The Issue The issue presented for decision is whether Proposed Rules 20-15.001, 20-15.002, and 20-15.003 constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a)-(e), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulated facts, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Florida Citrus Commission was established in 1935 to organize and promote the growing and sale of various citrus products, fresh and processed, in the State of Florida. The purpose of the Citrus Commission is today reflected in Section 601.02, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Florida Citrus Commission ("the Commission") and the Department, are set forth in full in Section 601.10, Florida Statutes. The powers of the Department include the power to tax and raise other revenue to achieve the purposes of the Department. In particular, Section 601.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, state: The Department of Citrus shall have and shall exercise such general and specific powers as are delegated to it by this chapter and other statutes of the state, which powers shall include, but shall not be confined to, the following: To adopt and, from time to time, alter, rescind, modify, or amend all proper and necessary rules, regulations, and orders for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this chapter and other statutes of the state, which rules and regulations shall have the force and effect of law when not inconsistent therewith. To act as the general supervisory authority over the administration and enforcement of this chapter and to exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may be imposed upon it by other laws of the state. The Department is authorized to set standards by Section 601.11, Florida Statutes, as follows: The Department of Citrus shall have full and plenary power to, and may, establish state grades and minimum maturity and quality standards not inconsistent with existing laws for citrus fruits and food products thereof containing 20 percent or more citrus or citrus juice, whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, including standards for frozen concentrate for manufacturing purposes, and for containers therefor, and shall prescribe rules or regulations governing the marking, branding, labeling, tagging, or stamping of citrus fruit, or products thereof whether canned or concentrated, or otherwise processed, and upon containers therefor for the purpose of showing the name and address of the person marketing such citrus fruit or products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed; the grade, quality, variety, type, or size of citrus fruit, the grade, quality, variety, type, and amount of the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, and the quality, type, size, dimensions, and shape of containers therefor, and to regulate or prohibit the use of containers which have been previously used for the sale, transportation, or shipment of citrus fruit or the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or any other commodity; provided, however, that the use of secondhand containers for sale and delivery of citrus fruit for retail consumption within the state shall not be prohibited; provided, however, that no standard, regulation, rule, or order under this section which is repugnant to any requirement made mandatory under federal law or regulations shall apply to citrus fruit, or the products thereof, whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed, or to containers therefor, which are being shipped from this state in interstate commerce. All citrus fruit and the products thereof whether canned or concentrated or otherwise processed sold, or offered for sale, or offered for shipment within or without the state shall be graded and marked as required by this section and the regulations, rules, and orders adopted and made under authority of this section, which regulations, rules, and orders shall, when not inconsistent with state or federal law, have the force and effect of law. The Department is authorized to conduct citrus research by Section 601.13, Florida Statutes. To help pay for these duties of the Department, the Legislature first enacted the "box tax" in 1949. The box tax is now codified as Section 601.15(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, provides in relevant part: There is hereby levied and imposed upon each standard-packed box of citrus fruit grown and placed into the primary channel of trade in this state an excise tax at annual rates for each citrus season as determined from the tables in this paragraph and based upon the previous season's actual statewide production as reported in the United States Department of Agriculture Citrus Crop Production Forecast as of June 1. Section 601.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes, goes on to set forth specific rates for fresh grapefruit, processed grapefruit, fresh oranges, processed oranges, and fresh or processed tangerines and citrus hybrids. Section 601.15(1), Florida Statutes, sets forth the Department's authority to administer the box tax, as follows: The administration of this section shall be vested in the Department of Citrus, which shall prescribe suitable and reasonable rules and regulations for the enforcement hereof, and the Department of Citrus shall administer the taxes levied and imposed hereby. All funds collected under this section and the interest accrued on such funds are consideration for a social contract between the state and the citrus growers of the state whereby the state must hold such funds in trust and inviolate and use them only for the purposes prescribed in this chapter. The Department of Citrus shall have power to cause its duly authorized agent or representative to enter upon the premises of any handler