Elawyers Elawyers
Washington| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. ATLANTIC OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., 85-003021 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003021 Latest Update: Jun. 18, 1986

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Atlantic Outdoor Advertising, Inc., has erected a sign adjacent to Southside Boulevard, approximately 346 feet from Atlantic Boulevard, in the City of Jacksonville, Florida. Atlantic Boulevard is a federal-aid primary highway, while Southside Boulevard is not. The place where the Respondent erected the subject sign is within 660 feet from Atlantic Boulevard, and this sign is visible from the main-traveled way of Atlantic Boulevard. The subject sign is approximately 300 feet from another sign, owned by Naegele Outdoor Advertising Company, which was permitted by the Department in 1980 and 1981. The Naegele permits are still valid, and they authorize a sign within 660 feet of Atlantic Boulevard on the same side of the road as the Respondent's subject sign. When the Respondent erected its sign it had obtained a building permit from the City of Jacksonville, and it holds a lease to the site where the sign is located, but the Respondent does not have a state permit for its sign and no state sign permit has been applied for by the Respondent.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the outdoor advertising sign of the Respondent, Atlantic Outdoor Advertising, Inc., located adjacent to Southside Boulevard, approximately 346 feet from Atlantic Boulevard, in the City of Jacksonville, Florida, be removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 18th day of June, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 85-3021T Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but irrelevant. Accepted, but irrelevant. Accepted, but irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Paul M. Glenn, Esquire 2900 Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. Spalla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 120.57479.01479.07479.11
# 1
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. HEADRICK OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, 86-000111 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-000111 Latest Update: May 11, 1987

The Issue The issue is whether the Outdoor Advertising Permits AG820-2 and AG821-2 issued to Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, (Headrick) should be revoked because Headrick no longer has the permission of the property owner to maintain the subject sign at that location. The Department of Transportation (DOT) presented the testimony of Jack Culpepper and Phillip N. Brown, together with four exhibits admitted into evidence. Headrick presented the testimony of James K. Baughman and had one exhibit admitted into evidence. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the parties agreed that their proposed orders would be filed ten (10) days following filing of the transcript. The transcript was filed on April 22, 1982. Both parties have failed to file proposed orders within ten days following filing of the transcript. Accordingly, this Recommended Order is entered without consideration of any proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law proposed by the parties.

Findings Of Fact Headrick Outdoor Advertising is the holder of permits AG820-2 and AG821-2 located on U.S. 29, three miles north of Alternate 90, in Escambia County, Florida. These permits were originally issued to Western Gate Sign Company in 1982. The permits were subsequently purchased by Headrick Outdoor Advertising. On November 20, 1985, DOT received a letter from Frances E. Hampton, the owner of the property on which the signs had been placed, indicating that the lease with Western Gate Sign Company was signed by an unauthorized person and that a subsequent lease dated October, 1984, had been entered into with Franklin Sign Company. Upon receipt of this letter, DOT wrote a letter to Headrick Outdoor Advertising, giving Headrick thirty days to show cause why its permits should not be revoked because they did not have the continuing permission of the owner. In response to that letter, Headrick requested this formal administrative hearing. Headrick did not present any evidence to DOT prior to this proceeding or in this proceeding which established any continuing permission of the owner. Headrick did introduce a document entitled Land Lease Agreement between Frances E. Hampton and Headrick to erect a sign in the subject location. However, this document contained no date and it therefore cannot be determined when the lease was entered into and the time periods covered by the lease. By Mr. Baughman's own admission, Headrick does not currently have permission of the landowner, having released the landowner from all leases during the pendency of this case. The lease agreement which Headrick introduced was admittedly not signed until some time in 1986.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits AG820-2 and AG821-2 be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 James K. Baughman, Sr. Headrick Outdoor, Inc. 808 Brainerd Street Pensacola, Florida 32503 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064

Florida Laws (2) 120.57479.07
# 2
GATOR OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 87-003649 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-003649 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1988

Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation ("DOT") originally issued sign permits in 1964 for the location authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2, and these permits have been renewed continuously thereafter. The location authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2 is on the east side of U.S. 441. Effective October 30, 1987, Eagle Outdoor Advertising, Inc., which has owned Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2 since 1968 or earlier, transferred them to Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corp. ("Peterson"). On July 10, 1987, Gator Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("Gator") applied to DOT for sign permits. The location for which Gator sought sign permits is on the same side of U.S. 441, approximately 348 feet from the location authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2. On July 16, 1987, DOT rejected Gator's application solely because the proposed sign location did not meet applicable spacing requirements relative to the sign authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2. In 1984, the owner withdrew his permission for maintaining the sign authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2. There has been no sign lease or owner permission for a sign at this location since 1984. As of the date of the final hearing, Peterson had not obtained the owner's permission to maintain a sign. Representatives of the property owner and a representative of Peterson have discussed the possibility of owner permission, but it had not been unequivocally granted.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57479.02479.07
# 3
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs FIRST COAST OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., 91-004938 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Augustine Beach, Florida Aug. 05, 1991 Number: 91-004938 Latest Update: Jul. 14, 1993

Findings Of Fact Interstate Highway 95 (I-95) and State Road 16 (SR 16) intersect in St. Johns County, Florida. There is an interchange located at the intersection of I-95 and SR 16 in St. Johns County. The sign in question is the northernmost of three signs constructed by Respondent on properly zoned private property owned by Charles Usina located southwest of the above interchange and adjacent to I- 95, fifteen feet from the DOT right of way. There is an entrance ramp southwest of the interchange that permits traffic traveling eastbound on SR 16 to enter the southbound lane of I-95. Prior to submitting sign applications to DOT, Respondent's President, Robert Harry, met with Helen Hession at the interchange. Ms. Hession is a Property and Outdoor Advertising Inspector employed by DOT in its District II. Mr. Harry requested the meeting with Ms. Hession to obtain her interpretation of where to begin measuring along the southbound lane of I-95 under DOT's "500 foot rule." At that meeting, Ms. Hession gave her interpretation as to how to locate the point of beginning measurement according to Rule 14-10.009 F.A.C. as enforced by DOT through Section 479.02(1) F.S. The relevant language of Rule 14-10.009 F.A.C. provides: Outside incorporated towns and cities, no structure may be located adjacent or within five hundred (500) feet of an interchange, intersection at grade, or rest area. Said five hundred (500) feet shall be measured along the interstate from the beginning or ending of pavement widening at the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way, or an interstate highway. Mr. Harry had been in the business of outdoor advertising for many years, but this was his first experience with this type of measurement using the "500 foot rule" at this type of interchange. Mr. Usina was present with Mr. Harry and Ms. Hession for their pre-application meeting on January 19, 1991. At that time, Ms. Hession indicated the point of beginning for them to measure from in order to utilize the "500 foot rule." Ms. Hession testified consistently and credibly that she had told Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina that the point to begin measuring the 500 feet pursuant to the rule was at the southern tip of the "gore" located between I-95 and the southbound entrance from SR 16. The "gore" is an asphalt triangle marked with white lines that is widest at the northern end where vegetation grows between the southbound lane and the entrance. According to her testimony, Ms. Hession stood in the middle of the gore, facing south, and stated that, under the rule, the measurement should start at the point of the triangle. Ms. Hession illustrated her formal hearing testimony by marking "Point 3" on Joint Exhibit 12, a demonstrative sketch of the interchange and environs, to show the location she had indicated to Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina as the point of beginning. Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina testified equally credibly and consistently that during their pre-application meeting, Ms. Hession had indicated to them that the point to begin measuring was located at the northern end of the gore, or the place at which the vegetation and the asphalt met. For purposes of illustration, they identified the point that Ms. Hession indicated during their pre-application meeting as being "Point 2" on Joint Exhibit 12. While it is clear that Mr. Harry was not seeking Ms. Hession's personal interpretation of "the 500 foot rule," but was seeking the agency's interpretation of the rule it has promulgated and is charged with administering, it is equally clear that Ms. Hession and Mr. Harry never had a meeting of the minds on the exact location that she told him to begin his measurements. Ms. Hession was in her bare feet and unwilling to move around with Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina on the roadway during part of their meeting, and Mr. Harry and Mr. Usina are not entirely consistent as to where everyone was standing at crucial times during their discussion. It is easy to see how a misunderstanding occurred. Mr. Harry made the measurements for Respondent's sign permit application beginning at "Point 2," the northern end of the gore where the end of the asphalt gore meets the vegetation between the entrance and the highway. This location is over 400 feet closer to the interchange than the point Ms. Hession testified she had indicated to Mr. Harry. On January 29, 1991, Respondent filed an application for a DOT permit to construct the sign in question and for the two other signs. The application for the sign in question stated that the sign would be located on private property adjacent to the southbound lane of I-95, fifteen feet (perpendicular measurement) from the right of way and .15 miles from the nearest intersection. Simple arithmetic shows .15 miles equals 792 feet. The sign in question was not actually in existence at the time the application was reviewed and approved. For purposes of DOT review and approval of Respondent's permit application, Mr. Harry had placed stakes bearing the FCOA initials on the DOT right of way at locations parallel to where he intended to erect the signs on Mr. Usina's property. 2/ When reviewing Respondent's application prior to permit approval, Ms. Hession did not rely on the location stated in the application, (.15 miles from nearest intersection), but made her own on-site measurements. She measured using a Distance Measuring Instrument (DMI) mounted in Bartley (Bob) Burch's truck. Mr. Burch drove the truck and observed the stakes but did not participate in making the measurements. Use of the applicant's stakes and DOT's own measurements is standard operating procedure for DOT in reviewing/approving permit applications because sometimes the applicants' measurements as made or as stated on the application are incorrect. Use of the DMI is also standard operating procedure for DOT in this process. The DMI in question was calibrated for accuracy by Mr. Burch immediately prior to Ms. Hession taking the measurements. During her pre-approval application review, Ms. Hession measured the distances between stakes bearing FCOA initials and the distance of the first stake from the SR 16 overpass. She also used the southern tip of the gore ("Point 3") as a reference point when taking her measurements. She measured to the first stake from SR 16 and found the first stake to be .3 miles distant therefrom. (TR-44-45, 53) She reset the DMI at zero and then measured 1500 feet south to the next stake; again reset the DMI at zero and measured 1500 feet south to the third and final FCOA stake. During her pre-approval application review, Ms. Hession found the first FCOA stake to be in a location consistent with her understanding that "Point 3" was the correct point of beginning for applying the "500 foot rule." The first stake was 500 feet south of the tip of the gore ("Point 3"). Using the measurements obtained with the DMI during the pre-approval application review, Ms. Hession approved Respondent's application for a sign .3 miles (not the applied-for .15 miles) south of SR 16, the intersection of SR 16 and I-95. Simple arithmetic shows .3 miles equals 1584 feet. Subsequent to the pre-application meeting with Ms. Hession, but prior to the issuance of the DOT sign permits/tags, Respondent entered into a ground lease agreement with Mr. Usina 3/ and also entered into outdoor advertising lease agreements for the sign (two sign faces) involved here. 4/ These advertising lease agreements were later voided due to a stop work order issued by DOT (See Finding of Fact 19). Respondent has subsequently mitigated some of its loss therefrom by entering into other leases at lower figures. Respondent's six applications for outdoor advertising sign permits were approved by Ms. Hession and processed through DOT's main office in Tallahassee. Permits and tags were issued by DOT on February 22, 1991. Issuance of these permits and tags constitutes final agency approval of the application in question. The permits authorized the erection of three signs in the vicinity of the I-95 and SR 16 interchange at .30, .58, and .86 miles respectively south of the SR 16 intersection. Respondent has never challenged the fact that each of these signs was permitted significantly further south and further away from the intersection than each of the locations applied for: .15, .43, and .72 miles, respectively. Respondent has never protested that the permit issued for the sign in question was not for .15 miles (792 feet) from the intersection, but was for .3 miles (1584 feet) from the intersection. Respondent timely and properly affixed the permit tags to the three monopole