Findings Of Fact Prior to his termination, Petitioner had been employed as a Correctional Officer by the Respondent, Department of Corrections, at Glades Correctional Institute for approximately two years. On April 3, 1987, Petitioner signed a written statement acknowledging that he was immediately responsible for reading the rules of the Respondent. Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Edward Minor, Correctional Officer Supervisor at Glades Correctional Institute. Mr. Chester Lambdin is the Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institute. Although he felt ill, Petitioner reported to work on January 25, 1989 before his scheduled eight hour work shift was to begin at midnight and continue through January 26, 1989. Petitioner left work due to his illness before the end of his January 26, 1989 shift. Petitioner did not report to work after he left on January 26, 1989. On January 26, 1989, Petitioner contacted his supervisor, Mr. Minor, and informed him that he was ill; that he would not report to work for about two days and that he had a doctor's excuse for his absence. Mr. Minor excused Petitioner for two days, January 27, 1989 and January 28, 1989. Petitioner's doctor's excuse covered the period of January 27, 1989 through January 30, 1989. Petitioner gave the excuse to a fellow worker and requested the associate to deliver the excuse to Mr. Minor. Before February 2, 1989, Mr. Minor did not see the excuse. Petitioner did not contact Mr. Minor until the afternoon or evening of February 2, 1989. Petitioner was not scheduled to work on January 30 or January 31, 1989. Petitioner stated that he knew he should contact his supervisor before each work shift if he were ill and would not report to work, but he stated that most of his fellow workers did not follow the procedure and were not penalized for failure to make the required report. Notice before an absence is the standard policy of the Respondent. Petitioner was on unauthorized leave on January 29, 1989, February 1, 1989 and February 2, 1989. On February 3, 1989, Mr. Lambdin drafted a letter to Petitioner, which was posted by certified mail, informing Petitioner that he had been deemed to have abandoned his position as a Correctional Officer I at Glades Correctional Institution and to have resigned from the career service system.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration issue a final order that the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of May 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-1189 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. The Respondent was the sole party who submitted Proposed Findings of Fact. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2; rejected in part as not supported by competent and substantial evidence. Rejected as conclusion of law. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 11. As to first sentence, rejected as irrelevant. As to the remainder, adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Lynne Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Mr. Lewis C. Stewart 692 Waddel Way Pahokee, Florida 33476 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Varga, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
The Issue The issue is whether the Stop-Work Order and 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment issued by Petitioner, Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers' Compensation (Department), on July 1, 2015, and February 29, 2016, respectively, should be upheld.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for enforcing the various requirements of chapter 440. Respondent is a Florida corporation with offices located at 1904 28th Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida. The company is engaged in the construction business, and its activities fall within the statutory definition of "construction industry." See § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat. Respondent also does business under the name of M & M Construction of South Florida, but both are the same corporate entity with the same Federal Employer Identification Number and use the same bank accounts. Respondent's assertion that the two are separate and work done under the "d/b/a" name cannot be used to establish liability under chapter 440 is rejected. On July 1, 2015, Munal Abedrabbo, a Department compliance inspector, made a random inspection of a job site at 4115 East Busch Boulevard, Tampa, where remodeling work on a commercial building was being performed. When he entered the premises, Mr. Abedrabbo observed Bernard Reed on a ladder painting an interior ceiling. After identifying himself, he informed Mr. Reed that he needed to verify his insurance coverage. Mr. Abedrabbo was directed to Mr. Cook, Respondent's vice-president and part owner, who acknowledged that he was the general contractor on the job and had three employees/painters working that day, Reed, James Dabnes, and John Russell. Mr. Cook informed the inspector that the three employees were leased from Paychek, Inc., an employee leasing company, and that firm provided workers' compensation coverage for the leased employees. Mr. Abedrabbo returned to his vehicle and accessed on his computer the Department of State, Division of Corporations, Sunbiz website to verify Respondent's status as a corporation. After verifying that it was an active corporation, he then checked the Department's Coverage and Compliance Automated System to verify whether Respondent had a workers' compensation policy or any exemptions. He was unable to find any active policy for Respondent, as the most recent policy had lapsed in January 2013. Mr. Cook has an exemption, covering the period October 20, 2014, through October 19, 2016, but the exemption is with a different company, Thomas Cook Carpenter, LLC. Mr. Abedrabbo spoke again with Mr. Cook and informed him that Department records showed no insurance coverage for his employees. Mr. Cook telephoned Paychek, Inc., and then confirmed that the three painters had no workers' compensation insurance. Mr. Cook explained that before he allowed Mr. Reed to begin work, Mr. Reed had shown him an insurance certificate that turned out to be "falsified," and then "conveniently lost it" when the inspector appeared. He also explained his firm "was caught with our pants down once before" and he did not want it to happen again. For that reason, he contended he was especially careful in hiring leased employees. Even so, he does not deny that Respondent has had no insurance in place since January 2013 and Paychek, Inc., failed to provide coverage. The Department issued a Stop Work Order and Penalty Assessment the same day. To determine the amount of Respondent's unsecured payroll for purposes of assessing a penalty in accordance with section 440.107(7)(d)(1), Florida Statutes, the Department requested Respondent to provide business records for the preceding two years. This period of non-compliance is appropriate, as Respondent was actively working in the construction industry during that time period without securing insurance. The request informed Mr. Cook that if complete records were not provided, the Department would use the imputation formula found in section 440.107(7)(e) to calculate the penalty. After reviewing the information provided by Respondent, on August 18, 2015, the Department issued an Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $114,144.52 for the period July 7, 2014, through June 30, 2015. Based on two depositions of Mr. Cook, a 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment in the amount of $105,663.48 was issued on February 29, 2016. The Department penalty auditor calculated the final penalty assessment using the "imputed" method because insufficient business records were provided to determine Respondent's payroll for all relevant time periods, except the month of October 2014. In addition to missing bank statements and check images, Respondent failed to provide its entire second bank account. Although Mr. Cook contends some records were in the possession of M & M Construction of South Florida, and he could not access them in a timely manner, this does not excuse Respondent's failure to timely produce all relevant records. Under the imputed method, the penalty auditor used the average weekly wage ($841.57) times two to determine Respondent's payroll for the imputed portions. See Fla. Admin. Code R. 69L-6.028(2); § 440.107(7)(e), Fla. Stat. The gross payroll was then divided by 100 in order to be multiplied by the applicable approved manual rates. The Department applied the proper methodology in computing the penalty assessment. A class code is a numerical code, usually four digits, assigned to differentiate between the various job duties or scope of work performed by the employees. The codes were derived from the Scopes Manual Classifications (Manual), a publication that lists all of the various jobs that may be performed in the context of workers' compensation. The Manual is produced by the National Council on Compensation Insurance, Inc., an authoritative data collecting and disseminating organization for workers' compensation. The Manual provides that class code 5474 applies to painters who perform painting activities. Reed, Dabnes, and Russell were assigned this code. Mr. Cook agrees this code is correct. Mr. Cook was assigned