of citrus fruits and to examine or cause to be examined any books, papers, records, or memoranda bearing on the amount of taxes payable and to secure other information directly or indirectly concerned in the enforcement hereof. Any person who is required to pay the taxes levied and imposed and who by any practice or evasion makes it difficult to enforce the provisions hereof by inspection, or any person who, after demand by the Department of Citrus or any agent or representative designated by it for that purpose, refuses to allow full inspection of the premises or any part thereof or any books, records, documents, or other instruments in any manner relating to the liability of the taxpayer for the tax imposed or hinders or in anywise delays or prevents such inspection, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. The box tax was challenged in 1936 under various provisions of the Florida Constitution as well as the Export Clause, Article 1, s. 9, cl. 5, of the United States Constitution. The Florida Supreme Court issued an opinion in 1937 upholding the validity of the box tax. C.V. Floyd Fruit Company v. Florida Citrus Commission, 128 Fla. 565, 175 So. 248 (1937). In 1970, the Legislature enacted the "equalization tax," codified as Section 601.155, Florida Statutes. The statute mirrored Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, but added certain processors who were mixing foreign citrus products with Florida products. The purpose of the equalization tax was to have all Florida processors of citrus products help pay for the costs of the Department, rather than have the burden fall entirely on the Florida growers subject to the box tax. Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, provides, in relevant part: The first person who exercises in this state the privilege of processing, reprocessing, blending, or mixing processed orange products or processed grapefruit products or the privilege of packaging or repackaging processed orange products or processed grapefruit products into retail or institutional size containers or, except as provided in subsection (9) or except if a tax is levied and collected on the exercise of one of the foregoing privileges, the first person having title to or possession of any processed orange product or any processed grapefruit product who exercises the privilege in this state of storing such product or removing any portion of such product from the original container in which it arrived in this state for purposes other than official inspection or direct consumption by the consumer and not for resale shall be assessed and shall pay an excise tax upon the exercise of such privilege at the rate described in subsection (2). Upon the exercise of any privilege described in subsection (1), the excise tax levied by this section shall be at the same rate per box of oranges or grapefruit utilized in the initial production of the processed citrus products so handled as that imposed, at the time of exercise of the taxable privilege, by s. 601.15 per box of oranges. In order to administer the tax, the Legislature provided the following relevant provisions in Section 601.155, Florida Statutes: Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall keep a complete and accurate record of the receipt, storage, handling, exercise of any taxable privilege under this section, and shipment of all products subject to the tax imposed by this section. Such record shall be preserved for a period of 1 year and shall be offered for inspection upon oral or written request by the Department of Citrus or its duly authorized agent. Every person liable for the excise tax imposed by this section shall, at such times and in such manner as the Department of Citrus may by rule require, file with the Department of Citrus a return, certified as true and correct, on forms to be prescribed and furnished by the Department of Citrus, stating, in addition to other information reasonably required by the Department of Citrus, the number of units of processed orange or grapefruit products subject to this section upon which any taxable privilege under this section was exercised during the period of time covered by the return. Full payment of excise taxes due for the period reported shall accompany each return. All taxes levied and imposed by this section shall be due and payable within 61 days after the first of the taxable privileges is exercised in this state. Periodic payment of the excise taxes imposed by this section by the person first exercising the taxable privileges and liable for such payment shall be permitted only in accordance with Department of Citrus rules, and the payment thereof shall be guaranteed by the posting of an appropriate certificate of deposit, approved surety bond, or cash deposit in an amount and manner as prescribed by the Department of Citrus. * * * (11) This section shall be liberally construed to effectuate the purposes set forth and as additional and supplemental powers vested in the Department of Citrus under the police power of this state. In March 2000, certain citrus businesses challenged Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, as being unconstitutional. At the time of the suit, Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, read as follows: All products subject to the taxable privileges under this section, which products are produced in whole or in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, are exempt from the tax imposed by this section to the extent that the products are derived from oranges or grapefruit grown within the United States. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit grown within the United States, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. The citrus businesses claimed the exemption in Section 601.155(5) rendered the tax unconstitutionally discriminatory, in that processors who imported juice from foreign countries to be blended with Florida juice were subject to the equalization tax, whereas processors who imported juice from places such as California, Arizona and Texas enjoyed an exemption from the tax. The case, Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al. v. Department of Citrus, Case No. GCG-00-3718 (Consolidated) ("Tampa Juice"), was brought in the Tenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Polk County. Judge Dennis P. Maloney of that court continues to preside over that case. In a partial final declaratory judgment effective March 15, 2002, Judge Maloney found Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, unconstitutional because it violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution due to its discriminatory effect in favor of non-Florida United States juice. In an order dated April 15, 2002, Judge Maloney severed the exemption in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, from the remainder of the statute. The court's decision necessitated the formulation of a remedy for the injured plaintiffs. While the parties were briefing the issue before the court, the Florida Legislature met and passed Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, which amended Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, to read as follows: Products made in whole or in part from citrus fruit on which an equivalent tax is levied pursuant to s. 601.15 are exempt from the tax imposed by this section. In the case of products made in part from citrus fruit exempt from the tax imposed by this section, it shall be the burden of the persons liable for the excise tax to show the Department of Citrus, through competent evidence, proof of that part which is not subject to a taxable privilege. Chapter 2002-26, Laws of Florida, was given an effective date of July 1, 2002. By order dated August 8, 2002, Judge Maloney set forth his decision as to the remedy for the plaintiffs injured by the discriminatory effect of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. Judge Maloney expressly relied on the rationale set forth in Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 574 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1991)("McKesson II"). In its initial McKesson decision, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco v. McKesson Corporation, 524 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1988), the Florida Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment ruling that Florida's alcoholic beverage tax scheme, which gave tax preferences and exemptions to certain alcoholic beverages made from Florida crops, unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce. The Florida Supreme Court also affirmed that portion of the summary judgment giving the ruling prospective effect, thus denying the plaintiff a refund of taxes paid pursuant to the unconstitutional scheme. The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. In McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990), the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision as to the prospective effect of its decision. The United States Supreme Court held that: The question before us is whether prospective relief, by itself, exhausts the requirements of federal law. The answer is no: If a State places a taxpayer under duress promptly to pay a tax when due and relegates him to a postpayment refund action in which he can challenge the tax's legality, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to rectify any unconstitutional deprivation. 496 U.S. at 31 (footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court set forth the following options by which the state could meet its obligation to provide "meaningful backward-looking relief": [T]he State may cure the invalidity of the Liquor Tax by refunding to petitioner the difference between the tax it paid and the tax it would have been assessed were it extended the same rate reductions that its competitors actually received. . . . Alternatively, to the extent consistent with other constitutional restrictions, the State may assess and collect back taxes from petitioner's competitors who benefited from the rate reductions during the contested tax period, calibrating the retroactive assessment to create in hindsight a nondiscriminatory scheme. . . . Finally, a combination of a partial refund to petitioner and a partial retroactive assessment of tax increases on favored competitors, so long as the resultant tax actually assessed during the contested tax period reflects a scheme that does not discriminate against interstate commerce, would render Petitioner's resultant deprivation lawful and therefore satisfy the Due Process Clause's requirement of a fully adequate postdeprivation procedure. 496 U.S. at 40-41 (citations and footnotes omitted). The United States Supreme Court expressly provided that the state has the option of choosing the form of relief it will grant. In keeping with the United States Supreme Court opinion, the Florida Supreme Court granted the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco (the "Division") leave to advise the Court as to the form of relief the state wished to provide. The Division proposed to retroactively assess and collect taxes from those of McKesson's competitors who had benefited from the discriminatory tax scheme. McKesson contended that a refund of the taxes it had paid was the only clear and certain remedy, because retroactive taxation of its competitors would violate their due process rights. McKesson II, 574 So. 2d at 116. The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on McKesson's refund claim, with the following instructions: While McKesson