The Issue At issue was whether Petitioner should be granted a permit from the Respondent, Department of Environmental Regulation, to excavate material in front of the Petitioner's seawall in Naples Bay, Collier County, Florida. The Petitioner owns a residential homesite lot in the Royal Harbor Subdivision in Naples, Florida. Royal Harbor is a waterfront oriented residential community devoted to single family residences; each residence either has waterfront' on Naples Bay or through a network of interior canals which provide navigational access to Naples Bay. All lots are bordered by concrete seawalls. The Concrete seawall bordering the Petitioner's property does not Immediately abut the water, but has an amounts of earth between the seawall and the water's edge, somewhat resembling a beach. It is this earth the Petitioner wishes to remove so that he may have his seawall abut the water which would facilitate the launching of a vessel from his property. Presently, it does not appear that the Petitioner could keep a boat at his property without building a lengthy dock from his seawall into Naples Bay. The Department of Environmental Regulation opposes the application in that it claims the excavation of this material would destroy an oyster bar which exists in front of the Petitioner's property and would eliminate an ecologically significant area. From the exhibits presented at the hearing and after consideration of the testimony, it appears that in the entire Royal Harbor development only the Petitioner's property lacks having the bay waters abut the seawall. The Petitioner's property is approximately one quarter mile from the channel in Naples Bay which is a low energy water body. That is to say, wave action does not become extremely forceful in this area because of the protected nature of the waterway. The Department of Environmental Regulation in part opposes the permit because they state to remove the berm from in front of the seawall would expose the seawall to direct wave energy which would cause turbidity within the waters. No direct evidence was presented that wee the seawalls in Naples Bay are in direct contact with the water that this ill fact does cause increased turbidity and therefore this testimony is rejected by this Hearing Officer as being merely speculative. On the other hand, the Petitioner made no showing that the project would actually be in the public interest except to show that the area in question was a relatively small area. Witnesses for the Department of Environmental Regulation stated that were this berm removed and the area converted to a shallow submerged bay bottom, oysters and marine vegetation would eventually propagate here, particularly if the bottom was excavated with a smooth contour. It is difficult to imagine after listening to all the testimony in this case how the granting of this permit would have a measurable environmental Impact. It would appear to this Hearing Officer that there could be some benefit to water quality from the granting of this permit by somewhat restoring Naples Bay to its original condition. Testimony was received that the entire Royal Harbor development was man-made and the removal of this fill would, in some slight degree, remove fill material that had been previously placed within the waters of Naples Bay. Testimony was also received from Mr. Thomas Provenzano, District Supervisor of the Department of Environmental Regulation, that in his opinion it would be environmentally acceptable for the Petitioner to excavate this berm from within five (5) feet of the concrete seawall. This appears to be a reasonable disposition of this dispute. Whatever destructive force the waves of Naples Bay might have on an exposed vertical seawall would be minimized by leaving a five (5) foot berm seaward of that wall and would in no way interfere with the Petitioner's intended use of his land; reasonable navigational access to Naples Bay. It is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: The application be granted with the proviso that the Petitioner leave a five (5) foot berm between Naples Bay and his vertical seawall. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of November, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. KENNETH G. OERTEL, Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Carole Haughey, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2552 Executive Center Circle, E. Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald T. Frank, Esquire Suite A, U.S. Home Building 3174 E. Tamiami Trail Naples, Florida 33940 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LYNN A. LUNDSTROM, Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 76-1555 STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for variances for certain signage on his property is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of certain property located at 1923-1943 U.S. Highway 19 North, Clearwater, Florida (Section 05-29-16, M&B 23.05). This property is zoned CC (Commercial Center), and is the site of a strip shopping mall. On or about March 23, 1989, Petitioner applied for three variances for the subject property, as follows: 243 square feet to permit a total of 411 square feet of property identification signage; 13.5 feet in height to permit a 33.5 foot high pole sign; permission for a roof mounted sign. