Findings Of Fact The Respondents, F. H. Dicks, III; F. H. Dicks, IV; and F. H. Dicks Company, are wholesale dealers in watermelons which they purchase and sell interstate. The Respondents' agents during the 1991 melon season in the Lake City area were Harold Harmon and his son, Tommy Harmon. The Harmons had purchased watermelons in the Lake City area for several year prior to 1991, and the Petitioner had sold melons through them to the Respondents for two or three seasons. The terms of purchase in these prior transactions had always been Freight on Board (FOB) the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. The terms of purchase of the melons sold by Petitioner to Respondents prior to the loads in question had been FOB the purchaser's truck at the seller's field with the farmer bearing the cost of picking. One of the Harmons would inspect the load being purchased during the loading and at the scale when the truck was weighed out. After the Harmons left the area, their work was carried on by Jim Coffee, who the Harmons introduced to Mr. Shiver as their representative. Once the melons were weighed and inspected, the melons belonged to the Respondents. Price would vary over the season, but price was agree upon before the melons were loaded. Settlement had always been prompt, and the Harmons enjoyed the confidence of the local farmers. On July 8, 1991, load F 276 of 45,840 pounds of watermelons was sold by Petitioner to Respondents for 4 per pound. They were weighed and inspected by Coffee. These melons were shipped to West Virginia where they were refused by the buyer. The melons were inspected in Charleston, WV, on July 12, 1991. This inspection revealed 10% transit rubs, 12% decay, and 22% checksom. These melons were subsequently shipped to Indianapolis, IN, for disposal. The Respondents deducted the freight on this load in the amount of $2,459.76 from moneys owed the Petitioner on other transactions. On July 9, 1991, two loads of watermelons, F 277 and F 278, were sold to the Respondents. Load F 277 weighed 46,200 pounds and Load F 278 weighed 45,830 pounds. Both loads were inspected by Coffee. Mr. Shiver had negotiated a price of 4 per pound for F 278 and 3.5 per pound for F 277. Load F 278 was received by the Respondents at their facility in Yamassee, SC, where it was government inspected on July 11, 1991. It was found to be in very bad shape. It was bartered to the trucking company by the Respondents in exchange for the freight charges. Load F 277 was also received by the Respondents, who accepted 38,000 pounds of 45,830 pounds of melons shipped. On July 10, 1991, load F 279 of 42,180 pounds was sold for 3.5 per pound, and shipped to the Respondents in Yamassee, SC, for repacking and shipment to Baltimore, MD. They were weighed and inspected by Coffee before shipment. This load was rejected without any inspection by the Respondents. The Petitioners received $1,330 for load F 277, nothing for loads F and 279, and Respondents retained $2,459.76 from prior transactions for freight charges on load F 276. Under the terms of the sale, FOB purchaser's truck at grower's field, the Respondents bore the cost of transportation. The Respondents also bore the risk of loss on sales which they made and which were rejected. On the two loads which were not inspected by government inspectors, F and F 277, the Petitioner is entitled to the sales price for the melons. Although there is evidence to support the Respondents' contention that the produce was not within grade specifications, the Respondent had accepted the produce. Contrary to Respondents' assertion that the produce coming from the same field on the same day would all be bad, these loads were not loaded on the same day. Further, most of one of the loads received on the same day from the same field was accepted. Lastly, as stated above, all the loads were inspected by Respondent prior to acceptance. The Respondents owe the Petitioners $1,833.60 on load F 276, $1,570.80 on load F 277, 1833.20 on load F 278, and 1476.30 on load F 279. This is a total of $6,713.90. The Respondents improperly retained $2,359.76 for freight charges, but did pay the Petitioners $1,330 for load F 277. The total owed by the Respondents to the Petitioners is $9,073.66, of which Respondents have already paid $1,330.00. The Respondents still owe the Petitioners $7,743.66 less $32 for the watermelon assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: Respondent be given 30 days to settle with the Petitioner in the amount of $7,711.66 and the Petitioner be paid $7,711.66 from Respondent's agricultural bond if the account is not settled. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of October, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry McDavid, Esquire 128 South Hernando Street Lake City, FL 32055 F. H. Dicks, III c/o F. H. Dicks Company P.O. Box 175 Barnwell, SC 29812 Bob Crawford, Commissioner Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 South Carolina Insurance Company Legal Department 1501 Lady Street Columbia, SC 29202 Victoria I. Freeman Seibels Bruce Insurance Companies Post Office Box One Columbia, SC 29202 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Respondent, IMG Citrus, Inc. (Respondent), owes Petitioner, Vero Beach Land Company, LLC, (Petitioner) the sum of $63,318.50 for citrus that was purchased but not harvested.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner and Respondent were involved in the growing and marketing of citrus fruit in the State of Florida. For purposes of this Order, Petitioner is also described as "the seller"; Respondent is described as "the buyer." On October 26, 2007, Respondent agreed to purchase fruit from Petitioner. The terms of their agreement were reduced to writing. The “Fresh Fruit Purchase Agreement” provided that Respondent would purchase from Petitioner all of the citrus fruits of the varieties of merchantable quality as delineated in the contract. More specifically, Respondent was entitled to purchase the following described citrus from Petitioner: Block Name Variety Est Field Boxes Price Unit of Measure Rise Movement Date Pepper Grove Red Grapefruit 16,000 $4.50 Floor FB ½ Rise to Grower March 15th, 2008 Pepper Grove White Grapefruit 20,000 $2.00 Floor FB All Rise to March 15th, Grower 2008 Pepper Grove Navels 2,500 $5.00 Floor FB All Rise to Grower January 1, 2008 The contract recognized that “only that fruit produced as the result of normal seasonal bloom” and not late maturing or out of season bloom would be included. Additionally, all of the fruit was to be for fresh shipment. Citrus intended for the fresh market must be visually appealing as well as having other attributes associated with the fresh fruit market. Discolorations or damage to the fruit makes it unsuitable for the fresh fruit market. In anticipation of the crop the buyer expected to harvest, Respondent advanced to Petitioner the sum of $34,500.00. Additional payments were to be made to Petitioner as described in paragraph 2 of the contract. Critical to this matter, however, were the terms of the contract set forth in paragraph 3. That paragraph provided: Merchantability of Fruit: Seller represents to Buyer that all fruit sold under this Agreement shall be sound and merchantable, in conformance with industry standards, and fit for their intended purpose of fresh packing and marketing. Grower shall keep said fruit sprayed sufficiently to keep the fruit bright and free from rust mite, disease and insect damage and shall not fertilize or cultivate the grove upon which the fruit is grown, during the term of this Agreement, in anyway that will deteriorate the quality of the fruit. In the event such fruit is rendered not merchantable by virtue of damage from cultivation, fertilization, re-greening, cold, hail, fire, windstorm, or other hazard, the Buyer shall have the right to terminate this Agreement and the Seller shall refund to the Buyer the advance payment this day made, or that portion thereof not applied in the payment for fruit picked prior to termination. The buyer shall have four weeks from the occurrence of such cold, hail, fire, windstorm or other hazard within which to notify Seller that the fruit has been rendered non merchantable and of the termination of this agreement. Seller shall reimburse the Buyer for all deposits and advances made on unpicked fruit within thirty (30) days of notification by Buyer. Paragraph 6 of the parties’ Fresh Fruit Purchase