Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On or about June 16, 1976, petitioner Frederick W. Campbell, M.D., Director of the proposed Kidneycare of Florida, submitted his application to respondent for the issuance of a certificate of need. The applicant proposes to organize as a nonprofit corporation to operate a freestanding hemodialysis facility to provide maintenance dialysis for patients who qualify for care under the Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease Program. The proposed facility is to be located in north Tampa adjacent to both the College of Medicine of the University of South Florida and the University Community Hospital. The area proposed to be served includes the northern area of Hillsborough County, Pasco County and the western half of Polk County. A capital expenditure in the amount of $220,000.00 is proposed. The facility is to include ten stations or renal dialysis units. Six are to be available for chronic patients on an outpatient basis, two are for limited self care and two are to be used for training for home dialysis patients. In its application, petitioner proposed to operate eight patient stations six days per week on two, four hour shifts per day. The other two stations were proposed to operate on one shift six days a week. An estimated construction and operation time is six to nine months from the date of approval of petitioner's proposal. The staff of the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency, Inc. reviewed petitioner's application and recommended approval of the project. The staff found that need for the facility had been established based upon the assumption that two shifts per day or 3.6 patients per machine per week was the optimum for planning purposes. (Exhibit 4). The Hillsborough Project Review Committee voted five to one to recommend disapproval of the application. This Committee found that only a marginal potential need for additional dialysis service had been demonstrated by the year 1978, and that such need could be met by the present facilities by increasing their operation to three shifts per day. (Exhibit 4). By a vote of ten to seven, the governing body of the Florida Gulf Health Systems Agency, Inc. recommended to respondent that the application be approved. As a basis for this recommendation, it was found that a three shift operation was not a viable alternative and that there was a definite need based upon a two shift assumption by the year 1978. Accessibility, the offering of a service not presently available (home dialysis), duality of choice and lower costs were also factors supporting the recommendation of approval. (Exhibits 4 and 8). At some time prior to respondent's letter of denial, respondent sought advice from the Florida Kidney Council and from a review panel of three nephrologists regarding petitioner's application. The response was a unanimous recommendation that the application be approved. (Exhibit 7). By letter dated September 17, 1976, respondent notified petitioner that the proposal to construct a free standing hemodialysis center had not been favorably considered. Respondent found a lack of demonstrated need in the foreseeable future within the proposed service area. This conclusion was based upon the following assumptions: a current patient load of 151, 44 existing dialysis units having a current potential for treating 198 patients based on a factor of five patients per unit and a utilization rate of ninety percent. The factor of five was derived from the operation of three shifts three days a week and two shifts three days a week. Assuming a three shift operation six days a week, and a ninety percent utilization rate, respondent found an unused current capacity of 87 patients. With such findings, respondent concluded that: "approval of additional dialysis units would be a duplication of existing, available, and under utilized hemodialysis units which are considered as sufficient in numbers to meet forseeable needs." In computing these figures, respondent did not take into consideration the projected future growth of the patient population. (Exhibit 1). In the proposed service area, three dialysis centers presently exist, excluding those at the Veterans Administration Hospital which serve veterans only. The dialysis unit at Tampa General Hospital has received approval to operate 14 stations, but is currently operating only 11. At the time of the hearing on this matter, there were approximately 54 patients being treated in this facility. Tampa General serves as a tertiary treatment center, treating acute as well as chronic patients. Bio-Medical Applications (BMA) of Tampa operates 20 stations and currently serves approximately 94 patients. The BMA facility in St. Petersburg, which opened in mid-September of 1976, operates 12 dialysis stations and has about twenty patients. Ten stations have been approved at Lakeland General Hospital in Polk County; however, such stations have not been placed into operation. An application is pending for six dialysis units in Brooksville, Hernando County. Other than the VA Hospital, none of the existing facilities currently provide training for home dialysis, although the BMA unit in St. Petersburg does anticipate home training capabilities. The optimum utilization rate for renal dialysis units is ninety percent. A figure less than 100 percent is necessary due to patient complications, scheduling difficulties, staff vacations, breakdown of machinery and the length of dialysis required by each patient. A figure somewhat lower than 90 percent may be applied for hospitals serving acute and emergency patients. The length of dialysis varies with the patient, as does the number of times per week the patient must dialyze. The average end-stage renal disease patient now dialyzes from four to six hours, three times a week. This is the amount of patient time normally required. The machine time is extended by thirty to sixty minutes to get it ready for operation and then to tear it down again after the patient is dialyzed. The majority of evidence adduced at the hearing related to the number of patients per week who could be serviced on a single machine. This of course, is dependent upon the number of shifts utilized per day. If two shifts per day were in operation for six days per week, four persons per week could be dialyzed on that machine. A ninety percent utilization rate for that machine renders a figure of 3.6. If three shifts per day were in operation for six days a week, six persons could be dialyzed per week. Assuming a ninety percent utilization rate, a figure of 5.4 ensues. All but one of the nephrologists who presented their views at the hearing thought that the operation of three shifts per day, in the absence of an absolute need for such operations, was totally unacceptable and incredible. Among their objections to the three shift operations were the following: inconvenience to those patients assigned to the third shift, though it was admitted that some patients are employed, students or housewives and may prefer an evening shift; many, if not most, patients do not feel normal or well enough to come out late at night to be dialyzed; inasmuch as the federal government reimburses 90 percent of the patients on dialysis at a specific rate per dialysis, the patient cost is not affected by the number of times a machine is actually used; the dialysis machines wear out more rapidly with three, as opposed to two, shifts; flexibility in patient load and scheduling is hampered; problems in staffing three shifts per day; nephrologists do not think it practical to work three shifts a day and therefore if three shifts per day were required in this State, nephrologists would be discouraged from coming into Florida; and expansion of kidney care dialysis units would be deterred; and finally neither the State Kidney Council nor the State Society of Nephrology have endorsed the three shift per day concept. Tampa General Hospital presently operates its dialysis program on a three shift basis on three days a week, and two shifts the other three days. This renders a 90 percent utilization figure of 4.5 patients per machine. Although problems in staffing have occurred in the past, these problems have been solved. The first shift patient is put on the machine around 7:00 a.m. and the third shift patients come off the machines around 10:00 p.m. Members of the staff then clean up and they are out by 11:00 or 11:15 p.m. The BMA unit in Tampa also operates three shifts per day, three days a week, with the first shift patients coming in at 6:30 a.m. and the last shift leaving at about 8:00 p.m. No real problems have been experienced in this operation. The BMA unit in St. Petersburg has not yet had the need to operate in three shifts. While the co-director of the dialysis units at both Tampa General and BMA was content to work with three shifts alternating with two every other day, he did not feel it medically or economically desirable to operate three shifts all six days of the week. The "Analysis of Dialysis Needs - 1974-1979 contained in Appendix D of the Renal Disease Plan for Florida indicates that the annual statewide incidence rate for new end stage renal disease patients requiring dialysis is seventy per million. In South Florida, a higher rate of eighty per million is probable. These figures are somewhat higher than the national average due to a higher than average Florida population over age 65. (Exhibit 16, p. 64). Population figures derived from the University of Florida indicate an estimated 1977 population of the proposed service area of 1,677,700 and for 1978, 1,734,367. Through either successful transplantation or patient mortality, the number of persons requiring dialysis will be reduced by approximately 25 percent in any given year.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited above, it is recommended that the determination of the Office of Community Medical Facilities to deny the petitioner's application for a certificate of need be REVERSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 10th day of December, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
The Issue Whether Rule 59C-1.038, the acute care bed need rule, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Whether this rule challenge should be dismissed as an untimely attack on a published fixed need pool.
Findings Of Fact In August 1994, the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") published a numeric need of zero for additional acute care beds in AHCA District 9, Subdistrict 5, for southern Palm Beach County. Pursuant to Subsection 408.034(3), Florida Statutes, AHCA is the state agency responsible for establishing, by rule, uniform need methodologies for health services and facilities. In September 1994, NME Hospitals, Inc. d/b/a Delray Community Hospital, Inc. ("Delray") applied for a certificate of need ("CON") to add 24 acute care beds for a total construction cost of $4,608,260. AHCA published its intent to approve the application on January 20, 1995, in Volume 21, No. 3 of the Florida Administrative Weekly. By timely filing a petition, Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Inc. ("Bethesda") challenged AHCA's preliminary decision in DOAH Case No. 95-0730. Bethesda is also located in AHCA District 9, Subdistrict 5. On May 24, 1995, Bethesda also filed the petition in this case challenging Rule 59C-1.038, Florida Administrative Code, the acute care bed need rule. Pursuant to the acute care bed need rule, AHCA's August 1994 notice published its finding that zero additional acute care beds will be needed in the southern Palm Beach County subdistrict by July, 1999. The data, formulas, and calculations used in arriving at the number zero were not published. AHCA and Delray argue that the publication put persons on notice to inquire into the population data, occupancy rates, or the calculations leading to the published need number. An AHCA rule bars a person from seeking, and AHCA from making, any adjustments to the fixed need pool number if the person failed to notify AHCA of errors within ten days of publication. Still another rule defines "fixed need pool" as the " . . . numerical number, as published. " Bethesda is not contesting and, in fact, agrees that the fixed need pool number as published, zero, is correct. Using AHCA's definition of the fixed need pool, Bethesda's challenge is not barred because it failed to notify AHCA of an error in the fixed need pool number within 10 days of publication. Bethesda is challenging as irrational and invalid subsections (5), (6), and (7) of the acute care bed need rule. Subsection (5) directs the local health councils to determine subdistrict bed need consistent with the methodology for determining district bed need. Under that provision, total projected patient days of acute care needed in a district is calculated by adding together the projected patient care days needed in medical/surgical, intensive care, coronary care, obstetric, and pediatric beds. Each of these separate bed need projections is computed, in general, by multiplying projected population in the district for the appropriate age or gender group times a factor which is the product of the statewide discharge rate and the average length of stay for that particular type of care. After the total projected acute care patient days for district residents is computed, the number is adjusted to reflect historical patient flow patterns for acute care services, for out-of-state residents served in the district, for residents of other districts served in the district, and for residents of the district served outside the district. The rule includes specific percentages to apply for each patient flow group for each of the eleven districts. After the total number of beds needed in the district is derived, that number is decreased by the number of existing licensed or approved beds to get the number of additional acute care beds needed in the district, if any. Bethesda is challenging subsections (7)(a), (b), and (c) of the acute care rule, which authorize adjustments to the calculations from subsections (5) and (6) to achieve desired occupancy levels, based on historic utilization of acute care beds in a district. Bethesda is also seeking a determination that subsections 7(d) and (e) are invalid. Each of those subsections of the rule refer to (5)(b), although AHCA's expert witness testified that they should refer to (6)(b). Subsection (7)(d) requires at least 75 percent occupancy in all hospitals in the district before new acute care beds normally are approved, regardless of the net need projected by the formulas. Subsection (7)(e) allows approvals under special circumstances if net need is projected by the formulas and the applicant facility's occupancy rate equals or exceeds 75 percent. Subsection (7)(e), the provision directly related to the Delray application, is as follows: (e) Approval Under Special Circumstances. Regardless of the subdistrict's average annual occupancy rate, need for additional acute care beds at an existing hospital is demonstrated if a net need for beds is shown based on the formula described in paragraphs (5)(b), (7)(a), (b), (c), and (8)(a), (b), (c), and provided that the hospital's average occupancy rate for all licensed acute care beds is at or exceeds 75 percent. The determination of the average occupancy rate shall be made based on the average 12 months occupancy rate made available by the local health council two months prior to the beginning of the respective acute care hospital batching cycle. Phillip C. Rond, III, Ph.D., was the primary architect of the rule, beginning in 1981. The rule was initially published in 1982, and adopted in 1983. Constants in the rule formulas, including use rates, average lengths of stay, occupancy standards and patient flow patterns were taken from a 1979 survey of some state hospitals. Because data used for the constants in the formulas was expected to change, subsection (6) also provides, in pertinent part, that: Periodic updating of the statewide discharge rates, average lengths of stay and patient flow factors will be done as data becomes available through the institution of statewide utilization reporting mechanisms. Patient flow factors were updated in March 1984 to reflect a change in the realignment of counties in Districts 5 and 8. No other constants have been updated since the rule was adopted in June 1983. More current data is available. The Hospital Cost Containment Board ("HCCB") began collecting statewide hospital inpatient discharge data in the fourth quarter of 1987, which became available by the fall of 1988. AHCA now collects the data. Using the rule, the projected net need for acute care beds in 1999 in District 9 is 1,442 additional beds. By contrast, with the factors updated by Dr. Rond, the projected net need is a negative 723 or, in other words, District 9 has 723 more acute care beds than it will need in 1999. The updated formulas show a need for a total of 3,676 beds in District 9, which already has 4,399 licensed or approved acute care beds. Since 1983, hospital utilization has declined in both rates of admissions or discharges, and in average lengths of stay. Although the occupancy goals in the rule are 75 to 80 percent, depending on the type of hospital service, the occupancy rate achieved by using the number of beds projected by the rule methodology is 45 to 52 percent. The statewide occupancy rate in acute beds is approximately 50 percent in 49,215 licensed beds. The formulas in the rule show a statewide net need for 6,000 more beds in 1999, but updated constants in the same formulas result in a total statewide need for approximately 36,000 acute care beds in 1999, or 13,000 fewer beds than currently exist. Statewide utilization of acute care hospital beds declined from 1187.2 days per 1000 population in 1983 to 730.5 days per 1,000 in 1993, despite increases in the percentage of the elderly population. By 1987, AHCA's predecessor realized that the need methodology in the rule was grossly overestimating need and inconsistent with its health planning objectives. Subsection (7)(d) was added to the rule to avoid having a published fixed need based on the outdated methodology in subsections (5), (6) and 7(a)- (c). The occupancy data is also, as the 1987 amendment requires, that reported for the most recent 12 months, available 2 months before the scheduled application cycle. In August 1994, AHCA published a numeric need of zero for District 9, Subdistrict 5, rather than 1,442, the calculated net need predicted by the formulas in the rule, because all subdistrict hospital occupancy rates did not equal or exceed 75 percent. Elfie Stamm of AHCA, who is responsible for the publication of fixed need pools, confirmed that the 1987 amendment to the rule was an efficient and cost-effective way to avoid publishing need where there was no actual need. She confirmed Dr. Rond's conclusions that the formulas are no longer valid and produce excessive need numbers, as in projecting a need for 6,000 or 7,000 more acute care beds in the state. She also confirmed that none of the constants in the formula have been updated as required by subsection 6. Ms. Stamm claims that the information needed to update the formulas cannot be obtained easily from any statewide utilization reporting mechanism. One problem, according to Ms. Stamm, is the possibility of including patients in acute care beds with comprehensive rehabilitation, psychiatric, or substance abuse problems, although it is not lawful for acute care providers to place patients with these primary diagnoses in licensed acute care beds and all data bases have some miscoding of diagnoses. She also testified that some factors required in the formulas are not included in HCCB data base. In addition, she testified that AHCA is in the process of filing a notice to repeal the acute care bed need rule. The filing of the notice of repeal, published in Volume 21, Florida Administrative Week, pp. 4179-4180 (6/23/95) was confirmed by Bethesda's Request For Official Recognition, which was filed on July 20, 1995, and is granted. Ms. Stamm also noted that rules for other need-based health services have facility-specific special circumstances provisions, which are not tied to numerical need, otherwise the special circumstances are not really facility- specific. Need rules make no sense, according to Ms. Stamm, without an exception in the absence of a determination of need. Subsection (7)(e) of the acute care rule requires a finding of numeric need and a 75 percent occupancy rate at the applicant facility. Ms. Stamm's records indicate that AHCA's predecessor adopted the facility-specific provisions tied to net need at the same time it adopted the 75 percent average district occupancy standard to overcome the problems with the net need formula. AHCA asserts that the admittedly irrational need methodology when combined with the 1987 amendment achieves a rational result. Because the need methodology always over estimates numeric need, facilities exceeding 75 percent occupancy have an opportunity to demonstrate special circumstances. Daniel Sullivan, Delray's expert, also testified that problems exist in extracting acute care bed from specialty bed utilization data, in hospitals which have both. He also agreed with Ms. Stamm that the 1987 amendment corrects the erroneous projections of the formula to give a rational outcome from the rule as a whole when not all hospitals in a subdistrict equal or exceed 75 percent occupancy and when one hospital, over 75 percent occupancy, attempts to establish a special circumstance, despite the fact that the need methodology itself is always wrong in projecting numeric need. Ms. Stamm testified that one district is approaching 75 percent occupancy in all hospitals. Mr. Sullivan testified that, if and when that occurs, then the formula is intended to, but does not, reflect the number of additional beds needed. An alternative methodology is required to determine bed need. AHCA, with its responsibility for the data base formerly collected by the HCCB, receives discharge data and financial worksheets from every hospital in the state. The claim that AHCA cannot update the formulas because its data may be unreliable is rejected as not credible. The data now available is more reliable than the 1979 data used in developing the rule, which was not collected from a formalized statewide reporting system, but from a sample of hospitals. The claim that AHCA cannot use its data base from mandatory statewide reporting mechanisms to extract the data needed to update the formulas is also rejected. The rule contemplated ". . .the institution of statewide utilization reporting mechanisms." Dr. Rond's work to update the formulas before the final hearing began on May 23, 1995. Dr. Rond used a total of approximately 1.5 million acute care discharges from the AHCA (formerly, HCCB) data base for the 1992 calendar year. At the time of the final hearing, Dr. Rond had not separated days of care for medical/surgical, intensive and coronary care. The data can be taken from hospital financial data, including detailed budget worksheets which are submitted to AHCA. Separate data are anticipated in the formula because the computation of need for the different bed categories is based on different occupancy goals. For medical/surgical and intensive care beds, the goal is 80 percent occupancy, but it is 75 percent for coronary care for persons age 0 to 64. For persons 65 and older, the rule applies a combined occupancy standard of 79.7 percent for all three bed categories, which assumes that approximately 4 percent of the combined days of older patients will be spent in coronary care. Dr. Rond reasonably applied the 79.7 percent occupancy standard to the combined days for persons under 65, in arriving at the total district bed need for 3,676 beds. To check these results and to assume a worse case scenario of all patient days attributable to coronary care beds, for which more beds are needed to maintain a lower occupancy, Dr. Rond worked the formula using 75 percent occupancy as the goal for medical/surgical, intensive and care coronary care beds combined. Although the base number increased by 100, the calculations and adjustments in the rule yielded the same number of total acute care beds needed in the district, 3,676. That reliably confirms that the maximum number of acute care beds needed in District 9 is 3,676 by 1999. AHCA could use its data base to update formulas and achieve rational results in the rule by using the hospital financial data to distinguish coronary care days for patients 0-64 to include in the formula, or by using a rational blended occupancy standard in a rule amending the existing methodology. AHCA demonstrated that the 1987 amendment overrides the exaggerated numeric need number to yield a rational published fixed need pool in the absence of 75 percent occupancy in all acute care beds in a subdistrict. AHCA also demonstrated that because the projected need is always excessive under the formula, hospitals are allowed to demonstrate special circumstances, although it is absurd to include a requirement of numeric need in a provision for special circumstances. AHCA's claim that the excessive need projection is, therefore, irrelevant is rejected. Net need under the rule formula fails to give any rational indication of the number of beds needed when all hospitals in a subdistrict reach 75 percent occupancy.
The Issue Whether Respondent Cleveland Clinic Florida Hospital's Motion to Dismiss the Petition in this case, for lack of standing, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The facts necessary for disposition of the Motion to Dismiss are not in dispute. The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County operates Jackson Memorial Hospital ("JMH") in Dade County (AHCA District 11). In its Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, certified to have been served on August 19, 1998, the Trust alleged that JMH is the only provider of adult kidney transplantation services within Florida Transplant Service Planning Area 4, which includes AHCA Districts 8, 9, 10 and 11. The Trust described itself in both the Petition and an amended Petition which followed as: [A]n agency and instrumentality of Miami-Dade County, which is organized and operated pursuant to Chapter 154, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 25A of the Code of Miami-Dade County. It governs and operates Jackson Memorial Hospital and other designated health care facilities. Its address is 1611 N.W. 12th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33136. Amended Petition, paragraph 2, p. 2. The Trust and Jackson Memorial Hospital are both in Dade County, AHCA District 11. With regard to CCFH, the Petition alleged the following. CCFH is located in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County (AHCA District 10). CCFH has CON approval to construct a new facility in Weston, also in Broward County. It submitted an application for an adult kidney transplantation program at the new Broward County facility which was awarded preliminary CON approval as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly on July 31, 1998. It is the application for the adult kidney transplantation program at the Weston facility in AHCA District 10 which the petition seeks to have denied contrary to AHCA's preliminary approval. The Petition's allegations with regard to standing are contained in paragraphs seven and eight: As the sole provider of adult transplantation services in Transplant Area 4, Petitioner has standing to file this petition because its substantial interests will be directly affected by the Agency action for which this petition seeks review. The adverse affects to the PHT if the preliminary approval of CON No. 9026 is upheld include but are not limited to: A decrease in the number of procedures performed at JMH, which may impair research objectives and medical proficiency; A loss of needed revenue to JMH, the largest provider of indigent hospital care in Florida; An increase in the competition for professional staffing, thereby driving up the costs of performing these hospital services; and An increase in the cost to the health care system for performing transplant services through he unnecessary duplication of services. Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing, p. 3 and 4. CCFH moved to dismiss the Petition on the basis that the Trust had not alleged facts sufficient to meet the standing requirement in CON proceedings found in Section 408.039(5), Florida Statutes. In essence, CCFH asserted that the Trust had failed to allege that its adult kidney transplantation program in District 11 was within the same district as the challenged kidney transplant program of CCFH approved by AHCA for District 10. In response, the Trust informed the Agency that it had on the same date filed an Amended Petition which, differs substantively from the original petition only in paragraphs 4 and 8, concerning the issue of standing. By filing its Amended Petition, the Trust adds an additional basis for standing, and does not in any manner retreat from the basis for standing asserted in its original Petition. Public Health Trust's Response to Cleveland Clinic Florida Hospital's Motion to Dismiss, p. 2, paragraph 2. The new paragraphs four and eight in the Amended Petition, state: PHT's medical staff (including its transplantation physicians) is provided by the university of Miami School of Medicine, doing business as the University of Miami Medical Group (UMMG), under an affiliation agreement between the PHT and the University of Miami. Through the UMMG, JMH conducts various activities in Broward County as part of its adult kidney transplantation program, including but not limited to the following: UMMG sees approximately one third of all its post transplant patients at two satellite clinics in Fort Lauderdale; and UMMG through the University of Miami's Organ Procurement Organization maintains agreements with various Broward donor hospitals and provides in-service training to hospital personnel involved in organ procurement, including kidney procurement. * * * As the sole provider of adult transplantation services in Transplant Area 4, as an existing health care facility with an established adult kidney transplant program operating in both Districts 10 and 11, Petitioner has standing to file this petition because its substantial interests will be directly affected by the Agency action for which this petition seeks review. Amended Petition, pages 2 and 3. The Amended Petition was filed with the Department Clerk for AHCA on September 4, 1998, prior to the case's referral by AHCA to DOAH. Argument on the Motion to Dismiss was heard on September 28, 1998. Ruling was reserved until entry of this order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order dismissing the amended petition in this case of the Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack P. Hartog, Esquire Assistant County Attorney Jackson Memorial Hospital West Wing 109 1611 Northwest 12th Avenue Miami, Florida 33136 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Karen A. Putnal, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs LLP 118 North Gadsden Street, 2nd Floor Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Patterson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3 Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue for consideration is whether Respondent, Sarasota County Public Hospital Board's, (Board), Motion To Dismiss HCA of Florida, Inc.'s (Doctors), Petition For Formal Administrative Proceedings should be granted.
