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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. FRICA LEICHUS, 77-001801 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001801 Latest Update: Oct. 02, 1978

Findings Of Fact From December 29, 1975, to January 15, 1976, and from February 5, 1976, to September 30, 1976, Leichus was a registered real estate salesperson in the employ of FAR, a registered corporate broker, located in Dade County, Florida. During those periods of time, FAR was engaged in an enterprise whereby advanced fee listings were obtained from Florida property owners. Salesmen known as "fronters or qualifiers" were employed to place calls to Florida property owners whose names and phone numbers had been provided to the salesmen by FAR. The prospects were asked if they cared to list their real estate with FAR in anticipation of resale. It was explained that there would be a refundable fee to be paid by the property owner for the listing. The refund was to occur upon sale of the property. If the prospect was interested, then certain literature was mailed out to them. Other salesmen were employed as "drivers" who would make the second contact of the prospect who indicated an interest in listing his property. The driver would secure a signed listing agreement along with a check for $375.00 which constituted the refundable listing fee. There was no evidence that any of the listings obtained by FAR were ever resold. There were, however, three parcels of land in negotiation for sale when the operations of FAR were terminated in June, 1976. There was to be a division separate and apart from the "fronters" and "drivers" to do the actual selling of the property. The listings were advertised in the Fort Lauderdale area but there was no evidence to establish whether or not other advertising occurred. There was a total absence of evidence and, hence, a failure of proof as to the allegations of misrepresentations by Leichus. FREC introduced no evidence to show that Leichus represented that the property could be sold for several times the purchase price, that it would be advertised nationwide and in foreign countries or that the company had foreign buyers wanting to purchase United States property listed with the company. There was no evidence introduced to show that Leichus either made the representations or knew them to be false. There is no evidence introduced to show that Leichus knew that no bona fide effort would be made to sell the property listed. There was no evidence of any nature introduced by FREC to show that Leichus was dishonest or untruthful. No evidence was introduced to establish the amended allegation that Leichus was guilty of a violation of a duty imposed by law.

Florida Laws (1) 501.204
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DIVISION OF FINANCE vs BARAT COMPANY, 92-005620 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 16, 1992 Number: 92-005620 Latest Update: Mar. 17, 1993

The Issue The issue in this case concerns whether the Petitioner should issue a cease and desist order and/or impose sanctions against the Respondent on the basis of allegations that the Respondent, by failing to have its books, accounts, and documents available for examination and by refusing to permit an inspection of its books and records in an investigation and examination, has violated Sections 520.995(1)(a), (f), and (g), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Sometime during the month of February of 1991, Ms. Jennifer Chirolis, a Financial Investigator from the Department of Banking and Finance, visited the offices of the Barat Company. She spoke with Mr. Roque Barat and determined that the Barat Company was conducting retail installment sales without being licensed to do so under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. Mr. Chirolis advised Mr. Roque Barat that he needed a license and asked him to cease operations until he obtained the necessary license. The Barat Company thereafter obtained the necessary license and was still licensed as of the time of the formal hearing. Thereafter, the Department received a complaint about the Barat Company from a customer. The customer's complaint was to the effect that the Barat Company had made misrepresentations concerning the fee paid by the customer. The Department initiated an "investigation" of the customer's complaint and also decided to conduct an "examination" of the Barat Company. On April 22, 1992, a Department Examiner, Mr. Lee Winters, went to the office of the Barat Company to conduct the "examination" and "investigation". The Barat Company is operated out of a small office with two employees and a few filing cabinets. When Mr. Winters arrived, employees of the Barat Company were conducting business with two customers. Mr. Winters identified himself to the employees and informed them that he had been assigned to conduct an "examination" and "investigation" of the Barat Company. A Barat Company employee, Mr. Fred Vivar, said that he could not produce the company's records without express authorization from Mr. Roque Barat, that Mr. Roque Barat was out of the country, that he could not get in touch with Mr. Roque Barat at that moment, but that when he did get in touch with him, he would advise Mr. Roque Barat of Mr. Winter's desire to examine the company's books and records. Following a number of telephone calls over a period of several days, on May 1, 1992, Mr. Vivar advised Mr. Winters that he had received authorization from Mr. Roque Barat for the Department to inspect the books and records of the Barat Company. An appointment was made for the Department to inspect the books and records on May 6, 1992, beginning at 10:00 a.m. On May 5, 1992, a letter from an attorney representing the Barat Company was hand delivered to Mr. Winters. The letter included the following paragraph: It is my understanding that you have requested the opportunity to view the records of the above-referenced company, said inspection to take place on May 6, 1992. Please be advised that if this "inspection" is purportedly being done by your agency's authority, pursuant to F.S. 520.996, that no records will be produced absent compliance by your department with F.S. 520.994 including, but not limited to, the Barat Company exercising its right to challenge said subpoena. The Department concluded from the letter of May 5, 1992, that the Barat Company not only refused to produce records without a subpoena, but that, even if served with a subpoena, the Barat Company would resist compliance with the subpoena unless and until ordered to comply by a court. For that reason the Department did not pursue the issuance of a subpoena. Mr. Winters has been involved in over one hundred "examinations" under Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. In the course of those "examinations" there have been only two licensees that did not produce their records. Those two licensees were the Barat Company and another company known as Phase One Credit. Mr. Roque Barat is an officer and director of both Phase One Credit and the Barat Company. The license of Phase One Credit was revoked for its failure to produce its books and records. The refusal to produce the books and records of the Barat Company was occasioned by an effort on the part of Mr. Roque Barat to avoid payment of "examination" fees authorized by Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. In the summer of 1992, the Barat Company filed for bankruptcy, closed down its business operations, and is currently winding up the business.