Agreement provided: Default: Should the Buyer, without lawful excuse, fail or refuse to pick and remove the fruit subject to this Agreement within the time specified or any extension thereof, the Seller hereby accepts and agrees to retain the deposit this day made less portion thereof applied and deducted as aforesaid, as his liquidated damages for such failure without any other claim for damage against the Buyer. In the event of any sale or attempted sale of the crop to a third party or other unexcused failure to deliver, Buyer shall be entitled to avail itself of all available legal and equitable remedied [sic] including injunctive relief. If either party fails to materially comply with the provisions of the agreement, the other party must give written notice of non- compliance, stating the nature of the violation or non-compliance and giving the other party thirty (30) days to bring themselves into compliance. If a disagreement exists regarding the interpretation of this Agreement, the parties agree to discuss the issues and negotiate in good faith to resolve the dispute. No waiver of any breach, right or remedy, shall constitute a continuing waiver, nor shall it be construed as a waiver of any other breach, right or remedy. Paragraph 7 of the contract provided, in pertinent part, that the agreement could be “supplemented or modified only by written agreement between the parties.” The parties did not provide any written supplements or modifications to their agreement. Petitioner wanted to have his fruit removed in a timely manner as he did not want the fruit left to potentially interfere with the next year's crop. It was Petitioner's desire to have the fruit picked as early and as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the contract provided for a pick or "movement date." With regard to the navel oranges, the movement date was January 1, 2008. The movement date for the grapefruit was March 15, 2008. Presumably, these dates were negotiated and agreed to by the parties. Had Petitioner wanted earlier movement dates, that was within a contractual option available at the time of contract negotiations. The "Pepper Grove" that is described in the parties' agreement is a 120 acre grove sectioned into four blocks. The white grapefruit are located on two interior blocks with the red grapefruit on the two outer blocks. The navels were located on a portion of one of the outer blocks adjacent to the roadway. All of the blocks border 122nd Avenue. Presumably, as the four blocks adjoin one another it would be fairly easy to move from one block to the next to complete picking the crop. The contract specified that Respondent would purchase 2,500 boxes of navels. Respondent picked 2,928 boxes of navels from Petitioner's grove. This fruit was harvested between December 6, 2007 and January 10, 2008. Respondent did not meet the "movement date" specified in the contract and Petitioner apparently did not complain, in writing, regarding this technical violation. Moreover, the buyer did not allege that the navels were not acceptable quality or merchantable. This fruit was in the same block as the grapefruit. The contract price for the navels was $5.00 with 100 percent of the rise to go to the seller. On or about December 19, 2007, Petitioner inquired as to whether Respondent wanted to be released from the contract. This request was not reduced to writing and Respondent did not accept the verbal offer. On or about December 22, 2007, Respondent started harvesting the Pepper Grove grapefruit. In total Respondent harvested 4,266 boxes of the white grapefruit. Respondent harvested 5,400 boxes of red grapefruit from the Pepper Grove. In total, Petitioner's Pepper Grove produced 13,077 boxes (out of the contract volume of 16,000) of red grapefruit. In total, Petitioner's Pepper Grove produced 19,289 boxes (out of the contract volume of 20,000) of white grapefruit. Based upon the volumes produced by the Pepper Grove and the contract prices with the rise going to Petitioner for the navels, Respondent owed Petitioner $25,034.40 for the navels harvested, $24,300 for the red grapefruit, and $8,532.00 for the white grapefruit. These amounts total $57,866.40. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent had paid Petitioner $59,126.48. Of the unpicked fruit left on the trees by Respondent, Petitioner was able to market 15,023 boxes of white grapefruit that went to the cannery and yielded $7,965.46. The red grapefruit that went to the cannery yielded $4,162.21. Red grapefruit that was harvested by Minton yielded 1,056 boxes, but only $168.96. Thus, Petitioner recovered only $12,296.63 for the 22,700 boxes of fruit that Respondent left on the Pepper Grove. Respondent maintained that it did not pick Petitioner's fruit because it was damaged by rust mite. If true, Respondent claimed that the fruit would not meet fresh fruit standards. Although Petitioner acknowledged that some of the fruit did have damage, Mr. Hornbuckle maintained that he offered fruit from another grove to make-up the difference in volume. None of the conversations that allegedly occurred regarding the rust mite issue were reduced to writing at the time. Petitioner maintains he had more than sufficient fruit to meet the amounts due under the parties' agreement. On March 6, 2008, Respondent issued a letter to Petitioner that provided, in part: We are very sorry however we are unable to continue to harvest the grapefruit from your groves due to the lack of merchantability of the fruit for the fresh market. Due to the disease and insect damage present on the fruit, the return on the fruit is unable to cover harvesting and packing charges for the fresh channel. On March 11, 2008, Petitioner wrote back to Respondent and stated, in part: Please be advised that refusal to harvest any additional fruit constitutes a breach of the contract, which requires IMG Citrus to harvest all of the red and white grapefruit no later than March 15, 2008. All of the navel fruit was to have been harvested by January 1, 2008. Contrary to your letter, the fruit is merchantable, and does not have disease or insect damage which unreasonably reduces the merchantability of the crop. At the time of the allegations of rust mite or other damage, Petitioner took pictures of his crop to demonstrate that it appeared to be healthy fruit. Respondent did not have pictures to demonstrate its claim that the fruit was not merchantable. Moreover, Respondent did not formally document that the fruit was unacceptable until March 6, 2008. Under the terms of the contract, the harvesting of the grapefruit was to be completed March 15, 2008. Respondent's claim that it purchased fruit from Duda Products, Inc. (Duda) to demonstrate the market price for grapefruit is not persuasive. The contract with Duda named a variety of "Ruby Reds." There is no evidence that the "Ruby Red" variety is comparable to the whites and reds depicted on Petitioner's contract. Respondent claims that the packout percentage for Petitioner's fruit did not support the harvesting of the crop. That is to say, that the percentage of fruit meeting a fresh fruit quality did not justify the harvesting and packing expense associated with Petitioner's fruit. If the fruit were not marketable in the fresh market, the fruit had no value to Respondent. The parties' agreement did not, however, specify what would be an acceptable packout percentage to support a notion that the fruit was merchantable. Taken to extreme, Respondent could claim any percentage short of 100 percent demonstrated fruit that was not merchantable. No evidence of an industry standard for an acceptable packout percentage was presented.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order approving Petitioner's complaint against Respondent in the amount of $51,021.87. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Collins Westchester Fire Insurance Company 436 Walnut Street, Routing WA10A Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19106 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, M-38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Melanie Sallin Ressler, COO IMG Citrus, Inc. 2600 45th Street Vero Beach, Florida 32967 Michel Sallin IMG Citrus, Inc. 7836 Cherry Lake Road Groveland, Florida 34736 Larmarcus E. Hornbuckle Rebecca Hornbuckle Vero Beach Land Company, LLC 6160 1st Street Southwest Vero Beach, Florida 32968 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceedings Petitioner was a producer of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1983). At all times pertinent to this proceedings Respondent BB & W was a licensed dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1983), issued license No. 245 by the Department, and bonded by Fireman's Fund Insurance Company (Fireman) in the sum of $15,000 - Bond No. SLR - 4152 897. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent Fireman was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The complaint filed by Petitioner was timely filed in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes (1983). Although Respondent BB & W contends that the watermelons in dispute were purchased through Scotty Luther Produce as were all watermelons purchased by the Respondent BB & W in Florida, the evidence shows that on the load in dispute, Respondent BB & W, through its president Cecil Bagwell was dealing directly with Petitioner when Cecil Bagwell contacted him by telephone to discuss the purchase of the watermelons and in making the necessary arrangements for a truck to pick up and deliver the watermelons to their destination. The evidence also shows that Scotty Luther of Scotty Luther Produce was not present in the area when the watermelons in dispute were purchased or loaded and was not involved in this transaction. The agreement between Petitioner and Respondent BB & W was that title and risk of loss passed to Respondent BB & W on shipment, with all remedies and rights for Petitioner's breach reserved to Respondent BB & W. Petitioner loaded three (3) loads of Charleston Grey Watermelons (grey) to Respondent BB & W on June 3 and 4, 1985 but only one (1) load is in dispute which is a load of grey watermelons loaded on June 4, 1985 on a truck furnished by Respondent BB & W. The net weight of the watermelons was 46,810 pounds and the agreed upon price was $0.03 per pound for a total price of $1,404.30 which Respondent BB & W has refused to pay. Petitioner also sold Respondent BB & W two (2) loads of grey watermelons on June 3, 1985 that were harvested from the same field as the watermelons in dispute and shipped: one load to Orlando, Florida; and one (1) load to Atlanta, Georgia without any incident of loss as a result of overmaturity or otherwise. The watermelons in dispute were not federally or state inspected before or during loading. Although Respondent BB & W contended that the watermelons had been inspected by a federal inspector at their destinations the evidence was insufficient to show that the watermelons in dispute had been inspected or that they were over mature upon arrival at their destination. Likewise the evidence was insufficient to prove that the watermelons in dispute were over mature upon loading. The record reflects that the watermelons in dispute were loaded in a closed trailer with no apparent ventilation and the refrigeration unit not operating when the trailer departed from Petitioner's farm after loading. Petitioner received a call from Respondent BB & W's office two (2) days after shipping the watermelons advising him that the watermelons had been "kicked" but it was two (2) more days before he reached Cecil Bagwell to find out that they were "kicked" for being over mature.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent BB & W be ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $1,404.30. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent BB & W fails to timely pay the Petitioner as ordered, then Respondent Fireman be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) and that the Department reimburse the Petitioner in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1983) Respectfully submitted and entered this 25th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of February, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Doyle Conner, Commissioner Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ron Weaver, Esquire, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joe W. Kight, Chief License and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Freddie Woods Jr. Post Office Box 52 Evinston, FL Cecil Bagwell, President BB & W Farms, Inc. Route 2, Box 855 Cordell, GA 31015
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner (complainant) is entitled to recover $1,340.50 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a grower of watermelons and qualifies as a "producer" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. is listed as surety for Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. The amount and period of the bond have not been established. The time material to the amended complaint is June, 1994. Two or three weeks before Petitioner's melons were ready for harvest, Steve Helms personally came to Petitioner's home and requested to ship Petitioner's melons for ultimate retail sale. Petitioner requested to be paid "up front." Mr. Helms would not agree to pay all the money "up front" but agreed to pay some. He also agreed to pay within 14 days of the first shipment. Petitioner had had a bad experience two years previously, so he got Mr. Helms to promise to "clean up" his field. This expression is subject to some interpretation, and although Petitioner initially stated that the agreement was for Respondent broker-shipper to buy all his melons regardless of condition, Petitioner later modified his statement to say that Mr. Helms only promised not to take the best melons and leave the rest. Harvesting began May 15, 1994. Until June 10, 1994, Petitioner's usual contact with Respondent broker- shipper was Frank Favuzza, who oversaw all weighing and loading and assessed the Petitioner's melons on behalf of Respondent broker-shipper. On June 10, 1994, Mr. Helms was again personally in the field. Petitioner told Mr. Helms that he had to get the remainder of the melons off the field by Sunday, otherwise the heat would ruin them. Mr. Helms said he would wait until Monday. Petitioner believes that if the melons had been harvested by Sunday, June 12, 1994, three truckloads could have been harvested. On Monday, less than a full truckload was in good enough condition to be loaded onto a truck. A lot of melons were going bad and were left in the field to rot. On Tuesday, June 14, 1994, Petitioner's melons were weighed at Romeo, Florida and the poundage established at 29,330 pounds. Frank Favuzza estimated to Petitioner that his melons would only bring $.04/lb. From this conversation, related by Petitioner, it may be clearly inferred that Petitioner knew he would not be paid until after Respondent broker-shipper received payment from the ultimate retailer at the other end of the transaction. Petitioner's amended complaint alleged the amounts due as follows: "On June 1, 1994, #92111, 700 lbs. at $.07 equals $49.00, not $490.00; June 3, 1994, #92117, 900 lbs. at $.07 equals $63.00, not $630.00; and June 3, 1994, #92120, 790 lbs. at $.07 equals $55.30, not $553.00. Therefore Item (12) Complaint Total is amended to $1,340.00." The amendments did not alter the original claim for 6-14-94, invoice 92157 for 29,330 lbs. of melons at $.04 for $1,173.20. There was no claim for the melons that rotted in Petitioner's field. Weight tickets and Respondent's corresponding broker-shipper's bills of lading were admitted in evidence. These showed the following amounts were received by Respondent broker-shipper: 6/1/94 INVOICE 92111 46,020 net weight melons 6/3/94 INVOICE 92117 45,580 net weight melons 6/3/94 INVOICE 92120 44,720 net weight melons 6/14/94 INVOICE 92157 29,330 net weight melons Petitioner testified, without refutation, that he was present at each weighing and that he had agreed to take $.07 per pound on all loads except for the June 14, 1994 load for which he was claiming $.04 per pound. The bills of lading support Petitioner's testimony as to the price per pound. The bills of lading also clearly show that the price per pound was "to farm minus labor." This notation means that the net amount to be paid Petitioner by Respondent was subject to a prior deduction for labor, but it cannot reasonably be inferred to include a deduction for shipping. Petitioner's last load of 29,330 lbs. of melons weighed on June 14, 1994 was less than a full truckload, so Respondent added melons from another farm to that truck to make up a full load. Respondent broker-shipper did not pay Petitioner for 700 pounds of the June 1, 1994, invoice 92111 truckload; for 900 pounds of the first June 3, 1994 invoice 92117 