class code 5606 (construction executive) and placed on the penalty assessment because he is an owner of the corporation and was managing the work. Although Mr. Cook argues he had an exemption and should not be placed on the assessment, Department records reflect that Mr. Cook had an exemption with a different company during the audit period. Therefore, his inclusion in the employee census was correct. Because Respondent's business records included checks written to Kerry Francum for tile work, he was assigned class code 5348 (tile work) and placed on the penalty assessment as an employee. At his deposition, Mr. Cook acknowledged that Francum performed tile work for his firm and was an employee. At hearing, Mr. Cook changed his testimony and contended Francum was only a material supplier, not a subcontractor, and should not be on the penalty assessment. This assertion has not been accepted. Mr. Francum's inclusion on the assessment is appropriate. Respondent's business records also indicated a check was written to Kerry Randall, a tile subcontractor. At hearing, however, Mr. Cook established, without contradiction, that because of Mr. Randall's violent temper, he was paid a one-time fee of $1,000.00 and let go before he performed any work. Mr. Randall should be removed from the assessment. The Department has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment is correct, less any amount owed for Mr. Randall.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order assessing Respondent the penalty in the 2nd Amended Order of Penalty Assessment, less any amount owed for Mr. Randall. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer, failed to maintain good moral character as required by chapter 943, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B- 27.011, and if so, the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of certifying correctional officers and taking disciplinary action against them for failing to maintain good moral character as required by section 943.13(7). § 943.1395, Fla. Stat. (2009).2/ Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by Petitioner on July 8, 2009, and holds Correctional Certificate Number 284876. In February through May, 2010, the time frame relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed as a correctional officer at Miami-Dade Correctional Institute ("Miami-Dade CI"). Incident Giving Rise to this Proceeding On or about July 29, 2010, Captain Eric Parrish, a midnight shift supervisor at Miami-Dade CI, convened a meeting of several employees under his supervision. Among those present at the meeting were Respondent and Officer Demetrices Demeritte. The purpose of the meeting was to address rumors regarding alleged sexual activity among staff members while present or on duty at Miami-Dade CI.3/ Ultimately, these rumors were determined to be unsubstantiated. However, at the meeting, Demeritte informed Parrish that Respondent had exposed his penis to her while they both were on duty at Miami-Dade CI. Respondent verbally admitted at the meeting that he did show Demeritte his penis, but stated that she had wanted to see it. Parrish ordered everyone in attendance at the meeting to complete an incident report after the close of the meeting.4/ Consistent with Petitioner's standard practice regarding the completion of incident reports, Parrish requested that the reports be submitted by the end of the shift.5/ This gave the employees approximately four hours to complete their reports. Ultimately, Parrish collected completed incident reports from all in attendance at the meeting, including Respondent. In his incident report, Respondent stated that he and Demeritte had engaged in discussions regarding sexual matters on more than one occasion. Respondent acknowledged that he exposed his penis to Demeritte on one occasion when they had discussed its size, and that upon seeing it, Demeritte took off in her post vehicle. The next day she asked him not to do that again because he was not "her man." Respondent stated that he apologized to Demeritte and considered the matter resolved between them as friends. Based on the information provided in the incident reports, Parrish recommended that Respondent and others be reviewed for disciplinary action. On or about December 6, 2011, Petitioner filed an Administrative Complaint against Respondent, alleging that he had failed to maintain good moral character, as required by section 943.17, by having engaged in acts that constitute indecent exposure pursuant to section 800.03. Violation of section 800.03 is a misdemeanor of the first degree. § 800.03, Fla. Stat. (2009). There is no evidence in the record that Respondent was arrested or prosecuted for, convicted of, or pled guilty or nolo contendere to, a violation of section 800.03. Evidence Adduced at the Final Hearing At hearing, Demeritte testified that while she and Respondent were on duty inspecting the fence line or refueling vehicles or at other posts, Respondent exposed his penis to her on four separate occasions. In doing so, he would tell her to "look" and would watch her while exposing himself. Demeritte testified that on one of these occasions, he stroked his penis. Demeritte testified that she was uncomfortable and offended by Respondent's actions, that she considered his actions vulgar, and that on each occasion, she drove away. After she finally confronted Respondent, he apologized and never exposed himself to her again. The undersigned finds Demeritte's testimony credible and persuasive. Demeritte reported the incidents to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. However, not until the July 29, 2010, meeting did she report the incidents to Petitioner. Demeritte claimed that she did not report the incidents due to a "breach of confidentiality." No specific explanation was provided regarding what the breach of confidentiality entailed or why it deterred Demeritte from reporting the incidents before July 29, 2010. At the hearing, Respondent recanted his statement in his July 29, 2010, incident report that he had exposed his penis to Demeritte on one occasion. Respondent testified that the statements in his report were "sarcastic" and that he had needed more time to complete his incident report. However, Parrish credibly testified that near the end of the shift, Respondent told him he was still working on the incident report, but that at the end of the shift, Respondent provided the completed, signed, dated report and did not ask for more time to complete the report. Respondent denied having exposed his penis to Demeritte while on duty, and testified that he previously had performed as a dancer at private functions and that she may have seen his penis under those circumstances. Respondent's testimony on these points was not credible. Consistent with his incident report, Respondent testified that he and Demeritte engaged in discussions of a sexual nature on several occasions. There is no other evidence in the record directly corroborating or refuting this claim. However, the evidence does establish that around the time of the incidents at issue in this proceeding, there was discussion of, and rumors regarding, sexual matters between officers employed on the midnight shift at Miami-Dade CI. Under these circumstances, the undersigned finds credible Respondent's account that he and Demeritte engaged in discussions of a sexual nature. The undersigned does not find credible any claim by Respondent that Demeritte wanted or asked him to expose his penis to her. However, the undersigned finds it plausible that Respondent may not have understood that Demeritte was offended by his actions, particularly if they engaged in discussions of a sexual nature, and also given that she did not tell him, until after the fourth incident, to not expose himself to her. Indeed, once she told him not to expose himself to her, his behavior ceased and he apologized. There is no evidence in the record that Respondent previously has been subject to disciplinary action by Petitioner. Findings of Ultimate Fact Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent exposed his penis to Demeritte on four separate occasions, in violation of section 800.03, and that in doing so, he failed to maintain good moral character, as required by section 943.13(7). Respondent's behavior in exposing himself to Demeritte was inappropriate and unacceptable. However, the undersigned finds that the circumstances afoot around the time of Respondent's actions——specifically, discussions and rumors of sexual matters between staff, discussions of a sexual nature between Respondent and Demeritte, and the fact that Demeritte did not tell Respondent to stop exposing himself to her until after he had done so four times——may have created an atmosphere that led Respondent, mistakenly, to believe that such behavior was not a significant departure from the accepted norm on the Miami-Dade CI midnight shift at that time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order suspending Respondent's correctional officer certification for a period of six months, imposing two years' probation, and ordering Respondent to undergo counseling. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 6th day of August, 2013.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent continues to be qualified for certification as a correctional officer.
