Findings Of Fact Until on or about December 22, 1978, respondent held petitioner James Alan O'Neal in custody at its Alyce D. McPherson School in Ocala. No question as to the validity of petitioner's initial commitment to respondent's custody arises in these proceedings. On or about December 22, 1977, respondent released petitioner to the Social Economic Services Group Home in Gainesville, Alachua County, on conditions set forth in a furlough agreement, which petitioner signed and which was received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit No. 8. The fourth numbered condition in the furlough agreement is that petitioner "[n]ot change or leave residence . . . or . . . county of residence without the consent of the counselor." Marty Richardson works for respondent as an intake counselor at the juvenile detention center in Daytona Beach. He first met petitioner at quarter of six one morning on or about March 19, 1978, shortly after petitioner had been arrested for breaking and entering. After Mr. Richardson gave petitioner Miranda warning, he heard petitioner admit that he had broken into a house in Volusia County and stolen drugs from the house. Frank Lynch, employed by respondent as a probation aftercare counselor in Gainesville, testified without contradiction that no counselor gave his consent for petitioner to leave Alachua County.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's revocation of petitioner's furlough be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph E. Hodges, Esquire 3rd Floor, Oak Park Executive Square 2002 N. W. 13th Street Gainesville, Florida 32601 James O'Neal Alyce D. McPherson School Post Office Box 1359 111 S. E. 25th Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670
Findings Of Fact Cirilo Alvarez, at all times pertinent to the allegations in the complaint, operated an adult congregate living facility in Lake City, Columbia County, Florida, Briar's Haven Adult Care Center, under license number 03-12- 0128-BPS, issued by the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In late July or early August, 1982, Respondent, who is a psychiatric nurse specialist and who works full time at North Florida State Mental Hospital (Hospital) at Macclenny, Florida, took Woodrow Harrison, an elderly patient at that institution, into his home, Briar's Haven Adult Care Center, on pass status from the Hospital for periodic short visits. Ultimately, on July 30, 1982, Harrison was released from Macclenny and began living full time at Respondent's facility. On August 3, 1982, Sharon Stucky, a registered nurse case manager for the North Florida Mental Health Center (Center) in Lake City, Florida, did an intake interview with Harrison, who had just been released from the Hospital and who was living at Respondent's facility. Mr. Harrison was brought into the Center by Respondent's wife. Records from the Hospital pertaining to Harrison, which came to the Center, reflected that he suffered from a seizure disorder and a diabetic condition. His medication consisted of 300 mg. of Dilantin daily and 30 mg. of phenobarbital daily, and he was to receive a daily insulin injection. At the time of his release from the Hospital, he was furnished with a thirty-day supply of these medications. On the afternoon of August 13, 1982, Mr. Alvarez went into the Center with Mr. Harrison and asked to see Ms. Stucky. Respondent indicated that Mr. Harrison was having many physical problems. Earlier in the day, he had taken Harrison back to Macclenny to have him readmitted for seizures, incontinence, etc., even though he was taking his medications, but officials at the Hospital refused to admit him. Mr. Alvarez wanted him admitted to some facility in Lake City. Stucky, indicating she would have to talk with Harrison before taking any action, did so and felt she could see no change in his condition since her first interview of him on August 3, and she decided she could not justify having him recommitted to the mental hospital. Since Stucky wanted to find out if the seizures were the result of a physical problem, and she could not do a physical herself, she requested that Respondent take Harrison to a doctor for an examination. The Respondent again demanded that Harrison be admitted and, when Ms. Stucky refused, stated he would take Harrison to the hospital and leave him. Ms. Stucky talked with her supervisor to see if there was any way that Harrison could be readmitted to Macclenny, and it was determined there was not. When the information was related to Mr. Alvarez, he departed with Mr. Harrison. Respondent then took Harrison to the emergency room at Lake City's Lake Shore Hospital. After a chart was prepared on Harrison, Alvarez departed, leaving Harrison there without his medications. When Alvarez first took Harrison in, he was told there would be an hour wait before Harrison could be seen. Alvarez asked if Harrison could sit there and wait, and the person on duty said, "Yes." Once that was arranged, Respondent left without Harrison. According to a report of the doctor on duty, Harrison was confused and incapable of giving a complaint or history. As a result, evaluation of him was difficult, and his well-being was compromised. Respondent subsequently made no effort to get Harrison's drugs to him by delivering them to Ms. Stuckv, nor did he inquire where Harrison was. Respondent's