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for variances on April 13, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. Under the provisions of the City of Clearwater Land Development Code applicable to the Petitioner's property, only 168 square feet of property identification signage and pole signs not to exceed 20 feet in height would be allowed without a variance, and roof signs of any kind are prohibited unless a variance has been granted. Several months prior to Petitioner's filing for these variances, a roof sign was erected on the building located on the subject property. This roof sign consists of individual letters spelling "Harbor Square", which is the name of this shopping mall. The letters are from 3 feet, to 4 feet 9 inches in height, and span a distance of 34 feet 9 inches in width. The roof sign replaced a property identification sign at the right of way which previously carried the name of the shopping center, but the space on the pole sign previously used to identify the mall was not eliminated. That space is now used to identify a uniform business in the mall. Petitioner is seeking these after the fact variances to authorize the roof sign which has already been erected, and to approve the height of an existing pole sign. An enforcement action initiated by the City is pending this variance determination. Tenants in the Harbor Square mall testified that the change in signage has made the mall more visible and accessible, and several of their customers have commented that their businesses are now easier to find. The tenants feel that this change in signage will benefit their businesses financially. The Development Code Adjustment Board has previously granted variances from the signage limitations imposed by the Code, but the evidence produced at hearing indicates that none of these variances were granted after the fact. The two variances which were approved for roof signs were based upon a finding of conditions unique to the property which created a hardship for the applicant. In both instances, the Board found that the applicant had not created his own hardship, but that it arose from the size or positioning of the property involved in each application. In this case, nothing unique about the property can be found. The applicant has caused his own problems by allowing a sign to be erected without first obtaining a permit or variance. The Petitioner urges that it was the responsibility of his sign contractor to obtain all necessary permits or variances, and that the contractor did not inform him that a variance was necessary before he erected the sign. However, neither the sign contractor nor the Petitioner himself was present to testify, and therefore, there can be no finding with regard to his credibility, or with regard to whatever arrangement he had with the contractor. In any event, as the property owner seeking a variance, Petitioner has failed to establish any basis for a finding of a hardship or circumstance unique to his property, other than the fact that he allowed this sign to be erected without obtaining the necessary approvals from the City.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the evidence sustains the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) to deny the application of the Appellant, Clearwater Bay Marine Ways, Inc., for a 62-space parking requirement variance (200 spaces instead of the 262 required under the Code) for its property located at 900 North Osceola Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. (The variance is required as a result of the Appellant's desire to use a part of the property as a cruise ship docking facility.)
Findings Of Fact On or about October 25, 1993, the Appellant, Clearwater Bay Marine Ways, Inc., applied to the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) for an 81-space parking requirement variance (128 spaces instead of the 209 required under the Code) for its property located at 900 North Osceola Avenue, Clearwater, Florida. After filing the application, the site plan was modified, and the variance application was modified to request a 62-space variance (200 spaces instead of the 262 required under the Code). The variance is required as a result of the Appellant's plan to have Adventure Seaways Corporation use a part of the property for use as a docking facility for its 600-passenger cruise ship, the Majestic Empress. The City of Clearwater Development Code (the Code) has no parking space requirements specifically designed for cruise ship operations. To establish the parking space requirements, it was decided to utilize Section 