The Issue The issue presented is whether HMY New Yacht Sales, Inc., is liable for the payment of use tax, together with penalty and interest, on a yacht which it purchased for resale and for use as a demonstrator.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner HMY New Yacht Sales, Inc., is a Florida cor-poration located in Dania, Florida. It is a franchise and an authorized dealer for several lines of new boats. Petitioner is registered as a dealer for Florida sales tax purposes and has a dealer decal. Petitioner became an authorized dealer for Davis Yachts, a manufacturer located in North Carolina, in 1985. In January 1990 Petitioner purchased a boat from Davis Yachts to be used for demonstration and promotional activities and for resale. The boat was a 47-foot fiberglass sports fisherman named "The Bandit." When the boat was delivered, Petitioner outfitted The Bandit with extensive electronics and fishing equipment, including a tuna tower, outriggers, a fighting chair, rocket launchers, and live wells. It took approximately two months (until the second week in March 1990) to outfit the boat to have it ready for its intended sports fishing purpose. The type of equipping done by Petitioner is typical of that done on every such boat when it is sold since such a boat cannot be used for its intended purpose without the electronics and other equipment. Petitioner, however, wanted the boat to be "ready to go," when Petitioner sold it rather than having the purchaser wait for the outfitting to be done before the purchaser could use the boat. Petitioner paid the factory approximately $520,000 for the boat. Petitioner's payments to local vendors for services and materials used in outfitting the boat brought Petitioner's cost to approximately $590,000. The Bandit was never documented or registered in the state of Florida. It was only operated under Petitioner's dealer registration and decal, as provided in Section 327.13, Florida Statutes. The boat was purchased with the intent to sell it, and it was always for sale from the first moment it was outfitted and ready to be shown. It was never Petitioner's intent to keep the boat. As soon as it was outfitted, the boat had on board, at all times, a file containing a complete inventory of the boat's equipment, including custom and standard options, and a color brochure with pictures of the boat to be given to potential customers. While Petitioner was attempting to sell the boat, it was also used by Petitioner as a sales promotional tool. Petitioner took the boat to various fishing tournaments and exhibited it at boat shows and open houses. Davis Yachts bore some of the expense of those activities since promoting the boat inured to the benefit of Davis as well as of Petitioner. When the boat was being used for promotional or sales activities, it would always have on board employees or salespersons of Petitioner or of Davis Yachts and customers. On occasion, family members accompanied Petitioner's salespersons on board the boat. The manner in which The Bandit was marketed--taking it to fishing tournaments and boat shows and having open house at various events--is typically the way new sport fisherman yachts are sold throughout the industry. The boat was shown to prospective customers at least once a month. Approximately 50 customers were taken on sea trials. The boat was never loaned or rented to anyone. It was used only under the direction of Petitioner or Davis Yachts. The only compensation received by Petitioner relating to the boat resulted from the occasions when Davis Yachts split some of the expenses for the promotional or sales activities. The boat did not sell as quickly as Petitioner hoped. In October 1990 Petitioner placed the boat on the Buck System, a multiple listing service which distributes information to other yacht brokers concerning boats which are for sale. Generally, boat dealers would not put new inventory in the multiple listing system. Petitioner did so in this instance, however, in order to quickly sell the boat because the government had announced a luxury tax proposal which Petitioner feared would result in a downturn in the boat market. Even with all the effort put into attempting to sell the boat, it did not sell until November 1991. In July 1992 the Department began a routine sales tax audit of Petitioner. The audit was completed in September 1992 and covered the period of time from March 1987 through February 1992. The Department auditor determined that Petitioner owed use tax on The Bandit because in November 1990, on the advice of its accountant, Petitioner took the boat out of its inventory account and placed it in its fixed assets account in order to take depreciation for federal income tax purposes. Based solely on Petitioner's treatment of the vessel on its corporate books, the auditor determined that Petitioner converted The Bandit to its own use and was, therefore, responsible for payment of the statutory use tax rate of 6 percent of the value of the boat as reflected on Petitioner's records. Based upon the audit, the Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment, assessing Petitioner $33,921.94 in tax, $8,480.50 in penalty, and $7,085.52 in interest through September 16, 1992. Interest continues to accrue at $11.15 per day.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered determining that Petitioner is not liable for payment of use tax, penalty, or interest on The Bandit, and withdrawing the assessment which is the subject of this proceeding. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 1995, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-12, 15, and 19 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 13, 14, and 18 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel, conclusions of law, or recitation of the testimony. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 16, 17, and 20 have been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 6, 8, and 9 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 4, 5, and 10 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the competent evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed finding of fact numbered 7 has been rejected as being unnecessary to the issues involved herein. COPIES FURNISHED: Cynthia S. Tunnicliff, Esquire Pennington & Haben, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Mark T. Aliff, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact National Sun Control Company sells reflective film for installation on windows and glass doors throughout the southeastern United States. Sales are made only to distributors and dealers who do the installation or resell the film to customers. Petitioner holds a wholesalers occupational license and makes no sales to individuals for their own use. Petitioner sells the film only in 100 foot rolls and the normal order exceeds $100. Throughout Florida its maximum number of dealers has been about 25 and at present there are only 4 or 5 actively engaged in installing this film for their customers. Petitioner failed to ascertain that each of its dealers had a tax exemption number and when his accounts for the years 1974 - 1976 were audited by the Respondent, a sales tax was levied on all of Petitioner's sales to Florida dealers in the amount of $3,814.47. To this was added a 25 percent delinquent penalty of $953.62 and interest in the amount of $743.82. Petitioner has recovered some of the sales taxes for which it was assessed and remitted same to the Respondent. In the revised assessment dated April 5, 1977 the tax was shown to be $1,362.38, the penalty (reduced to 5 percent) to be $68.13 and interest $290.00. From this is deducted a partial payment made by Petitioner of $636.60, leaving a balance owed by Petitioner of $1083.91 Petitioner has provided Respondent with the names and addresses of each of the dealers to whom he shipped reflective film for installation and resale and has requested Respondent to collect the taxes owed from those dealers. One area supervisor responded (Exhibit 3) that the dealer said he had been told by Petitioner that the film was tax exempt and he refused to reimburse Petitioner for "the Florida Sales Tax that you [Petitioner) failed to collect."