actions in dropping Mr. Harrison off at the Lake Shore Hospital unsupervised, and only calling to check on his status somewhat later, constitute an intentional abandonment which could have seriously affected Harrison's health, safety, and welfare. Somewhat later the same day, Respondent called Lake Shore Hospital to find out what Harrison's status was, but Harrison had already been placed in another adult care facility by Ms. Stucky when the hospital called her and told her of Harrison's situation. Respondent did not make any other calls. Ms. Stucky visited Harrison daily at this new facility and administered his insulin shot. He appeared to be doing well there and wanted to remain, but on August 17, 1982, he was readmitted to Macclenny, where he currently resides. Harrison is incapable of taking care of himself. He has a poor memory and is somewhat retarded and childlike, according to Stucky. He has no concept of time and could not administer his medicines to himself. He could not understand the need to take his medicine or remember to take it if he could. Since Mr. Harrison was dropped off at Lake Shore without either his medicines or a change of clothing, Stucky made several telephone calls to the Respondent to retrieve them. Mr. Alvarez was always out when she called, and Stucky talked with several different females who answered the phone and with whom she left messages requesting him to call her back. Alvarez did not return any of the calls, but he states he never received them. This is rossible since, he says, neither his mother nor his wife, two of the people at home who may have received the original calls from Stucky, speaks much English. Respondent provided Mr. Harrison with all the clothes he had except those he was wearing when he came from Macclenny. Upon the advice of individuals at Macclenny who he could not remember to identify, Respondent applied for Social Security benefits to support Harrison while he was at Respondent's facility. Because Harrison had no family, Respondent sought the counsel of the legal aid office in Lake City to see if he could be appointed Harrison's legal guardian and was told he could not. In late January or early February, 1983, Respondent received one Social Security check in the amount of $1,900 made out to Harrison and Mrs. Alvarez. This check was not cashed because Harrison was no longer with the Respondent, but was returned to the Social Security Office. Harrison's medicines that were in Respondent's possession when Harrison was taken to the hospital were discarded. Respondent worked with Harrison at Macclenny for about a year before taking him to his own facility. During that time to his knowledge, Harrison never had any seizures. Respondent gave him his medications at Macclenny and knew he needed drugs. When he took Harrison to his facility, he took Harrison's drugs as well.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Secretary of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order revoking the Adult Congregate Living Facility License of Cirilo Alvarez, doing business as Briar's Haven Adult Care Center. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of April, 1983 in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Sawyer, Jr., Esquire District III Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2002 NW 13th Street, 4th Floor Gainesville, Florida 32601 Mr. Cirilo Alvarez Post Office Box 2392 Lake City, Florida 32055 Mr. David H. Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Marilyn Ward, operated a foster family group home at 14854 Southwest 304th Terrace, Homestead, Florida. The facility is licensed by petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), and as such, is subject to that agency's regulatory jurisdiction. Ward had been licensed by HRS for approximately three years prior to the alleged incidents. On or about May 5, 1986 a North Miami police officer, Berry Komie, responded to a call from a resident who complained her daughter and a friend had just run away from respondent's facility in Homestead. The daughter, who will be identified as Deborah, and her friend, Regine, related a variety of complaints against Ward to the police officer. These included being called inappropriate and derogatory names, being beaten by Ward, being forced to have sexual relations with Ward's twenty-five year old son, David, and being forced to use cocaine and marijuana. After compiling a police report, Komie contacted HRS officials. An HRS counselor interviewed the girls the next day and found that although all charges were "indicated," only one of the charges was "substantiated," that being the allegation that Ward had used inappropriate and derogatory names toward the children. All children were immediately removed from Ward's home. An administrative complaint was thereafter issued which prompted this proceeding. During the pendency of this proceeding, Ward has been unable to keep foster children in her home. Ward became involved in foster home work around 1983 because of her interest in children. She has raised four of her own. Besides the satisfaction of helping children, she was also compensated $350 per child per month by HRS to keep and maintain the children. Her home has three bedrooms, with only one devoted to foster children. They sleep in two sets of bunk beds and a roll- away, while Ward and her