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BEST WESTERN TIVOLI INN vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 78-002180 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002180 Latest Update: Apr. 11, 1979

Findings Of Fact The signs located one mile east of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 and one-half mile west of State Road 79 on Interstate 10 and bearing copy advertising Best Western Tivoli Inn are owned by Mr. Fleming. These signs are located within 15 feet of the right-of-way of a federal interstate highway outside an incorporated municipality or town. The copy of these signs is visible from the interstate highway. The signs do not have permits issued by the Department of Transportation attached to them.

Recommendation Based on the violation of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation direct the owner to remove said signs. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James Moore, Esquire Post Office Box 746 Niceville, Florida 32570 Gerald Holley, Esquire Post Office Box 268 Chipley, Florida 32428 Frank King, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN RE: NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BEST WESTERN TIVOLI INN, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-2180T FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Respondent. /

Florida Laws (3) 479.07479.11479.111
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GIL GONZALEZ vs TRAVBUZZ INC., D/B/A PALACE TOURS, AND HUDSON INSURANCE COMPANY, AS SURETY, 20-003509 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 07, 2020 Number: 20-003509 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 2024

The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 559.929(3), Florida Statutes (2019), Petitioner has been injured by the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, financial failure, or any other violation of chapter 559, part XI, by Respondent Travbuzz, Inc. (Respondent), for prearranged travel services and, if so, the extent to which Respondent is indebted to Petitioner on account of the injury.