Findings Of Fact On June 26, 1990, the Board filed CON application No. 6347, seeking approval to construct a comprehensive outpatient center and medical office complex on the campus of Sarasota Memorial Hospital. The new facility, anticipated to have a cost of slightly in excess of $18,000,000.00, was to house several outpatient functions including: outpatient registration outpatient diagnostic radiology outpatient laboratory services outpatient rehabilitative services outpatient cardiology diagnostic center outpatient dialysis Health resources center, and an office building located adjacent to the existing ambulatory surgical center. On or about July 13, 1990, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, (Department), issued its State Agency Action Report, (SAAR), in which it indicated a preliminary decision to approve the subject application in its entirety, designating the project reviewable under Section 381.706(2)(d), Florida Statutes. Notice of this decision was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on August 3, 1990. On August 14, 1990, Doctors filed a Petition For Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the preliminary approval, claiming that components of the project are reviewable under several subsections of Section 381.706(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Doctors claims that the operation of a home health agency from the complex renders it reviewable under subsection (f); that as the project constitutes a substantial change in the provision of inpatient services, or establishes new inpatient services, it is reviewable under subsection (h); and that it is an additional health care facility which is reviewable pursuant to subsection (b). Doctors also claims the new facility will hurt its ability to compete for patient referrals from physicians who will be housed in the new facility and will result in a reduction of Doctors' market share. Doctors is an existing hospital that provides a full range of acute care services to residents of Sarasota County. The Board's application contends that the development of this complex will free up capacity in key ancillary areas to better accommodate patients, and it is so found. The ambulatory diagnostic and treatment space proposed for the new facility represents what would have otherwise been less efficient additions to the existing departments. There will also be a bridge connecting the main hospital to the new center which will provide convenient access to any outpatient who may need to visit the hospital. It will also provide, "... direct linkage between the acute inpatient facility with the physicians' offices thereby enhancing pertinent access to a range of diagnostic and treatment services." Doctors contends in its Petition that it is the Board's clear intention and expectation to increase its service area and market share of Sarasota County patients as a result of this project. It asserts that if the Board's project is implemented, it will be serving different patients, and a different patient mix from a different geographical area than currently served. For the purpose of resolving the limited issues at this motion hearing, these assertions are accepted as fact. Accepting the assertions in paragraph 5 through 7, above, as fact, however, does not necessarily require the conclusions be reached that the accomplishment of the Board's project would result in any significant change to the level of its patient service since what is planned deals only with outpatient services. While Doctors disputes this, its claims that inpatient services would be effected is not supported.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Secretary, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a Final Order dismissing HCA of Florida, Inc.'s Petition in opposition to the grant of CON No. 6347 to the Sarasota County Public Hospital Board. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Weiss, Esq. Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs The Perkins House 118 N. Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Radey, Esq. Elizabeth McArthur, Esq. Aurell, Radey, Hinkle & Thomas Suite 1000, 101 North Monroe Street Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Edward G. Labrador, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
Findings Of Fact Respondent St. Augustine Artificial Kidney Center, Inc. (AKC) filed an application for a certificate of need with Respondent Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) on June 2, 1980, to construct and operate an eight-station outpatient free standing hemodialysis center at St. Augustine, Florida, for an estimated capital expenditure of $144,650. Petitioner University Hospital Academic Fund, Inc. (Academic Fund) also filed an application with Respondent on June 16, 1980, to construct a similar facility at St. Augustine, with a proposed project cost of $138,131.64. The Academic Fund application stated that it was in the process of incorporating a separate entity to operate the proposed facility. By letter of July 28, 1980, the Academic Fund informed HRS that it planned to form a new corporation named St. Johns Renal Services, Inc. to operate the facility and that any certificate of need which might be granted should be issued in the name of that corporation. However, no such corporation has yet been formed. (Testimony of Goldberg, Exhibits 1-2) The two applications were comparatively reviewed by the Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida, Area 3, Inc. (HSA) during July 1980. The review consisted of evaluation at various agency levels and culminated in a determination by the HSA Board of Directors on July 24, 1980, that the application of the Academic Fund should be recommended to HRS for approval. The HSA reports on the two applications were transmitted to HRS by a letter of Fred J. Huerkamp, Executive Director of the HSA, dated August 7, 1980. Although the HSA Board of Directors did not specifically vote to deny the application of AKC, the HSA report on the AKC application stated that inasmuch as the Board of Directors had adopted the recommendations of its Health Needs and Priorities Committee recommendations to approve the Academic Fund application, it had also adopted the implicit denial of the AKC application by the committee. The HSA report itself recommended denial of the AKC application. The HSA found that there was a need for an eight-station dialysis facility in St. Augustine under its Health Systems Plan because only three such dialysis facilities are located in the applicants' proposed service areas, two of which are in Jacksonville and one in Daytona Beach, thus necessitating considerable present travel to prospective patients residing in St. Johns County and contiguous portions of adjacent counties. One of the Jacksonville facilities is an inpatient unit at University Hospital. The HSA also found that the two applicants were virtually equal with respect to probable quality of service, financial resources, and costs of operation. The HSA decided that the Academic Fund application should be approved because funds received for operation of the facility could, in part, be utilized to enhance the overall patient care capabilities of University Hospital, particularly with medical staff teaching expenses. The Academic Fund is a nonprofit corporation which provides a billing service for professional fees of the physicians who are salaried employees of University Hospital and who participate in a University of Florida teaching program there. The organization is comprised of these physicians and operates in a manner similar to a medical group practice plan. A percentage of fund assets are donated to University Hospital to support its teaching program. The hospital is a tax-supported indigent care facility. (Testimony of Dewberry, Goldberg, Huerkamp, Exhibits 1- 3) The two competing applications also were reviewed by the Florida End Stage Renal Disease Network 19, Inc., (Network 19) , a federally funded organization under the Department of Health and Human Services which performs a planning function to determine the need for new or expanded services with respect to dialysis and kidney transplants in Florida. It makes recommendations to the federal Health Care Finance Administration in such matters for determination of eligibility of a provider for participation in the Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement programs. By agreement with HRS, Network 19 also provides review and recommendations as to certificate of need applications submitted by proposed dialysis facilities. HRS considers such recommendations during its certificate of need review process as "other pertinent data" under Rule 10-5.10(5), F.A.C. On July 29, 1980, Network 19 transmitted its recommendation to HRS which stated that although it had found both applications to be essentially equal under the Network's review criteria and standards, AKC was chosen over the Academic Fund in light of the fact that it had submitted the first application and because of its expected greater cost efficiency of operation. The organization projected a need for eight dialysis stations in St. Augustine by mid-1982. The basis for the finding that AKC would be more cost efficient was that the AKC application projected a profit during the first year of operation whereas the Academic Fund application indicated a deficit for the initial year. (Testimony of Moutsatsos, Hudson, Exhibit 4) HRS reviewed the two applications, together with the recommendations of Network 19 and the HSA, and determined that the AKC application should be approved. By a letter of October 3, 1980, the Administrator of HRS' Office of Community Medical Facilities transmitted a certificate of need to AKC, subject to any request for a hearing filed pursuant to Chapter 10-5, F.A.C. By letter of the same date, the Administrator advised the Academic Fund that its application had not been favorably considered because the proposed project did not demonstrate "favorable feasibility" when compared with the financial aspects of the AKC proposal, and that it presented a less favorable alternative method of providing services in St. Augustine. The Administrator also informed the HSA by letter of the same date that the HSA recommendation had been rejected for reasons contained in an attached "State Agency Report." Both the Academic Fund and HSA thereafter filed appeals of the HRS decision. (Exhibits 1-3) The HRS medical facilities consultant, Nancy E. Hudson, who reviewed the applications and made the initial staff recommendation, favored the AKC proposal as being more financially feasible in that it planned to charge the Medicare "screen" or maximum of $138 per treatment, as opposed to the Academic Fund's plan to charge $133, plus a $5 laboratory fee. She was of the opinion that the Fund's proposed charges would be less cost effective because experience showed that laboratory fees would normally exceed $5, and thus require either an additional charge to patients or obtaining an exception to the Medicare "screen." She further found that AKC had considerable experience in the field of free standing dialysis facilities since its principals operated several other facilities in Florida, whereas the Academic Fund had not involved itself in such an enterprise apart from its members' participation in the dialysis unit at University Hospital. Although Hudson recognized that the Academic Fund's proposal stated overall lesser project costs, she testified that she could not adequately assess the resources of the applicant, particularly due to the fact that it had indicated its intention to form a new corporation to operate the facility. She also felt that competition in the area would be adversely affected if the Academic Fund, which was affiliated with University Hospital, was granted approval to set up the facility at St. Augustine. The Administrator of HRS' Office of Community Medical Facilities accepted the staff recommendations and approved the AKC application. He, too, was of the opinion that the AKC experience factor was important and placed reliance on the recommendations of Network 19, even though he did not view the fact that AKC had filed its application first to constitute a valid reason for preference. (Testimony of Hudson, Forehand, Exhibits 1-3) AKC plans to spend $144,650 to establish its proposed facility and begin operations, whereas the Academic Fund intends to allocate $138,131.64 for its project. AKC estimates a first-year net income of $16,476, while the Academic Fund estimates a first year net loss of some $42,000. Financial statements submitted by both applicants show that they will have sufficient financial resources to meet the projected initial costs of establishment and operation of the planned facility. AKC shows a proposed cost of $35 for supplies per treatment and the Academic Fund estimates a $50 per treatment cost of supplies. The difference in expected costs is explained by the fact that AKC intends to obtain bulk negotiated discount prices from various manufacturers as its principals have done in past operations, compared to the Academic Fund's plan to seek out the "best list" prices it can obtain. AKC plans to purchase necessary equipment in the amount of an estimated $115,350, but the Academic Fund plans to expend only $96,105. The discrepancy between these figures is, in part, based upon the fact that AKC plans to install individual television sets at each dialysis station which it considers essential for the comfort of patients. Additionally, the Academic Fund plans to purchase generally less expensive equipment for its facility than does AKC. AKC believes that for essentially the same treatment costs, it will offer a better center for patients, and that efficiency in controlling costs will maintain a high quality of care. The Academic Fund is somewhat pessimistic concerning the number of patients who will use its services during the first year, thus providing a basis for the anticipated first-year loss in revenues. Approximately fifteen patients in the proposed service area reasonably can be expected to transfer to a facility in St. Augustine. However, the Academic Fund expects to gradually acquire about three to twelve patients during its first year of operation, whereas AKC estimates that it will have some twelve patients at the outset, primarily due to the accessibility of the new facility. (Testimony of Levy, Dewberry, Anderson, Cunio, Exhibits 1-4) The applicants have made satisfactory arrangements for ancillary services, including acute backup, kidney transplant, and home training services with qualified medical facilities. Both plan to use University Hospital at Jacksonville as a backup hospital and Shands Teaching Hospital at Gainesville for any necessary transplant services. The Academic Fund intends to use University Hospital for home training services and AKC will utilize Dialysis Clinics, Inc. of Jacksonville. Both applicants plan to have a nephrologist available at the facility and other personnel staffing proposed is sufficient for proper operation. AKC plans to utilize a smaller staff than the Academic Fund, thus reducing expenses. (Testimony of Levy, Dewberry, Anderson, Cunio, Exhibits 1-3) Both of the applicants reasonably can be expected to offer a satisfactory quality of care in the operation of a dialysis facility. Academic Fund will draw upon its staff of experienced physicians who operate the 24- station unit at University Hospital. Their association with the Hospital assures ready access to that "backup" facility in the event of acute need. Both applicants plan to use the two local St. Augustine hospitals for routine hospitalization requirements. AKC's principals, Doctors Cunio and Anderson, have had extensive experience in the ownership of free standing dialysis facilities. Dr. Cunio is the Director of the Mercy Hospital Dialysis Unit in Miami and has had a close affiliation with the South Florida Artificial Kidney Center and Dade Dialysis Center in Miami. Dr. Anderson is the Medical Director of the South Florida AKC and its satellite unit in Fort Myers. He has been affiliated in the management and direction of the Dade Dialysis Center, Hialeah Dialysis Center and Indian River Artificial Kidney Center in Stuart. He is also the operator and owner of Suncoast Artificial Kidney Center in Naples. The South Florida Artificial Kidney Center was commended by the Mayor of Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, in 1977, in a proclamation that November 7th of that year would be "South Florida Artificial Kidney Center Day," in recognition of its ten years of success in the treatment of patients. Although the University Hospital dialysis unit received an unfavorable report as the result of a state Medicare survey in 1980, the deficiencies were primarily housekeeping in nature and did not directly reflect unfavorably upon the quality of medical services provided to patients. (Testimony of Dewberry, Cunio, Anderson, Exhibits 1-2, 5-0)
Recommendation Case No. 80-2137: That the petition of the Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida, Area 3, Inc. be DISMISSED. Case No. 80-2138: That the application of St. Augustine Artificial Kidney Center, Inc. for a certificate of need to establish an eight-station free standing dialysis center in St. Augustine, Florida be APPROVED, and that the competing application of the University Hospital Academic Fund, Inc. for a similar facility be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Alvin J. Taylor, Secretary Department of HRS 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eric J. Haugdahl, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of HRS 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eleanor Hunter, Esquire 702 Lewis State Bank Bldg. Post Office Box 471 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 E. G. Boone and Richard Whitton, Esquires 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 33595 Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida, Area 3, Inc. 1045 Riverside Avenue, Suite 260 Jacksonville, Florida 32204
The Issue The issue presented is whether the application of Respondent Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. d/b/a East Pasco Medical Center for a certificate of need to add 24 acute care beds to its existing facility should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Seventh Day Adventist Church owns Respondent Advent-ist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc. That corporation, which occupies a strong financial position, operates not-for-profit hospitals in several states, including Florida. One of the Florida hospitals is East Pasco Medical Center (East Pasco), located in Zephyrhills. Zephyrhills is in eastern Pasco County, which, for health planning purposes, is known as Subdistrict 2 of District 5. East Pasco is an 85-bed acute care hospital which provides most of the common services found in a community hospital. In addition to providing general acute care and obstetrics (OB), it has an intensive care unit (ICU) and offers neurosurgery and kidney dialysis services. East Pasco also has completed but not yet opened an 11-bed skilled nursing unit (SNU) and a 10-bed observation unit. The 11 beds in the SNU and the 10 beds in the observation unit are in addition to the 85 acute care beds for which East Pasco is licensed. For licensure purposes, acute care beds are not divided into types of service. East Pasco's current configuration for its 85 acute care beds is as follows: 68 medical-surgical beds, 8 ICU beds, and 9 OB beds. East Pasco has an active emergency room which experiences up to 30,000 visits per year. East Pasco obtains approximately 55 percent of its in-patient admissions through its emergency room. East Pasco is accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). Petitioner Humana of Florida, Inc. d/b/a Humana Hospital Pasco (Humana) is an existing 120-bed acute care hospital in Dade City. It is situated approximately 10 minutes away from East Pasco. Humana provides the same services that East Pasco provides, including medical-surgical, ICU/CCU, OB, kidney dialysis, and neurosurgery. Like East Pasco, Humana is accredited by the JCAHO. However, Humana's accreditation is "with commendation", the highest rating given by the JCAHO. Like East Pasco, Humana has a large medical staff, primarily consisting of physicians who have their offices located in Zephyrhills or Dade City. The medical staff rosters of Humana and East Pasco are virtually identical. Dade City is also located in east Pasco County, and the primary service areas of Humana and East Pasco are virtually identical. Like East Pasco, Humana serves the Medicaid and indigent patient populations. In its fiscal year 1991, Humana provided 6 percent of its patient days to Medicaid patients. In fiscal year 1992, that increased to 8.8 percent, the same as East Pasco. Humana's Medicaid patient days increased substantially with the introduction of OB services at Humana since Medicaid patients receive primarily OB services. East Pasco has been designated as a disproportionate share provider under the State's program to give economic incentives to hospitals serving a certain percentage of Medicaid patients. East Pasco also serves the indigent patient population pursuant to a contract between it and Pasco County. In September, 1991, East Pasco filed its application for a certificate of need (CON) requesting approval for 24 additional medical-surgical beds (acute care beds) for the July, 1996, planning horizon. In January, 1992, the Agency notified East Pasco of its intent to approve the application and issue to East Pasco CON No. 6783. Humana filed this challenge to the Agency's intent to grant the application, and this proceeding ensued. All parties subsequently stipulated that Humana has standing to initiate and maintain this proceeding and that Humana was not obligated to present evidence of its standing. East Pasco has proposed a new unit to house the 24 additional medical- surgical beds to be located on the third floor of a new three-story tower. That third floor would consist of 13,000 gross square feet (GSF), would cost $4,087,810, and would consist of only private rooms with three nurse stations. East Pasco proposes no new services, only additional beds. Construction of the three-story tower has not yet commenced but is awaiting the outcome of this proceeding. The first floor of the new tower will be a wellness center, a project which did not require CON review. The second floor will house a new ICU. East Pasco presented conflicting evidence as to the size of that new ICU. The Agency approved East Pasco's second floor ICU as a 12-bed ICU with a cost below the threshold cost which would have required CON review. In spite of the exemption from review obtained by East Pasco, it is specifically found that East Pasco intends to place a 16-bed ICU on the second floor of the yet-to-be-constructed tower. Thus, East Pasco would achieve its 16-bed ICU by relocating its existing 8-bed ICU and converting other beds to ICU beds. Thus, if the 24 new beds sought are approved they will produce 16 additional medical-surgical beds and 8 additional ICU beds. Resolution of the number of beds proposed for the second floor of the new tower is required in this proceeding for two reasons. First, the cost of this project is impacted. If 8 of the new beds are to be used as ICU beds rather than as medical-surgical beds, they will be more expensive to construct and equip. Second, corporate approval of corporate projects is a prerequisite in Florida's CON process. East Pasco's Board of Directors met on August 14, 1991, to authorize the filing of this application. This application proposes 24 medical-surgical beds, the corporate resolution filed with the Agency authorized 24 acute care beds, but the minutes of the Board's meeting reflect that the Board itself approved 24 beds for ICU and PCU services. Although ICU, PCU, and medical-surgical beds are all acute care beds, they are constructed, equipped, and staffed differently. For the reasons described below, there is no need in District 5 or in the east Pasco County Subdistrict for East Pasco's proposed 24 additional medical-surgical beds. Rule 59C-1.038, Florida Administrative Code, includes the numeric need methodology for projecting acute care bed need. Under that Rule, applications for acute care beds will "not normally" be approved unless there is numeric need. For the September, 1991, application batching cycle, the Agency published a fixed need of zero acute care beds needed in District 5, Subdistrict 2, which is composed of only East Pasco and Humana hospitals. This fixed and published need of zero was not challenged. Per paragraph (7)(d) of the Rule, additional acute care beds will "not normally" be approved unless the subdistrict occupancy is at or exceeds 75 percent. All parties agree that calendar year 1990 is the proper period to ascertain whether this standard is met. In 1990, the acute care bed occupancy rate in the Subdistrict was 55.33 percent. The parties agree that the Rule's occupancy standard is not met. Therefore, no additional beds should normally be approved. There is ample unused capacity in District 5 and in the Subdistrict to meet acute care demand. Humana's occupancy is well below 50 percent. In years and 2 for the proposed unit, East Pasco projects 1,042 and 1,760 patient days, respectively. Humana has sufficient unused capacity to accommodate that projected demand. Utilization trends support the lack of need shown by the need methodology and the occupancy standard. Acute care utilization in the Subdistrict has decreased since 1986. In 1986, the two Subdistrict hospitals generated 42,830 patient days, a 57.2 percent occupancy. In 1991, notwithstanding population growth in the Subdistrict, the two Subdistrict hospitals generated 41,756 patient days, a 55.8 percent occupancy. Clearly, then, there is no increased demand for acute care services, but only a reshuffling of market share between the two hospitals. Contrary to East Pasco's suggestion, first quarter utilization does not show need and has, in fact, been decreasing. For example, the first quarter (January-March) of 1986 generated 13,572 patient days in the Subdistrict, a 73.6 percent occupancy; in the first quarter of 1992, there were 12,482 patient days, a 66.9 percent occupancy, the lowest first quarter utilization in the last 6 years in the Subdistrict. Additionally, the average length of stay (ALOS) in the Subdistrict continues to decline. In the first quarter of 1991, the ALOS was 5.4 days; in the first quarter of 1992, the ALOS was 5.1 days. Accordingly, although East Pasco shows an increased number of admissions over the last several years, the continued decline in the ALOS has resulted in a decreasing number of patient days. The population growth in the Subdistrict is not so substantial as to demonstrate need. Humana relied upon population projections produced by a national firm specializing in demographic analyses. Such a population data source is generally more reliable than a county's own projections, relied upon by East Pasco. The Subdistrict is growing but not at an extraordinary pace. In comparison, the West Pasco Subdistrict is growing faster. There are no geographic access problems to receiving acute care services which would support a finding of need. There are many hospitals available and accessible to residents of the Subdistrict within 30 minutes travel time or less. The entire Subdistrict is within a 30-minute travel time of Humana and of East Pasco. Most of the Subdistrict is also within 30 minutes travel time to other acute care hospitals, including University Community Hospital in Tampa, Lakeland Regional Medical Center in Lakeland, and South Florida Baptist Hospital in Plant City. The Zephyrhills area in particular is within 30 minutes travel time to those other facilities. Humana is an available alternative to the proposed project. Humana is geographically accessible to the entire Subdistrict, provides all the services that East Pasco provides, and provides good quality of care. Humana's medical staff roster includes the same physicians that practice at East Pasco. Humana already serves the same geographic service area that East Pasco serves. Indeed, several East Pasco witnesses testified that patients are transferred to Humana when East Pasco is full, thereby acknowledging Humana as an alternative for Subdistrict residents. Hospitals situated outside the Subdistrict are also available and appropriate alternatives to the proposed project. These hospitals have unused capacity to accommodate the projected demand from the Subdistrict. Notably, residents of the Subdistrict have historically greatly utilized hospitals located outside the Subdistrict. In 1990, 63.7 percent of the Subdistrict's residents went to a hospital other than Humana or East Pasco. Thus, physicians and residents regard hospitals situated outside the Subdistrict as appropriate and viable alternatives. Since East Pasco does not propose to offer any new service, and since there is accessible unused capacity at Humana and these other facilities, there are better alternatives to adding new beds at East Pasco. In addition, although approving more beds at East Pasco would improve availability of services at East Pasco, such is not a planning consideration or a review criterion. East Pasco and Humana provide similar levels of Medicaid care. In calendar year 1991, Medicaid comprised 8.8 percent of all patient days at East Pasco, less than in 1990. From September, 1991, to August, 1992, 8.8 percent of all patient days at Humana were Medicaid days. The two hospitals also provide similar amounts of indigent care. Therefore, Humana is economically accessible to all residents of the Subdistrict. Facilities located outside the Subdistrict also are economically accessible. Physician preferences are not significant in formulating conclusions of need on a District or Subdistrict basis. Physicians may well have their own reasons for doing things which may be contrary to sound health care planning principles. Further, physicians' personal preferences are not relevant to ascertaining how existing resources can be best and most efficiently used. The acute care bed Rule provides that additional beds "may" be approved at a specific facility if its occupancy exceeds 75 percent even though no beds can be authorized pursuant to the mathematical calculations established by the Rule. While East Pasco achieved an occupancy rate of 78.78 percent in calendar year 1990, that statistic merely "opens the door" for an evaluation of whether there are compelling circumstances to justify the approval of beds at a specific facility despite the absence of need demonstrated by the acute bed methodology. There are no factors or circumstances which would justify the approval of 24 additional medical-surgical beds at East Pasco pursuant to the specific facility provision. First, there are accessible and available alternatives for meeting projected demand. The majority of east Pasco County residents outmigrate even when beds are available at East Pasco. There is an excess capacity in the Subdistrict and in the District. Second, East Pasco's application discusses seasonal overcrowding due, in large part, to using in-patient beds for "observation" patients. Observation patients are those with a hospital stay of less than 24 hours. East Pasco has recently completed a new 10-bed observation unit. In 1991, East Pasco averaged observation patients per day; therefore, this new 10-bed unit will ease the strain on East Pasco's in-patient beds. Third, East Pasco's application relies on the "overflow" of patients in the winter season to justify its proposed bed addition. The actual amount of "overflow" is reflected in East Pasco's transfer log, which shows that there were not that many patients transferred in 1991. In fact, there were several months in which there were zero transfers. Fourth, the proposed beds are only intended to handle "seasonal" population demands. The proposed unit would not be open year-round. East Pasco was below 75 percent occupancy from May to October, 1991. East Pasco acknowledges that the proposed beds are only for part of the year and are intended to accommodate the demands of the seasonal population, who are not necessarily residents of the Subdistrict. East Pasco's application in reality requests approval for adding 24 beds at a cost of over $4,000,000 to accommodate, by East Pasco's own projections, an average daily census of three patients the first year and five patients the second year in a unit that would be closed at least six months out of each year. That is an excessive expenditure to provide access to relatively few people, where access to nearby facilities exists. Although East Pasco has shown that on certain days it has exceeded its OB capacity, and although East Pasco maintains that its most common capacity problem is the lack of available ICU beds, East Pasco's application itself does not suggest that it intends to increase the number of OB or ICU beds. Further, although on certain days East Pasco has experienced over 100 percent occupancy and has placed patients in the hallways, that situation can be obviated by referring patients to other hospitals, and the situation will be alleviated when East Pasco soon opens its additional 10-bed observation unit and 11-bed SNU. East Pasco has, therefore, shown that it has an occupancy rate sufficient to entitle it to review despite the lack of need under the acute care bed Rule, but it has shown no other reasons why its application should be approved. The Florida State Health Plan includes various preferences for reviewing CON applications. On balance, the East Pasco application is not consistent with that Plan. The first group of preferences relates to the addition of hospital beds. The first item in that group provides that no additional beds should generally be approved unless the subdistrict occupancy is at or exceeds 75 percent or unless the applicant-facility is at 80 percent. Since calendar year 1990 data was used to calculate the need formula and Subdistrict occupancy standard, it is appropriate to use that same data to determine East Pasco's occupancy for evaluating this preference, rather than using two different time periods as the Agency did. In 1990, the Subdistrict was below 75 percent, and East Pasco's occupancy was below 80 percent. Therefore, this preference is not met. The second item under this group provides that "in the event that acute care bed need is shown", preference shall be given to an applicant who provides a disproportionate share of Medicaid and indigent services in the Subdistrict. This preference is not met since no "acute care bed need is shown". The next group of preferences is entitled "transfer and conversion of acute care beds". Because East Pasco does not propose to transfer or convert acute care beds, East Pasco does not satisfy any of the preferences included under this grouping. The next group of preferences is entitled "indigent care". The first item provides that preference shall be given to an applicant who provides a disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care in relation to other hospitals in the District or Subdistrict. This preference is not met. Although East Pasco has historically provided more Medicaid and indigent care than Humana, there is no showing that East Pasco will provide disproportionately more Medicaid and indigent care for medical-surgical services specifically. Most of East Pasco's Medicaid participation is for OB and newborn services, not medical- surgical services. Both Humana and East Pasco provide less than 1 percent of their gross revenues