son, David, occupied the other two bedrooms. For obvious reasons, Ward never had more than five children at any one time. Their ages ranged from ten to seventeen years of age, and all were female. The testimony of the witnesses in this case is sharply conflicting, with HRS' witnesses portraying a picture of a continuing pattern of Ward abusing the residents, and Ward's witnesses denying all charges. To resolve these conflicts, the undersigned has accepted the most credible and persuasive testimony, and rejected the other. The alleged areas of abuse will be dealt with separately below. Physical Abuse -- The charge in the complaint that "the foster mother occasionally hit a foster child" stems from the testimony of Deborah, who was fourteen years old when the alleged events occurred, and her best friend Regine, then a fifteen year old resident. Deborah was a resident at Ward's home for thirteen days in late April and early May, 1986. She had been in at least two other foster homes prior to her stay with Ward. At one of them (Catholic Children's Home), she had filed a complaint of sexual abuse against the operator of that home. While at Ward's house, Deborah was one of five residents, all of whom occupied the same bedroom. According to Deborah's testimony at final hearing, Ward once "slapped" her "pretty hard" on the shoulder when she ignored Ward's instructions and made several trips into the house to use the bathroom one afternoon. She had previously told police officer Komie on May 5, 1986 that she had run away from Ward's home because Ward had "beaten" her. Regine was a resident at Ward's home in March-May, 1986. Although she too claimed Ward had struck Deborah, she recalled it happening in a different time and place. According to Regine, Deborah was struck on the cheek by Ward while Deborah lay on top of her bunk bed. She also said she observed Ward pulling and slapping the face of another resident, Barbara, on one occasion. These acts were denied by Ward, and her story was credibly corroborated by Barbara, who denied Regine's account that Ward had struck her or any other resident, and by Mary, another resident who did not observe any physical abuse. Accordingly, the testimony of Regine and Deborah is rejected as not being credible, and it is found Ward did not "occasionally hit a foster child" as alleged in the complaint. Drug Use -- Except for Regime's testimony, there was none to support the charge that David "supplied the. . . girls with marijuana." At hearing Regime testified she used "drugs" with David approximately "every other day" after school for three months at an undisclosed location away from the foster home. However, when interviewed by police officer Komie on May 5, 1986, Regime stated that "David . . . forced her on several occasions to use cocaine and marijuana." In her interview with an HRS counselor, she recalled smoking marijuana with David in the bathroom "one one occasion" but was vague about other occurrences. In view of these conflicts, the testimony of Regime is rejected as being incredible, and it is found that no drugs were used by or given to the residents by David. Verbal Abuse -- The source of these charges also stems from the complaints made by Deborah and Regine on May 5. At hearing, Deborah claimed that Ward called her a "hooker," "whore," and a "bitch," and that she felt "guilty" when she was called these names. Regine also claimed that she was called a "slut" by Ward, and that Ward also used derogatory names towards Barbara, Deborah and two other residents. However, she said it did not bother her to be called a "slut." In contrast, Mary never heard such names used, while Barbara said Ward's policy was to not use such terms, and that Ward even instructed the girls not to curse. Ward acknowledged using the word "tramp" on one occasion but denied using any other adverse abusive terms. 1/ With the exception of this admission, the other testimony is rejected, and it is found that no inappropriate or derogatory terms were used by Ward toward the foster children. Sexual Advances and Activities -- At hearing Regine claimed that David came into her room "every night" during her three month stay and they then went to his room to "have sex." In contrast, when the HRS investigator interviewed her on May 6, 1986, Regine told him she had sex with David only on "a couple of occasions" and "once" in his bedroom. In her police interview on May 5, Regine told police officer Komie she was "forced" to have sex with David, and that "other girls" of the Ward home were "sexually molested." She named Barbara and Mary as possible molestation "victims." The latter charge was denied by Barbara and Mary at hearing. It is also noted that the children's bedroom had an alarm system which caused a bell to sound whenever the door was opened during the nighttime hours. Had David been entering the room "every night" as Regine claimed, the alarm system would have alerted other residents and Ward as to what was happening. Accordingly, the undersigned finds the testimony to be incredible and it is found that David did not make sexual advances or engage in sexual activities with the girls as charged in the complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the administrative complaint, with prejudice, and reinstating respondent's right to operate a foster family group home. DONE AND ORDERED this 21st of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1987.