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge that the Barat Company has violated Section 520.995(1)(a), Florida Statutes; Concluding that the Barat Company has violated Sections 520.995(1)(f) and (g), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint; Imposing a penalty consisting of: (a) an administra-tive fine in the amount of one thousand dollars, and (b) revocation of the Barat Company's license; and Ordering the Barat Company to cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5620 The following are my specific rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law, rather than a proposed finding of fact. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: Accepted in substance, with the exception of the last five words. The last five words are rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case and as, in any event, not supported by clear and convincing evidence. Paragraph 6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 8: First sentence accepted. Second sentence rejected as inaccurate description of letter. (The relevant text of the letter is included in the findings of fact.) Last sentence rejected as subordinate and unnecessary evidentiary details. Paragraph 9: Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 10: First two sentences rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Last two sentences accepted in substance. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence rejected as irrelevant to the issues in this case. Paragraph 13: Accepted. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent: As noted in the Preliminary Statement portion of this Recommended Order, the Respondent's proposed recommended order was filed late. The Respondent's proposed recommended order also fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, in that it fails to contain citations to the portions of the record that support its proposed findings of fact. A party's statutory right to a specific ruling on each proposed finding submitted by the party is limited to those circumstances when the proposed findings are submitted within the established deadlines and in conformity with applicable rules. See Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, and Forrester v. Career Service Commission, 361 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), in which the court held, inter alia, that a party is not entitled to more than a reasonable period of time within which to submit its proposals. Because the Respondent submitted its proposals late and because those proposals fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 60Q-2.031, Florida Administrative Code, the Respondent is not statutorily entitled to a specific ruling on each of its proposed findings and no such specific findings have been made. (As noted in the Preliminary Statement, the Respondent's proposed recommended order has been read and considered.) COPIES FURNISHED: Ron Brenner, Esquire Office of the Comptroller 401 Northwest 2nd Avenue Suite 708-N Miami, Florida 33128 Louis J. Terminello, Esquire 950 South Miami Avenue Miami, Florida 33130 Michael H. Tarkoff, Esquire 2601 South Bayshore Drive Suite 1400 Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Copies furnished continued: William G. Reeves, General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (6) 112.061120.57520.994520.995520.996520.997
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. HERBERT LIPSHUTZ (LANE), 77-001796 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001796 Latest Update: Dec. 08, 1978

Findings Of Fact From March 4, 1976, through March 18, 1976, and from April 19, 1976, until the business closed in 1976, Lipshutz was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR. From October 29, 1975, through February 18, 1976, Gottstein was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR. From February 20, 1976, until March 31, 1976, and from April 19, 1976, until the business closed in 1976, Beck was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR. FAR was a registered corporate broker, located in Dade County, Florida. During those periods of time, Far was engaged in an enterprise whereby advanced fee listings were obtained from Florida property owners. Salesmen known as "fronters" or "qualifiers" were employed to place calls to Florida property owners whose names and phone numbers had been provided to the salesmen by FAR. The prospects were asked if they cared to list their real estate with FAR in anticipation of resale. It was explained that there would be a refundable fee to be paid by the property owners for the listing. The refund was to occur upon sale of the property. If the prospect was interested, then certain literature was mailed out to them. Other salesmen were employed as "drivers" who would make the second contact of the prospect who indicated an interest in listing his property. The driver would secure a signed listing agreement along with a check for $375.00 which constituted the refundable listing fee. There was no evidence that any of the listings obtained by FAR were ever resold. There were, however, three parcels of land in negotiation for sale when the operations of FAR were terminated in June, 1976. There was to be a division separate and apart from the "fronters" and "drivers" to do the actual selling of the property. The listings were advertised in the Fort Lauderdale area but there was no evidence to establish whether or not other advertising occurred. There was a total absence of evidence and, hence, a failure of proof as to the allegations of misrepresentations by Respondents. FREC introduced no evidence to show that Respondents represented that the property could be sold for several times the purchase price, that it would be advertised nationwide and in foreign countries or that the company had foreign buyers wanting to purchase United States property listed with the company. There was no evidence introduced to show that Respondents either made the representations or knew them to be false. There was no evidence introduced to show that Respondents knew that no bona fide effort would be made to sell the property listed. There was no evidence of any nature introduced by FREC to show that Respondents were dishonest or untruthful.