for indigent care. Given that most of the Subdistrict population is elderly, indigent care is not a major issue. Also, it was stipulated that East Pasco does not know how much indigent care it provides for medical-surgical services only. The second item under this group relates to whether CON approval would negatively affect the financial viability of a disproportionate share hospital. This preference is not relevant to East Pasco's application. The third group of preferences is entitled "emergency services". The first item relates to the applicant's record of accepting indigent patients for emergency care. East Pasco presented no information on this in its application except for its proof that it has a contractual obligation to do so. The second item relates to whether the facility/applicant is a trauma center. East Pasco is not a designated trauma center. The third item relates to whether the applicant demonstrates a full range of emergency services. East Pasco did not address this in its application. The fourth item addresses whether the facility has ever been fined by HRS for violations of emergency services statutes. East Pasco did not address this item in its application. Therefore, East Pasco does not meet the preferences in this group. The fourth group of preferences is entitled "teaching, research, and referral hospitals". The application does not address these particular preferences, and East Pasco does not hold itself out as a teaching, research or referral hospital. Therefore, East Pasco does not satisfy the items under this grouping. The fifth group of preferences is entitled "specialized services". East Pasco does not propose to provide any specialized services and, therefore, items under this grouping are not satisfied. The District 5 Local Health Plan includes recommendations for reviewing CON applications. On balance, the East Pasco application does not satisfy that plan. The first preference relates to whether the applicant provides a disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care. For the reasons indicated above regarding the State Health Plan, this preference is not met. Further, East Pasco's application does not suggest that the 24 medical-surgical beds sought will enhance its Medicaid or indigent participation. The second recommendation provides that "if a numeric bed need exists as shown by the state bed methodology", preference is given to an applicant who has generated certain occupancy levels. Because no numeric bed need was shown per the Rule methodology, this recommendation is not met. The third recommendation relates to the transfer of existing acute care beds. Because East Pasco does not propose a transfer of beds, its application is not consistent with this recommendation. The fourth recommendation gives preference to applicants who document the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of their project. East Pasco does not satisfy this preference. East Pasco failed to show any cost efficiencies for its project. East Pasco proposes to spend over $4 million to serve, on the average, 3 to 5 patients per day in years 1 and 2. That is cost-inefficient. East Pasco did not prove that the charges or costs of providing medical-surgical services would be any less than what it currently charges. East Pasco's application includes two pro formas: a hospital-wide pro forma and an incremental pro forma for the proposed 24-bed unit. The person who prepared those pro formas did not testify, and the person who did testify did not participate in preparing the pro formas. Further, the witness only testified to the reasonableness of the incremental pro forma; he did not testify, directly or indirectly, regarding the hospital-wide pro forma. An incremental pro forma alone does not demonstrate long-term financial feasibility, even if the incremental pro forma were reasonable. An incremental pro forma alone does not reflect the project as a whole. At East Pasco, there are several projects and activities on-going or planned that must be evaluated. In addition to the existing 85 beds, East Pasco has underway: (1) opening a 10-bed observation unit; (2) opening an 11-bed SNU; (3) a planned wellness center on the first floor of the proposed 3-story tower; and (4) the planned relocation and enlargement of its ICU to the second floor of the proposed tower. Those projects add expenses, put strains on cash, and require debt. Without considering all the activity at the hospital, one cannot reasonably ascertain whether the proposed $4.1 Million third-floor project is financially feasible. For example, a small project could show an incremental profit but the hospital as a whole could lose money. East Pasco simply assumes that its 24-bed unit will be financially feasible in 1994 and 1995, years 1 and 2 of the project. The health care field is too dynamic and volatile for such assumptions. For example, East Pasco had an operating loss in 1990 but did well in 1991. By not analyzing the hospital-wide pro forma and proving its reasonableness, East Pasco did not show the required financial feasibility. It only demonstrated the results of one component of an entire operation. East Pasco has left unanswered the question of whether the facility as a whole will be able to finance this project in conjunction with all its other requirements. Further, the application lacked sufficient and clear presentation of the assumptions underlying the hospital-wide pro forma. Restated, the hospital-wide pro forma is not self-explanatory. The incremental pro forma, showing the proposed revenues and expenses for the 24-bed medical-surgical unit for years 1994 and 1995, is not reasonable. The projected revenues are overstated, and the projected expenses are understated. The assumptions underlying the financial projections are unreasonable. Further, the profit projections are unrealistic; in year two, East Pasco projects a profit of about $615,000 on an average daily census of less than 5 patients per day. On its face, that is unrealistic. In 1991, East Pasco generated 24,517 patient days, which was virtually the same as its 1990 utilization. In 1993, East Pasco projects 26,220 days. In year 1 of this project (1994), East Pasco projects 27,262 days hospital-wide, including the 1,042 incremental days associated with this project. Thus, in just a 3-year period, East Pasco projects almost 3,000 additional patient days, and even more for year 2 (1995). It is not reasonable to assume such an increase in utilization since utilization during the first quarter of 1992 declined from first quarter 1991. Therefore, patient day projections are overstated, thereby causing overstated projected gross revenue. East Pasco's projected daily charge is based on the hospital-wide average charge. It is not based on historical charges for medical-surgical services specifically. It is unreasonable to use charges for hospital services as a whole when the proposed project is for medical-surgical services only. Because the underlying assumption is invalid, projected revenues lack credibility. In calculating deductions from gross revenues, East Pasco assumed the hospital-wide payor mix and did not specifically ascertain the payor mix (and, therefore, the deductions) for medical-surgical services specifically. Again, this is an unreasonable assumption. Deductions from gross revenue should have been analyzed for medical-surgical services specifically. Due to the invalid assumption, the deductions from revenue figures lack credibility. East Pasco projects 5.8 FTEs for year 1 and 6.0 FTEs for year 2. East Pasco proposes to operate the 24-bed unit as an independent unit. These staffing levels are insufficient. East Pasco's proposed utilization equates to a 4.8 average daily census, which requires two nurses at all times. By East Pasco's admission, to staff a unit with two persons at all times throughout the year requires 9.2 paid nursing FTEs in addition to ward clerks and other support personnel. If the volume fluctuated and the census exceeded 7 or 8, more than two nurses would be needed. Thus, the 5.8 and the 6.0 FTE numbers are too low. The proposed staffing does not allow one RN to be on the floor at all times. To maintain one RN on the floor at all times throughout the year requires 4.2 FTEs; East Pasco budgeted for one. East Pasco does not have excess RNs available from its existing staff to cover the proposed addition. The supplies expense shown on the incremental pro forma was based on a hospital-wide average. The proposed project is for a specific service, and one cannot reasonably use a hospital-wide average instead. Accordingly, the calculation of expense for supplies is not reasonable. The pro forma includes an expense item entitled "other". East Pasco offered no explanation for that expense. Also, the pro forma did not include a line-item for the HCCCB indigent care tax, which is 1.5 percent of net revenue. East Pasco's proposed 24-bed medical-surgical unit will cover 13,000 GSF and will cost more than $4.1 million. All rooms will be private. The unit will have three nurse stations. According to East Pasco, the unit is to be a basic medical-surgical floor and is not intended to be a progressive care unit (PCU). This proposed design is not reasonable and is excessively large by at least 30 percent. This design is inefficient and, in reality, is not the design of a basic medical-surgical unit, but is instead the design of a PCU. There are three main reasons why the design is excessive. First, it is not necessary or reasonable to have all private rooms. A regular medical- surgical unit should have about an equal split of semi-private rooms. Notably, East Pasco's new 11-bed SNU has 5 private and 3 semi-private rooms for patients who will require hospitalization for up to 90 days. Second, these private rooms are almost twice the minimum size required by state licensure regulations. Third, three nurse stations are unnecessary; only one nurse station is needed for a basic 24-bed medial-surgical unit. East Pasco currently has 68 medical- surgical beds on 2 units, and each such unit has only 1 nurse station. The existing 68 medical-surgical beds at East Pasco average about 360 GSF per bed. The proposed 24 beds will average 542 GSF per bed. All private rooms and 3 nurse stations are, clearly, the design for a PCU. A PCU is a step- down unit from an ICU, which has high staff-to-patient ratios thereby requiring more nurse stations. East Pasco's projected construction cost for the 24-bed medical- surgical unit is $142.91 per GSF. This is unreasonably understated. It is uncontroverted that an SNU is less costly to construct than a medical-surgical unit. According to its projections, East Pasco's 11-bed SNU cost $171 per GSF in 1992. Clearly, that SNU cost is substantially greater than East Pasco's projected construction cost at issue. This inconsistency was never explained by competent evidence. In evaluating East Pasco's estimates, the Agency's architect relied upon 1991 Means construction cost data. He averaged the Means' medium figure ($123 per GSF) with the high figure ($172 per GSF) to derive a 1991 estimate of $147.50 per GSF. To that, one must add a 10 percent contingency factor, inflation, and an architectural fee. That totals $187.69 per GSF. The $187.69 projected figure is consistent with the 1992 SNU cost figure of $171. Thus, for construction costs alone, East Pasco underestimated by $44.77 per square foot, which is about $582,000. East Pasco proposed to construct a three-story tower; the third floor will house the proposed 24 medical-surgical beds. The second floor will house a 16-bed ICU, comprised of relocating the existing 8 ICU beds and converting 8 other acute care beds. East Pasco's application project costs only cover the third floor; East Pasco maintains the second floor is exempt from CON review and thus its cost is not relevant. As described below, East Pasco unreasonably failed to include costs of the second floor in its application. A hospital project costing $1,000,000 or more (other than an out- patient project) requires CON review. In its letter for exemption East Pasco states that the second floor would contain 12 ICU beds and cost $975,000 (calculated by multiplying 6,500 GSF by $150/foot). That letter is erroneous for several reasons: (1) the $150/foot is in 1992 dollars and does not include inflation; (2) the $150/foot does not include a 10 percent construction contingency fee, which is necessary and reasonable; (3) the $150/foot does not include an 8.4 percent architectural/engineering fee, which is necessary and reasonable; and (4) the $150/foot does not include any debt or financing fee. Including these necessary amounts alone shows that the second floor, in truth, exceeds the $1,000,000 threshold. Also, the cost for equipping an ICU bed is $45,000 per bed; for 16 beds, that is $720,000 for equipment. Surely the size and cost of a 16-bed ICU is different from and greater than a 12-bed ICU. East Pasco stated in its exemption request letter that the second floor would have 12 beds even though East Pasco intends 16 beds. East Pasco and the Agency correctly argue that the exemption given to East Pasco by the Agency for its second-floor ICU project is not part of the instant application and cannot be considered in this proceeding. However, the accuracy and reasonableness of the costs projected by East Pasco attendant to the 24 additional beds it seeks are an integral part of this proceeding, as is the scope of the project being reviewed and challenged. The second and third floor projects are, in truth, one project. It is East Pasco's intention to add 16 medical-surgical beds and 8 ICU beds to its facility. To establish the 16-bed ICU unit, East Pasco needs additional acute care beds; East Pasco does not have 8 available beds among its existing bed complement to convert to ICU purposes. The OB beds often run at 100 percent occupancy and, during the peak season, the medical-surgical beds run high occupancy. Thus, East Pasco cannot fully implement the second floor without approval of the proposed 24 new beds. There will be no community benefits in terms of charges if this application is approved. "Net revenues" must be the basis for comparing charges between facilities. Net revenues refers to what third party payors (such as Medicare, Medicaid, HMO/PPOs and most insurors) actually pay for hospital services as opposed to what hospitals charge. Few patients ever pay gross charges, particularly in the elderly East Pasco Subdistrict. In 1991, Humana's average net revenue per day was lower than East Pasco's. Humana's actual net revenue per admission in its fiscal year 1992 was $4,180. East Pasco's projected 1992 net revenue per admission is $5,301. Thus, for 1992, third party payors paid, on behalf of their patients, less per admission at Humana than at East Pasco. In its application, East Pasco projects an 8 percent per year increase in charges. An annual increase of 8 percent is not promoting charge-efficiency. East Pasco's application did not demonstrate cost-efficiencies resulting from approval, but rather, cost-inefficiencies. First, Humana would lose patient volume should East Pasco be approved. Humana currently receives transfers and direct admissions when East Pasco is full. Loss of patient volume would increase operating costs per patient day at Humana. Second, there is no need for additional beds in the Subdistrict. There is already excess capacity in the Subdistrict. Exacerbating excess capacity promotes cost-inefficiency. East Pasco admits the unit will not even be open six months out of the year because there is no need for it then. Third, East Pasco projects very low census in years 1 and 2, about 3 patients per day in year 1 and less than 5 patients per day in year 2. Spending over $4,000,000 to accommodate such low utilization is inefficient and unreasonable. Approval of East Pasco's application would not promote positive competition. There is competition now in the Subdistrict between Humana and East Pasco. East Pasco already captures a larger market share of the Subdistrict than Humana. Approving this application would only tip the scales more in favor of East Pasco and would adversely impact Humana's already poor financial condition. The quality of care delivered at Humana is very good. The JCAHO rates all acute care hospitals, and its rating is widely recognized in the hospital industry. The JCAHO evaluates many factors and components of a hospital. Humana is accredited "with commendation", the highest rating given. Only 5-6 percent of all acute care hospital in the country receive that highest ranking. Humana maintains a good utilization management program. Humana implements an excellent quality improvement plan, including soliciting and reviewing patient satisfaction comments. Mortality statistics cannot, by themselves, meaningfully measure the quality of care delivered at a hospital. Although the Health Care Finance Administration (HCFA) produces such a report for Medicare patients, the report itself represents that it is not intended to measure quality of care, and the American Hospital Association does not view HCFA mortality statistics as a measure of quality of care. There are many factors which influence mortality statistics at a hospital and, even more importantly, mortality is only one clinical outcome resulting from a hospital admission. When East Pasco is full, there is no medical problem or complication resulting from transferring patients to Humana or from directly admitting patients at Humana. There is no diminution of care or loss of continuity of care in transferring to or directly admitting to Humana. Emergency medical services are available in the Subdistrict, and, therefore, transfer is not a problem. Also, driving to Humana or to a hospital outside the Subdistrict is neither a problem nor an unusual circumstance. The large seasonal population drive to Florida in the winter, and, therefore, it is a mobile patient population. Most of its residents seeking hospital services receive them outside the Subdistrict. Subdistrict residents currently leave the Subdistrict to receive a variety of hospital services, including: in-patient cardiac cath, open heart surgery, Level II NICU, psychiatric services, substance abuse services, and comprehensive rehabilitation services. Thus, there is no merit to the suggestion that transferring patients from East Pasco to Humana or elsewhere is problematic. There would not be community benefits regarding Medicaid/indigent care by approving this application. As indicated, for all hospital services, Humana and East Pasco provide similar amounts of Medicaid and indigent care, although indigent care at both facilities is relatively insignificant. Therefore, access to Medicaid and indigent care does not provide a basis for approving East Pasco's application. Also, East Pasco's payor mix in its application was based on hospital-wide averages. East Pasco has not shown the amount of Medicaid or indigent care which would be specifically provided to, or which is needed for, medical-surgical patients. Finally, East Pasco's Policy and Procedure Manual includes several provisions requiring deposits upon in-patient admission absent verification of third party payor coverage. Such provisions are inconsistent with the proposition that East Pasco accepts all patients regardless of ability to pay. In Florida, an application for a CON must include a certified copy of an authorizing resolution of the applicant's Board of Directors. East Pasco included its corporate resolution in its CON application, that resolution being adopted at an August 14, 1991, meeting. That resolution clearly states, among other things, authorization to file an application for up to 24 additional acute care beds. The minutes of that meeting clearly reflect the Board's approval for 24 beds for ICU and PCU. The application itself requests approval of 24 medical-surgical beds. PCU, ICU, and medical-surgical beds are all types of acute care beds. Accordingly, East Pasco did file a proper corporate resolution consistent with the minutes and consistent with the application. The minutes and the application, however, are inconsistent. Although the corporation resolution is technically correct and fulfills the requirements for a CON application, the inconsistency among the corporate resolution, the minutes, and the application raised questions about the actual intent of East Pasco. The intent became more questionable during the final hearing when East Pasco's witnesses contradicted each other as to the number of beds to be placed in the to-be-constructed ICU on the second floor of the to-be-constructed 3-story tower. It is clear that the Agency only approved the construction of a 12-bed ICU on the second floor. It is also clear that East Pasco in fact intends to construct a 16-bed ICU on that second floor. It is also clear that East Pasco intends to construct a "medical-surgical" unit on the third floor in accordance with a design for a PCU. While the corporate resolution technically complies with the requirements for a CON application, the questionable nature of its accuracy, when considered in conjunction with the conflicting evidence of the scope of this project, raises concern as to East Pasco's projections regarding revenue, expenses, staffing, and the actual services to be made available in the Subdistrict. The lack of clarity as to East Pasco's proposal is a compelling reason to deny East Pasco's application. East Pasco's occupancy rate is quite high. It is higher even during the "peak season," i.e., November through April. The projections contained in East Pasco's application are based upon the historic high occupancy rate experienced at East Pasco. Those projections, however, do not take into account, nor did the Agency consider in reviewing East Pasco's application, the fact that East Pasco now has more than the 85 beds which formed the basis for its historic occupancy rate and its projections related to this project. Construction has been completed on the 10-bed observation unit and the 11-bed SNU. East Pasco already has an expanded capacity in place which should alleviate some of its occupancy problems. For example, East Pasco has experienced an increased number of out-patient observation days. With its new observation unit, the beds previously used for observation days are now available for in-patients which, in turn, will likely alleviate East Pasco's most common capacity problem-the lack of available ICU beds. Similarly, the SNU beds will also be available for in-patients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying East Pasco's application for Certificate of Need No. 6783. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 92-1497 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-32, 34-82, and 84-96 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 83 has been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 33 and 97 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. The Agency's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-6, 8, 13, 14, 27, 28, 31-33, 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 47, 49, 51, and 90 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. The Agency's proposed findings of fact numbered 20, 21, 34, 45, 52, 54, 56-58, 68, 71, 73, 82, and 89 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. The Agency's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or a conclusion of law. The Agency's proposed findings of fact numbered 7, 9, 19, 26, 48, 59, 61, 62, and 64 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration herein. The Agency's proposed finding of fact numbered 46 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues involved in this proceeding. The Agency's proposed findings of fact numbered 10-12, 15-18, 22-25, 29, 30, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 50, 53, 55, 60, 63, 65-67, 69, 70, 72, 74-81, 83-88, and 91-93 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible, competent evidence in this cause. East Pasco's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5-7, 10, 13, 16- 18, 20, 22-24, 37, 38, 40, 45, 46, 48, 62, 63, 66-69, 73, 78, 79, 81, 82, 85, 89, 118, 119, 131, 135, 140, 174, 178-180, and 192 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. East Pasco's proposed findings of fact numbered 15, 25, 26, 55, 56, 70, 83, 90, 92, 94, 95, 100, 121, 127-129, 145, 146, 163, 164, 171-173, 176, 177, 184-189, 191, and 194 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues herein. East Pasco's proposed findings of fact numbered 19, 87, and 88 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting recitation of the testimony, argument of counsel, or conclusions of law. East Pasco's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 8, 9, 11, 12, 14, 21, 30, 31, 33-36, 39, 41, 51, 61, 86, 96-98, 102, 103, 105, and 154 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration herein. East Pasco's proposed finding of fact numbered 84 has been rejected as being subordinate to the issues involved in this proceeding. East Pasco's proposed findings of fact numbered 27-29, 32, 42-44, 47, 49, 50, 52-54, 57-60, 64, 65, 71, 72, 74-77, 80, 91, 93, 99, 101, 104, 106-117, 120, 122-126, 130, 132-134, 136-139, 141-144, 147-153, 155-162, 165-170, 175, 181-183, 190, and 193 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible, competent evidence in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward G. Labrador, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 James C. Hauser, Esquire Messer, Vickers, Caparello, Madsen, Lewis, Goldman & Metz Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Darrell White, Esquire William Wiley, Esquire McFarlain, Wiley, Cassedy & Jones 215 South Monroe Street Suite 600 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Procedural background: Petitioner, COMMUNITY DIALYSIS CENTERS, INC., d/b/a COMMUNITY DIALYSIS SERVICES OF LAKELAND (CDC), owns and operates a 16- station outpatient kidney dialysis facility in Lakeland, Florida. On February 14, 1984, Respondent, WATSON CLINIC (WATSON), received a certificate of need to operate a four-station outpatient kidney dialysis center in Lakeland, Florida, CON No. 2916, from the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES (HRS). Petitioner contests the grant of this certificate of need as an existing provider. Timely notice of the final hearing was issued June 26, 1984, and the final hearing was held as stated above. WATSON presented the testimony of Spero Moutsatos, Dudley Towne, Franklin L. Smith, Carter Fitzgerald, Joy Harrison, Nell Boutwell, Eugene DeBerry (by deposition), Sandra Biller, Dr. James Whitfield, John Dowless, Robert L. Mayer, Don Morris, Marilyn Neff, and Dr. Henry M. Haire. HRS presented the testimony of Ed Carter. CDC presented the testimony of Elaine Feegel, Jan Graff, and Michael Sullivan. CDC presented seven exhibits which were received into evidence, HRS had one exhibit, and WATSON presented into evidence 27 exhibits. The parties stipulated that subparagraphs 6, 7, 10, and 11 of Section 381.494(6)(c), Fla.Stat., are not applicable to this case, but that subparagraphs 1 through 5, 8, 9, 12, and 13 are in dispute in this proceeding. WATSON seeks a certificate of need to provide kidney dialysis for end- state renal disease (ESRD) patients in the western portion of Polk County, District 8, and particularly in the vicinity of Lakeland, Florida. WATSON's proposal would also include training for home hemodialysis and chronic ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD). WATSON originally applied for ten dialysis stations, HRS Exhibit 1, but amended its application at the hearing to four stations. WATSON Exhibit 14, hereinafter W. Exhibit 14. The area in which WATSON seeks to provide services is now served primarily by the 16 dialysis stations operated by CDC. ESRD patients must either successfully dialyze, obtain a successful kidney transplant, or they will die. Evidence as to need was provided by Spero Moutsatos, Executive Director of the Florida End-Stage Renal Disease Network 19. Network 19 was established in August 1977 as a part of a national network established by Congress, administered by the Health Care Financing Administration. Network 19 gathers data in Florida regarding End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) patients, provides data and projections of ESRD dialysis need to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), assists patients and professionals with information, serves as an ombudsman for patient complaints, and monitors and evaluates the quality of care delivered in dialysis facilities. Network 19 did two evaluations of need with respect to the WATSON proposal, WATSON Exhibits 1 and 2. In the last three years, following the growth in availability generally of renal dialysis facilities in Florida, Network 19 has considered need on the basis of sub-areas within a District in about 75 percent of the cases considered. As of September 1, 1984, most of the ESRD patients residing in Polk County were dialyzing at CDC in Lakeland. CDC Lakeland provided services for 51 patients and one home patient, while the remainder (10 in-clinic patients and 16 home dialysis patients) were treated at Lakeland Regional Medical Center, CDC Winter Haven, CDC Tampa, and BMA of Orlando (one patient). WATSON Exhibit 2. Dialysis often leaves a patient feeling very weak at the end of the dialysis session. Dialysis in-clinic is required at least three times each week and takes about four hours. Emergency services are needed nearby since on occasion a dialysis patient will become unconscious and need immediate attention and hospitalization. Patients needing dialysis frequently are not employed or underemployed and do not have money for extensive travel for dialysis. Based upon the zip code analysis in WATSON Exhibit 2 and the testimony of patients, the appropriate service area for consideration of the need for dialysis facilities in this case is at a minimum in Polk County, and more appropriately, the vicinity of Lakeland. While some Lakeland area patients in the past drove all the way to Tampa for in-center dialysis, this is not a suitable alternative. Only CDC Lakeland and CDC Winter Haven adequately provide in-center dialysis to persons living in the Polk County and Lakeland areas. Lakeland Regional Memorial Center does not provide in-center dialysis, but only provides services for chronic ambulatory peritoneal dialysis (CAPD) Rule 10-5.11(18), F.A.C., establishes the methodology applicable in this case for determining need for chronic renal dialysis facilities. This rule sets forth the method to project the number of patients who will need dialysis one year from the date the application is deemed complete. The number of dialysis stations needed is then computed by using an 80 percent use rate for each station. The rule provides that each station at 100 percent use can dialyze four patients, assuming two shifts, six days each week. (Each patient dialyzes three times during the week.) Evening or third shifts are not counted as a part of capacity. The 80 percent use rate results in a capacity of 3.2 patients per station. The record evidence reflects that 80 percent is a reasonable level of use to set as a maximum justifying additional stations. The 20 percent additional capacity is needed for transient patient dialysis during the winter season, to account for repairs and maintenance on machines, and to provide some leeway when there are staffing problems. The net number of new stations needed is then computed by dividing the number of projected patients by 3.2 stations and subtracting from this the number of existing stations. The use rates for the two in-center dialysis facilities in the Lakeland area for the most recent quarter prior to the hearing show that facilities in the area are over the threshold for expansion: Utilization Month Rate (percent) CDC Lakeland July 1984 78 August 1984 81 September 1984 81 CDC Winter Haven July 1984 85 August 1984 87 September 1984 88 The evidence indicates that the above rates are not unusual, but reflect an upward trend in the area. In 1983, CDC Lakeland operated at an average of 76.5 percent, and CDC Winter Haven operated at 77 percent of its capacity. Network 19 projects a need by September 1, 1985, for six additional in-center dialysis stations for Polk County, and seven additional stations for the Lakeland sub-area. These calculations are explained in WATSON Exhibit 2 and the testimony of Mr. Moutsatos, transcript pages 68-72. The methodology for these projections is to take the ESRD patient census from Net work 19 records as of September 1, 1984, for the particular area, subtract the number of actual home dialysis patients on that date, add the number of patients projected for the area as new patients by September 1, 1985, calculated using 116 new patients per one million of projected population, subtract the number of these new patients expected to go on home dialysis, subtract the projected number of kidney transplants for the coming year, add back 25 percent of these transplant patients as transplant failures, subtract projected deaths of patients, and add back the number of patients on home dialysis which must return for in center dialysis. The final number is the number of patients expected to need in-center dialysis by September 1, 1985. Then, using 3.2 patients as the optimum per station, the number of stations projected as needed by that date, less the existing number, yields the projected net need. These projections of need followed the formula set forth in the rule. Moreover, there was no evidence that the assumptions or data underlying the above methodology was unreasonable, inaccurate, and for any other reason unreliable. Based upon the evidence, there is in fact a need for six in-center kidney dialysis stations for Polk County by September 1, 1985, and a need for seven stations by the same time for the Lakeland sub-area. Polk County is the only county in Florida where all in center dialysis facilities are owned by one owner. That owner is Community Dialysis Centers, Inc., CDC. CDC also owns the only other somewhat near facility in Plant City. Of the 97 patients using in-center dialysis in Polk County on September 1, 1984, 54 percent of these (52 patients) were using CDC in Lakeland. Home dialysis and CAPD are two alternatives to dialysis in-center. These alternatives for certain patients are more desirable due to the greater freedom afforded by these methods. Training and continued assistance, however, is needed to allow use of these methods. CDC Lakeland has not in the last few years provided adequately in this area. CDC's current home training nurse, unit administrator Elaine Feegel, lives in Tampa and must commute to Lakeland each day, thus making it more difficult for her to provide home training. Ms. Feegel further has not been able to provide home training because she has been so busy trying to correct problems at the CDC Lakeland facility. In addition to the lack of home training, the evidence showed that for significant periods of time in the past few years the ESRD patients who have had to use the CDC Lakeland facility as their only reasonable source of dialysis have been subjected to seriously inadequate, and at times, dangerous health care. Several patients who now dialyze at CDC Lakeland, and who have used that facility for several years, testified to the quality of care received. The facility was initially named Kidneycare, and was not opened or operated by CDC. In late 1980 or sometime in 1981, CDC bought Kidneycare and took over the management of the facility. (The precise date was not established by competent non-hearsay evidence, but is irrelevant.) At some time