The Issue At issue is whether Petitioner’s foster home license should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in social work from Florida International University. Since his graduation in December 1995 he has been steadily employed in a variety of positions which involve dealing with foster children and special education students. Davis' employment included work for the Department as a foster care counselor and a protective investigator. In addition, he has a long history of involvement in his church, including teaching Sunday school and volunteer work with youth in the community. Relatives, including a mother and sister, live in the area and are supportive of his desire to continue as a foster parent. For all these reasons, the Department held high hopes for Davis as a foster parent when he sought and received a foster home license in the fall of 2001. Notwithstanding his extensive experience with exceptionally needy children Davis was required to and did attend the 30-hour training course required of all new foster parents. Davis, like all foster parents, entered into a detailed contractual agreement with DCF which sets forth the obligations of foster parents and states that non-compliance will lead to revocation of the license. The contract is lengthy, but for purposes of this case it suffices to say that it obligates foster parents to provide adequate, age-appropriate supervision at all times. In order to assist the foster parents in fulfilling this and other obligations, DCF is contractually obligated to support foster parents in a number of ways. The foster parent must be informed in as much detail as is available to DCF of a child's special needs or limitations. If the child is taking prescribed medication, DCF is obliged to provide the medication when the child is brought to the foster home, along with instructions for administering the drug. DCF is also required to exercise professional judgment when placing a child in a foster home to assure, to the extent possible, that the foster parent is capable of managing the child. Shortly after Davis was licensed, DCF assigned to him a particularly difficult child, K.N. At the time K.N. was brought to Davis on December 4, 2001, the child, a boy, was 12 years old. Davis was informed that K.N. was on medication, but DCF did not provide the medication. Davis made several efforts to secure the medication for K.N., but he was not successful. At the time K.N. was placed in Davis' home, Davis already had one foster child, D.L. Davis had previously committed to D.L. and to other neighborhood teenagers to take them in his van to the Soul Bowl high school football game in Tallahassee on December 9, 2001. The trip was uneventful until the return drive. During the trip back from Tallahassee, K.N.’s difficult behavior irritated the other children. In the ensuing horseplay, K.N. ended up with his pants down for approximately the final hour of the return trip. Details of the incident are impossible to state with certainty. The Department presented no testimony of any individual with personal knowledge of the incident. Davis and a teenage girl who was on the trip testified to their recollections. The undersigned, having carefully viewed their demeanor under oath, credits their testimony as candid; they were clear and precise with regard to elements of the day that they did recall, and honest in stating where their recollections were imprecise. The Department repeatedly asserts that K.N. was "naked" but the use of this word, as it is commonly understood, is unsupported by any competent evidence. It cannot be ascertained from the record, for example, whether K.N. was wearing underwear as well as pants, and if so, were the underwear pulled down as well? The only direct testimony regarding whether or not K.N.'s genitals were exposed to the other children was offered by Davis, who believes that K.N.'s genitals were always covered. K.N. and D.L. denied any improper touching to DCF's investigator, according to his written report. After years of driving youth from his church and community on field trips, Davis, like anyone who drives carloads of children, had learned to filter out background noise in order to focus on safe driving. Yet, like anyone responsible for a vanload of kids, he also had to remain cognizant of behaviors in the back seat(s). At some point, Davis became aware that there was an issue concerning K.N.'s pants. Davis, as well as the teenage passengers in the car, acting on Davis' instructions, made efforts to convince K.N. to get his pants back up. K.N. refused. It was raining for at least a portion of the time while Davis was attempting to deal with the situation from the driver's seat. The testimony offered by Davis on his behalf establishes that the situation among the children, particularly K.N., could have been dealt with more aggressively and with better results. The wiser course would have been for Davis to pull over, rearrange seating, verbally re-direct K.N. and the other passengers, and, as a last resort, summon the police. It is equally clear that Davis was the only adult in the car and responsible to deliver the children home safely on a rainy day. He had tuned out the back seat noises to focus on driving when it seemed reasonable to do so, and, once