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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. PAUL P. JACKSON, 83-003255 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-003255 Latest Update: Apr. 16, 1984

Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed as a real estate broker and was so licensed at all times relevant hereto. He has taught real estate salesman courses at Hillsborough Junior College for about eight years. In February, 1982, Thomas E. Webb and Johnnie M. Webb, husband and wife, signed an offer to purchase real estate owned by Ruby Carline (Exhibit 1). This document was prepared by Respondent as broker and signed by him as witness and escrow agent. The offer was not accepted by the seller. Respondent had a listing agreement (Exhibit 6) on property owned by Ruby Carline in Seffner, Florida, giving him exclusive right to sell this property until June 12, 1982, at a price of $65,800, with buyer assuming an existing mortgage of $27,000 at ten (10) percent. There was also a second mortgage on the property in the amount of $10,000 at eighteen (18) percent. Shortly after Exhibit 1 was not accepted by Carline, the Webbs' trailer burned and they needed a residence quickly. Respondent inquired of Carline how much she would take to move out of her house and she told him $10,000, but needed $2,000 to actually relocate her furniture. On March 5, 1982, Respondent acknowledged receipt of $2,000 from Webb (Exhibit 7). Shortly thereafter, this money was paid to Carline and she vacated her house. Webb moved in during the latter part of March and commenced paying rent. Following this, Respondent prepared an updated contract for sale and purchase which was signed by Thomas Webb and Ruby Carline in early May (Exhibit 3). This contract provided for a purchase price of $59,900, with 7,000 deposit held in escrow by Respondent, and the balance of the purchase price comprising the existing first mortgage of $27,000 to be assumed by the buyer; a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $15,900 to be obtained; and the second mortgage in the amount of $10,000. Special Clause XII provided: Buyer shall rent property for $560 per month with an option to purchase by June 12, 1982, which shall be extended an additional 90 days at time of purchase. Buyer shall assume first mortgage and pay balance to seller. At the time this contract was executed Webb had paid Respondent $7,000. The additional $5,000 cashier's check was given to Respondent by Webb on April 27, 1982 (Exhibit 7) and Exhibit 3 was thereafter prepared. The $5,000 was not placed in escrow but in Respondent's operating account. By check dated May 1, 1982, Respondent disbursed $2,666 to Carline from the proceeds of this down payment plus some rent moneys collected from Webb and claimed the balance of $3,594 as commission on the sale of the property. Carline testified that she received only $1,000 from Respondent in the form of a check when she moved out of the house. Respondent actually paid her $2,000, of which $1,000 was in cash. In her letter to Respondent dated January 1, 1983 (Exhibit 11), Carline acknowledged the $2,000 as a gratuitous payment to her vacating the property and resettling elsewhere. Webb was expecting fire insurance money on his trailer which was to provide funds necessary to pay off the second mortgage. They expected to get additional financing either from a bank or from the seller, or both. When it became evident Webb was experiencing difficulty obtaining financing, Respondent prepared Exhibit 2, another contract for sale and purchase, executed by seller October 22, 1982, which, in Special Clause XII stated: This is a lease option contract, buyer has 30 days to close on property. Rent shall be $560 per month until property is transferred. Property is being purchased "as is". Commission has been paid by seller. This contract also provided for purchase price of $59,900. Deposit (paid to owner-seller Ruby Carline) of $7,000, buyer to assume existing first mortgage of $27,000, the second mortgage to General Finance Corporation in the amount of $10,000 to be paid off and balance to close of $25,900. Clause III provided that if any part of the purchase price is to be financed by third party loan, the contract is contingent upon the buyer obtaining a firm commitment for said loan within 30 days at a rate not to exceed 18 percent for 15 years in the principal amount of $25,000. At the time this contract was signed, all parties knew the buyer needed additional financing to close. While the Webbs occupied the house, Respondent collected the rent, usually in cash, and remitted same to Carlile in the manner received. By the time the closing date of September 12, 1982, arrived, it became evident Webb was having difficulty obtaining financing and would be unable to close. Webb demanded return of the $7,000 deposit from Respondent and Carline. Carline demanded Respondent pay her all of the moneys received by him from Webb; and Respondent claimed a set-off of fees paid by him for appliance repairs, for the institution of eviction proceedings against Webb and for services in collecting the rent for Carline. Respondent paid Webb some $1,200 and attempted to get Carline to release him from liability for further payment to Carline (Exhibit 15). Carline reported the incident to the Real Estate Commission.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. ROBERT CHARLES HURBANIS, PAULINE P. SEELY, JOHN M. PARKS, AND JEAN MAXWELL, 86-000140 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000140 Latest Update: Oct. 07, 1987