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner owes sales and use tax or specifically use tax, on certain purchases of tangible personal property in accordance with the relevant provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Property Care, Inc. (Petitioner, taxpayer), was a Florida "Subchapter-S Corporation" having its home office in Dade City, Florida, at times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner's federal employer identification number was 59-3288869 and its Florida sales tax number was 06-1041158. The Petitioner was engaged in the business of cutting and removing trees, driveway construction, lawn maintenance, and landscaping. The Department of Revenue (Department) is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering the tax laws of the state in accordance with Section 212 and 213, Florida Statutes. After issuing proper notification to the Petitioner on January 2, 2003, the Department conducted a sales and use tax audit of the Petitioner's business records. The audit covered the period of December 1, 1999 through December 16, 2001. The Petitioner corporation ceased doing business on December 16, 2001. The Department examined purchase invoices, general ledgers, and federal income tax returns of the Petitioner in the course of its audit. The Department elected to examine the records in detail rather than doing a statutorily permissible sample audit, since the assessment period was relatively short. The Petitioner was engaged in the business of making improvements to real property (construction driveways, landscaping, etc.) through the purchase and use of items of tangible personal property, as raw materials, it bought for use in its business. This included the purchase of limerock, plants, sod, mulch and the like for use in maintaining or landscaping real property. Because the Petitioner was engaged in the business of making improvements to real property, and not merely re-selling limerock, mulch, etc., it was generally only liable to pay sales tax on its purchases of items of tangible personal property used in its business, but not to charge and collect sales tax on its landscaping and real property improvement business activities or services for its ultimate customers. See Chapter 212, Fla. Stat. During the audit period, it was determined by the Department that sales tax had not been paid by the Petitioner on some of its purchases of items of tangible personal property used in the conduct of its business, such items as sod, limerock, asphalt, hay, and other products. The Department also found that the Petitioner had not paid sales tax on certain auto repairs that included both parts and labor charges. Accordingly, the Department noticed an assessment to the Petitioner for use tax on the purchases of items of tangible personal property, for which sales invoices produced in the audit, and by the Petitioner, did not indicate that sales tax had been paid when the items had been purchased from the suppliers. The Department calculated the additional tax due by multiplying the taxable amounts taken from the purchase invoices by the applicable tax rate. The Department also gave the Petitioner credit for sales taxes already paid. Specifically, on a purchase invoice for auto repairs, the Department gave the Petitioner credit for sales tax paid on the parts used in the repairs. The Petitioner's witnesses testified that the four purchase invoices identified as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 2 in evidence, represented freight charges and were not tangible personal property purchase amounts for the limerock involved. Those purchase invoices, however, indicate on their face that they were for limerock. They indicate the total tonnage and the price per ton and do not indicate any portion of the charges representing freight or delivery charges. The price indicated per ton appears reasonable as a price for limerock and not just for freight charges. Moreover, the Petitioner's own witnesses concede that the purchase invoices in composite Exhibit 2 do not indicate any itemization or amount for freight charges. It is determined that these invoices are actually invoices for the purchase of limerock and not merely freight charges. The Petitioner contends that it assumed that the purchase invoices, identified as Petitioner's Exhibits 1, 4, and 7-9, in evidence, included sales tax in the unit price represented on those invoices, even though any sales tax increment of those invoices is not separately stated and itemized. The Petitioner's witness in this regard conceded, however, that he had no way of knowing whether the vendors from whom he purchased the goods actually charged sales tax on the subject invoices, since it was not itemized. He was only assuming that the tax was included in the unit price he paid, as a part of the total number. The Petitioner contends that it is not liable for the sales tax because sales tax was included in the unit price of the tangible personal property that the Petitioner purchased. The Petitioner argues, in the alternative, that it is not liable for sales tax because the vendors were responsible for charging and collecting the sales tax and that they should be held liable for the tax. In consideration of the evidence which shows that the Petitioner bought the limerock, sod, and other items for use in its business of providing landscaping, maintenance, and other improvements to real property, the Petitioner did not provide documentary or other evidence to corroborate its testimonial assumption or belief that the invoices were either not subject to tax or that the invoiced amounts included payment of the tax. Most of the invoices (the only documentary evidence of billing and the amount and category of payment), do not depict an itemization or category for tax on the face of the invoices. The evidence adduced by the Petitioner does show, as to Invoice Number 29, that tax indeed was paid on that purchase in the amount of $679.25. Additionally, with regard to APAC Invoice Number PORT 16175, $73.39 in tax was paid. Any assessment and collection of tax, penalty and interest by the Department upon conclusion of this proceeding should reflect credit to the Petitioner for these amounts. On June 3, 2003, a Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued by the Department to the Petitioner, setting forth deficient sales and use tax in the sum of $1,812.86, with interest through June 3, 2003, in the sum of $354.34, accruing at the rate of $.25 per day as well as a penalty in the sum of $906.44. The Notice of Proposed Assessment became a Final Assessment on August 2, 2003, for purposes of filing a request for formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings or for contesting the assessment in the circuit court. On September 30, 2003, the Petitioner elected to file a Petition with the Division of Administrative Hearings seeking a formal proceeding and hearing to contest the final assessment in this case.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and the arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue assessing the tax as depicted in the notice of assessment, in evidence herein, including credit for the tax shown to have been collected on the two invoices referenced in the above Findings of Fact, and assessing interest and penalties in the amounts legally prescribed or as agreed to by the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Charles B. Morrow Jeanne Morrow Post Office Box 659 Astor, Florida 32102 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner owes additional sales and use tax, plus penalties and interest, on the purchase of bowling equipment during the audit period August 1, 1987 to July 31, 1992.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, Beverly Hills Bowl, Inc., is a Florida corporation. Petitioner was formed by Charles and Evelyn Gill, the shareholders of Petitioner. Petitioner was formed to own and operate a bowling alley. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with, among other things, responsibility for assessing and collecting sales and use taxes in Florida pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. The Respondent's Audit. Between July 23, 1992 and October 8, 1992, Respondent performed a sale and use tax audit of Petitioner for the period August 1, 1987 through July 31, 1992. Respondent concluded that Petitioner's books and records were reasonable except for documentation to support the payment of sales and use tax on a purchase by Petitioner of bowling equipment. Respondent issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment on October 29, 1992. Respondent proposed the assessment of $31,609.05 in sales and use tax. Petitioner paid $8,137.05 of the additional tax. The parties stipulated that the additional tax liability at issue in this proceeding amounts to $23,472.00. Respondent also assessed a penalty of $7,888.96 and interest of $5,264.15. Disputed Purchase. Petitioner purchased bowling lane equipment from United Bowling Products, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "United"), a Florida corporation, during the audit period. Petitioner paid $391,200.00 to United for bowling lanes and equipment described on Petitioner's exhibit 1. Before consummating an agreement to sale bowling lanes to Petitioner, United gave Petitioner a "Proposal" offering to sell bowling lanes to Petitioner for $391,200.00. See Petitioner's exhibit 1. The Proposal states, among other things, the following: * WE OFFER THE ABOVE EQUIPMENT FOR $16,300.00 PER LANE INCLUDING INSTALLATION, FREIGHT, AND FLORIDA SALES TAX. . . . [Emphasis added]. Petitioner accepted the Proposal and purchased the bowling lanes for $391,200.00. Oral communications between Petitioner and United were also consistent with the Proposal concerning the inclusion of sales tax in the purchase price. No written documentation of the agreement between United and Petitioner was entered into. Petitioner received the bowling lanes and paid United $391,200.00. No written documentation or invoices were provided Petitioner by United upon consummation of the sale. The additional assessment at issue in this case is attributable to this sale of bowling equipment by United to Petitioner. Respondent's Treatment of the Purchase. Respondent concluded that, since the amount of sales tax was not separately stated on the Proposal, additional documentation of the payment of the sales tax by Petitioner to United was required. Respondent requested additional documentation but Petitioner was unable to provide it to Respondent's satisfaction. Respondent concluded that Petitioner was responsible for the payment of use tax on the equipment because it could not be proved to Respondent's satisfaction that sales tax had been paid to United. Respondent is also attempting to collect sales tax on the purchase from the primary dealer responsible for the collection and remittance of sales tax.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the assessment dated October 29, 1992 against Beverly Hills Bowl, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 2-3, 5-6 and 11. Accepted in 9-11. Accepted in 1, 10 and 12. See 14. What Mr. Aliff may have said during the hearing may not form the basis of a finding of fact. Mr. Aliff was not sworn and did not testify. See 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 Accepted in 1. 2-3 Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. The last sentence is a conclusion of law. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 9-10 and 12. Hereby accepted. See 12-13. What the Citrus County Property Appraiser may have reported is hearsay. Accepted in 5. Not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter C. Johnston, CPA, P.A. 6 Beverly Hills Boulevard Beverly Hills, Florida 34465 Mark T. Aliff Assistant Attorney General Tax Section, Capitol Building Department of Legal Affairs Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire Department of Revenue Legal Office 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is engaged in the cattle business and sells these cattle to in-state and out-of-state buyers who purchase the cattle at Clewiston, Florida, and have them transported either by the purchaser's own equipment or by a commercial carrier to their in-state or out-of-state destination. Those sales determined to be out-of-state sales are not included in the numerator of the fraction used to compute what percentage of Petitioner's income results from Florida sales and is therefore subject to Florida income tax. In making the determination respecting out-of-state sales Respondent applies the destination test if the cattle are shipped by common carrier but treats all other carriers as agents of the buyer to whom the cattle are delivered at Clewiston, thereby making such sales in-state sales. It is this policy determination which Petitioner contends is a rule. The policy has not been promulgated in accordance with Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and, if this interpretation constitutes a rule, it is invalid because it was never promulgated as required. In determining whether certain sales are subject to the Florida sales tax, the Legislature in Section 212.06(5)(a), Florida Statutes, excluded from tax that tangible property imported or manufactured for export and provided such tangible property shall not be considered as being manufactured for export unless the manufacturer delivers the same to a licensed exporter for exporting or to a common carrier for shipment outside the State or mails the same by United States Mail to a destination outside the State. The rationale of the sales tax provision is used by Respondent in determining whether the sales are in-state sales for the purpose of computing Florida income tax. Respondent has promulgated, to its auditors, as a policy and as an interpretation of the statute, the directive to apply the destination test in determining out-of-state sales only when the merchandise sold is shipped by common carrier to a destination out of state. It is this policy determination or interpretation of the statutes that Petitioner contends is a rule and attacks in these proceedings. In the testimony Respondent acknowledged that this policy determination is uniformly applied. It also has application both within and outside the agency. Respondent further testified that if the merchandise (here cattle) had been delivered by Petitioner to the buyer outside the State of Florida by any means of transportation Petitioner chose, it would have treated the sale as an out-of-state sale.
The Issue The issue posed herein is whether or not the Petitioner remitted to Respondent, pursuant to Chapter 212.05(1), Florida Statutes, the, proper amount of sales tax on the boat "Captain Deebold" which was purchased on November 29, 1976. A related issue, assuming that the proper sales taxes were not remitted by Petitioner, is whether or not a levy of penalty and interest is warranted under the circumstances.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received, legal memoranda submitted by the parties and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant facts are found. Petitioner purchased the vessel "Captain Deebold" on November 29, 1976, and alleged that the purchase price of the boat was $20,000.00. Accordingly, Petitioner remitted to the Department sales taxes based on the declared value of $20,000.00. Respondent maintained that the subject boat was purchased for the sum of $75,000.00 and has, therefore, issued an assessment against Petitioner for the additional taxes, penalty and interest. By letter dated November 29, 1978, Respondent's Revenue Investigator, Leslie J. Smithling, advised Petitioner that a routine verification concerning his purchase of the subject boat revealed a transaction amount of $75,000.00 upon which the four percent Florida Sales Tax is $3,000.00. Petitioner was further advised therein that his remittance in the amount of $4,202.00 was due no later than December 15, 1979. Taxes, penalties and interest were calculated as follows: Purchase Price $75,000.00 Tax Rate 4% Tax $ 3,000.00 Minus Tax Paid (Based on $20,000.00) $ 800.00 Tax Due $ 2,200.00 Administrative Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 550.00 Fraud Penalty (Ch. 212.12[2], F.S.) $ 1,100.00 Interest: 1% per month from 8/1/77 to 12/1/77 16% Plus $.72 daily thereafter Total Interest Accrued $ 352.00 Total Tax, Penalties & Interest Due $ 4,202.00 In support of its position that the true purchase price of the boat was only $20,000.00, Petitioner points out that the seller of the boat, Frank Deebold, had neglected the boat and had only