aware of the situation with K.N.'s pants, decided to manage it as best he could from the driver's seat and get everyone back home as quickly as possible. The situation was resolved when Davis drove his van to the north Dade home of Davis’ sister, who had a good rapport with K.N. K.N. complied promptly with her instruction that he get himself properly dressed. Soon after the trip, K.N. related a lurid and untruthful version of events to a third party. A complaint against Davis to the state's child abuse hotline resulted. Davis felt mistreated by the DCF investigator who was dispatched to look into the allegations. Davis perceived that the investigator had prejudged the complaint and deemed Davis to be guilty of participating in and/or allowing sexual abuse of K.N. Rather than complain to the supervisor of the investigator who offended him, Davis made another bad decision---he refused to honor the investigator's request that he provide the names and whereabouts of the other passengers in the van. Davis' failure to provide this information immediately was not deemed by DCF as a serious enough offense to warrant immediate removal of the foster children. Nor did it prejudice DCF in these proceedings, for Davis did provide the names to DCF well in advance of the final hearing. Davis' refusal to provide the names when first asked to do so was self-defeating in the extreme, for the passengers were in a position to corroborate what the investigator was told by both foster children: that Davis had not provoked the removal of K.N.'s pants, and had made efforts to ameliorate the situation as soon as he became aware of it, and was successful to the extent that the other children cooperated with his request to encourage K.N. to pull his pants up, which K.N. was fully capable of doing. The Department contends that "there is no amount of additional training or any other remedial action (short of license revocation) that would alleviate the Department's concern about [Davis'] ability to provide proper care and supervision to foster children." This contention is rejected for two reasons: First, although the substance of DCF's investigation was completed by December 12, K.N. remained in Davis' home until December 17, at which time Davis realized that he was not capable of handling K.N.'s behaviors and returned him to the custody of his foster care counselor. Second, Davis requested and received DCF's permission to keep his other foster child, D.L. "through the holidays." That time frame was generously interpreted by DCF staff; they did not take D.L. from Davis' care until February 8, 2001. Davis is appropriately regretful that he was not adequate to the task at hand on December 9. He also understands the inappropriateness of failing to fully cooperate with DCF's investigation in a timely fashion. Although the future is impossible to predict, it is reasonable to credit Davis' word that he has learned from these mistakes. Davis is willing to unconditionally accept additional training, supervision, and assistance from DCF.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order dismissing the April 1, 2002, charges against Davis. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of September, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Travis Davis 2922 Northwest 92nd Street Miami, Florida 33147 Rosemarie Rinaldi, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josefina Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioners, Gwendolyn and William Parker, should be granted a license to operate a family foster home pursuant to the provisions of Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1997).
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Gwendolyn and William Parker, are husband and wife. The Parkers have been married since October 9, 1989. The Parkers have three children. Mr. Parker is the father of one of the children. The Parkers reside in Jefferson County, Florida, in a three bedroom, two bath home they own. Mr. Parker is employed as a case officer at Greenwood Hills Academy, Greenville, Florida. Mr. Parker supervises youthful offenders under the Juvenile Justice Act. Respondent, the Department of Children and Family Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with, among other things, the authority and duty to grant licenses for family foster homes pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1997). On or about January 19, 1999, Mr. and Ms. Parker submitted an application to the Department for licensure as a family foster home pursuant to Section 409.175, Florida Statutes (1997). Mr. and Ms. Parker successfully completed a course for foster parents. By letter dated April 12, 1999, the Department notified Mr. and Ms. Parker that their application was denied "based upon the confirmed abuse report on Mrs. Parker for excessive corporal punishment and bruises and welts and the history of arrest for battery against Mrs. Parker, the last arrest being as recent as March 23, 1996." By letter dated April 29, 1999, Mr. and Ms. Parker requested a formal hearing to contest the Department's denial of their application. Ms. Parker was adjudicated guilty of battery on October 2, 1987. She was sentenced to six months' unsupervised probation. Ms. Parker was 22 years of age when this incident took place. The battery charge arose out of a fight between Ms. Parker, who was