may not necessarily be entitled to a refund, it is entitled to a "clear and certain remedy," as outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion. Because nonparties, such as amici, will be directly affected by the retroactive tax scheme proposed by the state, all affected by the proposed emergency rule must be given notice and an opportunity to intervene in this action. Therefore, on remand, the trial court not only must determine whether the state's proposal meets "the minimum federal requirements" outlined in the Supreme Court's opinion, it also must determine whether the proposal comports with federal and state protections afforded those against whom the proposed tax will be assessed. We emphasize that the state has the option of choosing the manner in which it will reformulate the alcoholic beverage tax during the contested period so that the resultant tax actually assessed during that period reflects a scheme which does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Therefore, if the trial court should rule that the state's proposal to retroactively assess and collect taxes from McKesson's competitors does not meet constitutional muster and such ruling is upheld on appeal, the state may offer an alternative remedy for the trial court's review. However, any such proposal likewise must satisfy the standards set forth by the Supreme Court as well as be consistent with other constitutional restrictions. 574 So. 2d at 116. In the Tampa Juice case, Judge Maloney assessed the options prescribed by the series of McKesson cases and concluded that the only fair remedy was to assess and collect back assessments from those who benefited from the unconstitutional equalization tax exemption. His August 8, 2002, order directed the Department to "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." On September 18, 2002, the Department promulgated the Emergency Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-3648RE. The Emergency Rules were filed with the Department of State on September 24, 2002, and took effect on that date. Those emergency rules were held invalid in Peace River, and are not at issue in the instant case. In the November 15, 2002 issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 28, no. 46, pp. 4996-4998), the Department published the Proposed Rules that were at issue in DOAH Case No. 02-4607RP. In the March 7, 2003, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly (vol. 29, no. 10, p. 1036), the Department published amendments to the Proposed Rule. The Proposed Rules, as amended, read as follows: EQUALIZATION TAX ON NON-FLORIDA UNITED STATES JUICE 20-15.001 Intent. The Court in Tampa Juice Service, et al v. Florida Department of Citrus in Consolidated Case Number GCG-003718 (Circuit Court in and for Polk County, Florida) severed the exemption contained in Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, that provided an exemption for persons who exercised one of the enumerated Equalization Tax privileges on non-Florida, United States juice. The Court had previously determined that the stricken provisions operated in a manner that violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. On August 8, 2002, the Court ordered that the Florida Department of Citrus "take appropriate steps, consistent with existing law, to assess and collect the Equalization tax from those entities which [benefited] from the unconstitutional exemption." It is the Florida Department of Citrus' intent by promulgating the following remedial rule to implement a non- discriminatory tax scheme, which does not impose a significant tax burden that is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress constitutional limitations. These rules shall be applicable to those previously favored persons who received favorable tax treatment under the statutory sections cited above. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.002 Definitions. "Previously favored persons" shall be defined as any person who exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege as defined by Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, but who was exempt from payment of the Equalization Tax due to the exemption for non-Florida, United States juice set forth in the statutory provision, which was ultimately determined to be unconstitutional and severed from Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes. The "tax period" during which the severed provisions of Section 601.155(5), Florida Statutes, were in effect shall be defined as commencing on October 6, 1997, and ending on March 14, 2002. "Tax liability" shall be defined as the total amount of taxes due to the Florida Department of Citrus during the "tax period," at the following rates per box for each respective fiscal year: Fiscal Year Processed Rate Orange Grapefruit 1997-1998 .175 .30 1998-1999 .17 .30 1999-2000 .18 .325 2000-2001 .175 .30 2001-2002 .165 .18 Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, , 601.155 FS. History-- New . 