Findings Of Fact Respondent provides prearranged travel services for individuals or groups. Having relocated from New Jersey to Miami, Florida, evidently in 2018, Respondent has been registered at all material times with the Department as a "seller of travel" within the meaning of the Act and holds registration number ST-41461. With Respondent as the principal, the Surety issued a Sellers of Travel Surety Bond bearing bond number 10076529 in the amount of $25,000, effective from June 22, 2018, until duly cancelled (Bond). On November 12, 2019, Petitioner, a resident of San Diego, California, purchased from Respondent one ticket for himself and one ticket for his daughter on the Palace on Wheels: A Week in Wonderland Tour (POWAWIWT) with a departure date of April 1, 2020. Earnestly described by Respondent's principal as a "cruise ship on wheels," the POWAWIWT provides one week's transportation, accommodations, and meals for travelers seeking to visit several of India's cultural and historical landmarks without the inconvenience of changing hotels, finding restaurants, arranging intercity transportation, or, it seems, obtaining refunds for trips that never take place. The purchase price for two POWAWIWT tickets was $8600.40. Additionally, Petitioner purchased from Respondent a guided side trip at one location for $75. At the time of the purchase of the two POWAWIWT tickets, Respondent charged Petitioner's credit card for the required downpayment of $1911.20 for both tickets. By personal check dated January 6, 2020, Petitioner timely paid the balance due for both tickets of $6689.20. By personal check dated February 19, 2020, Petitioner paid the $75 charge for the side trip. The credit card issuer duly debited Petitioner's account and credited Respondent's account for the charged amount, and Respondent obtained the funds represented by both checks. Petitioner later disputed the credit card charges, and the credit card company debited the $1911.20 amount in dispute from Respondent's account. Although Petitioner claimed that his account had not been credited for this amount, as of the evening prior to the hearing, Respondent's credit for these charges had not been restored, so the $1911.20 still seems to be in the possession of the credit card issuer. Despite availing himself of the remedy available under the Act, Petitioner has not authorized the credit card issuer to restore to Respondent's account the credit for the $1911.20. This case is a byproduct of the emerging Covid-19 pandemic, which, as discussed below, caused RTDC to cancel Petitioner's April 1 POWAWIWT. According to Respondent, RTDC has refused to refund Petitioner's payment of $8600.40 gross or about $8000 after deducting Respondent's 7% commission.1 Although Respondent's principal deflects the blame to RTDC for its no-refund policy and to Petitioner for supposedly waffling on the relief that he sought for the cancelled trip, Respondent quietly has declined to refund its commission of approximately $600, as well as the additional $75 payment, although the failure to refund the $75 may be explained by Petitioner's failure to address this negligible amount until he prepared the Prehearing Statement in this case. 1 Respondent's principal testified that Respondent discounted the price of the April 1 POWAWIWT by reducing its standard 17% commission, which would approximate $1460, to 7%, for a 10% discount, or about $860, leaving a net commission of about $600. Respondent's factual defenses to Petitioner's refund claim include the several defenses set forth above and a new defense asserted for the first time at the hearing: Petitioner cancelled his POWAWIWT before RTDC cancelled his POWAWIWT, so Petitioner was never entitled to a refund under the terms of the Contract. This defense oddly finds more support in Petitioner's allegation that he demanded a refund before RTDC cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT than in Respondent's allegation that Petitioner did not demand a refund until the March 13 email, in which he reported that RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT.2 Regardless, this new defense is no more supported by the facts than Respondent's previously stated defenses. Respondent's who-cancelled-first defense is based on emails and telephone calls. Petitioner's emails portray his consistent efforts to obtain a refund for the trip, but only after RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT. The lone email of Respondent's principal serves to reveal Respondent's inability to respond meaningfully to Petitioner's efforts to protect his travel purchase and raises the possibility of bad faith on the part of Respondent's principal. On March 9, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the March POWAWIWTs, but not the April 1 POWAWIWT. This email does not seek to cancel the April 1 POWAWIWT, but expresses concern that RTDC will cancel the trip. On March 13, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the remaining POWAWIWTs through April. This email complains that RTDC had not 2 This oddity is unsurprising given the patter of each witness's testimony. Respondent's principal peppered his testimony with false apologies while, in a reassuring tone, he gently deferred and deflected blame and patiently, but mistakenly, insisted that the Contract did not require him to refund monies paid for a train trip that never took place. Petitioner frenetically rebutted each factual defense while somehow missing the salient points that he had paid for a POWAWIWT that never took place, Respondent refused to refund Petitioner's payment, and the Contract calls for a refund. Although a retired appellate attorney for the state of California, Petitioner seems to have grounded his early demands for a refund on natural law, because he appears not to have discovered one of the crucial contractual provisions, as discussed below, until he prepared the Prehearing Statement responded to Petitioner's requests for information, requests advice as to his available options, and asks for some assurance that Petitioner would not lose his payments of $8600 for the train tour plus an unspecified amount "for post trip activities" that are also unspecified. On March 15, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a news article in The Hindu that reported that another operator of train tours in India was paying refunds for cancelled trips and all tourist visas into India had been cancelled through April 15. This email implores Respondent to do the right thing and immediately refund the money paid for the cancelled trip. A few hours later, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal an India West news article that reported that India was now in a complete lockdown and the Indian government had cancelled all nondiplomatic visas. This email asks Respondent's principal to keep Petitioner informed on what RTDC was going to do and expresses hope that RTDC issues refunds. On March 19, Respondent's principal emailed Petitioner that "we are reaching some agreement with our ground operator for the train and this is what is being finalized." The statement clearly discloses no agreement, but, at best, an expectation of an agreement. The email describes the expected agreement to allow Petitioner to take a POWAWIWT during the following season from September 2020 through April 2021, but requires Petitioner to select travel dates within six days and pay whatever fare is in effect at the time of the trip. Respondent's principal never explained why Petitioner had only six days to accept an "offer" that RTDC had not yet authorized its agent to make, might not authorize within the six-day deadline, and might not ever authorize. Respondent's demand for a near-immediate acceptance of a nonexistent offer of a trip at market price was unreasonable and suggests that Respondent's principal was merely trying to induce Petitioner to make an offer in the form of an acceptance, so the principal might have greater bargaining leverage with RTDC. On March 23, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal, noting a series of unanswered emails and phone calls from Petitioner to the principal since the receipt of the March 19 "offer." Asking for clarification of the terms of the "offer," Petitioner's email concedes that it appears that Petitioner's money is lost and asks merely that Respondent show him the courtesy of calling him, confirming his fear, and providing a full explanation of what happened. Later that day, an employee of Respondent emailed Petitioner and informed him that the principal was suffering from a respiratory disorder and was unable to talk, so that future communications needed to be by email. Petitioner received no more emails from Respondent's principal, who, having returned to the United States after taking a POWAWIWT in early March, was later diagnosed with Covid. The telephone calls are undocumented. The credibility of Respondent's principal started to leave the tracks with the March 19 email of an illusory "offer" with an immediate deadline for acceptance. A month later, in responding to the disputed credit card charge, the credibility of Respondent's principal derailed completely, as he attempted to resecure the $1911.20 credit with material misrepresentations of what had taken place in an email dated April 21 to the credit card issuer. The email claims that Petitioner never cancelled the trip, so he was a "no-show"--a Kafkaesque claim that implies a duty to report for a trip that, undisclosed in the email, the sponsor had cancelled over two weeks prior to departure. The email states that, at the beginning of March, Petitioner called and said he did not feel comfortable taking the trip, but the trains were still running and "'Cancel for Fear'" was not an allowable reason for waiving a cancellation fee--perhaps true, but irrelevant. The email encloses a copy of the principal's March 19 email, states that Petitioner did not accept this "offer," and concludes that "[s]ince [Petitioner] did not cancel or inform us of