The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 463.014, Florida Statutes, by violating Rule 64B13-3.008(15)(a), Florida Administrative Code; violated Section 463.014, Florida Statutes, by violating Rule 64B13-3.008(15)(f), Florida Administrative Code; violated Section 463.016(1)(h), Florida Statutes, by violating Rule 64B13-3.009(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code; and violated Section 463.016(1)(f), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed to practice optometry by the State of Florida, Board of Optometry. On or about April 19, 1998, Respondent entered into a lease agreement captioned "Equipment License," with U.S. Visions, Corp., to lease space and equipment as an optometric office in the J. C. Penney retail store on Mary Esther Avenue, Mary Esther, Florida. This location also constitutes the Santa Rosa Mall. Respondent paid $100.00 monthly rent for this office space. At all times material, Respondent also maintained a separate office for the practice of optometry under the name "Coastal Vision Center" in rental space in Destin, Florida. Respondent paid $2,900.00 monthly rent for the Destin office space. Respondent practiced in both locations during 1998. Respondent practiced under a professional corporation, named Shannon Fowler, O.D., P.A. Respondent's office space at the J.C. Penney location was inside the J.C. Penney retail store. Adjacent to Respondent's office space was the "J.C. Penney Optical Center," in which an optometrist practiced, and in which eyeglasses, contact lenses, and other optical merchandise could be purchased. Respondent personally placed a sign at the entrance to his office space at the J.C. Penney location identifying himself by name, stating that an independent practice of optometry was located there, and stating that he was not affiliated with the J.C. Penney retail store. During the time he practiced at the leased office space located in the J.C. Penney store, Respondent maintained telephones listed in his name at both his office locations. The telephone number for his office in J.C. Penney was different than the telephone number for his Destin office. Only Respondent, himself, answered Respondent's telephone at the J.C. Penney location. This telephone and telephone number were separate and had a different telephone number from the telephones for the J.C. Penney Optical Center. The receptionist at the J.C. Penney Optical Center occasionally made appointments with Respondent for persons who walked into the J. C. Penney Optical Center or who telephoned the J. C. Penney Optical Center telephone, but all such appointments were subject to confirmation by Respondent. There was no formal arrangement or agreement for the J. C. Penney Optical Center receptionist to make appointments over the Optical Center telephone for Respondent, and Respondent did not pay the receptionist. However, Petitioner benefited if the appointments she made were confirmed by him and actually kept by the patient. All of Respondent's patients at either location were advised that Respondent maintained an office in Destin, and all of his patients were advised to call a third telephone number, Respondent's cell phone number, for after-hours or emergency matters. All after-hours matters were handled at the Destin office by Respondent. However, patient files for patients that Respondent saw solely at the J.C. Penney location were stored by Respondent at that location. Respondent had no after-hours access to the J.C. Penney store. If there were an emergency, Respondent would have to obtain the patient's file the following day. At both office locations, Respondent, alone, determined which patients to see, what examinations and procedures to conduct, what optometry services to render, and what fees to charge any patients for his services. The lease agreement for Respondent's office space at J.C. Penney contained provisions precluding U.S. Visions Corp. from interfering with, or regulating, Respondent's independent practice of optometry in the office space he had leased. The lease agreement also contained a provision by which U.S. Vision Corp. covenanted not to violate Florida law. Respondent's lease with U.S. Visions Corp. prohibited his selling "frames, contacts, and related items" at the J.C. Penney location. Respondent did maintain inventory, employ an optometrist, and sell eyeglasses, lenses and frames at the Destin location. Respondent worked out of the J.C. Penney location three half-days per week on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays. When requested by the patient, Respondent accepted the J.C. Penney credit card as payment for optometric services rendered at that location. When such card was used by a patient to pay for Respondent's services, J.C. Penney processed the payment and billed the patient directly. J.C. Penney rendered accounting and payment in full to Respondent for services charged on the credit cards on a bi-monthly basis. There is no evidence as to whether payment to Respondent was, or was not, affected by a delinquent payment by a patient to J.C. Penney. Respondent also accepted payment for his services rendered to patients at either location by check, cash, and Visa, Mastercard, and American Express credit cards. The patient elected which manner of payment to tender. Respondent's business records indicate that all of these forms of payment were utilized by patients at both locations. J.C. Penney charged a two-percent (2%) processing fee for the collection and accounting of services charged by patients on their J.C. Penney credit card. This fee, and the manner in which J.C. Penney processed the payments charged to the J. C. Penney credit card, are comparable to, and do not materially differ from, the typical arrangements between small business merchants and issuers of the other major credit cards which Respondent accepted. Unrefuted testimony of a certified public accountant employed by Respondent was to the effect that the financial records of Respondent's two optometry offices for 1998 show no indication that J.C. Penney exercised any influence or control over Respondent's independent practice of optometry or billing practices, and in fact, indicate that J.C. Penney did not. There is no evidence that the Respondent ever used prescription forms or any other forms referring to J.C. Penney at either of his office locations. On July 12, 1998, an advertisement appeared in the Sunday supplement to the "Northwest Florida Daily News" under the heading "J.C. Penney Optical Center," advertising a "FREE eye exam & 50% off frames." In very small print, the advertisement said, "we'll pay for your eye exam for eyeglasses by deducting up to $40 from your prescription eyeglass purchase." The advertisement specified "Santa Rosa Mall." The J.C. Penney Optical Center is not a licensed optometrist. A corporation can never hold an optometrist license. Only an individual can be licensed as an optometrist in Florida. The record is silent as to who or what entity placed the advertisement. Respondent was not named in the advertisement. Respondent did not place the advertisement. There is no evidence that Respondent had any involvement in the text or publication of the advertisement. Respondent did not have any prior knowledge that the advertisement was going to be published. U.S. Visions Corp. had never published any advertisement prior to July 1998, and Respondent did not foresee that the subject advertisement would be published. Respondent had no opportunity or means to prevent the publication of the advertisement. Respondent did not approve of, or consent to, the publication or content of the advertisement. Respondent had no opportunity to review the advertisement prior to publication. The lease for the J.C. Penney office location did not provide for U.S. Vision Corp. to do any advertising for Respondent. Respondent had no arrangements for advertising with either U.S. Vision Corp. or J.C. Penney. Respondent did not contemporaneously see the advertisement. He learned about it only through service of notice of the Department of Health's investigation into the advertisement, which ultimately resulted in this case. No patient or potential patient ever brought the advertisement or the coupon in the advertisement to Respondent or ever requested that the Respondent provide optometry services in accordance with the advertisement or the coupon. Respondent did not provide any optometry services in accordance with the advertisement or coupon, and would not have done so if requested. Respondent received no benefit from the advertisement. Respondent provided no "FREE" eye exams. The Respondent charged $49 per eye exam. The agency's expert witness, a licensed optometrist and former member of the Board of Optometry, testified that he believed that, on its face, the advertisement implied an association or affiliation between Respondent and J.C. Penney; that an optometrist practicing at J.C. Penney could be expected to benefit from the advertisement because of the content of the advertisement; that the advertisement was misleading because a person reading it would expect an eye exam to be "FREE"; and that when there is a lessor-lessee relationship of the type presented in this case, the Respondent optometrist has a responsibility to ensure that advertisements conform to the optometry statute and rules. The same expert witness testified that Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, does not prohibit optometrists from commercial establishments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Optometry enter a final order dismissing Counts II, III, and IV, finding Respondent guilty of Count I of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, and issuing a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2001.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Walt Disney World, violated Section 760.08, Florida Statutes (2006), as alleged in the Petition for Relief in this matter.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a Caucasian male, born in Puerto Rico. He is an amateur photographer. He had visited Walt Disney World at least ten times prior to December 1, 2006. Respondent owns and operates a theme park in Orange and Osceola Counties, Florida. Respondent employs individuals with the job title, "security host," with the responsibility of maintaining security in the theme park. This category of employees is licensed by the State of Florida, and they receive training in "abnormal behavior of guests," threat analysis, surveillance, intelligence, and other job-related skills incidental to maintaining a safe environment within the theme park. Respondent has a specific protocol regarding theme park guests exhibiting "abnormal behavior." In the context of this case, taking photographs in the theme park is not an "abnormal behavior." In fact, guests are encouraged to photograph those accompanying them and various theme park characters, e.g., Mickey Mouse. However, excessive photographing of structures, "mapping or progression photography," is considered "abnormal behavior." "Mapping" consists of taking pictures in a progression, so as to familiarize someone who has never been to an area with the layout of that area and is considered very unusual behavior. Petitioner entered the Magic Kingdom, part of Respondent's theme park, on December 1, 2006. A security host observed Petitioner photographing the main entrance and security bag check. Petitioner was unaccompanied. The subject matter and manner of Petitioner's photography was considered to be "abnormal" by the security host. Once a security cast member identifies potentially abnormal behavior by a guest, the protocol requires the security host to contact a member of management (by radio) and continue to observe the guest. Petitioner moved further into the Magic Kingdom and took photographs of Main Street and City Hall. Because Petitioner was limiting his photography to structures, the