after patients became aware that CDC was managing the Lakeland unit, the quality of care began to decline. The quality of care when the unit was operated as Kidneycare was adequate. Joy Harrison is a resident of Lakeland, Florida, and has depended upon kidney dialysis since 1978 to stay alive. She moved to Lakeland, Florida, in 1981. She is 41 years old and has two children, 12 and 8 years of age. Ms. Harrison dialyzed at CDC from March 29, 1981, until June 1984 when she went on CAPD. Dr. Haire has been her physician since 1981. Her testimony concerned the quality of health care at CDC from 1981 until June 1984. Ms. Harrison testified to the following regarding the quality of care at CDC, all of which were unrebutted and is found to be true: Another patient was dialyzing at the station immediately next to Ms. Harrison. Ms. Harrison, who was then being disconnected from her dialyzer at the end of her session, noticed that the other patient was getting sick. She told the CDC employee on duty. Ms. Harrison had to tell the employee three times, and still the employee failed to respond, continuing to work on disconnecting Ms. Harrison from her dialyzer. By this time, the adjacent patient had passed out and began vomiting. When CDC staff finally responded, it took 20 minutes to revive her. CDC staff failed to turn on the air bubble detector on another occasion when Mrs. Harrison as dialyzing. Air got into the lines. The air bubble came within three inches of entering Ms. Harrison's body when CDC staff stopped it. (The distance is the estimate of the Hearing Officer observing the witness indicate the distance.) Had the air bubble entered her blood stream, it may have killed her. CDC staff failed to observe or record the correct number of bags of saline solution that is normally to be given to a patient at the end of the dialyzing session to restore the correct balance of fluid and weight, and ended up giving her two bags too many. Ms. Harrison got very sick as a result. On another occasion, there was only one nurse on the floor. Ms. Harrison was dialyzing, and her feet began to cramp. Saline solution at times must be injected when cramps occur to prevent cramping. Ms. Harrison called out to the nurse, who was talking on the telephone, to tell her she was cramping and needed saline solution. The nurse continued to talk. A few minutes went by and the pain of the cramps got worse. Again, Ms. Harrison called to the nurse for help. The nurse continued to talk on the telephone. The cramps worsened, and Ms. Harrison's hands started to cramp, and she was in much pain. She then told the nurse that if she did not get off the phone and help, she (Ms. Harrison) was going to pull the dialyzing lines out by herself. The dialyzing lines are inserted into Ms. Harrison's arms with two 16-gauge needles. The nurse finally came to assist her. Ms. Harrison could hear the nurse's conversation on the telephone as she was cramping, and the nurse was "laughing and joking on the phone to somebody." (This testimony is not hearsay, but is admissible as proof of what Ms. Harrison heard, not for the truth of what the nurse said on the phone.) During the dialyzing process, nurses each hour are supposed to take blood pressure, weight, and temperature to insure that the patient's system remains stabilized during the otherwise rather intrusive and disruptive process of having all of their blood circulating outside their body to be cleansed. Nurses at CDC frequently failed to check these vital signs when Ms. Harrison was dialyzing for two and three hours at a stretch. Ms. Harrison later checked her medical record and discovered that weights and blood pressures would be recorded at hourly intervals when in fact no one at CDC had actually observed and taken these readings at these times. On other occasions she was given 5 percent extra saline solution, but CDC staff failed to record this in the record. Someone else came along and read the chart and tried to give her another dose of 5 percent saline solution. Ms. Harrison stopped her. When Ms. Harrison first dialyzed at the Lakeland facility, it was in good location near the hospital. Shortly thereafter, while under the ownership of CDC, it was moved to a small shopping center. The location, as will be discussed in additional findings ahead, was undesirable for two reasons: the outside was trashy, and alcoholics and transients hung around the parking lot and rear of the facility. ESRD patients who must dialyze to remain alive depend upon the continued health of special grafts that are placed in their arms or legs which provide access for the dialyzing needles three times each week. Ms. Harrison lost her arm graft apparently due to the negligence of CDC staff in the insertion of the needle or use of a needle with a burr on it. (Additional findings have been made ahead as to the substantial likelihood that the injury was caused by a needle with a burr on it.) On the day of the injury, Ms. Harrison felt unusual pain during the entire dialyzing process. When CDC staff took the needle out at the end of the dialyzing session, an aneurysm (a sac formed by enlargement of the wall of an artery, caused by disease or injury, Webster's New World Dictionary) had formed in her arm. That night the aneurysm broke and a blood clot came out. Ms. Harrison had to go to the hospital. Her graft was destroyed, and surgeons next created a Bentley button for further dialyzing. A Bentley button is another method of allowing access to the blood stream of an ESRD patient. Ms. Harrison still had some infection in her system from the failed arm graft. It was very important that the Bentley button be kept antiseptic and clean because it is a direct open hole providing access to the patient's blood steam. Ms. Harrison's infection was doing well, responding to antibiotics given to her by her physician. But as she was dialyzing at the CDC facility, the attending nurse failed to use the antiseptic procedure of wearing a mask and using gloves. At the end of the session, the button must be carefully cleaned and Betadine placed in the two holes. The nurse said she was in a hurry and did not carefully clean the Bentley button or put any Betadine in the button. She simply replaced the cap and wrapped gauze around it. By the next treatment several days later, Ms. Harrison's infection was worse, and she had to start again on antibiotics. For the next two months Ms. Harrison could not use the Bentley button. Finally, it failed entirely as a method of dialysis, and it was removed. Ms. Harrison now is on CAPD, but testified it is not working very well, and she does not know what alternative for dialysis she may have if it too fails. CAPD (chronic ambulatory peritoneal dialysis) is a method of dialysis that involves the implantation of a tube into the interior of the peritoneum. A bag of fluid is placed above the point of insertion so that the fluid will slowly drain into the peritoneal area. Blood slowly exchanges its impurities with this fluid. After a few hours, when the bag has drained fully, the process is reversed. The bag is lowered, and the fluid drains out. When the bag is again full, it is discarded, a new bag is attached, and the process begins again. On another occasion, the dialyzing machine was not working properly. A line collapsed, the red light was flashing, and when the line collapses, it hurts the patient. The nurses failed to respond. A technician, who is not supposed to do any work in connection with treatment of a patient, tried to come over and get the machine working again. During the time CDC owned the facility at Lakeland, there was a significant continuing turnover of nurses, thus subjecting patients to new nurses who were not very experienced in dialysis. Some stayed only a few months; others, longer. Ms. Harrison dreaded getting a new nurse because an untrained nurse often took three or four attempts to implant the needle and it hurt. Also, as described above, ESRD patients depend upon the life of their access point for their own life. An untrained nurse who is likely to cause injury to an ESRD patient's access is particularly hazardous to the health of that patient. Ms. Harrison served for a time as a patient representative for patients on her shift. Of the complaints made by patients, CDC only responded to the request that curtains be installed on the back windows to prevent vagrants from looking in at the patients. (A man was seen at the window on one occasion.) Another request, that a particular nurse not pump the blood pressure cuff up so high as to be painful, was not corrected. Nell Boutwell is an ESRD patient who has dialyzed for about seven years. She began her dialysis at Tampa General Hospital, then dialyzed at Tampa BMA. In about August 1978, she began to dialyze at Kidneycare in Lakeland. She had no complaints about the quality of care at the Kidneycare unit. There then came a time, which the witness was unable to establish precisely, when it became generally known among patients and staff that Kidneycare had been purchased by Community Dialysis Centers, Inc. The purchase by CDC occurred before Ms. Boutwell wrote a certain letter dated August 25, 1981. Ms. Boutwell testified to a number of matters concerning the quality of health care at the CDC Lakeland facility. Her testimony was unrebutted and is found to be true: Under Kidneycare, the Lakeland facility was typically staffed at about two nurses for four patients, or six nurses for a shift of 12 patients. When CDC took over, the number of nurses declined until there were only two or three nurses for 11 or 12 patients, about one nurse for four patients, which is approximately 50 percent fewer nurses. One result of having fewer nurses was that patients had to stay on the dialyzer machine longer because a nurse is needed to disconnect that patient, thus causing patient discomfort. The replacement nurses were not well trained. On one occasion, air got into the lines of Ms. Boutwell's machine. The available nurses were busy and failed to respond to her calls for help. A technician came over, and he finally was directed by another patient to turn off the machine. Then a nurse appeared and fixed the machine. Air in the machine is a life-threatening condition, as described above. CDC was short on tape and frequently had no Band Aids to cover the place where the needles are removed at the end of the session. When Kidneycare ran the Lakeland facility, it was clean. When CDC took over, the new location was dirty on the outside: there were bottles, dirt, and Pampers in the parking lot. A streak of blood was on the wall of the reception room a week before the hearing. Blood is sometimes left on the dialysis chairs from the last patient to dialyze, including the arm rest. Ms. Boutwell was concerned about cleanliness due to the risk of infection. A patient with a heart monitor attached during dialysis was left unattended as all nurses left the floor, and the monitor began to "act up", although Ms. Boutwell is not trained in reading such a monitor and could not say what it meant. The needle came out of the arm of one patient and he became unconscious as his blood drained onto the floor. This accident was not discovered by CDC staff, but was first discovered by another patient. The restrooms had no paper towels so that patients who wished to wash their hands had nothing sanitary to dry them on. A CDC nurse by mistake put Clorox into Ms. Boutwell's machine as she was dialyzing. The Clorox was intended for another machine which was being cleaned. Ms. Boutwell caught the error before it harmed her. Ms. Boutwell dialyzes early in the morning now, and in the winter it is dark when she arrives. Having vagrants hanging around the shopping center causes her fear. As will be discussed ahead, the artificial kidney in a dialysis machine is a relatively small tubular filter. After appropriate cleaning, an artificial kidney under some circumstances can be reused. Ms. Boutwell did not want to dialyze with an artificial kidney that had been used before. She had had experience with reused kidneys, and they did not clear her blood as well as new kidneys. Ms. Boutwell's insurance pays for a new kidney for each dialysis. CDC staff brought a consent form for Ms. Boutwell to sign agreeing to reuse. She refused to sign. CDC told her she either had to sign or she would not be allowed to dialyze at CDC Lakeland. Her only other choices involved unreasonable travel (Tampa, Orlando) or facilities owned by CDC (Winter Haven, Plant City) After continuing to refuse to sign the consent form, CDC allowed her to have a new artificial kidney for each dialysis. CDC Lakeland periodically was inspected by outside agencies. For the week or so prior to inspections, Ms. Boutwell observed CDC staff making unusual efforts to clean the facility and bring patient records up-to-date. For four years, Ms. Boutwell worked during the day, and thus had to dialyze at night. The administrator of CDC Lakeland told Ms. Boutwell that CDC was going to discontinue the evening shift. She told Ms. Boutwell that she could come early in the morning to dialyze, drive to Tampa in the evenings after work, or quit work. There were four patients using the evening shift. As a result of the proposal to stop the evening shift, Ms. Boutwell wrote a letter dated August 25, 1981, to Dr. Michael Pickering. Dr. Pickering had been one of the physicians associated with the clinic when it was Kidneycare and knew of the needs of those patients. In the letter, Ms. Boutwell asked for his help to prevent the cessation of the evening shift. She explained that dialysis left her in a weak condition, and that travel home from Tampa at 10:00 p.m. would not be safe, that dialysis at 6:00 a.m. at CDC Lakeland would require too many hours away from her job, that she did not have help for home dialysis, and that CAPD was not suited for her due to her work. Her letter is WATSON Exhibit 17. CDC sent a representative to investigate as a result of her letter. The representative told Ms. Boutwell that CDC was only "talking" about discontinuing the evening shift, but that they were not actually going to do it. This contradicted what the administrator had told Ms. Boutwell initially, leading to the conclusion that either on the first occasion or the second occasion, and more probably the second occasion, the CDC administrative staff was untruthful to one of their patients. On each occasion mentioned above when CDC staff told Ms. Boutwell that she could go somewhere else to dialyze if she did not like the new CDC policy, there was no adequate alternative for Ms. Boutwell to turn to. The suggestion that she could go somewhere else when no reasonable alternative existed was evidence of a callous indifference to her needs as a patient, and was harmful to the trust needed for a healthy clinical patient relationship. Ms. Boutwell had experienced dialysis at CDC since January 1984 when Elaine Feegel became unit administrator. Ms. Boutwell was of the opinion that Ms. Feegel was doing a good job as the new administrator, trying to clean the place up, trying to hire good nurses, and personally on the floor more often than her predecessor checking on the operation of the unit. She felt that she was personally getting good treatment at CDC Lakeland at the time of the hearing, November 6, 1984. The deposition of Eugene DeBerry, another patient who dialyzes at CDC Lakeland, was received into evidence as WATSON Exhibit 18. Petitioner's objections to certain portions of that deposition have been ruled upon in the conclusions of law. Mr. DeBerry began dialysis in January 1977 at Tampa General Hospital. Mr. DeBerry has dialyzed at seven other clinics and CDC Lakeland since he began at Tampa General Hospital. Mr. DeBerry's testimony has not been rebutted and is found to be true with respect to the following matters concerning the quality of care at CDC Lakeland: Of all of the units in which Mr. DeBerry dialyzed, the Lakeland unit operated by Kidneycare was the best, in his opinion. Mr. DeBerry was one of the six initial patients at Kidneycare when it opened on June 22, 1977. Kidneycare operated the clinic for two or three years before CDC purchased it. The original locations of the Kidneycare facilities (there were two) were about a block from the Lakeland General Hospital. The second facility that was used by Kidneycare had a central nurses station that permitted observation of all kidney dialysis stations at one time. About a year after CDC bought the Kidneycare facility, CDC moved it to its present shopping center location. Mr. DeBerry described the same problem with vagrants and trash on the outside of the CDC facility as described by other witnesses. There have been occasions when these vagrants have entered the clinic to use the restrooms, sit in patient chairs, or steal. Mr. DeBerry requires a wheelchair for movement. The restroom at the CDC unit is too small to allow him to use the toilet, that is, it is not accessible to a wheelchairbound person. Similarly, the waiting room for patients is not suitable for wheelchair patients, and Mr. DeBerry has to wait in his wheelchair in the hall. Kidney dialysis patients are restricted on intake of fluids, so being able to have coffee or a soft drink is a special treat. At the beginning of dialysis in the first hour there is an opportunity to drink a liquid. Kidneycare used to provide this treat; CDC cut it out, stating that it was expensive. When CDC took over the unit, the attitude of the nurses changed. The nurses said that CDC was very cost-conscious, and were cutting back on expenses, including nursing staff, that CDC wanted to get rid of four nurses. (This hearsay evidence was corroborative of direct testimony that the staffing under CDC was decreased by about 50 percent compared to Kidneycare staffing.) When CDC took over the unit, it attempted to require all patients to use only one type of artificial kidney, or to stock only a few. ESRD patients, however, have different needs. Some still have a portion of their natural kidneys intact and operative, and need less dialysis, and especially cannot tolerate large losses of fluid during dialysis because this causes painful cramps. Others, like Dr. DeBerry, have no kidneys, and need an artificial kidney that dialyzes more completely. The CDC effort to cut this cost ultimately was blocked by the orders of individual physicians requiring specific artificial kidneys for their patients. Within six months of the CDC takeover, CDC circulated a consent to reuse form among all patients. The form relieved CDC from responsibility for harm that might be caused by reuse of artificial kidneys. Darlene, the CDC unit administrator told Mr. DeBerry that he could either reuse the artificial kidneys or he could dialyze someplace else. Mr. DeBerry did not want to reuse due to the possibility of infection. He had already lost not only his kidneys, but his bladder, prostate, and both legs due to infection. But Mr. DeBerry could not go on home dialysis because it caused him severe hypertension, and travel to Tampa was unacceptable, so he signed the consent form. After about a year of reuse, Mr. DeBerry again discussed his options with the unit administrator, then Pat Segien. Ms. Segien said that the CDC units at Plant City and Winter Haven also required reuse. The CDC unit was often short on important supplies. Mr. DeBerry had to dialyze with the wrong needle and the wrong kidney on occasion. The unit was out of Band Aids, tape, blood lines, and saline solution on a regular basis, and Mr. DeBerry complained about this several times. The CDC facility was not clean inside. Blood would remain on dialysis chairs, the floor, and on walls for a week or more. As a result of these problems with the quality of care at the CDC unit, Mr. DeBerry complained to Senator Lawton Chiles' office. Thereafter, Network 19 came in to inspect and the unit was cleaned up. When CDC took over Kidneycare, they began using a cheaper grade dialysis needle, and Mr. DeBerry began to experience a tearing of the place where the needle was inserted, resulting in bleeding around the needle throughout the four hours of dialysis. Mr. DeBerry complained to his physician. His physician then ordered CDC to provide him with the needle he had formerly used. CDC complied. Mr. DeBerry encouraged other patients who were experiencing the same bleeding to contact their own physicians. Now CDC seems to use the good needles generally throughout the unit. Pat Segien, the unit administrator, told Mr. DeBerry that CDC used the new, inferior, needles because they were cheaper. CDC cut the nurse/patient ratio to 1:4. It had been 1:3 or less under Kidneycare. The problem with having only one nurse for four patients is that nurses routinely during dialysis have to respond to special needs, including sick patients. Mr. DeBerry described the following example of why three nurses cannot adequately handle 12 patients: one patient passed out; two nurses responded. Another patient started vomiting, Mr. DeBarry's line got air in it, and another patient was nearly unconscious due to low blood pressure. The nurses were unable to handle all of this and continue to do the routine work of checking blood pressure of other patients. Mr. Deberry was home trained, and therefore knew to clamp off the incoming air bubble and turn off his blood pump, which he did himself. Mr. DeBerry had seen air enter the lines of other patients on a number of other occasions because CDC staff allowed saline or blood bags to be pumped dry without properly attending to them. Many of the patients sleep during the four hours of dialysis, and thus the attentiveness of CDC staff is very important to their health. Since CDC took over, there has been so much turnover of nurses that many of the nurses are not experienced. Under CDC management, technicians who were not trained as nurses were allowed to do blood pressures, put heparin in the dialysis machine, and mix the formula for the bicarbonate bath. These practices have now been discontinued by CDC. CDC suffered from a frequent lack of soap, towels, and toilet paper in the restrooms, and a lack of soap at the sink at the exit to the isolation room. Nurses had no soap to wash their hands after leaving the isolation room when that room was in use dialyzing a patient that required isolation from the other patients. It took six to eight months for CDC to buy curtains to stop vagrants from looking into the back windows at the patients at night. In May 1984, Mr. DeBerry was mistakenly given a double dose of Desferal, and went into such shock that he could not talk so as to tell the nurses the mistake they had made. CDC has been constantly out of blankets, and once recently was out of sheets. Mr. DeBerry's wife had to buy a sheet to enable him to dialyze on schedule that day. CDC nurses are supposed to keep patient medical records current. On several occasions, Mr. DeBerry was asked to go over and sign his records for as many as four months earlier, which had-not been kept up-to-date. This happened before inspections in particular. Prior to inspections, CDC staff makes a number of improvements, including updating records and cleaning the facility. The front door of the CDC facility is not adequately constructed to allow a wheelchair to enter unless the patient has one person to push him up the ramp and another person to hold the door. Since Elaine Feegel became unit administrator at CDC, the quality of care has improved, but the nurses still need to improve in implementation of sterile procedures. Mr. DeBerry felt that he had received good quality care in the last few months. Sandra Biller is a registered nurse specializing in hemodialysis. She is currently employed by the Lakeland Regional Medical Center. She has specialized in hemodialysis for six and one-half years. She was accepted as an expert witness in ESRD nursing. She has worked in hemodialysis nursing at the Kidneycare facility beginning in 1979 and remained employed there under CDC until October 1982. During the time that the facility was managed as Kidneycare, the quality of care was good. Then CDC purchased the facility and began management thereof. Ms. Biller testified to the following aspects of health care at CDC when she was employed by CDC. The testimony was not rebutted, and is found to be true: When CDC took over the facility, it changed the type of needle used. The new needles had burrs on them that tore the access points in the patients' bodies and prolonged bleeding. Trauma to the access ultimately decreases the life of the access. As was seen by the medical history of Joy Harrison, an ESRD patient depends upon the life of the access for her own continued life. When all accesses and dialysis methods have been exhausted, and dialysis becomes impossible, the patient dies. Moreover, burrs on the needles caused unnecessary pain to the patients. Kidneycare did not have these problems because they used Terumo needles. CDC "frowned" upon use of these needles, and required a special order by the physician to use these needles. The new needles used by CDC were cheaper and were used to save money. Patients and nurses complains about the use of the cheaper needles, but nothing was done about it. A policy was instituted by CDC requiring reuse of artificial kidneys by all patients. Patients were told to dialyze elsewhere if they refused to reuse. Some patients who objected to reuse long enough were allowed not to reuse, but CDC told nurses to keep that fact quiet among other patients, and did not tell other patients about the exceptions. Jerry Bryant, the area administrator for CDC, told Ms. Biller that the reuse policy was premised upon the size of the facility and a goal of having a certain percentage of patients reusing. CDC's reuse policy was initially limited by a standard that the reused kidney function at 80 percent of its initial capacity. This was then changed to 75 percent of initial capacity. At one point reuse was also limited to 12 reuses, but later some artificial kidneys were reused 25 or 30 times. Patients and nurses complained about reuse without success. The primary harm to patients caused by reuse was that Ms. Biller's patients did not feel well at the end of dialysis on a reused kidney. Reused artificial kidneys frequently still had dark brown clots of fibrin in them. CDC reused the parallel plate type of dialyzer, and this type of dialyzer was inappropriate for reuse because it was impossible to inspect between the parallel plates to see if the dialyzer was clean. One patient became septic reusing a parallel plate kidney. Reuse caused an additional health problem or potential health problem for CDC patients because a reused kidney is cleaned with formaldehyde which is toxic to humans and must not be ingested in excessive quantities. Cleaning the dialyzers with formaldehyde released fumes into the air. Although CDC had an instrument to measure the quantities of formaldehyde fumes in the air to insure safety to patients, it did not use it to test the air as required on a regular basis. There are several types of artificial kidneys, and some are more suitable than others for the needs of specific patients. CDC would not provide the type of dialyzers specifically needed by individual patients. Dialyzing machines were not maintained according to the 100- and 500- hour schedules for maintenance that they were supposed to have. Staffing at Kidneycare was two patients per nurse. Under CDC, the staffing ratio ultimately became four patients per nurse, a loss of 50 percent of the nursing staff. It was a dangerous condition for the patients sometimes. Many of the patients were unstable. The nurses did not have enough time to care for sick patients and monitor the equipment properly due to the staffing shortages. When CDC took over, the pay and benefits for nurses was regulated more strictly. All nurses were paid on an hourly basis. Sick leave went from an informal system to a strict accounting policy. CDC refused to carry over certain forms of sick leave earned as employees of Kidneycare. New nurses were placed in charge of direct care of patients without sufficient training. Nurses require four to six weeks not only to learn how to operate the machines, but more importantly, to learn what to look for as trouble signs in a dialyzing patient. Jerry Bryant stated it should not take more than two weeks to train a CDC nurse, and CDC nurses were put onto the floor with less than four weeks' training. One nurse was found to be doing dangerous things, and when Ms. Biller reported this, she was ignored and told to "watch her closely." The nurse was failing to turn on the air bubble detector and failed to close the saline line to prevent an overdose of saline solution. On one occasion a patient was negligently given three liters of saline solution, and this mistake was never documented on the patient's record. This sort of mistake happened more than once. One liter was the normal amount, and probably was not proper for this patient, who usually needed fluid taken off during dialysis. CDC staff generally did not show a professional attitude toward their work. They came in late without correction by the administrator. One nurse, who did the reuse job, wore dirty clothes, and she was handling the dialyzers. Sometimes a nurse would see that a patient was sick and vomiting and would walk right by, failing to stop and care for the patient. All of the nurses who originally worked for Kidneycare have left CDC and most work for Lakeland Regional Medical Center now. Typically, within a period of four years nurses do not leave a good dialysis center. Ms. Biller left CDC due to her dissatisfaction with the quality of health care provided at CDC. Patient charts were supposed to be done at least every two weeks. Sometimes the CDC staff would fail to complete these records for six or eight months, but would do so for an inspection. Charts were not kept current due to the shortage of nursing staff. Dr. de Quesada was the Medical Director of CDC when Ms. Biller was a nurse employed by CDC. He lived in Tampa where he had his practice, and she saw him at the CDC Lakeland facility about once a month. During emergencies, it was sometimes difficult to reach the Tampa physicians until two or three hours later. The Watson Clinic physicians were always available. Watson Clinic nephrologists were seen at the CDC clinic at least every week or so. James Whitfield is a physician specializing in internal medicine and kidney diseases. He practices nephrology with Dr. Haire and has treated ESRD patients who dialyze at the CDC Lakeland facility since July 1983. Dr. Whitfield observed the following matters with respect to the quality of medical care at CDC Lakeland which were not adequately rebutted and are found to be true: The most frequent problem at CDC was failure to achieve the proper weight at the end of the dialysis session. CDC staff is supposed to monitor the process so as to achieve the correct weight at the end. Leaving a patient with either too much fluid or too little fluid is hazardous to the patient. One patient on two successive occasions had too much fluid taken off, causing the patient to go into shock and necessitating emergency procedures to revive the patient. The problem was that the CDC dialysis machine had a part stuck in an open position, thus operating to remove excessive amounts of fluid. Patient records were not maintained in a current condition. Orders were given to CDC to take a blood count at the end of each dialysis because the patient had recurrent internal bleeding. CDC failed to take the blood count. The patient suffered a substantial drop in blood count, and had to be hospitalized for anemia. On another occasion, an order to use a particular type of artificial kidney was not followed by CDC. CDC delayed a long time in providing a bicarbonate dialysis machine, which was needed for several patients. Four or five weeks before the hearing, Dr. Whitfield had a patient that for a two-week period needed to be dialyzed daily. CDC refused to do this, stating that they would only get recompensed for routine dialysis and would not be paid for the extra dialysis. Medicare will pay for non-routine dialysis in certain cases, but in this case, CDC did not apply. In the summer of 1983, Dr. Whitfield performed a rectal examination of a patient, taking a small amount of fecal matter to test for blood. A week later he used the same examination room at CDC Lake land. He found the feces and towel he had used the week before in the same place he left it. CDC had not cleaned it up for a week. CDC has a goal of requiring all patients to reuse artificial kidneys. Formaldehyde is used to clean the kidney for reuse. The long-range toxic effects of formaldehyde are unknown. Many of the leaders in the field of dialysis feel it is inappropriate for ESRD patients to constantly be exposed to formaldehyde. Formaldehyde use also creates a heard of fumes in the air. Moreover, a reused dialyzer is not as efficient as a new one, and results in fluid not being removed properly from the patient, causing the patient to come back the next day for dialysis. On one occasion, a dialyzer that had been reused 15 times was supposed to have removed 10 pounds from a patient, but removed only two pounds, resulting in the discomfort of another dialysis session the next day. Reuse can, for some patients, be beneficial because the reused kidney does not cause a mild allergic reaction suffered by some patients. But the safe level of reuse cannot be established administratively at a single standard or level because the medical needs of patients vary greatly. Supervision of nursing staff at CDC has improved considerably since Elaine Feegel became unit administrator. John Dowless is a hospital consultant/supervisor, Office of Licensure and Certification, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. He is a team leader on an interdisciplinary survey of health care team. The team determines if health care facilities in Florida meet federal and state requirements. He has 40 years of experience in health care, and has worked in the above capacity for eight years. He was accepted as an expert in health care surveying. In late March 1983 his office received a request from the Health Care Financing Administration that Mr. Dowless' office conduct an investigation of the CDC Lakeland facility with respect to complaints received about the quality of health care at that facility. Mr. Dowless and Maryanne Judkins, R.N., constituted the survey team that conducted the investigation on or about April 8, 1983. The investigation was an unannounced visit. (Annual routine surveys conducted by HRS are announced in advance.) The purpose of the April investigation was to determine if the CDC Lakeland clinic was in compliance with Medicare regulations. WATSON Exhibit 4 contains the HCFA forms used by Mr. Dowless in conducting this survey. Mr. Dowless found more patient care deficiencies at the CDC Lakeland facility than he had previously found at any other renal dialysis facility. The survey team found three Medicare "conditions" not met by CDC Lakeland. Failure to meet a condition results in disqualification for Medicare participation by the facility. Mr. Dowless at that time was considering decertifying the CDC Lakeland facility as a Medicare provider. CDC then sent a representative from its Atlanta office, and CDC promised to make corrections. On June 20, 1983, a reinspection was made. Mr. Dowless found that the facility had made quite a bit of improvement. The facility did not lose its Medicare certification, and sufficient progress was made toward correcting the deficiencies. The April 1983 survey of CDC Lakeland by HRS found the following substantial deficiencies: One