Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a prisoner incarcerated at Sumter Correctional Institution near Bushnell, Florida. Petitioner was convicted in Dade County of the crime of attempted rape and sentenced to serve a fifteen-year prison term. Petitioner was interviewed by an examiner of the Parole and Probation Commission on September 8, 1980, for the purpose of establishing a presumptive parole release date (PPRD). Under Parole and Probation Commission rules then in effect, the examiner was to consider the gravity of the offense for which the Petitioner was sentenced, establish a "salient factor score," and consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. The examiner classified the attempted rape conviction as "Greatest (Most Serious--I)." Taking into account the number of prior convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, the total time Petitioner had served in prison, Petitioner's age at the first conviction, the number of parole violations, the number of escapes, and whether burglary was the offense of conviction, the examiner set the salient factor score at 2. Parole and Probation Commission rules in effect at the time that Petitioner's PPRD was considered included guidelines for the time a prisoner should serve before being released on parole. The guideline range for the offense characteristic "Greatest (Most Serious--I)" with a salient factor score of 2 was from fifty- eight to seventy-nine months. The examiner recommended that Petitioner's PPRD be set at the outer limit of the guideline range, and that it be aggravated an additional six months because of another offense. The examiner thus recommended that the PPRD be set for September 18, 1984. The Commission examined the recommendation and considered the aggravating factors to be more severe than they had been by the examiner and set the PPRD at September 22, 1985. Petitioner sought an administrative review of the PPRD, but was unsuccessful. The Objective Parole Guidelines Act of 1978, Chapter 947, Florida Statutes, directs the Parole and Probation Commission to establish objective criteria for establishing parole release dates for inmates. The two primary considerations that the Commission determined should go into setting a parole release date were the probability of a favorable outcome on parole and offense severity. The Commission boiled factors relating to probability of a favorable outcome down to seven. These were dubbed in the Commission's rules as the "salient factors." They are the number of prior convictions, the number of prior incarcerations, total time served in years, the age at first commitment, the number of prior parole revocations, the number of prior escapes, and whether burglary is the present offense of conviction. Consideration of these factors under the Commission's rules results in the setting of a "salient factor score." In deciding how to rate the severity of different offenses, the Commission utilized its own collective judgment. Each Commissioner ranked various offenses in terms of severity as he or she perceived it. These rankings resulted in a consensus that was codified into a rule. Every possible offense was not given an offense characteristic rating. Various potential crimes of "attempt," for example, were not individually rated. Instead, the Commission determined to rate attempts as follows: [Rule 23-19.01(6), Florida Administrative Code] Conspiracies, Solicitations, and Attempts shall be rated for Guideline purposes according to the underlying offense behavior if such behavior was consummated. If the offense was not consummated, the conspiracies, solicitations or attempts shall be rated one severity offense characteristic below the offense which was not consummated. Through its Rule 23-19.05, Florida Administrative Code, the Parole and Probation Commission adopted guidelines in the form of a table to establish the typical total time in months to be served in jail before release on parole. The guidelines are based upon the offense characteristic or severity and the salient factor score. The offense of sexual battery is rated under four different offense characteristics. Under the offense characteristic "Very High," sexual battery is included if it was committed "with force not likely to cause serious bodily injury; victim over 11." Under the offense characteristic "Greatest (Most Serious--II)," sexual battery is listed as follows: Sexual Battery (threat of force likely to cause serious bodily harm; victim physically helpless to resist; use of incapacitating narcotics upon victim without victim's knowledge or consent; familial, custodial, or official authority relationship with a victim over 11 but under 18; victim is mentally defective and the inmate knew or had reason to know of the mental condition. All victims in the foregoing categories are over 11 years of age); incest. Under the offense characteristic "Greatest (Most Serious--III) it is listed: "Sexual Battery (use of force likely to cause serious bodily harm. Victim over 11 years of age)." Under the characteristic "Greatest (Most Serious- -IV)," it is listed: "Sexual Battery; offender 18 or over, victim 11 or under." In Note 6 which follows the table, attempts are mentioned as follows: Conspiracies, Solicitations, and Attempts shall be rated for guideline purposes according to the underlying offense behavior if such behavior was consummated. If the offense is unconsummated, the conspiracies, solicitations, or attempts shall be rated one severity offense characteristic below the offense which was not consummated. The Petitioner's offense characteristic was established by the Parole and Probation Commission as "Greatest (Most Serious--I)." This was based upon a finding that the sexual battery attempted by Petitioner was done with a threat of force likely to cause serious bodily harm. If the rape had been consummated, the attempt offense would have been rated "Greatest (Most Serious--II)" by the Commission. Since it was not consummated, the attempt was rated one severity offense characteristic below the unconsummated offense.