the decision for travel before the travel date, the charge is valid as per the terms and conditions." The email cites a provision of the Contract addressing no-shows and, despite the absence of any mention of RTDC's cancellation of the trip due to the pandemic, adds a seemingly obscure reference to another provision of the Contract addressing acts of God, medical epidemics, quarantines, or other causes beyond Respondent's control for the cancellation of a trip. Notably, the email omits mention of the provisions of the Contract, described below, clearly calling for a refund. On balance, it is impossible to credit the testimony of Respondent's principal that, in telephone calls, Petitioner cancelled the trip before RTDC cancelled the trip or, more generally, that Petitioner could not settle on an acceptable remedy, and his indecisiveness prevented Respondent's principal from negotiating a settlement with RTDC--an assertion that, even if proved, would be irrelevant. Notwithstanding resolute attempts by Respondent's principal to misdirect attention from these unavoidable facts, Petitioner has paid for a train tour that never took place, RTDC cancelled the tour, and Petitioner never cancelled his tickets. The question is therefore whether, in its Contract, Respondent successfully transferred the risk of loss to Petitioner for a trip cancelled by the tour sponsor due to the pandemic. Analysis of this issue necessitates consideration of several provisions of the Contract that, despite its prolixity, is initially remarkable for two omissions: Respondent's Seller of Travel registration number3 and the name of RTDC as the sponsor of the POWAWIWT. Respondent claims that Petitioner caused his injury by declining to purchase travel insurance. The cover page of the Contract contains a section 3 Section 559.928(5) requires a seller of travel to include in each consumer contract the following: "[Name of seller of travel] is registered with the State of Florida as a Seller of Travel. Registration No. [X]." Even absent any mention of a statute, this disclosure provides a consumer with some means to learn of the somewhat obscure Act, the seller's statutory responsibilities, and the relief that may be available to a consumer for a seller's failure to discharge these responsibilities. Petitioner testified only that he somehow learned of the Act, but never said how. The record does not permit a finding that the omission of the statutory disclosure was purposeful, so as to conceal from the consumer the existence of the Act, or was a product of guileless ineptitude. called "Travel Insurance." This section provides an opportunity to purchase travel insurance from an entity "recommended by [Respondent]." The options are to check a box to purchase from Respondent's recommended entity or to check a box that states the traveler undertakes to obtain travel insurance independently, but this provision adds that, if travel insurance is not obtained, the consumer "absolve[s Respondent, t]he tour operator and the travel agent of all possible liabilities which may arise due to my failure to obtain adequate insurance coverage." Respondent offered no proof that its recommended travel insurance or other available travel insurance would pay for the cancellation of the April 1 POWAWIWT due to the pandemic, so Petitioner's choice not to purchase travel insurance is irrelevant. Additionally, the clear provisions of the Contract, discussed below, requiring a refund for a trip cancelled by the sponsor rebut Respondent's labored effort to apply the travel insurance provision to shift to the customer the risk of loss posed by a cancellation of the trip by the sponsor--a risk that might be better addressed by Respondent's purchase of commercial business interruption insurance. Respondent claims that the trip was cancelled by RTDC too close to the departure date to entitle Petitioner to any refund. The Contract contains a section called "Cancellation Fees." This section provides for increasing cancellation fees based on the proximity of the cancellation to the trip departure date. The Contract provides a 10% cancellation fee "if cancelled" more than 90 days prior to departure, 20% cancellation fee "if cancelled" between 89 and 35 days prior to departure, and 100% cancellation fee "if cancelled" within 34 days prior to departure. The Contract fails to specify if this provision applies to cancellations at the instance of the consumer or the trip sponsor, but the graduated fee reflects the greater value of a trip cancelled well in advance of the trip departure date, so that the trip can be resold. Obviously, a trip cancelled by a sponsor cannot be resold, so the cancellation fee provision applies only to a cancellation by a customer and does not shield Respondent from liability in this case. Lastly, Respondent relies on a section of the Contract called "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability." Provisions in this section warn that Respondent acts as an agent for a trip sponsor, such as the railroad, from which Respondent purchases the travel services. Although Respondent makes every effort to select the best providers of travel services, Respondent does not control their operations and thus CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR OTHER CLAIM which may occur as a result of any and/or all of the following: the wrongful, negligent or arbitrary acts or omissions on the part of the independent supplier, agent, its employees or others who are not under the direct control or supervision of [Respondent]; [or] * * * (3) loss, injury or damage to person, property or otherwise, resulting directly or indirectly from any Acts of God, dangers incident to … medical epidemics, quarantines, … delays or cancellations or alterations in itinerary due to schedule changes, or from any causes beyond [Respondent's] control. … In case of overbooking, [Respondent] will only be liable for refund [sic] the charged amount to the guest. [Respondent] shall in no event be responsible or liable for any direct, indirect, consequential, incidental, special or punitive damages arising from your interaction with any retailer/vendor, and [Respondent] expressly disclaims any responsibility or liability for any resulting loss or damage. The "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" provisions are general disclaimers of liability for various forms of damages arising out of the acts and omissions of third parties or forces outside the control of Respondent, such as the pandemic. These provisions represent a prudent attempt to avoid liability for damages, such as the lost opportunity to visit a gravely ill relative who has since died, that may amount to many multiples of the price paid for a trip. Complementing these general provisions limiting Respondent's liability, other provisions limit Respondent's liability to the payment of a refund of the purchase price of a trip cancelled by the sponsor. The section immediately following the "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" section is the "Reservation of Rights" section, which provides: "The company [i.e., Respondent] reserves the right to cancel any tour without notice before the tour and refund the money in full and is not responsible for any direct or indirect damages to the guest due to such action." As noted above, the Contract omits any mention of Respondent's principal, so as to Respondent in the place of its undisclosed principal; thus, a provision referring to a cancellation of the tour by Respondent includes a cancellation of the tour by Respondent's principal. As cited by Petitioner in the Prehearing Statement, the other relevant provision is in the "Prices, Rates & Fares" section and states that, if a customer cancels, any refund to which the customer is entitled, under the above-cited cancellation fee provisions, will be dependent on then-current exchange rates, but "[i]n the event that a tour is canceled through no action of the Client, the Client will receive a full refund of US$."4 This provision entitles a consumer to: 1) a refund and 2) a refund in U.S. dollars, presumably unadjusted for currency fluctuations since the payment. At the hearing, Respondent's principal tried to construe the "US$" provision as a reference to the currency to which a consumer is entitled to be paid when a consumer cancels a trip under conditions in which the customer is entitled to a refund, but this construction ignores that the cited clause applies to 4 An identical "US$" provision is found at the end of the section called "A Note About Cancellation for All Tours/Reservations." cancellations occurring through no action of the consumer and imposes on Respondent the obligation to make a "full refund" in such cases.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 within 30 days of the date of the order and, absent timely payment, directing the Surety to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 from the Bond. 7 Perhaps the recommended and final orders in this case will persuade the credit card issuer to issue the credit for the $1911.20 to Petitioner, who is entitled to this disputed sum. But, if Respondent regains possession of this disputed sum and refuses to refund it to Petitioner, the Department may wish to consider suspending or revoking Respondent's certificate or referring the matter to the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's Office. See the preceding footnote. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gil Gonzalez 8444 Mono Lake Drive San Diego, California 92119 (eServed) Benjamin C. Patton, Esquire McRae & Metcalf, P.A. 2612 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (16) 120.569120.57120.60320.641394.467552.40559.927559.928559.929559.9355559.936559.937604.21760.11766.303766.304 DOAH Case (1) 20-3509
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TEESHA WILLIAMS vs NORTH BROWARD HOSPITAL DISTRICT, 06-003665 (2006)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 25, 2006 Number: 06-003665 Latest Update: Feb. 15, 2007