Findings Of Fact The Commission, among its other duties, is empowered to certify, and revoke the certification of, officers, instructors, including agency in-service training instructors, and criminal justice training schools. Mr. Paige was certified by the Commission and was issued Correctional Certificate No. 45658 on July 1, 1981. He has continued to be certified since that time. On November 23, 2004, Mr. Paige was riding in a truck with Mr. Givens. The truck was traveling south on County Road 229, in Baker County, at about 2:20 in the morning and the truck's tag light was not functioning. Cpl. Lagle was patrolling on the same road at the same time and observed the truck and noted that the tag light was not functioning. Cpl. Lagle stopped the truck. After the truck pulled to the side of the road, Cpl. Lagle approached the driver's side of the vehicle. The window was down. As Cpl. Lagle requested the driver's license and the passenger's identification, he smelled marijuana smoke. Cpl. Lagle identified the driver as Mr. Givens. The passenger, Mr. Paige, did not provide identification as requested. Both Mr. Givens and Mr. Paige appeared nervous and Cpl. Lagle observed Mr. Paige trying to hide something. Cpl. Lagle asked Mr. Givens to exit the truck and to move to the front of the truck. Mr. Givens did as instructed. While at the front of the truck Cpl. Lagle asked Mr. Givens if they had drugs in the truck. He said no, but commented that they "had just smoked some." Mr. Paige was in the truck when this conversation occurred. Subsequently Cpl. Lagle walked to the passenger side of the truck and opened the door. A Budweiser beer can fell on the ground as the door was opened. Cpl. Lagle asked Mr. Paige to exit the vehicle. During a pat down search, Cpl. Lagle found a plastic bag of green vegetable matter which he believed was marijuana, hidden in the waistband of Mr. Paige's trousers. He handcuffed Mr. Paige and placed him in his patrol car. Cpl. Lagle performed a field test on the green vegetable material and it was positive for cannabis, which is the formal name for marijuana. He informed Mr. Paige that he was under arrest. Mr. Paige told Cpl. Lagle that he was a correctional officer and that he had "information." Cpl. Lagle transported Mr. Paige to the Baker County Sheriff's Office Annex so that he could discuss his "information" with narcotics officers of the Baker County Sheriff's Office. Upon arrival at the Annex he was searched and seated in an interview room. He was interviewed by Narcotics Investigator David Bryant. After the interview, Mr. Paige stood up and a second bag of green vegetable matter fell from his pant leg. Cpl. Lagle picked it up and the two officers together determined that this substance was also marijuana. Mr. Paige told the officers that the marijuana belonged to Mr. Givens. The marijuana that was seized weighed less than 20 grams, so Mr. Paige was charged with the misdemeanor of possessing less than 20 grams of marijuana. He subsequently pleaded nolo contendere to the charged offense. It is found by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Paige possessed marijuana, in an amount less than 20 grams, on or about February 23, 2006.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter an order finding that Roosevelt Paige lacks moral character as defined by the commission and revoking Correctional Certificate No. 45658, which is currently held by Roosevelt Paige. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Roosevelt Paige Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Crews, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioner violated Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office, 3-1.1(002), 3-1.3(066), and 3-1.3(067), and, if so, whether Petitioner should be terminated from his position with the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office.
Findings Of Fact Based on a review of the case file, the Transcript of the final hearing, and the exhibits entered into evidence, the following Findings of Fact are found. On July 13, 2001, Dominguez was assigned to foot patrol at the K-Mart store in South Pasadena, Florida, as a community police officer. At that time he had been employed by the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office for approximately sixteen and one-half years. On the evening of July 13, 2001, Dominguez was standing outside K-Mart talking to an employee of K-Mart, Renee Herrington (Herrington). While talking to Herrington, Dominguez observed a white van and a black sport utility vehicle (SUV) parked in front of K-Mart next to a yellow curb. The area in which the vehicles were parked was marked by a faded “no Dominguez observed the vehicles for a time and when no one moved the vehicles, he decided to cite both vehicles for parking violations. He issued a citation to the white van and then proceeded to the black SUV. The SUV had been parked in front of K-Mart by Maryellen Ruvolo (Ruvolo) while she and her niece went into K-Mart to make a purchase. Ruvolo left the vehicle running, and her sister and two nephews remained in the vehicle. Dominguez went to the rear of the SUV and began writing the ticket. Ruvolo’s sister, Eugenia Quinn (Quinn), got out of the SUV and asked Dominguez to not issue the ticket and allow her to move the vehicle. Dominguez refused her requests and gave the ticket to Quinn. Dominguez started walking in the direction of Herrington, who was sitting on a bench approximately 30 yards away from the vehicles. When Ruvolo returned to the vehicle, Quinn gave her the ticket and told her that Dominguez would not let her move the SUV. Ruvolo turned in the direction of Dominguez and shouted, “Have a nice day, you fucking fat bastard.” Dominguez turned around and went back to where Ruvolo was standing. He wanted to confront her about her comment. Ruvulo started to yell after Dominguez went up to her. He arrested her, handcuffed her, and put her in his patrol car. The charge was disorderly conduct. During the confrontation between Dominguez and Ruvolo, none of the members of the public became involved in the dispute and Ruvolo did not incite any members of the public to participate in the dispute. She never physically or verbally threatened Dominguez. Ruvolo’s actions did not invade the right of others to pursue their lawful activities. Herrington went back inside K-Mart and other members of the public were not disrupted in their entering and leaving K-Mart. Quinn asked Dominquez why he was arresting her sister and he told her that he did not get paid enough to put up with what Ruvolo had said. While he was arresting Ruvolo, Dominguez had requested assistance from another deputy sheriff, Kelvin Franklin. When Deputy Franklin arrived on the scene the confrontation was over. Dominguez asked Franklin to go inside K-Mart and get the address of Herrington, who had witnessed the incident. Dominguez did not request Franklin to take a statement from Herrington. On the way to the jail, Ruvolo apologized to Dominguez, and he told her to shut up. Prior to reaching the jail, Ruvolo stopped for a few minutes in a parking lot and met with his supervisor to get some in-service papers. When they reached the jail, Dominguez was advised that there were six persons to be processed ahead of Ruvolo. Dominguez got out of the patrol car and turned off the ignition. He did some paperwork on the trunk of his patrol car while waiting. He left Ruvolo in the patrol car without air conditioning and the windows rolled up for approximately six or seven minutes. He returned to the vehicle and turned on the ignition and waited to be called to take Ruvolo inside the jailhouse. They waited approximately 20 minutes from the time they got to the jail until they entered it. Ruvolo spent approximately five hours in jail and was required to post bail before she could be released. After arresting Ruvolo, Dominguez prepared his incident/offense report and complaint/arrest affidavit. Dominguez admitted during his testimony that neither the arrest report nor the arrest affidavit set forth facts to establish the elements for the offense of disorderly conduct, the crime for which he arrested Ruvolo. Dominguez told the Administrative Review Board (ARB) that he felt that Herrington’s peace had been disturbed. Dominguez did not talk with Herrington between the time he heard Ruvolo make her remarks to him and the time he arrested Ruvolo. When asked why he had not included any statements from Herrington in his report, he replied, “Laziness.” During the ARB hearing, Dominguez stated that he had no excuse for not completing a thorough report and detailing the elements of the crime. He acknowledged the position that he placed the Sheriff's Office in when he did not do a complete and thorough report. Ruvolo and Quinn made complaints to the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office about Dominguez’s actions. The complaints alleged that Dominguez was rude, intimidating, and unprofessional in his behavior during the July 13, 2001, incident. Ruvolo also alleged her arrest to be false. As a result of the complaints, Sergeant Tim Pelella (Pelella) of the Administrative Investigations Division of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office conducted preliminary interviews of Ruvolo and Quinn. During the course of the interview, Ruvolo recognized that she would have to pursue her false arrest claim through the courts. Pellella referred the matter to the commander of the road patrol division for investigation of the non-arrest components of the complaints. The complaints were referred to Sergeant Jay Morey (Morey), Dominguez’s immediate supervisor. Sergeant Morey talked to Dominguez and Herrington, but did not talk to either Ruvolo or Quinn. Morey concluded that he would not sustain the complaint, but his conclusion was never finalized or reduced to writing. The arrest for disorderly conduct was referred to the State Attorney’s Office for prosecution. The arrest report and arrest affidavit were reviewed by Assistant State Attorney Lydia Wardell, who concluded that neither the report nor the affidavit set