Findings Of Fact The Petitioner paid intangible personal property taxes in the amount of $2,706.26 on March 22, 1977 for the tax year of 1977. The said taxes were not due until June, 1997. The Petitioner filed an application with the Respondent, Office of the Comptroller, State of Florida, on May 5, 1980, requesting a refund of the taxes paid because of the subsequent discovery by the Petitioner that the monies had been paid by mistake or in error. The Respondent, Office of The Comptroller, served a Notice of Intent to Deny by U.S. Mail upon the Petition on November 12, 1980. Respondent's Notice of Intent to Deny Refund is based upon the three- year statute of non-claim, as provided in Section 199.252, Florida Statutes. The issues to be determined are whether the right to refund accrued to the Petitioner when the taxes were paid (March 22, 1977) or when the taxes were due (June 30, 1977).
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is qualified to be licensed as a Florida real estate sales associate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has a Bachelor of Science degree in accounting from Florida State University. After receiving a Florida license as a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) in 1974, Petitioner worked as a CPA in private practice until 1978. He then returned to school at Trinity University, where he earned a Master of Science degree in Health Care Administration. Petitioner worked for the Hospital Corporation of America (HCA) for approximately 20 years. In the early 1980's, Petitioner's job with HCA involved the management of physician clinics. One of the physicians requested Petitioner to prepare some financial statements and to assist with the preparations of some federal income tax returns for a private client. At that time, Petitioner was living and working in two locations: Atlanta, Georgia, and Dothan, Alabama. Petitioner was not licensed to practice as a CPA in any state except Florida. For approximately two and one-half years, Petitioner helped the private client maintain her books. During this time, Petitioner corresponded with the client, sending her letters with CPA after his name. In 1986, Petitioner decided to discontinue his business relationship with the private client. The private client, who was upset, filed a complaint against Petitioner. In 1987, the private client's complaint resulted in Petitioner’s pleading no contest to the offense of identifying himself as a CPA when he was not a licensed CPA in Georgia. Petitioner subsequently satisfied all sanctions related to the Georgia offense. The Florida Board of Accountancy has not disciplined Petitioner's CPA license. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner's Florida CAP license was inactive. In 1991, Petitioner received a stock bonus from his employer, HCA, when it purchased a private hospital. The bonus consisted of stock certificates in a spin-off company known as Quorum Health Care. The stock was restricted and could not be sold for five years. Petitioner never received a Federal Income Tax Form 1099 related to the stock bonus. Petitioner placed the stock certificates in his safe. He did not include the stock bonus on his personal federal income tax return. In 1994, the Internal Revenue Service audited Petitioner's personal tax returns. During the audit, Petitioner disclosed the stock bonus and immediately filed an amended income tax return, paying all tax and interest due and all penalties. In 1996, Petitioner filed a whistleblower lawsuit against his employer for Medicare fraud. Because the lawsuit was filed in Alabama, the United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama, intervened in the case. The lawsuit resulted in the recovery of $180,000,000 from Quorum Health Care. Petitioner was entitled to a whistleblower award in the amount of $5,000,000. In 1999, before Petitioner received his financial reward from the lawsuit, the United States Attorney in Birmingham, Alabama, advised Petitioner that he would be charged with failure to file a correct federal income tax return for the years 1991 and 1992. Petitioner granted the government's request to extend the statute of limitations while the government investigated the tax fraud allegations against him. In 2000, Petitioner pled guilty to income tax fraud and agreed to forego any reward for his participation in the whistleblower lawsuit. Petitioner was sentenced to serve two years in a federal prison, followed by one year of supervised probation. Petitioner also paid a $50,000 fine. Petitioner was incarcerated for 367 days. He was released from federal prison in August 2002. His supervised probation terminated February 2004. In January 2006, Petitioner's civil rights were restored. In an effort to prove rehabilitation, Petitioner presented evidence to show his involvement and/or active participation with the following: (a) his church; (b) children's sports programs; (c) Habitat for Humanity; (d) neighborhood hurricane recovery; (e) and other activities beneficial to his friends and family. The following three witnesses testified on Petitioner's behalf at the hearing: (a) Mike Papantonio, an attorney and Petitioner's brother-in-law; (b) Randal Spencer, a Florida licensed real estate broker who, along with his partners, sold a commercial building to Petitioner's wife; and (c) Carl Collins, Petitioner's neighbor since 2000. Each witness testified that Petitioner is honest, trustworthy, and of good character. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was owner/manager of CommStructure, a company that manufactures and installs cellular towers. Petitioner oversees all financial aspects of the company. Petitioner's wife owns a real estate brokerage company, Spencer Realty. If Petitioner becomes licensed as a real estate sales associate, he would assist his wife in her business. A real estate sales associate, like a CPA, is responsible for important financial transactions where accuracy is important. Therefore, a real estate sales associate must be trustworthy regarding financial matters.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent enter a final order denying Petitioner a license as a real estate sales associate. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of April, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of April, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel R. Biggins, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Daniel Villazon, Esquire Daniel Villazon, P.A. 1020 Verona Street Kissimmee, Florida 34741 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Real Estate Commission Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is liable for the sales and use tax assessment issued by Respondent on February 21, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this proceeding, Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), has issued a proposed sales and use tax assessment in the amount of $24,546.54, plus $6,640.12 in penalties, plus interest from the date of the assessment, against Petitioner, Florida Truck Dock Company (Petitioner or taxpayer). As of March 20, 1997, the assessment totaled $55,195.27, and it continues to increase by $8.07 each day. The assessment constitutes taxes, penalties, and interest allegedly due from Petitioner for various materials and supplies purchased by Petitioner for use in the performance of real property contracts for Petitioner's customers. In its response to the assessment, Petitioner denied that it owed the money. Petitioner's business activities consisted primarily