truckload; for 790 pounds of the second June 3, 1994 invoice 92120 truckload; or for any (29,330 pounds) of the June 14, 1994 invoice 92157 truckload, upon grounds that those melons were not saleable at their destination. Petitioner put in evidence Exhibit P-3 which is an accounting Respondent had sent him. It shows that Respondent broker-shipper had deducted $690.30 for labor on invoice 92111 and claimed 700 pounds could not be sold; had deducted $683.70 for labor on invoice 92117 and claimed 900 pounds could not be sold; had deducted $670.80 for labor on invoice 92120 and claimed 790 pounds could not be sold; and had paid Petitioner nothing on a June 14, 1994 truckload, invoice 92159. Invoice 92157, which corresponds to Petitioner's June 14, 1994 partial truckload of 29,330 pounds of melons, is not listed or otherwise explained in the exhibit. The exhibit is conclusionary and inexplicably is dated 1993. There is no back-up evidence to support Respondent's making these deductions. No inspection certificate or labor charges are in evidence. Petitioner's initial complaint, which he put in evidence as P-1, constitutes an admission by him. In the complaint, Petitioner contended (1) that he was selling "direct" to Respondent broker-shipper; (2) that he was selling "f.o.b."; and (3) that he was selling "Fob shipping point excectance (sic) after final inspection." Petitioner also stated therein that he was given an inspection sheet showing 46,310 lbs. of watermelons had failed inspection and he did not feel the melons that failed inspection were his melons because Frank Favuzza approved of all melons loaded from Petitioner's field and the inspection sheet did not say that the bad melons were Petitioner's melons. Somewhat contrariwise, Petitioner testified at formal hearing that he had asked Respondent broker-shipper for a government inspection certificate showing that his melons were bad and never got it. From the credible evidence as a whole, it is inferred that Petitioner sold his watermelons on the June 14, 1994 truckload at $.04 per pound contingent upon the melons arriving at their ultimate destination in saleable condition per a federal inspection. It is further inferred that the prior three loads at issue also were sold contingent upon their arriving in saleable condition. The evidence as a whole also supports a finding that Petitioner's melons left the weigh station in a condition capable of being sold for the respective prices agreed upon between Petitioner and Respondent broker-shipper. Any deterioration of melons between June 10, 1994 when Petitioner requested that the broker-shipper take the last load and June 14, 1994 when the last load actually was weighed and shipped is attributable to Respondent broker-shipper, but that fact is not significant since the lesser rate of $.04/lb. was agreed upon prior to shipping and after Respondent broker-shipper had seen and approved the loaded melons. Petitioner's foregoing evidence of delivering saleable quality melons to Respondent broker-shipper is unrefuted. The presumption is thereby created that but for some failure of Respondent broker-shipper, the melons would have arrived at their ultimate destination in saleable condition. There is no evidence of record to support Respondent's deductions for "labor," or for melons which allegedly could not be sold upon delivery at the ultimate destination. Petitioner moved ore tenus to further amend his complaint to include a prayer for reimbursement for the cost of the melons which rotted in his field and became unsaleable between June 10 and June 14, 1994 due to Respondent broker-shipper's delay in loading and to assert a claim for interest on the $1,340.50 claim. This motion was denied as too late.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioner $1,340.50, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $1,340.50, which in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.'s case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of June, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 94-6189A The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted. Rejected as unnecessary Rejected as subordinate and mere argumentation. 5-6 Rejected as mere argumentation. Rejected as these were not the dates testified. Rejected as mere argumentation. Respondent Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc.'s PFOF: 1 Accepted. 2-4 Rejected as not proven. Accepted as to the June 10-14, 1994 load. Rejected as not proven. Not proven in whole. Covered to the extent proven. While one inference might be that a different invoice number was assigned to the combined load, that is not the only reasonable inference based on the evidence submitted. Likewise, although Petitioner apparently got some inspection certificate, that certificate is not in evidence. There is no record evidence as to what it covered. It is not reasonable to infer or guess that it covered four loads on four trucks on three dates or that there is any way to calculate from it that the only bad melons were Petitioner's melons and not those mixed in from another farm on June 14, 1994. See FOF 19-20. 8-15 Rejected as not proven. Respondent Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.'s PFOF: None filed COPIES FURNISHED: Frank Favuzza, President Steve Helms Fruit Co., Inc. Post Office Box 1682 Auburndale, Florida 33823 Tom Morton Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. Post Office Box 94-5010 Maitland, Florida 32794-5010 L. C. Stevenson 333 NW 46th Avenue Ocala, Florida 34482 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issues that were considered in the course of the hearing were those related to a claim by the Petitioner of entitlement to receive an additional $5,581.00 in proceeds related to the sale of watermelons to J. R. Sales, Inc. In this case Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent J. R. Sales, Inc. in the person of its representative, one Carr Hussey, had agreed to pay a fixed price of four cents per pound for large grey watermelons and 3.5 cents per pound for medium grey watermelons and that four cents per pound was due the Petitioner for the delivery of large jubilee watermelons. It is further alleged that those prices were not paid. If the Petitioner's assertions are correct, the additional amount owed would be $5,581.00. In reply Respondent J. R. Sales, Inc. denies the claim of $5,581.00 and in its defense states that all money due and owning to the Petitioner has been paid.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Earl Dicks, is a farmer in Columbia County, Florida. In 1984 Petitioner grew two varieties of watermelons in Columbia County for the purpose of selling those crops commercially. Those watermelon varieties were greys and jubilees. As of June 21, 1984, Petitioner had not sold his crop of watermelons. On that date Petitioner was introduced to Carr Hussey, President of J. R. Sales, Inc. This introduction was made by another farmer, one Doyle Ottinger. The purpose of this introduction was to ascertain whether Hussey would be interested in purchasing the watermelons which Petitioner had available for sale. J. R. Sales, Inc. is a company which purchases watermelons in Florida for delivery and further sale in markets outside of Florida. Following the introduction of the Petitioner and Hussey, those two gentlemen, Ottinger and Petitioner's son, Edward Dicks, went to see Petitioner's grey watermelon crop in Columbia County. Prior to arriving at the field, no discussion had been entered into between the Petitioner and Hussey as to price. While at the field Petitioner offered to sell the entire field of watermelons, and Hussey declined the purchase. At that juncture Hussey was not aware of any particular market in which he might place the Petitioner's watermelons. Hussey did indicate that if he were able to find a market for those crops, he would pay Petitioner the fair market value per pound for those watermelons on a given day. He further stated that the fair market price on June 21, 1984, was four cents a pound for large and 3.5 cents a pound for medium greys. The market price considerations at work, as Hussey envisioned them, had to do with the market conditions in New York, New England and Canada, places where the watermelons would be delivered. It also was important that the watermelons be delivered prior to July 4, 1984. The importance of this date had to do with the demand for watermelons for retail purchase prior