security host's initial impression that Petitioner was doing something "abnormal" was reinforced and, in accordance with the established protocol, he again called management. As further dictated by Respondent's security protocol, the uniformed security host is then met by an "undercover" security host whose job-responsibility is "real-time threat analysis." The "threat-analysis" security host continued to observe Petitioner as he took what was interpreted by the security host to be "panoramic" photographs of Town Square and "mapping" photographs of the interior of the train station. He, too, assessed Petitioner's photographic activities as "abnormal." Because the "threat analysis" security host concurred with the initial determination of "abnormal," the security protocol dictates that a security manager make contact with the guest. This was done in a discreet and unobtrusive manner. The security manager identified himself as an employee of Respondent and asked Petitioner if "he could do anything to assist him." Petitioner did not respond, so the security manager repeated himself. Respondent responded that he "was not an Arab terrorist," or words to that effect. His response was louder than conversational, and he appeared to be agitated. Because Petitioner was uncooperative, the security manager called a uniformed law enforcement officer, an Orange County, Florida, deputy sheriff, as dictated by Respondent's security protocol. The deputy sheriff asked for, and received, Petitioner's driver license. After a license check revealed that Petitioner's address was valid, he was allowed to pursue his activities in the theme park. His interaction with the security manager and deputy sheriff lasted approximately 15 minutes. Petitioner then returned to his theme park photography without limitation and spent an additional two hours in the theme park, until his camera's battery pack ran down. He did not have any further interaction with Respondent's security personnel, nor was he kept under surveillance. Petitioner returned to Respondent's theme park on December 9, 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2006 (he had an annual pass), had access to all facilities without difficulty, and had no encounters with Respondent's security personnel. The incident that occurred on December 6, 2006, was a result of Petitioner's photography being identified as "abnormal." There is no evidence that it was precipitated by his national origin or that Respondent was not exercising reasonable diligence in an effort to protect theme park visitors and employees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Jose M. Gandia, failed to present a prima facie case of discrimination based on national origin, and, therefore, this matter should be dismissed in its entirety and a determination be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations that Respondent, Walt Disney World, did not violate the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jose M. Gandia 3054 Holland Drive Orlando, Florida 32825 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802-4956
The Issue Whether the Department acted arbitrarily and capriciously in giving notice of its intended award of a contract for the purchase of optical character reading equipment to Scan Optics?
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with the administration of Florida's unemployment compensation insurance program. The Department's Bureau of Claims and Benefits (hereinafter referred to as the "Bureau") is responsible for receiving claims for unemployment insurance benefits and for the disbursement of unemployment insurance payments. In processing and paying claims for unemployment insurance benefits, the Bureau must work with the Comptroller, who issues the payment checks. The Comptroller's office has been issuing checks on IBM punch cards. The Bureau has also been using IBM punch cards in processing unemployment insurance claims so that the punch cards could be collated with the IBM punch card checks issued by the Comptroller. In early 1984, the Bureau was informed that IBM card stock would no longer be printed. In early 1985, the Bureau was informed by the Comptroller's office that the Comptroller was going to begin to use paper warrants for the payment of benefits instead of IBM cards. As a result of this change, the Department is no longer able to use checks issued by the Comptroller to collate with its IBM punch cards. Because of the switch to paper warrants by the Comptroller, the Department began in 1985 to look at other technologies capable of efficiently working with paper warrants. The Bureau formed a committee to explore alternatives. That committee researched alternatives and visited other states to determine how other states were processing claims. The Department decided to purchase an optical character reader (hereinafter referred to as an OCR), for use in processing unemployment compensation claims. An OCR is a device which reads printed or handwritten characters. It scans a document, reads characters by comparing them to a mask or template and reads and records the data. The Department plans to use the OCR to read and record data from certifications for unemployment compensation insurance benefits. The data recorded will be transferred to the Department's mainframe IBM computer for use in processing by an automated benefits system. The Petitioner and Scan Optics are manufacturers of OCR equipment. Scan Optics has been manufacturing OCR equipment for 20 years. The Department requested a list of vendors from the Division of Purchasing and received a list of 167 potential vendors. On July 14, 1986, the Department issued a Request for Proposals (hereinafter referred to as the "RFP"), seeking competitive bids for the purchase by the Department of an OCR. All 167 potential vendors were notified of the RFP by the Department. Approximately 25 of the potential vendors requested a copy of the RFP. Only the Petitioner and Scan Optics submitted proposals in response to the RFP. A 6 member committee appointed by the Department prepared the RFP. Three members of the committee were employees of the Bureau and three members were employees of the Department's Bureau of Computer Data Systems. A request for proposal is a solicitation by an agency of offers from potential vendors to provide a needed commodity or service. It is different from a bid where the agency simply identifies the product it wishes to purchase and chooses the vendor offering the product at the lowest cost. The RFP set forth the Department's functional requirements and asked vendors to respond in any manner which they believed would meet those requirements. In the RFP, the Department stated the requirements which vendors were required to meet, evaluation criteria and the weight to be given to those criteria. It was also provided that responses would be verified by documentation and demonstration in a benchmark test. In the RFP, vendors were informed that if they disputed the reasonableness, necessity, or competitiveness of the RFP they must file a protest in accordance with Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Paragraph 8 of the General Conditions. Vendors were also informed that any questions concerning the conditions and specifications of the RFP had to be submitted in writing to the Department no later than 10 days prior to the proposal opening and that "[n]o interpretation shall be considered binding unless provided in writing by the State of Florida in response to request in full compliance with this provision." Paragraph 5 of the General Conditions. Section 1.07 of the RFP instructed vendors to examine the RFP to determine if the requirements were clearly stated. Section 1.10 of the RFP provided that only written and signed vendor communications would be considered and that only written communications from the purchasing off ice would be considered authoritative. The Petitioner did not file a protest of the terms of the RFP pursuant to Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes. Section 1.03 of the RFP provided for a vendors conference at which the contents of the RFP and any written inquiries from the vendors could be discussed. The Petitioner and Scan Optics submitted written questions to the Department. The vendors' conference was scheduled and conducted on July 30, 1986. Representatives of the Petitioner and Scan Optics attended the vendors' conference. The questions submitted by the Petitioner and Scan Optics were discussed. At the commencement of the vendors' conference, the Department's representative cautioned all present that statements made during the conference would not modify the RFP. This representation was heard and understood by the Petitioner's representative at the vendors' conference. Subsequent to the vendors' conference, the Department issued amendments to the RFP. The cover letter dated August 7, 1986, conveying the amendments to the Petitioner stated that any questions about the amendments had to be received in writing in the Office of Purchasing no later than 5:00 p.m., August 12, 1986. Draft samples of claims' certification forms and paper stock described in Section 3.01.18 of the RFP were also sent to the Petitioner and Scan Optics. The Petitioner did not submit any additional questions about the RFP or the amendments before 5:00 p.m., August 12, 1986. The Department proposed to accept Scan Optics' proposal and purchase the OCR from Scan Optics. The Petitioner brought this administrative action challenging the Department's proposed action. Chapter I of the RFP contains administrative and general information. Chapter II of the RFP contains a description of the Department's current system, a list of proposed OCR applications and the objective of the Department. Chapter III of the RFP sets out the technical requirements. Mandatory requirements and desirable requirements are provided. The terms "mandatory requirement" are defined in Section 1.17.ao of the RFP as follows: "Mandatory Requirement" shall be defined as a requirement the vendor must meet for the proposal to be considered responsive, failure to meet a mandatory requirement will cause the proposal to be rejected. The terms desirable requirement" are defined in Section 1.17.ak of the RFP as follows: "Desirable Requirement" shall be defined as a function, feature, or service the State considers necessary for optimal application flexibility, ease of system operation, or system reliability. Failure to meet a desirable requirement will result in a lower technical evaluation. The technical requirements set out the specifications which the Department had determined must (mandatory) or should (desirable) be met in order for an OCR to fulfill the Department's objectives. Chapter IV of the RFP provides the evaluation process the Department was to follow in determining which proposal to accept. The evaluation process was to include the awarding of points for compliance with the technical requirements. The RFP also included provisions designed to ensure that the representations of a vendor in a proposal would be fulfilled, including a benchmark test to verify certain representations of a vendor and acceptance testing after the equipment was purchased and installed. The general objective of the Department was provided in Section 2.04 of the RFP: The State wishes to procure an Optical Character Reading System with related soft- ware capable of meeting the requirements for the reading of UI benefit certifications and other UI applications that are feasible. The Optical Character Reading System will consist of a [sic] Optical Character Reader (OCR) and Correction System. The complete System will be bought from a single vendor. Section 1.17.ap of the RFP defines "objective" as: A statement describing generally the system to be procured. Any proposed system not meeting the objective will be rejected. Although Section 2.03.3 of the RFP provides that processing of quarterly wage