made repairs that were absolutely necessary to operate the vessel. Thus, when Petitioner purchased the vessel, numerous repairs were made to make it seaworthy including 1) repaired electrical wiring; 2) sealed the deck seams; 3) reconnected the port fuel tank; 4) repaired the clutch in the port engine; 5) repaired leaks in the starboard stern quarter; 6) replaced and rebolted the chines; 7) replaced a section of the keel; 8) rebuilt the main clutch; 9) caulked deck; 10) replaced or repaired the winch on the anchor; 11) reworked and/or repaired the engine room, including insulation, lighting, lining, painting and hauling. To perform these repairs, Petitioner places the value on materials utilized at approximately $18,000.00. Additionally, Petitioner estimated that the value of his labor involved in making the approximately $25,000.00. The articles of agreement for the purchase of the boat provides in pertinent part as follows: Witnesseth, that if the said party of the second part shall (purchaser) first make the payments and perform the covenants hereinafter mentioned on his part to be made and performed, the said party of the first part (seller) hereby covenants and agrees to convey and assure to the said party of the second part, his heirs, personal represent- atives or assigns, clear of all encumbrances, whatever by a good and sufficient bill of sale the Oil Screw vessel, Captain Deebold, o/n294675, gross tons-36, its equipment, hull, machinery, present insurance policies and business including fifty or more used rods and reels, one 3.5 KW Lister auxiliary generator, used and in need of repair, spare Jabsco water pump (used and in need of repair), spare 24 volt DC alternator, spare 24 volt DC main engine starter, spare stub shaft, three spare propellers (used and in need of repair) and a spare UHF Pierce- Simpson radio transceiver (used and in need of repair) and the said party of the second part hereby covenants and agrees to pay to the said party of the first part the sum of seventy-five thousand and 00/100 ($75,000.00) dollars in the manner following. . . . Nevertheless, Petitioner stressed that inasmuch as the Articles of Agreement provided that the seller only required Petitioner to maintain insurance coverage in the amount of $50,000.00 indicating that the purchase price was something less than $75,000.00 and in fact was no more than $50,000. Pursuant to the Articles of Agreement, the amount insurance coverage required was $50,000.00. Petitioner also declared that included in the $75,000.00 purchase price were other items which included the business (dock space), and reduced prices for miscellaneous supplies and fuel prices. In this regard, an examination of the Articles revealed that these items were provided Petitioner on a cost plus basis and the dock space was leased for an amount based on a rebate of the percentage of ticket sales or charter fees received. Petitioner ultimately sold the boat for 95,000.00. Petitioner initially tried to sell the boat for the sum of $105,000.00 of which $10,000.00 represented the value he (Petitioner) placed on the business. An examination of the accounting records introduced indicated that Petitioner placed the sum of $75,000.00 as the purchase price for the boat. Petitioner thought that his estimation of the labor and materials necessary to properly repair the boat were items that could be used as a setoff to reduce the amount of taxes due. Petitioner testified that he, in no way, intended to defraud the Respondent of taxes properly due and owing. Petitioner's testimony in this regard is credited.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner remit to the Respondent the proper interest as set forth herein in paragraph 4 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner remit to the Respondent an administrative penalty of 5 percent of the aggregate taxes due as set forth herein in Paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner not be held liable for payment of for allegedly filing a "false or fraudulent" return for reasons set forth herein in Paragraph 6 of the Conclusions of Law. RECOMMENDED this 27th day of February 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February 1981.
The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue (DOR) has properly issued an assessment against Petitioner for sales and use tax, interest, and penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida resident. In 1996, Petitioner began doing business as a sole proprietor under the name of "Duraline Industries" and registered with DOR as a sales tax dealer. Later, this entity was called "Dura Steel." Petitioner also operated as a corporation, Steel Engineered Design Systems, Inc. Petitioner's Florida sales tax numbers are 42-11-009271-63 and 40-00-003416- For purposes of these consolidated cases, Petitioner has been audited and charged individually as "Charles R. Bielinski," because the audit revealed that no checks were made out to the corporation(s) and that the monies received were received by Mr. Bielinski as a sole proprietor in one or more "doing business as" categories. Petitioner engaged in the business of fabricating items of tangible personal property, i.e., prefabricated steel buildings, many of which later became improvements to real property in Florida. Petitioner used some of the steel buildings in the performance of real property contracts by installing the buildings as improvements to real property. Petitioner also engaged in the business of selling buildings and steel component parts such as sheets and trim in Florida. Petitioner sold buildings and component parts in over- the-counter retail sales, also. On October 7, 2002, DOR issued Petitioner a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records for the period of September 1, 1999 through August 31, 2002. This audit was assigned number AO226920428. In 2002, Petitioner provided DOR's auditor with his sales activity records, such as contracts and job information. A telephone conversation/interview of Petitioner was conducted by the auditor. Over a period of several months, the auditor attempted to get Petitioner to provide additional records, but none were forthcoming. DOR deemed the contracts and job information provided by Petitioner to be an incomplete record of his sales activity for the audit period. Petitioner claimed that most of his sales activity records had been lost or destroyed. Due to the absence of complete records, DOR sampled Petitioner's available records and other information related to his sales in order to conduct and complete its audit. Petitioner purchased materials used to fabricate his steel buildings. Petitioner sometimes would erect the buildings on real property. Petitioner fabricated main frames for smaller buildings at a shop that he maintained at the Bonifay Airport. Otherwise, Petitioner subcontracted with like companies to fabricate main frames for larger buildings. Petitioner made some sales to exempt buyers, such as religious institutions and government entities. When he purchased the materials he used to fabricate the buildings, Petitioner occasionally provided his vendors with his resale certificate, in lieu of paying sales tax. Petitioner did not pay sales tax on the materials he purchased to fabricate buildings when such buildings were being fabricated for exempt buyers such as churches and governmental entities. On June 23, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Form DR-840), for audit number AO226920428, covering the period of November 1, 1997 through August 31, 2002. DOR has assessed Petitioner sales tax on the buildings, sheets, and trim he sold over-the-counter in Florida. DOR has assessed Petitioner use tax on sales of the materials used in performing real property contracts in Florida. The auditor calculated a method of estimating taxes based on the limited documentation that had been provided by Petitioner. She used a sampling method based on Petitioner's contract numbering system; isolated the Florida contracts; and divided the Florida contracts between the actual sale of tangible property (sale of just the buildings themselves) and real property contracts (where Petitioner not only provided the building but also provided installation or erection services). The auditor scheduled the