to July 4, 1984, and a softening market immediately subsequent to that date. The discussion as to price was made in the presence of Petitioner, his son, and Hussey. There was no other discussion concerning the purchase price of the grey variety of watermelon, and no written document evidences this oral discussion of price. Following the conversation of June 21, 1984, in which price was discussed between the Petitioner and Hussey, the grey watermelons which Petitioner had in Columbia County were available for harvesting. One or two days after this conversation, the first loads of watermelons were harvested. Although Petitioner believes that 17,000 pounds of medium watermelons were harvested with the balance of the watermelons taken on that day being large watermelons, it is found that the 17,000 pounds related to large watermelons with the balance being medium watermelons. This pertains to Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1 admitted into evidence which contains the composite invoices for those loads together with poundage and price. Seventeen thousand pounds relates to the large at 3.5 per pound with the balance of the weights pertaining to mediums at three cents per pound. The net amount paid after deducting the cost of harvesting was $3,085.78. On July 2, 1984, additional medium and large grey watermelons were harvested from the Petitioner's Columbia County fields, through J. R. Sales, Inc. A copy of the composite invoices related to the latter, together with a description of the sizes, weights, and prices paid with deduction of harvesting cost, may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit Number 3 admitted into evidence. Price paid was 2.5 cents per pound for medium greys and three cents per pound for large greys. These watermelons were watermelons which would not have arrived at J. R. Sales' markets in time meet the July 4, 1984, peak sales period. The total amount paid for this July 2, 1984, harvest of greys was $5,104.75. 6..Watermelons purchased from the Petitioner had to be placed in markets other than those normally served by J. R. Sales, Inc. In the period June 23 through June 25, 1984, J. R. Sales, Inc. bought watermelons from other farmers in the growing area and paid prices for large greys which varied from three cents to 3.5 cents per pound. The price being paid for medium greys in that time frame was three cents per pound, to a farmer other than Petitioner. In the same sequence of days, 3.5 cents per pound was paid for a purchase of large jubilees from another farmer. On the subject of large jubilees, Hussey had been shown a field of jubilee watermelons that were grown by Petitioner in Columbia County. When shown the melons, he indicated that he was not interested in purchasing them. Nonetheless, J. R. Sales, Inc. harvested large jubilee watermelons from that field and paid $1,529.15 for them. Payment was made to Petitioner at a rate of three cents per pound less harvesting cost. Petitioner's son was aware of this harvesting of the large jubilees. The composite invoices related to the large jubilees may be found in Petitioner's Exhibit Number 2 admitted into evidence, a copy. This document shows the invoice numbers, the size, the price per pound and weight together with the gross price less harvesting cost and the net payment price. These watermelons were harvested on June 28, 1984. Even though there was no discussion as to price of the jubilees, Petitioner was of the opinion that four cents a pound for large jubilees should be the price, a price never agreed to by J. R. Sales, Inc. Sherod Keen, another individual who brokered and purchased watermelons in the area of Columbia County, Florida, in 1984 gave testimony. His testimony established that in the period June 21 through June 28, 1984, he was paying farmers a price between 3.5 cents to four cents per pound for medium greys and four to 4.5 cents per pound for large greys. On July 2, 1984, Keen was paying 3.5 to four cents for large greys. Keen agreed with Petitioner and Hussey that the cutoff date prior to July 4, 1984, is critical in terms of the price to be paid, in that watermelons delivered to the market prior to July 4, 1984, would bring a better price than those prices immediately following July 4, 1984. Keen sells in places such as Florida, Maine and Wisconsin. Keen was not interested in purchasing the watermelons which Petitioner sold to J. R. Sales, Inc. Hussey, Keen and Ottinger established through their testimony that the prices for watermelons varied day to day within the relevant time frame, June and July, 1984.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral testimony and the documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers were "producers" of agricultural products in the State of Florida as defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., (Nichols was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, issued license number 1547 by the Department, and bonded by the U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Fidelity for the sum of $50,000.00, bond number 790103-10-115-88-1, with an effective date of March 22, 1988 and a termination date of March 22, 1989. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Nichols was authorized to do business in the State of Florida. The Complaint filed by Petitioners was timely in accordance with Section 604.21(1), Florida Statutes. Prior to Petitioners selling or delivering any watermelons (melons) to Nichols, Petitioners and Nichols agreed verbally that: (a) Petitioners would sell Nichols melons on a per pound basis at a price to be quoted by Nichols on the day of shipment; (b) Petitioners would harvest and load the melons on trucks furnished by Nichols; (c) a weight ticket with the weight of the truck before and after loading would be furnished to Petitioners; (d) Nichols or its agent in the field would have the authority to reject melons at the place of shipment (loading) which did not neet the guality or grade contracted for by Nichols; (e) the melons were to be of U.S. No. 1 grade; and, (f) settlement was to be made within a reasonable time after shipment. Although Nichols assisted Petitioners in obtaining the crew to harvest and load the melons, Petitioners had authority over the crew and was responsible for paying the crew. On a daily basis, L. L. Hiers, would contact Nichols and obtain the price being paid for melons that day. The price was marked in a field book with the net weight of each load. Nichols contends that the price quoted each day was the general price melons were bringing on the market that day. The price to be paid Petitioners was the price Nichols received for the melons at their destination minus 1 cent per pound commission for Nichols, taking into consideration freight, if any. Nichols was not acting as Petitioners' agent in the sale of the melons for the account of the Petitioners on a net return basis nor was Nichols acting as a negotiating broker between the Petitioners and the buyer. Nichols did not make the type of accountiig to Petitioners as required by section 604.22, Florida Statutes, had Nichols been Petitioners' agent. The prices quoted by Nichols to L. L. Hiers each day was the agreed upon price to be paid for melons shipped that day subject to any adjustment for failure of the melons to meet the quality or grade contracted for by Nichols. On June 11, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 6 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of the load of melons shipped on June 11, 1988. Only a partial load, no. 10896 weighing 11,420 pounds for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound, is in dispute. The amount in dispute is $114.70. On June 13, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the net weight of 3 loads of melons shipped that day that are in dispute. The 3 loads in dispute are as follows: (a) Load No. 10906, weighing 48,620 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound; (b) Load No. 10904, weighing 50,660 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound, and; (c) Load No. 10902, weighing 45,030 pounds for which Nichols paid 4 cents per pound. The amount in dispute is as follows: (a) Load No. 10906, $486.20; (b) Load No. 10904, $253.30; and (c) Load No. 10902, $450.30. On June 20, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5 cents per pound. This price was recorded in the field book with the weight of 52,250 for which Nichols paid 2 cents