member of the nursing staff did not have a current Florida license. This was a violation of a condition to obtain Medicare participation. The governing body failed to effectively manage. It has no written policy on reuse of dialyzers. Patients were scheduled without an adequate time between treatments. The facility failed to adequately insure that physicians made rounds when the patients were in the facility. Records did not have physician signatures for orders. Patient copies of the grievance procedure did not inform them they could complaint to Network 19. The above cumulatively was a violation of a Medicare condition. There were no written policies regarding patients' rights available to relatives. This was a violation of a Medicare condition. The patient environment was found to be unsafe and unsanitary. A bloody reused kidney was placed on top of a disinfected dialysis machine. Two chairs used by patients for dialysis were soiled with blood. The nursing station had 21 items marked sterile with an expiration date 12 months earlier. Other dusty, dirty, and cluttered items were noted. The floor of the dialyzing area had soiled gauze, cotton, rubber gloves, and paper. A soiled mop and dirty water were stored in the supply room, and the floor of the supply room was dirty and cluttered. The acetate hemodialysis concentrate solution was contaminated. The emergency tray was not fully stocked. The facility had been directed by a written memorandum to discharge patients who refused to reuse dialyzers, in violation of the written discharge policy. CDC failed to recognize individual needs concerning reuse, forcing patients to choose between reuse and traveling 60 miles to Orlando to dialyze, and refusing to allow one patient to reuse who offered to pay for the new kidney. A year later, on April 5, 1984, HRS conducted its annual survey for Medicare certification. Annual surveys are announced beforehand, and as prior testimony indicated, CDC would make a special effort to clean up and correct deficiencies before such surveys. This annual survey found no discernible deficiencies. As a result of complaints about the quality of care at CDC Lakeland, Network 19 also conducted an investigation of the facility on May 2, 1983. The report of that investigation is contained in WATSON Exhibit 4. The report was acted upon by the executive committee of Network 19 and transmitted to HCFA for its information and action. The site visit was announced ahead of time to CDC. Network 19 concludes in the report that the problems existed at CDC due to lack of leadership at all management levels and poor communication. It also concluded that the physician director appeared to have no direct or deciding input into unit operations, and the new unit administrator was following corporate policy changes. It was reported to Network 19 that CDC had instituted changes to correct these deficiencies. Finally, after recommending that the physician director become more involved in directing the unit, the report concluded with the finding that there was no direct evidence that the health and safety of the patients were then being compromised. It is evident from the findings above that between the unannounced inspection by HRS on April 8, 1983, and the announced inspection by Network 19 on May 2, 1983, CDC made improvements. Dr. Alejandro de Quesada is the Medical Director of CDC Lakeland and CDC Winter Haven. He originally became involved with the Lakeland unit as an owner and investor, as well as a physician having ESRD patients treated three. He is responsible for delivery of medical care, but is not directly responsible for machine maintenance, purchasing of supplies, or personnel matters, including hiring and firing. In these areas, he becomes only involved to the extent that the Lakeland staff tells him about problems they have identified. Dr. de Quesada lives and works in Tampa and is an Associate Professor of Medicine at the University of South Florida as well. Dr. Tapia is Associate Director of the unit and he is located in Lakeland. Dr. de Quesada has been Medical Director at the Lakeland facility either in the fall of 1983 or 1982; he could not state precisely when. Neither Dr. de Quesada or Dr. Tapia attended the hearing, and Dr. de Quesada's testimony was made a part of the record by deposition. Dr. de Quesada admitted in general terms many of the problems found above (loss of experienced nurses, reuse of dialyzers, problems with needles) but did not have any detailed knowledge of these problems, did not state whether he felt the problems were serious or minor, did not elaborate on the cause of the problems, and asserted that each one had been corrected. He admitted that at about the time he became Medical director, there was a large turnover of nurses and medical care was not "optimum." The location and external condition of the CDC facility in Lakeland is very unpleasant. WATSON Exhibits 19, 20, and 21 are photographs taken during the work week (October 19, 22, and 26, 1984) and very close to the date of the hearing. The CDC facility is located in a small strip shopping center. Immediately next door is a grocery store. Drunks and vagrants hang around the shopping center. Thus, CDC dialysis patients must come three times every week to a place not associated with health care, but with vagrants and groceries. For two years CDC has received complaints about unsightly trash outside the CDC facility. Yet, one week before the final hearing these photographs show a dishearteningly filthy collection of debris in the gutter immediately in front of the door into the CDC facility. For patients who are so critically vulnerable to infection, this array of trash at the entrance to the place they depend upon for cleansing of their blood directly erodes their confidence in the CDC facility and is demeaning to them. Dr. Henry M. Haire lives in Lakeland and is a nephrologist. Since early in 1980, he has both been on the staff of Watson Clinic and a member of the treating staff at Kidneycare and CDC. He was accepted as an expert in nephrology. Dr. Haire wrote the original certificate of need application for WATSON. The original application for a certificate of need was the result of Dr. Haire's assessment in January or February of 1983 that it was unsafe for his patients to dialyze at CDC Lakeland due to the quality of care at that facility. Dr. Haire testified to the following matters concerning the quality of health care at the CDC Lakeland clinic. These matters were not adequately rebutted by the Petitioner and are found to be true: The quality of health care at CDC Lakeland has been like a roller coaster for the last four years, with poor care followed by improvement and then another decline in care. Care improved after the HRS and Network 19 investigation in April-May 1983, and then declined again. Since July 1984 the quality of care has again improved. There have been occasions when the Tampa treating physicians could not be located in emergencies, and Dr. Haire had to respond for their patients at CDC. Some patients need a bicarbonate dialysis machine to reduce acid levels. Dr. Haire waited 18 months after he requested CDC to obtain one of these machines before they did so. CDC on two occasions transferred patients of Dr. Haire without prior notification to him. One patient was transferred to Tampa when the night shift was discontinued. Two other patients were transferred to Winter Haven one month before the hearing. One of these patients was very unstable and needed to be dialyzed near Dr. Haire. Dr. Haire had her transferred to a physician in Winter Haven. As recently as July 1984, Dr. Haire had found that CDC staff had failed to take weights and record other data in the charts. On one occasion, Dr. Tapia, the Associate Medical Director at CDC who lives in Lakeland, was not available to handle an emergency involving evacuation of patients due to formaldehyde fumes in the room, and Dr. Haire had to fill in for him. Based upon the foregoing findings, the following additional findings are made: End-State Renal Disease (ESRD) patients are captive consumers. Without continuing adequate renal dialysis they will die. ESRD patients are particularly vulnerable in a variety of ways. Loss of the use of one's kidneys demands a major psychological readjustment for the patient. Confidence in the quality of health care is critical to the readjustment. Some ESRD patients are frail, confused, disabled in other ways, elderly, and cannot adequately protect themselves from inadequate health care during dialysis. Further, ESRD patients have a well justified fear of infection, since loss of dialysis access may mean loss of ability to dialyze and death. Dialysis is uncomfortable and painful under the best circumstances, and is easily made more uncomfortable and more painful if treating staff is overworked, untrained, or indifferent. The quality of health care at the Lakeland facility since 1980 when CDC purchased it and began to manage it has been inadequate in a number of ways. From 1980 until 1984, despite repeated complaints from patients, physicians, and nursing staff, the quality of care at CDC for substantial periods of time was inadequate. Improvements have been made in 1984. The current administrator, who took that job in July 1904, is doing an excellent job. She is well- qualified for the job and has shown a genuine interest in improving CDC Lakeland. The current regional administrator is equally well-qualified, and has also demonstrated a sincere desire to improve the Lakeland facility. But problems persist. A few instances of questionable care occurred within a few months of the November 1984 hearing. The outside of the facility remains trashy as of ten days before the hearing and the location of the facility continues to suffer from proximity to vagrants. From 1980 to 1984, the health care at CDC Lakeland has been erratic and unstable, improving only in response to an investigation under threat of loss of Medicare money, annual inspections, or the potential of competition that may occur as a result of this certificate of need proceeding. Health care which is erratic and unstable is unreliable and, for that reason, inadequate, and the health care provided by CDC Lakeland for this additional reason has not been adequate. The Watson Clinic was started in 1926. Today, it is a large specialty hospital providing a wide range of services, from primary care to open-heart surgery. It has 22 departments and specialty services. The Clinic has 75 affiliated physicians, all of whom, with the exception of two, are specialists. Of these, 67 physicians are partners in the partnership which owns and manages the Clinic. The organization of the Clinic as a multispecialty group practice was derived from the Mayo Clinic example. Major decisions are made by the full partnership. Day to-day management is committed to an Executive Committee and to the Clinic Manager, Dudley Towne. The Clinic is located in Lakeland, Florida, in Polk County. The Watson Clinic currently has approximately 265,000 outpatient visits annually. As of January 31, 1984, Watson Clinic had current assets of $3,084,200.36, of which more than 50 percent was in cash deposits. For the year ended January 31, 1984, the Watson Clinic collected over $27 million in fees and distributed more than $12 million to its 67 partners. The Watson Clinic partnership, through its Executive Committee and by vote of the partnership, approved the plan to seek a certificate of need for a kidney dialysis center. Watson Clinic's amended application for a certificate of need seeks a four-station unit. The Watson Clinic partnership will pay for the purchase of equipment of the proposed dialysis center, will pay all start-up costs, and will continue to absorb all losses until the dialysis center becomes profitable. The dialysis center would be managed as another one of the entities of the Watson Clinic. Watson Clinic does not necessarily plan to do more than break even in its operation of the dialysis center. From a fiscal perspective, the Watson Clinic frequently undertakes to provide a new service to its patients that itself may only be marginally profitable but that furthers the goal of the Clinic to be a full-service multi-specialty clinic. WATSON Exhibit 14 is WATSON's amended certificate of need application. The amendments were primarily to conform the application to the number of dialysis stations initially approved by HRS. WATSON originally requested ten stations, but HRS approved only four. The projected staffing for the dialysis center is one head nurse who would administer the unit, two staff registered nurses, one licensed practical nurse, and part-time assistance from a dietician, a social worker, and a secretary/receptionist. Watson Clinic is currently aware of six registered nurses with some background in nephrology who might fill one of the three nursing positions, and four licensed practical nurses. Of these, only one (one LPN) is currently on the staff of CDC Lakeland. There was no rebuttal evidence on these facts, and it thus appears that the new center could be staffed reasonably soon, and without causing a loss of staff to CDC. The projected salaries for staff were reasonable and sufficiently high to attract reasonably qualified staff. The total cost of the project is projected to be $81,500, and the underlying costs which make up this figure are reasonable. Two additional costs not included in the above figure were identified. Legal fees have been incurred in the amount of about $25,000, and this is paid by the Watson Clinic partnership, and future fees will be paid in a like manner. Most renovation costs will be of minimal expense. The dialysis center will be in a building owned by the Watson Clinic partnership directly across the street from the Clinic. The only cost not identified in the application that may be substantial is the cost of putting in plumbing. This, however, does not affect the financial feasibility of the project since the Watson Clinic clearly has sufficient assets to absorb the costs of plumbing renovation. The projected utilization of the new dialysis center is reasonable based upon the projected need data discussed above. It is projected that the new center will have ten patients the first month and will grow to a maximum of 16 patients by the seventh month, October 1985. Thereafter, the center is projected to operate at full capacity of 16 patients. WATSON Exhibit 2, page 3, shows a predicted 75 ESRD patients needing dialysis in the Lakeland sub-area by September 1, 1905. If 16 of these dialyzed at the WATSON dialysis unit, the remaining 59 would dialyze at CDC Lakeland, which would be seven or eight more patients at CDC than are currently using that facility. The data of projected ESRD patients from Network 19 were corroborated by evidence provided by Dr. Haire. Dr. Haire and his partners are currently following 12 patients with renal problems and expect six of these will need dialysis in the next four or five months. Dr. Haire estimated that initially four of his 22 patients now using CDC would immediately transfer to the new unit, and that later in the year another one or two would transfer. Dr. Haire finally estimated that the remaining six patients of the 12 mentioned above as having renal problems would need dialysis by the end of the year. Thus, the majority of the projected patients were in fact known to Dr. Haire by name and their projected needs currently identified. The projected operating revenues were based upon reasonable assumptions from experience in reimbursement and payment in dialysis centers in the industry and actual reimbursement experience at Watson Clinic. The operating expenses were likewise based upon experience in the industry and are found to be reasonable projections. Attached to WATSON Exhibit 14 are computer-generated pro forma financial statements. These statements project net income and operating profit for the new facility for a two-year period, and are premised upon the patient utilization rates discussed above, as well as projected revenues and expenses, including the expense of amortizing the initial project cost. The first year operating profit is projected to be $19,809, with a pretax profit of $428. The second year has a projected operating profit of $20,790 and a pretax profit of $13,126. The financial statements erroneously show a corporate income tax, which does not exist since the Clinic is a partnership, so the pretax profit is the same as the net income. The financial statements are conservative in that they presume that all patient revenue will come from patients who dialyze in the unit. Medicare pays for home dialysis as well, to encourage that form of dialysis, but since operating expenses are less for home dialysis, the new center will enjoy greater net revenue (approximately $6,000 more per patient per year) for each patient on home dialysis. Dr. Haire and his partners in their practice have historically placed great emphasis on home dialysis, and it is reasonably certain that the center will have greater net revenue as a result of their efforts to train new patients on home dialysis. The projected revenues are conservative for another reason: they are based on patient visits at a 90 percent rate during the year, rather than 100 percent of the available dialysis days. The 10 percent shortfall was used to account for missed appointments or hospitalization. For example, there are three dialysis days per week, or 156 dialysis days per year for 52 weeks. Thus, at 100 percent 16 patients would generate 2,496 revenue visits. WATSON's second year projection of revenue, however, is based upon 2,254 visits, or 90 percent of 2,496. Elaine Feegel, CDC's current administrator, however, testified that "very few" patients ever miss a dialysis visit. The willingness of the Watson Clinic, with its clearly ample resources, to absorb all losses from the new dialysis unit in order to provide a full range of services, means that the unit will always have a resource to turn to during the start-up phase and during lean periods. The evidence in the record also shows that the facility will be self-supporting in a reasonable period of time and therefore is financially feasible. The facility will break even in the first year based upon an average of 14.25 patients per month. While this utilization rate is somewhat high, it is supported by the evidence. First, Network 19 projects 75 patients needing dialysis in the Lakeland area by September 1, 1985. If 14 of these patients use the Watson unit, the remaining 61 can use the CDC unit, putting CDC at 95 percent of its capacity of 64 patients. Given the record of inadequate care at CDC and the fact that the Watson unit will be brand new, coupled with the association of the Watson unit with the adjacent Watson Clinic, it is very likely that the Watson unit will have from 14 to 16 patients regularly using the facility by the end of the first year. CDC's expert on accounting, Michael Sullivan, sought to discredit the financial feasibility of the proposed four station dialysis center, but his testimony was not persuasive. The portion of his testimony based upon the original CON application data was not relevant because the data was altered by the amended application. Mr. Sullivan also excluded pharmacy and EKG revenue from his calculations of revenue. The main Watson Clinic has both a pharmacy and EKG that will be used by the dialysis center. It is unclear on this record whether the revenues from these activities will, for accounting purposes, be treated as separate revenues of the dialysis center, or revenue of the Watson Clinic. The point is irrelevant, however, since the Watson Clinic will cover all losses that may occur at the dialysis center, and can use these center generated revenues to do so. Moreover, the amounts in question are relatively small. The annual projected EKG revenue is only about $600, and the annual projected pharmacy revenue is only about $7,000. If Watson Clinic successfully has three patients on home dialysis, it will enjoy $18,000 in additional revenue annually, which will more than cover any overstatement of pharmacy or EKG revenue. Mr. Sullivan's criticism that there was no expense indicated for fees of the medical director was not relevant since Dr. Haire will provide those services without charge until the center becomes financially self-sustaining. Mr. Sullivan's further criticism that administrative costs were not accounted for was similarly not correct. A portion of the rental fee will cover administrative services to be provided by the Watson Clinic. Further, the current plan is to computerize much of the billing, and the cost of the computer equipment is included in the financial statements. In summary, the evidence shows that the proposed dialysis center will be financially feasible. The quality of care that will be delivered by the proposed four- station center will with a reasonable probability be adequate. There was a substantial amount of evidence as to the qualifications of persons who will be involved in delivery of that health care, and no rebuttal of any consequence from CDC. WATSON intends to offer complete dialysis services consistent with the current state of the art, with new equipment, properly trained staff, professional operating and management procedures. a patients' bill of rights, adequate professional supervision, and adequate staffing. Dr. Haire, who will be the Medical Director, is well-qualified for the job. Initial planning and consultation will be provided by a professional consulting firm. The medical staff will be open staff. The proposed center will place great emphasis on self care and home dialysis since Dr. Haire and other nephrologists at the Watson Clinic actively encourage these techniques. Additionally, the Watson Clinic plans to offer a full range of support services, including dietary counseling, rehabilitation services, social services, and the like. When the new Watson facility opens, CDC Lakeland should experience some loss of patients, but will not suffer harm in the long run. Dr. Haire will continue to use CDC Lakeland for some of his 24 patients, since the new facility can only handle 16 patients at its maximum capacity. By September 1, 1985, there will be enough new patients in the Lakeland area that even if WATSON served 16 of these, CDC Lakeland still would be needed to serve the remaining 51 patients and would at that time be operating at 92 percent of its capacity. The new clinic will, over the long run, compete with CDC Lakeland for staff, but as discussed ahead, competition will be beneficial to patients and should result in better health care in dialysis in the area. Initially, however, as found above, the Watson facility could be staffed without "raiding" the staff at CDC since there is an adequate, identified pool of potential staff other than current CDC staff. Since CDC Lakeland has enjoyed a virtual monopoly over dialysis services in the Lakeland area for the last few years, and the quality of health care provided by CDC has been so unreliable, there is a great need for the Watson Clinic facility to provide CDC Lakeland with competition. Patients at CDC tried to persuade the management of CDC to improve, but when these patients objected to CDC policies and sought change, they were told to dialyze elsewhere if they were dissatisfied. Having the Watson Clinic facility available will enable CDC patients to make that choice, which should then result in sustained and real improvement at CDC. In sum, the need is such that the new facility will not really be duplicative of services provided by CDC, but to the extent it may be duplicative, the competition that will result will be beneficial, not detrimental, to ESRD patients. The parties may have proposed other findings of fact which have not been considered in the paragraphs above. Many of these are subordinate to findings stated above, are cumulative, or are irrelevant to the above findings and this case. Those of marginal relevance are considered in the following paragraphs: WATSON proposes that a finding be made as to the accidental infusion of formaldehyde and bleach into two patients on two separate occasions. This proposed finding was based solely upon hearsay, and therefore cannot be made on this record. WATSON proposes that a finding be made that formaldehyde causes cancer. There is no evidence in the record to support this finding. CDC Lakeland proposes a finding that the fluctuations in health care occurred as a natural consequence of change in management. This finding is contrary to the evidence and has no evidence to support it. CDC Lakeland proposes a finding that the absence of any projected cost for accounting or legal fees shows the project to be financially not feasible. The evidence does show that Watson Clinic has incurred about $25,000 to date in legal fees, and that it intends to pay these costs without attribution to the dialysis center. The issue, however, is basically irrelevant, since the Watson Clinic, which has sufficient funds to underwrite this project, intends to fund all costs until the project is self-sustaining. CDC Lakeland proposes a finding that Watson Clinic might expand to three shifts. There is no evidence to support this finding, and the only evidence on the evidence on the point is to the contrary.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether the Intervenor, St. Joseph Hospital of Port Charlotte, should be issued Certificate of Need #6202 for the establishment of a cardiac catheterization laboratory at its facility in Port Charlotte, Florida.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Department was the state agency responsible for the regulation and certification of health care facilities in this state and charged with the responsibility of issuing Certificates of Need, (CON), under the criteria set forth in Section 381.705 Florida Statutes and the Department's Rules. St. Joseph Hospital is a 212 bed general acute care hospital located in Port Charlotte, Florida, within the jurisdiction of the Department's District VIII. It is a not for profit, tax exempt corporation owned by Bon Secours Health Systems, a multi-hospital system. It offers varied medical and surgical services, including obstetrics and pediatrics, and operates a 24 hour emergency room. The facility is accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation and Health care Organization, and its laboratory is accredited by the American College of Pathology. Because St. Joseph opened a nursing home in Port Charlotte in 1975, Chapel Manor Nursing Home, Fawcett's predecessor, and at that time, the only nursing home in Port Charlotte, applied for and was issued a CON to convert from a nursing home to an acute care hospital and began operation as Fawcett Memorial Hospital that year. Fawcett is now a 254 bed general medical surgical acute care hospital providing a broad range of services with the exception of obstetrics and pediatrics, and is located directly across the street from St. Joseph. It offers diagnostic cardiac catheterization service only, implementing that service in August, 1989. Both Fawcett and St. Joseph have the same service area and utilize the same physicians on their medical staffs, which are practically identical. St. Joseph offers a full array of cardiology services with the exception of cardiac catheterization. As a result, any St. Joseph patient requiring cardiac catheterization must be discharged from St. Joseph and transferred to another hospital in the area which provides that service. Between January 1989 and February, 1990, approximately 97 St. Joseph patients required transfer because of the fact that St. Joseph had no pertinent program. Because of this fact, and recognizing that the Department had determined there was a numeric need for an additional cardiac catheterization lab within the district, specifically based on the under-served indigent and Medicaid patients, in February, 1990, St. Joseph submitted a letter of intent to file a CON application for the establishment of an adult inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory at its facility in District VIII. This letter of intent was based on proper Board Resolution, and was filed not only with the District but also with the local Health Council, and the required notice was published in a local paper. Thereafter, in March, 1990, St. Joseph filed its CON application for the facility, along with the appropriate fee, with the Department, at the same time filing a copy with the local Health Council. The Department responded with an omissions letter, the requirements of which were met by St. Joseph in a timely manner, and the Department thereafter deemed the application complete. Notwithstanding Fawcett's allegations in the post hearing submission that St. Joseph's application was not complete, there was no evidence presented at hearing to so establish, and the Department deemed it both timely and ultimately complete. On on about July 17, 1990, the Department issued its State Agency Action Report and notified St. Joseph of its decision to approve the application. Approximately one month later, in a timely fashion, Fawcett filed its Petition challenging the Department's approval of St. Joseph's application. St. Joseph projects implementation of service by the unit in December, 1992. The unit will encompass approximately 3,800 square feet and will be part of and companion to a larger construction project designed to expand St. Joseph's surgical capacity. It will be located in a proposed two-story addition to the south side of the existing hospital. Total cost of the project, including construction of the building and equipment, is estimated to be approximately $2.6 million, one hundred percent of which will be financed by debt. It is estimated that interest costs over the term of the financing will be an additional $2.25 million. St. Joseph anticipates the charge for a cardiac catheterization will be $6,657.48 in 1993, and $7,123.50 in 1994. This is the same as the average charge for the procedure by existing providers in the district, adjusted for inflation in later years. The facility will be open routinely from 7:00 AM to 2:30 PM, Monday through Friday. An on-call team will, however, be available 24 hours a day although cardiac catheterization, usually an elective procedure, should not require much in the way of emergency services. Dr. Victor Howard, a Board certified internist and cardiologist, who is already on staff at St. Joseph, is projected to be the medical program director for the new facility without additional compensation. Cardiac catheterization is a relatively new diagnostic and therapeutic invasive procedure which involves the insertion of an extremely fine hollow tube through a blood vessel in the groin, up into the patient's heart. Because the patient faces danger from collateral problems such as bleeding, stroke, congestive heart failure and medication reactions, at least three staff members are required to assist the physician performing the catheterization. As with most procedures, the more it is done, the more proficient the individuals doing it become. By the same token, the medical staff assistants to the physician in charge must have specialized skills and training, and the Department rules require that in order to properly provide for therapeutic catheterization patients, an open heart surgery facility must be available within thirty minutes of the facility where the catheterization is being carried out. St. Joseph intends to rely on Medical Center Hospital in Punta Gorda, approximately ten miles away, as the required backup open heart facility. Medical Center is within the maximum thirty minute drive time criteria. It provides not only an open heart surgery program but also both diagnostic and therapeutic cardiac catheterizations. Diagnostic catheterizations, as opposed to therapeutic catheterizations, can be done on an outpatient basis. Experience has indicated that staff assistant technicians, nurses and others, are frequently not reasonably available. As a result, there is continuing competition between hospitals providing the services requiring these individuals, and this competition is often severe. Nonetheless, Fawcett has, up to the present, been able to recruit and retain adequate numbers of experienced personnel without the necessity for paying a bonus over and above normal salary. By the same token, St. Joseph believes it, too, will be able to attract and retain sufficient numbers of qualified personnel to successfully operate its laboratory as approved. At the present time, St. Joseph has ten registered nurses on staff who have cardiac catheterization laboratory experience. The laboratory, if approved, will not open at St. Joseph until the second half of 1992. At that time, manpower requirements for the project call for 3.36 full time employees, (FTE's), and that number appears capable of being satisfied by the current staff, though a cardiovascular technician, (CVT), has not yet been hired for the lab. In addition, St. Joseph appears to have on hand adequate management and supervisory personnel. It projects salary and benefits expense of almost $140,000.00 in 1993 and almost $150,000.00 in 1994. Maintenance expense is expected to approximately $65,000.00 the second year of operation. The proposed project has been enthusiastically received by the medical community in the service area. Because, in that area, the treating physician determines where the patient will be treated, support for the project by the area cardiologists is important as a positive factor for consideration. Because it has both the financial and personnel resources to provide the service, access to the service will be improved for the medically indigent and the facility's current cardiology program will be enhanced. The Florida legislature has, by its passage of Section 381.705, Florida Statutes, laid the basic analytical framework to be used in determining whether the facility here in question is needed. Consistent with the terms of the enabling statute, the Department has promulgated Rule 10-5.011, F.A.C., to implement the provisions of the statute. The rule formula provides a showing of "need" if at least 300 procedures could be performed by the new program, based on the total number of catheterizations, diagnostic and therapeutic, projected for the District. Projections for Charlotte County alone indicate 180 additional catheterizations between 1989 and 1994. Consistent therewith, the Department has determined that within DHRS District VIII, the pertinent service district, there is a numeric need for one additional cardiac catheterization laboratory. Need, however, goes beyond the question of numeric need. It is also a factual issue that requires an analysis of health planning principles and standards used within the ultimate goal of providing the best quality medical care for the citizens of this state in a sound, economically justified manner. In that regard, it is appropriate to evaluate need with an eye that looks toward avoiding unnecessary and costly duplication of services that are unnecessary. Fawcett contends there is no need for an additional lab in District VIII, based on the underutilization of existing programs. The Department's rule, the use of which resulted in a determination of need for one additional unit, does not regulate capacity. District VIII consists of Sarasota, DeSoto, Glades, Hendry, Charlotte, Lee, and Collier Counties. Sarasota and Lee Counties each have three cardiac catheterization programs while Collier has one in its only hospital. Charlotte County has two, Fawcett and Medical Center. It has already been noted that Fawcett and St. Joseph are located