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing and regulating the practice of real estate salesmen and brokers by the various provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Included in those duties and enforcement authorities is the duty to investigate conduct by realtors allegedly in violation of Chapter 475, and related rules, and prosecuting administrative proceedings filed as a result of such investigations in order to seek imposition of disciplinary measures against the licensure status of miscreant realtors. The Respondents, at all times pertinent hereto, were licensed real estate brokers or salesmen in the State of Florida, having been issued the license numbers depicted in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent Hurbanis last was issued a license as a broker/salesman located at Sanibel Realty, Inc., Sanibel, Florida. Respondent Pauline Seely was last licensed as a broker/salesman located at VIP Realty Group, Sanibel, Florida. Respondent John M. Parks was licensed as a broker/salesman, last issued for a location at The Realty Shoppe of Lee County in Fort Myers, Florida. Respondent Jean Maxwell was licensed as a broker/salesman located at Suite 205, 1619 Periwinkle Way, Sanibel, Florida. At all times pertinent hereto, the Respondents were licensed and operating in the real estate brokerage business in the employ of VIP Realty Group, Inc., a licensed corporate real estate broker. Concerning the charges in Count I, one Eric Rosen, a real estate salesman employed by VIP Realty Group, Inc., the same firm employing Respondent Pauline P. Seely, obtained Nicholas Fontana and John Priebbe as purchasers of a certain piece of property by sales contract which was owned by Clarence Liebscher and Joseph Kubosch. The sales contract was entered into June 3, 1983, and reflected a purchase price of $315,000, including the sale of certain furniture and other personal property. The complaint alleges that former Respondent Rosen and Respondent Hurbanis, together with the purchasers and sellers, conspired to enter into a second bogus sales contract (so called "double contracting") substantially similar to the first contract, except the sales price was shown to be $350,000 and the terms concerning sale of furniture and other personalty was deleted. It is alleged that this contract was prepared by Rosen under the direction and approval of Respondent Hurbanis for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan from a lending institution in an amount greater than the normal percentage of the sales price that the banking laws and policies of such lenders provide as the maximum amount of mortgage financing which can be obtained on a given piece of property. It is alleged that these Respondents were thus attempting to obtain a loan commitment in an amount greater than could have been obtained had the actual sales price of $315,000 been revealed to the lender. The bogus contract showing the $350,000 sales price was allegedly submitted to the lender, AmeriFirst Savings and Loan Association, without the Respondents notifying AmeriFirst that the actual sales price was $315,000. Although witness Rosen for the Petitioner, testified that he believed the contracts involved in this count had been discussed with Mr. Hurbanis he could not say for certain and could not recall the conversation. In fact, another Petitioner witness, Brandy Vallois, stated several times that Mr. Hurbanis was on vacation during the time that the contract was negotiated, executed and submitted to the lender and that, although Respondent Hurbanis was the office manager at VIP Realty Group at the time, others were serving in his stead at the time he was on vacation (the time of the incident alleged in Count I). Although the Department elicited testimony to the effect that seminars had been given where the Respondent, as well as other realtors, had discussed "creative financing," there was no testimony or other evidence that such lectures by the Respondent or others advocated a policy of "double contracting" or in effect deluding lenders into lending more money for real estate purchases than they normally would have if true purchase prices were disclosed. In any event, both the seller and buyer were aware of the situation concerning this transaction and the lender was never deceived or misled because in fact the loan never closed and no funds were disbursed. There was no evidence that the true particulars of this transaction were not disclosed to the lender. Count II Count II concerns a transaction in which Respondent John Parks was the listing and selling salesman and Respondent Hurbanis was the office manager with the same real estate firm. Allegedly, Respondent Hurbanis directed and approved Respondent Parks' preparation of two sales contracts on or about December 16, 1982, calling for the purchase and sale of certain real estate by Mike Volker from Dr. Robert Pascotto and Gaspar Turanna. Both contracts were similar and pertained to the same parcel of property, but one reflected an actual sales price of $149,000, whereas the allegedly bogus, second contract reflected a total sales price of $157,000. It is thus alleged that these two Respondents conspired with the purchasers and sellers to enter into the higher priced, bogus contract for the purpose of obtaining a mortgage loan commitment principal amount at a greater percentage of the sales price than could have been obtained if the actual sales price had been disclosed to the lender. It is alleged that these two Respondents submitted the bogus contract reflecting the $157,000 false sales price together with loan application documents to First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Myers without informing that institution that the actual sales price was $149,000. No competent, substantial evidence was offered, however, to show that Respondent Parks was anything other than the listing salesman. It was not established that he drafted the contract nor that he submitted either contract to the lender. Concerning Respondent Hurbanis, although it was shown that he was the office manager at the time of the incident, it was not established that he directed or approved the drafting of either contract, directed or approved the submission of either contract to the named lender nor that he was involved in the negotiation or closing stage of the transaction in any way. In fact, although the two contracts show differing