20-15.003 Collection. The Florida Department of Citrus shall calculate the tax liability for each person or entity that exercised an enumerated Equalization Tax privilege outlined in section 601.155, Florida Statutes, upon non-Florida, United States juice based upon inspection records maintained by Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services and the United States Department of Agriculture. Subsequent to adoption of this rule, the Florida Department of Citrus will provide to the previously favored persons by certified mail a Notice of Tax Liability which shall contain a demand for payment consistent with the above-referenced itemized statement. The Department will deem late payment of Equalization Taxes owed by previously favored persons to constitute good cause, and shall waive the 5 percent penalty authorized by Section 601.155(10), F.S., as compliance with either of the following is established by Department [sic]: Lump sum payment of the tax liability remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20-100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability; or Equal installment payments remitted with the filing of Department of Citrus Form 4R (incorporated by reference in Rule 20- 100.004, F.A.C.) for the relevant years and then-applicable tax rate(s) per subsection subsection [sic] 20-15.002(3), F.A.C., over a 60-month period, the first payment being due within 61 days of receiving Notice of Tax Liability pursuant to subsection 20- 15.003(2), F.A.C.; or The Good Cause provisions of 601.155(10), F.S., shall not apply to persons who do not comply with paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(a), F.A.C., or paragraph 20- 15.003(2)(b), F.A.C. Failure to pay the taxes or penalties due under 601.155, F.S. and Chapter 20-15, F.A.C., shall constitute grounds for revocation or suspension of a previously favored person's citrus fruit dealer's license pursuant to 601.56(4), F.S., 601.64(6), F.S., 601.64(7), F.S., and/or 601.67(1), F.S. The Florida Department of Citrus will not oppose the timely intervention of persons who previously enjoyed the subject exemption that wish to present a claim to the Court in the Tampa Juice Service, Inc., et al v. Florida Department of Citrus. However, the Florida Department of Citrus does not waive any argument regarding the validity of the calculation of the tax liability or that imposition of this tax is constitutional. Specific Authority 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. Law Implemented 601.02, 601.10, 601.15, 601.155 FS. History-- New . The Final Order in Peace River held that the Proposed Rules were not an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, for reasons discussed in the Conclusions of Law below. Judge Maloney has yet to rule on the backward-looking remedy proposed by the Department. On March 26, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an order extending until May 1, 2003, the time for interested parties to file motions to intervene with regard to the Department's proposed backward-looking relief. The order noted that the parties have stipulated to the suspension of the back tax as to plaintiffs and objecting non-parties until further order of the court. On February 19, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-- Import-Export." The sole issue before Judge Maloney was "whether Section 601.155, Florida Statutes, (the 'Equalization Tax'), as it existed in 1997, violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the 'Import- Export Clause')." (Emphasis in original) After setting forth the standard for analysis of whether a taxing scheme violates the Import-Export Clause under Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535, 46 L.Ed.2d 495 (1976), Judge Maloney ruled as follows: It is precisely [the exemption for United States products found in 601.155(5), Florida Statutes] that causes the 1997 Equalization Tax to contravene the Import-Export Clause. Specifically, the court finds that because the statute exempts "citrus fruit grown within the United States," but does not exempt citrus fruit grown in foreign countries, the exemption causes the tax to "fall on imports as such simply because of their place of origin." Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286. Additionally, because the tax falls on foreign-grown citrus as such simply because of its origin but does not fall on domestic-grown citrus, the Equalization Tax, with the exemption, creates a "special tariff or particular preference for certain domestic goods." Id. (i.e. California, Arizona, and Texas citrus products). * * * In conclusion, because the court finds the exemption contained within the 1997 Equalization Tax violates both the first and third elements of the Michelin test,1 the court finds the 1997 Equalization Tax violates Article I, Section 10, clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (the "Import-Export Clause"). On March 31, 2003, Judge Maloney entered an "Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment." In this order, Judge Maloney found that the box tax itself, Section 601.15, Florida Statutes, violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Petitioners and Intervenor in the instant case are licensed citrus fruit dealers regulated by Chapter 601, Florida Statutes. As such, they are subject to the rules of the Department. Petitioners and Intervenor buy, sell, and manufacture citrus juices. They shipped products made with non- Florida U.S. juice during the tax period without paying equalization taxes. Petitioners and Intervenor have been notified by the Department that they are liable to pay back taxes pursuant to the Proposed Rules, as well as the invalid Emergency Rules.
Findings Of Fact Lawrence was, at all times pertinent to this case, a teacher with the Orange County Public School System. For about two years, and including the months of March, April and May, 1977, Lawrence's responsibilities included supervision of the work experience program at the Green House, Inc., an alternate school program. The Green House is a joint effort between the Orange County school system and a private community agency designed to provide special training for socially maladjusted children. The work experience program at the Green House gives the students insight into job opportunities through interviews, placement assistance and shadowing (the observation by the students of people actually working on the job). As part of his duties, Lawrence set up job interviews, placement and shadowing trips and then transported the students to their appointments. It would regularly happen that Lawrence and a student would travel together alone in Lawrence's car around the Orange County environs. It was alleged that the improper advances were made during such trips in March, April and May, 1977. However, as previously stated, Lawrence's testimony is accepted as accurate and it is found that no improper advances or contact occurred.