The Issue Whether Respondent, a corrections officer, has failed to maintain the qualification to have good moral character, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 19, 1993, as a Corrections Officer, Certification Number 136191. Respondent’s certification is active. At all times relevant, the Respondent was employed as a corrections officer with the Central Florida Reception Center. On November 5, 1994, Karen Mills was employed as a law enforcement officer with the Seminole County Sheriff’s office. At the time of the event, Officer Mills had been working under cover for five years with the City/County Investigative Bureau. Officer Mills was working undercover at one o’clock on a Saturday morning posing as a prostitute on the sidewalk and parking lot located at State Road 427 and Pomosa in Sanford, Florida. On November 5, 1994, Mills approached a black male driving a Toyota car, later identified as the Respondent, Travis Long, when he stopped for a traffic light at the corner of State Road 427 and Pomosa. After idle conversation, the Respondent asked what she was doing. She advised that she was trying to make some money. He asked her if she would “take it up the ass?” She took that to mean that he wanted anal intercourse. Mills said yes and asked him how much money he was willing to pay. Respondent said $25.00. Mills said she wanted $40.00. Respondent agreed but stated that he would have to go get the money from an ATM and also that he wanted to get something to eat. He asked Mills if she wanted to go with him to get something to eat. Mills declined. Mills did not immediately arrest Respondent because she wanted to see the money to confirm that he was there to buy sex. Respondent left the area and returned 20 minutes later. Upon his return, Respondent asked Mills if she was a cop and asked her to pull up her shirt to prove that she was not carrying a recording device (a wire). Mills asked Respondent if he was a cop. He said no, and ultimately exposed his penis as a way to prove it to her. Mills asked Respondent to show her the money and kept encouraging him to do so, by saying, “You ain’t gonna pay me . . . You ain’t got no money. I just want to be sure I’m gonna get paid.” Respondent finally showed Mills the money and mouthed, without speaking, “I will pay you.” As soon as she saw the money, Mills, who was wearing a wire, gave the predetermined code. Respondent began to pull away in his vehicle but other officers pulled him over and arrested him. Respondent plead Nolo Contendere to the charge of Lewd and Lascivious Behavior, a second degree misdemeanor, in the County Court for Seminole County, Florida, on January 5, 1995. Respondent was adjudicated guilty, and a $100 fine was imposed. Respondent’s testimony that, although he conducted himself as above stated, he did not have the intent to solicit for prostitution on the night of November 5, 1994, is not credible. Respondent was an energetic, hard-working individual. Respondent had no prior criminal or employment discipline problems prior to this incident. Respondent has continued in his current position as a corrections officer in the three years since the incident and has received above-average ratings.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED as follows: Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes (1993). Respondent's certification be SUSPENDED for a period of six months and that the Commission impose such conditions on his reinstatement as it deems reasonable and necessary. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Amy Bardill, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 H. R. Bishop, Jr., Esquire 300 East Brevard Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Department of Law Enforcement Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue presented is whether Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO or Petitioner) properly terminated Christopher Hamilton (Respondent) from his employment as a deputy sheriff for engaging in conduct prohibited in Chapter 89-404, Laws of Florida (the Civil Service Act), and Petitioner's General Order Section 3-1.3, Rule and Regulations 3.4(d) and 5.21, and General Order Section 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is responsible for providing law enforcement and corrections in Pinellas County, Florida. At all times pertinent to these cases, Petitioner employed Respondent as a deputy sheriff. Respondent does not dispute that his conduct violated Petitioner’s rules and regulations. Respondent alleges that the penalty of termination is excessive, inconsistent with the progressive discipline policy, and, therefore, disparate. General Order 3-1.3, Rule and