Findings Of Fact Florida Real Estate Commission is a licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes, and their implementing rules. Respondent Louis Diabo is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker holding license number 0146400. The last license issued was as a broker in limbo with a home address of Post Office Box 2386, Marathon, Florida 33050. On or about July 13, 1988, Ms. Diabo solicited and obtained a one (1) year exclusive right to sell agreement from Anthony and Milagros P. Bonachea, as owners, to sell vacant land located in the Florida Keys, further described as Lot 11, Block 16, Coco Plum Beach Subdivision. On or about March 13, 1989, Ms. Diabo solicited and obtained a contract for sale and purchase of Lot 11, Block 16, Coco Plum Beach Subdivision, between Duane W. Lewis and Helen F. Lewis, as buyers, and Anthony and Milagros P. Bonachea, as sellers, for a total price of $34,900. Ms. Diabo drafted the contract for sale and purchase. In its paragraph VII, "Restrictions, Easements, Limitations," the buyer accepted title subject to zoning, restrictions, prohibitions and other requirements imposed by governmental authority, but Ms. Diabo added that nothing would prevent use of the property for the purpose of "single family" housing. As a real estate professional and as the listing agent Ms. Diabo was aware that she was under a duty and an obligation to know the correct zoning, restrictions, prohibitions and other requirements imposed by governmental authorities on the property she listed for sale. She also knew that there was uncertainty about whether county development regulations under consideration might require the buyer to obtain transferrable development rights from other property owners in the Keys to build on the vacant lot being sold to Dwayne and Helen Lewis. Ms. Diabo owed Mr. and Mrs. Lewis a duty and they reasonably expected Ms. Diabo to inform them about governmental restrictions that might limit the use of the real property as a single family homesite. The transaction closed on or about April 7, 1989. Subsequent to closing, Mr. & Mrs. Lewis learned that they would have to purchase from $9,000 to $18,000 worth of transferable development rights (TDRs) in order to build on the vacant lot they bought through Ms. Diabo. Ms. Diabo had not explained to Mr. and Mrs. Lewis that they might be required to buy transferable development rights from another landowner to build on their lot, but there is no proof that such restrictions were effective at the time she dealt with the Lewises. There is no evidence in the record showing when the requirement to obtain transferrable development rights went into effect. As a consequence, it is not possible to determine whether Ms. Diabo failed to disclose to Mr. and Mrs. Lewis a zoning or use restriction in effect at the time of their purchase while she had asked Mr. Lewis to check on the zoning with the county building official, this did not relieve her of her own duty to investigate under Paragraph VII of the contract, and tell the purchasers of any limitations on building a single family home on the property. Petitioner failed to demonstrate, however, that any restrictions existed as of the time of the closing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued and filed by the Florida Real Estate dismissing the Administrative Complaint DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of February, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 90-6140 All but proposed paragraph 12 have been accepted and used, with appropriate editing, in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Louise Diabo, pro se 3015 Seville Street Apartment 14 Fort Lauderdale, FL 33304 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Although the parties to this case stipulated that the contract between the LaPointes and the Crowes was a valid contract for the purchase and sale of real estate, a genuine dispute arose between the LaPointes and the Crowes in that regard. Respondents became involved in this matter by showing the Crowes' property to the LaPointes on or before May 9, 1983, and thereby becoming a "co-operating broker'. with Deltona's Marco Island Realty Co. under an Exclusive Right To Sell agreement between Deltona and the Crowes dated January 13, 1983. Under the Exclusive Right To Sell, the Crowes agreed to pay Deltona a fee of 6% of the sales price for brokerage services and agreed, if a buyer failed to close a sales contract and forfeited a deposit to the Crowes, that Deltona could retain one- half of the deposit, but not exceeding the total amount of Deltona's fee, as compensation. The Exclusive Right To Sell also provided that Deltona was responsible to promptly pay any cooperating broker who sells the property for his services as soon as possible after receipt by Deltona of its real estate broker fee as provided in the Exclusive Right To Sell. By May 10, 1983, the LaPointes had made an offer to buy the property and the Crowes, by May 10, 1983, telegram to Deltona, agreed to sell the property for "$165,000, $500 in escrow with balance of $15,500 additional deposit after acceptance with balance at closing . . . sales commission $8,650. On May 11, 1983, Respondent Mary S. Davey, signed the sales contract for the LaPointes' purchase of the Crowes' property as "Agent (authorized by Buyer)." The sales contract also recited: "Buyer acknowledges that Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc/Deltona Marco Island