42.34(6)(d)2.c. of the Code, which addresses certain "retail sales and service uses," and states: Theaters, indoor and outdoor recreation centers, swimming pools, skating rinks and other public or private recreation and amusement facilities: One parking space per three customers or patrons computed on the basis of maximum servicing capacity at any one time, as determined by the requirements of the city, plus one additional space for every two persons employed on the premises at peak period of use. Specific provisions over and above the standard may be required for uses such as movie theaters involving successive changes of patrons with a corresponding overlap in parking required. Under that provision, it was calculated that 200 spaces would be needed for peak capacity for the 600-passenger cruise ship. An additional 62 parking spaces are needed for other uses proposed in the site plan (including boat slips, a dive charter operation, a sail charter operation, a 2,800 square foot parts and service business and three work bays), for a total of 262 parking spaces for the overall site plan. The evidence was that no adjustments to the calculation under the "one space per three customers or patrons" formula were "determined by the requirements of the city," and that no additional spaces were required for "persons employed on the premises." (There was some evidence that the Adventure Seaways employees will park off-site.) Nor was there any evidence that there were any "[s]pecific provisions over and above the standard required for . . . successive changes of patrons with a corresponding overlap in parking required." The Adventure Seaways Corporation plans two excursions of the Majestic Empress a day, one during the day and one in the evening. It is expected that the ship would sail at full capacity only approximately one day a week, on Saturday. At peak capacity, it is expected that 30 percent of the passengers will arrive at the docking facility by tour bus. During the day cruise, the buses would leave the facility and return at the end of the cruise to drop off passengers for the evening cruise and pick up off-loading day cruise passengers. They would not remain at the facility during the times other cruise ship passengers would have their cars parked at the facility. Using only the "one space per three customers or patrons" formula under Section 42.34(6)(d)2.c. of the Code, the 70 percent of the total complement of passengers, who are expected to arrive by personal vehicle on peak days, would require only 140 parking spaces (420 passengers divided by three per parking space), well below the 200 spaces allocated to the cruise ship operation under Clearwater Bay Marine Ways site plan. Since Adventure Seaways has not been able to use the Majestic Empress at the Clearwater Bay Marine Ways facility without the parking space variance, it has transferred a smaller cruise ship, the Crown Empress, from its docking facility at Johns Pass on Treasure Island in the interim. The Crown Empress's capacity is only 400 passengers, and no parking space variance is required to use it at the Clearwater Bay Marine Ways facility. Meanwhile, Adventure Seaways has received temporary permission to utilize the Majestic Empress at the Johns Pass facility on the condition that it make greater than normal use of tour buses to transport passengers to and from the Johns Pass docking facility. Adventure Seaways purchased the Majestic Empress after being encouraged by City officials about the prospects of being able to utilize the Clearwater Bay Marine Ways facility. After purchasing the vessel, it had the vessel reconfigured to reduce its draft to accommodate the shallow waters it would have to navigate getting to and from the facility. Adventure Seaways also closed in the top deck of the vessel to meet Code requirements for noise control. Neither the special shallow draft configuration nor the noise control measures are required for utilization of the Johns Pass facility. Part of the encouragement by City officials about the prospects of Adventure Seaways being able to utilize the Clearwater Bay Marine Ways facility included assurances that the City would help Adventure Seaways gain access to additional parking, or develop or acquire additional parking, in the vicinity, if needed. Another option would be to utilize off-site parking and transport passengers to and from the Clearwater Bay Marine Ways facility by bus.
The Issue The issues to be determined in this appeal are whether the decision of the Community Development Board (“CDB”) to approve Flexible Development Application FLD2015-10040 filed by Appellee Clearwater Marine Aquarium, Inc. (“the Aquarium”), cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the Board, or that the decision of the Board departed from the essential requirements of law.