real property contracts and assessed only the material amounts as taxable in Florida. Since she had only 19 out of 47 probable contracts, or 40 percent, she projected up to what the taxable amount should be and applied the sales tax and surtax at the rate of seven percent, as provided by law. She then divided that tax for the entire audit period by the 58 months in the audit period, to arrive at a monthly tax amount. This monthly tax amount was broken out into sales and discretionary sales tax. Florida levies a six percent State sales tax. Each county has the discretion to levy a discretionary sales tax. Counties have similar discretion as to a surtax. The auditor determined that Petitioner collected roughly $22,000.00 dollars in tax from one of his sales tax registrations which had not been remitted to DOR. During the five-year audit period, Petitioner only remitted tax in May 1998. DOR gave Petitioner credit for the taxes he did remit to DOR during the audit period. The foregoing audit processes resulted in the initial assessment(s) of August 28, 2003, which are set out in Findings of Fact 25-31, infra. On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR-832/833), for additional discretionary surtax, in the sum of $2,582.19; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $782.55; and penalty, in the sum of $1,289.91; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.50 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0008) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional sales and use tax in the sum of $154,653.32; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $50,500.06; and penalty, in the sum of $77,324.54, plus additional interest that accrues at $31.54 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0009) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional local governmental infrastructure surtax, in the sum of $7,001.82; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $2,352.09; and penalty in the sum of $3,497.35; plus additional interest that accrues at $1.45 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0010) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional indigent care surtax, in the sum of $513.08; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $156.33; and penalty, in the sum of $256.24; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.10 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0011) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional school capital outlay surtax in the sum of $3,084.49; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $922.23; and penalty, in the sum of $1,540.98; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.60 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0012) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), for additional charter transit system surtax, in the sum of $2,049.22; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $766.07; and penalty, in the sum of $1,023.27; plus additional interest that accrues at $0.46 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0013) On August 28, 2003, DOR issued Petitioner a Notice of Proposed Assessment (Form DR 832/833), additional small county surtax, in the sum of $10,544.51; interest through August 28, 2003, in the sum of $3,437.85; and penalty in the sum of $5,282.30; plus additional interest that accrues at $2.15 per day. (DOAH Case No. 04-0014) However, the auditor testified at the May 13, 2004, hearing that she attended Petitioner's deposition on March 18, 2004. At that time, Petitioner provided additional documentation which permitted the auditor to recalculate the amount of tax due. The auditor further testified that she separated out the contracts newly provided at that time and any information which clarified the prior contracts she had received. She then isolated the contracts that would affect the Florida taxes due. Despite some of the new information increasing the tax on some of Petitioner's individual Florida contracts, the result of the auditor's new review was that overall, the contracts, now totaling 33, resulted in a reduction in total tax due from Petitioner. These changes were recorded in Revision No. 1 which was attached to the old June 23, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, which was sent by certified mail to Petitioner. The certified mail receipt was returned to DOR as unclaimed. The auditor's calculations reducing Petitioner's overall tax are set out in Respondent's Exhibit 16 (Revision No. 1). That exhibit appears to now show that taxes are owed by Petitioner as follows in Findings of Fact 34-40 infra. For DOAH Case No. 04-0008, discretionary surtax (tax code 013), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,937.37, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0009, sales and use tax (tax code 010), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $111,811.04, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0010, local governmental infrastructure surtax (tax code 016), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $5,211.00, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0011, indigent care surtax (tax code 230), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $317.39, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0012, school capital outlay tax (tax code 530), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $2,398.68, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0013, charter transit system surtax (tax code 015), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $1,558.66, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law. For DOAH Case No. 04-0014, small county surtax (tax code 270), Petitioner only owes in the amount of $7,211.83, plus penalties and interest to run on a daily basis as provided by law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order upholding the amount of tax calculated against Petitioner in its June 21, 2003, Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes, Revision No. 1, in the principal amounts as set forth in Findings of Fact Nos. 34-40, plus interest and penalty accruing per day as provided by law, until such time as the tax is paid. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is liable for use tax, pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, to the Florida Department of Revenue for the use and storage of a vessel.
Findings Of Fact Camden Corporation (Petitioner) is a foreign corporation, incorporated in Delaware on August 7, 1990. Petitioner is a solely owned, closed corporation. Petitioner has two officers: a President, who is the sole owner, and a Treasurer. At all times material hereto, Petitioner's President and Treasurer were residents of Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner's business address is in Jacksonville, Florida. Petitioner's officers handled its day-to-day activities and records from Jacksonville, Florida. Prior to the Petitioner's incorporation, its President wanted to purchase a vessel to take a world wide cruise. He obtained the services of a law firm to advise him on avoiding a state's sales and use tax on the purchase of a vessel, with Florida being one of the states. A lawyer in the firm contacted the Florida Department of Revenue (Respondent) and inquired, without relating any of Petitioner's factual circumstances, as to whether the case of Department of Revenue v. Yacht Futura, 510 So.2d 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987) was still good case law in Florida. Yacht Futura was a case in which the parameters of Florida's sales and use tax were interpreted regarding repairs and personal use of vessels while in Florida waters. Respondent's representative informed the firm's lawyer that Yacht Futura was still being followed by Respondent and that no exceptions existed; but Respondent's representative further cautioned that the factual circumstances must conform to Yacht Futura. The firm's lawyer prepared a memorandum advising Petitioner's President, among other things, that no liability for Florida's sales and use tax would be incurred for repairs and personal use of a vessel in Florida's waters, so long as the circumstances complied with Yacht Futura. After having received the firm's advice and advice from tax advisors, Petitioner's President created and incorporated