across the street from one another. Medical Center, which is used for therapeutic catheterizations, is located not far from the other two, and all three are Medicaid providers. All three also serve generally the same service area and use, essentially, the same medical staff. Moreover, the three facilities' cardiology staffs are essentially identical. When evaluating the service availability, however, it must be noted that Charlotte County experienced the highest relative increase in population among all the District VIII counties during the decade of the 1980's, and projections are that it will continue to lead up through 1995. At the present time, Charlotte County has the highest percentage of residents over age 65, (34%), of any of the District VIII counties. Looking at the proposed service in light of the pertinent State Health Plan, that for 1989, four preferences should be considered when evaluating the need for the proposed service. One deals with giving preference to those who propose to establish both cardiac catheterization and open heart surgical services. Since there is no established need for an open heart surgery service in the District, St. Joseph could not and does not plan to provide for one. Consequently, this preference is not pertinent here. The second preference is for those applicants who propose to establish a cardiac catheterization program in a county without any existing program. Again, this is not pertinent to the current situation. The third preference is toward applicants with a history of providing a disproportionate share of Medicaid and charity care. Here, St. Joseph is not a disproportionate Medicaid share provider, a point made by Fawcett. By the same token, however, neither is Fawcett. Fawcett did not, over the years, keep an accurate record of the number of patients to whom it provided free medical services, or of the value of those services. It claims it did not realize the importance of those numbers, concerning itself more with the provision of the service rather than with the recording of it. It was not, for most of its existence, however, a Medicaid provider, applying for and gaining that certification as of September l, 1989. Yet, during those non-certified, unrecorded years, it claims to have provided care to patients regardless of their ability to pay. While this claim is accepted as true, it is impossible to quantify it. The fourth preference is given to applicants who agree to provide services to all patients regardless of ability to pay. St. Joseph has agreed to do so and has a history of providing care to the medically indigent. So does Fawcett, but Fawcett is not an applicant, so the preference issue does not, necessarily, apply. It is clear, however, that neither the existing providers nor the applicant are precluded or disqualified as a result of the application of these preferences. Turning to the local, (District) Health Plan, which is also to be considered in the evaluation of the projects, the 1989 update of the District VIII Plan, that pertinent here, also provides for applicants to be evaluated in light of several preferences. One calls for an applicant to provide certain services, all of which are provided currently by St. Joseph. The second preference calls for the laboratory to be open no less than 40 hours a week and to provide a maximum waiting time of one month for simple, elective cases. The evidence presented indicates that the currently operating facilities meet this criteria, but also that St. Joseph will likely do the same if approved. Another preference relates to the proposed program's impact on existing providers in the area. It is here that the parties disagree radically on whether or not such an impact exists. St. Joseph has taken the position that its program will have only minimal impact on the ability of Fawcett and other existing providers to continue to provide quality economic service. On the other hand, Fawcett projects a major negative impact on its services, and claims the Department apparently failed to consider, at the time it did its initial evaluation, whether or not St. Joseph's program would adversely impact on it's existing service. Fawcett contends that its presently improving financial posture will be definitely impacted adversely by St. Joseph's implementation of the new service, if approved, in that its anticipated positive financial improvement will be reduced, if not destroyed, by the opening of St. Joseph's proposed program. Evidence produced by Fawcett tends to indicate that by 1994, if current projections hold true, Charlotte County will experience an increase of only 180 diagnostic catheterizations per year. St. Joseph's projections indicate that in that timeframe it expects to perform 509 diagnostic catheterizations per year. Simple arithmetic, then, would reveal that if those figures are correct, 329 of the 509 projected diagnostic procedures would have to come from the number of procedures performed by both Fawcett and Medical Center. Since approximately 75% of the current cardiac catheterizations performed in Charlotte County are performed at Fawcett, by far the greatest impact would be on that institution. The figures projected indicate a loss by Fawcett, then, of 232 procedures in 1993 and 318 in 1994. Medical Center's projected losses would be somewhat less, but nonetheless, such a reduction, if realized, would result in a loss of revenue to each of the existing providers from current income levels. Fawcett experienced severe financial problems during the past several years prior to the incumbency of the present CEO. In 1987 and 1988, it had financial losses which were improved in 1989 to a result showing a marginal excess of revenue over expenses. For 1990, Fawcett expects to show a profit for the first time in several years. Its prior negative operating result, however, has had a negative impact on its debt to equity ratio which, itself, is significant in that it is used by lenders as an index or flag regarding the financial health of an institution which seeks to borrow money. Because of its poor financial condition in the past, Fawcett was unable recently to borrow money needed for 1990 capital projects, and it is the increasing profit margin, which Fawcett hopes will make it more competitive in the borrowing market, that is most threatened by the proposed initiation of St. Joseph's project. The improved financial picture which Fawcett experienced in the most recent financial years has been directly attributed to the revenue earned by its cardiac catheterization program. In 1989, Fawcett determined that each cardiac catheterization patient contributed $1,927.00 to the hospital's financial health, and Fawcett contends that each patient taken from it by the opening of St. Joseph's proposed program will result in a financial loss to it. Utilizing the 1989 contribution margin projected to 1993 and 1994 reflects that if St. Joseph's program is approved, and if the anticipated numerical patient load is lost, the net financial loss to Fawcett would be in excess of $446,000.00 in 1993 and in excess of $612,000.00 in 1994. If these figures are inflated to 1993 and 1994 dollars, the loss could well be greater. Fawcett contends that it is currently experiencing a healthy improvement in its financial position which it anticipates would be substantially and adversely affected by the loss of cardiac catheterization patients to St. Joseph if that facility's project were approved as proposed. No doubt there would be a negative impact, but the degree thereof is speculative. Both the statute and the rule mentioned previously set forth criteria for the evaluation of these projects. One is the existence of an alternative to the service provided. Whereas St. Joseph contends there is no alternative diagnostic procedure preferable to cardiac catheterization, Fawcett contends there are several alternatives to St. Joseph's proposed project. Nonetheless, prior to its application, St. Joseph considered some alternatives. One was the setting up of a mobile laboratory on an interim basis. Since this could be used only by outpatients, it was determined not to meet the need of those patients requiring an inpatient procedure or of the physicians who would perform in it, and the anticipated $1.3 million cost was considered excessive for a short term fix. It is so found. Another was the possibility of establishing the lab somewhere within the hospital's existing space, but a survey of the facility quickly revealed there is no available existing space. However, since a part of the service proposed by St. Joseph would include outpatient catheterization, this part of the need could be met by the laboratory established in Charlotte County by several cardiologists who practice on the staff of St. Joseph, and who recently established a facility in the county. By the same token, if a need for outpatient procedures is demonstrated, the existing inpatient program could, Fawcett contends, provide it. Finally, is the existence of under-utilized programs at Fawcett and the Medical Center which have existing excess capability which could be considered an adequate and available alternate to the St. Joseph program. Turning to the question of financial feasibility, another evaluation criteria, there is no doubt that St. Joseph has the ability to borrow the capital to make the project financially feasible in the immediate future. St. Joseph's financial condition is sound. As might be expected, there is substantial difference in opinion as to the reasonableness of the pro forma projections submitted by St. Joseph's as evaluated by the Department. In fact, the parties agree to very little. St. Joseph contends that the patient mix estimated in the application is reasonable and based on its experience and that of Lee Memorial Hospital, and that the staffing level is appropriate and reasonable, and there is little to contest. The major difference in positions is in the area of supply costs and the percentage of patients accounted for by Medicare. St. Joseph estimated a supply cost of $248.00 per admission in 1989 dollars, inflated by 7% per year up to 1993 and 1994, but Fawcett contends the actual supply cost in 1989 dollars is $492.00 per admission. Assuming, arguendo, that Fawcett is correct, the projected supply costs would then be increased by in excess of $85,000.00 in 1993 and almost $126,000.00 in 1994, and this would result in a reduction of projected income for the service in both years. Fawcett's evidence and argument here are not persuasive, however. Fawcett also contends that St. Joseph's assumption that 58.9% of the cardiac catheterization patients would be Medicare, a figure which assumes that the Medicare patient utilization for catheterization would be the same as the facility as a whole, is not reasonable. Fawcett relies on the fact that St. Joseph is the sole obstetrics provider in Charlotte County and the majority of these obstetric patients are not Medicare patients. Considering that along with the fact that cardiac catheterization is a service which has a higher level of Medicaid utilization than St. Joseph presently provides, a more likely and reasonable predictor of the Medicare utilization of St. Joseph's program would be the Medicare utilization for the two existing catheterization programs. Fawcett's utilization in that regard is 64.6% and Medical Center's is 70.5%. Extrapolating from those figures, Fawcett contends a reasonable financial projection for St. Joseph's program would be 65% Medicare utilization. Since that type of service is reimbursed on the basis of DRG, the amount of income to the hospital is less, and the resultant contractual allowances, deductions from revenue, would be in excess of $61,000.00 in 1993 and more than $87,000.00 in 1994. Therefore, combining both the increase in projected supply costs and the decrease in projected income from Medicare, Fawcett contends that the projected number of catheterizations in 1994 and 1994, as modified using Fawcett's figures would result in a net reduction of approximately $210,000.00 in the former year and in excess of $126,000.00 in the latter. If those figures prove correct, St. Joseph's proposed program , it is suggested, would apparently not be feasible in the long term. On the other hand, St. Joseph contends its utilization figures for 1993 and 1994 are reasonable in that it projects a volume slightly greater than one-half of the number of procedures accomplished by Fawcett in its first year of operation. St. Joseph's expert evaluated the use projections for the first two complete years of operation and the costs assumptions and found both to be reasonable. Nonetheless, he also accomplished calculations of profitability utilizing Fawcett's suggested increased costs figures, and utilizing three different approaches, ultimately concluded that even looking at the worst case scenario, St. Joseph's proposal would be financially feasible both in the short and the long term. Independent analysis of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the projected staffing level and the salaries and benefits for that staff are reasonable. The anticipated reimbursements on the basis of the DRG's are reasonable. The projected utilization in the first and second years of operation are reasonable, and taken together, the evidence supports the conclusions drawn by St. Joseph's expert. It is so found. Another area for consideration is the impact St. Joseph's program would have on Fawcett's existing program. Fawcett's program has now been in operation for several years and even with approval of St. Joseph's, will continue to operate without competition until the second half of 1992, after which St. Joseph's program would be in a start-up configuration for at least a year. As such, it will be well into 1993 and possibly into 1994 before St. Joseph's program can be considered to have its full impact vis-a-vis the Fawcett program. Fawcett's expert, who concluded that St. Joseph's program would have a serious adverse effect on Fawcett's ability to contribute to its improving financial picture did not consider the fact that Fawcett does not currently perform outpatient cardiac catheterization procedures, and any of that nature done by St. Joseph should have no impact on Fawcett. The expert also did not consider in his analysis of impact any population growth beyond 1990 or growth in the demand for diagnostic catheterization procedures. Fawcett listed approximately $13.7 million in proposed capital expenses over the next five years which, it claims, will be adversely impacted by the effect of St. Joseph's proposed program on its cash picture. Many of the line items within this figure are much the same as normal routine replacement items, and only $3.5 million represent the cost of items specifically identified as needed to meet existing life safety code violations or for accreditation purposes. No doubt there will be some impact on Fawcett's operation by the opening of St. Joseph's program, yet Fawcett has not demonstrated clearly that the impact will result in a return to the pre-1990 negative cash position which was shown to now be reversing. Even accepting Fawcett's expert's assumptions, the likelihood is great that Fawcett's equity balance would increase by over $900,000.00 from 1992 to 1993 and by over $800,000.00 from 1993 to 1994. So long as Fawcett's cardiac catheterization program performs more than 182 procedures per year, its current break-even point, no negative impact to the hospital's overall financial picture is likely to occur. Assuming that Fawcett's procedures were no more than one-half its 1990 admissions, at current rates, its program would render a positive contribution of more than $650,000.00 to the hospital's financial picture. This figure could not be considered as other than a viable financial contribution. What is more, the implementation of the program at St. Joseph should not exert any upward pressure on the cost of other services rendered by St. Joseph, and should, by competition, moderate future price increases for this procedure at the two competing facilities. As regards Medicaid and indigent care, St. Joseph has been a Medicaid provider since 1965 and has a history of providing service to indigent patients and under-served groups. In fact, the value of care rendered without cost to patients by St. Joseph has climbed from $418,000.00 in 1988 to a projected $1.5 million in 1991. By the same token, its commitment to Medicaid has increased to almost 4% in 1990, in addition to approximately 2% of uncompensated care that same year. The obstetric unit has been shown to operate $500,000.00 a year in the red because of the volume of indigent care provided. Nonetheless, St. Joseph agrees to accept a condition to its CON requiring it to provide 1.5% Medicaid and 2% charity care. In comparison, Fawcett was not certified for Medicaid until late 1989 and its experience since that time has not been substantiated. This tends to underscore the Department's contention that Medicaid and charity patients are under-served within the Charlotte County area. Other criteria outlined within the statute have not been shown by evidence presented, as being significantly affected one way or the other by the implementation of St. Joseph's proposed program. Several of the statutory criteria are, in fact, not applicable to the proposed project in this case. Much the same can be said for the criteria outlined in Rule 10-5.011(1), F.A.C., which tend to overlap to a substantial degree with the statutory review criteria. Fawcett claims that the application filed with the Department by St. Joseph is "very incomplete" in that it omits significant information regarding project costs, capital expenses, source of funds, and a litany of other required information. It claims, therefore, that the Department could not have conducted any meaningful review of the application based upon the information provided. The Department's representative, Ms. Dudek, admits that most, if not all applications omit some information. That is the purpose of the omissions letter which is sent to an applicant after initial review. Not all information called for by the statute is deemed essential however. If an omission is considered immaterial, it will not cause the application to be denied, all other essential material being provided. There are primarily two criteria called for by the statute which are essential to Departmental approval. The first deals with the applicant's access to resources to develop and operate the project, and the second is that the applicant offer quality care. In this case, both were deemed to have been met as was stipulated to by Fawcett. In the instant case, the Department's representative concluded that St. Joseph's application was one of the most thorough and comprehensive, in terms of presentation and backup, to have been filed within the past few years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department approving St. Joseph's application for an inpatient cardiac catheterization laboratory, (CON #6202) for District VIII. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 4th day of April, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 90-5815 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Sec 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted. 5. & 6. Accepted. 7. - 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. 11. & 12. Accepted. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. - 34. Accepted. Rejected. - 39. Accepted. 40. - 42. Accepted and incorporated herein, except for the first sentence of Finding 41. Rejected. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 46. Accepted. Rejected. Rejected. - 51. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Not proven. - 59. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted that the loss of revenue will have an impact but the loss has not been shown to be substantial. - 65. Accepted and incorporated herein. 66. & 67. Accepted. 68. - 76. Accepted incorporated herein in substance. Rejected that the loss of revenue would "cripple" the health trend. It would adversely affect it but not cripple it. - 83. Accepted and incorporated herein. 84. - 90. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 97. Accepted that there are alternatives, but rejected that they are acceptable or adequate. Rejected as too broad a statement. Rejected as to the conclusion of waste. & 101. Accepted. Ultimate conclusion rejected. Need for level of education and experience accepted. Accepted. Underlying fact accepted. Balance is editorialization. - 108. Accepted. Accepted. Not an appropriate Finding of Fact. Accepted. & 113. Accepted and incorporated herein. 114. - 116. Rejected. Accepted. & 119. Rejected. 120. & 121. Accepted and incorporated herein. Rejected. - 126. Accepted. 127. & 128. Accepted. 129. & 130. Rejected. 131. & 132. Accepted. 133. & 134. Rejected. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment of the state of the evidence. Accepted. & 138. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. & 142. Accepted. Rejected. St. Joseph was a Hill-Burton hospital. Accepted. Accepted that St. Joseph receives funds from taxes and other sources, but the conclusions that aid to Medicaid an the indigent "is to be expected" is an unjustified conclusion. 146. Accepted. 147. Accepted but probative value questionable. 148. Accepted that it is less costly. 149. First two sentences accepted. Remainder not proven. 150. Rejected. 151. & 152. Accepted in the short term. 153. Accepted. 154. Not proven. 155. Rejected. 156. - 158. Rejected. 159. & 160. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: 1. - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 13. Accepted. 14. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. & 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted. 22. - 24. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 28. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and Incorporated herein. - 35. Accepted and incorporated herein. 36. - 41. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. - 45. Accepted and incorporated herein. 46. & 47. Accepted. 48. & 49. Accepted and incorporated herein. 50. & 51. Accepted. 52. - 54. Accepted and incorporated herein. 55. - 58. Accepted. 59. & 60. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 64. Not Findings of Fact but a comment on the state of the evidence. 65. & 66. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a statement of party position. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. & 70. Accepted and incorporated herein. 71. & 72. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a comment on the evidence. Accepted. - 80. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but irrelevant to the issues here. Accepted but considered more a statement of party position and a comment on the evidence. & 84. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted and noted in the Conclusions of Law portion of the Recommended Order. - 100. More proper as Conclusions of Law than as Findings of Fact, but accepted where pertinent. COPIES FURNISHED: John D. C. Newton, II, Esquire Aurell, Radey, Hinkle & Thomas Suite 1000, Monroe-Park Tower P.O. Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Richard Patterson, Esquire DHRS 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Philip Blank, P.A. P.O. Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Linda K. Harris Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether there is need for a new Pediatric Heart Transplant and/or Pediatric Heart and Lung Transplant program in Organ Transplant Service Area (OTSA) 3; and, if so, whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 10471 (heart) and/or 10472 (heart and lung), filed by The Nemours Foundation, d/b/a Nemours Children’s Hospital (Nemours or NCH), to establish a Pediatric Heart Transplant and/or Pediatric Heart and Lung Transplant program, satisfy the applicable statutory and rule review criteria for award of a CON.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses and other evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Applicant, Nemours Nemours Children’s Hospital is a licensed Class II specialty children’s hospital located in Orange County, Health Planning District 7, Subdistrict 7-2, OTSA 3, which is owned and operated by The Nemours Foundation. Nemours is licensed for 100 beds, including 73 acute care, nine comprehensive medical rehabilitation, two Level II neonatal intensive care unit (NICU), and 16 Level III NICU beds, and is a licensed provider of pediatric inpatient cardiac catheterization and pediatric open-heart surgery. As the primary beneficiary of the Alfred I. duPont Testamentary Trust established in the will of Alfred duPont, the Foundation was incorporated in Florida in 1936. The Foundation set out to provide children and families medical care and services, its mission being “[t]o provide leadership, institutions, and services to restore and improve the health of children through care and programs not readily available, with one high standard of quality and distinction regardless of the recipient’s financial status.” Foundation assets reached $5.5 billion, by the end of 2015. The Foundation has funded $1.5 billion of care to Florida’s pediatric population through subspecialty pediatric services, research, education, and advocacy. Nemours has established a pediatric care presence throughout the State of Florida. Nemours operates over 40 outpatient clinics throughout Florida that offer primary care, specialty care, urgent care, and cardiac care services to pediatric patients in central Florida, Jacksonville, and the panhandle region. Nemours also provides hospital care to pediatric inpatients at Nemours Children’s Hospital in Orlando, as well as through affiliations with Wolfson’s Children’s Hospital in Jacksonville, West Florida Hospital in Pensacola, and numerous hospital partners in central Florida. The resources Nemours offers in the greater Orlando area are especially significant with 17 Primary Care Clinics, five Urgent Care Clinics, 10 Specialty Care Clinics, nine Nemours Hospital partners, and, of course, NCH itself. These clinics are located throughout OTSA 3 where Nemours determined access to pediatric care was lacking, including Orlando, Melbourne, Daytona Beach, Titusville, Kissimmee, Lake Mary, and Sanford, as well as neighboring Lakeland. The clinics are fully staffed with hundreds of Nemours-employed physicians who live in the clinic communities. Through these satellite locations, as well as the Nemours CareConnect telemedicine platform, Nemours is able to bring access to its world-class subspecialists located at NCH to children throughout the State of Florida who otherwise would not have access to such care. Nemours was established to provide state of the art medical care to children through its integrated model. Nemours’ development has been and continues to be driven by its mission and objective to be a top-tier, world-class pediatric healthcare system. NCH is the first completely new “green field” children’s hospital in the United States in over 40 years, allowing Nemours to integrate cutting-edge technology and a patient-centered approach throughout. Nemours has created a unique integrated model of care that addresses the needs of the child across the whole continuum, connecting policy and prevention, to the highest levels of specialized care for the most complex pediatric patients. From its inception, Nemours envisioned the development of a comprehensive cardiothoracic transplant program as proposed by the CON applications at issue in this proceeding. NCH is located in the Lake Nona area, just east of downtown Orlando in a development known as Medical City. Medical City is comprised of a new VA Hospital, the University of Central Florida (UCF) College of Medicine and School of Biomedical Sciences, the University of Florida (UF) Research and Academic Center, the Sanford Burnham Medical Research Institute, and a CON-approved hospital, which is a joint venture between UCF and AHCA, which will serve as UCF’s teaching hospital. Medical City is intended to bring together life scientists and research that uses extraordinarily advanced technology. Co- location in an integrated environment allows providers and innovators of healthcare, “the brightest minds,” so to speak, to interact and to share ideas to advance healthcare and wellness efforts. Agency for Health Care Administration AHCA is the state health-planning agency that is charged with administration of the CON program as set forth in sections 408.031-408.0455, Florida Statutes. Context of the Nemours Applications Pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.044, AHCA requires applicants to obtain separate CONs for the establishment of each adult or pediatric organ transplantation program, including: heart, kidney, liver, bone marrow, lung, lung and heart, pancreas and islet cells, and intestine transplantations. “Transplantation” is “the surgical grafting or implanting in its entirety or in part one or more tissues or organs taken from another person.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 59A-3.065. Heart transplantation, lung transplantation, and heart/lung transplantation are all defined by rule 59C-1.002(41) as “tertiary health services,” meaning “a health service which, due to its high level of intensity, complexity, specialized or limited applicability, and cost, should be limited to, and concentrated in, a limited number of hospitals to ensure the quality, availability, and cost effectiveness of such service.” AHCA rules define a “pediatric patient” as “a patient under the age of 15 years.” Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(2)(c). AHCA rules divide Florida into four OTSAs, corresponding generally with the northern, western central, eastern central, and southern regions of the state. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(2)(f). The programs at issue in this proceeding will be located in OTSA 3, which is comprised of Brevard, Indian River, Lake, Martin, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Seminole, and Volusia Counties. Currently, there are no providers of PHT in OTSA 3, and there are no approved PHLT programs statewide. The incidence of PHT in Florida, as compared to other types of solid organ transplants, is relatively small. The chart below sets forth the number of pediatric (ages 0-14) heart transplant discharges by year for the four existing Florida PHT programs during Calendar Years (CY) 2013 through 2016, and the 12-month period ending June 2017: HOSPITAL HEART TRANSPLANT CY 2013 CY 2014 CY 2015 CY 2016 12 MONTHS ENDING JUNE 2017 All Children’s Hospital 7 14 9 8 7 UF Health Shands Hospital 6 8 15 15 9 Memorial Regional Hospital 5 5 5 7 4 Jackson Health System 2 2 1 4 1 Total 20 29 30 34 21 The above historic data demonstrates that the incidence of PHT statewide is relatively rare, and does fluctuate from program to program and from year to year. As can be seen, the most recent available 12-month data reflects that only 21 PHTs were performed during that time, for an average program volume of only 5.25 cases. Florida has more existing and approved PHT programs than every other state in the country except California, which has more than double the pediatric population of Florida. And like Florida, two of the California programs are extremely low- volume programs. Additionally, evidence regarding the number of PHLT patients demonstrated just how rare this procedure is. From 2013 to 2016, there was an annual average of only four PHLTs nationally, with only one actual transplant on a Floridian. Nemours’ health planner stated that although Nemours projected in its application that it would perform one heart/lung procedure each year, it is a “very low-volume service,” and Nemours in actuality expects that there will be years with zero volume of PHLT. The CON Applications Nemours filed its applications for heart transplantation, heart/lung transplantation, and lung transplantation in the second Other Beds and Programs Batching Cycle of 2016. Nemours is proposing the development of a comprehensive cardiothoracic transplant program, which will be the only such program in Florida. This will be achieved by combining three types of transplant services (heart, lung, and heart/lung) in one comprehensive cardiothoracic transplant program. Each application was conditioned on the development of all three transplantation programs. Nemours is located in OTSA 3, where there is currently no PHT provider, PLT provider, or PHLT provider. There are, however, three providers of pediatric open-heart surgery and pediatric cardiac catheterization, and a large, growing pediatric population. Unlike any other facility in Florida, the Nemours Cardiac Center (Cardiac Center) is uniquely organized to treat all forms of congenital heart disease. The Cardiac Center employs a “programmatic approach” to offer the most beneficial environment and the finest care available for pediatric patients. The Cardiac Center, physically located at NCH, throughout Florida, is organized as a single Department of Cardiovascular Services to house Cardiac Surgery, Cardiac Anesthesia, Cardiac Intensive Care Unit (ICU), and Cardiology. Cardiac Center physicians throughout Florida are organized as a single entity with the goal of providing the highest quality, patient-centered care to all patients without the usual barriers created by the departmental “silos.” The entire Cardiac Center clinical team, including nurses and physicians, is dedicated solely to the special challenges of congenital heart abnormalities and makes the care of children with heart disease the life’s work of team members. The fully integrated organizational structure permits the team to take shared responsibility for all aspects of the delivery of quality care to these pediatric patients from admission to discharge. The Cardiac Center holds weekly patient consensus conferences, where all providers, including physicians, nurses, and the patients’ caregivers, participate in case reviews of all inpatients and those patients scheduled for surgery or catheterization. The Cardiac Center is “state of the art” with a designated cardiovascular operating room, a designated cardiovascular lab that includes an electrophysiology lab, and a dedicated comprehensive care unit. In addition, The Foundation has furthered the commitment to the Cardiac Center by funding an additional $35 million expansion to the sixth floor of NCH, adding an additional 31 inpatient beds, an additional operating room, and a comprehensive cardiovascular intensive care unit. Dr. Peter D. Wearden joined Nemours in 2015 as the chief of cardiac surgery, chair of the Department of Cardiovascular Services, and director of the Cardiac Center at Nemours. Dr. Wearden will serve as director of the Comprehensive Cardiothoracic Transplant Program at Nemours and will be instrumental in the development and implementation of the program. Dr. Wearden was recruited from the Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh (CHP), where he served as the surgical director of Heart, Lung, and Heart/Lung Transplantation. He was also the director of the Mechanical Cardiopulmonary Support and Artificial Heart Program. CHP rose to a US News and World Report top 10 program during Dr. Wearden’s tenure. CHP is at the forefront of organ transplantation and is where the first pediatric heart/lung transplantation was performed. Dr. Wearden is a trained cardiothoracic surgeon who completed fellowships in both cardiothoracic surgery (University of Pittsburgh) and Pediatric and Congenital Heart Surgery (Hospital for Sick Children, Toronto, Canada). He is certified by the