Findings Of Fact The Aquarium is the owner of a 4.53-acre site, consisting of three parcels, located at 249 Windward Passage in Clearwater, Florida (“the property”). The site is on a small island near Clearwater Beach, known as Island Estates. A single roadway, called Island Way, provides ingress and egress to Island Estates. The Aquarium property is zoned Commercial. The property is designated Commercial General in the Future Land Use Element of the City of Clearwater Comprehensive Plan. The area around the Aquarium property is developed with attached dwellings, offices, a marina, an automobile service station, a restaurant, and a retail plaza with building heights ranging from one to six stories. On September 30, 2015, the Aquarium filed a Flexible Development Application for a Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Project to develop two buildings, a dolphin pool, and a parking garage. To be approved, the proposed development must meet “flexibility standards” set forth in the City’s Community Development Code. The application required a Level Two approval. Under Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code, a Level Two approval requires that notice of the application be mailed to owners of properties “within a 200-foot radius of the perimeter boundaries of the subject property.” The notice mailed by the City identifies (by parcel number) only one of the three parcels which comprise the Aquarium site. The City Clerk mailed notice of the Aquarium’s application to owners of parcels located within 200 feet of the single parcel identified in the notice. The calculation of 200 feet was not made from the boundaries of the Aquarium’s combined three-parcel property. Whether the mailed notice conformed with Section 4-206 was not an issue raised before the CDB. The record does not show the reason the calculation was made in the manner it was made, whether it was consistent with the City’s interpretation of the applicable code requirement, or whether it was based on the location of the proposed structures. There is no evidence in the record about what additional property owners, if any, would have received notice if the boundaries of the entire site had been used. Section 4-206 of the Community Development Code also requires that a sign be posted on the “parcel proposed for development.” The record does not show whether the sign was posted. Appellant Kohut Family Trust received mailed notice of the Aquarium’s application by and through Peter Kohut at his residential address. On January 12, 2106, Mr. Kohut attended a town hall meeting about the Aquarium’s application, held at St. Brendan’s Church on Island Estates. Mr. Kohut stated that he sent e-mails and through word-of-mouth was able to get about 55 people to attend the town hall meeting. At the town hall meeting, an Aquarium representative presented information about the proposed project and answered questions. On January 19, 2016, the CDB conducted a public hearing on the Aquarium’s application. Mr. Kohut appeared at the public hearing, requested and was granted party status by the CDB, and made a presentation to the CDB. Mr. Kohut did not mention the Kohut Family Trust in his presentation to the CDB and did not request party status for the Kohut Family Trust. Mr. Kohut told the CDB that “the only notification that was given was given by the civic organization to its members.” Because Mr. Kohut knew he had received mailed notice, Mr. Kohut likely meant that the only detailed information about the Aquarium’s proposed project was provided at the town hall meeting. Mr. Kohut was provided an opportunity to present witnesses, introduce evidence, and to cross-examine witnesses at the public hearing. He did not introduce any exhibits or present any witnesses. Mr. Kohut objected, generally, about increased traffic and lowered property values and, specifically, about his desire for curbs and gutters. Mr. Kohut did not identify any specific criterion for approval of the Aquarium’s application that he believed would not be met. The City Planner, Matt Jackson, was accepted by the CDB as an expert witness in the areas of zoning, site plan analysis, planning in general, and the City’s landscape ordinance. Mr. Jackson discussed the Aquarium’s application and stated his opinion that it complied with all applicable Community Development Code and Comprehensive Plan requirements. Mr. Jackson was cross-examined by Mr. Kohut. The Aquarium’s attorney made a presentation to the CDB in support of the application and introduced the testimony of engineers Al Carrier and Robert Pergolizzi. The CDB accepted Mr. Carrier as an expert witness in the areas of civil engineering, land use planning, and planning in general. The CDB accepted Mr. Pergolizzi as an expert witness in the areas of planning, land use, and traffic impact studies. Mr. Pergolizzi was cross-examined by Mr. Kohut. The attorney for Island Way Grill, Inc., obtained party status for his client and made a presentation in support of the Aquarium’s application. Steven Traum obtained party status and made a presentation to the CDB. Mr. Traum did not appear for oral argument on April 8, 2016, and did not file a proposed order. On January 22, 2016, the City entered a Development Order memorializing the CDB’s approval of the Aquarium’s application.