single at the time, and another woman of approximately the same age as Ms. Parker. It has been approximately 12 years since this incident took place. Ms. Parker pled guilty to, and was adjudicated guilty of, battery a second time on January 20, 1989. Ms. Parker was fined. Ms. Parker was 23 years of age when this incident took place. It has been over ten years since this incident took place. Also during 1989, Ms. Parker was investigated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for excessive corporal punishment. Ms. Parker admitted hitting her then five- year-old son with a belt. The punishment left bruises on her son's arm. Although it was determined that the incident was an isolated one, the report was classified as a confirmed report of abuse. This incident took place over ten years ago. No criminal charges arose out of this incident and Ms. Parker's son remained in her custody. On February 21, 1996, Ms. Parker took her son and teenage daughter to school. After dropping them off, an altercation between her daughter and several other girls took place. Ms. Parker and several female students shouted at each other, at times trading obscenities. During the incident, Ms. Parker took hold of the arm of one of the students. No harm was caused to the student. Ms. Parker was charged with three counts of battery as a result of the February 21, 1996, incident. Ms. Parker was tried and found guilty of one count of battery related to Ms. Parker's taking hold of the arm of one of the students. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Ms. Parker was placed on six months' non-reporting probation. Ms. Parker was found not guilty of the other two counts of battery. Applicants for family foster home licenses must demonstrate self control and the ability to handle stressful situations with minimal anger and without violence. Children placed in foster care normally are taken out of homes where they have been subjected to physical, emotional, and/or sexual abuse or neglect. They often display behavior that tries the patience of their caregivers. Extreme care must be exercised in placing these children to ensure that they are not further abused.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Children and Family Services denying the application for licensure as a family foster home filed by Gwendolyn and William Parker. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian T. Hayes, Esquire Brian T. Hayes, P.A. 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 John R. Perry Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Children and Family Services District 2 Legal Office 2639 North Monroe Street, Suite 252A Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John S. Slye, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Respondent) should issue a license to operate a foster home to Mr. & Mrs. Steven Price (Petitioners).
Findings Of Fact On or about April 19, 1989, the Petitioners applied to the Respondent for a foster home license, and on or about July 12, 1989, the Respondent denied their application for licensure. The Petitioners timely sought this hearing to determine if their application for a foster home license should be approved. After investigation and review of their application, the Respondent informed the Petitioners, by letter dated July 12, 1989, that their application was denied due to insufficient income, harassment of a prior ward, the exercise of poor judgement involving their prior ward in misrepresenting to that child that her grandmother had died as an inducement for her to return home, and the fact that their ward had become pregnant by their son while living in their home. At hearing, the Petitioners admitted that their previous ward had become pregnant by their son while living with them, and while under their care and custody. They also admitted that they had exercised poor judgement by telling that child that her grandmother had died as an inducement for her to return home after she had run away. They also essentially admitted that they had continually and persistently attempted to contact the ward through foster parents with whom she had been placed after she ran away from the Petitioners' home, and through others with whom they believed she was living. Their efforts were unrelenting and desperate, and eventually culminated in the misrepresentation about the death of the ward's grandmother, with whom she had been particularly close. From their testimony at hearing, it is evident that Petitioners harassed the foster parents with whom their prior ward had been placed in their unrelenting efforts to return her to their home. The only factor identified by the Respondent in its denial of the Petitioners' application which was actively contested at hearing was Petitioners' apparent lack of sufficient income. In their application, the Petitioners indicated that their monthly income was $1,169 and at hearing they testified that this amount had increased to $1,272. No corroborating evidence was introduced for either amount. Petitioners have four children, ages 14 to 17, living at home with them. Thus, their stated income must support a total of six persons. They estimated their monthly expenses to be $851, including $562 for a home mortgage and $289 for utilities. No corroborating evidence was introduced to support this estimate of their expenses. However, using