of purchasing truck loading dock equipment from suppliers, principally Kelly Company, Inc. (Kelly), and then installing such equipment as an improvement to real estate. Its records indicate that purchased equipment was generally brought into Florida and installed in real property in the state under a contract whereby parts and labor were furnished for one lump sum contract price. The foregoing contracts were Class A or lump sum contracts within the meaning of Rule 12A-1.051(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. Class A contracts are considered contracts for the improvement of real estate, not contracts for the resale of tangible personal property. In addition, when the equipment was purchased, Petitioner had not issued resale certificates to its vendors. Under these circumstances, Petitioner was properly treated as an end-user of the equipment in question and owed use taxes on all such purchases of tangible personal property. This controversy began on March 30, 1992, when DOR issued a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records of the taxpayer in conjunction with a routine audit. The notice requested that Petitioner make available various corporate records pertaining to its sales and use tax and intangible tax liability. However, only the sales and use tax is in issue here. DOR later advised the taxpayer that the audit period would run from March 1, 1987, through February 29, 1992, and that instead of a detailed audit, only a three-month sampling of the full audit period would be necessary. An initial audit revealed that Petitioner was entitled to a refund. None was given, however, because of information supplied by an employee of the taxpayer regarding the possible destruction and alteration of certain records by the taxpayer, and the auditor's conclusion that a three-month sampling of the records was not representative for the full five-year audit period. In addition, the auditor concluded that the results of the sample period were not reasonable. For these reasons, the scope of the audit was expanded. The auditor then requested, among other things, that copies of all sales (summary) journals for the entire five-year period be produced. Although Petitioner has always contended that these journals were merely "commission" journals for transactions between its vendors and customers, the auditor's finding that they are records of cash transactions is consistent with the language on the face of the journals, referring to "deposits" and "total deposits." Further, a comparison of the journals with Petitioner's own bank statements confirms this finding. At least twelve months of the records were missing, and the taxpayer agreed to recreate the missing records. Once a copy of all journals (both original and recreated) was produced, the auditor tested their validity and then made various audit adjustments, which are reflected on Schedule A-2 of Exhibit 5. In those instances where inadequate cost price information concerning equipment purchases was provided by the taxpayer, the auditor properly used estimates in making his adjustments. The tax liability for each taxable transaction was recorded by the taxpayer under Account 367 on the sales journals. The auditor then examined the source documents (original invoices) to verify the accuracy of the recorded amounts. These numbers were then compared with the taxes paid by the taxpayer on its monthly tax returns filed with DOR. This comparison produced a deficiency which represents approximately 75 percent of the total assessment. However, in those instances where Petitioner collected sales tax from its customers, and remitted the same to DOR, Petitioner was not assessed with a tax for those same items. A sampling of the audit period established that Petitioner also had a number of lump-sum contracts with various governmental customers on which it neither paid taxes to the vendor when the equipment was purchased, nor did it collect taxes from the end-user when the equipment was resold. Thus, it was responsible for the use taxes on these transactions. The deficiency is detailed on Schedule B-3 of the final audit report (Exhibit 6), and it accounts for approximately 14 percent of the total assessment. The remaining part of the assessment is related to four miscellaneous transactions which are unrelated to the sales journals. Two of the transactions occurred during the short period of time when the service tax was in effect in 1987, while the remaining two relate to small purchases of equipment and supplies by the taxpayer for its own consumption. There was no evidence that the taxpayer paid the taxes due on these transactions. DOR met with the taxpayer, its accountant, and its original counsel on various occasions in an effort to obtain more documentation favorable to the taxpayer's position. In most cases, the taxpayer refused to provide more records. At one meeting, however, the taxpayer produced additional source documents (invoices) that appeared to be altered from the original invoices previously given to the auditor. These are shown in Exhibit 7 received in evidence. When asked by the auditor for copies of the same invoices sent to customers so that the discrepancy could be resolved, the taxpayer refused to comply with this request. During the audit process, the taxpayer contended that its primary supplier, Kelly, had already paid taxes on a number of the transactions. No documentation was produced, however, to support this contention. It also complained that there was bias on the part of DOR's auditor. As to this contention, the record shows that the auditor had no relationship with the taxpayer prior to this audit, and for the intangible personal property tax, the auditor's field work actually resulted in a refund for Petitioner. Finally, the taxpayer contended that rather than using the originally supplied records, the auditor should have used Petitioner's recreated or altered records in making the audit adjustments. This latter contention has been rejected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining its original assessment against Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Jeffrey M. Dikman, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Benjamin K. Phipps, Esquire Post Office Box 1351 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 L. H. Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be denied on the basis of his having pled guilty and been convicted of a felony. Embodied within that general issue are the issues of whether the felony involved is one of moral turpitude and whether the conviction, and the circumstances surrounding it, demonstrate that the Petitioner lacks fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Preston Hursey, Jr., filed an application for qualification in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities agent. The application was filed on November 13, 1989. On April 9, 1990, the Department of Insurance issued a letter of denial with regard to that application based upon a felony conviction of the Petitioner in the past. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with enforcing the licensure, admission and continuing practice standards for insurance agents of all types, embodied in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and with regulating the admission of persons to licensure as insurance agents in the State of Florida. On August 12, 1988, an Information was filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, charging the Petitioner with three felony counts involving "aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return". That is a felony violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Sections 7206(2). On November 15, 1989, the Petitioner was found guilty of three counts of aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return in violation of that statutory section. The actual conduct for which he was convicted occurred prior to the charges. Prior to 1984, the Petitioner worked for some years as a medical examiner for insurance companies, taking medical histories, blood pressures, pulses and the like, for purposes of establishing insurance coverage for clients of the companies. Some time in early 1984, the Petitioner approached American Dynamics Corporation, as a client, with the intent of availing himself of the financial planning services of that company with the intent of saving on income taxes. The company was apparently counseling clients as to tax shelters in which they could invest or which they could claim, as a means of' avoidance of federal income tax. The Petitioner became very interested in that tax saving procedure and sometime in 1984 became involved with the firm as one of its financial counselor employees. The firm trained him in the service they offered to taxpayers, which involved financial planning by using trusts to defer taxes, as well as other means of sheltering income from tax liability. The company and the Petitioner counseled numerous clients and assisted them in taking advantage of alleged tax shelters, including the final act of preparing their tax returns. During the course of going to hearings with his clients, when their tax returns came under question by the Internal Revenue Service, the Petitioner became aware that apparently the service would not accept the tax shelter devices being used by his company and him as a legitimate means of avoiding taxes. He then sought legal advice from a tax attorney and received an opinion from him that the tax avoidance counseling methods, devices and tax return preparation the Petitioner and his employer were engaging in were not legal, and that the Petitioner should advise anyone he knew involved in such schemes to terminate their relationship. The Petitioner acted on that advice, terminated his relationship with the company and recommended to his clients that they terminate their relationship with the company and the tax avoidance devices being used. Through hindsight and learning more about relevant tax law in the last four to five years since the conduct occurred, the Petitioner realizes that the tax shelter schemes marketed by his employer at that time and, by himself, did not make financial or legal sense. The Petitioner at that time had very little training in financial counseling or advising and very little training in the Federal income tax laws arid regulations. In retrospect, after receiving much more such training as an agent of New York Life Insurance Company since that time, he realized the significance of the error he and his former employer committed. When the tax returns were prepared by the Petitioner and others employed with the firm involved, the tax return accurately reflected the gross income of he taxpayer, the "W2 forms", and all appropriate documentation. Then, the gross income of the taxpayer was shown as reduced by the amount of funds affected by the tax shelter system marketed by the Petitioner's former employer and the Petitioner. There was a statement on the tax return itself explaining the disparity in taxable income so that basically the Internal Revenue Service had the facts and circumstances of such situations disclosed to it. It, however, deemed anyone marketing such tax shelters as engaged in marketing "abusive tax shelters", in effect, in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. Ultimately, the Petitioner was prosecuted along with others involved in the transactions and suffered a felony conviction of three counts of violation of the statute referenced above. The Petitioner has steadfastly maintained both before and after his conviction that he had no intent to violate the tax laws of the United States, but rather believed, until he sought a legal opinion from a qualified attorney, that the service he was marketing was a legal one. After he came under prosecution by the Justice Department for the violation, the Petitioner cooperated fully with the Internal Revenue Service and the Justice Department. The felony violation of which he was convicted, by guilty plea, carried a sentence of three years imprisonment, one year for each tax return involved. That sentence was reduced by the court; however, in consideration of the circumstances of the Petitioner's offense and his cooperation with the prosecuting authorities, to one month of "work release", which he served by working during the day for senior citizens organizations and returning to a confinement facility in the evening. He also was required to render 200 hours of community service, which he has completed, and three years probation. Because of his excellent attitude and behavior and his demonstrated activities designed to further his education in the insurance and securities field, his successful pursuit of the insurance and securities marketing profession in other states and his obviously-positive motivation, his probation officer has recommended that his probation be terminated early, after only two years of it would have been completed in November, 1990. The sentence was reduced because of the Petitioner's positive record in his community, the fact that he had no prior criminal history and because of widespread support by responsible members of the community and by the probation officers who reviewed his case and situation. The judge, upon sentencing, also noted that he was impressed by the fact that the Petitioner wanted to continue to work in the insurance and securities field and was the sole support of a young son whom he was supporting and caring for as an active parent. He continues to do that. The record establishes that the Petitioner's conviction was the result of a guilty plea. That plea resulted from a negotiated "plea bargain" settlement with the prosecuting authorities. The Petitioner established with unrefuted testimony, that he never had any willful intent to commit a crime or defraud the Federal government and the Internal Revenue Service. While he had a general intent to offer the tax advice involved to clients and assist them in engaging in tax shelter arrangements and in preparing the related tax returns, he had no specific intent to commit acts which he knew to be illegal when he committed them, nor which he believed amounted to fraud or deceit of the Internal Revenue Service. Although he pled guilty to a crime involving, by the language of the above--cited statute, the element of falsity, which bespeaks of deceit or fraud, the evidence shows that the Petitioner harbored no such fraudulent or deceitful intent. This is corroborated by the fact that the Petitioner and his clients disclosed all income on the tax return and simply disclosed that a portion of it was sheltered, which procedure was determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be illegal. There was no evidence of record to indicate that the Petitioner sought to conceal income or otherwise commit a false or fraudulent act in the course of his financial and tax advice to these clients, nor in the preparation of their tax returns for submittal. While the statute he is convicted of violating appears to involve the element of moral turpitude because it refers