisions of this Agreement will apply equally to all employees regardless of sex, color, race, creed, age, religious preferences, status as a veteran or military reservist, disability, or national origin. The Union recognizes that the Company will have sole jurisdiction of the management and operation of its business, the direction of its working force, the right to maintain discipline and efficiency in its hangars, stations, shops, or other places of employment, and the right of the Company to hire, discipline, and discharge employees for just cause, subject to the provisions of this Agreement. It is agreed that the rights of management not enumerated in this Article will not be deemed to exclude other preexisting rights of management not enumerated which do not conflict with other provisions of the Agreement. * * * Copies of the Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) Program will be available to all employees upon request. Any changes to the PPC Program will be provided and explained to the TWU prior to implementation. ARTICLE 29- REPRESENTATION * * * The Union does not question the right of the Company supervisors to manage and supervise the work force and make reasonable inquiries of employees, individually or collectively, in the normal course of work. In meetings for the purpose of investigation of any matter which may eventuate in the application of discipline or dismissal, or when written statements may be required, or of sufficient importance for the Company to have witnesses present, or to necessitate the presence of more than the Company supervisor, or during reasonable cause or post accident drug/alcohol testing as provided in Article 29(h), the Company will inform the employee of his right to have Union representation present. If the employee refuses representation, the supervisor's record will reflect this refusal. At the start of a meeting under the provisions of Article 29(f), the Company will, except in rare and unusual circumstances, indicate the reason that causes the meeting and then provide an opportunity for the employee and his Union representative to confer for a reasonable period of time. Following that period, the 29(f) meeting will be reconvened and continue until concluded by the supervisor. Before written notification of discipline or dismissal is given, an employee will be afforded the opportunity to discuss the matter with his supervisor. If he desires, he will have a Union representative in the discussion. . . . * * * ARTICLE 30- DISMISSAL An employee who has passed his probationary period will not be dismissed from the service of the Company without written notification of that action. The notification will include the reason or reasons for his dismissal. Appeal from dismissal will be made, in writing, by the employee within seven (7) calendar days after receiving the notification and will be addressed to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days following his receipt of the appeal, unless mutually agreed otherwise. A copy of the written decision will be provided to the Union. * * * If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the dismissal and decision will be appealed in accordance with Article 30(c), provided, however, the appeal must be submitted within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of the decision rendered by the Chief Operating Officer. An appeal from the decision of the Chief Operating Officer will be submitted to the appropriate Area Board of Adjustment in accordance with Article 32. . . . * * * ARTICLE 31- GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE An employee who believes that he has been unjustly dealt with, or that any provision of this Agreement has not been properly applied or interpreted, or against whom the Company has issued written disciplinary action, may submit his grievance in person or through his representatives within seven (7) calendar days. The grievance will be presented to his immediate supervisor, who will evaluate the grievance or complaint and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than seven (7) calendar days following his receipt of the grievance. . . . If the written decision of the immediate supervisor is not satisfactory to the employee whose grievance is being considered, it may be appealed within ten (10) calendar to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and will render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days, unless mutually agreed otherwise, following his receipt of the appeal. . . . If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the grievance and the decision may be appealed to the System Board of Adjustment, as provided for in Article 32. * * * ARTICLE 32- BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT * * * Area Board of Adjustment, Discipline and Dismissal Cases * * * (2) Each Area Board will be composed on one member appointed by the Company, one member appointed by the Union, and a neutral referee acting as Chairman. . . . * * * Procedures Generally Applicable to the Boards * * * Employees and the Company may be represented at Board hearing by such person or persons as they may choose and designate. Evidence may be presented either orally or in writing, or both. The advocates will exchange all documents they may enter and the names of witnesses they may call in their direct case not later than ten (10) calendar days prior to the date set for