forth sufficient facts to prosecute the case. As a result, a No Information was filed by the State Attorney’s Office disposing of the charges against Ruvolo, stating: “The facts and circumstances revealed do not warrant prosecution at this time.” As a result of the decision not to prosecute, the Administrative Investigation Division of the Sheriff’s Office retrieved the complaints from Morey and began its investigation of the false arrest complaint. It is the policy of the Sheriff’s Office not to investigate allegations of false arrest until such time as the State Attorney’s Office makes a decision on whether to prosecute. Dominguez was notified that an investigation was being initiated. Dominguez gave a sworn statement to the investigators assigned to the case. Ruvolo and other witnesses also gave sworn statements. After the investigation was completed, Dominguez was given an ARB hearing. In accord with General Order 10-2 of the Sheriff’s Office, at least one member of Dominguez’s chain of command sat on his ARB hearing. Prior to the hearing, the ARB members are given a copy of the investigation conducted by the Administrative Investigation Division. At the hearing Dominguez was permitted to offer a statement, to respond to questions, and to present additional evidence. The ARB made the following determination: On July 13, 2001, Manuel Dominguez, #52303, while on duty in Pinellas County, Florida; did violate the Pinellas County Sheriff's Civil Service Act Laws of Florida, 89-404 as amended by Laws of Florida 90-395, Section 6, Subsection 4, by violations of the provisions of law or the rules, regulations and operating procedures of the Office of the Sheriff. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.1 (Level Five Violation), 002, relating to Loyalty, to wit: Members shall maintain their loyalty to the Sheriff's Office and it's [sic] members as is consistent with law and professional ethics as established in General Order 3-2. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you failed to abide by the PCSO Code of Ethics, to wit: You acted officiously or permitted personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or friendships to influence your decisions while in the performance of duty as a deputy sheriff. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three Violation), 066, relating to Performance of Duty, to wit: All members will be efficient in their assigned duties. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you failed to accurately document an incident that resulted in the arrest of a citizen of this county. Violate Rule and Regulation of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, 3-1.3 (Level Three Violation), 067, relating to Performance of Duty, to wit: All members will be effective in their assigned duties. Synopsis: On July 13, 2001, you effected an arrest which the State Attorney's Office could not prosecute because you were ineffective in your assigned duties. The violations resulted in a cumulative point total of 75 points. A Level Five violation is given a point value of 50 points. A Level Three violation is given a point value of 15 points. The ARB assigned a total of 25 points for the two Level Three violations and 50 points for the Level 5 violation. There were no previous discipline points added. The discipline range for 75 points is from a ten-day suspension to termination. The ARB recommended the maximum penalty of termination. General Order 10-2 of the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office deals with disciplinary procedures. It provides that the termination procedure to be followed is the same as that of a member who is suspended without pay with certain additional procedures. Only the sheriff has the authority to terminate a member of the Sheriff’s Office. A member can only be terminated “subsequent to an Administrative Investigation Division investigation supported by findings and disciplinary action recommended by a Administrative Review Board, and at the instruction of the Sheriff” that the member be terminated. At the time that the ARB made its recommendation that Dominguez be terminated, Rice, the Pinellas County Sheriff, was out of the state. He had discussed Dominguez’s disciplinary case with Chief Deputy Coats (Coats) prior to leaving the state. Rice had specifically authorized Coats to impose discipline, including termination, upon Dominguez that was consistent with the ARB’s recommendations. Coats advised Rice of the findings and recommendations of the ARB. Rice told Coats that he had no problem with terminating Dominguez. Coats signed the inter- office memoranda for Rice, advising Dominquez of the findings and recommendations of the ARB and advising of the decision to terminate Dominguez from employment with the Sheriff's Office. Coats was instructed by Rice to terminate Dominguez. In his deposition, Rice stated that Dominguez should have been terminated and that it was his decision to approve Dominguez's termination. Dominguez did not know the elements of the offense of disorderly conduct when he arrested Ruvolo. He felt that he could arrest her for her inappropriate comments to him. At the final hearing, Dominguez admitted that based on his long career in law enforcement that he should have known what constituted disorderly conduct. Dominguez was insulted by Ruvolo's name-calling and felt that her words were a challenge to the uniform of a deputy sheriff. Dominguez allowed his personal feelings to influence his decision to arrest Ruvolo.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Civil Service Board of Pinellas County Sheriff's Office enter a Final Order finding Manuel R. Dominguez guilty of violating the Rules and Regulations of the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office as set forth in September 27, 2001, inter-office memorandum and upholding the termination of Manuel R. Dominguez from his employment as a deputy sheriff with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Laubach, Esquire Pinellas County Police Benevolent Association 14450 46th Street, North Suite 115 Clearwater, Florida 33762 B. Norris Rickey, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 34756 Keith C. Tischler, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, et al. 1669 Mahan Center Boulevard Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186
The Issue Two issues were involved in this case: Whether the Respondent unlawfully discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of race when it failed to promote him to the position of lead man in the Respondent's Public Works Department. Whether the Respondent unlawfully retaliated against the Petitioner by giving him written reprimands and unsatisfactory scores on job performance evaluations because of the fact that he filed an administrative charge of racial discrimination against the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a black male approximately 35 years of age. Prior to returning to Florida, Nunn had worked all over the United States, to include Alaska, as a construction worker. Respondent is an incorporated city in Florida. The Petitioner was hired in 1988 as a temporary employee in the Respondent's Water and Sewer Department by Dennis Monroe, Director of Public Works. While he was a temporary employee, the Petitioner indicated to Mr. Monroe, that he wished to remain in the Respondent's employ. On October 1988 the Petitioner was hired in a full time position as a Laborer I, and began a 6 months probation period. At the conclusion of the Petitioner's initial six-month probationary period (in April 1989), he received a above satisfactory score on an Employee Performance Evaluation completed by Mr. Monroe (Respondent's Exhibit A). Mr. Monroe at that time promoted the Petitioner to the position of Laborer II. At about this time, the water department lost three of its senior employees, and Nunn was suddenly the most senior person in the water department. Nunn talked with Moore about a promotion, but Moore hired Mr. Edwin Krusemark, a while male, who had been a consultant on the city's system, to run the water and sewer department. Sometime after the completion of his probationary period in April 1989, the Petitioner asked Edwin Krusemark, Public Works Superintendent, for an additional helper to complete his job duties. Mr. Krusemark turned down this request, although two persons had been performing the duties now performed by Nunn. Mr. Krusemark stated it was his opinion that two men were not needed to do Nunn's job, although it had previously taken two men to do it. Nevertheless, both Monroe and Krusemark verbally complained to Nunn about his delays. Neither manager formally reprimanded the Petitioner or placed any documentation of the Petitioner's faults in the Petitioner's personnel file prior to September 27, 1989. Neither supervisor indicated to Nunn that his work was substandard and unacceptable prior to September 27, 1989. Nunn stayed in the water and sewer department, and learned a short time later that a new lead man position was free. He applied and was rejected again without an interview. The promotion went to a new employee, William Threet, who was a white male with no experience in public utilities. Mr. Krusemark recommended to Mr. Monroe not to promote Nunn because of his lack of supervisory experience. There was no evidence presented by Respondent that Mr. Krusemark knew anything about Nunn's experience, except at the City. Mr. Krusemark admitted his recommendation was based upon his observations of Nunn at Belleview. William Threet was hired as the lead man in September 1989, based in large part upon his 19 years of experience in construction and his experience in supervisory positions (Respondent's Exhibit C) outside of government. Nunn had to help Threet learn about the water and sewer functions after Threet was hired. Shortly before September 25, 1989, the Petitioner filed an administrative charge with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, alleging that he was refused the position of lead man because of his race. The Respondent learned of Nunn's charges on or