reports is a major application, the RFP does not require that the proposed OCR equipment must be capable of this application. The only requirement is that the objective" be met. The reference to "other UI applications that are feasible" in the objective was intended to refer to future applications of the OCR which the Department only wanted to be aware of. There was no requirement that proposed OCR's be capable of other applications. The RFP made it clear that proposals would be based on the technical requirements of Chapter III of the RFP and would be evaluated pursuant to Chapter IV of the RFP. When these chapters and the "objective" are considered it is clear that the Department was proposing to purchase an OCR to perform the task of reading unemployment insurance claims forms and not wage reports. The responses to the RFP submitted by the Petitioner and Scan Optics were evaluated by the committee established by the Department to prepare the RFP. The committee determined whether the vendors met the mandatory requirements of the RFP and allocated points for mandatory and desirable requirements based upon the vendors' responses. The committee's evaluation consisted of 3 stages as required by the RFP. First, the committee evaluated and scored the vendors' technical responses. Each vendor was awarded points for their responses to the mandatory and desirable requirements as provided in the RFP. The committee fairly and reasonably applied the scoring system. Secondly, the committee evaluated and scored the vendors' cost responses as provided in the RFP. Finally, each vendor's scores were added. The vendor with the highest score was then given an opportunity to subject its proposed system to a benchmark test. The RFP provided that only the vendor with the highest points from the first 2 stages of the evaluation would be subjected to the benchmark test. The benchmark test was used by the Department to verify some of the statements in the highest scoring vendor's response, including some responses which the committee had some questions about during the evaluation. Based upon the committee's evaluation, Scan Optics was selected as the highest scoring vendor and its proposed system was subjected to the benchmark test. The benchmark test is provided for in Chapter X of the RFP. If Scan Optics' system had failed the benchmark test with regard to a mandatory requirement, its proposal would have been rejected. If it had failed to fulfill a desirable requirement, its response would have been rescored. The benchmark test was designed to give some assurances that a vendor's claims were correct. The test gave the committee confidence that the vendor was providing accurate information. Scan Optics' system successfully completed the benchmark test. During the first two stages of the evaluation, the committee looked at each vendor's total response, read all of the documentation submitted by the vendors and did all the research it could without actually having the system itself to evaluate. Not every response of the vendor was verified with absolute certainty. It was necessary for the Department to exercise judgment and discretion in determining whether responses were responsive to the RFP. Each response was evaluated as a whole and relevant information contained in one response was considered in evaluating other responses. Both vendors' responses were reviewed carefully. Both vendors provided responses which were not as thorough as the committee desired. The committee exercised its discretion in those instances and reviewed all documentation and the complete response to determine if sufficient information had been provided to conclude that a response was acceptable. Clarification or explanation of some responses was requested by the committee from both vendors. The manner in which mandatory responses were to be evaluated is provided in Section 1.06 of the RFP: The State has established certain requirements with respect to Request for Proposals to be submitted by vendors. The use of "shall", must" or "will" (except to indicate simple futurity) in this Request indicates a require- ment or condition from which a material deviation may not be waived by the State. A deviation is material if the deficient response is not in substantial accord with this Request for Proposal requirements [sic] provides an advantage to one vendor over other vendors, has a potentially significant effect on the quantity or quality or items proposed, or on the cost to the State. Material deviations cannot be waived. Determining whether a deviation was material required the Department to use discretion. The RFP does not require rejection of a proposal if a desirable requirement was not met. Section 1.06 of the RFP provides the following with regard to desirable requirements: The words "should" or "may" in this Request for Proposal indicate desirable attributes or conditions, but are permissive in nature. Deviation from, or omission of, such a desirable feature, will not in itself cause rejection of a proposal. In determining whether a mandatory requirement was met, the committee determined if a vendor's response indicated that the requirement could be met. If there was any question about the vendor's response, the committee then evaluated the response to determine if the response was sufficient to justify rejecting the entire proposal. This is a reasonable approach. The Department, through its committee, exercised its discretion fairly and equitably in reviewing each vendor's response. Scan Optics proposed a 442 system in response to the RFP. A 4542 system consists of two primary hardware component: a 4500 editing system and a 542 optical scanner. Section 3.01.1 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement The Vendor must supply documentation indicating the proposed System's capabilities to meet each mandatory and desirable item listed in this RFP. The documentation must refer to the section and item number it applies to in this RFP. There is no requirement in the RFP that the documentation provided by a vendor be listed. Scan Optics provided a great deal of documentation with its response. The Department reasonably concluded that the documentation provided met the requirement of Section 3.01.1 of the RFP. A list of most of Scan Optics' documentation was provided with its response. In addition to the documentation listed, Scan Optics provided a Model 542 Product Guide and a Model 533/542 Operator's Manual. Scan Optics' Models 530 and 540 optical scanners are very similar to their Model 542. The designation 540 refers to a family of optical scanners which includes the Model 542. Most of the information concerning the operation and capacity of the 540 also applies to the 542. Differences are due to greater capacity and speed of the 542 and internal differences. All of the documentation supplied by Scan Optics was considered by the committee in its evaluation and was determined to satisfy the requirement of Section 3.01.1 of the RFP. The committee talked with representatives of Scan Optics to determine whether documents pertaining to Model 530/540 supplied to the Department were relevant. The Department was informed that the Model 542 was a member of the same family of models and the information provided in the Model 530/540 documents was also applicable to the Model 542. Manufacturers of computer equipment have constantly evolving families of models with a number of similarities. The use of manuals and guides which apply to a family line is a common practice. The committee reasonably accepted the Model 530/540 documents as documentation supporting the Model 542 proposed. Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP initially required that vendors show how the Initial System could be upgraded to meet a number of requirements, including the " [a]bility to read 700 different fonts including handprint in a multifont mode." The Petitioner submitted a written question which was discussed at the vendors' conference concerning the use of the term "fonts." There are not 700 fonts in the English language. An OCR is capable of scanning written documents and reading and recording the data contained thereon. Each particular design or style of a1phabetic (A to Z, in upper and lower case) and numeric (0 to 9) characters typed or written is called a font. Each style, or font, is unique and different from other styles. Characters are recognized and read by an OCR by templates or masks. Templates or masks determine an OCR's ability to read a particular character of different fonts. To read all the characters of one font, 36 masks or templates are needed. A single mask or template can read the same character, such as the letter "A" in more than one font. The question raised by the Petitioner was discussed at the vendors' conference and resulted in a written amendment to the mandatory requirement of Section 3.01.10.f. Section 3. 01.l0.f of the RFP, as amended, required that the Initial System be upgradeable to include the " [a]bility to read 700 different fonts/masks/templates, plus alpha numeric hand print." The Department and the vendors realized that Section 3. 01.10.f of the RFP, as amended, required that the ability to read 700 templates or masks, and not 700 fonts, was what was required. The Petitioner did not submit any questions concerning the amendment to Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP. The Petitioner's representative at the vendors' conference indicated that he understood the amendment and that the amendment eliminated the confusion created by the original requirement concerning "700 fonts." No statements were made by representatives of the Department during the vendors' conference concerning the requirement of Section 3.O1.10.f of the RFP, as amended. A statement concerning proposing a "maximum capability machine" was directed only to the Petitioner. The Department was aware that the Petitioner's maximum capability machine with regard to templates or masks was a machine with 720 templates. Therefore, the Petitioner was told that if it bid its maximum capability machine it would meet the requirement of Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP, as amended. This discussion was directed only at the Petitioner and was in response to the Petitioner's question, submitted in writing, about the requirement of Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP before it was amended. Section 3.01.10 of the RFP contains 7 subparagraphs labeled "a" through "g". Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.10 of the RFP contained only 5 subparagraphs labeled "a" through "e". The responses of Scan Optics did not correspond to the subparagraphs of Section 3.01.10 of the RFP. There was no requirement that they do so. One of the subparagraphs for which there was no labeled response from Scan Optics, Section 3.01.10.f of the RFP, pertains to upgrading the Initial System to read 700 templates. Scan Optics proposed a system which already contained 768 templates. There was therefore no requirement to explain how the system could be upgraded. The other subparagraph for which there was no labeled response from Scan Optics, Section 3.01.10.g of the RFP, pertains to upgrading the Initial System to include "necessary system CPU's and controllers." Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.10 of the RFP, when considered with other responses and the documentation provided, indicated that the Initial System would meet this provision. The Department reasonably determined that the response of Scan Optics to Section 3.01.10 of the RFP adequately explained how its system could be upgraded. Section 3.01.13 of the RFP contains the following mandatory requirement: The OCR must capture and store data on a 9-Track, 1600 and/or 6250 BPI EBCDIC Tape compatible with the equipment in use at the Caldwell Data Center at the State's Central Office in Tallahassee. Each tape drive in the proposed system must be usable for both output and input operations. The requirement of Section 3.01.13 of the RFP was amended to add the following sentence: The drives in use in the Data Caldwell Center [sic] are IBM 3420 Dual Density (1600 6250 BPI) with odd parity. In its response Scan Optics quoted the requirement without the amendment and then provided the following answer: The Scan-Optics Tape Drive provided is an operator selectable 1600 or 6250 BPI EBCDIC drive compatible with IBM equipment including the equipment in use at the Caldwell Data Center, and is capable of output or input. Although Scan Optics did not quote the requirement with the amendment, the amendment was included elsewhere in its response and Scan Optics' representatives were aware of the amendment. Even though Scan Optics did not correctly quote the requirement as amended, its response indicates that Scan Optics' proposal meets the amended requirement. Scan Optics indicated that its system is compatible with the Caldwell Data Center's equipment and identified the drives which it uses. The failure to quote the amended requirement was merely an oversight on the part of Scan Optics. There is no requirement that the requirements of the RFP be properly quoted or quoted at all in a response. Section 3.01.15 of the RFP, as amended, provides the following mandatory requirement: The OCR Microfilm camera must provide an image reduction ratio within the range of 40:1 to 50:1, image reduction in duplex mode and provide at least two (2) blip sizes based on Kodak IMT specifications which can be selected under program control. The system must be capable of filming any blip sizes based on predefined conditions on a document by document basis. In its response Scan Optics identified the range of its image reduction ratios and indicated that it would provide the blip sizes required. Although Scan Optics' response can be interpreted to indicate something which Scan Optics will be able to do in the future, the Department reasonably accepted Scan Optics' response. The committee knew that technology for meeting the microfilm requirement existed and was in use in the industry. Based upon documentation provided by Scan Optics, the committee also knew that the reduction ratios could be provided by Scan Optics because its camera was under program control and was therefore adjustable. Because the camera was under program control, the committee knew that it could be adjusted to provide two blip sizes. The committee also knew that if Scan Optics was selected as the high scorer as a result of the first two phases of the evaluation its camera would be subjected to the benchmark test. In fact, Scan Optics' camera was subjected to the benchmark test and demonstrated that the requirements of Section 3.01.15 of the RFP could be met. Scan Optics properly responded Section 3.01.15 of the RFP and the Department reasonably accepted its response. Section 3.01.18 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement: The OCR must be capable of processing documents with a paper weight range from 20 lbs. to 110 lbs. A paper thickness of .0075 inch capability is required. Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.18 of the RFP was as follows: Standard Scan-Optics specification of paper weight is from 20 lbs. to 100 lbs. However, Scan-Optics personnel will modify the transport vacuum pumps and perform the necessary pre- ventative maintenance routines to accomplish the additional 10 percent requirement at the higher paper range, as we have done in numerous other installations. Scan Optics' total response indicates that it can meet the requirement of Section 3.01.18 of the RFP. The Department reasonably accepted the response. The Department-knew that similar equipment was frequently modified to fit specific jobs, that Scan Optics had indicated that it had modified its equipment in "numerous other installations" and that Scan Optics had indicated that it would modify its transport system. The Department also knew that the ability to process 110 lb. paper would be benchmark tested. The vendors were provided with sample forms which were .0075 inch thick and 110 lb. weight. This was the actual paper used by the Comptroller. Scan Optics' ability to meet the requirement of Section 3.01.18 of the RFP was tested and demonstrated in the benchmark test. Section 3.01.43 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement: "The Vendor must propose to provide four (4) manuals for application and program development." Section 3.01.44 of the RFP provides the following mandatory requirement: "The Vendor must propose to provide three (3) sets of manuals for support of system operations. Scan Optics indicated that it would provide the manuals at the time the contract was awarded. There was no requirement that a vendor provide the manuals at the time a response was filed. Section 3.01.43 and Section 3.01.44 of the RFP only sought assurances that the manuals would be provided. Scan Optics' response to Section 3.01.43 and Section 3.01.44 of the RFP and the Department's acceptance of the response was reasonable. Prior to amendment, Section 3.03.2 of the RFP provided the following desirable requirement: The Vendor should be able to upgrade the OCR font recognition as the Vendor makes improve- ments in font recognition to improve OCR read rates. This upgrade should be installable by the State. Section 3.03.2 of the RF was renumbered as Section 3.02.2 and the last sentence was amended to provide: "This upgrade should be installable by the State or, if installed by the Vendor, at no additional cost to the State." Scan Optics' response quoted the requirement before the amendment. The response, however, indicated that the requirement, as amended, could be met and the amendment was included in another portion of the Scan Optics' response. The Department reasonably accepted the response of Scan Optics to Section 3.02.2 of the RFP. Section 3.02.3 of the RFP (originally numbered 3.03.3) includes a desirable requirement that vendors specify the projected number of desk weekly unemployment insurance claim certification documents a vendor's proposed system could process in one hour with no more than three operators -- one to operate the OCR and two to correct unrecognized characters. Section 3.02.3 of the RFP provides that the document to be processed and the rules for processing are described in Chapter x, Section 10.2 of the RFP. The vendor with the highest score was to be benchmark-tested pursuant to these rules to determine if the vendor's response was accurate. Chapter x, Section 10.2 of the RFP describes the data that would be included in the claim form, how the form would be completed, the weight of the paper and the styles or fonts which would be used. Section 3.02.3 of the RFP only requires that the number of documents processed be provided. Scan Optics' response to Section 3.02.3 of the RFP provided that "Scan-Optics throughput based upon your requirements above will be: 3,500 desk weekly UI claim certification forms in one hours [sic]." Scan Optics' response went on to repeat the criteria set out in the RFP and provided: "Therefore, because of the above variables, Scan-Optics throughput has been calculated using the following assumptions:" The response goes on to provide certain assumptions made by Scan Optics in calculating the number of documents it projected could be processed. The assumptions set out in Scan Optics' response do not expressly limit or condition its estimate of 3,500 documents per hour. The response was given with knowledge that the estimate would have to be proved to be accurate in the benchmark test. Scan Optics' response was based upon the use of a standard formula and was reduced from 4,800 to 3,500 in order to give a projection which could be met and accounted for loss of productivity due to jams, operator absence and other problems. The projection was tested by Scan Optics before the proposal was submitted to the Department. The Department accepted the projection of Scan Optics and awarded Scan Optics the maximum points available for the desirable requirement of Section 3.02.3 of the RFP, 280 points. The Department did not take into account the assumptions expressed by Scan Optics in its response. The evidence did not prove if the assumptions expressed by Scan Optics are inconsistent with the rules for processing which would be followed in the benchmark test. Scan Optics successfully demonstrated its ability to process 3,500 forms per hour in the benchmark test. The benchmark test did not incorporate the assumptions made by Scan Optics. The forms used in the test were completed by individuals who received less instructions than claimants and State employees who will actually complete the forms. Even the instructions given were not completely followed. The benchmark test provided an accurate test of Scan Optics' ability to process claims. The Department reasonably accepted Scan Optics response to Section 3.02.3 of the RFP. Section 1.14 of the RFP required vendors to provide five references where "similar or exact proposed equipment and Licensed Software is installed and operational." Section 4.05 of the RFP provided for the manner in which references were to be evaluated. Up to 10 points per reference could be awarded, up to a maximum of 50 points. Section 4.05.6 of the RFP defined "similar equipment and software" to mean equipment consisting of "an OCR with microfilm option that reads either numeric handprint or multifont." [Emphasis added]. The Petitioner and Scan Optics provided more than five references. All references were contacted. Five of the references provided by both vendors had similar equipment and software as defined by Section 4.05.6 of the RFP. Scan Optics' five satisfactory references were Newport News Ship Building, IRS Atlanta, Barnett Bank of Florida, State of Ohio Department of Taxation and State of Tennessee Department of Revenue. The Department reasonably concluded that the references provided by Scan Optics satisfied the requirement of Section 1.14 of the RFP. The Department did not evaluate Scan Optics' response in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Formal Written Protest and Petition for Formal Administrative Proceeding filed by the Petitioner, Recognition Equipment, Inc., be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 26th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4570 BID The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they were accepted. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reasons for their rejection have also been noted. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RO ." THE PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Proposed Finding RO Number of Acceptance or of Fact Number Reason for Rejection 1 RO 13. 2 RO 9 and 75-76. 3 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4 RO 25, 27 and 29. 5 Although this statement was made, see RO 81. 6 RO 34-35 and 60. 7 RO 45. 8 RO 34, 36 and 47. 9 RO 48. 10 Irrelevant. 11 RO 124 and 126. Although the first sentence is true, it is irrelevant. The second sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted in RO 83. The rest of the proposed finding of fact is irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is argument. The second sentence is irrelevant. If the Petitioner relied on oral state- ments such reliance was not reasonable. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although Mr. Stallworth did make the quoted statement, it does not expand the requirements specifically included in the RFP. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first two sentences are accepted in RO 49. The third and fourth sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 21 RO 57. 22 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. THE DEPARTMENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: 1 RO 1, 3 and 5. 2 RO 5-6 and 8. 3 RO 13 and 38. 4 RO 12 and 14-16. 5 RO 22-23. 6 RO 25. 7 RO 26-27. 8 RO 29. 9 RO 29-30. 