hearing. Nothing in this paragraph will require either advocate to present the documents or the witnesses provided above during the course of the hearing. The advocates will not be restricted from entering documents or calling witnesses that become known subsequent to the ten (10) ten calendar day exchange, provided a minimum of forty-eight (48) hours notice is provided to the other party and a copies are submitted to the other party prior to the presentation of the direct case. The party receiving the late document or witness has the option to postpone the hearing in light of the new document or witness. Upon the request of either party to the dispute, or of two (2) Board members, the neutral referee will summon witnesses to testify at Board hearing. The Company will cooperate to ensure that all witnesses summoned by the board will appear in a timely fashion. Reasonable requests by the Union for employee witnesses will be honored. The requests for witnesses will normally not be greater than the number, which can be spared without interference with the service of the Company. Disputes arising from this provision will be immediately referred to the Director of the Air Transport Division and the Vice President-Employee Relations, or their respective designees, for resolution. A majority of all members of a Board will be sufficient to make a finding or a decision with respect to any dispute properly before it, and such finding or decision will be final and binding upon the parties to such dispute. . . . * * * ARTICLE 36- MEAL PERIODS Meal periods will be thirty minutes, except when a longer period is agreed upon between the parties. Meal periods will be scheduled to begin not earlier than three (3) hours after commencement of work that day and not later than five hours after commencement of work that day. The commencement of work is from the start of the employee's regular shift. If an employee is not scheduled for a meal period within the foregoing time span, the meal period will be provided immediately before or after it. In the event that a meal period has not been provided in accordance with the foregoing, the employee is then free, if he so desires, to take his meal period. At all times material to the instant cases, American had Rules of Conduct for its employees that (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) were applicable to TWU- represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners. These Rules of Conduct provided, in pertinent part, as follows: As an American Airlines employee, you can expect a safe and productive workplace that ensures your ability to succeed and grow with your job. The rules listed below represent the guidelines and principles that all employees work by at American. Attendance * * * During your tour of duty, remain in the area necessary for the efficient performance of your work. Remain at work until your tour of duty ends unless you are authorized to leave early. * * * 17. Work carefully. Observe posted or published regulations. * * * Personal Conduct * * * 34. Dishonesty of any kind in relations with the company, such as theft or pilferage of company property, the property of other employees or property of others entrusted to the company, or misrepresentation in obtaining employee benefits or privileges, will be grounds for dismissal and where the facts warrant, prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. Employees charged with a criminal offense, on or off duty, may immediately be withheld from service. Any action constituting a criminal offense, whether committed on duty or off duty, will be grounds for dismissal. (Revision of this rule, April 10, 1984) * * * Violations of any of the American Airlines Rules of Conduct (listed above) . . . could be grounds for immediate termination depending of the severity of the incident or offense and the employee's record. . . . At all times material to the instant cases, American had a Peak Performance Through Commitment Policy (PPC Policy) to deal with employee performance and disciplinary problems. The policy, which (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) was applicable to TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) is a program that fosters ongoing communication between managers and employees. It encourages managers . . . to regularly recognize outstanding performance and to work together with employees to address and correct performance issues fairly. For the few employees whose performance does not respond to regular coaching and counseling, the following steps advise them that continued performance problems have serious consequences, ultimately leading to termination: -First Advisory for employees with problem performance or conduct who do not respond to coaching or counseling. -Second Advisory for employees whose performance fails to respond to initial corrective steps. -Career Decision Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct warrants termination. They are given a paid Career Decision Day away from work to consider their future and continued employment with American Airlines. -Final Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct requires termination, or those who have failed to honor the Letter of Commitment signed after their Career Decision Day. Please note that steps can sometimes be skipped, in instances where the nature of the conduct is very serious. It is your responsibility as an employee to know