about September 25, 1989, when the Petitioner gave a copy of the charge to the Respondent's Clerk. Nunn's file on or about September 25, 1989 contained no adverse personnel comments or actions. On September 27, 1989, Nunn received a letter of reprimand for not being available when he was "on call" for emergencies. When Nunn was rated in November 1989, an entire list of deficiencies had been retroactively placed in Nunn's file. These notes memorialized trivial complaints made earlier by Moore and Krusemark to Nunn about the cleanliness of Nunn's truck, and the quality and speed of Nunn's work. However, no appropriate warnings or corrective action had been taken contemporaneously with the incidents about which Monroe and Krusemark complained, except the letter of reprimand. On November 1989, the Petitioner received an unsatisfactory score on this evaluation which had been due in October. Nunn and was placed upon a 90- day probationary period for the purpose of notifying him of his performance deficiencies and allowing him time in which to remedy those deficiencies and improve his job performance (Respondent's Exhibits E and F). Subsequent to the November 1989 evaluation, several handwritten notes from Mr. Monroe and Mr. Krusemark regarding deficiencies in the Petitioner's job performance were placed in his personnel file (Respondent's Exhibits G, H, I, and J). There were no such handwritten documentation in Nunn's file to justify or substantiate the considerable list of "comments" attached to Nunn's November 1989 evaluation. The written reprimand and the November evaluation were in retaliation for Nunn filing the discrimination complaint about Threet's hiring. These were pretexual. In January 1990, the Petitioner filed another administrative charge, alleging that the September 27, 1989 reprimand, the November 1989 evaluation, and the subsequent handwritten notes had been issued to him in retaliation for having filed the original charge of discrimination against the Respondent. In March 1990, the Petitioner received another Employee Performance Evaluation, this one being a collaborative effort among Mr. Monroe, Mr. Krusemark, and Mr. Threet. The Petitioner's score on this evaluation had improved over that of the November 1989 evaluation, but it was still unsatisfactory (Respondent's Exhibit K). Rather than discharge the Petitioner, which the Respondent could have done at that point, the Respondent placed the Petitioner on a six-month probationary status (Respondent's Exhibit L). Shortly thereafter, the Petitioner requested and was granted a leave of absence to be with his son who had to undergo a heart transplant. The terms of this leave were ill defined because it was leave without pay. After an absence of approximately two months, the Petitioner reported to work one morning in June 1990. Because of the Petitioner's extended absence from his job, the Respondent had employed another individual to perform the duties previously performed by the Petitioner. On the day that the Petitioner returned to work, this individual was sent out to perform Nunn's regular duties, while Mr. Threet contacted Mr. Monroe to inform him that the Petitioner had returned to work. Nunn was instructed to replace a faucet and then report to Mr. Monroe's office downtown. Nunn asked why he was being asked to go to Monroe's office. Nunn could not obtain a complete answer as to why. Nunn replaced the faucet, but declined to go downtown to Monroe's office because he felt he was being pushed out and Nunn was afraid he would be victimized if he went down town to Monroe's office. He rejected Mr. Monroe's request to report to Monroe's office when Mr. Monroe would not clarify the need for the visit. At that point, the Petitioner submitted his voluntary resignation from employment. After leaving Belleview's employment, the Petitioner was unemployed for four months and received no employment benefits. He was then employed by Marion County Country Club for $4.75/hour for six months. He then found his current job where he makes $6.00, the same salary he made with Belleview.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order GRANTING in part the Petition for Relief, and awarding the Petitioner $5,380.00. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of November, 1991. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS THIS 7th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana Baird General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Margaret Jones Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Reginal Nunn 1010 100th 467 Belleview, Florida 32620 Kenneth A. Knox, Esquire Fisher & Phillips Suite 2310 One Financial Plaza Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33394
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue has violated the requirements of Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes, by failing to adopt the June 1998 edition of its Code of Conduct and the July 1995 edition of its Disciplinary Procedures and Standards as rules pursuant to the rulemaking procedures of Section 120.54, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, including the Prehearing Stipulation of the parties, the following findings of fact are made: Facts which the parties admitted and which required no proof1 The Department of Revenue is an agency within the meaning of Section 120.52(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Obinyan was a career service employee of the Department until she was discharged on January 12, 1999. Ms. Obinyan has standing to challenge the June 1998 edition of the Code of Conduct Guidelines, Department of Revenue Policy Statement #1141-2 ("Code of Conduct"), and the July 1995 edition of the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards, Department of Revenue Policy Statement #1141-9. The Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards are official policy statements of the Department. The Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards are agency statements of general applicability that are generally and equally applicable to all Department employees and were applicable to Ms. Obinyan when she was an employee of the Department. The Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards are agency statements that prescribe and implement policy. The Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards are agency statements that are intended by their own effect to require compliance. The Department has a policy and practice of requiring all of its employees to sign a written acknowledgement of receipt of the Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards and an acknowledgement that the employee understands that his or her violation of any of the conduct standards contained in the Code of Conduct or in the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards shall be grounds for disciplinary proceedings pursuant to the disciplinary action procedures contained in the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards. It is the Department's policy and practice to require its employees to comply with the procedures and standards reflected in the Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards. It is the Department's policy and practice, in administering discipline, to follow the disciplinary procedures set forth in the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards and to apply the disciplinary standards set forth therein to avoid disparity as to the type and severity of discipline administered for the violations specified in the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards. It is the Department's policy and practice to take disciplinary action in accordance with the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards when an employee violates the Code of Conduct or the disciplinary standards contained in the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards. The Department has taken disciplinary action against its employees, including Ms. Obinyan, pursuant to the disciplinary procedures and standards in the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards since its adoption in 1995. The Department has not adopted the Code of Conduct or the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards as rules or initiated the rulemaking process to adopt either of these statements as a rule. Additional facts established by the evidence The Code of Conduct compiles in one twenty-page document both conduct prescribed or proscribed in statutes and rules and conduct which is prescribed or proscribed by Department policy. It is not intended to be all-inclusive, but an employee is subject to disciplinary action if he or she fails to conform to the provisions contained in the Code of Conduct. The proposed Code of Conduct was submitted to the Governor and Cabinet, as agency head, for review prior to implementation. The Department's Disciplinary Procedures and Standards contain forty-five standards, and violation of any of these standards is grounds for disciplinary action. The disciplinary procedures must be complied with whenever discipline is to be administered to career service employees of the Department. The proposed Disciplinary Procedures and Standards were submitted to the Department of Management Services for approval prior to implementation, as required by Rule 60K-9.002, Florida Administrative Code. The proposed procedures and standards were approved by the Department of Management Services after they were reviewed for consistency with the standards of other agencies and after they were submitted to the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) for review and comment. The Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards do not apply to anyone other than the Department's employees and include disciplinary standards and conduct prescriptions and prohibitions unique to those employees. The provisions of the Code of Conduct and the Disciplinary Procedures and Standards are detailed and precisely describe the disciplinary procedures, disciplinary standards, and prescribed and proscribed conduct which govern the Department's employees.