10 RO 73-74. 11 RO 77-78. 12 RO 80. 13-15 RO 81. 16 RO 40-44. 17 RO 44. 18 RO 67-68. 19 RO 70. 20 RO 82-84. 21 RO 84. 22 RO 87-88 and 90. 23 RO 91. 24 RO 93-97. 25 RO 96. 26 RO 99-100. 27 RO 100 and 102. 28 RO 112-113. 29 RO 115-116. 30 RO 122. 31 RO 57. 32 RO 47-49. 33 RO 53. 34 RO 54-55. 35 Irrelevant. 36 RO 54. 37 RO 124 and 127. 38 RO 125. 39 RO 126. 40 RO 127. 41 RO 128. SCAN OPTICS' PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: 1 RO 1. RO 8. RO 9. 4 RO 75-76. 5 RO 76. 6 Irrelevant. 7 RO 10. 8 RO 11 and 26. 9 RO 11. 10 RO 1-2. 11 Irrelevant. 12 RO 3. 13 Hereby accepted. 14 RO 4. 15 RO 5. 16 RO 6. 17 RO 7. 18 RO 8. 19 RO 13. 20 RO 17. 21 RO 18 and 57. 22 RO 19. 23 RO 20. 24 RO 14-16. 25 RO 21. 26 RO 26. 27 RO 27. 28-29 RO 28. 30 Hereby accepted. 31 RO 29. 32 RO 30. 33 RO 32. 34 RO 33. 35 RO 34 and 37. 36 RO 37. 37 RO 38. 38 RO 39. 39 RO 39. The second and third sentences are irrelevant. 40 RO 40. 41 RO 43. 42 RO 44. 43 RO 42 and 44. 44 The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The second sentence is hereby accepted. 45 RO 45. 46 RO 56. 47 RO 57. 48 RO 58. 49 RO 59. 50 RO 60. 51 RO 61. 52 RO 62. 53 RO 52. 54 RO 53. 55 RO 54. 56 RO 63. Irrelevant. Hereby accepted. 59 RO 64. 60-64 Irrelevant. 65 RO 38, 47 and 49. 66 RO 47-49. 67 RO 49-51 and 55. 68 RO 65. 69 Hereby accepted. 70 RO 78. 71 RO 66-68 and 70. 72 Hereby accepted. 73 RO 69. 74 RO 70. 75 RO 71. 76 RO 72. 77 RO 78. 78 The first and last sentences are accepted in RO 78-79. The second sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 79 RO 75. 80 RO 82-84. 81 RO 84. 82 RO 85. 83 RO 92. 84 RO 93. 85 RO 95. 86 RO 96. 87 RO 97. 88 RO 98. 89 RO 99-100. 90 RO 101. 91 RO 100. 92 RO 102. 93 RO 86. 94 RO 87. 95 RO 88-90. 96 RO 103. 97 RO 106. 98 RO 105. 99 RO 106. 100 RO 107. 101 RO 104. 102 RO 105. 103 RO 107. 104 RO 108-109. 105 RO 110. 106 RO 111. 107 RO 112-113. 108 RO 114. 109 RO 113. 110 RO 115. 111 RO 116-117. 112 RO 119. The last sentence is irrelevant. 113 RO 118. 114 RO 121-122 Cumulative. Hereby accepted. 117 RO 123. 118 RO 124. 119 RO 125. 120 RO 126. 121 RO 127. 122 RO 128. 123 RO 129. 124 RO 130. 125 Not a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Edwin F. Blanton, Esquire Post Office Box 12808 Tallahassee, Florida 32317 Hugo Menendez Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0657 Leonard A. Carson, Esquire John D. C. Newton, II, Esquire Mahan Station 1711-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas J. McHale, Esquire Gager, Henry & Narkis One Exchange Place Post Office Box 2480 Waterbury, Connecticut 06722
The Issue Whether Petitioner's applications for two outdoor advertising signs in Sumter County, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this permitting dispute, Petitioner, Rite Media Enterprises, Inc., seeks the issuance of two state sign permits from Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT). In preliminary decisions dated August 24, 1998, DOT denied the applications on the ground the land owners had not given Petitioner permission to place the signs on their property. As an additional ground, DOT alleged that one sign violated the spacing requirements by being "[i]n conflict with a[n] existing permitted sign." Petitioner contends, however, that it has two legally enforceable leases with the property owners, and that its applications should be approved. If the applications are approved, the signs would be placed on two parcels of property near Interstate 75 in Sumter County, Florida, one on the east side and one on the west side of the highway. Both parcels are owned by Intervenors, William and Debra Farkus. On July 29, 1998, Dan Hucke, a real estate representative for Petitioner, was "scouting" for suitable billboard locations and decided that Intervenors' property would be a desirable location. After Hucke discussed the matter with Intervenors, the parties agreed to execute lease agreements that day for the two parcels of property in question. A copy of the lease agreements is found in Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 received in evidence. In Hucke's presence, both Debra and William Farkus executed each lease agreement and a Notice of Lease. The documents reflect that only one person, Hucke, served as a witness. Hucke then carried the agreements to Petitioner's president, who executed the agreements on behalf of the corporation. In addition, Hucke's wife, a notary public, placed her seal on the Notice of Lease indicating that the signatures had been signed in her presence after an oath was administered to the lessors. Intervenors were not present when the documents were notarized. The day after the documents were executed, Debra Farkus contacted Hucke by telephone. Hucke told her he would be in the area the following Monday (August 2) and they could "work out" any problems she might have with the agreements. The same day (July 30), Debra Farkus faxed a handwritten letter to Hucke advising him to "[c]ancel the lease as per our conversation immediately," and to not "record them as per our conversation." After receiving the cancellation notice, Hucke met briefly with the Intervenors, but contended at hearing that he could not recall the substance of that conversation. On the other hand, William Farkus testified that in that meeting he again reiterated his desire for the agreements to be cancelled. In any event, Hucke acknowledged that he left the meeting with the impression that the Intervenors objected to the agreements. Despite receiving the foregoing notice and oral advice from Intervenors, Hucke nonetheless believed he had valid leases. Whether he recorded the leases is not of record. However, he promptly filed two applications for sign permits with the DOT, and he enclosed a copy of the lease agreements to evidence the fact that he had the permission of the property owners. When a DOT inspector conducted a preliminary investigation of the applications, he learned that Intervenors did not consent to having the signs on their property. Under long-standing DOT policy (since at least 1992), when this type of dispute occurs, which the inspector says happens "[a]ll the time," it requires that the applicant either submit an affidavit (or present testimony at a hearing) evidencing the fact that the property owners have consented to the placement of a sign on their property, or submit an order of a circuit court reflecting that the lease agreement is enforceable. Where a dispute such as this occurs, in no circumstance does DOT attempt to construe the legal sufficiency of a lease agreement or adjudicate the rights of a party under a lease agreement. The foregoing policy is applied by the agency on a statewide basis, without discretion, and it has a logical and rational basis, particularly since an administrative agency lacks jurisdiction to construe contracts or make property-right determinations. At the hearing, Intervenors again stated that they did not authorize Petitioner to place its signs on their property. In addition, Petitioner did not submit a court order indicating that enforceable leases between the parties existed. DOT presented testimony which established that the proposed sign location in Case No. 98-4459T would violate statutory spacing requirements because the location conflicted with an existing nearby sign. There was no evidence to contradict this assertion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying the applications for state sign permits filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Andrew B. Thomas, Esquire Post Office Box 4961 Orlando, Florida 32802-4961 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' rejection of the Petitioner's bid, based on the facts and figures available on August 12, 1994, was a proper exercise of the Agency's discretion and was not arbitrary, fraudulent, illegal, or dishonest as to HRS lease No. 590:2500.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Department issued an Invitation to Bid (ITB) for Lease Number 590:2500 for office space in an existing building in a geographic area near Apopka, Florida for a ten (10) year lease with options. The ITB called for net square footage of 14,910 + 3 percent, measured in accordance with the Standard Method of Space Measurement. The ITB and Bid Submittal, including at page 16, Paragraph 10(c) of the Bid Submittal Form lists the documentation that is to be provided to the Respondent at the time of the bid submittal. Included in this list is a requirement that a bidder provide the calculation of the proposed net rentable square feet. Paragraph 10(c) indicates that the square footage calculations are to be based on measurements from the floor plan. Sealed bids were received until 10:00 a.m. on August 5, 1994. Petitioner submitted a completed Bid Submittal form in a timely manner. Petitioner's Bidder Response reflected 14,463 as the net square feet proposed. Respondent Department has occupied the building being offered since 1986. 14,463 is the absolute minimum net square/footage that could be submitted to meet the bid specifications. Petitioner provided no calculations indicating how the net square footage proposed in their bid submittal was calculated, other than page 85 which contained the exterior dimensions of the building bid. The Respondent was entitled to know how the Petitioner calculated the net square feet proposed to determine whether the Petitioner's bid was responsive. Following the bid opening but prior to the rejection of the Petitioner's bid, Petitioner was asked to provide calculations which would provide reasonable assurances to the Department that Petitioner in fact had the minimum net square footage available. The Respondent had no obligation to go back to the Petitioner and ask for such calculations. One day prior to the rejection of the Petitioner's bid, Petitioner faxed a handwritten note to the Department which read as follows: HRS 590-2500 No 5 Bld Size 117'10" x 130'8" Gross Space 115 x 10" x 12810" 115.833 x 128.833 = 14,923.113 deduct 2-sets Bath Rooms - 355.873 Net Rentable 14,567.240 Jim we have calculated our space based on your standard measurements The bid specifications called for a minimum of 2 sets of restrooms for public and 2 sets of restrooms for staff use, for a total of 4 separate sets of restrooms, each set to provide for male and female and meet other requirements. Based on these representations from Petitioner, the Department rejected its bid on August 12, 1994, as non-responsive. This decision was based on the Department's interpretation which concluded that the bid submitted failed to meet the minimum square footage requirements and to provide for the proper number of bathrooms as set forth in the bid specifications. The Department's evaluation concluded that the Petitioner's bid only proposed two sets of restrooms at 355.823 square feet. Deducting another two sets of restrooms at the same size in order to comply with the bid specifications would cause the Petitioner's bid to fall below the minimum square foot requirements as set forth in the bid submittal. Petitioner asserts that the required restrooms can be located within the Petitioner's building, and that there are sufficient minimum square feet available per the bid specifications. In the alternative, Petitioner would show that, under the bid specifications, restrooms could be located either in or out of the building. The Department's decision to seek clarification prior to rejecting the Petitioner's bid was reasonable. The Department having done so, the subsequent submittal by Petitioner of calculations in response to the request for clarification was considered as an addendum to the original bid.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's protest and proceed with the award of bid for HRS Lease No. 590:2500. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 1994. COPIES FURNISHED: Terrence William Ackert, Esquire P. O. Box 2548 Winter Park, Florida 32790 Ronald M. Schirtzer, Esquire Foley & Lardner 111 North Orange Avenue Suite 1800 Orlando, Florida 32801 James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District 7 Legal Counsel Hurston Tower, Suite S-827 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1782 Ladd H. Fassett, Esquire Warlick, Fassett, Divine & Anthony, P.A. Post Office Box 3387 Orlando, Florida 32802-3387 Robert L. Powell Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Kim Tucker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent, Sport Clips, Inc., is Petitioner’s “employer” under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, chapter 760, Florida Statutes (“FCRA”).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: SCI is a Texas corporation, whose sole office is located at 110 Sport Clips Way, Georgetown, Texas, 78628. SCI’s Chief Executive Officer at the time of the alleged discriminatory events was Gordon B. Logan. SCI is the owner of the “Sport Clips” trademarks and business system. It licenses the Sport Clips trademarks and business system to independent business people. Each Sport Clips franchisee signs a franchise agreement under which SCI licenses its trademarks and the franchisee agrees to abide by certain operating rules that protect the Sport Clips trademarks and brand. In addition, each franchisee pays to SCI a royalty and advertising fee, as well as other fees. Sport Clips is a sports-themed hair-cutting salon which provides customers with haircuts, shampoo, and beard trims. There are approximately 1,800 Sport Clips franchise stores and an additional 75 Sport Clips stores owned and operated by SCI. SCI provides operating rules to its franchisees in a confidential operating manual.2 The operating manual does not cover employment policies, employee compensation, or employee benefits. These employment matters are determined by the individual franchisee. Instead, the operating manual focuses on business operations. According to Gordon Logan, CEO of SCI, the company trademark “[is] the essence of the business. You have to have a trademark and protect that trademark in order to have a viable system, one that franchisees can present in a consistent manner and the public knows what to expect when they come into a franchise business using that trademark.” The purpose of the procedures and specifications in the operating manual is to protect the Sport Clips trademark and brand. If SCI failed to enforce its trademark and brand standards, it could lose the right to use the trademark. Further, it ensures that the public’s expectations are met 2 Neither party introduced a copy of the confidential operating manual into evidence at the hearing and therefore it is not part of the record of this case. no matter which store they visit in the country, and protects the franchisees’ investments in the franchise. The procedures and specifications set forth in SCI’s franchise agreement and operating manual, including requiring franchisees to participate in specific training, use Sport Clips uniforms, and use a particular point of sales system, are typical of the franchise industry. JV-SC is a Florida Limited Liability Company managed by Drew C. Hopper. JV-SC’s sole corporate office is located at 708 Main Street, Houston, Texas. No SCI officer, employee, or representative holds any position with JV-SC, nor does any JV-SC officer, employee, or representative hold any position with SCI. Likewise, SCI has no ownership interest in any of Mr. Hopper’s Sport Clips stores or business entities, and Mr. Hopper and his business entities have no ownership interest in SCI. Over the last 21 years, Mr. Hopper has been involved in approximately 30 Sport Clips stores as a franchisee. Through JV-SC, Mr. Hopper operates eight Sport Clips franchise stores for profit in North Central Florida, including two locations in Gainesville. Mr. Hopper hired Ms. Kelley to manage the day-to-day operations of the Gainesville stores, and Ms. Kelley hired Ms. Turner, with Mr. Hopper’s approval, to manage and cut hair at one of JV-SC’s Gainesville stores. JV-SC has a franchise agreement with SCI with regard to the Gainesville location managed by Ms. Turner (“Franchise Agreement”). Under the Franchise Agreement, SCI granted JV-SC “a non-exclusive and personal license to operate one unit of the Franchised Business in strict conformity with the Franchisor’s standards and specifications” at 2231 Northwest 13th Street, Suite 20, Gainesville, Florida 32608 (“13th Street Location”). Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were responsible for recruiting and hiring hair stylists at the 13th Street Location. Ms. Turner was responsible for supervising the stylists at the 13th Street Location. Employees in JV-SC’s corporate office in Houston also handled human resources functions for JV-SC. Mr. Hopper ultimately decided what to pay stylists on behalf of JV-SC. JV-SC set employee expectations and Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were responsible for handling employee misconduct and firing decisions at the 13th Street Location. Ms. Kelley and Ms. Turner were also responsible for ensuring that the 13th Street Location was properly equipped with necessary tools and inventory. Mr. Boyd was a hair stylist at the 13th Street Location. He was hired by Ms. Turner on August 30, 2017, and his rate of pay was set by JV-SC at $10 per hour. When he was hired, he completed a new hire form which states in bold print at the top: “JV-SC Investments LLC DBA Sport Clips FL901.” Mr. Boyd’s employment was terminated less than three months after he was hired by Ms. Turner for a violation of JV-SC policy related to a customer complaint. SCI had no involvement in Mr. Boyd’s hiring or termination of employment. During his employment, Mr. Boyd’s work schedule was established by Ms. Turner and his benefits, including holidays, vacation pay, and health insurance, were determined by JV-SC. If Mr. Boyd was going to be late or absent from work, he needed to contact Ms. Turner. Ms. Turner supervised Mr. Boyd’s appearance and conduct while on duty at the 13th Street Location and she conducted his performance reviews. SCI has never exercised control over Mr. Boyd, including his working hours, pay, and vacation benefits. Mr. Boyd’s personnel records were created and maintained by JV-SC and the records repeatedly identify JV-SC as Mr. Boyd’s employer. Mr. Boyd’s paychecks and W-2 were issued by JV-SC and make no reference to SCI. Likewise, Ms. Turner and Ms. Kelley were hired and paid by JV-SC and JV-SC created and maintained their personnel records. SCI has no employment records indicating that Mr. Boyd, Ms. Turner, or Ms. Kelley were ever employed by SCI. JV-SC had an employee handbook based on a template it received from SCI. The handbook was modified by JV-SC and could be modified by JV-SC at any time. Indeed, SCI expressly advised JV-SC to modify the form handbook to ensure it complied with local laws and to reflect the business practices of JV-SC. The employee handbook identifies JV-SC in bold red print on the front cover and provides “Sport Clips stores are independently owned and operated franchises. Team Members working in franchised stores are employed by the franchisee (Team Leader) and are not employed by Sport Clips, Inc.” JV-SC’s employee handbook was provided to its employees, including Mr. Boyd. JV-SC’s employee handbook required Mr. Boyd to report complaints of discrimination to his manager, Ms. Turner, or if he had a complaint concerning her, to Mr. Hopper at JV-SC. Under section XVI of the Franchise Agreement, JV-SC “acknowledges and agrees that [JV-SC] is an independent business person and independent contractor.” Further, this section provides in relevant part: Nothing in the Agreement is intended to make either party an agent, legal representative, subsidiary, joint venturer, partner, employee or servant of the other for any purpose whatsoever. During the term of this Agreement, [JV-SC] shall hold itself out to the public as an independent contractor operating the Franchised Business pursuant to a license from [SCI] and as an authorized user of the System and the Proprietary marks which are owned by [SCI]. [JV-SC] agrees to take such affirmative action as may be necessary to do so, including exhibiting to customers a sign provided by [SCI] in a conspicuous place on the premises of the Franchised Business. In compliance with this section of the Franchise Agreement, JV-SC posted at its 13th Street Location a sign in the front of the store which states: “This Sport Clips store is owned and operated by JV-SC Investments, LLC an independent Sport Clips franchisee.” With regard to JV-SC’s employees, the Franchise Agreement provides that “[SCI] shall not have the power to hire, manage, compensate or fire [JV-SC’s] employees and it is expressly agreed that [SCI] has no employment relationship with [JV-SC’s] employees.” The Franchise Agreement further provides: Franchisees are responsible for hiring, managing and compensating their employees within the laws of any jurisdiction in which they operate and are encouraged to consult their own legal counsel to ensure their compliance with all applicable laws. Franchisee and Franchisor recognize that Franchisor neither dictates nor controls labor and employment matters for the Franchisee or the Franchisee’s employees. Over the last 21 years, SCI has never told Mr. Hopper “who to hire, how to hire, how much [he] should hire them for, how much [he] should pay [employees]. It’s always been up to [him].” With regard to JV-SC’s funds and store premises, the Franchise Agreement provides “[e]xcept as herein expressly provided, [SCI] may not control or have access to [JV-SC’s] funds or the premises of the Franchised Business, or in any other way exercise dominion or control over the Franchised Business.” SCI has no control or ownership interest over JV-SC’s bank accounts, set up by Mr. Hopper; SCI is only authorized to withdraw from the accounts the specific royalties and fees set forth in the Franchise Agreement. Proceeds from the sales at the 13th Street Location are deposited into JV-SC’s bank account. SCI does not lease or own the property at the 13th Street Location or any of the 23 locations Mr. Hopper franchises from SCI. JV-SC leases the property from a third party. SCI does not own any real estate in common with or lease any property to Mr. Hopper or his related business entities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the undersigned hereby RECOMMENDS that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner failed to prove that Sport Clips, Inc. is an “employer” pursuant to section 760.02(7), Florida Statute, and dismissing the Petitions for Relief filed in these consolidated cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of August, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Robert W. Bauer, Esquire Bauer Law Group, P.A. Suite B 3721 Northwest 40th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32606 (eServed) Deborah L. Taylor, Esquire SportsClips, Inc. Suite 1200 3730 Kirby Drive Houston, Texas 77098 Stephanie M. Marchman, Esquire GrayRobinson, P.A. Suite 106 720 Southwest 2nd Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-6250 (eServed) Maria Perez Youngblood, Esquire Law Office of Robert W. Bauer, P.A. Suite B 3721 Northwest 40th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32606 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice by failure to promote Petitioner on February 9, 2005, due to discrimination against his handicap.