to false or fraudulent tax returns, it is a very general type of charge which can cover many types of activities or conduct. Consequently, one should consider the specific conduct involved in a given instance, such as this one, to determine whether the crime committed factually involved moral turpitude. Based upon the unrefuted evidence of record culminating in the findings of fact made above, it is clear that the Petitioner committed no conduct involving moral turpitude at the time the activity in question was engaged in for the above reasons. The Petitioner has been in no legal altercation, criminal or otherwise, before or since the instance which occurred in 1984. He has become licensed in Washington DC, Maryland and Virginia as an insurance agent and as a broker agent. He represents numerous insurance companies, including, for approximately five years, the New York Life Insurance Company and other reputable companies. He has pursued his continuing education requirements and has earned more requirements than he needs for licensure in Florida and Maryland. He is actively seeking to improve his professional standing and competence in the insurance and securities field and is highly motivated to continue doing so. A great deal of his motivation comes from the fact that he is the sole support of his young 11-year-old son. He enjoys the insurance profession because it gives him time to participate in his son's many school-related and extracurricular activities, such as football. The Petitioner's testimony, and the proven circumstances of the situation, establish without question that he is an honest, forthright person who has candidly admitted a past mistake and who has worked actively, in the approximate six years which have elapsed since the conduct was committed, to rectify that blemish on his record. His efforts to rehabilitate himself personally and professionally involved his active participation as a parent for his son in his son's school life and otherwise, and participation in church and community activities. During the time period which has elapsed since the conduct in question occurred, he has sufficiently rehabilitated himself both personally and professionally so as to justify the finding that he has demonstrated trustworthiness and fitness to engage in the business of insurance. Indeed, three other states, after having the circumstances of his conviction fully disclosed to them, have licensed him or retained him as a licensee insurance agent. The Petitioner is a navy veteran of Vietnam, having served three tours in the Vietnam war, for which service he was decorated. He had a number of security clearances, including a top secret security clearance based upon his work in the field of communications and cryptology during that war. This honorable service, the efforts he has made to improve himself personally and professionally before and since the subject conduct occurred, the fact that it was an isolated incident on his record, the fact that it did not involve any established intent to defraud or deceive on his part, the fact that he is an active, positive parental role model, community member and church member, and his general demeanor at hearing of honesty and forthrightness convinces the Hearing Officer that the isolated incident of misconduct he committed did not involve a demonstrated lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Quite positively, the Petitioner has demonstrated his fitness and trustworthiness to engage in that business.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be granted. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-3069 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. 6-14. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Preston Hursey, Jr., pro se Post Office Box 43643 Washington, DC 20010 Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esq. Andrew Levine, Esq. Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Winn-Dixie. Winn-Dixie is a Florida corporation with its principal offices at 5050 Edgewood Court, Post Office Box B, Jacksonville, Florida. [Stipulation of Facts]. Winn-Dixie's taxpayer identification number is 59-0514290. The Department's audit number is 88-04203785035. Winn-Dixie's fiscal year ends on the last Wednesday of June. Winn-Dixie's Intangible Tax Returns. Winn-Dixie has filed a Florida intangible tax return for every year beginning with the calendar year 1972. For calendar years 1972 through and including 1988, Winn-Dixie reported the value of its intangible personal property based upon the value of its intangible personal property at the end of its previous fiscal year, the last Wednesday of June. For example, in its 1972 intangible tax return Winn-Dixie reported the value of its intangible personal property as of June 26, 1971. The decision to use the value of its intangible personal property as of the end of its fiscal year for Florida intangible tax was made by Winn-Dixie without any direction from, or communication with, the Department. When Winn- Dixie began using its fiscal year end as the date to value its intangible personal property for Florida intangible tax purposes, no representation concerning the appropriateness of this method was made by the Department. Winn- Dixie made no effort to obtain approval of its method of valuation from the Department. Winn-Dixie indicated on each of its intangible tax returns for 1972 through 1988, that it had determined the value of its intangible personal property based upon its value as of the end of Winn-Dixie's fiscal year. Winn-Dixie used the fiscal year end value of its intangible personal property as the value of those assets for Florida intangible tax purposes for administrative convenience. It was easier to use such data than it would have been to redetermine the value of its intangible personal property at the end of each calendar year. When Harry Francis began working for Winn-Dixie in 1978, Mr. Francis was aware that Florida law required that intangible personal property be valued as of the first day of the calendar year. Mr. Francis, who served as director of taxes for Winn-Dixie until 1989, was also aware that Winn-Dixie was using the incorrect valuation date to value its intangible personal property for Florida intangible tax purposes. When Leon Calvert became the director of taxes for Winn-Dixie in 1989, Mr. Calvert was aware that Florida law required that intangible personal property be valued as of the first day of the calendar year. Mr. Calvert was also aware that Winn-Dixie was using the incorrect valuation date to value its intangible personal property for Florida intangible tax purposes. The explanations Mr. Francis and Mr. Calvert gave for not changing Winn-Dixie's method of valuing its intangible personal property for Florida intangible tax purposes were not credible. Both Mr. Francis or Mr. Calvert indicated that the valuation practice of Winn-Dixie was followed, in part, because of the need for consistency in the field of accounting. Neither Mr. Francis or Mr. Calvert, however, cited any generally accepted accounting principle to support the use of an incorrect method of valuing assets for tax purposes when that method is clearly contrary to law. Winn-Dixie does not collect intangible tax as an agent for the State of Florida by separately stating and passing along said tax to its customers. [Stipulation of Facts]. Therefore, Winn-Dixie has not lost any right to pass the asserted additional intangible tax liability along to others. Subsequent to the audit involved in this case Winn-Dixie prepared an analysis of the difference in the value of its intangible personal property for 1972 through 1984 and the value of its intangible personal property for 1972 through 1984 if it had valued its intangible personal property as of January first of each year. Based upon this analysis, Winn-Dixie over reported the value of its intangible personal property by $78,390,211.00 for the period from 1972 through 1984. [See Stipulation of Facts]. This amounted to an overpayment of taxes of approximately $81,485.00. Winn-Dixie has not filed any claim for refund of any amount of intangible taxes it may have overpaid as a result of using the value of its intangible personal property as of the end of its fiscal year. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the value of Winn- Dixie's intangible personal property as of the end of its fiscal year for any year for which it has filed an intangible tax return was approximately the same as the "just value" of those assets as January first. 1972 and 1973 Intangible Tax Returns. Winn-Dixie's intangible tax returns for calendar years 1972 and 1973 were examined by the Department. [Stipulation of Facts]. Winn-Dixie's 1972 and 1973 returns clearly indicated that the value of the assets included in the returns was the value as of the last Wednesday of June as of the previous year, Winn-Dixie's fiscal year end. No changes to Winn-Dixie's valuation method were recommended by the Department to Winn-Dixie's 1972 or 1973 intangible tax returns. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any Department employee made any statements as a result of the Department's audit of the 1972 and 1973 returns to Winn-Dixie concerning Winn-Dixie's use of the value of its intangible personal property as of the end of its fiscal year to determine its intangible tax liability. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any representation was made to Winn-Dixie by a Department employee that it was okay to use the June value of Winn-Dixie's intangible personal property even if that value was not the same as the January first value of Winn-Dixie's intangible personal property. Therefore, it is possible that the Department made no adjustments to Winn-Dixie's 1972 and 1973 returns because of a determination that the value of Winn-Dixie's intangible personal property in January was not materially different from the June value of its intangible personal property as reported by Winn-Dixie. Such a conclusion is consistent with Harry Francis' belief that there was not much difference in the value of Winn-Dixie's intangible assets at any time during the year. [See Transcript of Formal Hearing, page 90, lines 9- 12]. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that any representation was made to Winn-Dixie as a result of the audit of the 1972 and 1973 returns by a Department employee concerning the filing of future year intangible tax returns. 1979, 1980 and 1981 Intangible Tax Returns. Winn-Dixie's intangible tax returns for calendar years 1979, 1980 and 1981 were examined by the Department. [Stipulation of Facts]. The auditor that performed the examination is now deceased. [Stipulation of Facts]. The director of taxes for Winn-Dixie at the time of the audit of the 1979, 1980 and 1981 returns described a conversation he had with the Department's auditor as follows: The gist of the conversation was why did we use the June year end instead of January 1st. And the answer was as I said before, it was a long-standing practice, it was a consistency method, it was not a question of cherry picking for a good date and it seemed to do no harm. The recollection I have is that he was hesitant to make a determination on his own as to whether he required an adjustment or required a recomputation using a different date and that he was checking with some unknown superior in the Department of Revenue and later the no-change audit resulted. I don't recall if he ever called me about his conversation with the superiors, but I do recall no adjustments of any kind were made to any of those tax returns. And I would have recalled. I was nervous about those because I had prepared them. And they were the first ones that had been audited since I had been there. So I was relieved that no adjustments were made. And that was the gist of my relationship with the auditor. [Transcript of Formal Hearing, page 94, lines 17-25, and page 95, lines 1-12]. No changes were recommended by the Department to Winn-Dixie's 1979, 1980 or 1981 intangible tax returns. [Stipulation of Facts]. The weight of the evidence, however, failed to prove why the Department made no changes. Winn-Dixie did not change its method of reporting its intangible personal property as a result of any representations from a Department employee. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any Department employee made any statements to Winn-Dixie as a result of the Department's audit of the 1979, 1980 and 1981 returns concerning Winn-Dixie's use of the value of its intangible personal property as of the end of its fiscal year to determine its intangible tax liability. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any representation was made to Winn-Dixie by a Department employee that it was okay to use the June value of Winn-Dixie's intangible personal property even if that value was not the same as the January first value of Winn-Dixie's intangible personal property. Therefore, it is possible that the Department made no adjustments to Winn-Dixie's 1979, 1980 and 1981 returns because of a determination that the value of Winn-Dixie's intangible assets in January was not materially different from the June value of its intangible personal property as reported by Winn- Dixie. Such a conclusion is consistent with Harry Francis' belief that there was not much difference in the value of Winn-Dixie's intangible assets at any time during the year. [See Transcript of Formal Hearing, page 90, lines 9-12]. The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that any representation was made to Winn-Dixie as a result of the audit of the 1979, 1980 and 1981 returns by a Department employee concerning the filing of future year intangible tax returns. 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 Intangible Tax Returns. The Department performed an audit of Winn-Dixie's intangible tax returns for 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988. For these tax years Winn-Dixie valued its intangible personal property as of the end of the fiscal year preceding the taxable year, consistent with prior years. As a result of the Department's audit of the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 returns, the Department determined that Winn-Dixie had underpaid Florida intangible tax in the following amounts and issued an assessment for same: 1985 $(16,244.00) 1986 21,471.00 1987 93,980.00 1988 86,974.00 Total $186,181.00 The Department's auditor who performed the audit of Winn-Dixie's 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 tax returns determined the value of Winn-Dixie's intangible personal property based on the value of those assets as reasonably close to January first as provided to Winn-Dixie. The information provided by Winn-Dixie was reasonably close to the value of Winn-Dixie's intangible personal property as of January first. Winn-Dixie filed a Petition for Reconsideration dated August 24, 1990. By letter dated October 17, 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Reconsideration. [Stipulation of Facts]. Other Receivables. Winn-Dixie has taken the position that