The Issue The Issue for consideration herein was whether the Respondent's certification as a corrections officer in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters set out in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Petitioner, Commission, was the state agency responsible for the certification of law enforcement and corrections officers in this state, and the Respondent, Richard J. Havey was a certified law enforcement officer employed by the Indian River County Sheriff's Department. On September 5, 1990, Sgt. Alfonzio Washington, of the St. Lucie County Sheriff's Office, responded to a disturbance call at a residence on Hummingbird Lane where, reportedly, an individual was threatening to kill himself. When he arrived at the residence, Sgt. Washington saw the Respondent engaged in conversation with two sheriff's deputies. Respondent was ordering the deputies off his property. At this point, individuals identified as respondent's parents asked the deputies to leave, indicating that if they did, the Respondent would calm down. After some further discussion, Respondent did, shortly thereafter, calm down. As a courtesy to the Respondent's status as a law enforcement officer, he was not arrested even though he appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. Sgt. Washington was led to believe that at the time, the Respondent was having marital problems and was upset, and in cases of that nature, it is Sheriff's Department policy to help officers with alcohol or stress problems straighten out. He thereupon directed the other deputies to leave the area and they did. Somewhat later that same evening, Detective Robert Gregg went to the Respondent's residence in response to another disturbance call. He had been told of the previous disturbance there and was advised that weapons were present. When he arrived, shortly after Deputy Walton got there, he spoke with the complainant, Mrs. Barstow, Respondent's mother at the door. As she approached, the Respondent stepped in front of her and told the officers they had no warrant and to get off his property. The officers, however, said they were there to speak with Mrs. Barstow who was beckoning them into the house. Just as Lt. Miller came up to the door and started in, the Respondent, who was loud and belligerent, shoved him when Miller asked Respondent to move so they could speak with his mother. At this, the other officers attempted to handcuff the Respondent and when he resisted they wrestled him to the ground where they placed cuffs on his wrists behind his back. All during this time, Respondent was saying that they shouldn't have done that because he was one of them. As a result of this scuffle, Respondent sustained an abrasion to his forehead and the officers took him to Longwood Hospital for treatment. In the car, during the ride there, Respondent was still angry and kept hitting his head against the plexiglass screen between the front and rear seats. He also made some unspecified threats. After being treated for his injuries and released, Respondent was then arrested for battery on a law enforcement officer; for disorderly conduct, and for intoxication. In Gregg's opinion, based on the many drunks he has seen over his career, Respondent was intoxicated. Lt. Miller basically confirms the testimony of Detective Gregg. When he arrived at Respondent's home, the other officers were already there and he could hear the Respondent yelling. Respondent claimed he didn't call the police and because they didn't have a warrant they should leave his property. Miller saw Mrs. Barstow beckon to Deputy Walton to come into the house. As she started to enter, Respondent put up his hand to bar her and Miller told him they were going to come in to talk to Mrs. Barstow. At this, Respondent pushed out at Miller, forcing him up against the wall to the right of the door when looking out, and, reportedly took a swing at him. No other evidence was presented to confirm the attempt to strike and it is found that considered in its worst light, the evidence shows only a push of Miller by Respondent. To be sure, Miller and all the other officers were in uniform and on duty. Miller and all the other law enforcement personnel who testified indicate that the law enforcement profession is stressful - especially the job of a corrections officer such as that held by Respondent due to the concentration of difficult people with whom the officer must regularly deal. Miller supervises more than 30 individuals and over the years, has evaluated a lot of officers. Alcohol problems are not at all uncommon nor are marital problems, but most officers can cope with them and have been able to resolve them one way or another to resume productive law enforcement careers. In his opinion, a police department has an obligation to assist a troubled officer to alleviate his or her alcohol and other problems in a joint effort by both parties. If Respondent has completed a rehabilitation program and does not now drink, this would weigh in his favor. The same would be true regarding his marital problems, especially if the initiative came from him. His past record should also be taken into account if it is good. This one incident, under the circumstances here regarding Respondent's personal stress and alcohol problem, should not prevent him from continuing in law enforcement, Miller believes. Lt. Phil Redstone, the Commander of the Indian River County Sheriff's Department's Internal Affairs Division and an expert in toxicology and the effect of alcohol on the body and in officer evaluation reviewed the Respondent's case, interviewing not only Havey but also his wife and parents. He determined that before this incident, Havey had been drinking heavily because his wife had told him she was leaving him and taking the children. Added to this was the pressure of having just built a new home and the stress he was experiencing at work and as a result, he threatened to kill himself. Havey thought his wife had called the police and when they first came, the meeting was congenial. Then Respondent's parents came and he became more upset, breaking a few items at the house. When the second set of deputies came, he was by then quite upset and admitted to ordering them off his property and to obstructing their entrance to his house in response to his mother's invitation. However, Havey denied either swinging at or shoving Lt. Miller or making any threats to the officers during their transport of him to the hospital. Redstone found, as a result of his investigation, that Respondent's conduct was contrary to Department policy and the case was sent to the Department's Disciplinary Review Board for a hearing. This Board, made up of 5 Sheriff's Department employees, after hearing the evidence against the Respondent, found he did not commit a battery upon a law enforcement officer and did not resist apprehension with force. It found, however, that he was guilty of misconduct and as a result, Respondent was discharged from employment. In his letter of discharge, the Sheriff noted that if Respondent were to be found not guilty of the charges, he would be eligible for rehire. After the incident, Respondent was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer and resisting arrest with violence. He plead nolo contendere to a lesser offense of simple battery and resisting without violence and was placed on probation with adjudication of guilt withheld. He successfully completed all the terms of his probation and was released early. Redstone also found that up to the time of this incident, and since, Respondent's conduct has been exemplary. He completed the terms of the probation imposed upon him by the court and has had no other problems. He has not been employed by the Indian River County Sheriff for the past two years, but, since he has completed probation properly, he could be rehired. Redstone believes Respondent is of good character and has a good work record and that the instant situation was an isolated matter totally out of character. In fact, it was the Sheriff's Department which suggested to Respondent that he seek expungement of and sealing of court records. Taken together, Lt. Redstone concluded Respondent is fit to be a police officer now. Respondent denies having either punched or swung at any officer. He has too much respect for the profession. He admits to being very vocal and to using obscene language, but on the night in question, he was very much under the influence of alcohol and was in a rage and out of control. Nonetheless, he was not so intoxicated he can't remember what happened. This was an isolated incident. His drinking had been building up for about two months prior to this incident. He admits Officer Walton was trying to get past him into the house and he told the officers to get out because he didn't want them there. He claims, however, he kept his hands at his side because he knew if he raised them it would be taken as a hostile act. When he realized the officers would not leave, he turned to go back into the house and grabbed for the door handle. Just as he grabbed it, he found he couldn't breathe and was hit hard from behind. He fell to the ground and hit his head on the concrete. He admits to trying to cover his face but claims he did not intentionally resist being handcuffed. Respondent claims that once he was handcuffed, he walked voluntarily to the patrol car and got in. He further claims he was in the car for 30 minutes without being told he was under arrest for anything. The day after his arrest, after being incarcerated for about 6 hours, he was released and driven home by his bondsman. He voluntarily signed himself up for the 30 day alcohol program and is glad he did. He now has his drinking under control and believes he can handle his job and the other stress points now. He wants to stay in law enforcement. Mrs. Barstow describes her son as a very kind, good hearted, and reliable man who only started to have alcohol problems after close to 10 years of good service with the St. Lucie and Indian River County Sheriffs' Departments. On the night in question she was at her son's house because she had received a call that he was despondent. She knew he had been drinking and was afraid he might do something foolish. She was upset at the way the incident was allowed to progress. She had called the police to get help for her son and before she knew it, he was on the ground and injured. In conjunction with Respondent's wife, Mrs. Barstow had Respondent committed under the provision of the Baker Act to insure he got the help he needed. He spent 30 days in Harbor Shores, a rehabilitative center, and since his release has stopped drinking and attends Alcoholics Anonymous meetings once or twice a week. Respondent is still married and has 2 children. Their relationship is considered good. Respondent is known to have high moral values and is an honest individual. He liked being a law enforcement officer though it took its toll on him. The birth of his children so close to each other along with the fact that his wife works in law enforcement also created pressure. His being out of work, though he has aggressively sought other employment, has placed a financial strain on the family. Nonetheless, he has not resumed his drinking. Respondent entered his plea of nolo contendere to the charges against him because he was advised it was in his best interests to do so. His plea was based on the alleged representation that if he was convicted of no more than a misdemeanor, he'd be rehired. Had he known he would not be rehired, he would have demanded trial.