Realty is the procuring real estate broker(s) in this transaction, and that the Broker is the agent for the Seller, and is being paid by the Seller." Respondent. Davey notified the LaPointes of the requirement for a $500 initial deposit and submitted the signed sales contract for the Crowes' signature. By letter dated May 12, 1983, Respondents confirmed "that the total commission to be paid on the sale of the [Crowes'] property is $8,650.00." It also confirmed: said commission is to be split 50/50 between MARCO BEACH ENTERPRISES, INC. and Deltona's Marco Island Realty." Also on May 12, 1983, the LaPointes sent Respondents a check for the $500 initial deposit with a note asking for a complete inventory of the contents of the condominium the LaPointes had inspected and a list of renters. The Crowes signed the Sales Contract on May 16, 1983. By May 24, 1983, Respondents still had not complied with the request for a complete inventory of the condominium's furnishings and for a list of renters. On that date, Respondents sent the LaPointes a copy of the signed Sales Contract with a letter requesting them to sign the Sales Contract under Respondent Davey's signature. Before they arrived, the LaPointes' May 25, 1983, letter to Respondents crossed in the mail. It requested that Respondents put something in the contract concerning pro-ration of water bills and taxes and payment of a water damage bill by the Crowes. The LaPointes repeated their request for an accurate inventory of the furnishings of the condominium and stated that they were placing their trust in Respondents to represent the LaPointes' interests. Some time between the LaPointes' receipt of Respondents' May 24 letter with a copy of the Sales Contract and June 13, 1893, the LaPointes decided to ask for cancellation of the purchase. The LaPointes cited circumstances involving their financing and their disappointment that Respondents had not furnished an inventory of the furnishings. By June 16, 1983, Respondents had responded to the request for cancellation, vigorously contending that a valid and binding contract existed between the LaPointes and the Crowes. By June 24, 1983, the Crowes, through an attorney, echoed their agreement with the position taken by the Respondents that there was a valid and binding contract. By letter dated June 29, 1983, from the LaPointes attorney, the LaPointes questioned the validity of the contract, saying that Respondent Davey had no authority to sign the Sales Contract on behalf of the LaPointes, who never did sign. The Respondents got a copy of this June 29 letter. On July 11, 1983, the LaPointes, through a Florida attorney, demanded of Respondents that their deposit be, returned. Respondents tried to extricate themselves by referring the LaPointes to the Crowes' attorney. The Crowes and the LaPointes remained at a stalemate until after May 7, 1984, when the Crowes sold their property to another purchaser for $162,500. Thereafter, by about June 19, 1984, the LaPointes, the Crowes and Deltona had negotiated their proposed resolution of the matter by disbursement of $3,000.00 to the Crowes and $13,500.00, plus all accrued interest, to the LaPointes. Respondents had not been included in any of these negotiations, and they refused to sign the agreement. As stipulated by the parties to this case, the matter remains unresolved. The Florida Real Estate Commission Handbook states in pertinent part: "But, what are the rights of the seller and the broker? In the absence of a specific agreement or custom, when a purchaser refuses to sign a contract after the offer has been accepted, the broker is only entitled to the agreed or usual commission percentage of the deposit. Where the purchaser refuses to go through with a contract by which he is bound and which can be enforced against him by the seller, the broker may, in the absence of a contract or custom, appropriate the deposit up to the amount of the earned commission."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint that has been filed by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, against Respondents, Mary S.·Davey and Marco Beach Enterprises, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 7 day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7 day of August, 1986. APPENDIX The following are rulings on proposed findings of fact to the extent required by Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985): Paragraphs 1 through 6 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as substantially factually accurate and are incorporated in the Findings Of Fact to the extent necessary. Paragraphs 8 and 10 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact would be included in paragraph 1 above except that they are unnecessary. Paragraph 7 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as unsupported by the evidence. Paragraph 9 of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and/or Findings Of Fact. It ignores the Exclusive Right To Sell which must be read together with the Sales Contract. Respondents submitted no proposed findings of fact designated as such or in a form which entitles them to specific rulings. However, their proposed findings of fact were carefully considered. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Hartmann, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Arthur V. Woodward, Esquire 940 North Collier Blvd. P. O. Box 1 Marco Island, Florida 33937 Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL
Findings Of Fact Donald L. Stuart is a real estate broker registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission. He holds license number 215732 with expiration date of 3/3/77. In the renewal application received April 3, 1975 by FREC, Stuart reported his business address to be 407 S. Old Dixie Highway, Vero Beach, Florida. In early August, 1976 an investigator for FREC visited the address on South Old Dixie Highway and found a vacant house with no real estate broker's sign displayed. Inquiry in the neighborhood revealed the house had been unoccupied for a considerable period of time. By Election of Rights form submitted November 26, 1976, Stuart acknowledged receipt of the Administrative Complaint by checking Block 1 in which he acknowledged having read the explanation of rights, did not dispute the allegations made in the Administrative Complaint, and requested a hearing. Notice of Hearing was forwarded by Certified Mail, to the same address, viz. 407 S. Old Dixie Highway, Vero Beach, Florida to which the Administrative Complaint had been forwarded.
Findings Of Fact John M. Stroud is a registered real estate saleman holding registration number 0172065 issued the Florida Real Estate Commission. On December 17, 1976, John M. Stroud was arrested for burglary and committed to the custody of the sheriff of Brevard County for the offense of burglary. On December 15, 1976, Stroud had his completed application notarized by R. Jack Simpson. Stroud's application was initially received by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 5, 1977, and was returned to Stroud because he had not enclosed the fee required. It was resubmitted with the fee and received by the Florida Real Estate Commission on January 14, 1977.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer RECOMMENDS: That the registration of John M. Stroud be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of December, 1977 in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1977. COPIES FURNISHED: David T. Young, Esquire 1197 So. U.S. Highway 1 P.O. Box 563 Rockledge, Florida 32955 Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789
Findings Of Fact Documents introduced into evidence revealed that the Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke is a registered real estate broker and Clarke Real Estate is an entity registered as a partnership broker and authorized to act as such with the Commission. On or about September 15, 1975, Jerry Kent, a salesman with Respondent, Clark Real Estate, obtained an oral open listing from Esther Braverman on a condominium unit denominated as "Apartment B-804, 1111 Crandon Boulevard, Key Biscayne, Florida." Pursuant thereto, salesman Kent showed the condominium unit to Jacques Benoist and Jeanine Benoist, his wife, who executed a deposit receipt contract to purchase a condominium unit on September 27, 1975. Esther Braverman, the seller, executed the contract during October of 1975. The deposit receipt contract provided for a $10,000 earnest money deposit to be held in the escrow account of the law firm of Snider, Young, Barrett, and Tannenbaum, P.A., attorneys for seller Braverman. Said deposit was made on September 27, 1975, by delivering a check to attorney Bruce L. Hollander, a member of the firm, who deposited the deposit in the firm's escrow account. (See Commission's Exhibit No. 9). The deposit receipt contract also obligated the seller, Esther Braverman, to pay Respondent Jeremiah C. Clark a commission of $7,875. Specifically, the contract provides that "I, or we, agree to pay to the above assigned broker a commission for finding the above signed purchaser for the above described property, the sum of $7,875 . . . ." Closing took place on January 19, 1976, at the offices of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida, from whom the Benoists had obtained financing for the purchase. At the closing on January 19, 1976, Esther Braverman signed and delivered a warranty deed made out to Jacques Benoist and Janine Benoist, transferring the property to the Bravermans. The warranty deed was recorded with the clerk of the Dade County Circuit Court by the lending institution, Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association. (See Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) At the closing, Jeremiah Clark was given a check representing the commission to Clarke Real Estate in the amount of $7,875. Thereafter, Jerry Clarke was requested by the lending institution to hold the funds in escrow until the bank dispursed the mortgage proceeds. He was then told that the mortgage proceeds would be paid within the following week. Respondent Clarke agreed, pursuant to a request from the seller's attorney, Bruce Hollander, to hold the commission check until January 27, 1976, without depositing same. Mr. Clarke held the commission check until January 29, 1976, as agree. On that day, he dispursed the proceeds to salesman Jerry Kent and the balance was credited to Clarke Real Estate. The mortgage funds were never disbursed because the lending institution could not obtain a quit-claim deed from the seller, Esther Braverman's former husband and therefore in the lending institution's opinion, the defect was not discovered until after the closing. On May 6, 1976, attorney Hollander acting for his law firm and the seller sent Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke and Respondent Clarke Real Estate a letter stating that the mortgage proceeds had