per pound. The amount in dispute is $1,567.50. On June 23, 1988, L. L. Hiers contacted Nichols and was informed that the price to be paid for melons shipped that day was 5.25 cents per pound. This price is 0.25 cent per pound less than that quoted on the same day in Case No. 88-5632A which is apparently due to the variety, Crimson Sweet, as opposed to Charmston Grey, since the average size of the melons shipped that day was within 4 ounces. This price was recorded in the field book with the load of melons shipped that day weighing 44,140 pounds for which Nichols paid 5 cents per pound. The load in dispute is load no. 11251, and the amount in dispute is $110.35. The total amount in dispute is $2,982.35. Load no. 11090 was federally inspected and failed to meet U.S. No. 1 grade on account of condition, not quality requirements. Therefore, the price of 2 cents per pound is a reasonable price and within the terms of the verbal contract. On all other loads, Nichols contends that the quality was low resulting in a lesser price than that agreed upon. However, Nichols failed to present sufficient evidence to support this contention. Nichols has refused to pay Petitioners the difference between the agreed upon price for load nos. 10896, 10902, 10904, 10906, 11090, and 11251, and the price paid by Nichols as indicated in the settlement sheet. The total difference is $2,982.35. However, subtracting $1,567.50, the difference in load no. 11090 that was rejected, from the total differnce results in a net difference of $1,414,85 and the amount owed to Petitioners.
Recommendation Upon cnsideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., be ordered to pay the Petitioners, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers, the sum of $1,414.85. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent, Jay Nichols, Inc., fails to timely pay Petitioners, Carl Hiers and Rachel Hiers, as ordered, then Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Doyle Conner, Commissioner Mr. Carl Heirs Depaftment of Agriculture and Mrs. Rachel Hiers Consumer Service Route 5, Box 339 The Capitol Dunnellon, Florida 32630 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mallory Horne, Esquire Jay Nichols, Inc. Department of Agriculture and Post Office Box 1705 Consumer Services Lakeland, Florida 33802 513 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company Ben H. Pridgeon, Chief Post Office Box 1138 Bureau of License and Bond Baltimore, Maryland Mayo Building 21203 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondents Smith are broker-shippers of watermelons and qualify as "dealers" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent South Carolina Insurance Company is surety for Respondents Smith. Petitioners Brewton and Respondents Smith have had a good business relationship overall, including the 1992 growing season during which several loads of high quality watermelons were sold by the Brewtons through the Smiths. Of the several loads of melons sold, only one load, the one invoiced on June 18, 1992, is at issue. Regardless of oral agreements with varying conditions for other loads, the parties agreed as of June 18, 1992 that the load of June 18, 1992, invoice 2088, (R-5), would be paid for by Respondents Smith advancing harvest costs and agreeing to pay Petitioners for the load, minus the costs of harvesting, after Respondents had received payment from the recipient. At the time of loading, everyone concerned felt the June 18, 1992 load might have some problems with it, but every attempt was made to load only quality product. Petitioners and Respondents each had input on which specific melons were loaded. At that time, Mr. Rick Smith o/b/o Respondents Smith advised Mr. Dewey Brewton, III that because the quality of the load was borderline and as a result of its borderline condition the whole load could be rejected at its ultimate destination, Respondents Smith wanted Petitioners Brewton to protect the Respondents Smith on the quality of the melons. He also specifically advised Dewey Brewton, III that the whole load could be rejected. The parties then entered into an agreement, partly oral and partly written. Rick Smith and Dewey Brewton, III understood their agreement to mean that Petitioners would absorb any loss as a result of the quality of the watermelons from that point forward, but that Respondents would not come back against Petitioners for the costs Respondents had advanced on Petitioners' behalf or for the cost of the freight. To signify this, the words "grower protects shipper on quality" was written on the invoice. On or about June 22, 1992, Rick Smith informed Dewey Brewton, III that the entire June 18, 1992 load had been rejected by the first receiver. At that time, Dewey Brewton, III accepted Rick Smith's representation and did not require further proof of rejection at the first point of delivery or request an independent inspection at the first point of delivery. He also acquiesced in Respondents shopping around for a second buyer who might take all or some of the load originally sent out on June 18, 1992, and did not request the return of Petitioners' watermelons. At that time, Rick Smith also told Dewey Brewton, III that the load might have to be held on the truck a day or two to ripen some of the watermelons for a second point of delivery. He again indicated that the whole load could be rejected again when the load was sent on to a second receiver. Dewey Brewton, III specifically agreed to let the melons ripen "a day or so," and did not request any change in the grower protection plan initially agreed to between the parties. Respondents Smith were eventually able to market the melons to a second delivery point (consignee) in Michigan. That receiver complained that the melons started breaking down and he had to dump 735 melons. Pursuant to standard custom of the trade, Respondents accepted payment of $1,944.00 for the melons, subtracted $1,831.98 they had laid out in freight costs and also subtracted the $675.18 they had advanced on behalf of Petitioners to the harvester. Thus, Respondents sustained a net loss of $563.16. Respondents absorbed the $563.16 loss and did not require any repayment of harvesting costs advanced or any freight charges from Petitioners. Dewey Brewton, III testified that he originally understood that "grower protection" meant that Petitioners "would stand behind their quality product until the ultimate point," but that he had interpreted a comment by Mr. Rick Smith on June 22, 1992 to the effect that "the grower (Petitioners) agreed to 'ride' the watermelons and the shipper (Respondent) agreed to 'ride' the freight" to mean that the growers (Petitioners) no longer had any duty to cover their own losses on the June 18, 1992 load of watermelons after the first rejection and up to final sale to the second buyer. In light of Mr. Brewton's failure to change the written language concerning protection on the invoice, his knowledge from the day of initial shipment that the June 18, 1992 load was of dubious quality, his acceptance that the first recipient had rejected the load, and his agreement that Respondents could have a further waiting/ripening/shopping around period before ultimate sale, coupled with his knowledge from the very beginning that the June 18, 1992 load could be utterly rejected at any point so as to render the endeavor a complete loss to the Petitioners, Mr. Brewton's assumption that on June 22, 1992, Respondents Smith were voluntarily waiving their written agreement that "grower protects shipper on quality" was not reasonable. On June 22, 1992, the load had already been rejected once. At that stage, the outcome of the proposed sale was considerably more precarious than when the crop was loaded on June 18, 1992. It is also found Mr. Brewton's assumption that the agreement had been modified was not knowingly or intentionally induced by the Respondents and that the assumption was not contemporaneously conveyed to Respondents Smith so that they could disabuse Mr. Brewton of his error. Upon the foregoing, it is further found that the written initial agreement that "grower protects shipper on quality" was not altered on June 22, 1992 but continued in force.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's complaint. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of March, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Jacquelyn J. Brewton 8876 NW 115th Avenue Ocala, FL 34482 Dewey Brewton III 8876 NW 115th Avenue Ocala, FL 34482 Richard L. Smith Midwest Marketing Company P. O. Box 193 Vincennes, IN 47591 South Carolina Insurance Company Legal Department 1501 Lade Street Columbia, SC 29201-0000