Findings Of Fact On November 10, 1977, Henry was employed as a teacher working under a continuing contract for the Citrus County School Board in Citrus High School, Inverness, Florida. At or about 12:35 p.m., on that date, Henry was responsible for a fourth period driving education class. At that time, class was beginning when Henry removed himself from the classroom to investigate a commotion in the hallway. The door of the classroom swung shut by itself and the lights to the classroom were switched off. A general commotion ensued in the classroom. After a brief period of time, Henry reentered the classroom and closed the door behind him. Henry removed his belt from his pants and did not turn on the lights. There was very little light in the classroom because the room had only two windows, one leading to an interior office which had no light on and the other approximately 1 square foot in size and located in the door leading to the hallway. There was, however, barely enough light for some students to observe the ensuing sequence of events. Henry then angrily asked the class who had turned the lights off and at the same time swung his belt in a threatening manner striking not only desks in the classroom but also a student, one Tracy White, between one and five times on the leg. Miss White was not seriously injured but she did experience some anxiety. One other student shared Miss White's concern for her personal welfare and moved from her seat near Miss White to another portion of the room in which she was out of danger. The incident was terminated several minutes later when someone turned the lights on. On September 8, 1977, a recommended order was entered in Citrus County School Board v. Allen P. Henry, Jr., Case No. 77-970, Division of Administrative Hearings, which order was adopted by the Citrus County School Board on September 27, 1977. In that case, Henry was found to have used his belt to break up a fight between students. It was concluded that such injudicial use of force constituted inconsiderate treatment of the pupils and it was recommended that Henry be formally advised by the School Board that the methods he employed were improper and were not to be repeated. On September 30, 1977, the School Board mailed a letter to Henry, which letter Henry subsequently received, referring to the recommended order of the Hearing Officer and advising Henry that the methods he employed in the circumstances of that case were improper and were not toe be repeated.
The Issue Respondent's alleged immorality and misconduct in office on March 29, April 5, 6, 8 & 13, 1976, under Section 231.36(6), Florida Statutes, as set forth in letter to Respondent from James E. Maurer, dated June 18, 1976.
Findings Of Fact During the academic year 1975-1976, Respondent was a classroom instructor in science at the Coconut Creek High School, Broward County, Florida. In the fall of 1975, Marcia Vulpis, a 14 year-old student at the school, was assigned to his class. He noticed during the ensuing months that she stared at him frequently which made him somewhat uncomfortable. About December, he spoke to Pamela Quianthy, Attendance Clerk at the school, about Marcia's behavior. Quianthy, who had observed Marcia on several occasions because of her presence in the office as a student aide, agreed that she was a rather strange girl and that she, Quianthy, also felt uncomfortable in her presence. In March, 1976, Marcia came into another class that Respondent was teaching and somewhat hysterically told him that she needed to see him right away. Respondent sensed the urgency in her request and was pleased that she had sought him out since she had seemed somewhat hostile during prior months. They thereafter had a long discussion at his office during which she informed him that a young man who lived next door to her had raped her and that she was bleeding inside. At this time, she also expressed past and present suicidal ideations and thoughts of murdering certain persons. She said that she had not told her mother or the police about the rape and did not wish to do so. He urged her to see a physician about her condition and determined that she was willing to have her 21 year-old aunt take her for such purpose. Respondent asked Quianthy to talk to her concerning the matter and she did so. During this conversation, Marcia told her that she had been raped and had not told anyone about it. Quianthy recommended that she inform her parents and also advised her to see a doctor. The next day the aunt came to the school to take Marcia to a doctor and Respondent sent them to the school dean for necessary permission to leave the grounds. (Testimony of Respondent, Quianthy) During the third week of March, 1976, Marcia, who sat at a desk directly in front of Respondent in his classroom, began writing notes to him during class in which she expressed love for him. On one occasion, after class, she told him that she wanted to go to bed with him. He reprimanded her for her statement. She pursued her request by subsequent notes and he penned some responses thereon advising her to come to his office to talk about it or to call him at home. He was concerned for her welfare and wished to help her. He did not refer her to the school counselor because she refused to talk to anyone else about her problems and he felt capable of providing necessary counseling because of his past experience as a Baptist minister and handling