the company's rules of conduct and performance standards for your job, and to consistently meet or exceed those standards. In the event that your performance does not measure up to the company's expectations, your manager will work with you to identify the problem and outline steps to correct it. * * * SERIOUS INCIDENTS OR OFFENSES Some violations of our guiding principles and rules of conduct will result in immediate termination. For example, insubordination, violating our alcohol and drug policy, abusing travel privileges, aircraft damage, violations of the work environment policy, and job actions could be grounds for immediate termination, depending on the severity of the incident and the employee's record. Hate-related conduct and dishonesty will always result in termination. In cases when immediate termination may be appropriate but additional information is needed, the employee may be withheld from service while an investigation is conducted. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioners' regular shifts were eight and a half hours, including an unpaid, thirty minute "meal period" (to which TWU-represented bargaining unit members were entitled under Article 36 of the TWU Contract). Although they were paid to perform eight hours of work during their eight and a half hour shifts, TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, were, in practice, allowed to take up to an hour for their meals, without penalty. TWU-represented bargaining unit members "clocked in" at the beginning of their shift and "clocked out" at the end of their shift. They were expected to remain "on the clock" during their "meal periods" (which, as noted above, were to be no longer than one hour). During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Castellanos was assigned to perform a "routine 'A' [safety] check" on a Boeing 757 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" approximately four hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Castellanos was two hours and 15 minutes into his shift. During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Pena was assigned to perform "PS checks" on two Boeing 737 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" at least six hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Pena was three hours and 45 minutes into his shift. Walter Philbrick, an investigator in American's corporate security department, covertly followed Petitioners when they left MIA that evening and kept them under surveillance until their return almost four hours later. Petitioners did not clock out until following the end of their shifts on July 31, 2004. In so doing, they effectively claimed full pay for the shifts, notwithstanding that, during the shifts, they had been off the worksite, engaged in non-work- related activity, for well in excess of the one hour they were allowed for "meal periods." Mr. Philbrick prepared and submitted a report detailing what he had observed as to Petitioners' movements and conduct during the time that they had been under his surveillance. Mike Smith is American's maintenance department station manager at MIA. He is "responsible for the entire [American] maintenance operation in Miami." Mr. Smith assigned his subordinate, Anthony DeGrazia, a day shift production manager at MIA, the task of looking into, and taking the appropriate action on behalf of management in response to, the matters described in Mr. Philbrick's report. Neither Mr. Smith nor Mr. DeGrazia is Hispanic. Mr. DeGrazia met separately with both Mr. Pena and Mr. Castellanos. The meetings were held in accordance with the provisions of Article 29(f) of the TWU Contract. Before conducting the meetings, Mr. DeGrazia had reviewed Mr. Philbrick's report. Mr. Castellanos stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was trying to complete his assignment as fast as possible because he wanted to have an alcoholic beverage; that evening, he was "away from work" for approximately four hours, which he knew was wrong; and he and Mr. Pena had engaged in similar activity on perhaps six or seven previous occasions. Mr. Pena stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was "off the field" for three to four hours, which he knew was not "okay"; this was something he had done "sometimes" in the past; and American was a "great company" to work for. Based on his review of Mr. Philbrick's report and the information he had obtained from Petitioners, Mr. DeGrazia concluded that Petitioners had committed "time clock fraud" in violation of Rule 34 of American's Rules of Conduct and that they therefore, in accordance with American's policy that "dishonesty will always result in termination" (as expressed in the PPC Policy), should be terminated. Before taking such action, Mr. DeGrazia consulted with Mr. Smith and "someone" from American's human resources department, who both "concurred" with Mr. DeGrazia that termination was the appropriate action to take against Petitioners. On August 12, 2004, Mr. DeGrazia issued Final Advisories terminating Petitioners' employment. The Final Advisory given to Mr. Castellanos read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2230-0700. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete an A-check on a 757 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when asked how it was possible for you to complete your assignment in such a short amount of time you stated that you were, "trying to complete the job as fast as I can because I was getting the urge of getting a drink." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, 17, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * The Final Advisory given to Mr. Pena read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2100-0530. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete two PS-checks on 737 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when you[] were asked if it is acceptable to go to lunch for 3-4 hours you stated, "no, according to Company Rules, it's not OK." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * That Petitioners were Hispanic played no role whatsoever in Mr. DeGrazia's decision to terminate them. Mr. DeGrazia terminated Petitioners because, and only because, he believed that they had engaged in dishonesty by committing "time clock fraud." Mr. DeGrazia has never encountered another situation, in his capacity as a production manager for American, where an aviation maintenance technician over whom he had disciplinary authority engaged in conduct comparable to the conduct for which he terminated Petitioners. No one has ever reported to him, nor has he ever observed, any aviation maintenance technician other than Petitioners taking "meal periods" that were longer than an hour while remaining "on the clock." Petitioners both grieved their terminations pursuant to Article 31 of the TWU Contract. Neither of them advanced any allegations of anti-Hispanic discrimination in his grievance. Petitioners' grievances were ultimately denied on September 9, 2004, by William Cade, American's managing director for maintenance. Petitioners appealed the denial of their grievances to the American and TWU Area Board of Adjustment for Miami, Florida (Board), in accordance with Article 32 of the TWU Contract, which provided for "final and binding" arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. A consolidated evidentiary hearing was held before the Board on April 28, 2005. At the hearing, Petitioners were represented by counsel. Through counsel, they called and cross- examined witnesses, submitted documentary evidence, and presented argument. Neither of them testified. The Board issued a decision on June 27, 2005, denying Petitioners' grievances. The TWU Board member dissented. The Discussion and Opinion portion of the decision read, in pertinent part, as follows: There is no dispute that the rule violations by grievants['] actions on July 30, 2004 constituted time card fraud and violation of rules relating to remaining at work. This was not some minor taking of time, such as overstaying lunch for a shortened period. It was a well-planned event. They had with them a change of clothes - in effect "party clothes" apropos to a late night-early morning South Florida nightclub. They had even done this several times before. Once at this nightclub they actually drank very little. Grievant Pena had two drinks and grievant Castellanos appeared to have just one. In fact, when he was later tested after his return to work almost five hours later, the result was negative for drugs and alcohol. Clearly, they failed to remain at work for their tours of duty in violation of Rules 3 and 4. These rules, however, do not by themselves call for immediate discharge nor do any of the Company documents relating to rules, such as its PPC, refer to them as serious violations that would incur discharge. The seriousness here concerns the grievants' badging out after their eight-hour tour and being paid for eight hours, almost five of which they did not work. There is no question that this is time card fraud and as such it involves dishonesty that is covered by Rule 34's "dishonesty of any kind." Numerous arbitrators for the parties have found such conduct to be violative of Rule 34 and have concluded that stealing time from the Company is dishonesty that requires immediate dismissal. * * * [T]he grievants engaged in this misconduct on multiple occasions that involved more than half of their shift being spent at a nightclub. And they knew it was wrong as they readily admitted when finally caught. Mitigation based on the grievants' EAP involvement is insufficient to overcome and reduce in any fashion their core responsibility to be honest employees and abide by all Company rules and regulations. The Company made this clear enough in its current Drug and Alcohol policy, and, as seen, other Boards have found it reasonable, as does this Board. To all of this the Union argues that there are other mitigating factors - seniority, disparate treatment, failure to consider employment records and a common practice permitting employees to extend lunch breaks. As to the latter, there is no evidence that any employee has been allowed to stay away from work for almost five hours with the knowledge or consent of management at any level. There is some evidence of employees overstaying the break by 30 minutes, of employees going for food for the crew and arriving back late and even some two-hour absences. None of this is comparable to the grievants' conduct. Nor is the evidence concerning supervisor Delgadillo enough to warrant the finding of a practice. She was not Pena's supervisor. She called grievant Castellanos' cell, but that alone does not mean that she knew he was off several hours at that point socializing and drinking in Coconut Grove on July 30 or at other times. She may have gone out with