Regulation 3.4(d), relates to “Performance of Duty.” The cited provisions require that “All members will be efficient and effective in their assigned duties, performing them in a competent, proficient and capable manner.” For convenience, the cited provisions are referred to as Rule 3.4(d). The evidence shows that from March 2004 through August 8, 2008, Respondent demonstrated a pattern and practice of violating Rule 3.4(d). The individual violations are undisputed, and it is undisputed that the violations arose from Respondent’s inability to complete required reports, to do so in a timely manner, and to be punctual in attendance. It is also undisputed that the violations arose from events in Respondent’s personal life, which included a divorce and custody battle that precipitated a financial crisis for Respondent and the death of Respondent’s father. Finally, Respondent acknowledged during cross-examination that Petitioner attempted to “work with” Respondent during his personal crises. Petitioner first disciplined Respondent for violating Rule 3.4(d) in March 2004. In January 2005, Petitioner issued a formal reprimand for a second violation. Petitioner issued a second formal reprimand for the third violation in February 2005. In May 2007, Petitioner issued a third formal reprimand for a fourth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On December 6, 2007, Petitioner issued a written reprimand to Respondent for a fifth violation of Rule 3.4(d). On April 10, 2008, Petitioner found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender, as defined hereinafter, and suspended Respondent for seven days for violation of Rule 3.4(d). In June of 2008, Respondent again violated Rule 3.4(d) by failing to complete and submit reports within the required timeframe. Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d) on May 27, 2008, and again on June 24, 2008. Petitioner notified Respondent that he was required to attend a Vehicle Crash Review Board (VCRB) on May 27, 2008. However, Respondent failed to attend the VCRB. Petitioner re-scheduled the VCRB for June 24, 2008, and notified Respondent that he was required to attend that VCRB. Respondent failed to attend the VCRB on June 24, 2008. General Order 3-1.4, Rule and Regulation 2.17, relates to “Timeliness.” The cited provisions state that “Members shall not be late to work without valid reason or authorization,” The cited provisions are referred to for convenience as Rule 2.17. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work on February 28 and March 8, 2008. Petitioner disciplined Respondent for both offenses in a single written reprimand. Respondent violated Rule 2.17 by being late to work again sometime between June 18 and July 2, 2008. On or about August 8, 2008, Respondent reported to work approximately 30 minutes late in violation of Rule 2.17, and this proceeding began. On September 11, 2008, Petitioner conducted an Administrative Review Board (ARB) meeting at which Respondent testified. The ARB concluded that Respondent had violated Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17 and found Respondent to be a Chronic Offender of both rules. General Order 3-1.1, Rule and Regulation 5.21 (Rule 5.21), defines “Chronic Offender” as a member of the PCSO who violates the same rule or regulation three or more times within an 18-month period. Respondent is a Chronic Offender of Rules 3.4(d) and 2.17. Respondent violated each rule three or more times within an 18-month period. The progressive discipline policy treats Chronic Offender violations as a more severe “Level Five” violation. Petitioner has issued written guidelines that are followed during the disciplinary process and are contained within General Order 10-2. The goal of General Order 10-2 is to standardize the disciplinary process and make the process fair and consistent in application. Consistency is important to ensure fairness for the member being disciplined and for maintaining accountability throughout the agency. General Order 10-2 sets forth a procedure for assigning points for sustained violations based on their severity level. The points range from Level Five to Level One. Level Five violations result in the most serious discipline. The total of points to be assigned in these cases is determined by considering Respondent’s prior disciplinary record. Additional points are assigned for disciplinary violations within the recent past. Total disciplinary points are comprised of points for the current offense, plus carryover points for recent discipline against Respondent. The range of discipline that is appropriate in these cases is based upon the total number of disciplinary points accumulated. The highest or most severe discipline applies because Respondent accumulated more than 100 discipline points. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4823 is 108.3 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Respondent’s point total in Case No. 08-4824 is 116 points. Authorized discipline ranges from a 15-day suspension to termination of employment. Termination of employment is reasonable in this proceeding. Termination of employment does not impose disparate discipline on Respondent. From 2005 through the date of the final hearing, nine members of the PCSO have been disciplined within the same discipline range as Respondent. Petitioner terminated the employment of seven of those nine members of the PCSO. Four of Respondent’s exhibits are excerpts of the case files of other PCSO members charged with violating Rule 5.21 as was Respondent. In each case, the alleged violation of the Level Five Chronic Offender rule was based upon repeated violations of Level Three rules. Respondent’s Exhibits 2 and 3 each show a member who violated the Level 3 rule, pertaining to abuse of sick leave a sufficient number of times to be considered a Chronic Offender in violation of Rule 5.21. In both cases, it was the member’s first Chronic Offender violation. Authorized discipline ranged from a suspension to termination of employment. In each case, the member received the minimum length of suspension, which is the minimum discipline in General Order 10-2. This is comparable to and consistent with the seven-day suspension Petitioner imposed against Respondent for his first violation of the Chronic Offender rule. The remaining proposed comparator introduced as Respondent’s Exhibit 1 relates to an agency member disciplined for being a Chronic Offender based on repeated violations of Rule 3.4(d). This was the member’s first violation as a Chronic Offender in Rule 5.21. Like Respondent’s seven-day suspension for his first offense as a Chronic Offender, the member in Respondent’s Exhibit 1 received a suspension corresponding to the bottom of the disciplinary range under the disciplinary policy. Prior to Respondent, no other agency member had been found to have violated the Chronic Offender rule a second time. However, Petitioner’s Exhibit 5 shows that subsequent to Respondent’s discipline, the member referenced by Respondent’s Exhibit 2 was disciplined for violating Rule 5.21 a second time. In similar fashion to Respondent, this member was disciplined as a Chronic Offender for the second time with respect to accumulated violations of the same Level Three rule as the first time he was found to be a Chronic Offender. Like Respondent, this member received the minimum suspension for the first violation of Rule 5.21 and was terminated for the second.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a final order terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth J. Afienko, Esquire Kenneth J. Afienko, P.A. 560 First Avenue, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Sherwood S. Coleman, Esquire Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Post Office Drawer 2500 Largo, Florida 33779-2500 James L. Bennett, County Attorney Office of County Attorney 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint and if so, what penalties should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact During all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent has been licensed as an adjuster by the Department. Respondent has also been licensed in a similar capacity in Texas. Respondent has never been the subject of a disciplinary proceeding previously. On March 24, 2008, Respondent pled nolo contendere to one count of criminal use of personal information and one count of offense against intellectual property. Both offenses are felonies, and adjudication was withheld for each count. As a result of this plea, Respondent was sentenced to three years probation, 200 hours of community service, required to submit to anger management counseling, and required to pay costs, $2,121.36 in restitution to the Department for its investigative costs, and $1,258.50 in restitution to the victim, Thuy Daoheuang, for a missing ring. $400.00 of the amount due the victim was paid at the time of the plea, and payments of $200.00 each to the Department and to the victim were to be paid monthly. The terms of the plea allowed for early termination of probation if all conditions of probation were met. The conduct giving rise to the charges against Respondent, and ultimately resulting in his pleas to the criminal charges, stemmed from the termination of his relationship with a former girlfriend, Thuy Daoheuang. Ms. Daoheuang was also an insurance adjuster. After the termination of their relationship, Respondent accessed her insurance licensure information while performing continuing education checks for persons in his firm. Because of his relationship with her, Respondent knew the personal information necessary to have access to her profile. While viewing Ms. Daoheuang's information, Respondent selected the option to cancel her license. Respondent's action was impulsive and although he testified that he regretted it immediately, he could not "undo" the selection. However, he did not take any steps to call the Department and report the action or ask that it be corrected. Respondent's action resulted in the cancellation of Ms. Daoheuang's insurance license. The Department mailed her a letter indicating that her license had been canceled and upon her inquiry, reinstated the license. There was no evidence presented to indicate that her ability to transact insurance was disrupted. Respondent was contacted by investigators from the Department regarding the cancellation of Ms. Daoheuang's license. He admitted his actions and cooperated fully with their investigation. Respondent's employer was informed of the conduct and the resultant criminal action. The company withheld Respondent's annual raise in salary, but did not penalize him otherwise. He remains employed with the same company. The Department was integrally involved in the prosecution of Respondent, and Respondent has been making monthly payments to the Department by check since the acceptance of his plea, as required by his sentence. Respondent also completed the anger management course and has been remorseful for his actions. The criminal proceeding has been a source of great humiliation and Respondent has accepted responsibility for his actions.