Petitioner. On August 14, 1990, Petitioner purchased a used motor vessel in international waters for $5,618,000. The vessel was a 131' Feadship with Coast Guard documentation number 623589. Petitioner named the vessel "CAMDEN." The CAMDEN was the only assest owned by Petitioner. Petitioner did not pay any Florida sales tax at the time of CAMDEN's purchase. From August 14, 1990 through October 15, 1990, the CAMDEN was outside the State of Florida. Petitioner's President had taken the vessel on a cruise. During the time period that the vessel was on the cruise, Petitioner did not pay any sales or use tax in any jurisdiction in the United States. Also, during the time period that the vessel was on the cruise, Petitioner did not license, title, or register the CAMDEN in any jurisdiction in the United States. On October 15, 1990, relying on the law firm's advice, Petitioner imported the CAMDEN into Florida waters for major repairs, with the intention of departing after the repairs and not returning to Florida waters. Petitioner obtained the services of Huckins Yacht Corporation, a registered repair facility, in Jacksonville to perform repairs to the CAMDEN, which had a dock in Huckins Marina. However, the dock at Huckins Marina was unable to accommodate a vessel the size of the CAMDEN. The vessel was docked at Southbank Marina which could accommodate the vessel and which was the closest marina to Huckins Marina. Petitioner's President was not in the State of Florida when the CAMDEN arrived in Florida waters. He did not return to Florida until October 24, 1990. Petitioner did not have a written contract with Huckins Yacht Corporation (Huckins) to perform any repairs on the CAMDEN. However, Huckins did perform some minor repairs to the CAMDEN. Also, Huckins arranged for a major repair to the CAMDEN. It arranged for Petitioner to purchase a global position satellite electronic system as a nonwarranty repair. The electronic system was to be installed by someone who was not an employee of Huckins and who did not have a contractual agreement with Huckins for the installation. The electronic system was installed on the CAMDEN at the Southbank Marina. During the time that repairs were being made to the CAMDEN, its crew remained on board. Petitioner never received any bill from Huckins for any repairs made to the CAMDEN, including the installation of the electronic system. While the vessel was docked for repairs at the Southbank Marina, it was used for personal entertainment. On October 25, 1990, Petitioner's President and his friends had an open house type of party on the CAMDEN. On October 26, 1990, Petitioner had a luncheon cruise on the CAMDEN. On October 27, 1990, Petitioner had a dinner cruise and a birthday party for the daughter of Petitioner's President. On October 28, 1990, Petitioner took the CAMDEN from Jacksonville to St. Augustine for a pleasure trip. Leaving St. Augustine, the CAMDEN traveled to Miami, Florida and docked there on October 30, 1990, to get the vessel prepared for world travel. In Miami, the CAMDEN was docked at the Moorings Yacht Services, Inc. (Moorings), a registered repair facility. In November 1990, the Moorings began repairs to the CAMDEN, and in December 1990, the vessel departed the Moorings. In November 1990, Petitioner hired a tax consultant, who was a former employee of Respondent, for advice regarding Petitioner's liability for sales and use tax of the CAMDEN in Florida. The tax consultant advised Petitioner to register the CAMDEN as a charter for sales and use tax. Further, he advised Petitioner to late-file with Respondent an Exemption Affidavit for Boats Placed in a Registered Repair Facility, referred to as a Safe Harbor Affidavit, pursuant to Subsection 212.08(7)(t), Florida Statutes. On December 19, 1990, a Safe Harbor Affidavit was executed by both Huckins and Petitioner's President. The Safe Harbor Affidavit indicated, among other things, that Huckins was a registered repair facility in Jacksonville, Florida and that, from October 16, 1990 through October 25, 1990, the CAMDEN was under the care, custody, and control of Huckins for the purpose of installing electronics, which was the electronic system. Even though the Safe Harbor Affidavit does not provide that Huckins installed the electronic system on the CAMDEN, it does infer that Huckins had installed the electronic device. Respondent interprets "care, custody, and control" as the vessel being in the "physical" care, custody, and control of the registered repair facility. Clearly shown on the Safe Harbor Affidavit is that it is to be filed with the Respondent within 72 hours after the repair facility takes possession of the vessel. Additionally, clearly shown on the Safe Harbor Affidavit is that a copy of it is to be filed with Respondent within 72 hours after the work is completed and the vessel is released to the owner. On or about December 22, 1990, the CAMDEN departed Florida waters for a pleasure cruise to the Bahamas. In early January 1991, the vessel returned to Florida. The CAMDEN remained in Florida until mid-January 1991, when it traveled to the Caribbean. Around mid-May 1991, the vessel returned to Florida. In 1990, Petitioner was not issued a permit by any agency of the United States government to use the CAMDEN in Florida waters. In April 1991, one of Respondent's representatives discovered, during a routine examination of the records of the Miami Marina, that the CAMDEN was named as a boat docked in Florida with an out-of-state hailing port. On May 13, 1991, Respondent's representative sent a Declaration for Florida Sales and Use Tax (Declaration) to Petitioner for it to complete and return to Respondent. Instead of completing the Declaration, on December 10, 1991, Petitioner's tax consultant delivered the Safe Harbor Affidavit executed on December 19, 1990, to Respondent's representative. Additionally, Petitioner's tax consultant verbally supported the Safe Harbor Affidavit by stating that the CAMDEN was docked at Southbank Marina in Jacksonville while the repairs to the vessel were being completed by Huckins and the nonemployee. The Moorings filed a Safe Harbor Affidavit with Respondent, providing that the CAMDEN entered the facility in November 1990 and departed in December 1990. The Safe Harbor Affidavit was not submitted to Respondent within 72 hours of the CAMDEN either entering the facility for repairs or departing the facility after the repairs were completed. 1/ Respondent has a practice of accepting late-filed Safe Harbor Affidavits, with the condition that all documents supporting repairs are also to be submitted. A subsequent review of all the documents submitted would determine whether a person would be responsible for sales and use tax. On December 10, 1991, based on the Safe Harbor Affidavit and the representations by Petitioner's tax consultant, Respondent's representative closed her file regarding the sales and use tax, without assessing any sales or use tax against Petitioner. However, she forwarded neither a closing letter nor a closing agreement to Petitioner. Even though Petitioner had not received a closing letter or a closing agreement from Respondent, it believed that Respondent had terminated its inquiry of any assessment against it. In or around November 1991, another of Respondent's representative (Respondent's second representative) observed, while performing a routine marina check, the CAMDEN docked at the Palm Harbor Marina in West Palm Beach, Florida. Subsequently, he opened a new file on the CAMDEN. Petitioner was unaware that Respondent's second representative had opened a new file. Respondent's second representative performed an investigation of the vessel, including reviewing the Safe Harbor Affidavit submitted to the Respondent's other representative on December 10, 1991. His investigation led to the assessment at issue. The investigation by Respondent's second representative showed, and it is determined as a finding of fact here, that the CAMDEN was not in the physical care, custody, and control of Huckins during the repairs for the period October 16, 1990 through October 25, 1990. From October 15, 1990, when the CAMDEN entered in Florida waters for repairs, the vessel remained in Florida for more than a total of 10 days. Petitioner decided to sell