purchase prices, neither contract depicts any different amount to come from mortgage financing by First Federal. In fact, both contracts reflect that a mortgage would be obtained from First Federal in the amount of $125,600. Nothing any different was disclosed to First Federal. The difference comes in a differing deposit amount held in escrow by VIP Realty Group, Inc., according to the terms of the contract. One contract, that with the lower purchase price, reflects $7,000 in deposit money toward the purchase and the second contract reflects $15,000 deposit money held toward the purchase. This accounts for the $8,000 difference in the amount of the two contracts, but, in any event, the amount to be obtained by mortgage funds from First Federal was the same on each contract. There was no evidence to prove that the deposit amounts depicted on either contract were bogus or other than the result of bona fide arm's length negotiations between the parties. In any event, there was no evidence that First Federal or its lending officers were not aware of any of the particulars in the transaction. There was no showing that that the lender relied on either contract to its detriment. Count III Respondent Pauline Seely, as listing salesman and owner of certain real property, with former Respondent (since dismissed) James O'Neill as selling salesman, and allegedly with Respondent Charles Hurbanis' direction and approval, prepared and obtained execution of two sales contracts on or about December 30, 1982, for the purchase and sale of her real property by Thomas and Sheila Floyd. Both contracts were substantially similar and pertained to the same parcel, but one contract reflected an actual earnest money deposit of $8,660 and a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $24,000, whereas the supposed bogus, second contract reflected a total earnest money deposit of $14,000 and a purchase money mortgage in the principal amount of $18,660. It is alleged that the Respondents then submitted this to the lending institution for the purpose of obtaining a greater percentage of the sales price in mortgage funds than could have been obtained had the actual sales price, terms and conditions been revealed to the lender. In fact, testimony of record and Respondent Seely's Exhibit 2 reveals that the lender was furnished all documents with regard to this transaction which revealed to the lender, as the loan officer involved stated in the letter constituting this exhibit, that the buyers and the seller had agreed that the seller would take back a second mortgage in the amount of $24,000 and that a contract addendum existed (which is in evidence) reflecting this second agreement. Thus, AmeriFirst, the lender, did in fact have a copy of the agreement stating that the seller would hold the second mortgage for the above amount and that AmeriFirst was aware of all details concerning the transaction. In point of fact, both contracts in evidence, one of which reflects a purchase money mortgage of $18,660 which the seller would hold and which reflects that $7,000 would be paid in cash to the seller at the time of contracting, and the second contract, are identical as to purchase price. The second contract also shows a purchase price of $125,000, the difference being essentially that the second contract shows the $24,000 purchase money mortgage amount instead of the figure of $18,660 shown on the first contract. Both contracts merely call for assumption of a mortgage already made in favor of AmeriFirst in the amount of $92,340. There is no evidence that any additional funds are being sought from AmeriFirst at all. There was no evidence that any action by the Respondents would result in any impairment of the security of AmeriFirst's first mortgage lien on the premises. The purchase money mortgage referenced in the testimony and evidence, regardless of its ultimate amount as that relates to the manner in which the total purchase price would be paid the seller, would, in all events, be a subordinate mortgage lien and it is difficult to see how AmeriFirst could rely on either contract to its detriment, even had it not known of one of the contracts. They both represented a purchase price of $125,000 and merely varied as to ways the purchase price would be paid, over and above the $92,340 outstanding first mortgage loan (which was to be assumed). In all events, however, AmeriFirst and its lending officer was fully aware of all details of this transaction and had no objection to the manner in which the transaction was to be closed and disbursements made, nor to the conditions of the assumption of its mortgage. The so called "double contract" that Ms. Seely is alleged to have entered into was shown thus to be an innocent modification of terms of the original sales contract. No wrongdoing or concealment was shown to have been committed by Respondent or any person who participated in the sale of Pauline Seely's property to Thomas and Sheila Floyd. Count V Concerning Count V, it is alleged that Respondents Seely, Parks and Hurbanis obtained two sales contracts on or about January 24, 1983, for the purchase and sale of certain real property by Computer Maintenance Corporation, purchaser, from James and Loretta Cottrell as sellers. Both contracts pertain to the same piece of real property. Both contracts showed a "purchase price" item of $310,000. One contract, however, actually reflected a total price of $344,000, arrived at by combining a $279,000 "90 percent mortgage loan" with a $60,000 purchase money mortgage and a $5,000 cash deposit. This contract contains a notation at the bottom that the "seller agrees that a separate contract for purchase will be given to the Savings and Loan for loan approval." The other contract related to this sale lists a total purchase price of $310,000 only, with a $5,000 deposit noted with no purchase money mortgage being shown, rather there is shown, in addition to the $279,000 90 percent mortgage loan, a balance of $26,000 cash being