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding that Respondent has violated Section 626.611(14), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint; Dismissing Count II of the Administrative Complaint; and Suspending Respondent's license as an adjuster for a period of four months. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: William Gautier Kitchen, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Lisa M. Hurley, Esquire Willard Hurley, LLC 517 East College Avenue Post Office Box 10007 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Tracey Beal, Agency Clerk Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Benjamin Diamond, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Alex Sink, Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate the Respondent's employment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Respondent, a teacher employed by Petitioner, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, which is a first degree felony pursuant to Section 825.103, Florida Statutes. At the same time, Respondent also entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petit theft over $100.00, which is a first degree misdemeanor. In entering these pleas, Respondent advised the court, pursuant to Rule 3.172(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, that she believed the pleas were in her best interest and that she was maintaining her innocence to the charges. The court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, adjudicated her guilty of petit theft, sentenced her to one day of time served, placed her on probation for 20 years, and required that she pay restitution to the Estate of Lillie Keller in the amount of $52,000.00. 1/ By letter dated October 21, 1997, Petitioner reassigned Respondent to a position with no direct contact with children pending the outcome of the criminal charges. Following an investigation, the superintendent of schools recommended to the school board that Respondent's employment be suspended without pay and terminated. On October 7, 1998, the school board voted to adopt that recommendation. The recommendation and the subsequent vote to adopt the recommendation were based on Respondent's plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person. Petitioner followed its procedural rules in investigating this matter and in voting to terminate Respondent's employment. As of October 7, 1998, Respondent held a professional services contract and had been employed by Petitioner for approximately 13 years as a teacher. Section 231.02(1), Florida Statutes, requires school board employees to be of good moral character. Respondent, as a teacher, is required by Section 231.02(2), Florida Statutes, to be fingerprinted and screened by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) Any person for whom employment screening is required by statute must not have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction: * * * (v) Section 825.103, relating to exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult, if the offense was a felony. Petitioner's Rule 3.12, pertaining to criminal background checks of current and prospective employees, has been duly enacted and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Definitions: For the purposes of this policy: * * * b. "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. * * * 3. A prospective or current employee may be disqualified or may be terminated from continued employment if the prospective or current employee has been convicted of a crime classified as a felony or first degree misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Section M of the collective bargaining agreement between the Petitioner and the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers' Association provides for progressive discipline of covered employees such as Respondent. Section M provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 7. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With a Written Notation. . . . Written Reprimand. . . . Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay may be issued to an employee when appropriate, in keeping with the provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. ... Dismissal. An employee may be dismissed (employment contract terminated or non-renewed) when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, requires an employing agency, such as the Petitioner, to take the following action when an employee has failed to meet the requirements of Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes: The employer must either terminate the employment of any of its personnel found to be in noncompliance with the minimum standards for good moral character contained in this section or place the employee in a position for which background screening is not required unless the employee is granted an exemption from disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that terminates Respondent's employment based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1999.