American Board of Thoracic Surgery and holds additional qualifications in Congenital Heart Surgery from that organization. In his tenure as a board-certified pediatric transplant specialist, he has participated in over 200 pediatric cardiothoracic transplantations, of which he was the lead surgeon in over 70. In addition, he has procured over $20 million in National Institutes of Health research funding since 2004 specific to the development of artificial hearts and lungs for children and their implementation as a live-saving bridge to transplantation. Dr. Wearden was a member of the clinical team that presented to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) panel for approval of the Berlin Heart, the only FDA-approved pediatric heart ventricular assist device (VAD)1/ currently available, and he proctored the first pediatric artificial heart implantation in Japan in 2012. A VAD is referred to as “bridge to transplant” in pediatric patients because the device enables a patient on a waiting list for a donated heart to survive but is a device on which a child could not live out his or her life. Both utilization of VADs and heart transplantation procedures are in the “portfolio of surgical interventions” that can save the life of a child with heart failure. Dr. Wearden is an international leader in the research and development of VADs. Victor Morell, an eminent cardiac surgeon and chief of Pediatric Cardiac Surgery at CHP, testified that Dr. Wearden’s presence in Orlando alone and the work that he will be able to do with VADs and a PHT program will likely save lives. Many of the physicians that comprise the Nemours Cardiac Center transplant team not only have significant transplant experience, but also have experience performing transplants together. These physicians came with Dr. Wearden from CHP, were trained by Dr. Wearden, or otherwise worked with Dr. Wearden at some point in their careers. The physicians recruited to the Nemours transplantation team were trained at or hail from among the most prestigious programs in the country. For example, Dr. Kimberly Baker, a cardiac intensivist, was trained by Dr. Wearden in the CHP ICU. Dr. Constantinos Chrysostomou, Nemours’ director of cardiac intensive care, worked with Dr. Wearden at CHP, and has experience starting the pediatric ICU in Los Angeles at Cedar Sinai Hospital. Dr. Steven Lichtenstein, chief of cardiac anesthesia, held the same position at CHP for 12 years before he was recruited to Nemours. Dr. Karen Bender, a cardiac anesthesiologist, was recruited by Dr. Wearden from the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia – one of the leading programs in the country. Dr. Michael Bingler, a cardiac interventionalist, was at Mercy Children’s Hospital in Kansas City for eight years. Dr. Adam Lowry of the Nemours cardiac intensive care center previously trained at both Texas Children’s Hospital (the number one program in the country) and Stanford. The 11 physicians that comprise the Cardiac Center’s Cardiothoracic Physician Team have collectively participated in 1,146 cardiothoracic transplantations. These physicians came to Nemours to care for the most acute, critically ill patients, including those requiring PHT. In addition to the physician team, the expertise and skill of the non-physician staff in the catheterization lab, the operating room, and the cardiac ICU are crucial to a successful program. Dr. Dawn Tucker is the administrative director of NCH’s Cardiac Center and heads the nursing staff for NCH’s Cardiac Center, which includes 23 registered nurses with transplant experience. Dr. Tucker holds a doctorate of Nursing Practice and was formerly the director of the Heart Center at Mercy Children’s Hospital in Kansas City, where she oversaw the initiation of a PHT program. The average years of experience for total nursing care in cardiac units across the nation is two years. The average years of experience in the Nemours Cardiac Center is eight years. Medical literature shows the greater the years of nursing staff experience, the lower the mortality and morbidity rates. The nursing staff at Nemours, moreover, has extensive experience in dealing not only with pediatric cardiac patients, but with pediatric heart transplants as well. The Cardiac Center’s cardiothoracic nursing staff has over 220 years of collective cardiothoracic transplant experience. Nemours operates a “simulation center” that allows the Cardiac Center to simulate any type of cardiac procedure on a model patient before performing that procedure on an actual patient. The model patient’s “heart” is produced using a three- dimensional printer that creates a replica of the heart based on MRI’s or other medical digital imaging equipment. These replica hearts are printed on-site, using the only FDA-approved software for such use, and are ready for use in the simulation center within a day after medical imaging. Nemours Cardiac Center currently performs what the Society of Thoracic Surgeons has coined “STAT 5” cardiac procedures. STAT 5 cardiac procedures are the most complex; STAT 1 procedures are the least complex. A PHT is a STAT 4 procedure. Since Dr. Wearden’s arrival at the Nemours Cardiac Center, there have been no patient mortalities. The uncontroverted evidence established that Nemours has assembled a high-quality, experienced, and unquestionably capable team of physicians and advanced practitioners for its cardiothoracic transplantation programs and is capable of performing the services proposed in its applications at a high level. UF Health Shands While not a party to this proceeding,2/ UF Health Shands’ (Shands) presence at the final hearing was pervasive. AHCA called numerous witnesses affiliated with Shands in its case-in-chief. The scope of the testimony presented by Shands- affiliated witnesses was circumscribed by Order dated December 13, 2017 (ruling on NCH’s motion in limine) that: At hearing, the Agency may present evidence that the needs of patients within OTSA 3 are being adequately served by providers located outside of OTSA 3, but may not present evidence regarding adverse impact on providers located outside of OTSA 3. Baycare of Se. Pasco, Inc. v. Ag. for Health Care Admin., Case No. 07-3482CON (Fla. DOAH Oct. 28, 2008; Fla. AHCA Jan. 7, 2009). UF Health Shands Hospital is located in Gainesville, Florida. UF Health Shands Children’s Hospital is an embedded hospital within a larger hospital complex. Shands Children’s Hospital has 200 beds and is held out to the public as a children’s hospital. The children’s hospital has 72 Level II and III NICU beds. Unlike Nemours, Shands offers obstetrical services such that babies are delivered at Shands. It also has a dedicated pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) as well as a dedicated pediatric cardiac intensive care unit. The Shands Children’s Hospital has its own separate emergency room and occupies four floors of the building in which it is located. It is separated from the adult services. Shands Children’s Hospital is nationally recognized by U.S. News & World Report as one of the nation’s best children’s hospitals. The children’s hospital has its own leadership, including Dr. Shelley Collins, an associate professor of pediatrics and the associate chief medical officer. As a comprehensive teaching and research institution, Shands Children’s Hospital has virtually every pediatric subspecialty that exists and is also a pediatric trauma center. The children’s hospital typically has 45 to 50 physician residents and 25 to 30 fellows along with medical students. Over $139 million has been awarded to Shands for research activities. As a teaching hospital, Shands is accustomed to caring for the needs of patients and families that come from other parts of the state or beyond. Jean Osbrach, a social work manager at Shands, testified for AHCA. Ms. Osbrach oversees the transplant social workers that provide services to the families with patients at Shands Children’s Hospital. Ms. Osbrach described how the transplant social workers interact with the families facing transplant from the outset of their connection with Shands. They help the families adjust to the child’s illness and deal with the crisis; they provide concrete services; and these social workers help the families by serving as navigators through the system. These social workers are part of the multidisciplinary team of care, and they stay involved with these families for years. Shands is adept at helping families with the issues associated with getting care away from their home cities. Shands has apartments specifically available in close proximity to the children’s hospital and relationships with organizations that can help families that need some financial support for items such as lodging, transportation, and gas. Ms. Osbrach’s ability to empathize with these families is further enhanced because her own daughter was seriously ill when she was younger. Ms. Osbrach testified that, while she was living in Gainesville, she searched out the best options for her child and decided that it was actually in Orlando. Despite the travel distance, she did not hesitate to make those trips in order to get the care her child needed at that time. The Shands Children’s Hospital is affiliated with the Children’s Hospital Association, the Children’s Miracle Network, the March of Dimes, and the Ronald McDonald House Charities. Shands operates ShandsCair, a comprehensive emergency transport system. ShandsCair operates nine ground ambulances of different sizes, five helicopters, and one fixed-wing jet aircraft. ShandsCair does over 7,000 transports a year, including a range of NICU and other pediatric transports. ShandsCair is one of the few services in the country that owns an EC-155 helicopter, which is the largest helicopter used as an air ambulance. This makes it easier to transport patients that require a lot of equipment, including those on extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO). Patients on ECMO can be safely transported by ground and by air by ShandsCair. Shandscair serves as a first responder and also provides facility-to- facility transport. It has been a leader in innovation. The congenital heart program at Shands includes two pediatric heart surgeons, as well as pediatric cardiologists Dr. Jay Fricker and Dr. Bill Pietra, both of whom testified for AHCA. Dr. Fricker did much of his early work and training at the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, and came to the University of Florida in 1995. He is a professor and chief of the Division of Cardiology in the Department of Pediatrics at Shands. He is also the Gerold L. Schiebler Eminent Scholar Chair in Pediatric Cardiology at UF. He has been involved in the care of pediatric heart transplant patients his entire career. Dr. Bill Pietra received his medical training in Cincinnati and did his early work at several children’s hospitals in Colorado. He came to the University of Florida and Shands in July 2014 and is now the medical director, UF Health Congenital Heart Center. Shands performed its first pediatric heart transplant in 1986. Shands treats the full range of patients with heart disease and performs heart transplants on patients, from infants through adults, with complex congenital heart disease. Shands provides transplants to pediatric patients with both congenital heart defects and acquired heart disease (cardiomyopathy). Shands will accept the most difficult cases, including those that other institutions will not take. Data presented by AHCA dating back to the beginning of 2014 demonstrate that Shands has successfully transplanted numerous patients that were less than six months old at the time of transplantation. This data also demonstrates that Shands serves all of central and north Florida, as well as patients that choose to come to Shands from other states. PHT patients now survive much longer than in the past, and in many cases, well into adulthood. Because Shands cares for both adult and pediatric patients, it has the ability to continue to care for PHT patients as they transition from childhood to adulthood. Managed care companies are now a significant driver of where patients go for transplantation services. Many managed- care companies identify “centers of excellence” as their preferred providers for services such as PHT. Shands is recognized by the three major managed-care companies that identify transplant programs as a center of excellence for PHT services. AHCA’s Preliminary Decision Following AHCA’s review of Nemours’s applications, as well as consideration of comments made at the public hearing held on January 10, 2017, and written statements in support of and in opposition to the proposals, AHCA determined to preliminarily deny the PHT and PHLT applications, and to approve the PLT application. AHCA’s decision was memorialized in three separate SAARs, all dated February 17, 2017. Marisol Fitch, supervisor of AHCA’s CON and commercial-managed care unit, testified for AHCA. Ms. Fitch testified that AHCA does not publish a numeric need for transplant programs, as it does for other categories of services and facilities. Rather, the onus is on the applicant to demonstrate need for the program based on whatever methodology they choose to present to AHCA. In addition to the applicant’s need methodology, AHCA also looks at availability and accessibility of service in the area to determine whether there is an access problem. Finally, an applicant may attempt to demonstrate that “not normal” circumstances exist in its proposed service area sufficient to justify approval. Statutory Review Criteria Section 408.035(1) establishes the statutory review criteria applicable to CON Applications 10471 and 10472. The parties have stipulated that each CON application satisfies the criteria found in section 408.035(1), (d), (f), and (h), Florida Statutes. The only criteria at issue essentially relate to need and access. However, the Agency maintains that section 408.035(1)(c) is in dispute to the extent that center transplant volume as a result of Nemours’ approval would lead to or correlate with negative patient outcomes. AHCA believes that there is no need for the PHT or PHLT programs that Nemours seeks to develop because the needs of the children in the Nemours service area are being met by other providers in the state, principally Shands and Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital. Section 408.035(1)(a) and (b): The need for the health care facilities and health services being proposed; and the availability, quality of care, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing health care facilities and health services in the district of the applicant. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.044(6)(b).3/ The criteria for the evaluation of CON applications, including applications for organ transplantation programs, are set forth at section 408.035 and rule 59C-1.044. However, neither the applicable statutes nor rules have a numeric need methodology that predicts future need for PHT or PHLT programs. Thus, it is up to the applicant to demonstrate need in accordance with rule 59C-1.044. There are four OTSAs in Florida, numbered OTSA 1 through OTSA 4. NCH is located in OSTA 3, which includes the following counties: Seminole, Orange, Osceola, Brevard, Indian River, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, Martin, Lake, and Volusia. (See § 408.032(5), Fla. Stat; Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 01.044(2)(f)3.) OTSA 3 also generally corresponds with the pediatric cardiac catheterization and open-heart surgery service areas defined by AHCA rule. (See Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C- 1.032(2)(g) and 59C-1.033(2)(h)). Currently, there is no provider of PHT in OTSA 3, but there are three providers of pediatric cardiac catheterization and pediatric open-heart surgery: Orlando Health Arnold Palmer Hospital for Children; Florida Hospital for Children; and Nemours. There are no licensed providers of PHLT anywhere in the State of Florida. There are four existing providers and one approved provider of PHT services in Florida: UF Shands in OTSA 1; Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital in OTSA 2; Jackson Memorial Hospital in OSTA 4; and Memorial Regional Hospital, d/b/a Joe DiMaggio’s Hospital in OTSA 4; and a third approved program in OTSA 4, Nicklaus Children’s Hospital, which received final approval from AHCA in August 2017. As noted above, there is no fixed-need pool published for PHT, PHLT, or PLT programs. Alternatively, AHCA follows rule 59C-1.008(2)(e)2., which requires consideration of population demographics and dynamics; availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; medical treatment trends; and market conditions. To quantify the need for a new PHT program in District 7, OTSA 3, Nemours created and presented a methodology that started with the statewide use rate in its projected first year. Then for the second year, Nemours aggressively increased the use rate to the highest rate in any of the other transplant service areas in the state. Then, in an even more aggressive (and unreasonable) assumption, Nemours projected that it would essentially capture all of the cases in OTSA 3 by the second year of the program. In its application, the assumptions resulted in a projection that Nemours would do four transplants in the first year of operation and eight in the second. These projections fall short of the rule requirement that the applicant project a minimum of 12 transplants per year by the second year of operation. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.044(6)(b)2. At hearing, Nemours updated (increased) those first and second year projections to 7 and 13 cases, respectively. However, these updated projections included one child, aged 15 to 17, in year one, and two in year two. There are several reasons these projections lack credibility. First, as noted, Nemours assumed a near- 100 percent market share based on the highest use rate in the state by just year two. Second, when Nemours prepared its update, it used the most recent calendar year data. However, this was not the most current data. Calendar Year 2016 reflected 34 cases statewide, but that number had dropped to 21 for the most recent 12-month period available at the time of the hearing. Use of this most recent 12-month data would have significantly decreased the Nemours PHT volume projections. In addition, the projection of 13 cases by year two would place Nemours at a higher PHT case volume than three of the four established programs in the state, and would be at a level that is nearly equivalent to the much more established Shands program. This is not credible, especially considering that Nemours also admitted at hearing that only two OTSA 3 residents received pediatric heart transplants in 2016. The existence of unmet need cannot be based solely on the absence of an existing service in the proposed service area. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.008(2)(e)3. While Nemours’ own health planner agreed that the absence of a PHT program in OTSA 3 is not itself a basis for finding need, Nemours nevertheless argues that this rule is inapplicable in this proceeding because the title to this subsection of the rule is “Comparative Review” and a portion of this subsection addresses competing applications in the same cycle. As detailed further in the Conclusions of Law section herein, this interpretation is unconvincing and rejected. AHCA interprets this rule provision to apply to those batched applications submitted without the submission of a competing application in the same batching cycle, as with Nemours in this proceeding. Nemours initiated its cardiac catheterization and cardiac surgery program in June/July 2016. In its PHT application, Nemours projected that it would meet or exceed the rule minimum required volumes of 200 cardiac catheterizations and 125 open-heart surgery cases by the end of 2017. Actual volumes achieved by Nemours in CY 2017 were 97 open-heart cases and 196 cardiac catheterizations. The incidence of PHLT is extremely low. During the four calendar years, 2013 through 2016, there were only 16 PHLT transplants performed nationwide. Only one Florida resident received a PHLT during that four-year period, and that was performed in Massachusetts. Also during that four-year period, only three Florida residents were registered for PHLT. There is no evidence in this record as to why two of the three registered Florida residents did not obtain a PHLT. Based on the national use rate for PHLTs from CY 2013 through CY 2016, Nemours projects that it will perform an average of one PHLT per year. Nemours acknowledges that due to the extremely low incidence of PHLTs, there may be some years that no PHLTs are performed at Nemours. Geographic Access There is no evidence of record that families living in central Florida are currently being forced to travel unreasonable distances to obtain PHT services. Indeed, there are five existing or approved programs within the state, with at least two located very reasonably proximate to OTSA 3. According to the analysis of travel distances for PHT patients living in OTSA 3 contained in the Nemours application (Exhibit 15), only some residents located in Brevard and Indian River Counties are not within 120 miles of an existing PHT program. There was agreement that patients that need a PHT are approaching the end-stage of cardiac function, and in the absence of a PHT will very likely die. Accordingly, it is reasonable to infer that the parents of a child living in central Florida and needing a PHT will travel to St. Petersburg or Gainesville for transplant services rather than let their child die because the travel distance is too far. To the contrary, the evidence in this record from witnesses on both sides, as well as common sense, is that families will go as far as necessary to save their child. The notion that there is some pent-up demand for PHT services among central Florida residents (especially when there is no evidence of a single OTSA 3 patient being turned down or unable to access a PHT) is without support in this record. The parents of four pediatric patients testified at the final hearing. Two testified for Nemours. The other two testified for AHCA and were parents of children that received PHTs at Shands. One of the Nemours witnesses was the parent of a child that has not received a transplant. The other received transplant services at Johns Hopkins All Children’s Hospital in St. Petersburg. The parents of the two Shands patients were representative of the two broad categories of PHT patients. One was a patient with a congenital heart defect that lives in Cocoa Beach (Brevard County). The patient likely had the heart defect since birth, but it was not diagnosed until she was six years old. That patient was asymptomatic at the time of diagnosis but deteriorated over a period of years. While she was first seen at Shands, the family had the time and researched other prominent institutions, including Texas Children’s Hospital, Boston Children’s Hospital, Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, and the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. They did this because, like all of the parents that testified, they “would have gone to the ends of the earth” to save their child. This family researched the volumes and experience of the programs they considered and looked for what they felt was the best program for their child, and ultimately chose Shands. It was clear that they felt Shands was the right choice. Their daughter received her heart transplant at Shands, is doing well, and is now considering what college to attend. Additionally, this family did not find the two hours and 35 minute travel time from their home in Brevard County to Shands to be an impediment, and actually consider Shands as being relatively close to their home. This testimony supports the obvious truism that obtaining the best possible outcome for a sick child is the paramount goal of any parent. The other parent witness called by AHCA has a daughter that, on Christmas Eve in 2008, went from perfectly healthy to near death and being placed on life support within a 24-hour period. As opposed to a congenital heart defect, this patient had cardiomyopathy. This family lives in Windermere, a suburb of Orlando. She acquired a virus that attacked her heart. She was initially treated at Arnold Palmer Children’s Hospital where she had to be placed on ECMO. From there, she was safely airlifted to Shands while still on ECMO where, upon arrival, the receiving team of physicians informed the family that she was one of the most critically ill children they had ever seen. After an 11-hour open-heart surgery, a Berlin Heart was successfully implanted and kept her alive for four months until an appropriate donor heart became available. This patient also had an excellent outcome and is now a student at the University of Florida. The following exchange summarizes how the child’s mother felt about the inconvenience of having to travel from the Orlando area to Gainesville: Q If a family in Orlando told you, or in your city of residence told you that their child was critically ill and they were worried about having to travel and potentially spend time in Gainesville to get care, what would you tell them? A Well, I would tell them to just take it a day at a time and – when your child is critically ill, convenience never really comes into your mind. What comes into your mind is how do I help my child live. And so you will go anywhere. And it’s just an hour and a half, it just doesn’t matter. When you are talking about saving your child, it means nothing. It literally means nothing. It is clear from the testimony of these two parents that nothing about having a gravely ill child is “convenient.” It creates great stress, but it was also clear that having an experienced provider was more important than just geographic proximity. The mothers of the two Shands patients persuasively spoke of their concerns about further diluting the volumes of the existing programs that could result from approval of a sixth pediatric heart transplant program in Florida, particularly when there are two other programs that are not that far from the Orlando area.4/ While transplantation is not an elective service, it is not done on an emergent basis. As noted, the number of families affected is, quite fortunately, very small. While having a child with these issues is never “convenient,” the travel issues that might exist do not outweigh the weight of the evidence that fails to demonstrate a need for approval of either application. The Orlando area, being centrally located in Florida, is reasonably accessible to all of the existing providers. Most appear to go to Shands, which is simply not a substantial distance away. The credible evidence is that families facing these issues are able to deal with the travel inconvenience. In addition, Nemours presented evidence regarding the various locations at which they provide services, ranging from Pensacola to Port St. Lucie. Clearly, Nemours sees itself as providing some cardiac services to patients in these locations, but it would also suggest that patients seen at these locations may be referred to NCH for transplant services, which would mean that some patients would be bypassing closer facilities. As observed by AHCA, for Nemours to posit that it is appropriate for patients to travel from Pensacola or Jacksonville to Orlando while asserting that it is not acceptable for patients in Orlando to go to Gainesville or St. Petersburg is an illogical inconsistency. Financial Access Nemours asserts that approval of its proposed programs will enhance financial access to care. Nemours currently serves patients without regard to ability to pay and will extend these same policies to transplant recipients. Approximately half of Nemours’ projected PHTs are to be provided to Medicaid recipients, the other half to commercially insured patients.5/ However, there was no competent evidence of record that access to PHT or PHLT services was being denied by any of the existing transplant providers because of a patient’s inability to pay. Transplant Rates at Shands In its need methodology, Nemours utilized the use rate from OTSA 1 where Shands is located because it is the highest use rate in the state. Despite this, Nemours then asserted that Shands is not performing as many PHTs as it could or should. The Nemours CON applications are not predicated on any argument that their proposed programs are needed because of poor quality care at any of the existing pediatric transplant programs in Florida. Indeed, Dr. Wearden stated his belief that Shands provides good quality care in its transplant programs, and he respects the Shands lead surgeon, Dr. Mark Bleiweis. As evidence of his respect for the Shands PHT program, Dr. Wearden has referred several transplant patients to Dr. Bleiweis at Shands. Despite that position, Nemours argued that the Shands program is unduly conservative and cautious in its organ selection and may have some “capacity” issues due to a few cited instances of apparent surgeon unavailability. These assertions, made by Nemours witnesses with no first-hand knowledge of the operations of the Shands program, are not persuasive. With regard to whether the Shands program is unduly “cautious,” “conservative,” or “picky,” Nemours relied on a document produced by Shands in discovery. Nemours also relied on data reported by Shands to the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR). The data included a list of all of the organs offered to Shands since the beginning of 2015, the sequencing of the offer of that organ to Shands, whether the organ was transplanted at Shands or elsewhere, the primary and secondary reasons the organ was refused (if refused) and other information. The SRTR exhibit demonstrates that a high number of the organs that are offered are not acceptable for transplant on patients waitlisted at Shands. It also shows that organs that are accepted may have to be examined by many different centers before being deemed potentially acceptable. This demonstrates the extensive level of complexity, nuance, and clinical judgment involved in the decision to accept an organ for transplant in a pediatric patient. Indeed, Dr. Wearden agreed that the decision by a program to accept or turn down an organ involves both clinical expertise and judgment, and that there are many reasons an organ might be turned down, which helps explain why the transplanted percentage of total organs offered nationally is on average, so small. Dr. Wearden chose a few examples of organs that were not taken by Shands to express an opinion that Shands may be unduly conservative in its organ selection. However, this assertion was credibly refuted by Dr. Pietra, a transplant cardiologist and the medical director of the UF Health Congenital Heart Center. Dr. Pietra discussed the complexity of these cases and how simply looking at the SRTR data does not provide enough information to reach Dr. Wearden’s conclusion. An organ that might be acceptable for one patient would not be acceptable for another for a host of reasons. Many more organs are rejected by transplant centers than are accepted. Dr. Pietra credibly opined that being conservative and cautious are important traits for a transplant surgeon, particularly for one that wants the accepted organ to work well for the patient long-term. That does not mean that Shands is rejecting organs when it should have taken them, nor does the SRTR data support the proposition that the Nemours program should be approved because its program may have accepted an organ for a particular patient that Shands might have rejected. Nemours also argues that Shands performs PHTs at a rate lower than the region and the country, and that this should mitigate for the approval of another program. This assertion is predicated on waitlist information reported in the SRTR data. Patients that are placed on the waitlist have different status designations, depending on the severity of their condition. That status may change, up or down, over time. Due to the shortage of organs, until a patient reaches status 1A, he or she is unlikely to be offered an organ. The evidence reflected that Shands puts patients on the PHT organ waitlist at a time earlier than the moment they require the transplant surgery under what is called the “pediatric prerogative.” This helps those patients maintain their status on the list but does not result in organs being provided to less severely ill patients to the detriment of those in greater need. Further, the record evidence supports the finding that Shands waitlists patients because the clinical determination has been made that the child will ultimately require a transplant. This was corroborated by the parent of a Shands PHT patient who testified that when her daughter was placed on the waitlist, Dr. Fricker concluded at that time that her daughter would ultimately need a PHT, even though she was placed on a lower status initially, and it was a few years before the transplant occurred. Transplant surgeon Dr. Victor Morell, of the Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh, testified that he waitlists his PHT patients not only when they need the procedure performed immediately, but rather when, in his clinical judgment, he determines the patient will ultimately need a PHT. This testimony supports the finding that there is nothing clinically unusual or inappropriate about how the Shands program waitlists patients. Shands realizes that its philosophy, which is contemplated within and permitted under the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) rules, makes its statistics, both in terms of percent of patients transplanted and waitlist mortality, look worse. While Shands’ waitlist mortality may be higher than expected as reflected in the SRTR data, it is still significantly lower than in the UNOS region or the United States. Shands advocates for its patients by their waitlist practices because it believes it helps secure the best outcomes for its patients. It does not indicate need for a new PHT program. Nemours also suggests that there may be a “capacity” problem at Shands because the organ rejection information provided by Shands shows that, during the 3-year period of CY 2015 through CY 2017, there were seven entries showing as either a primary or secondary reason for organ rejection that the surgeon was unavailable. However, this included both adult and pediatric hearts, and further investigation revealed that in only four instances were there potential PHT recipients at Shands. Of those four hearts that were rejected, two were not accepted by any PHT provider, and the two that were accepted were placed with adult transplant patients, not PHT patients. Shands has two PHT transplant surgeons. In very few instances at Shands, an organ was offered but not accepted because the surgeon was not available for one of several reasons. In one instance, there was another transplant scheduled. A surgeon could be ill, could be gone, or may have just completed another long surgery and be too fatigued to safely perform another. Like Shands, Nemours also has two experienced PHT surgeons. Although Dr. Wearden believes that Nemours would endeavor to not reject an organ for this reason, this ambition ignores reality. He cannot guarantee that the same could not or would not happen at Nemours for the same reasons it occasionally occurs at Shands. As explained by Dr. Pietra, when there are only small to medium volume programs, there is not likely to be a sufficient number of surgeons such that this scenario can be avoided