The Issue Whether the Petitioner timely filed her Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("Commission").

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Commission is the state agency charged with investigating and acting upon complaints filed under Florida's Civil Rights Act, Sections 760.01-760.11, Florida Statutes (2006).1 § 760.06, Fla. Stat. On August 14, 2006, the Commission issued a Right to Sue notice, in which it informed Ms. Williams, among other things, that the FCHR hereby issues this Right to Sue. Since it has been more than 180 days since your complaint was filed, and since no determination was made within 180 days, you are entitled to pursue the case as if the FCHR issued a Determination of Reasonable Cause. . . . (Citation omitted). You may pursue this case in the Division of Administrative Hearings by filing a Petition for Relief with the FCHR within 35 days from the date of this Right to Sue letter, or you may file a lawsuit in a circuit court of the State of Florida anytime within one year from the date of this Right to Sue letter, provided such time period is not more than four years from the date the alleged violation occurred. Pursuant to the terms of this notice, Ms. Williams was required to file her Petition for Relief with the FCHR no later than 35 days from the date of the August 14, 2006, notice, that is, no later than September 18, 2006. Ms. Williams completed and signed a Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice on September 14, 2006. A receipt from the USPS establishes that, on September 17, 2006, the USPS accepted a letter from Ms. Williams addressed to the Commission; that the letter was sent via express mail; that neither next-day nor second-day delivery was selected; that a third option for delivery, "Add Del Day," was selected. The scheduled date of delivery stated on the receipt was September 20, 2006. Ms. Williams's Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice was received by the Commission on September 19, 2006. The USPS tracking website shows that the letter assigned number EQ 628681913 US was delivered on September 19, 2006.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief from an Unlawful Employment Practice filed by Teesha Williams. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of November, 2006.

Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.57760.06760.11
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MAGED SAMAAN, BETTER MEDICAL CARE vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 07-001490MPI (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 02, 2007 Number: 07-001490MPI Latest Update: Jul. 27, 2009
Florida Laws (2) 120.57409.913
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STEPHANIE WALKER vs BENNETT AUTO SUPPLY, INC., 04-000724 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderhill, Florida Mar. 05, 2004 Number: 04-000724 Latest Update: Jun. 29, 2004

The Issue Whether the Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, timely filed a Petition for Relief regarding her charge of discrimination against the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Stephanie Walker, applied for and received employment with the Respondent, Bennett Auto Supply, Inc. The Petitioner's initial employment with the company ended on March 8, 2001, as she resigned her job on or about February 26, 2001. Thereafter, the Petitioner returned to employment with the Respondent. Again, the Petitioner resigned her job and left employment on April 27, 2002. The exact reasons the Petitioner began employment, left employment, returned to employment, and again left employment with the Respondent are immaterial to the findings dispositive of this case. Suffice it to say the Petitioner ultimately filed a claim of discrimination with the FCHR against the Respondent. The Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination naming the Respondent was dated March 21, 2003, and noted April 27, 2002, as the date the most recent discrimination had taken place. Based upon its investigation of the allegations, the FCHR issued a Determination: No Cause on September 23, 2003. The Determination: No Cause provided, in pertinent part, ". . . it is my determination that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred." The Notice of Determination: No Cause, provided: Complainant may request an administrative hearing by filing a PETITION FOR RELIEF within 35 days of the date of this NOTICE OF DETERMINATION: NO CAUSE. A Petition for Relief form is enclosed with Complainant's notice. It may be beneficial for Complainant to seek legal counsel prior to filing the petition. If the Complainant fails to request an administrative hearing with [sic] 35 days of the date of this notice, the administrative claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, will be dismissed pursuant to section 760.11, Florida Statutes (1992). The Petition for Relief was filed approximately 159 days after the FCHR issued its determination in this case.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's Petition for Relief as it was not timely filed and is, therefore, barred as a matter of law. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Aplachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard A. Giardino, Esquire Davis & Giardino, P.A. 201 Arkona Court West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Stephanie Walker 1808 Northwest 52nd Avenue Lauderhill, Florida 33313

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57760.11
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY, 76-001784 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001784 Latest Update: May 23, 1977

Findings Of Fact This Hearing Officer has jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter of this hearing. Proper notice was given to all parties and all parties had an opportunity to be present and to be heard. An alleged violation of Chapter 479 was served on the Respondent, National Advertising Company, citing subject -- sign located on Interstate 95, 0.89 miles south of Bowden Road with copy "Valles" thereon by written notice dated September 2, 1976. The original part of the sign was erected within the city limits prior to 1970 and was not permitted by the Petitioner, Florida Department of Transportation. The violation which is the subject of this hearing is that the sign has been added to by erecting forty feet of catwalk thereon and installing three lights. The monetary value was increased by approximately $1,084.00. The addition of catwalk and lights to the sign is not routine maintenance as defined in Section 479, Florida Statutes, and a permit was necessary for such additions to signs subsequent to January, 1971.

Recommendation Notify the Respondent that the subject sign will be removed if such is not removed within 30 days after entry of the final order. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: George L. Waas, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Mr. George E. Hollis National Advertising Company Post Office Box 23208 Tampa, Florida 33623 William Rowland, Esquire Post Office Box 539 Winter Park, Florida F. S. Whitesell, District Sign Coordinator Department of Transportation South Marian Street Lake City, Florida 32055

Florida Laws (2) 479.02479.111
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