paid to the seller. This contractual situation is somewhat mysterious and it may indeed be that an attempt was made to conceal the $60,000 purchase money mortgage on the first contract and make it appear to the lender that the purchaser was actually putting up an additional $26,000 in cash at the closing as an inducement to obtain the principal first mortgage of $279,000 from Naples Federal Savings and Loan, AmeriFirst or some other lender. In point of fact, however, the witness, Ms. Heavener, from AmeriFirst indicated that the bank did not act upon the advice contained on the face of the contract, but rather loaned a percentage of their own independent appraisal value and thus did not act to its detriment upon any information contained on the face of either contract. She indicated that that lender was fully informed about all aspects of this transaction in any event. The evidence does not reflect that Mr. Hurbanis nor Ms. Seely had any part in drafting the contract nor presenting it to the lender. Seely's only involvement was as listing agent, that is, the realtor who obtained the listing from the sellers. There is no evidence to indicate that she participated in any fashion in the sale of the property, the negotiations, nor the drafting or presenting of the contracts. No evidence was offered to show for what purpose, whether illicit or innocent, the two different contracts were drafted. In any event, Ms. Seely was not involved in the preparation of the contracts. Mr. Hurbanis was not connected by any competent, substantial evidence, with any activity concerning the drafting of the contracts nor the presenting of them to the lender. A representative of the lending institution testified that she did not recall any discussions at all with Mr. Hurbanis concerning this transaction and upon cross-examination clearly indicated that the lending institution had protected itself against a "double contract" situation by reliance upon its own independent appraisal in making its lending decision, rather than the contract or contracts themselves. Count VI In this count, it is alleged that Hurbanis obtained a sales contract on January 22, 1983, between T N T Partners, a general partnership as seller and Christopher Smith as purchaser. The pertinent terms of the sale were $30,000 total purchase price, $3,000 deposit and $4,500 cash to be allegedly furnished at closing, together with a $22,500 new note and mortgage on the property. It is alleged, in essence, that Respondent Hurbanis falsely represented to Naples Federal Savings and Loan Association that the purchaser would pay $4,500 cash at closing. The transaction closed on April 15, 1983, but instead of the cash, the seller took back a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $4,500. Thus, the issue here is whether the $4,500 mortgage was properly disclosed to the lender. The evidence is silent as to any connection of Mr. Hurbanis with this transaction. In any event, however, it would appear from the face of the contract itself that the lending institution could not have been deceived by the parties to the contract nor any realtor involved, since the contract itself does not require cash in the amount of $4,500 but rather requires "cash or equivalent at closing." Thus, even if there had been a participation by Respondent Hurbanis in this transaction, which was not proven, it is impossible to detect any concealment or deception since the words "or equivalent" would clearly not preclude the use of a purchase money mortgage in the amount of $4,500 as consideration for this portion of the purchase price, rather than actual cash. Indeed, any other thing of equivalent value could have been used as consideration in this particular without violating the terms of the contract, of which the lender clearly had notice.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the evidence of record, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed in its entirety as to all Respondents. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-0140 Petitioner: Petitioner filed no Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Respondent Hurbanis: The Proposed Findings of Fact by Respondent Hurbanis are subsumed in those made in this Recommended Order to the extent that that Respondent's submissions constitute bona fide Proposed Findings of Fact. In the main, the "Findings of Fact" in the Post-Hearing Submission by this Respondent constitute largely recitations of evidence and testimony, discussion of the weight thereof, inextricably intermingled with Proposed Findings of Fact which cannot be separately ruled upon because of multiple factual findings, legal argument and evidence discussion intertwined in the same paragraph. Respondents Maxwell's and Seely's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-12. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 John P. Milligan, Jr., Esquire Suite 201, Royal Palm Square 1400 Colonial Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Kenneth G. Oertel, Esquire Suite C 2700 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Johnny W. Parks c/o The Realty Shoppe of Lee County 12635 Cleveland Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33907 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. FUTRELL COMPANY, ELEANOR VAN TREESE, AND MARY CAPPS, 75-001988 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001988 Latest Update: Sep. 27, 1976