Findings Of Fact In 1983 William Lovett, Jr., Complainant, planted 65 acres of water melons, most of which were bought by Doyle L. Wadsworth, Respondent, either for himself or for William Manis Company. The only entity for which Respondent acted as agent was the Manis Company, for whom he has bought melons as its agent for many years. On behalf of himself or Manis, Respondent, in 1983, purchased melons from Complainant on June 16, 17, 20, 23, 24, 27, and 29. Complainant's melons were bought at prices ranging from seven cents to ten cents per pound. The melons were paid for by check signed by Respondent, dated zero to five days after the invoice date, on either Respondent's checking account at the Barnett Bank of Brandon or on Manis Company's account at Sun Bank of Tampa. Total payments to Complainant for these melons were $285,104.25 (Exhibits 2 and 3). Complainant and Respondent had met shortly before the 1983 water melon season through a mutual friend. Wadsworth agreed to buy water melons from Lovett, not to act as his broker. The grower had the water melons harvested, the buyer provided trucks and trailers to pick up the melons at the field, and the sale occurred when the melons were loaded. Wadsworth testified that he explained to Lovett that he buys melons on a load basis which he has done for many years, that he does not act as a broker to sell the melons, and that once the melons are loaded they are the responsibility of the then-owner, Wadsworth. 1983 was a good year for water melons and Wadwsorth bought nearly all of Lovett's production. Lovett asked Wadsworth if he would handle his melons if Lovett planted a crop in 1984 and Wadsworth agreed. Wadsworth also told Lovett that he preferred "grays," which Lovett planted. Lovett understood that Wadsworth had agreed to buy all of his water melons except for those Lovett sold independently, and to pay the prevailing prices. Wadsworth had no such understanding. Lovett's primary occupation is doctor of veterinary medicine and he relied on others for harvesting information. For reasons not fully explained at the hearing, the harvesting of Lovett's 1984 crop of water melons was a little late. Accordingly, any further delays resulted in overripe or sunburned water melons. The first harvesting of Lovett's melons occurred on Saturday, June 2, 1984, and Wadsworth bought 46,480 pounds at 3-1/2 cents per pound on behalf of Manis Company. Harvesting next occurred Monday, June 4, 1984, when Wadsworth bought 40,680 pounds for Manis and just over 100,000 pounds for himself. Payment for these water melons was made June 5, 1984, by a check in the amount of $3,050.60 on the Manis bank and $3,626.70 00 Wadsworth's bank. During the loading on June 4 a large number of water melons were discarded as culls. This made the task of grading and overseeing the grading much more onerous, and Wadsworth advised Lovett he would not be buying any more water melons from him that season. Lovett came to Wadsworth's motel to persuade him to do otherwise, but without success. Lovett asked Wadsworth if he could refer him to someone else to handle his melons, which request Wadsworth declined. Lovett subsequently obtained the services of a broker to handle his water melons but the additional delay in getting the crop harvested and the extra brokerage cost he incurred resulted in less income to Lovett than he would have received had Wadsworth bought all of Lovett's melons. Conflicting evidence was presented regarding the condition of the water melons grown by Lovett in 1984. Lovett's witnesses described the field as the finest ever seen, while Wadsworth testified that recent excess rainfall left part of the field wet, and some vines were wilting. All witnesses agreed that there were a large number of culls discarded from the water melons graded No. 1 on the first harvesting. In view of the recommended disposition of this case, a definitive finding of fact on this issue is unnecessary.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to payment in connection with the sale of watermelons in June, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner grows watermelons. He has only done business with Respondent Jim Rash, Inc. (Respondent) in 1991 and 1992. In both of those years, Petitioner was responsible for the hiring of the crews to pick the melons and load the trailers. Respondent obtained receivers who supplied the trailers and then drove them to the markets, which are typically up north. In 1991, Respondent paid for two of the seven loads at the weighing scales and the remainder a few days later. It is unclear whether the latter payment was made before the shipments were received by the wholesalers and retailers from the shippers or receivers. In 1991, as in 1992, the parties maintained no documentation indicating when Respondent became liable for payment to Petitioner. The parties agree that the subject sale was not a sale on consignment. The price of the watermelons was fixed. Petitioner testified that the sale was to Respondent and complete once the weighing was completed and the final price could be calculated. Petitioner might allow a few days to pass before payment, but this, according to Petitioner, was only a convenience to Respondent. Respondent's representative testified that the role of Respondent was to find receivers who shipped the melons to wholesale or retail markets. If the melons were rejected there, then Petitioner was not due payment for the rejected melons. Perhaps the major problem for the parties is that 1992, unlike 1991, was a poor year for watermelon sellers. Unfortunately, the parties did not document which of them was to bear the risk of loss due to poor market conditions, or even due to substandard watermelons in terms of size or quality. Although the loading was performed by persons hired by Petitioner, Jim Rash, who died in December, 1992, supervised the loading of the melons at Petitioner's farm. He could note size discrepancies relatively easily. Although Respondent's representative testified that his late brother accepted the melons under protest, this testimony is not credited. Without Petitioner's consent, Mr. Rash evidently decided to market the melons as a premium, relatively small variety known as Sangrias, which they are not. However, Petitioner admitted that he should not be paid for watermelons that are of substandard quality. He did so when he admitted that Respondent's claim on spoiled or overripe watermelons would be a different matter if he had had a USDA inspector certify that the melons were bad. Although Mr. Rash took some field samples, he could not have as readily determined the condition of the watermelons as he could have determined their size. Petitioner has proved that Respondent was liable for payment of all melons loaded on the trailers except for those that were of deficient quality. In this case, between June 22 and 28, 1992, Petitioner sold nine loads to Respondent under the above-described terms. The total due Petitioner was $18,802.20, of which Respondent paid all but $5175.80. The only load that was rejected due to the watermelons' condition, rather than size, was the one in which Petitioner was underpaid by $2240.80. The purchaser in Chicago rejected these watermelons on June 26, 1992--two days after Petitioner sold them--because they were overripe and bruised.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order determining that Respondent owes Petitioner the sum of $2935. ENTERED on March 30, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of March, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Hon. Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Sonny Chesnut, pro se Route 1, Box 658 Bonifay, FL 32421 Earl M. Rash Post Office Box 1180 Dundee, FL 33838 Legal Department Fidelity & Deposit of Maryland Post Office Box 1227 Baltimore, MD 21203
The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of watermelon sales?