The Issue The issue is whether petitioners' development is entitled to a favorable determination by respondent under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes (1989), and thus is exempt from development of regional impact review.
Findings Of Fact PETITIONERS' EXCEPTIONS In its Exception No. 1., Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's determination that there was no evidence in the record to support a finding that Lee County Sheriff's Office, or any other local law enforcement officials strictly enforce Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51. Petitioners' exception is not supported by the record. Lee County Ordinance No. 90-51, requires that a vessel must proceed at idle speed, no wake, within five hundred feet of a water oriented structure, such as a seawall or dock. If enforced, the ordinance would require that boaters on the channel who venture closer than five hundred feet to the seawall which fronts a part of the island's shoreline or a dock located several hundred yards south of the collector canal, which is the site of Petitioners' proposed project, be obliged to travel no faster than idle speed, no wake in those areas. The Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced was based on the testimony of Lt. Graylish of the Florida Marine Patrol. Lt. Graylish appeared as a witness for Respondent and testified as to his opinion as a law enforcement officer on the impact of Lee County Vessel Control Ordinance No. 90-51 on vessel speeds in Estero Bay. During Lt. Graylish's direct examination when asked whether the Marine Patrol enforced the ordinance he replied: Well, we have the power to do it. The hardest problem for us is what in fact is that 500 foot distance. It's really hard on the water to come up with that, and then we've got a lot of transient traffic that goes through that area from out of state during season and part-time residents, and it's very difficult to enforce that when you don't have an actual sign placement indicating what in fact the condition is. [Tr. p. 118, Ins. 15-24] The lieutenant's testimony was uncontroverted. Petitioners produced no competent substantial evidence to refute Lt. Graylish's testimony. Likewise in its exceptions, Petitioners have failed to present competent substantial evidence to demonstrate why the Hearing Officer's determination that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced should be rejected. Accordingly, Petitioners' Exception No. 1. is therefore rejected as being contrary to the evidence presented. In its Exception No. 2, Petitioners object to the Hearing Officer's determination that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel (i.e., Coon Key Pass). Petitioners state that the parties only stipulated that "Estero Bay is an area that is, at least, frequented by manatees" and cites to the Transcript in support of its position. [See Petitioners' Exceptions] However, a review of the statement in the record which Petitioners rely on and which was made by Petitioners' own attorney at the hearing demonstrates that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the parties stipulated that manatees frequent the channel. In pertinent part the passage states: At this time I would like to stipulate to one thing that was omitted in here [i e., prehearing stipulation], is that we do stipulate that the areas are Outstanding Florida Waters and Class II waters, Estero Bay, and they are waters that are at least frequented by manatees . . . (emphasis added)[Tr. p. 8, Ins. 18-24] The Hearing Officer's finding that the parties stipulated that manatees now frequent the channel, which is part of Estero Bay, is consistent with the parties' stipulation. The exception is therefore rejected as unnecessary. In its Exception No. 3, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's finding that since there was no evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced, DNR could not reasonably determine that Petitioners' project would not have an adverse impact on manatees. The issue in this case was whether Petitioners were entitled to a favorable determination under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, that their proposed project was located so that it would not adversely impact Outstanding Florida Waters or Class II waters an would not contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. It was Petitioners' burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that they were entitled to a favorable determination. It was therefore incumbent upon Petitioners to present competent evidence regarding the enforcement of Ordinance No. 90-51. This Petitioners did not do. Therefore, Petitioners' Exception No. 3 is rejected as either irrelevant or not being based on competent substantial evidence. In