work experience programs in the school system. He made arrangements with Quianthy for her to phone him at his office during Marcia's visits in order that he would have an excuse to leave if necessary because he feared what the student might do on these occasions and wanted some means of leaving gracefully. The meetings in his office were held usually before afternoon classes commenced, and were at the request of Marcia. At one of these meetings, she told him that he was "driving her crazy" and attempted to kiss him. He pushed her away and cautioned her against such demonstrations. On another occasion, she remained after class and kissed him on the cheek, telling him that she loved him. He also admonished her at that time for her conduct. The above-mentioned incidents were the only times when there was physical contact between Respondent and the student. (Testimony of Respondent, Quianthy Petitioner's Exhibits 3-8) Respondent showed Marcia's notes to his wife and they discussed them a number of times. He also showed the notes to Quianthy and Regina Howard, a friend. Mrs. Howard had previously sought out Respohdent to assist her daughter with adolescence problems because she knew of his background as a minister and youth counselor. He discussed Marcia's situation with her and was serious about his concern for the girl. He requested that Howard get in touch with Marcia. She tried to do so several times, but was unable to contact her. (Testimony of Respondent, Ruth Barnett, Howard) During the school Easter vacation in April of 1976, Marcia called Respondent's home and his wife answered the telephone. Marcia asked to speak to "Ronnie" and during a subsequent conversation with Mrs. Barnett, learned that Respondent had shown her notes to his wife. Marcia was quite upset at learning this fact and said, "I'll show him." She also acknowledged to Mrs. Barnett that she had kissed the Respondent in his office and that she would assume the blame for that incident. Respondent attempted to speak with her at this time but she was too upset. The next day her aunt called him and said that Marcia had told her of certain sexual advances that had been made by Respondent. He informed her that this was not true and asked her to have Marcia call him. She did so and they agreed to meet at Fort Lauderdale Beach because she was staying with her father there. They subsequently met at a prearranged place where Respondent picked her up in his car and, after driving around a few minutes looking for a parking space, parked in a vacant motel parking lot. Respondent explained to her that he had retained her notes against her wishes and shown them to others because he did not feel confident to counsel her concerning female problems. There was no physical contact during this meeting. (Testimony of Respondent, Mrs. Barnett) After Easter vacation was concluded, Marcia informed Respondent that her mother had found her diary and that he would have to be careful or she (Marcia) would "put a noose over his head." Her mother, after discovering the "diary" (consisting of several sheets of notebook paper) that contained matters concerning Respondent, took Marcia to their church, Jehovah's Witnesses, where she told the elders of the church about her association with Respondent. Her father, who was divorced from Marcia's mother, was present and heard Marcia relate her alleged experiences with Respondent. He thereafter reported the matter to the authorities at Coconut Creek High School, taking with him one or two pages of Marcia's diary which contained entries for the last week of March. These included references to several of her visits to Respondent's office during which he had purportedly kissed her and fondled her breasts. (Testimony of Respondent, John Vulpis, Petitioner's Exhibit 11) A school investigation ensued during which Marcia initially declined to cooperate, but eventually made a written statement in which she,stated generally that she trusted and respected Respondent, that he was a good man and she did not wish anything to happen to him. Respondent was questioned by school security personnel and he related the two incidents when Marcia had kissed him on one occasion and had attempted to do so on the other. He also told them about the incident at the beach which had not been known to the investigators at the time, and he turned over Marcia's notes to them. Later, Marcia made another written statement in which she said that she and the Respondent had kissed each other three different times in his office and that on at least two occasions, he had put his hands on her breasts inside her blouse and kissed her breasts. Her statement also related that they had kissed one another during the beach incident and that he had kissed her breasts and had put his hands down her pants and that she had touched his "privates." In this statement she also said that he had made certain suggestive statements to her during classes earlier in the school year and that, although she had informed him of a sex experience with a "guy I loved," she had not told him she was raped. (Testimony of Respondent, Stearns, Patterson, Petitioner's Exhibits 9 & 10) Marcia Vulpis testified at the hearing and her version of the relationship with Respondent and their meetings differs in material respects from that of Respondent which is set forth in the foregoing Findings of Fact. She testified that Respondent made several suggestive remarks to her during the school year. She admitted seeking him out to discuss the incident with the boy next door and that he had advised her to see a doctor. She stated that, although she had disliked Respondent at first, she later changed her views and began writing notes to him. She admitted asking him to go to bed with her, but testified that while discussing