not been disbursed by the lending institution and requested a demand for the commission check. The Commission takes the position that the closing which occurred on January 19, was an escrow closing and that the Respondent Jeremiah Clarke was not authorized to disburse the proceeds from the commission check until notification that the mortgage proceeds were disbursed by the lending Institution. The Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that their only obligation was to find a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete the transaction, which acts were consummated by their salesman, Jerry Kent. Based on my examination of the document introduced herein, and the testimony adduced during the hearing, the undersigned concludes that the Respondent's position that it was entitled to receive the commission monies here in dispute has merit. Although the Commission takes the position that an escrow closing occurred, an escrow has been defined as a written instrument which by its term imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party to be kept by the depository until the performance of a condition or a happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. It cannot be seriously contended herein that the Respondent Clarke was acting as an escrow for himself when consideration is given to the above definition of an escrow. See Love v. Brown Development Company, 131 So. 144. It is further essential to an escrow that delivery of the instrument be to a stranger or to a third person, that is, to one who is not a party to the instrument, or a person so free from any personal or legal identity with the parties to the instrument as to leave them free to discharge his duty as a depository to both parties without involving a breach of duty to either. For example, a deed delivered to a grantee cannot be regarded as held in escrow. Here, Respondent Clarke was in no way acting for anyone other than himself or as agent for his salesman, Jerry Kent, both of whom had a direct stake in the commission proceeds. Additionally, upon examination of the deposit receipt contract, the broker became entitled to the commission proceeds when the buyer (purchaser) was found. Additionally, and as an aside, it was noted that the lending institution in fact recorded its mortgage the day following the closing This would lead any examiner of the public records to believe that the lending institution was satisfied with the title as conveyed on the closing date. It was further noted that the Respondents had no indication that there was a problem with the title until approximately five months following the closing. Finally, the undersigned received a letter from attorney Lipcon dated August 1, 1975, advising that the civil case which was pending before the Dade County Circuit Court involving similar issues as posed herein before the commission had been fully and finally settled. There was a stipulation for dismissal signed by attorneys for each of the parties including the attorney for the firm that made the complaint against the Respondents stating in essence that the monies paid to Respondent Clarke and which was retained by him as full and final settlement of his brokerage commission were to be retained by Respondent Clarke as final payment of his commission in connection of the sale of the subject condominium. For all of these reasons, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as found above, it is hereby recommended that the complaints filed herein be dismissed in their entirety. Recommended this 23rd day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The Defendants are registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission as brokers. The Defendant Mershon is the President of the Defendant Orlando Metro Realty, Inc. During May, 1971, the Defendant Mershon, acting as a real estate broker, negotiated a sale of land from Carolina Caribbean Corporation to Edye Lynn. The property is located in North Carolina, and the contract for sale was signed in an airplane between North Carolina and Florida. For reasons that are not relevant to this proceeding, Ms. Lynn became disenchanted with the transaction. The Defendant Mershon agreed to assist her in finding a purchaser. On January 23, 1972, Charles Schiller Martin, signed a contract to purchase Ms. Lynn's property. The Defendants acted as brokers in securing the purchaser. The contract was signed in North Carolina. The contract was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 1 to each of the four depositions. Mr. Martin deposited the sum of $500 with the Defendant when he signed the contract. A copy of the cancelled check from Mr. Martin to the Defendants was received in evidence and is marked as Exhibit number 2 to each of the depositions. Ms. Lynn accepted Mr. Martin's offer. Mr. Martin submitted the contract to his attorney, George W. English III. On March 7, 1972 Mr. English wrote to Henry J. Prominski, an attorney who represented Ms. Lynn, requesting that several items respecting the property be forwarded to him. This letter was received in evidence and is marked as Exhibit number 5 to each of the depositions. On March 22, 1972, Mr. English wrote to Mr. Prominski informing him that Mr. Martin wished to cancel the contract to purchase. A copy of this letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 3 to each of the depositions. Mr. English advised Mr. Martin that marketable title could not be delivered, primarily because