entirely. Not Normal Circumstances In both its heart and heart/lung applications, Nemours articulated the following “not normal circumstances” in seeking approval: Florida does not have any approved pediatric heart/lung transplant programs. Florida's only two approved pediatric lung transplant programs have not performed any lung transplant programs in the last two reporting years according to AHCA reporting data. Significantly, there are no pediatric heart transplant or lung transplant programs in AHCA's Organ Transplant Service Area OTSA 3 in which NCH is located-an area of the State with one the fastest growing and youngest populations. Florida has no other pediatric comprehensive, multi-organ thoracic transplant program. Florida has no other pediatric comprehensive, multi-organ thoracic transplant program that is part of a pediatric specific integrated delivery system such as Nemours offers. NCH offers a unique, dedicated model of cardiothoracic care developed at its Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children (AIDHC) in Wilmington, Delaware and implemented upon the opening of the program at NCH. The key and differentiating element of this Model of Care is a unified team of cardiac clinical and administrative professionals who serve children with cardiac problems in dedicated facilities (the "Cardiac Team"). The Cardiac Team only cares for children with cardiac diagnoses. As such, the Cardiac Team of anesthesiologists, surgeons, cardiologists, nurses, and other support personnel do not "float" to other hospital floors or departments as in a typical hospital setting. This dedicated model of cardiac care allows the Cardiac Team to develop highly specialized knowledge and relationships to provide the best treatment protocols for patients with cardiac conditions. NCH has developed state-of-the art facilities and innovative clinical pathways for the care of the most complex pediatric thoracic patients. NCH has and will bring new opportunities for research in pediatric cardiology, cardiac surgery, and pulmonary medicine, particularly clinical translational and basic research into the linkages between childhood obesity and cardiac conditions. Nemours operates a regional network of clinics in Florida, with primary locations in Pensacola, Jacksonville, and Orlando, that will operate in partnership with NCH for the appropriate regional referral of patients in Florida for pediatric thoracic care. NCH can reduce the out-migration of pediatric, thoracic transplant patients from OTSA 3 to other parts of the State as well as the out-migration of these patients to other out-of-state transplant programs. Similarly, NCH will reduce the outmigration of organs donated in Florida to other states ensuring that Florida recipient patients are first priority for organs donated in Florida. NCH has in place the infrastructure, facilities, and resources to seamlessly add thoracic transplant services to its existing comprehensive cardiac surgery program. Additional needed staff are already being recruited to this program. As a result, the project has minimal incremental cost that will need to be incurred. Total project costs are, therefore, estimated to be $715,425.00. In addition, according to Nemours, an additional “not normal” circumstance has emerged since the filing of the applications: the approval of Nemours’ PLT application in the absence of a PHT program at the facility, which it contends is “a very unusual situation.” Noteworthy about these purported reasons for approval are that: (1) none of them are specifically directed at a unique circumstance relating to a need for another PHT program; and (2) most of them are either a recitation of the fact that there is no existing program in the service area or are about Nemours’ capability to provide these services. They are not directed at whether there is a need for its proposed programs. In fact, the main thrust of Nemours’ case was directed at proof regarding its capabilities. But the flaw in this theme is best demonstrated in the testimony of Dawn Tucker, the last witness called by Nemours. Ms. Tucker is the cardiac program administrative director for Nemours. When asked why she supported the proposed program, she talked about the experience of the team, a desire to care for sick patients, an organization (Nemours) that financially supports the program, and the network of centers that Nemours has in Florida. These factors address why Nemours “wants” these CONs. None of them addresses the threshold issue of whether there is a “need” for these programs in OTSA 3. More specifically, the first, third, and fourth bullet points are all based on the absence of a program in OTSA 3. By rule, that is not a basis for establishing need. Fla. Admin. Code R. 59C-1.009(2)(e)3. AHCA appropriately rejected the absence of a program in OTSA 3 as the sole basis upon which need for the proposed projects could be established. The second bullet point relates to the pediatric lung transplant application that is not at issue in this matter. The fifth and sixth bullet points relate to the Nemours integrated model of care. But again, this does not address whether there is a need for the proposed programs. The fact that Nemours has an employed-physician model is not unique or “not normal.” AHCA considered the information regarding the model of care and correctly noted that the model of care does not itself enhance access or improve outcomes. It should be noted that Shands’ doctors are employed by the University of Florida. In addition, the reliance on this model does not guarantee a robust program. This bullet point references the much older and more established Alfred I. duPont Hospital for Children in Wilmington, Delaware, that is touted as the model for Nemours. Nemours presented evidence relating to its more established hospital in Delaware that also provides PHT services. However, the PHT program at duPont is a low-volume program, performing only one PHT in 2016. None of the managed- care companies that recognize Shands as a center of excellence also recognizes the duPont Hospital as such. One of the companies--Lifetrac--acknowledges duPont as a “supplemental” program, whereas Shands is one of its “select” programs. This demonstrates that simply having the financial resources of the duPont Foundation or the model of care used by that organization does not guarantee high volumes or success. The “not normal circumstance” bullet points regarding Nemours’ facilities, research, and other infrastructure similarly do not demonstrate need. Otherwise, a hospital could obtain a CON for a new program by spending the money in advance and then demanding approval based upon those expenditures. AHCA recognized that Nemours had recruited some very qualified clinicians, but correctly noted that that does not create or evidence need for the proposed programs. The remaining bullet point asserts that approval of the PHT and PHLT programs could reduce outmigration of both patients and organs. By definition, because neither of these transplant programs exists in OTSA 3, all patients leave OTSA 3 for these services. Again, that alone does not establish need, nor is it automatically a “not normal” circumstance. As discussed herein, Nemours has not demonstrated a sufficient need or an access problem that justifies approval of either application. With regard to the outmigration of organs from Florida, Nemours has argued that Florida is a net exporter of organs and that this is a “not normal” circumstance justifying approval of its application. However, organs harvested in one state are commonly used in another. There is nothing unusual or negative about that fact. Indeed, Dr. Wearden agreed that in his experience, this is a common occurrence. There is a national allocation system through UNOS and this sharing, as explained by Dr. Pietra, facilitates the best match for organs and patients. UNOS divides the country into regions for the purpose of allocation of donor organs, with Florida being one of six states in Region 3. The evidence of record did not establish that approval of the Nemours applications would result in the reduction of organs leaving Florida, or even that such would be a desirable result. Nemours also argued at hearing that approving their applications would increase the number of donor organs that are procured and transplanted in Florida. Nemours suggested that its programs would increase public awareness and implied that it would accept organs for future patients that surgeons at other programs turn down. However, these arguments are purely conjectural and are rejected. No record evidence exists which demonstrates that a Nemours program would increase the supply of organs in Florida. Indeed, Nemours presented no such relevant data or statistical evidence in its applications to demonstrate that this will occur. Finally, Nemours argues that its PHT and PHLT applications should be approved because it does not make sense for AHCA to have approved the PLT program but denied the other two applications. Nemours goes on to note that while there are hospitals in the country that do PHTs but not PLTs, there are no hospitals that do lungs but not hearts. Regardless of whether that is true, Florida law separates these three services into separate CON applications, which are reviewed independently. The wisdom of the rule is not at issue in this proceeding. Regardless of any overlap in the skill sets required to perform these procedures, approval of the pediatric lung transplant application does not determine need for pediatric heart or pediatric heart/lung programs. Nemours failed to establish that “not normal” circumstances currently exist that would warrant approval of either the PHT or PHLT programs. Nor did Nemours credibly demonstrate any other indicators of need for its proposed programs. Section 408.035(1)(c): The ability of the applicant to provide quality of care and the applicant’s record of providing quality of care. The parties stipulated that Nemours is a quality provider. However, AHCA maintains that this criterion is in dispute to the extent that center transplant volume as a result of Nemours’ approval would lead to or correlate with negative patient outcomes. Nemours failed to demonstrate that it would achieve the volumes it projected unless it takes significant volumes from other Florida providers.6/ Approval of Nemours will not create transplant patients that do not exist or are not currently able to reasonably access services. While Nemours has assembled a team of professionals with varying levels of transplant experience, it has not been demonstrated that it will achieve volume sufficient to reasonably assure quality care.7/ Section 408.035(1)(e): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to health care for residents of the service district. Approval of the Nemours PHT and PHLT programs would unquestionably improve geographic access to those services for the very few residents of OTSA 3 that need them. However, given the extreme rarity of pediatric heart and heart/lung transplants, approval of the Nemours programs would not result in enhanced access for a significant number of patients. Moreover, there was no credible non-hearsay evidence presented at hearing that any resident of OTSA 3 that needed PHT or PHLT services was unable to access those services at one of the existing PHT programs in Florida or, for PHLT, at a facility elsewhere. Based upon persuasive evidence at hearing, there is also clearly a positive relationship between volume and outcomes. As with any complex endeavor, practice makes perfect. In this instance, maintaining a minimum PHT case volume provides experience to the clinicians involved and helps maintain proficiency. According to the credible testimony of Dr. Pietra, programs should perform no fewer than 10 PHTs per year. “If you can stay above 10, then your program is going to be exercised at a minimum amount to keep everybody sort of at a peak performance.” The clear intent of the minimum volume requirement of 12 heart transplants per year contained in rule 59C- 1.044(6)(b)2. is to ensure a sufficient case volume to maintain the proficiency of the transplant surgeons and other clinicians involved in the surgical and post-surgical care of PHT patients. In addition, pediatric transplant programs are measured statistically based on outcomes, such as mortality and morbidity. Because of this, the loss of even one patient in a small program can be devastating to that hospital’s mortality statistics. As such, small programs may become less willing to take more complicated patients. In a perverse sort of way, adding more programs that dilute volumes may decrease, rather than increase, access because of the fear a small program might have for taking more complex patients. Adequate case volume is also important for teaching facilities, such as Shands, to benefit residents of all the OTSAs by being able to train the next generation of transplant physicians. The mothers of the two Shands patients that testified made note of the complexity of their daughters’ conditions and how their cases were used for training purposes. There was no persuasive evidence of record that approval of the Nemours applications would meaningfully and significantly enhance geographic access to transplant services in OTSA 3. The modest improvement in geographic access for the few patients that are to be served by the two programs is not significant enough to justify approval in the absence of demonstrated need. There is no evidence that approval of the Nemours applications will enhance financial access nor that patients are not currently able to access PHT or PHLT services because of payor status. Section 408.035(1)(g): The extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost- effectiveness. It is clear that establishing and maintaining a transplant program is expensive. Given the limited pool of patients, the added expense of yet a sixth Florida program is not a cost-effective use of resources. This criterion also relates to the Nemours position that AHCA should approve the PHT and PHLT applications simply because the PLT application was approved, and it would not be cost-effective for Nemours unless the PHT and PHLT applications were also approved. However, each of these applications must rise or fall on its own merit. As of the hearing, Nemours had not yet implemented its PLT program. Given the absence of need for either the PHT or PHLT programs, the cost-effective solution might be for Nemours to reconsider implementation of the PLT program. 408.035(1)(i): The applicant’s past and proposed provision of health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. AHCA agreed at hearing that Nemours satisfies section 408.035(1)(i). Nonetheless, Nemours provides a very high level of Medicaid services, and projects a high-level volume related to Medicaid patients and charity care patients. As noted, approximately half of the PHTs projected by Nemours will be performed on Medicaid patients. Conformance with this criterion would mitigate toward approval had there been persuasive evidence that Medicaid and medically indigent patients are currently being denied access to PHT and PHLT services. However, no such evidence was presented.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying CON Application Nos. 10471 and 10472 filed by The Nemours Foundation, d/b/a Nemours Children’s Hospital. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Lawnwood Regional Medical Center is a 225 bed community hospital in Ft. Pierce, Florida. It currently holds a CON to add an additional 50 beds. Lawnwood is owned and operated by Hospital Corporation of America, (HCA). On October 14, 1985, Lawnwood submitted a CON application for authorization to provide cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery programs at the facility. The project for both services would involve a total of approximately 10,000 sq. ft. of construction consisting of both new construction and renovation of the present facility, with a project cost of approximately $3.6 million. Lawnwood developed the project because it found a need therefor as a result of various visits to the administrator by physicians practicing in the area who indicated a growing demand for the services. The physicians in question indicated they were referring more and more patients to facilities out of the immediate area and the services in question were very much needed in this locality. The main service area for Lawnwood consists of the northern four counties of DHRS District IX, including St. Lucie, Martin, Okeechobee, and Indian River Counties. The majority of the cardiology practitioners in this service area find it necessary, because of the lack of cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery programs, to transfer patients to facilities either in Palm Beach County, which are from one to two hours away, or to facilities outside the District, primarily in Miami or the University of Florida area, which are even further. While many heart patients are not severely impacted by this, one specific class of patient, the streptokinase patient is. This procedure, involving the use of a chemical injected by catheter to dissolve a clot causing blockage must he done within a relatively short period of time after the onset of the blockage to be effective. However, this can he done outside a cardiac cath lab. A representative sampling of doctors testifying for Lawnwood indicated that during the year prior to the hearing, one doctor, Kahddus, sent 140 patients outside the district for catheterization procedures and 90 additional patients for open heart surgery. Other physicians referring outside District IX included Dr. Hayes - 4; Dr. Marjieh - 240; and Dr. Whittle - 12. Doctors indicated that the situation was so severe that some physicians practicing in the Palm Beach area, who have cardiac catheter and open heart surgery services available to them in the immediate locale are nonetheless referring patients outside the District for these procedures. No physician who does this testified, however. St. Mary's Hospital is a 358 bed not for profit hospital located in Palm Beach County. It has been issued a CON for a cardiac catheterization lab expected to come on line in April, 1987. Palm Beach Gardens Medical Center is a 204 bed acute care hospital which currently operates a cardiac catheterization laboratory and an open heart surgery program. It, too, is located in Palm Beach County. A second cardiac catheterization laboratory was scheduled to open at this facility in February, 1987. An additional cardiac catheterization laboratory is operating at Delray Community Hospital and this facility, as well as the currently existing facility at PBGMC are the only two currently operating cardiac catheterization laboratories within DHRS District IX. There are, however, other cardiac catheterization labs approved for District IX. These include the aforementioned second PBGMC lab, the aforementioned St. Mary's lab, one at JFK Hospital and one at Boca Raton Community Hospital. These latter four facilities are not yet operational. As to open heart surgery programs, only PBGMC and Delray Community Hospital have open heart surgery programs on line. JFK has been approved for an open heart surgery program. DHRS has promulgated rules for determining the need for cardiac catheterization and open heart surgery programs. These rules are found in Section 10-5.11(15) and (16), F.A.C. and establish methodologies based on use rates to determine need. The use rate for the applicable time period here, July, 1984 through June, 1985, is to be multiplied by the projected population for the District in the planning horizon, (July, 1987) which figure is then divided by 600 procedures per laboratory to determine the need for catheterization labs or 350 open heart procedures to determine the need for additional open heart surgery programs. The difficulty in applying this methodology to the current situation is in the calculation of the "use rate" used to measure the utilization of a service per unit of population. For the rule here, it is expressed as the number of procedures per 100,000 population. There is more than one way to calculate a use rate and the DHRS rules do not specify the method of calculation. An "actual use rate" is determined by applying the actual number of procedures performed within a particular geographical area in a particular time period. Data to determine an actual use rate for catheterization services or open heart surgery is not currently available in District IX, however. Applying the formula cited above to the existing figures, however, reflects a use rate of 62.3 procedures per 100,000 population in District IX. This is far below the 409.7 procedures per 100,000 population statewide. Lawnwood proposes to apply the statewide use rate rather than the District IX use rate because District IX is currently in a start up phase and does not have sufficient historical information available to provide an accurate use rate for the purpose of the need methodology. The lower the use rate, the lower the need will be shown to be. If the lower District IX rate is applied, in light of the numerous other laboratories coming on line approved already, there would clearly be no need for any additional services in either the catheterization or open heart surgery areas. Some experts offer as a potential substitute for the actual use rate a "facility based use rate" which involves determining the number of procedures performed in all hospitals within a particular geographic area for the applicable time period and dividing that number of procedures by the population of that area. DHRS evaluators employed this "facility based use rate" in their need calculations. At least one expert, however, contends that the "facility based use rate" is appropriate only when certain conditions exist. These include an adequate supply of facilities or providers in the area; historical, long-standing experience rather than start-up programs; and a lack of a high number of referrals outside of the particular area. Since these three conditions are not met here, it would seen that the "facility based use rate" would not be appropriate. In determining the statewide use rate of 409.07, Mr. Nelson, consultant testifying on behalf of Lawnwood, derived that figure by compiling utilization data for all hospitals in the state providing cardiac catheterization during the time period in question divided by the statewide population as of January 1, 1985. The resulting figure was thereafter converted into a rate per unit of population. A statewide figure such as this includes patients of all ages and it would appear that this is as it should be. Catheterization and open heart surgery services would be open to all segments of the state population and it would seem only right therefore that the entire population be considered when arriving at figures designed to assess the need for additional services. On the other hand, experts testifying on behalf of the intervenors utilized statistical manipulation which tended to indicated that the need, reflected as greater under Mr. Nelson's methodology, was in fact not accurate and was flawed. He that as it may, it is difficult to conclude which of the different experts testifying is accurate and the chances are great that none is 100 percent on track. More likely, and it is so found, the appropriate figure would be one more extensive than the population figures and resultant use rate for District IX alone and closer to the statewide rate across a broad spectrum of the population. When the fact that the older population of the District IX counties, the age cohort more likely to utilize catheterization and open heart surgery services, is greater in the District IX counties than perhaps in other counties north of that area, the inescapable conclusion must be reached that a use rate significantly higher than 62.3 would be appropriate. This may not, however, require the use of a statewide rate of 409.7. Utilizing, arguendo, the statewide use rate of approximately 409 procedures per 100,000 population results in a projected number of procedures of 4,576 in District IX if the projected population figure of slightly more than 1.1 million holds true. When that 4,576 figure is divided by the minimum number of procedures required by rule prior to the addition of further cardiac catheterization labs, (600),a need for 7.63 labs in District IX is shown. With six labs existing or approved, a net need of two additional labs would appear to exist since DHRS rounds upward when the number is .5 or higher. A similar analysis applied to open heart surgery, using a statewide use rate of 120.94 per 100,000 population results in a procedure number of 1,353 for the same population. Utilizing the DHRS rule minimum of 350 procedures per lab for open heart surgery procedures, a net yield of 3.87 programs would be needed in District IX in January, 1988. Subtracting the three existing or approved programs now in the district, and rounding up, would show a need of one additional open heart surgery program. These are the figures relied upon by Lawnwood. Accepting them for the moment and going to the issue of financial feasibility, DHRS apparently has agreed that the project costs for this facility are reasonable. Lawnwood has shown itself to be a profitable hospital and HCA is a large, well run corporation not known for the establishment of non- profitable operations. If one accepts that the actual utilization will approximate the projected utilization figures, then the operation would clearly be financially feasible. Both intervenors challenged the Petitioner's pro forma statement of earnings, but their efforts were not particularly successful. If Lawnwood can perform a sufficient number of procedures, then it should be able to break even without difficulty. Turning to the question of the impact that the opening of Lawnwood's facilities would have on the other providers or prospective providers in the area, both PBGMC and St. Mary's contend that there would be a substantial adverse impact on their existing services as well as on the prospective units already approved. Lawnwood proposes to service a portion of the indigent population with its two new operations. Were this to be done, indeed an impact would be felt by St. Mary's which is currently a substantial provider of indigent and Medicaid treatment and St. Mary's will be particularly vulnerable since it is in the start-up phase of its cardiac catheterization lab. Currently, PBGMC draws patients in both services from Martin and St. Lucie counties as well as from Palm Beach County. The percentage of patients drawn from these more northern counties is, while not overwhelming, at least significant, being 14 percent from Martin County and 9 percent from St. Lucie. Taken together, this constitutes 23 percent of the activity in these areas. St. Mary's anticipates a loss of 25 percent of its potential catheterization cases and if this happens, it will lose approximately $719,000.00 of its gross revenue in catheterization cases alone. St. Mary's further predicts that if Lawnwood's facility is opened, it will have difficulty recruiting and maintaining qualified personnel. PBGMC, figuring it's loss to be approximately $492,000.00, estimates that a layoff of nursing and other staff personnel or the redirecting them into other areas of the hospital would be indicated. PBGMC also refers to the cumulative impact not only of Lawnwood's proposal but of the other cardiac programs in the District which have been approved but are not yet on line. If all come into operation, PBGMC estimates it could lose as much as 69 percent of its activity in these areas. These negative predictions are not, however, supported by any firm evidence and are prospective in nature. From a historic perspective, it is doubtful that any lasting significant negative impact would occur to either PBGMC or St. Mary's overall operation by the opening of Lawnwood's facility. Turning to the question of staffing and its relationship to the issue of quality of care, there is little doubt that Lawnwood could obtain appropriate staffing for both its services if approved. Of the physicians already on staff at the facility, many are now certified and the hospital and the medical community plans training programs for those who are not. As to nurses and other support personnel, Lawnwood is satisfied that it can recruit from other HCA facilities and will recruit from the open market. It has a full time recruiter on staff. Quality of care is of paramount concern to the administration of Lawnwood. It has a current three year accreditation from the Joint Commission on Hospital Accreditation. It also has a quality control committee made up of both physicians and other staff members and the laboratory is approved by appropriate accrediting agencies. These same types of quality control programs would be applied to both new requested services as well. The rules in question governing the approval of cardiac catheterization laboratories and open heart surgery programs set down certain criteria for the approval of additional services which, as to the question of cardiac catheters states at subparagraph 15(o)1a that there will be no additional adult cardiac catheterization laboratories established in a service area unless the average number of catheterizations performed per year by existing and approved laboratories performing adult procedures in the service area is greater than 600. Much the same qualification relates to open heart surgery programs except that in that latter case, the minimum number would be 350 open heart procedures annually for adults and 130 for pediatric heart procedures annually. Ms. Farr, consultant for DHRS, feels that Petitioner's application would be inconsistent with the minimum standards set forth in the rule because she does not believe the Petitioner would do enough procedures in either cardiac catheterization or open heart surgery to meet the 600/350 criteria. She also contends that the proposal is not consistent with the District Health Plan, because the District plan requires the rule which addresses need be followed. Since, in her opinion, the application of the rule shows no need, there would be a violation of the District Health Plan if these proposals were approved. In the area of cardiac catheterization laboratories, of the six licensed and approved labs in District IX, only that existing currently at PBGMC is presently performing more than 600 procedures per year. Substantial testimony tending to indicate that a well organized cardiac catheterization lab can handle between 1500 and 2000 procedures per year, the 600 figure would tend to be a minimum and was so recognized by the drafters of the rule. No evidence was introduced by any party to show the numbers of open heart surgery procedures currently being performed in the three existing or approved open heart surgery programs in the District. Again, however, it would appear that DHRS criteria of 350 would be a minimum rather than an optimum or maximum figure. The parties have stipulated that as to the travel time criteria set forth in the rule for both procedures, 90 percent of the population of District IX is within two hour automobile travel time from availability to either or both procedures. It would further appear from an evaluation of the evidence, that while difficulty is experienced in arranging treatment for indigent transfer patients outside the District, little if any difficulty is experienced in arranging transfer treatment for those who can pay for the service. Little difficulty is experienced in securing treatment for these individuals in either Miami, Orlando, or elsewhere, and aside from inconvenience, there was no showing that a real, substantial health risk existed as a result of the transfer process. All things taken together, then, though the numerical evaluation under the rule process, applying a statewide use rate, tends to indicate that there is a "need" for this additional service, the subparagraph "o" criteria of 600/350 procedures requirement prior to authorization of additional service is not met.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Lawnwood's application for a CON to add a cardiac catheterization laboratory and open heart surgery program at its facility in Ft. Pierce, Florida, be denied. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of March, 1987 at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1539 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. By Petitioner - Lawnwood 1 & 2. Accepted and incorporated. 3 & 4. Accepted and incorporated. 5. Accepted and incorporated. 6. Accepted and incorporated. 7. Accepted and incorporated. 8. Accepted and incorporated. 9. Accepted and incorporated. 10. Accepted and incorporated. 11. Accepted and incorporated. 12. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 13. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 14. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected as indicating a need for 2 additional cath labs. Rejected as calling for determination of "not normal status for District IX. Accepted in general but rejected insofar as there is an implication that non-indigent patients experience "significant" difficulty securing treatment. Accepted. 19 & 20. Accepted as to the streptokinase patients specifically. Accepted but not considered to be of major significance. Accepted and incorporated. 23 & 24. Accepted and incorporated. 25 & 26. Accepted and incorporated. 27 & 28. Accepted and incorporated. 29. Accepted. 30 & 31. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 32. Rejected as not supported by the best evidence. 33-36. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Accepted. 39-42. Accepted. By Intervenor - St. Mary's 1 - 4. Accepted and incorporated. 5 & 6. Accepted and incorporated. 7 - 9. Accepted and incorporated. 10. Rejected as not supported by the best evidence. 11 & 12. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not supported by the best evidence. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. 19-21. Merely a summary of testimony. Not a Finding of Fact. 22-24. Summary of testimony. Not a Finding of Fact. Accepted as ultimate Finding of Fact. Rejected. Rejected as a summary of testimony. Not a Finding of Fact. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Subordinate. 32-36. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not Finding of Facts. 37-40. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 41 & 42. Accepted. 43-46. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. By Intervenor - PBGMC 1 & 2. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted except for last sentence which is irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated. 6 & 7. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted. 9. Accepted and Incorporated. 10 & 11. Accepted and incorporated. 12. Accepted. 13-16. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected ultimately as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Accepted. Rejected. Accepted. 23 & 24. Accepted. 25 & 26. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. 27. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas A. Sheehan, III, Esquire 9th Floor, Barnett Centre 625 North Flagler Drive West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 R. Bruce McKibben, Esquire 1323 Winewood Blvd. Building 1, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eleanor A. Joseph, Esquire Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire 2700 Blairstone Road, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire 306 North Monroe Street Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