their estimate of expenses and their revised statement of income, the Petitioners are claiming to have only $421 each month in excess income for food, medical bills, clothing, and other expenses for six persons. They are also receiving food stamps valued at $180 per month. Thus, their excess income plus food stamps equals $601 per month to provide food, medical care and clothing for six persons. Petitioners offered no credible explanation of how they could provide food, clothing and medical care for six persons on $601 per month. They were repeatedly asked to clarify how they were able to meet the essential needs of their children, as well as themselves, on this amount, but would only state that they have learned how to get by and manage on their limited income. While it may be possible to feed, clothe, and provide medical care to four teenagers and two adults for an average of $100 per month, it is not likely, and without corroborating evidence of the methods and means whereby Petitioners have accomplished this, their unsupported assertions lack credibility when weighed against practical realities and common sense.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioners' application for a foster home license be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of March, 1990 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-5285) Petitioners did not file Proposed Findings of Fact. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding 1. Adopted in Findings 2, 4 and 5. 3-5. Adopted in Finding 3. 5-7. Rejected since these are conclusions of law rather than proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. & Mrs. Steven Price 1403 Shadow Creek Place Brandon, FL 33510 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire W. T. Edwards Facility 4000 West Buffalo 5th Floor, Room 500 Tampa, FL 33614 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner's foster care license should be revoked because she allegedly lacks the ability to provide for the psychological development of foster children as required in Section 409.175(4)(a)2, Florida Statutes and Rule 10M-6.005(3)(i), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received, and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, is the licensing and regulatory agency in Florida for the issuance of foster home licensing. On January 16, 1991, Petitioner issued to Respondent, Pauline Cole, a provisional certificate of license for a foster home for her residence situated at 3501 River Grove Drive in Tampa, Florida indicating that she had complied with the minimum standards set by Petitioner for a foster home and approved her foster home application. By its terms, the license was effective for a period of one year from the above-referenced date unless renewed, extended, withdrawn, or revoked for cause. To demonstrate her eligibility for licensure, Respondent successfully completed several courses including "a clinical interventions for psychiatric nurses: frameworks for success" sponsored by the Florida Mental Health Institute in Tampa, Florida with six contact hours on June 15, 1990. On December 17, 1990, Respondent successfully completed 30 hours of training in "model approach to partnership and parenting (MAPP)". Additionally, Respondent took several other courses dealing with parenting and caring for foster children. On November 21, 1991, Petitioner filed an application to renew her license to provide for foster home care for dependent children. As a result of that application, Petitioner's agents visited Respondent's home to determine whether it still complied with standards set by Petitioner for licensure. During a foster parents meeting in June, 1992, Respondent inquired of one of Petitioner's agents whether or not Petitioner had a policy of surveilling foster parents by following them or otherwise monitoring their activities and particularly their vehicular travels. Petitioner's agent advised Respondent that that was not HRS's policy, i.e., to surveil foster care parents whereupon Respondent related that she felt that she had been followed by Petitioner's child protective investigators. Respondent related several steps that she undertook to determine whether or not she was in fact being followed. Specifically, Respondent would change directions or would make turns from main thoroughfares to see if the car that she considered to be following her would make a similar change in direction. Respondent did not take any evasive measures which in any manner endangered the lives of the foster children that were in her care. During the time of her foster care licensure, Respondent had two foster care children ages three and four. During the sessions wherein Respondent's application for licensure was discussed with Petitioner's agents, Respondent again expressed concern that she was being followed, however, during the last session during March 1992, Respondent advised Petitioner that while she still had her doubts that she was not being followed, she was no longer concerned that she was being followed to the point of taking evasive actions to try to verify her concerns. During the final meeting wherein Petitioner's agents inquired of Respondent if she still had the paranoid ideation that she was being followed, Respondent basically advised Petitioner's agents that "she was leaving the matter in the hands of the Lord." Petitioner's agents basically advised Respondent that if they (Petitioner's agents and Respondent) could put to rest their concern that Respondent no longer had the paranoia of being followed, Respondent could be relicensed. 