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered placing Respondent on probationary status for a period of one year subject to such terms and conditions as the Commission may impose. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of August, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. & 13. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted except for the word "intentionally". Accepted. - 25. Accepted. 26. & 27. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 29. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. & 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. 4. & 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated but a restatement of the evidence. - 17. All accepted and incorporated but noted to be a re- statement of the testimony. COPIES FURNISHED: Dawn Pompey, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Spotts, Esquire 2400 South Federal Highway Stuart, Florida 34994 James T. Moore Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jeffrey Long Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy General Counsel FDLE P.O. Box 14898 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Michael D. Ely, committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and licensing law enforcement officers pursuant to Florida law. As such, the Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary actions against law enforcement officers. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was a certified law enforcement officer holding certificate number 1119822. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was employed by the Escambia County Sheriff's Office and worked as a deputy sheriff assigned to road patrol for a designated geographic area within the county. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent was romantically involved with or was residing with an individual identified in this record as Greta Fernandez or Greta Brown. By his admission, the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown began around the first of August 2002. The Respondent met Ms. Brown while he was working an off duty job at Pensacola Beach. His romantic interest in her began in earnest a short while later after he bumped into her at a club known as "Coconuts." Shortly after beginning his association with Ms. Brown, the Respondent was verbally counseled by his superior officer regarding his choice of friends. Officers are warned not to socialize with and associate themselves with undesirable persons. Concerns over the Respondent's association with Ms. Brown continued and eventually led to a written report (Petitioner's Exhibit 3) issued on September 21, 2002. According to the Respondent, an individual named Patty Clark verbally teased and tormented Ms. Brown's minor child as the student left the school bus en route home. While the child did not testify in this cause it is presumed for purposes of this record that the extent of the "teasing" included verbal comments and a hand gesture commonly referred to as "the finger." It was alleged that the child was very upset by the incident. At Ms. Brown's urging, on or about September 21, 2002, the Respondent contacted Ms. Clark by telephone and identified himself as a deputy sheriff. He further admonished Ms. Clark to cease her behavior regarding the minor child and issued a veiled comment regarding the status of Ms. Clark's driving privileges (suspended). The Respondent did not write up the incident, did not refer the matter to other law enforcement who might have jurisdiction over the matter (e.g. the Pensacola police department), or take any official action against Ms. Clark. Other than the telephone call that was intended to curb Ms. Clark's actions toward the child, the Respondent took no other official action against the alleged perpetrator. Because she did not appreciate the manner in which she had been contacted, Ms. Clark filed a complaint against the Respondent with the Sheriff's Office. That complaint led to the written counseling report noted in paragraph 6. It is not alleged that Ms. Clark's actions or comments to the minor child constituted any criminal behavior. Moreover, other than to pacify Ms. Brown and presumably her child, it is unknown why the Respondent would have used his official position as a deputy sheriff to pursue the matter. If Ms. Clark committed a crime or an actionable infraction, the Respondent's wiser course would have been to refer the matter/incident to an appropriate law enforcement authority. As it happened, the Respondent attempted to use his official position of authority to secure a benefit for himself, his girlfriend and/or her child, that is, to coerce the alleged perpetrator (Ms. Clark) and to thereby keep her from interacting with the minor again. Despite the counseling on September 21, 2002, and in contrast to his testimony in this cause on October 15, 2003 (that his relationship with Ms. Brown ended "like the second week of September of 2002"), the Respondent's relationship with Ms. Brown did not end in September 2002. The weight of the credible evidence supports the finding that the Respondent continued seeing Ms. Brown after the second week of September 2002 and knew or should have known that she associated with persons whose reputations were less than stellar. In fact, the Respondent admitted that he utilized resources available to him through the Sheriff's Office to run background checks on at least two of Ms. Brown's friends because he thought they were "no good." More telling, however, is the fact that the Respondent admitted receiving and delivering to Ms. Brown what he believed were narcotic pills (from Dan Faircloth). The Respondent admitted that Ms. Brown did not go to physicians or doctors on a regular basis for treatment. He also knew that Mr. Faircloth was neither a doctor nor a pharmacist. Finally, the Respondent knew that Ms. Brown continued to receive and take pills for her alleged pain. How the Respondent could have imagined it appropriate for Mr. Faircloth to supply drugs to Ms. Brown is not explained in this record. Whether or not the pills actually were a controlled substance is unknown. It is certain the Respondent believed them to be. Eventually, the Respondent admitted to his superior that he found a crack pipe in his apartment (presumably owned by Ms. Brown). When the incident of the pipe came out, the Respondent was again instructed to break off his relationship with Ms. Brown. As late as November 2002 the Respondent continued to be in contact with Ms. Brown. The Sheriff's Office was by that time so concerned regarding the Respondent's poor judgment in his selection of associates that Lt. Spears felt compelled to write a memorandum to her superior regarding various allegations. One of the incidents that triggered an internal affairs investigation was the Respondent's disclosure to Ms. Brown that the Sheriff's Office was looking for one of her former friends. Ms. Brown tipped the person (for whom an arrest warrant had been issued) off that deputies were looking for her. Based upon the warning of her impending arrest, the suspect fled the jurisdiction. Ultimately, the suspect's arrest was delayed due to the Respondent's disclosure of the warrant information to Ms. Brown. At some point a reasonable person, and certainly a trained law enforcement officer, should have known that Ms. Brown and her associates were not appropriate persons with whom to socialize. In fact, when the Respondent elected to run a background check on Ms. Brown (presumably to check the status of her driving privileges) because he did not want her to drive his vehicle without a valid license, he should have questioned whether or not he should associate with someone he might not be able to trust. When two of her friends were arrested as a result of his checks on them, he should have clearly known to disassociate from Ms. Brown. That he remained in the relationship for as long as he did is incomprehensible. The Respondent offered no rational explanation for his behavior.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, enter a final order finding the Respondent failed to maintain good moral character as required by law and that the Respondent's certification be revoked based upon the severity of the conduct, the number of violations established by this record, and the lack of mitigating circumstances to support a lesser penalty. S DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9675 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Linton B. Eason, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Roy M. Kinsey, Jr., Esquire Kinsey, Troxel, Johnson & Walborsky, P.A. 438 East Government Street Pensacola, Florida 32502