them while she was a mechanic, but the evidence does not show that she went for these long journeys to drink and socialize at a night club. Most importantly, the grievants never claimed a practice existed but instead readily admitted at the 29(f)s that their conduct was wrong and they violated Company rules. As to the disparate treatment incidents, although the dishonesty issue appears similar, different treatment only becomes disparate when the employees being compared also have factual situations and records that are similar. The comparators here did not leave work on more than one occasion, or on any occasion, for four hours or more to drink and socialize in a nightclub. Thus, Mora's 45-minute late punch-in resulted from his retrieving his drivers' license; he then immediately informed management of what he did. He did not have to be put under security surveillance for this type of conduct occurring in the past. Although his 30-minute extended lunch was part of the practice referred to above, it hardly qualifies as like conduct when compared to the grievants' activities. The claim by Vizcaino that he was sick when he used his Company travel privilege is the type of violation referred to the Travel Abuse Committee under a rule penalizing employees by suspending their travel privileges. The facts of that incident and the reasoning of this committee are not known to make any clear and relevant comparison. Even if accepted as a valid comparison, it is only one employee incident that by itself is insufficient to show that management disparately treated these grievants. Nor is their any proof that Rule 34 was involved in either of these situations. Manager DeGrazia disclosed that he did not consider the grievants' prior record or their seniority. He explained that the seriousness of their conduct was sufficient for his decision. The Board fully recognizes that the grievants cooperated during the investigation, had no prior discipline, and had seniority from 1989 and 1996. Each of these factors is significant in assessing the suitability of the penalties. But it is well established by the parties and even in arbitration cases involving outside parties, that in light of the gravity of time card fraud, these factors need not be evaluated. The Chairman notes nonetheless, that seniority and work records cannot be entirely ignored. But here, the grievants' propensity in the past to engage in this same outlandish conduct, and to do so undetected, significantly minimized, for mitigation purposes, much of their good record and seniority. Petitioners subsequently filed employment discrimination charges with the FCHR, alleging for the first time that their terminations were products of anti-Hispanic discrimination. There has been no persuasive showing made, in support in these allegations, that the decision to terminate them was motivated by anything other than legitimate business considerations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding the American not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioners and dismissing their employment discrimination charges. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings are fact are determined: In this examination for licensure challenge, petitioner, Mason L. Flint, contends that he is entitled to a higher score on the March 1994 deputy pilot examination for the Port of Jacksonville. The examination is administered by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DBPR) on behalf of respondent, Board of Pilot Commissioners (Board). Although the original petition challenged the grade in twelve respects, petitioner now contends that only two items are in issue, item 21 relating to the local knowledge part of the examination, and item 270 relating to the aids to navigation part of the examination. Both are true-false questions. Unlike the more than fifty other professional licensure examinations administered by the DBPR, the seven-part pilot examination requires a candidate to achieve a minimum passing grade on each part, but candidates doing so then compete with each other for vacant positions. In other words, if only one position at a particular port is open, the candidate achieving the highest score above the minimum passing grade is the only candidate receiving a license. In this case, three deputy pilot positions were available at the Port of Jacksonville, and thus the candidates having the three highest scores among those exceeding the minimum passing grade would be given a license. Petitioner finished sixth on the original grading, but after having his examination regraded by the Board prior to hearing, he was ranked number four. By this challenge, he seeks to have his grade changed on items 21 and 270 so as to raise his ranking to number three. In order to preserve the confidentiality of Item 21 for future examinations, it is suffice to say that the item required a response of true or false concerning limitations on vessels leaving the Talleyrand Docks in Jacksonville, Florida. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. In preparing all questions pertaining to local knowledge, including item 21, the Board's consultant used the U. S. Coast Pilot, a compilation of operational guidelines governing the movement of vessels in the St. Johns River (and Port of Jacksonville). The specific source of authority for item 21 was paragraph (16) on page 153 of the 1993 edition of the U. S. Coast Pilot. That paragraph reads in pertinent part as follows: (16) Outbound vessels: Vessels with a draft of over 23 (sic) feet sailing between Main Street Bridge to, and including, U. S. Gypsum Co. Pier, shall get underway after 1-1/2 hours after flood current with a cut off time at the beginning of ebb current . . . Because Talleyrand Docks lies between the Main Street Bridge and the U. S. Gypsum Company Pier, this paragraph has application to vessels leaving those docks. The 1993 version of the U. S. Coast Pilot contained a typographical error. Rather than "23" feet, the guidelines should have read "32" feet. To correct this error, paragraph (16) was revised in mid-March 1994, or the same month the examination was given, to provide that any vessel drawing more than 32 feet would be subject to the above movement restrictions. However, candidates were advised that only revisions to the U. S. Coast Pilot through January 1, 1994, would be included in the March 1994 examination. Besides the limitation described in paragraph (16), two other paragraphs on the same page of the U. S. Coast Pilot made reference to the correct 32 foot limitation. In addition, the Guidelines of Vessel Movements on St. Johns River, which form the basis for the data in the U. S. Coast Pilot, used the correct 32 foot limitation. Candidates familiar with those provisions should have been on notice that a typographical error existed in paragraph (16). Although the Board's suggested response is arguably correct, the more persuasive evidence shows that the statement in item 21 was confusing and unclear due to the typographical error in the U. S. Coast Pilot and the conflicting provisions on the same page of the source material. Thus, item 21 does not reliably measure the specified area of competency. Under these circumstances, a candidate should be given credit for either a true or false response, or alternatively, the question should be discarded in calculating a candidate's final score. Accordingly, petitioner's grade should be adjusted in this respect. Petitioner has also contended that only a false response is correct since the question implies that a restriction exists because of its use of the words "up to the beginning of ebb current." The evidence shows, however, that a candidate could reasonably reject that suggested implication and properly make a true response. Item 270 requires a true or false response to a statement regarding identifying marks or buoys marking a channel. The item identifies a set of conditions and then states that such a marking "could" properly be made. The examination answer key shows true as the correct response. The primary source of authority for item 270 is 33 CFR 62.43. According to that federal regulation, buoys marking the side of a channel (lateral aids) are always a solid color, and all solid color buoys marking a channel are numbered. The regulation goes on to provide that, in addition to a number, all solid color numbered buoys may also carry a letter suffix to aid in their identification, or to indicate their purpose. They cannot, however, be identified by letter only, but only by number and letter. Because the more credible and persuasive evidence shows that the question, as stated on the examination, clearly suggests that only a letter could be used for identification of a sidemark buoy, the correct response should be false. Therefore, petitioner should be given credit for his answer. The record is not altogether clear as to how changing petitioner's overall grade will impact his ranking. According to the DBPR psychometrician who is in charge of the pilot examination development, both petitioner and the third ranked candidate gave the same response on one of the challenged questions. On the other item, the two gave different responses, but if either response is deemed to be a correct response, it would have no bearing on their overall ranking. The pychometrician added that if an item is challenged and credit given to the protesting candidate, the answer key is changed and all candidates' scores are adjusted to reflect the change in the answer key.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Board regrading petitioner's examination consistent with the above findings and conclusions. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5327 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 4-5. Rejected as being unnecessary. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 14-27. Partially accepted in findings of fact 3-8. 28-39. Partially accepted in findings of fact 9-11. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 9-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 12. Rejected. See finding of fact 11. Note: Where a proposed findings has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejcted as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordiante, not supported by the evidence, or cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Mason L. Flint 1605 Brookside Circle East Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Wellington H. Meffert, II, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack L. McRay, Esquire 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Susan J. Foster, Executive Director Board of Pilot Commissioners 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0773
The Issue Whether the Department of Children and Family Services should approve a plan submitted by Sharon George, the mother, primary caregiver, and representative of Petitioner, under the Choice and Control Pilot Project.