1/ Respondent earned a bachelor of science degree in nursing from Tuskeege Institute in 1958. She earned a master's degree from the University of South Florida in industrial and technical education during 1979. She is certified as a registered nurse and a community education instructor. Respondent was employed as a registered nurse and nursing instructor at the Veteran's Administration (VA) Hospital in Montgomery, Alabama, Gainesville and Tampa, Florida during the years 1962 through 1980. She retired from the VA in 1980. From 1989 to the present time, Respondent has been employed as a community education instructor at Hillsborough Community College in Tampa, Florida. Respondent holds memberships in several professional and civic organizations and has been very active in community service organizations in Hillsborough County. Among the awards and honors she received was a nominee in Who's Who in American Nursing during 1993-94, a nominee for the achievement award for advocacy/public service at the Tuskeege National Alumni Association during 1992; co-founder, Minority Nurses Association of the Tampa Bay Area and an award for dedicated service, Iota Phi Lambda Sorority, Southern Region, during the years 1983-1987, among others. Respondent has been able to provide a great deal of parenting and inspiration to her two foster children during the times that she cared for them until they were separated from her by Petitioner's agents during 1992. Based on her nursing background and the amount of time that she has been able to devote to her children, she has served as a model foster parent since the time that she was issued a provisional license during 1991.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order granting Respondent's application to be relicensed as a foster home provider assuming, of course, that she complies with other licensing requirements. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1993.
Findings Of Fact By administrative complaint filed May 5, 1986, the Department sought to impose a civil penalty upon Respondent, Sylvia Beckford, d/b/a Mt. Zion Retirement Home, Inc., for failure to correct certain deficiencies which were allegedly found at an adult congregate living facility. Pertinent to the disposition of this case, the complaint alleged: (2) Respondent, SYLVIA BECKFORD, is licensed to operate MT. ZION RETIREMENT HOME, INC., 2131 N.W. 28th Street, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33311, as an Adult Congregate Living Facility, in compliance with Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code. Predicated on the foregoing allegations, the Department claimed jurisdiction over Respondent, pursuant to Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, to impose a civil penalty against her for alleged violations of the provisions of Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the provisions of Chapter 10A-5, Florida Administrative Code. The Department failed, however, to establish that Respondent, Sylvia Beckford was the licensee of an adult congregate living facility and, therefore, failed to establish that it had any jurisdiction to impose a civil penalty against her. 1/
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Berta Cabral and Cabral Adult Foster Home were certified by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services to operate as an adult foster home. On October 2, 1985, Freda Aliber was released as a patient from Coral Gables Hospital and was placed in Cabral Adult Foster Home. When she arrived at the Cabral Adult Foster Home she had with her personal papers including bank statements for accounts which she held at Coral Gables Federal and at City National Bank. On October 3, 1985, Berta Cabral's daughter Odalys Ibarra telephoned Coral Gables Federal to advise that she would be coming to the bank that day with Freda Aliber. Later that same day Odalys Ibarra, Julie Ibarra, and Freda Aliber came to Coral Gables Federal at which time Odalys Ibarra attempted to have her name added to Aliber's bank account. Further, Odalys Ibarra made her requests of the bank personnel in Spanish although Freda Aliber does not understand Spanish. Bank employees refused to add Odalys Ibarra's name to Freda Aliber's account. On or about October 3, 1985, Odalys Ibarra telephoned City National Bank, identified herself as Berta Cabral's daughter, and asked a number of personal questions regarding Freda Aliber's account at that bank. Odalys Ibarra's attempts to gain access to Freda Aliber's personal funds were done with the full knowledge and consent of Berta Cabral. Freda Aliber did not understand what Berta Cabral, Odalys Ibarra, and Julie Ibarra were attempting to do and did not understand why she was taken to the bank.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking Berta Cabral's certification as Cabral Adult Foster Home. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 31st day of July, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: William Page, Jr., Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Berta Cabral Cabral Adult Foster Home 2331 N.W. 31 Street Miami, Florida 33142