Findings Of Fact On March 11, 2005, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination dated March 1, 2005, with FCHR. This Charge alleged only disability discrimination through Respondent's failure to promote Petitioner on or about February 9, 2005. It makes no mention of any discriminatory acts or omissions by Respondent Employer preceding interviews on January 26, 2005. After an August 22, 2005, Determination: No Cause by FCHR, Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Relief on September 16, 2005. In addition to alleging discrimination due to a failure to promote on February 9, 2005, the Petition for Relief alleged for the first time that: Petitioner requires a 19-inch monitor to perform his duties. Despite repeatedly requesting such a monitor, the Petitioner did not timely receive a monitor. In fact, it was not until the Petitioner filed a previous Complaint with the FCHR that he received the appropriate monitor. This was years after his initial request. The parties orally stipulated that Petitioner is "legally blind," and that Petitioner was a qualified candidate for the promotion interviewed for on January 26, 2005, which position was awarded to a non-disabled person on February 9, 2005. Petitioner's condition constitutes a "handicap" as contemplated by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has been employed for 21 years by Respondent, Department of Children and Family Services (DCF). At all times material, his worksite has been the North Florida Evaluation and Treatment Center (NFETC) in Gainesville, Florida. This facility houses accused persons who are incompetent to proceed to a criminal trial and those found not guilty in a court of law by reason of insanity. At the time of his application for the promotion at issue, Petitioner was a "T.R. Senior Supervisor I." He has been at that grade level for 19 years, and by all accounts is rated an excellent, long-term employee. His position involves supervision of five officers and twenty inmates. Petitioner's handicap makes it difficult for him to read and difficult for him to use a computer. To fulfill all the requirements of his current position and the promotional position at issue, he requires software for his computer which is called "Zoom Tech." Without this accommodation, he cannot read necessary information on a computer screen. Petitioner became aware and informed of the Zoom Tech software, which requires a 19-inch monitor, through the Division of Blind Services (DBS), in December 1998. Petitioner repeatedly requested that Respondent Employer provide him with the Zoom Tech software and a 19-inch monitor. Respondent never provided the Zoom Tech software as an accommodation for Petitioner's handicap, so DBS provided Zoom Tech software to Petitioner both at home and at DCF in late 1998 or January 1999. However, Respondent Employer refused to load the software onto Petitioner's computer at work. In April of 1999, Madeline Davidson of DBS met with Petitioner and Respondent's representatives regarding having the Zoom Tech software loaded onto Petitioner's computer at work. One of Respondent's technicians informed Petitioner and Ms. Davidson that the Zoom Tech software could not be loaded onto Petitioner's work computer until June of 1999. Ms. Davidson offered to have a DBS software technician install the Zoom Tech software on the work computer. Respondent maintained that only its own technicians were permitted to work on its computers. Respondent did not install the Zoom Tech software on Petitioner's computer at work until August 1999, a delay of eight months. Prior to receiving the Zoom Tech software in August 1999, Petitioner was unable to use his DCF computer, was not able to complete work on a timely basis, and had to rely on other supervisors and subordinate staff members to assist him in keeping up-to-date on issues that needed his attention. With the Zoom Tech software, he is able to fully perform all aspects of his job description. Petitioner's request for installation of the Zoom Tech software provided by DBS was a request for a reasonable accommodation of his visual handicap. Respondent's delay of eight months in installing it was unreasonable. Petitioner testified that he could not use the Zoom Tech software on his 17-inch monitor and that Respondent did not provide him with a 19-inch monitor at work until 2005, after Petitioner had filed a charge of discrimination prior to the current charge of discrimination at issue in this cause. However, because Petitioner has an excellent work history predating 2005; because Petitioner interviewed for the promotion at issue in the instant cause on January 26, 2005; because the cause at issue herein (promotion) arose when someone else was promoted in place of Petitioner on February 9, 2005; because the current charge of discrimination underlying the instant cause was filed March 11, 2005; and because of the chronology related by Petitioner of promotional interviews in 2003 and 2004 (see Finding of Fact 20); and because of Petitioner's description of problems with his 19-inch monitor (see Findings of Fact 16-19), it appears that Petitioner was probably mistaken about the year he received the 19-inch monitor from Respondent, and it further appears that he first received a 19-inch monitor from Respondent sometime prior to 2005. Also, because Petitioner testified that after he filed a prior charge of discrimination, his computer failed completely and Ron Leslie, NFETC'S new assistant administrator, got him a new computer and the 19-inch monitor, it is not clear whether Respondent provided the 19-inch monitor as part of a settlement of the prior charge of discrimination or for another reason. Therefore, although Petitioner requested the 19-inch monitor as a reasonable accommodation of Petitioner's handicap and Respondent unreasonably delayed providing the reasonable accommodation, it appears Petitioner was provided with the requested accommodation before the current promotion issue arose, and that DCF’s failure to timely provide the 19-inch monitor was at least included within a prior charge of discrimination. Petitioner also testified that after receiving the 19- inch monitor, Respondent periodically got computer upgrades or other changes which interfered with the Zoom Tech software on Petitioner's DCF computer. During these periods, Petitioner experienced delays in having the Zoom Tech software re- installed. This testimony simultaneously suggests that Petitioner had a 19-inch monitor for some period of time before 2005, instead of not getting one until 2005, and that during the intermittent periods of time after 1999 when Petitioner did not have the necessary software, he was intermittently unable to use his work computer or perform some functions of his job. On one such occasion, Petitioner had to go to a supervisor above his direct supervisor in the normal chain of command because both his computer and its Zoom Tech software had been removed from his desk while he had been on vacation. At that point, Petitioner's immediate supervisor had not solved Petitioner's computer problems for 18 days. Within one work-day of his report to the senior supervisor, the senior supervisor, Denny Guest, had Petitioner's software, computer, and monitor squared-away. Again, there is no clear time line of when this event occurred, but it surely occurred before the promotion interviews January 26, 2005, and the evidence as a whole shows that Petitioner had a suitable monitor before 2005. It also shows that on that particular occasion, which Petitioner felt was particularly egregious, Petitioner was without reasonable accommodation for his handicap for only 21 days. During those times when Petitioner did not have access to the necessary software, he was unable to perform certain work. In addition, other NFETC employees were able to use their computers at those times that Petitioner was not able to use his. Petitioner believed this situation hindered his ability to be promoted. In 2003 and 2004, Petitioner interviewed for several promotions. He was not selected for any of them. Thereafter, Petitioner scheduled a meeting with Ron Leslie to determine what Petitioner could do to enhance his chances of getting a promotion in the future. Madeline Davidson attended the meeting at Petitioner's request. During that meeting, Mr. Leslie suggested that Petitioner work more with the computer and join groups and committees to work out problems as other staff members did. Mr. Leslie told Petitioner and Ms. Davidson that if Petitioner were promoted, he would be required to make presentations, and as a result of Petitioner's handicap, Mr. Leslie questioned whether Petitioner could do that. Petitioner and Ms. Davidson informed Mr. Leslie that his perception was incorrect and that Petitioner was, in fact, capable of making such presentations using boards and his new visual aids. In response to this meeting, Petitioner joined the EEOC Committee and attended its day-time meetings, even though he was on the night shift. In January of 2005, Petitioner applied for a Supervisor II position. Specifically, he applied for the Building 10 Night Shift Building Manager position, classified as "Unit T/R Senior Supervisor II – F/C - SES." NFETC management appointed a three-person selection committee to interview qualified candidates for the promotional slot. John Almeida, Ronald Chisolm, and George McClain served on the selection committee. Petitioner was one of seven qualified candidates interviewed by the selection committee. The interview included written and oral questions.2/ Prior to the interviews, Ronald Chisolm was told by Ron Leslie that Petitioner's eyesight "might be an issue;" that Mr. Leslie wanted to be fair; and that Mr. Leslie did not want any complaints about unfairness. After a lot of discussion of how it was to be accomplished, Petitioner was offered the use of his own computer and special monitor to read the written part of the interview and to type his responses. However, Petitioner elected to have the selection committee read him the questions and transcribe his answers. Mr. Chisolm had concerns that the oral reading and transcription of oral answers method, which Petitioner had selected, might give Petitioner a greater chance of success than the other candidates, because Mr. Chisolm perceived the situation as giving Petitioner two "verbal" (oral) tests instead of one oral and one written test like all the other candidates. At the suggestion of the Employer’s Human Resources Office, Mr. Chisolm drafted a statement for Petitioner to sign, acknowledging that the foregoing procedure was Petitioner's choice. In fact, the typed statement Petitioner signed, and which was witnessed by the three interviewers, only acknowledges that the questions were read to him at the specific date and time named. Petitioner testified that the interview team had told him that he could not take the written questions out of the interview room and that Zoom Tech could not be placed on the computer in the testing area; this may have been a misunderstanding on Petitioner's part. Mr. Almeida testified credibly that he could put any font or the Zoom Tech software on any computer. Mr. Almeida and Mr. Chisolm both testified credibly that such an offer had been made to Petitioner and that Petitioner's choice of transcription had been of Petitioner’s free choice, signified by his signing the described statement. The undersigned did not get the sense that Petitioner was coerced or that he involuntarily agreed to have the written questions read to him or transcribed for him. Respondent entered into evidence the entire selection package comprised of eight exhibits detailing the scoring of each individual candidate, as well as the final calculations of the composite of all the interview scores. The numeric results of the interviews were compiled by the three-member selection committee and forwarded to a three member management team in NFETC's Operations Department for a final decision on whom to promote. The highest candidate score was that of Watson Louidor at 50.50. Petitioner scored second at 46.10. The other five candidates scored in a lower range between 44.96 and 29.45. The verbal (oral) part was worth 25 percent of the score. The written part was 50 percent of the score. Time and attendance counted for 15 percent of the score. Prior disciplinary actions were 10 percent of the score. Petitioner