it overpaid intangible taxes for 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 because it incorrectly treated certain accounts as intangible personal property. The parties agreed that the amount of tax paid on these accounts for the years at issue was as follows: 1985 $ 8,614.00 1986 9,823.00 1987 11,120.00 1988 13,562.00 Total $43,119.00 The parties agreed that the amount of intangible tax paid on the accounts at issue should be refunded to Winn-Dixie if it is determined that Winn-Dixie improperly paid intangible tax on the accounts. The following are the accounts which Winn-Dixie has argued it should not have treated as intangible personal property: Account Number 123-2, perishable vendors- billed outside sales warehouse invoices. Account Number 123-3, vendors debit balances/billed advertising coupons, vendor freight claims, promotion allowances, billings, return merchandise, charges and other debit memo billings. Account Number 123-4, claims insurance and freight/insurance and freight claims against carriers. Account Numbers 123-2, 123-3 and 123-4 are listed as "receivables" on Winn-Dixie's federal income tax return balance sheet as of its fiscal year end, Winn-Dixie's accounts receivable trial balances and on Winn-Dixie's SEC public disclosure forms 10-K. Account Numbers 123-2 and 123-3 are essentially identical except for the type of vendor involved. Account Number 123-2 involves vendors of perishable products and Account Number 123-3 involves vendors of nonperishable products. Winn-Dixie strives to pay for merchandise it receives within seven to ten days from the date it receives an invoice for the merchandise in order to receive discounts and the best merchandise available. Winn-Dixie earns trade discounts, promotional allowances and volume discounts on some of the merchandise it handles. When Winn-Dixie pays an invoice on merchandise for which it may receive such reductions in costs, Winn- Dixie may not know the exact amount of the discount. Therefore, it pays the entire amount invoiced. As a result of the quick payment of invoices and the inability to calculate the exact amount of discounts or other reductions in the amount owed, Winn-Dixie pays more on some invoices than it ultimately may owe on the invoice. The amount of any estimated overpayments is reflected in Account Numbers 123-2 and 123-3. Winn-Dixie also receives coupons from customers on certain merchandise. The coupons received by Winn-Dixie entitle it to reimbursement on the product sold from the vendor. The amount which Winn-Dixie will ultimately receive for the coupons is also recorded in Account Numbers 123-2 and 123-3. The coupons are ultimately turned over to a coupon handling firm which pays Winn-Dixie for the coupons. Account Number 123-4 involves claims insurance and freight. It is similar to the other two accounts at issue except that it relates primarily to claims against railroads for misdelivery or damaged merchandise which Winn-Dixie is entitled to. As is true of other merchandise, Winn-Dixie strives to pay for merchandise shipped to it by rail within seven to ten days to be entitled to the discounts for quick payment. Therefore, Winn-Dixie is not always able to estimate the amount of damaged or missing merchandise it may be entitled to a reduction for. The amount of such reductions are reflected in Account Number 123-4. When the amounts owed to Winn-Dixie, which are reflected in Account Numbers 123-2, 123-3 and 123-4, are finally determined, Account Number 123-2, 123-3 or 123-4 is debited and the amount received is recorded in another account. The amounts recorded in Account Numbers 123-2, 123-3 and 123-4 are valued, recorded and returned for tax purposes as accounts receivable. Account Numbers 123-2, 123-3 and 123-4 are "accounts receivable" under generally accepted accounting principles. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that all of the amounts recorded in Account Numbers 123-2, 123-3 and 123-4 during the years in question were not due at the time they were entered in the accounts. Therefore, the weight of the evidence failed to prove what portion of Account Numbers 123-2, 123-3 or 123-4 are contingent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department issue a Final Order assessing $186,181.44 in additional intangible tax, plus interest, against Winn-Dixie for 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988, and dismissing Winn-Dixie's Petition for Administrative Proceedings. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of May 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-8021 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Winn-Dixie's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2-4 and 6. 2 6. 3 15 and 17. 16. See 18-20 and 30. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 21 and 23. The last sentence is not relevant. See 22. The last sentence is not relevant. Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 9 12. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 12. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not relevant. 14 32-33, 35 and 40. 15 34. Not relevant. See 36 and 41. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Winn- Dixie was "required to pay" its vendors within seven to ten days. 37-38. The weight of the evidence failed to prove the last sentence. 19 40-41. 20 42. 21 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 and 3. 2 and 4. 3 5. 4 7. 5 15 and 21. 6 28. 7 4. 8-9 29. 10-11 11. 12 22. 13 22 and 25-27. 14 24. 15 22. 16 18-20 and 25-27. 17 5. 18 21. 19 12. 20 13. 21 14. Not relevant. See 45. 24 35 and 40. 25 37-38 and 43. 26 39. 27 Not relevant. 28 32. 29 See 44. 30 34. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas K. Purcell, Esquire Suite 1235, One Enterprise Center 225 Water Street Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Leonard F. Binder Kevin O'Donnell Assistant Attorneys General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 J. Thomas Herndon, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact In the original corporate income tax report submitted by Florida Power Corporation for the 1973 tax year the tax was computed using the federal income tax base. This included various depreciation methods and schedules in which accelerated depreciation had been claimed for federal tax purposes by Petitioner in years prior to 1972 and the initiation of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Law. By using accelerated depreciation schedules authorized by the federal tax laws, higher depreciation is allowed in the early years of an asset's useful life, leaving a lesser amount of depreciation to be charged off for tax purposes in the latter years of an asset's life. Essentially, Petitioner here contends that depreciable assets acquired prior to the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax law were depreciated on accelerated schedules for federal tax purposes, but upon the effective date of the Florida Corporate Income Tax Law had value in excess of that shown on the federal tax schedule. By requiring taxpayers to use the same depreciation schedules for Florida taxes that are required for federal taxes Petitioner contends it is being penalized for the accelerated depreciation taken before the Florida income tax became constitutional. As an example of Petitioner's position it may be assumed that a depreciable asset was acquired for $100,000 with a useful life of 10 years, three years before the Florida Income Tax Law was passed. Also assume that during this three-year period from acquisition a double