its Exception No. 4, Petitioners allege that Respondent's committed two discovery violations. These allegations are beyond the scope of what is permitted under the rules which deal with exceptions to recommended orders; however they will be addressed. Petitioners claim they were prejudiced by improper testimony from the Respondent's expert witnesses, Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. Petitioners state that these witnesses "allegedly re-examine Petitioners' project area on the afternoon prior to the hearing and alleged the discovery of new observations and conclusions at the hearings." [See Petitioners' Exceptions] Petitioners claim that this alleged re-examination precluded any opportunity for discovery and that therefore, "no testimony relating to this site visit should have been admitted into the record." However, Petitioners raised no such objection at the hearing and by not doing so have waived any right to do so now. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure that would preclude an expert witness from engaging in a review of information to be relied on at the hearing prior to the hearing. Additionally, for clarification only, it should be noted that there is no evidence in the record which would have led Petitioner to believe that Pat Rose visited the site prior to the hearing. In Exception No. 4, Petitioner further alleged that the Hearing Officer should have disallowed the testimony of Lt. Graylish, because his name "first appeared on the prehearing stipulation (not signed by Petitioners) approximately 48 hours before the hearing . . . ." However, Petitioners' did not object at the hearing to the testimony of Lt. Graylish and furthermore, stated on the record in reference to signing the prehearing stipulation: due to our, I guess you would say our geographic differences, the prehearing stipulation was submitted . . . without my signature; and at this time I would like to on the record confirm that I stipulate to that prehearinq stipulation that was jointly prepared and finally submitted by the Department. (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 4, Ins. 21- 25] In addition to having stipulated to Respondent's witnesses, which included Lt. Graylish, Petitioners had raised this very objection prior to the hearing and the Hearing Officer had conducted a telephonic hearing on the matter. The Hearing Officer ruled that the witness would be allowed to testify at the hearing subject to Petitioners' objections at that time. A review of the record of the hearing indicates that Petitioners made no further objections to the lieutenant's testimony. Exceptions as to alleged discovery violations are improper pursuant to the rules and in this case there is no competent substantial evidence to demonstrate the existence of any discovery violations. Exception No. 4 is therefore rejected as being improper. Finally, at Exception No. 5, Petitioners take exception to the Hearing Officer's application of law to the findings of fact to support a determination that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of demonstrating that their proposed project would riot "contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees." Petitioners allegation that this conclusion be rejected is based upon Petitioners' argument, discussed above, that the Hearing Officer erred in finding that Ordinance No. 90-51 was not strictly enforced. As stated in Paragraphs Nos. 1. and 3., any such rejection of the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is unsupported by competent substantial evidence. Petitioners allege that the Hearing Officer's "sole conclusion of possible manatee impacts from this project was based on what he determined to be a lack of evidence that Ordinance No. 90-51 would be strictly enforced. Petitioners have narrowly construed the Hearing Officer's ruling. There is ample evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the Petitioners had not met their burden. In fact, the Recommended Order demonstrates that the ruling was also based on competent substantial evidence presented by Respondent that this proposed project demonstrated a potential for harm to manatees. In that regard, the Hearing Officer's conclusion was based on testimony from both Pat Rose and Kipp Frohlich. It was their testimony which led the Hearing Officer to conclude that a "favorable determination for Petitioners would not lie." The record is replete with evidence the Hearing Officer could have reasonably relied upon to conclude that Petitioners failed to sustain their burden of proof. [See Tr. p. 118, Ins. 6-9; p. 156 p. 1; p. 158, Ins. 4-6; p. 158. In. 9; p. 159, In.18; p. 176, Ins. 20-23; ; p. 218, Ins. 20-24; p. 219, In. 40p. 316, Ins. 22-23; DNR Exh. 17J Accordingly, Petitioners' exceptions to Conclusion of Law No. 5., is rejected as being contrary to Florida law and the evidence presented. RESPONDENT' S EXCEPTIONS Respondent alleges that Finding of Fact No. 15., should be