and the highest scoring candidate had very close scores, but it was the disparity in the written portion of the interview which the sighted higher scoring candidate wrote for himself and which Petitioner had written for him by Mr. Almeida which was most significant: PETITIONER LOUIDOR Verbal (25%) 7.165 6.750 Written (50%) 35.330 40.000 Time and Attendance (15%) 2.250 2.250 Disciplinary (10%) Action 1.300 1.500 46.100 50.500 However, Petitioner has not claimed that he had too little time to correctly answer or too little time to complete the written interview, and Petitioner has not suggested that his oral answers on the written questions were not correctly transcribed for him. The three-member Operations Department management team selected the top-scoring candidate, Mr. Louidor, for the promotion. Mr. Louidor had worked at NFETC less time than Petitioner. Petitioner felt he, not Mr. Louidor, was the most qualified candidate, due to Petitioner’s much longer experience working at NFETC and because of post-interview conversations Petitioner had with Mr. Almeida and Jennifer Granto. For these reasons, Petitioner believed he had been discriminated against because of his handicap. Petitioner testified that after his interview, Mr. Almeida, the member of the interview team who had transcribed his oral answers, told Petitioner that he had been the highest scorer on the interview portion and that Petitioner would get the promotion. Petitioner further testified that Ms. Granto, a member of the three-member management team which made the final promotion decision, had led Petitioner to believe that although he was not the highest scorer, as the second highest scorer, Petitioner would get the promotion if the highest scorer did not accept the promotion, which was likely. Ms. Granto and Mr. Almeida acknowledged that they had each had a conversation about the interviews with Petitioner, but each stated that Petitioner had misunderstood their encouragement for his good score and good interview, as a promise of the promotion. Mr. Almeida testified credibly that when he discussed the interview process with Petitioner, it was in general terms only; he never referred to the scoring process and final scores of the candidates; and he was certain that he had never told Petitioner that Petitioner was the top-scoring candidate. Ms. Granto testified that Petitioner was considered to be a good employee and had clearly made progress in his presentation of himself in interviews for promotions. Petitioner and Ms. Granto both testified that she had encouraged Petitioner in the past to show more initiative and that in response to suggestions by Ms. Granto and others, Petitioner had elected to join the EEOC Committee. (See Findings of Fact 21- 22). Ms. Granto also testified that she and the other two management team members had felt that Petitioner's EEOC Committee membership was a step in the right direction towards a promotion for him. Ms. Granto further testified that the management team's final selection for promotion had been based on the candidates' respective interview scores, plus the management team's personal knowledge of the top-scoring candidate, Mr. Louidor. In some prior situations, management had promoted a lower-scoring candidate over a higher-scoring candidate, but in this instance, they viewed the top-scoring candidate, Mr. Louidor, as being energetic, positive, possessing initiative, and having new ideas that he had been regularly bringing to the attention of his supervisors for the last year, so that selecting him for the promotion was an easy choice. Regarding Petitioner, Ms. Granto testified that she and the other management team members felt that Petitioner performed his job well but he had not presented as positive an interview as did the top-scoring candidate, and they felt that the top-scoring candidate would bring more energy to the promotional position. They felt Petitioner's weak spot was his lack of initiative above and beyond his basic job description.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2006.
Findings Of Fact Since 1976, DHRS has leased two Xerox 9200 copy machines for its Tallahassee headquarters. The two units together rent for a total of $9,945.11 per year. On September 27, 1984, Mr. Charles A. Stryker, account manager for Xerox in Tallahassee, by letter to the director of central general services for DHRS in Tallahassee, proposed several alternative plans for DHRS to obtain the equipment necessary to handle its central reproduction duplicating needs. Among the proposals submitted by Mr. Stryker was a purchase of the present Xerox 9200 units currently being leased from Xerox. This proposal pointed out that the machines in question had reached the maximum equity per machine that they could earn on a rental basis and that among other things, Xerox would be willing, if DHRS were to buy them, to provide nine months free maintenance on the units and a guaranteed 50 percent trade-in value if the units were to be traded in on new units from Xerox within 12 months from date of purchase. DHRS officials, recognizing the fact that maximum equity on the machines had been realized and foreseeing the opportunity to obtain the machines at a substantial dollar saving to the State, by letter dated October 10, 1984, contacted the appropriate officials at the Department of General Services (DGS), requesting authority to procure these particular used units from Xerox on a sole source procurement. On November 1, 1984, DGS responded denying sole source procurement authority, but granting authority to purchase two suitable duplicating systems through the competitive bid process. It was the opinion of DGS that the equipment was available and the fact that the total cost of the acquisition exceeded the upper limit of $2,500.00, the competitive bid process was necessary. Thereafter, a purchase requisition was submitted on November 2, 1984, by Mr. Vick which was approved. On November 7, 1984, Mr. Vick forwarded a memorandum to Mr. Cox which stated: "Please determine how we are going to purchase the (2) Xerox 9200's. Their offer ends December 15, 1984." An Invitation to Bid on Bid No. 85-41 BC for two used high speed, high volume xerographic duplicating systems was mailed to Xerox and Kodak on November 19, 1984. The Invitation to Bid form reflected the bids would be opened on December 7, 1984, at 2 p.m. The Invitation to Bid forms were sent to Xerox and Kodak only because they were the two companies in the area which manufactured and supplied equipment which would meet the specifications required by DHRS. Both Xerox and Kodak submitted their bids on December 6, 1984. Xerox's bid price was $29,764.00 per machine for a total price of $59,528.00 for the used machines that were currently in use at DHRS headquarters. As a part of its bid, Xerox offered a rebate voucher in the amount of $5,990.75 to cover the purchase of 4 620 Memorywriter typewriters and 7 printwheels. This rebate was part of a National promotion to all government customers. Kodak's bid was for $134,280.00 per machine for a total price of $268,560.00 for new Kodak model 250AF machines. Mr. Goodrich admits that Kodak does not manufacture a xerographic which meets the technical qualifications contained on page 5 of the Invitation to Bid. In addition to this, he points to the specifications listed in the special conditions and technical specifications section of the IFB contained on pages 3 and 4, specifically number 3 which calls for full maintenance for a period of 9 months following installation at no expense to the department and a guaranteed 50 percent trade-in allowance within 12 months of purchase. Kodak contends that since as Kodak has its own price specials which it could have offered if the terms of the IFB were not so narrowly defined, and it was thereby precluded from competitively bidding on this contract, the inclusion of those terms mentioned above effectively negated the competitive bidding process. Admittedly, Kodak did not submit a proposal to DHRS at the time Xerox did prior to the issuance of the IFB. It is for this same reason that Kodak's bid referred to new equipment rather than the used equipment called for under the IFB because at the time, Kodak did not have any used equipment which would meet the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. Mr. Goodrich admits also that Kodak did not compete for the original contract to provide xerographic equipment in 1976 because it, was not in operation in the Tallahassee area at that time and could not have bid competitively. However, they have equipment which can do substantially what the Xerox 9200, in use since 1976, can do and more, and this was the item they offered in their response to the IFB. The IFB in this procurement was developed by Mr. Cox who built the solicitation utilizing the general conditions dictated by DGS for all procurements, the technical specifications developed by DHRS' technical services division, and the special conditions which he developed to satisfy the needs of the department in this procurement. Specifications calling for used equipment was utilized because it was felt that a purchase of the used, in place xerox equipment would permit a substantial monetary savings while still getting equipment which had been proven satisfactory to do the job. Nonetheless, if new equipment from either Xerox or Kodak would have done the job required and still saved money, that would have been the route taken. This was not the case, however. According to Mr. Vick, the request to go sole source on this procurement was prompted by a desire to take advantage of the Xerox proposal of late September 1984 which, it was felt, would result in a substantial dollar savings for the State while still providing equipment which was satisfactory for the task required. DHRS maintains an open door policy toward vendors to encourage them to come in and attempt to sell their product. Mr. Cox has dealt with Kodak on several occasions in the past but never in the area of copying equipment. At the time in question, there was nothing at all to preclude Kodak from coming in with their own offers. DHRS officials do not deny that they wanted to accept Xerox's proposal. Offers by several other vendors had been turned down in the past, but this one looked so good and appeared to have the promise of substantial dollar savings to the State, that a request was made to DGS to go single source procurement so that this proposal could be accepted. However, once this request was turned down, an Invitation for Bids was sent out to competing vendors and while the terms paralleled those offered by Xerox and it was obvious that Xerox's bid would comply with them, there was nothing in the procedure on DHRS' part that would preclude Kodak from offering the same terms. The officials at DHRS had no way of knowing that Kodak's internal policies would not permit the meeting of the same terms as to free maintenance and trade in allowance. If Kodak had been willing to meet those terms, it could thereafter have battled Xerox head to head on the one issue where they could compete - price. DHRS also admits that generally, it is reluctant to make outright purchases of technical equipment, preferring to lease as was done here for several years, because of the changing state of the art. It is for that reason that the invitation to bid specified used equipment here to keep costs down and to allow upgrading in the reasonably near future. To go even further, Mr. Cox admitted that while the bid was open to others, it was aimed at getting the Xerox proposal which would save a total of $76,000.00 on this purchase and trade-in. Considering the evidence in its totality, it is clear that the officials at DHRS were attempting to save state funds in this procurement. Their method of handling this procurement lacks finesse, perhaps, but cannot be said to be ill-motivated, arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