The Issue Whether Respondent employer is guilty of an unlawful employment practice, to wit: failure to accommodate Petitioner's handicap and termination of Petitioner, on the basis of handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an adult African-American male. After retiring from the United States Army with an excellent reputation, Petitioner was hired by Respondent Department of Corrections. When Respondent hired Petitioner it was aware he had a 10 percent physical impairment, as assigned by the Veterans' Administration (VA). Petitioner completed 512 hours of training and was certified as a Correctional Officer, pursuant to the Florida Statutes. At all times material, he was a "vested" State career service employee. Petitioner sustained an on-the-job injury on February 11, 2003, while employed by Respondent. Apparently, Petitioner was adequately performing his job duties up through the date of his injury. Respondent Employer provided workers' compensation and medical benefits as required by Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. These benefits were monitored by the State Risk Management Office within the Department of Insurance. The Employer instructed Petitioner not to return to work until he was medically released to return to work. Petitioner's injury was a torn medial meniscus (knee joint injury). He underwent collagen injections and lengthy physical therapy, but no surgery. His treating physician was Dr. Aguero. On July 21, 2003, Petitioner underwent a Functional Capacity Evaluation by a physical therapist. The report of this evaluation was typed up two days later and showed, in pertinent part, that: Mr. Brown demonstrated the capacity to sustain work tasks in the light strength category of physical demands. His . . . previous job was corrections officer. That job is estimated to be in the medium strength category. Known job duties of concern or particular relevance include: ability to move rapidly and to perform take- down and restraint procedures. Risk Management employees urged the treating physician to release Petitioner to return to work. On July 30, 2003, Dr. Aguero released Petitioner to return to work on light duty, with restrictions on standing, walking, and lifting. Presumably, Dr. Aguero believed Petitioner would be reassigned by the employer to appropriate light duty work until he reached maximum medical improvement from his knee injury. The Employer Department of Corrections, in fact, did assign Petitioner to "alternate duty" work when he returned to the correctional institution on or about July 30, 2003. Petitioner worked in the mail room for approximately three weeks thereafter. As of July 30, 2003, in addition to his 10 percent rating of permanent partial disability from the VA, Petitioner had gained a great deal of weight due to inactivity during the post-knee injury period. He also suffered from arthritis. On or about August 18, 2003, Dr. Aguero filled out a Workers' Compensation Maximum Medical Improvement (MMI) Form, designating that Petitioner had improved from his on-the-job injury as much as could be reasonably medically expected. As of that date, Dr. Aguero assigned him an additional two percent permanent partial disability rating, due to his on-the-job accident. The two percent rating carried continued work restrictions. Dr. Aguero provided the results of Petitioner's July 21, 2003, Functional Capacity Test score to the Employer (see Finding of Fact 6) attached to his MMI rating. Dr. Aguero's employment restrictions for Petitioner, post-MMI, as stated on the official MMI Form, say "See FCE," meaning that Dr. Aguero had adopted, as his restrictions on Petitioner, the functional abilities described in the July 21, 2003, Functional Capacity Evaluation Report. This meant that Petitioner was found by the physical therapist testing him to be unable to do these tasks on July 21, 2003, and the medical physician was saying for July 30, 2003, that Petitioner had achieved all the improvement he was going to achieve from the knee injury and he should not be required to do these activities on the job because he could not do them and trying to do them could be harmful to him. These restrictions included no extended periods of standing/walking, no balancing, and no significant lifting. Also, Petitioner was listed as being unable to lift 50 pounds, routinely. Essential Function A-4 of the Essential Functions of a Correctional Officer, which the Department of Corrections has adopted as its minimum standards for employment as a Correctional Officer, requires that a Correctional Officer be able to: Sit, walk, and stand for prolonged periods of time; stoop, squat, kneel, bend, run, and lift approximately 50 pounds on a routine basis. Within a day of receiving the MMI package, Petitioner's highest superior, the Warden, sent Petitioner home. Petitioner was subsequently provided a Predetermination Conference and a dismissal letter. Petitioner claimed to have begged to stay on in alternate duty positions, but neither he nor any of his local supervisors reported these requests for light duty or other accommodation of his permanent condition to the Employer's Americans With Disabilities Act Coordinator, Martie Taylor. It was not necessary under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, for Petitioner to do more than ask his supervisors for an accommodation, but Ms. Taylor testified that even if Petitioner's supervisors had properly relayed his requests for accommodation to her, she knew of no way the Employer could have accommodated Petitioner's lifting restrictions. Petitioner related that supervisors made comments to him that they needed a fully functional "soldier in the field" and that his obesity and inability to run and subdue prisoners rendered him not fully functional as a correctional officer. Petitioner believes that his large size is an asset in commanding and subduing inmates but that Respondent is prejudiced against his size. Petitioner testified that he knew of insulin-dependent diabetics and of other obese correctional officers who did very well at regular employment with the Employer and that he knew of other correctional officers whom the Employer had permitted to stay employed at light duty longer than he had been allowed to stay on light duty. However, Petitioner had no knowledge of whether these employees had reached MMI or of which essential requirements of the job of Correctional Officer they were able, or unable, to perform while they were on light duty. In fact, the Department of Correction's Procedure 208.10, covering "Career service employee's right to alternate duty assignments," reads, in pertinent part: SPECIFIC PROCEDURES COORDINATION OF ALTERNATE DUTY: . . . * * * (c) The department does not have specific alternate duty positions. The employee will remain in her/his current position while performing alternate duties. * * * Certified Officers: Individuals employed in a certified officer's position must be prepared and able at all times to perform the essential functions of his/her position. If approved for alternate duty, an employee in a certified officer's position will be temporarily assigned to non-certified officer duties for the period of time during which the employee is determined by the Division of Risk Management to have a temporary partial disability. * * * (8) MAXIMUM MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT (c) When maximum medical improvement has been determined by the treating physical and information has been provided to the Division of Risk Management, the employee will be reassigned the duties and responsibilities of her/his regular position unless the employee cannot perform the essential functions of the position. In no way will the employee be allowed to continue to perform alternate duties once the maximum medical improvement has been determined by the Division of Risk Management. (Emphasis supplied) Petitioner pursued his employment rights before the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC). PERC's Final Order (January 8, 2004) on this matter determined as a factual finding that Petitioner could not perform the essential duties of a correctional officer and accepted the hearing officer's findings of fact. Brown v. Dept. of Corrections, 19 FCSR 9 (2004). More specifically, the PERC hearing officer found that "Brown received maximum medical improvement on July 30, 2003, with a two percent impairment," and that "the doctor indicated on the evaluation that Brown has work restrictions and he cannot perform the standing and walking requirements of a correctional officer." At hearing, Brown indicated that he cannot perform the duties of a correctional officer . . . . He also stated that he cannot run . . . . In sum, the Agency demonstrated that it is undisputed that Brown cannot perform the essential duties of a correctional officer." Since there were no appeals, the findings of fact of the PERC hearing officer between the same two parties are res judicata; are presumed correct, and are binding herein as a matter of law. Some findings also constituted admissions of Petitioner. Loss of employment has been very hard on Petitioner and his family. On September 11, 2003, Petitioner applied for a disabled person license plate, reciting that he was so ambulatory disabled that he could not walk 200 feet without stopping to rest, and that he is severely limited in his walk due to an arthritic, neurological, or orthopedic condition. His treating physician signed this application, attesting to Petitioner's listed conditions. Petitioner's Answers to Respondent's Requests for Admission in the instant case concedes that he can perform jobs other than those of a correctional officer. Petitioner's testimony at hearing was to the effect that he still cannot perform all the duties of a correctional officer.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief and the Charge of Discrimination herein, and awarding no attorney's fees or costs to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Horace Brown, Jr. 2012 Bradley Avenue Valdosta, Georgia 31602 Mark Simpson, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399