rejected in its entirety inasmuch as it is not supported by competent substantial evidence. At finding of fact No. 15, the Hearing Officer implies that the Petitioners were "somehow surprised" on June 7, 1991, while the parties were preparing the Prehearing Stipulation to be filed at hearing on June Il, 1991, to learn that DNR intended to take the position at hearing that the proposed project would likely contribute boat traffic in a manner that would adversely impact an area frequented by manatees. In support of this finding the Hearing Officer refers to a comment made by DNR employee David Trimble at his June 5, 1990, deposition, during which he advised Petitioners that based upon the October 17, 1990 memorandum from the Division of Marine Resources he assumed that the manatee issue was "resolved" in Petitioners' favor. However, a review of the record reveals that at no time subsequent to November 8, 1990 or the date on which the unfavorable letter of determination was issued, could Petitioners reasonably claim they believed the issue regarding manatees was resolved. Accordingly, the Hearing Officer's finding in this regard is not based on competent substantial evidence and is rejected. At his deposition Mr. Trimble was asked who was responsible for making the final determination decision, to which he replied: I evaluate them and make a staff recommendation to my superiors. (emphasis added) [Tr. 22, Ins. 24-25] Q. So you go with your feeling - from what the letters say and - A. Not from my feeling, I go with what the letters say. [Tr. p. 23, Ins. 8-11] Furthermore, Trimble's statement at the deposition that he believed the manatee issue was resolved was given only after Petitioners specifically asked Mr. Trimble his opinion on the matter. Furthermore, Trimble was qualified to give only his opinion as to whether the manatee issue was resolved, not the agency's position which was memorialized in the November 8, 1991, letter of determination. Petitioners' claim that they believed the manatee issue was resolved and the Hearing Officer's subsequent finding that Petitioners' claim was meritious can not be supported on the basis of Trimble's answer to the following question: Q. Was, in your opinion - - and this is your opinion as the reviewer of the request - - was the manatee issue resolved . . . (emphasis added) [Tr. p. 26, Ins. 8-10] Further, the letter that was issued under the Executive Director's signature did not indicate that the manatee issue was resolved, quite the contrary. In fact, the Prehearing Stipulation at page 17, stipulated to by both parties after, the deposition of Trimble listed the following disputed issue for determination at the hearing: 2. Whether the DNR correctly determined that the proposed 132 wetslips in conjunction with the existing 161 slips, will contribute boat traffic in a manner that will have an adverse impact on an area known to be, or likely to be, frequented by manatees. In order to find that Petitioners were somehow surprised by this "newly discovered revelation" (i.e., that manatees were going to be an issue at hearing) the Hearing Officer improperly attributed more weight to the deposition testimony of Trimble thanit was due. Trimble was merely the conduit through which information on the manatee issue from the Division of Marine Resources passed. As he himself stated, he was the reviewer of the information - - he was not the final decisionmaker. Once having reviewed the material sent to him from the other divisions, he merely drafted the unfavorable letter of determination for the Executive Director's consideration. The Executive Director then reviewed the material and issued the letter of determination under his signature.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that respondent enter a final order confirming its earlier determination of November 8, 1990, under Subsection 380.0651(3)(e)1.c., Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of August 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Frenchy's Rockaway Grill, Inc., is the owner and operator of a restaurant and alcoholic beverage establishment located at 7 Rockaway Street, Clearwater, Florida. Petitioner purchased the property in 1991. Michael Preston is president of Petitioner. Petitioner's establishment is immediately adjacent to the Gulf of Mexico and Clearwater beach on the west, to the north is a public parking lot, to the east is a motel, and to the south is the Clearwater Beach Hotel, which is owned and operated by Hunter Hotel Co., as indicated above. On the beach side of Petitioner's establishment there is an existing 972 sq. ft. wooden deck. The existing deck was initially constructed on or about 1987 by prior owners without receiving appropriate variance approvals. Subsequent alterations to the deck occurred between 1987 and 1991, also without appropriate variance approvals. In 1991 Charles and Ypapanti Alexiou/Anthony Alexiou, former owners of the subject property, filed an application