there were deed restrictions applying to the property which were not mentioned in the contract for sale. Assessments for water, sewer, and road grading were cited by Mr. English as particularly onerous. The March 22 letter was followed on April 25, 1972, with another letter. This letter was received in evidence, and is identified as Exhibit number 4 to each of the depositions. Mr. English never made any direct demand upon Mr. Mershon for return of the $500 deposit to Mr. Martin. He did make a demand upon Mr. Prominski. It is Mr. English's legal opinion that the seller could not deliver marketable title to the buyer. Mr. Prominski, representing the seller, is of the opinion that marketable title was available to be delivered to the buyer. Mr. Prominski stated that his client did not default in her obligations under the contract. Mr. Mershon opted to construe the purchase contract between Mr. Martin and Ms. Lynn as breeched by Mr. Martin. He forwarded $250 of the deposit to Ms. Lynn and retained $250 for himself. He explained his action in this regard in a letter to Mr. Prominski dated September 13, 1972. This letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Defendants' Exhibit number 1. This arrangement was apparently satisfactory to Ms. Lynn, and Mr. Prominski communicated Ms. Lynn's approval through a letter dated October 11, 1972. This letter was received in evidence, and is marked as Exhibit number 8 to each of the depositions. Approximately three weeks prior to the time that Mr. Martin signed the contract to purchase the Lynn property, Mr. Mershon delivered copies of various reports to Mr. Martin, including the restrictions that would apply to the property, and the contract to purchase from Carolina Caribbean Corporation which had been executed by Ms. Lynn. At approximately the time that Mr. Martin signed the contract, Mr. Mershon advised him that title insurance was available. The Defendants acted as brokers in many transactions in the development in which the property involved in this case is located. They had obtained title insurance on many similar lots. Only in this case was there any objection to title. Prior to his distributing $250 of the $500 deposit to Ms. Lynn and his retaining the remaining $250, Mr. Mershon consulted with attorneys for Carolina Caribbean Corporation who advised him that the Martins had defaulted in their obligations. Mr. Mershon personally spent approximately $1,000.00 in transporting Mr. Martin from Florida to North Carolina. Defendants did not seek the advice of the Florida Real Estate Commision respecting the disposition of the deposit monies, did not submit the issue to arbitration, did not interplead the parties, and did not otherwise seek an adjudication in a proper court. No evidence was offered with respect to standards for determining the marketability of real property in North Carolina. No evidence was offered respecting the marketability of title to the land in this case, other than the opinions of Attorney English, Attorney Prominski, and Defendant Mershon.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Gladys A. Gibbons is licensed as a real estate broker by the Florida Real Estate Commission under license number 0031192 and has been so licensed at all times material to this case. During such time she was employed as the broker for Gregoire-Gibbons, Inc. Respondent Dorothy M. Comolli is licensed as a real estate salesman under license number 00336387 issued by the Florida Real Estate Commission and has been so licensed at all times material to this case. During the period in question here she was employed by Gregoire- Gibbons, Inc. and was supervised by Respondent Gladys A. Gibbons. On March 3, 1981 Ms. Dorothy Hawks listed her residential property located at 2349 Third Avenue North, St. Petersburg, Florida, for sale with Mr. Gerald O'Conner, a real estate salesman employed by Humpe Roney, Inc., in St. Petersburg, Florida. On July 1, 1981 Respondent Dorothy Comolli called Mr. O'Conner to tell him that she had a contract on Ms. Hawks' property. The offer which Ms. Comolli presented on behalf of Ms. Hortense Willoughby was an option to purchase with a lease. When the offer was presented to Ms. Hawks she demurred about the option and counteroffered with a lease and a contract for sale which provided for closing within one year. On a document entitled Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement dated July 1, 1981 the parties negotiated the terms of the property sale. Their handwritten amendments to the form contract were later incorporated into a real estate purchase and sale agreement dated July 14, 1981 which was executed by Ms. Willoughby but never signed by Ms. Hawks. With respect to the rental portion of the transaction the first contract was a receipt for deposit and agreement to lease dated July 19, 1981 presented through Ms. Comolli with a promissory note in the amount of $500 attached as a security deposit for the last month's rent on Ms. Hawks' house. The text of the receipt recited that the lease was for a period of one year with monthly payments of $500 a month to begin on August 15, 1981. It further provided for $200 "security" plus $500 for the last month's rent in a three-month promissory note. Both the note and the receipt for deposit and agreement to lease were presented by Ms. Comolli to Carol Denker at Humpe Roney, Inc. Ms. Denker had taken over Ms. Hawks' account due to the vacation of Mr. O'Connor. In addition to these