declining balance depreciation was taken for computing federal income taxes. Depreciation taken for the first year would be $20,000, for the second year $16,000 and for the third year $12,800, leaving a basis for further depreciation of $41,200 for this asset with seven years useful life remaining. For federal tax purposes Petitioner takes depreciation each year based upon initial cost less accumulated depreciation. Because this value decreased rapidly for the first three years in the assumed example and the excess depreciation thereby generated was not usable in reducing Florida taxes, Petitioner contends it is discriminated against in being required to, in effect, use the book value for federal tax purposes in computing its Florida income tax. Petitioner presented additional examples of reported income for federal income tax purposes which it claims should be exempt from Florida Income Tax. The specific deductions from which the $619,697 refund was computed were not broken down to show how much resulted from the accelerated depreciation schedules which commences prior to January 1, 1972, and how much was derived from these additional examples, some of which were given simply as an example of deferring income for tax purposes. Prior to January 1, 1972, Petitioner purchased some of its bonds prior to maturity and at a discount. As an example if Petitioner purchases $1,000,000 face value of these bonds for $800,000, it has realized a $200,000 gain which it must report as income for federal income tax purposes. These same federal tax rules allow Petitioner to elect to pay the income tax in the year received or spread it equally over the succeeding ten year period. Petitioner elected to spread the income over the succeeding ten year period and each year add $20,000 to its reported income for federal income tax purposes. Since the income was realized before January 1, 1972, Petitioner contends this is not subject to federal tax purposes. With respect to overhead during construction of depreciable assets the taxpayer is allowed to charge these costs off as an expense in the year incurred or capitalize these expenses. If the taxpayer elects to capitalize these expenses they are added to the cost of the constructed asset and recovered as depreciation as the asset is used. Petitioner elected to charge these expenses in the year incurred rather than capitalize them. Had they been capitalized originally, Petitioner would, in 1973, have been entitled to recover these costs in its depreciation of the asset. In its amended return it seeks to treat these costs as if they had been capitalized rather than expenses prior to January 1, 1972. Although apparently not involved in the amended return, Petitioner also presented an example where changes in accounting procedures can result in a gain to the taxpayer which is treated as income to the taxpayer, which he may elect to spread over future years in equal increments until the total gain has been reported.
Findings Of Fact Burger King, a Florida corporation, is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Pillsbury Company, with headquarters located in Minneapolis, Minnesota. Burger King filed its intangible tax returns and made its original tax payments on or before their respective due dates of June 30, 1972, and June 30, 1973. On May 3, 1974, DOR sent a letter to Burger King indicating that Burger King's intangible tax account was being reviewed and that DOR's records did not reflect having received the 1972 or 1973 returns. The next piece of correspondence between the parties (according to the record) occurred over two years later on June 3, 1976. At that time DOR informed Burger King that it was auditing Burger King's intangible tax account for the tax year 1973. This letter constitutes the initiation of an investigation prior to the expiration of three years from the due date for filing the 1973 return. The parties make no further reference in their correspondence to the 1972 return or the tax year 1972. However, DOR does request a copy of Burger King's balance sheet dated December 31, 1972. This request is contained in DOR's letter of September 12, 1977, which letter in its opening paragraph limits the inquiry to tax years 1973 through 1977, inclusive. In addition to its letter of June 3, 1976, DOR filed its proposed assessment for tax year 1973, on the same date, June 3, 1976. Typed at the bottom of the proposed assessment was the following statement: This proposed assessment shall become final within sixty (60) days of receipt, unless you file a protest requesting a departmental conference, or petition for a hearing under the provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, F.S. Upon receipt of these documents, Mr. Tom Howell, the property tax manager for Pillsbury Corporation asked for an extension of time to file the information requested in the June 3rd letter, which extension was granted by DOR. However, no protest or petition for hearing was filed within the sixty (60) days. Subsequently, Mr. Nicolas Joanos, a tax examiner with DOR recommended that Burger King file an amended tax return to take advantage of savings that would accrue if subsidiary corporations were consolidated on the return. While no such amended return was filed, a recomputation of tax liability based upon consolidation was made by DOR on January 6, 1977. On January 27, 1977, Burger King paid the additional tax for the years 1974, 1975, and 1976 but declined to pay the tax due for the 1973 tax year on the ground that the billing was dated past the expiration date for making a 1973 assessment. On February 23, 1977, DOR computed a new proposed assessment which included accrued interest from the prior proposed assessment. Burger King subsequently filed its request for a hearing pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The intangible properties sought to be taxed by DOR for 1973 include some $11,000,000 of inter-company accounts receivable due from Burger King's parent corporation, The Pillsbury Company. DOR does not contest that Burger King overpaid its intangible tax for the tax year 1972, but opposes a refund on the procedural ground more fully explained below. During the applicable periods of time herein, Burger King never made application for a refund for the 1972 tax paid. Rather, the issue was first raised by Burger King in its amended petition dated January 29, 1978.
Findings Of Fact Having listened to the testimony and considered the evidence presented in this cause, it is found as follows: Petitioner is a domestic corporation. Petitioner provided medicare services to patients in the 1969-70 fiscal year. An on-site audit by the medicare auditing team was concluded in December of 1971, and petitioner received $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements in January of 1972, for the services provided in the 1969-70 fiscal year. The petitioner did not file an amended federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1979. The adjusted federal income reported on petitioner's federal income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, included the $56,131.00 of medicare reimbursements received by petitioner in January of 1972. On petitioner's Florida income tax return for its fiscal year ending September 30, 1972, petitioner did not include the $56,131.00 figure in its adjusted federal income. On March 31, 1975, the respondent notified petitioner of a proposed deficiency in the amount of $2,100.99 arising from the petitioner's omission of the medicare reimbursements from its adjusted federal income as shown on its Florida corporate income tax return for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1972. Further correspondence ensued between the petitioner and the Corporate Income Tax Bureau of the respondent and the petitioner filed the present petition requesting a hearing on the issue. The respondent requested the Division of Administrative Hearings to conduct the hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is my recommendation that there is no legal basis for affording the petitioner any relief from the proposed deficiency and that said deficiency in the amount of $2,100.00 be sustained. Respectfully submitted and entered this 17th day of September, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Division, Northwood Mall Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Homer E. Ward, N.H.A. Administrator/President University Park Convalescent Center 1818 E. Fletcher Avenue Tampa, Florida 33612