the CAMDEN and listed it for $6.9 million. On February 14, 1992, Petitioner sold the CAMDEN for $5.3 million, which was $1.6 million less than it was originally listed. For 1991 and 1992, Petitioner's President treated the CAMDEN as his personal second home and took a home interest deduction for federal income tax purposes. On October 10, 1992, Respondent notified Petitioner that it was assessed, as of April 10, 1992, a tax of $337,080, representing: 6 percent of the CAMDEN's purchase price of $5,618,000; $84,270 in penalty; $168,540 in specific penalty; and $59,826.60 in interest. On October 26, 1992, Respondent issued a notice of final assessment to Petitioner which included the above assessment and the facts and reasons, including legal reasons, for the assessment. Petitioner contested the assessment. On January 14, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of reconsideration of the assessment and revised final assessment, withdrawing the $168,540 in specific penalty but sustaining the remaining assessment of $503,113.02, which represented: $337,080 tax; $84,270 penalty; and $81,763.02 interest. In its notice of reconsideration, Respondent determined, among other things, that Petitioner was issued an out-of-state registration, effective December 1, 1990, as a result of Petitioner submitting an application for sales and use tax registration, listing the major business activity as rental of tangible personal property. Additionally, Respondent determined, among other things, that Petitioner, as the corporation, maintained control and use of the CAMDEN during the period December 1990 through February 1992 when the CAMDEN was sold. No tax at issue was assessed for this period of time. Petitioner protested the revised assessment. Petitioner has not paid any Florida use tax.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of use tax against the Camden Corporation in the amount of $503,113.02, plus accrued interest. DONE AND ENTERED on this 30th day of September, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 1996.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, is subject to Florida sales and use tax pursuant to Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. STIPULATED FACTS Petitioner is a for-profit Florida corporation that sells perchloroethylene and other dry-cleaning supplies to the dry-cleaning industry. It is a "wholesale supply facility" as that term is defined in Section 376.301(17), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is a member of the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition, a state-wide trade association whose members consist of the owners/operators of dry-cleaning facilities and wholesale supply facilities. In 1993 and prior to and during the 1994 Florida legislative session, the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition employed lawyers-lobbyists to suggest and seek passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, commonly known as the Florida Dry-Cleaning Solvents Cleanup Program. In 1994, the Florida Legislature enacted Chapter 94- 355, Laws of Florida, which amended Chapter 376, Florida Statutes. Chapter 94-355 created Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which provides that: All penalties, judgments, recoveries, reimbursements, loans, and other fees and charges related to the implementation of this section and the tax revenues levied, collected, and credited pursuant to ss. 376.70 and 376.75, and registration fees collected pursuant to s. 376.303(1)(d), shall be deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, to be used upon appropriation as provided in this section. Charges against the funds for dry-cleaning facility or wholesale supply site rehabilitation shall be made in accordance with the provisions of this section. Chapter 94-355, Laws of Florida, also created Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, which provides, in part, as follows: Beginning October 1, 1994, a tax is levied on the privilege of producing in, importing into, or causing to be imported into the state perchloroethylene (tetrachloroethylene). A tax of $5.00 per gallon is levied on each gallon of perchloroethylene when first imported into or produced in the state. The tax is imposed when transfer of title or possession, or both, of the product occurs in this state or when the product commingles with the general mass of this state. Petitioner's corporate secretary and 50 percent shareholder is David J. Pilger. He contributed financially to the employment by the Florida Drycleaners' Coalition of lawyers- lobbyists charged with seeking passage of amendments to Chapter 376, Florida Statutes, and met several times with those lawyers- lobbyists in Tallahassee. He was assured during those meetings that it was the opinion of those lawyers-lobbyists that there was no danger of Florida sales tax being applied to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department conducted an audit of Petitioner for the period of January 1, 1993, through January 31, 1998. At no time prior to the Department's audit of Petitioner's financial records did Petitioner receive from the Department materials of any kind indicating that Florida sales and use tax would apply to the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The Department had, however, adopted emergency Rule 12BER94-2, effective October 1, 1994, and Rule 12B-12.003(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code, effective February 19, 1995. The 1998 Florida Legislature amended Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, by enacting Chapter 98-189, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1998, which added a sentence regarding the $5.00 per gallon tax, as follows: "This tax is not subject to sales and use tax pursuant to ch. 212." The Department has assessed and/or collected from certain taxpayers Florida sales and use tax on the sales price of perchloroethylene and the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene. The sales and use taxes are deposited into the general revenue fund pursuant to Section 212.20(1), Florida Statutes. The $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene is deposited into the Water Quality Assurance Trust Fund, pursuant to Section 376.3078(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing sales and use tax of $39,098.66, penalties of $19,549.64, and interest of $11,184.10 through October 22, 1998, with interest of $12.85 to accrue per day. The Department issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment to Petitioner on October 22, 1998, assessing indigent care surtax of $2,128.98, penalties of $1,064.48, and interest of $611.97 through October 22, 1998, and interest of $.70 to accrue per day. Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the $5.00 per gallon tax on perchloroethylene provided for in Section 376.75, Florida Statutes, but neither collected from the customer nor remitted to the Department sales and use tax on this $5.00 per gallon tax. The $5.00 per gallon tax collected by Petitioner from its customers was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "the ENVRN TAX." Petitioner charged its customers and remitted to the Department the excise tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes, but neither collected from its customers nor remitted to the Department sales and use taxes or indigent care surtax on this excise tax. This tax was reflected at the bottom of Petitioner's invoices as "PERC TAX." Petitioner does not contest the Department's assessment of sales and use taxes and indigent care surtax on the water quality tax provided for in Section 206.9935(2), Florida Statutes. Petitioner does not dispute that its sales to its customers during the audit period were paid for by its customers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered sustaining the assessment against Petitioner, together with interest, but compromising the entire penalty amount. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of November, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of November, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire John Mika, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Fred McCormack, Esquire Landers & Parsons, P.A. 310 West College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Joseph C. Mellichamp, III, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Larry Fuchs, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether this cause should be dismissed for Petitioner's failure to comply with Section 120.80(14)(b)3., Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is contesting an assessment of taxes, pursuant to an audit conducted by Respondent Department of Revenue. The total amount of the assessment was $32,312.24. Following the audit, in a letter to the Department's auditor dated April 17, 2006, Petitioner's counsel stated that taxes "in the amount of $5,744.80 is something [Petitioner] would be obligated to pay under the laws of the State of Florida, and as such, they are willing to do so. They would be willing to pay interest due on this money."1/ This statement constitutes a clear admission that Petitioner owes the stated amount of the tax, $5,744.80, plus interest that accrues daily. Petitioner's Memorandum makes the un-sworn statement that: At the time the parties met to discuss the assessment with the representative of the Department of Revenue, Martha Watkins, they offered to pay $5,744.80 of the taxes but were informed it was part of the $32,312.24, and they could either pay it all or contest it. At all times material hereto the petitioners have stood ready to pay the $5,744.80. On April 17, 2006, we wrote a letter to Martha Watkins making this offer for the second time. On August 17, 2006, we again wrote to the Department of Revenue attaching our letter of April 17, 2006, again making this offer. At no time was a response received to either letter. The August 17, 2006, letter alluded to in Petitioner's Memorandum is not of record and neither a copy of that letter, nor an affidavit of its contents, has been submitted by either party. At no time has Petitioner asserted that any amount of tax money was unequivocally tendered to Respondent. No affidavit to that effect has been filed in this case. The Second Affidavit of Martha Watkins, submitted with the Department of Revenue's timely Memorandum states, in pertinent part: I conducted the audit of C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., from which arose the challenged assessment and this controversy. During the course of the audit, and subsequent communication with C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., regarding the audit and assessment of taxes and interest, C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., made at least one settlement offer, that was unacceptable, and was rejected by the Department as such. At no time did C AND C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., unequivocally tender to me, or unequivocally offer to tender to me, the uncontested tax and applicable interest, and at no time did I refuse to accept any payment of taxes. On September 21, 2006, a Request for Administrative Hearing was filed with the Department of Revenue. On September 28, 2006, the Executive Director of the Department of Revenue entered an Order Dismissing the Petition with Leave to Amend. That Order reads, in pertinent part: On September 21, 2006, the Florida Department of Revenue received a "Request for Administrative Hearing" from Petitioner, C & C Mechanical Contractors. While the document clearly is a request for hearing, the petition does not state what the Petitioner is disputing. A record search shows that at least one Notice of Proposed Assessment was issued by the Department on June 15, 2006 to this Petitioner. It is impossible to determine from the petition whether this proposed assessment is being challenged. However, because this request was sent within the applicable time frame to dispute the Notice of Proposed Assessment, the Department will treat it as such. As required by law, the notice stated that a formal protest for an administrative hearing had to be received in the Office of the General Counsel within sixty days after the assessment became final and had to be in compliance with chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The petition fails to meet the requirements contained in chapter 120, Florida Statutes and Uniform Rule 28- 106.201, Florida Administrative Code, the appropriate rule for use in filing a petition requesting a hearing involving disputed issues of material fact. A copy of the appropriate rule is provided with this order. Specifically, the petition does not contain: (1) a statement of when and how the Petitioner received notice of the agency decision; (2) all disputed issues of material fact. If there are none, the petition must so indicate; (3) a concise statement of the ultimate facts alleged, including the specific facts the Petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action; (4) a statement of the specific rules or statutes the Petitioner contends require reversal or modification of the agency's proposed action, and (5) a statement of the relief sought by the Petitioner, stating precisely the action the petitioner wishes the agency to take with respect to the agency's proposed action. Because of these deficiencies, Petitioner's documentation must be dismissed. IT IS ORDERED: The petition for hearing filed by Petitioner is DISMISSED. Such dismissal is without prejudice to Petitioner to amend the petition to provide the information listed above. . . . On October 11, 2006, the Amended Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed with the Department of Revenue. That Amended Petition stated, in pertinent part: 1. The Petitioner received a certified letter dated June 15, 2006, stating taxes were due and owing in the amount of $32,312.24. This amount included $5,774.80 in fabrication cost taxes which the Petitioner does not object too [sic]. The balance of the $32,312.24 was for taxes on items sold to non-taxable entities. The Petitioner would object to these taxes and gives as grounds the following: Items sold to non-taxable entities are not subject to the Florida Tax Code. The department made a determination the items sold to the non-taxable entities were taxable stating the contractor, in this case the Petitioner, was the end user. Florida Tax Code states in part ". . . a determination whether a particular transaction is properly characterized as an exempt sale to a government entity or a taxable sale to a contractor shall be based on the substance of the transaction rather than the form in which the transaction is cast." The department "shall adopt rules that give special consideration to factors that govern the status of the tangible personal property before its affixation to real property." The Department of Revenue has adopted a rule which is in violation of the incident [sic] of legislature and contrary to Florida Statute 212.08.2/ (Emphasis supplied). The Amended Petition constitutes a clear admission that the $5,744.80 portion of the taxes due under the audit were both uncontested and owed, as of October 11, 2006. The first Affidavit of Martha Watkins, filed November 28, 2006, in support of the pending Motion to Dismiss, states, in pertinent part: I am a [sic] sui juris and otherwise competent to testify in this matter. I am employed by the Florida Department of Revenue in the position of Tax Auditor III. I am familiar with the accounts, accounting methods, and maintenance of records at the Florida Department of Revenue for sales tax, interest, and penalties. I am authorized by the Department of Revenue to make affidavit regarding the payment status of sales taxes, interest and penalties relative to registered Florida dealers. I have reviewed, and have personal knowledge of the accounts of the Florida Department of Revenue regarding tax payment of C&C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., a Florida corporation that has in the past been issued a Certificate of Registration by the Department of Revenue. According to the records of the Department of Revenue, as of November 27, 2006, C&C MECHANICAL CONTRACTORS, INC., has not paid any sums to the Department of Revenue against the assessed outstanding balance of sales tax, interest or penalties, since prior to April 16, 2006.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Revenue enter a final order dismissing the Amended Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of February, 2007.