Findings Of Fact On September 19, 1974 Eleanor Van Treese, as agent for Futrell Company, obtained a listing on a residence located at 12250 S. W. 67th Avenue in Miami, Florida from Newton J. Mulford and Elizabeth N. Mulford, the record owners of said property. A copy of this sales management agreement was admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 1. Thereon was shown one existing mortgage with Coral Gables Federal, with a balance of approximately $47,500. At the time the Mulfords executed Exhibit number 1, a second mortgage in the amount of some $25,000 was also recorded against this property and foreclosure proceedings had been instituted. The holder of the second mortgage was James V. O'Connor. George Bender, a Miami attorney, was aware that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against this property prior to the time that Futrell obtained the listing agreement. He called Mulford to inquire about purchasing the property, but apparently his offer was not high enough to interest Mulford. After the Futrell sign was placed in front of the house, Mrs. Capps met Mrs. George Bender at a social affair. When Mrs. Bender learned that Mrs. Capps was a real estate salesperson working for Futrell Company, she asked if she would show her the Mulford house. In late November or early December Mrs. Bender was shown the house and thereafter her husband also was shown the premises. On January 2, 1975 a final judgment of foreclosure was entered in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial District of Florida. Therein the court found that James V. O'Connor was the holder of a second mortgage on the premises in the principal sum of $25,000 together with interest accrued thereon from August 15, 1970 in the amount of $12,976.34. The court also awarded O'Connor $500 as a reasonable attorney's fee. The judgment further provided that the defendant, O'Connor, or any of the parties to the suit, may become bidders for purchase of the premises at the forthcoming sale thereof; and that the court would retain jurisdiction of the cause for the purpose of entertaining a Motion for Deficiency Judgment and "settle all other questions under the proceedings not settled by this order." O'Connor thereafter called Eleanor Van Treese to advise her that he had obtained the foreclosure order and that he would bid on the property when the judicial sale was held on the 15th of January. He further advised that he was anxious to turn over the property and get his money out of it. Mrs. Van Treese telephoned Mary Capps on January 10, 1975 to advise her of the information she had received from O'Connor. Not understanding the legal implication thereof Mrs. Capps decided that she should come to Mrs. Van Treese's house and the two of them talk to O'Connor regarding the property. This was done; and, with the two salespersons on the telephone with O'Connor, he read to them the judgment that he had obtained; advised them that he would be bidding on the property on January 15th and expected to purchase same; and that he would consider offers to purchase the property from him. Mrs. Capps, that same evening, called Mrs. Bender to advise that O'Connor was going to bid on the property on January 15th and was interested in selling the property. When Mr. Bender came home, Mrs. Bender and he discussed the purchase of the property and decided to submit an offer. Mrs. Bender so advised Mrs. Capps. The following morning, on Saturday, January 11th, Mr. and Mrs. Bender sent to the Futrell Company office and Mrs. Capps typed an offer to Purchase the property which the Benders executed. This was the deposit receipt and sales purchase agreement dated January 11, 1975 admitted into evidence as Exhibit number 2. While at the office Mr. Bender called another attorney, William A. Friedlander, who he considered to be more knowledgeable in real estate transactions than himself, for legal advice in the premises. Friedlander advised him that it was proper to submit an offer to O'Connor although O'Connor did not have present title and was therefore unable to execute a valid deed for the property until after he purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Friedlander considered the contract would be based upon a condition subsequent, viz: the acquisition of title by O'Connor, and such contract would be enforceable. Friedlander was also aware that several judgments had been entered against Mulford and that Mulford would be unable to execute a contract and deliver clear title at the amount Bender was offering. This was so because the sum of first mortgage, second mortgage, real estate commission, and other judgments that had been entered against Mulford exceeded the amount Bender was offering to pay for the residence. He advised Bender that, if the foreclosure suit had joined all necessary parties, the deed obtained by O'Connor at the foreclosure sale would be good and O'Connor would be able to give a good and merchantable title. He further advised Bender that a contract with Mulford would have been futile due to the amount of the offer and unworkable due to the short period of time before the foreclosure sale in which to obtain the cash necessary to provide Mulford sufficient funds to pay off all his creditors and the mortgages. At the time the Benders executed the contract for the purchase of the residence in question it was their intention that the offer be presented only to O'Connor. Mary Capps presented this offer by the Benders (Exhibit 2) to O'Connor who accepted same on January 11, 1975. The $6,000 earnest money deposit was delivered by Mrs. Capps to the Secretary of the Futrell Company for deposit in the Futrell Escrow Account. No evidence was presented that the earnest money deposit has ever been refunded to the Benders or that they have requested this earnest money deposit to be refunded. Mr. and Mrs. Mulford were not advised of the existence of the offer to purchase dated January 11, 1975 until long after O'Connor purchased the property at the foreclosure sale.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. CHARLES LA GUARDIA, 77-000205 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000205 Latest Update: Jul. 17, 1978