Findings Of Fact Threasa Garrett is a 29 year-old woman with brain damage and severe mental retardation. She is petite and appears to be much younger than her actual age. Ms. Garrett cannot articulate her needs and cannot perform most of the activities of daily living such as feeding, bathing and other hygiene, and dressing. She must be closely supervised at all times, as she is unable to recognize danger. She attempts to eat nonfood items if not prevented from so doing. She has the propensity to wander about. Ms. Garrett has been severely retarded most of her life. Her mother, Mrs. George, has been her primary caregiver. The caregiving for Ms. Garrett has been long term and extremely demanding. One of the means employed by Mrs. George to deal with Ms. Garrett's propensity to wander is by using a harness and tether. The harness fits around Ms. Garrett's upper torso and is attached to a tether in the back. Ms. Garrett is a client of the Developmental Disabilities Program of DCFS. The Developmental Disabilities Program provides and coordinates the provision of goods and services to developmentally disabled clients such as Petitioner. The Choice and Control Pilot Project is an experimental program operated by the Developmental Disabilities Program. The purpose of the Pilot Project is to allow families of developmentally disabled clients greater flexibility and a greater role in procuring and providing services for their developmentally disabled family members. A feature of the Pilot Program which is material to this case is that, with the approval of DCFS, the family members of the DCFS client can provide services to the client, and be paid to do so with state moneys. In order to participate in the Pilot Project, the family member must sign and agree to abide by the terms of the Pilot Project Agreement. This agreement requires that the participant must comply with project guidelines including purchasing guidelines. Two purchasing guidelines which are material to this case are guideline number four, "[the] provider must be capable and qualified" and guideline number 5, "[h]ealth and safety needs must be met." DCFS based its denial letter on its determination that Petitioner's request does not meet these two purchasing guidelines. Petitioner will be able to continue to be a client of and to receive services from the Developmental Disabilities Program despite DCFS' denial of Mrs. George's request to receive funding from the Pilot Project. On July 14, 2000, Mrs. George decided to go to northern Alabama. The reason for her trip is not clear in the record. The weather was hot and Mrs. George feared that Threasa would not do well in the heat of her vehicle. She based this fear on past experiences in which Threasa experienced health problems when overheated. Mrs. George left Threasa at the home of Donna Garrett, Threasa's sister. Mrs. George was aware that her daughter, Donna, had a job which would require her to leave the home at 6:30 a.m. the morning of July 14, 2000, and was not expected to return until approximately 1:00 p.m. that day. Mrs. George planned to be gone on her trip the whole day. Around noon, law enforcement personnel were summoned to Donna Garrett's home by someone who came to the home to perform pest control there. The officer gained entry to the home and saw Threasa alone wearing the harness and tethered to a couch. Petitioner was soaked with urine. DCFS sent a child protective investigator to the scene because the officer thought she was a child. When Threasa's actual age was established, an adult protective investigator was summoned. The adult protective investigator was concerned about the harness and tether, and that Threasa had been left alone in the home. Additionally, he was concerned that she had no food or water, and no access to a telephone to call for help. He arranged to send Threasa to a location where she would be supervised. After discussing this with family members who did not want her sent to an institutional setting, Ms. Garrett was sent to her grandfather's house with a family member. The Department's decision to deny Mrs. George's application was based primarily on the incident of July 14, 2000. That is, that Threasa had been left alone unsupervised for a number of hours with no means of escape in the event of an emergency. Additionally, as Mrs. George had indicated to DCFS that she would make the same choice again, DCFS was concerned that such an incident would happen again. Mrs. George's explanation for her actions were that Threasa had been tethered for her safety (so she would not roam and hurt herself), that food had not been left for her as she is unable to feed herself safely, that no telephone was needed because Threasa cannot communicate meaningfully, is unable to use a telephone, and a telephone wire could endanger Threasa. Mrs. George was confident that Threasa would be safe if left alone for a number of hours under these conditions and based this confidence on her years of caring for Threasa and on Mrs. George's religious beliefs.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent enter a final order rejecting Petitioner's request to be paid for services under the Pilot Project. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. BARBARA J. STAROS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2001.