documents Ms. Comolli gave Ms. Denker $200 as an earnest money deposit on the sale of the house. Ms. Denker in turn gave Ms. Comolli a receipt for the $200 but later returned the $200 to Ms. Comolli as it is customary for the agent of the purchaser to hold the deposit. The form of the promissory note and the receipt for deposit and agreement to lease were not acceptable to Ms. Denker. She had been instructed that promissory notes witnessed by a realtor were a bad business practice and were not acceptable to Humpe Roney, Inc. Ms. Denker therefore gave Ms. Comolli a promissory note form acceptable to Humpe Roney for Ms. Willoughby to execute. Ms. Denker then attempted to contact Ms. Hawks to let her know about the promissory note but was not able to reach her. On July 21, 1981 Humpe Roney prepared on its forms, a contract for sale of real estate and a receipt for deposit and contract for lease. The record is not clear why Humpe Roney wanted the contracts rewritten. After they had been redrawn Ms. Comolli picked them up, had Ms. Willoughby sign them, and returned them to Humpe Roney for Ms. Hawks' signature. These two documents which were executed by Ms. Willoughby and Ms. Hawks finally constituted the agreement between the two parties. Neither document recites that the last month's rent would be paid by Ms. Willoughby in the form of a promissory note. The record is not clear why the final contracts as redrawn by Humpe Roney did not reflect the $500 promissory note. The deletion of any mention of the note was not at the request of either Respondent and does not appear to have been done intentionally by Humpe Roney. At no time was Ms. Hawks aware that a promissory note would be provided instead of cash for the last month's rent. Ms. Willoughby moved into the house on August 4, 1981. She stayed there for the months of August, September and October and part of November when she defaulted on the promissory note which was due on November 15, 1981. Upon her default she was evicted from the house. She is still in default on the promissory note and has no funds with which to pay it. When Ms. Hawks made a demand upon Gregoire-Gibbons for the $200 earnest money deposit plus the $500 last month's rent she received $200 and the $500 note. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Gladys A. Gibbons and Dorothy M. Comolli. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL PEARCE DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1984.
The Issue The issue posed for decision herein is whether or not James T. Speaks, Respondent, engaged in conduct amounting to a failure to maintain in an escrow bank account deposits he received as a selling broker which were entrusted to him in the course of his brokerage activities until a proper or authorized disbursement of such monies was made. Based on its Administrative Complaint filed on May 17, 1978, the Florida Real Estate Commission, Petitioner, seeks to revoke, annul, suspend or otherwise discipline licensee James T. Speaks, who holds Florida Real Estate License No. 0083459, based on conduct which will be set forth herein in detail.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony presented during the course of the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: During October of 1976, Donna W. Ross was a listing broker to sell the property of Katherine Scanlon. During mid-October, 1976, Respondent Speaks located purchasers for the Scanlon property and submitted an offer to the listing broker, which offer was accepted by the seller. Respondent Speaks deposited a $1,000.00 binder deposit in his escrow account. (See FREC Composite Exhibit No. 7.) The closing of the real estate transaction in the Scanlon property took place in Attorney David Booher's office who, based on evidence received during the course of the closing, questioned Respondent Speaks as to the negotiability of a $1,000.00 check Respondent Speaks presented as a refund of the escrow deposit he had tendered to secure the deposit receipt contract for the Scanlon property. Virginia RawIs, who was formerly employed by Booher and Crabtree, Realtors, called the Barnett Bank of Regency to verify if sufficient funds were on deposit in Respondent Speaks' account and was advised that sufficient monies were not on deposit to cover the check. At that juncture, Respondent Speaks acknowledged that he had tendered a check which was drawn on an account without sufficient funds to cover it and agreed that the $1,000.00 binder deposit should be deducted from his commission monies due. This agreement was acceptable to all parties concerned at the closing and another check representing the commission monies due Respondent Speaks, less the $1,000.00 deposit, was drawn and made payable to Speaks. Donna W. Ross, the listing broker, was also present during the hearing and verified the testimony of Attorney Booher respecting the presentation by Respondent Speaks of the $1,000.00 check which was not secured by sufficient funds. As noted in the appearance section of this Recommended Order, the Respondent, James T. Speaks, did not appear during the hearing although copies of the Notice of Hearing were mailed to his last known addresses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the Registered Real Estate Broker license of Respondent, James T. Speaks, be suspended for a period of two (2) years. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of January, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