The Issue Whether Charles La Guardia violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Charles La Guardia is a registered real estate salesman. La Guardia was employed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. in late 1974 and drew commissions from the company only in that year. La Guardia ceased to work with International Land Services Chartered, Inc. in December, 1974, when he moved to California. La Guardia's duties at International Land Services, Inc. were to contact people by phone and to attempt to sell them the services of International Land Services Chartered, Inc. La Guardia represented that Florida land was appreciating in value, that foreign investors were buying Florida land, and that upon payment of a fee, International Land Services Chartered, Inc. would list an individual's land in a brochure which would be sent to brokers in the United States and in foreign countries. The depositions presented in behalf of the Florida Real Estate Commission indicate that someone calling themself La Guardia contacted the deponents. The person represented that Florida land was appreciating in value, that foreign investors were buying Florida land, that their land could be sold at a profit, and that International Land Services Chartered, Inc. would list their property in a brochure and send it to brokers in the United States and overseas. The deponents, the Karavangelos and Theo Miles, sent money to International Land Services Chartered, Inc. where their property was listed in a brochure prepared by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. and sent to at least one broker in Georgia, because Miles received a copy of his listing from a Georgia realtor. See Miles deposition, Page 11. The Karavangelos also received a copy of one of their listings with International Land Services Chartered, Inc. Theo Miles stated specifically that he set the price for this parcel of land. See Miles deposition, Page 6. The Karavangelos also stated that they had set the price for their land based upon suggestions of the value of land generally expressed to them by the person who called them. Mr. Karavangelos stated that the person identifying himself as La Guardia gave him "a high sales talk like which all real estate brokers do." Evidence was received from various witnesses at the hearing that brochures were prepared by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. and were mailed by the company to real estate brokers in the United States and in foreign countries.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Charles La Guardia as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel Oliver, Esquire Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Charles La Guardia 936 Bambi Drive Destin, Florida 32541 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-205 PROGRESS DOCKET NO. 2956 CHARLES LAGUARDIA, DADE COUNTY Respondent. /

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. MARTY KOPF, 77-001803 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001803 Latest Update: Aug. 24, 1992

Findings Of Fact From September 22, 1975, to December 24, 1975, Kopf was a registered real estate salesman in the employ of FAR, a registered corporate broker, located in Dade County, Florida. During that period of time, FAR was engaged in an enterprise whereby advanced fee listings were obtained from Florida property owners. Salesmen known as "fronters" or "qualifiers" were employed to place calls to Florida property owners whose names and phone numbers had been provided to the salesmen by FAR. The prospects were asked if they cared to list their real estate with FAR in anticipation of resale. It was explained that there would be a refundable fee to be paid by the property owner for the listing. The refund was to occur upon sale of the property. If the prospect was interested, then certain literature was mailed out to them. Other salesmen were employed as "drivers" who would make the second contact of the prospect who indicated an interest in listing his property. The driver would secure a signed listing agreement along with a check for $375.00 which constituted the refundable listing Fee. There was no evidence that any of the listings obtained by FAR were ever resold. There were, however, three parcels of land in negotiation for sale when the operations of FAR were terminated in June, 1976. There was to be a division separate and apart from the "fronters" and "drivers" to do the actual selling of the property. The listings were advertised in the Fort Lauderdale area but there was no evidence to establish whether or not other advertising occurred. In November of 1975, Kopf telephoned Mr. Harold E. Triplett, a resident of Pomeroy, Ohio. Mr. Triplett was the owner of two lots in the Cape Coral residential development. Kopf represented to Mr. Triplett that he, Kopf, had a buyer for the Triplett property which was a foreign company seeking tax advantages. Kopf guaranteed that the property would be sold by November 29, 1975. November 29 came and went without a closing on the Florida property. This, notwithstanding the fact that Kopf had advised Triplett that the property was already sold and that the $347.20 check that Triplett had sent to Kopf was for closing costs. Triplett tried unsuccessfully to contact Kopf but was advised that the telephone had been disconnected. Notwithstanding the fact that FAR had never resold any of its listings Kopf represented to Triplett that he had successfully concluded similar transactions. As to the remaining allegations numbered 1, 3 and 4 above, there was a total absence of evidence and, hence, a failure of proof as to misrepresentations of those facts. FREC introduced no evidence to establish that the prices for which the properties were listed were reasonable listing prices and further introduced no evidence to show that Kopf represented that the property would be advertised nationwide and in foreign countries, or that the company had foreign buyers wanting to purchase the property listed with FAR, with the exception of Kopf's property, or that such representations, if made, were false. However, the evidence establishes that Kopf represented that the property would be sold within 30 days of the listing, which representation was false, and that Kopf knew that the representation was false.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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