Findings Of Fact On September 30, 2010, Petitioner submitted an online application for a tax registration as a new business entity. Respondent began the process of creating an internal "account" for Petitioner on October 1, 2010. On October 2, 2010, Respondent's database system created a delinquency notice advising Petitioner that sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009 had not been received. On October 4, 2010, Respondent received an envelope from Petitioner containing sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, as well as Petitioner's signed Tax Amnesty Agreement. No remittance accompanied the tax returns (or the remittance check was misplaced), so the Department's system generated a billing notice to Petitioner dated December 10, 2010, and a Notice of Final Assessment dated January 25, 2011. Petitioner advised Respondent that a check had been sent along with the tax returns. Discussions between the parties ensued, and Petitioner was asked to provide a replacement check. On or about March 11, 2011, Respondent received a replacement payment from Petitioner. Petitioner, by way of his replacement check, paid the Department the sum of one thousand eighty-nine dollars and forty-three cents ($1,089.43) in full settlement of all amounts due and owing under Petitioner's sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and, although not included in the initial petitions, 2010. Respondent accepted the payment made by Petitioner in full settlement of the sales and use taxes owed for the years in question. Petitioner is not liable for any further penalties, interest, or other payments on the aforementioned tax returns.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitions for administrative hearing in this case be dismissed, as there are no further disputed issues of material fact. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Vickers, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Patrick John McGinley, Esquire Law Office of Patrick John McGinley, P.A. 2265 Lee Road, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent's certificates of registration should be revoked for an alleged failure to file tax returns and to remit taxes to the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency responsible for collection of sales and use taxes in Florida, pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2011).1/ The Respondent is a Florida company doing business at 7810 U.S. Highway 19, Port Richey, Florida, and is a "dealer" as defined at section 212.06(2). The Respondent holds two certificates of registration issued by the Petitioner (Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 and Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0) and is statutorily required to file tax returns and remit taxes to the Petitioner. As set forth herein, the Respondent has failed to file tax returns or has filed returns that were not accompanied by the appropriate tax payments. During the time the Respondent has held the certificates, the Petitioner has filed 15 separate warrants against the Respondent related to unpaid taxes, fees, penalties, and interest. The Petitioner is authorized to cancel a dealer's certificate of registration for failure of a dealer to comply with state tax laws. Prior to such cancellation, the Petitioner is required by statute to convene a conference with a dealer. On June 24, 2011, the Petitioner issued a Notice of Conference on Revocation of Certificate of Registration (Notice). The conference was scheduled for July 27, 2011. The Respondent received the Notice and attended the conference. Certificate of Registration No. 61-8012297146-3 The Respondent failed to file tax returns related to Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 for the period of August through December 2001. The Petitioner assessed estimated taxes of $587.50, fees of $110.95, and a penalty of $285.00. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $633.79. Additionally, the Respondent failed to remit taxes of $5,623.63 related to Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 that were due according to his filed tax returns. Based thereon, the Respondent assessed fees of $994.58 and a penalty of $2,478.26. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $4,702.27. As of the date of the Notice, the Respondent's total unpaid obligation on Certificate No. 61-8012297146-3 was $15,415.98, including taxes of $6,211.13, fees of $1,105.53, penalties of $2,763.26, and accrued interest of $5,336.06. Certificate of Registration No. 61-8012297147-0 The Respondent failed to file tax returns related to Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0 for the months of June 2000, September 2000, May 2001, and August 2001. The Petitioner assessed estimated taxes of $619.00 and fees of $202.00. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $782.56. Additionally, the Respondent failed to remit taxes related to Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0 of $4,332.48 that were due according to his filed tax returns. Based thereon, the Respondent assessed fees of $771.71 and a penalty of $1,576.87. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $4,725.27. As of the date of the Notice, the Respondent's total unpaid obligation related to Certificate No. 61-8012297147-0 was $13,009.89, including taxes of $4,951.48, fees of $973.71, penalties of $1,576.87, and accrued interest of $5,507.83. The Audit A separate audit of the Respondent's business records for the period of February 2004 through January 2007 resulted in an additional assessment totaling $9,314.07, including taxes of $5,048.23, fees of $661.76, and a penalty of $252.42. As of the date of the Notice, the accrued interest due was $3,351.66. At the July 27, 2011, conference, the parties negotiated a compliance agreement under which the Respondent would have retained the certificates of registration. The agreement required the Respondent to make an initial deposit of $2,000.00 by August 15, 2011, and then to make periodic payments towards satisfying the unpaid obligation. The Respondent failed to pay the $2,000.00 deposit, and the Petitioner subsequently filed the Complaint at issue in this proceeding. As of the date that the Complaint was filed, the Respondent owed a total of $37,797.66 to the State of Florida, including taxes of $15,004.34, estimated taxes of $1,206.50, fees of $2,741.00, penalties of $4,592.55, and accrued interest of $14,253.27.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order revoking the certificates of registration held by the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 2012.