Findings Of Fact Last spring, her first working on behalf of respondent McKay & Associates, Inc., Pat Harper nee ' Maddox accompanied Randy Finch, the company president, to Florida to help buy and ship produce. Because petitioner Bubba Hurst had sold watermelons to Ms. Harper season before last, she sought him out again. On Tuesday night, May 28, 1991, Ms. Harper orally agreed on behalf of McKay & Associates, Inc. (after Ruth Neuman, the company's secretary-treasurer, had been consulted by telephone) to pay Mr. Hurst 12 cents a pound for two truckloads of watermelons "as is." (Earlier she had seen the watermelons piled in the smaller trucks in which petitioner's crew had brought them from the fields to the melon yard, after harvesting them that day.) With Wednesday morning came a truck and driver (engaged by Ms. Harper or Mr. Finch) to haul the watermelons from petitioner's melon yard to truck scales some ten miles away, then to a farm in Denton, Georgia, for crating and transshipment to their ultimate intended destinations in Maryland and Pennsylvania. After the first truck left at 4:58 that afternoon, loaded with watermelons aggregating 43,280 pounds, Petitioner's Exhibits Nos. 1 and 2, a second truck and driver arrived. Mr. Finch had agreed to pay Mr. Hurst cash for the watermelons, but a complication arose before they could settle that night: Only after the crew had gone home was it discovered that the second truck was overloaded by some 9,000 pounds; and the driver refused to risk the fines he might incur by hauling an overload. As a result, it was not clear exactly how many watermelons McKay & Associates, Inc. would owe petitioner for. After some discussion, Mr. Finch wrote and signed a check in petitioner's favor but left blank the amount; petitioner then endorsed and returned the check. The plan was, once the exact amount was known, for Mr. Finch to complete the check, cash it, and give Mr. Hurst the proceeds. Afterwards it occurred to Mr. Hurst that if the check were made out for more than what he was to be paid for the watermelons, he could have problems with the Internal Revenue Service. Apprehensive, he asked Mr. Finch to void the check, which he did, by writing "VOID" across it. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Later somebody filled in an amount ($5,193.60, which corresponds to the first load, 43,280 pounds at 12 cents per) and wrote "melons no good," perhaps in anticipation of a formal administrative proceeding like the present one. The check was never negotiated. On Thursday, May 30, 1991, while watermelons were being unloaded from the second truck, two men with a brief case full of cash expressed an interest in the lightening truckload. When Ms. Harper told Mr. Hurst, he said the watermelons were hers to do with as she pleased. She then sold the load to the two men for 12 cents a pound cash, and handed the money over to petitioner. The excess watermelons on the second truck had been offloaded onto a third truck. Of like capacity as the first, the third truck was empty when it accompanied the overloaded truck to the melon yard on Thursday morning. With the departure of the second truck, Ms. Harper and Mr. Finch told Mr. Hurst to fill the third truck up and agreed to buy that truckload. For a while, Mr. Finch was actually "in the line" handing some watermelons along for loading in the third truck, and rejecting others. They weighed 20 pounds each on average. Meanwhile, when Ms. Neuman saw the first truckload, after its arrival in Denton, Georgia, on Thursday morning, she exclaimed, "My God! These are sun scald[ed]!" At hearing, she testified she was incredulous Florida would let such watermelons leave the state. Ms. Neuman telephoned Mr. Finch and told him she was sending the first load back, but that she would take the other load if it "meets federal." She also called the trucking company (then reportedly owned by the late Sam Walton), however, and told the trucker not to load any more watermelons. When Evelyn Hurst, Bubba's mother, answered the telephone at the melon yard lunchtime Thursday, she was asked to tell the driver of the third truck to call home because there was an emergency. The driver made a telephone call, after which he told Mrs. Hurst nothing was wrong at his home. Then he made a second telephone call. After that call, he ordered a stop to the loading then in progress. Bubba Hurst was eating when his mother called with word that no more watermelons were being loaded onto the third truck. He then telephoned the motel where Mr. Finch was staying, and inquired. Mr. Finch told him to finish loading the third truck; and later went to the melon yard and told the driver that loading should go forward. Loading resumed. Later Mr. Finch raised with the driver the possibility of taking the load to New York, but the driver declined the suggestion. Around four o'clock Thursday, the renewed efforts to fill the third truck with watermelons came to an abrupt end, about 250 melons shy of a full load, and the driver, who had ordered the halt, drove away. Mr. Hurst called the motel, and spoke to Ms. Harper, in hope of obtaining the cash he had been promised for his watermelons, but to no avail. The next day the first truck returned from Georgia with the watermelons whose presence on the other side of the state line had so surprised Ms. Neuman; and a federal agricultural inspector, a friend of Mr. Hurst's father, arrived at petitioner's melon yard to inspect them. Mr. Hurst told the inspector (who had been called by Ms. Neuman) that he was welcome to inspect but that the whole load had been sold "as is" and that he - Mr. Hurst - would not be paying for the inspection. Hearing this, the inspector left. Disinterested testimony established that inspections by USDA- certified inspectors are routinely called for by shippers when produce is refused by buyers claiming that produce spoiled before reaching them; but that, at least in the environs of Wildwood, Florida, it is not customary to call for a federal inspection at the point from which watermelons are shipped (unless the shipment is to the Government itself.) Of course, these particular watermelons had already been to Georgia and back. After the inspector left, the driver of the first truck asked that the watermelons be removed from his truck. When Mr. Hurst told him he was trespassing and asked him to leave the melon yard, the driver (or Ms. Neuman by long distance telephone call) summoned a Sumter County deputy sheriff. But the deputy sheriff, informed upon his arrival that the melon yard was a good quarter mile on the Marion County side of the county line, left to perform other duties. Still loaded, the first truck eventually left the melon yard a second time.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DACS order McKay & Associates, Inc. to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order. That, in the event McKay & Associates, Inc. fails to pay petitioner nine thousand seven hundred eighty seven dollars and twenty cents ($9,787.20) within fifteen (15) days of the final order, DACS order payment by State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., to the extent necessary to satisfy the requirements of Section 604.21(8), Florida Statutes (1991), for disbursal to petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see findings of fact Nos. 5 and 6. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, petitioner said the load may have been as many as 250 melons light. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 11, the value of the second load established by the evidence is $4,591.60, representing 38,280 pounds at 12 cents a pound. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 1 has been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 2 and 3, Ms. Neuman's testimony that she directed her agents to procure federal inspection before the first truck left has not been credited, but she did try to arrange one later. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 4, the second truck load was never rejected. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 5 is rejected. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, see paragraphs 5 and 6 of the findings of fact. Respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 7 is immaterial. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Finch agreed to buy the third truckload and ordered that loading go forward even after Ms. Neuman registered her dissatisfaction with the first load. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agricultural and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Julian E. Harrison, Esquire 324 West Dade Avenue Bushnell, Florida 33513 John Sowa, Esquire Robert L. Rehberger, Esquire 5025 North Henry Boulevard Stockbridge, Georgia 30281