for variance approval with the Board seeking three variances relating to the construction of the deck at the 7 Rockaway establishment. Specifically, the variances sought were: "1) 55.5 ft. to permit deck seaward of the coastal construction control line; 2) 15 ft. to permit a deck zero feet from a street right-of-way; and, 3) seven parking spaces to permit a 1,338 sq. ft. deck at 7 Rockaway Street, Miller's Replat, Lot 2 & vacated beach Drive on W and Lot 3, zoned CR 28 (resort commercial) & OS/R (open space recreation)." At public meeting on August 8, 1991, the application was considered by the Board. At that time Mr. Cline, as counsel for Hunter appeared in opposition to the application stating that approval of the variance requests would adversely impact the Clearwater Beach Hotel, that the request was for economic gain, that any hardship was self-imposed, and that development and traffic in the area was already heavy. The Board, however, granted the variance requests as to variances number 1 and number 2., and as to the third request, the Board denied the proposed 1,338 sq. ft. deck, but approved a variance of five parking spaces to permit the existing deck of 972 sq. ft. On or about July 13, 1993, a variance application was filed with the Board by Howard G. and Jean B. Hamilton and Palm Pavilion of Clearwater, Inc., seeking approval of four variances required for an 800 sq. ft. expansion of an existing deck at a restaurant at 10 Bay Esplanade, Clearwater Beach, Florida. The Palm Pavilion applicants were also represented by Mr. Cline. Like Petitioner's establishment, Palm Pavilion is a beachfront restaurant, which is located directly across the public parking lot to the north of Petitioner's establishment. Unlike Petitioner's establishment, Palm Pavilion is bordered by parking to the south and the east, and is not immediately adjacent to other buildings. On August 26, 1993, the Board granted the Palm Pavilion variance application for expansion of an existing beachfront deck with certain conditions. On October 6, 1994, Petitioner submitted its application to the Board requesting five variances required for a 650 sq. ft. expansion of the existing wooden deck at 7 Rockaway Street. Specifically, the variances sought were: 1) 13.22 ft. to permit a lot depth of 86.78 ft. where 100 ft. is required; 2) 8.2 ft. to permit it a rear setback of 6.8 ft. where 15 ft. is required; 3) 14 percent to permit 11 percent of open space where 25 percent is required; 4) three parking spaces to permit zero parking spaces where three additional are required; and, 5) 52.14 ft. to permit a structure seaward of the coastal construction control line. The subject property at 7 Rockaway Street is properly zoned CR-28 (resort commercial). Any scrivener's error indicating that the property is zoned OSC (open space recreation) has been corrected. Petitioner's restaurant, Frenchy's Rockaway Grill, is a popular beachside establishment. It is one of very few freestanding restaurants fronting the Gulf of Mexico on Clearwater Beach. Some patrons particularly enjoy dining on the open air deck adjacent to the beach. During peak hours, there is often over an hour's waiting time for tables on the deck. Petitioner is currently unable to accommodate the demand for seating on the beachside deck. Petitioner would sustain an economic benefit if more patrons could be accommodated on an expanded deck. Because of the size constraints of the lot and the establishment's location directly on the beach, development and improvement of the facility is highly restricted. The back of some residential rooms of the Clearwater Beach Hotel are immediately adjacent to the south of Petitioner's establishment. There are small bathroom windows from these residential rooms that face Petitioner's establishment. Petitioner's proposed expansion of the open air deck would place the proposed deck in very close proximity to the back of these residential hotel rooms. The City's staff reviewed the Petitioner's application and recommended approval with the following conditions: 1) the applicant shall obtain the requisite occupational license within 12 months; 2) the applicant shall obtain the necessary building permit within 6 months; 3) there shall be no outdoor entertainment and no outdoor speakers; 4) the applicant shall obtain the requisite alcoholic beverage separation distance variance from the City Commission. Petitioner agreed to the conditions recommended by staff. The recommendations of staff are not binding on the Board. In addition to the application for the five variances filed with the Board, Petitioner also filed a conditional use request with the Planning and Zoning Board. The conditional use request was approved on September 13, 1994, and imposed certain other conditions including the construction of a six foot wall on the south side of the proposed deck to buffer the adjoining hotel. Petitioner agreed to the conditions imposed by the Planning and Zoning Board.