this request in his office on March 29, 1976, Respondent pulled her in the corner and kissed her. She also testified that during other visits to his office on April 5, 6 & 8, they kissed one another, and Respondent kissed her breasts and touched her on the vagina, and that she touched him on the penis through his trousers. She stated that similar acts occurred during their meeting on the beach in mid-April. After her mother discovered the diary and her father had reported the relationship with Respondent to school authorities, she asked the Respondent what they were going to do and he replied that they were in a lot of trouble. Although conceding that she was upset after discovering that Respondent had showed her notes to his wife and others, she said that she did not tell anyone she would seek revenge for his disclosure. She also conceded that she had taken LSD and "pills" from nine to eleven years of age and had had a few "trips". She testified that she attempted to kill herself when she was ten years old with a needle when she was "freaked out." She further stated that she had thought about suicide a lot of times and that the last time she harbored these thoughts was in early March and that they were prompted by her failure to get along with her mother. Although she had loved Respondent, she decided after the investigation that she loved him no more. (Testimony of Marcia Vulpis) School policy at Coconut Creek High School which is announced to all teachers at the beginning of each school year, is that an upset or disturbed child should be referred by an instructor to the school guidance staff, that included a full-time psychologist. This policy was also contained in a handbook issued to instructional personnel. (Testimony of Weatherred, Roesch, Larson) Respondent is 45 years old and posseses a bachelor of arts degree in theology and linguistics and a masters degree in elementary education. He additionally has completed approximately 90 hours of post-graduate study. He served as a Baptist minister for five years in Lowell, Massachusetts and three years in another pastorate in Newton, New Hampshire. His prior experience includes service as an elementary school principal at Turner Falls, Massachusetts. He entered the teaching profession because of family obligations that required greater remuneration than received in the ministry. He has four children. He entered the Broward County school system in 1970 working with low- achievers at the Pines Middle School in a work experience program for two years. He served one year at Plantation doing the same type of work and in 1974 was transferred to the Coconut Creek High School where he set up a work experience program. He has done extensive work in counseling young people with their problems both as a minister and teacher. Respondent admitted that he had had marital conflicts with his wife in the past and that he had lived alone in Florida for a period of time, but that their marriage relationship was good at the present time. (Testimony of Respondent, Respondent's Exhibits 2, 3) Although denied by Respondent on cross-examination, evidence was received that he had patted two female office employees of the Coconut Creek High School on their posteriors in a "friendly" manner while walking by them in the office, and that he had also ran his finger down the back of their dresses. (Testimony of Ivell, Herter) Respondent was suspended without pay by Petitioner on June 18, 1976 pending final action on the charges involving Marcia Vulpis. (Exhibit l)
Recommendation That the School Board of Broward County, Florida reinstate Ronald R. Barnett as an instructor and restore all back pay and other benefits that have been withheld during the period of his suspension. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1976.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was the holder of a Rank III teacher's certificate, and was under continuing contract as a teacher with the Citrus County School Board. Respondent was assigned as a teacher to Crystal River Middle School for the 1978-1979 school year. Respondent was informed that all instructional personnel were to report to Crystal River Middle School on August 22, 1978. Respondent failed to report on August 22, 1978, and, in fact, has not communicated directly with any representative of the Citrus County School Board as of the date of the hearing in this cause. Respondent did cause a letter to be forwarded to the Principal of Crystal River Middle School, which letter was written on May 24, 1978, indicating that he had experienced some difficulty with her health, and was unable to advise Petitioner as to her future plans. At no time after the end of the 1977-1978 school year has Respondent requested or been granted a leave of absence. Representatives of Petitioner have attempted unsuccessfully on numerous occasions to contact Respondent to discuss her absence. These attempts have been to no avail, and Respondent's continued absence remains unexplained. Citrus County School Board Policy No. 6GX9-3.30(7)(h) provides as follows: Any member of the instructional staff who is willfully absent from duty without leave shall forfeit compensation for the time of such absence and his contract shall be subject to cancellation by the Board according to Florida Statute.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Citrus County School Board cancelling the continuing contract of Respondent, DeLoriss Fort, and dismissing her as an instructional employee of the Citrus County School Board. RECOMMEND this 24th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: J. Pattinson, Esquire P.O. Box 1506 Crystal River, Florida 32629 Mrs. DeLoriss Fort P.O. Box 492 Wildwood, Florida 32785 Thomas Skidmore, Esquire P.O. Drawer D Wildwood, Florida 32785