structures, as they were constructed. After the permits/tags were issued, Respondent borrowed $25,000 to erect the monopole/sign and Mr. Harry obligated himself to repay that loan with interest. Respondent began construction of the sign in question after February 22, 1991. After a monopole support for the sign in question was installed, two of Respondent's business competitors notified Tom Brown, DOT's Outdoor Advertising Administrator for District II and supervisor of Ms. Hession and Mr. Burch, that Respondent's northernmost sign in this location had been placed too close to the intersection/interchange. Mr. Brown reacted by issuing the stop work order on construction on May 2, 1991, which was posted on Respondent's monopole. The stop work order stated that the structure was within 500 feet of an intersection, in violation of Rule 10-14.009 F.A.C., as enforced through Section 479.02(1) F.S. Mr. Brown subsequently notified Mr. Harry by letter that pursuant to the authority of 479.105(1)(a), the stop work order had been issued because of an alleged violation of Chapter 14-10.009(B) SPACING OF SIGNS (2)(b) F.A.C. which is enforced through Florida Statutes Chapter 479.02(1). Respondent completed the sign in question after the stop work order was issued. Subsequent to her approval of the sign permits, Ms. Hession was instructed by Mr. Tom Brown that her interpretation of the agency rule was incorrect and that the proper place to have begun measuring for purposes of the "500 foot rule" was where the outside edge of the interchange entrance lane disappeared into the outside edge of the through lane of I-95. Bob Burch, a District II Outdoor Advertising Inspector of equivalent rank with Ms. Hession, testified that he interpreted the rule in a manner identical to Mr. Brown's interpretation. For purposes of illustration, this location is marked as "Point 1" on Joint Exhibit 12. The testimony of Tom Brown as to why his interpretation should be considered the agency's interpretation of the rule is sketchy but together with the corroboration of Bob Burch that this interpretation has been the standard application, it is accepted that DOT, as an agency, has interpreted the "500 foot rule" language to mean that a sign may not be located within 500 feet of the point at which the outside edge of an entrance disappears into the outside edge of a through lane on an interstate highway. This interpretation ("Point 1," for purposes of the instant case) is also consistent with the language of the rule and is the most reasonable reading of that language. "Point 2" is not consistent with the language of the rule. "Point 1," Mr. Brown's and Mr. Burch's interpretation of the rule's point of beginning, is furthest from the intersection, at the beginning of the through lane for I-95. "Point 3," Ms. Hession's original erroneous interpretation, is next furthest from the intersection, at the tip of the gore. "Point 2," Mr. Harry's mis-understanding of Ms. Hession's erroneous interpretation is closest to the intersection, where the gore meets the vegetation. Naturally, any distance measured from Mr. Harry's understanding of the point of beginning would be further north than, and closer to, the interchange than would be locations measured from either of the other two points. Immediately after the stop work order was issued, the sign in question was inspected and measured by Ms. Hession. This time she measured its location using a 100-foot tape. She used SR 16 and its overpass as her starting point. SR 16 and its overpass are permanent markers. (TR-47-49) She and Mr. Burch found that the monopole in question had been erected several hundred feet north of the location at which they had previously found Respondent's first stake. The monopole as constructed was less than 100 feet south of the tip of the gore, "Point 3," and north of "Point 1". According to these after-the-fact measurements, Respondent's erected monopole is not 500 feet or more south of either "Point 3" or "Point 1" and it is not located .3 miles from SR 16, as specified in the permit or even .3 miles from Points 1, 2, or 3.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order affirming the May 2, 1991 notices, revoking the permit for the single sign in question, and ordering the removal of the sign within 30 days. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of October, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1992.

Florida Laws (11) 120.56120.57120.68479.02479.07479.08479.10479.105479.107479.111479.24
# 4
TOWNGATE CORPORATION vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 96-002771 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port Richey, Florida Jun. 11, 1996 Number: 96-002771 Latest Update: Apr. 07, 1999

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent should revoke Petitioner's sign permits and retrieve Petitioner's permit tags because Petitioner violated Sections 479.07(5) and 479.08, Florida Statutes, 1/ and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 10.004(7), 2/ by allegedly removing its sign from its property and by failing to display the permit tag prior to removing the sign.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida corporation formed in 1983 by Mr. Rodney Forton. Mr. Forton is the president and sole shareholder of Petitioner. Sometime in 1987, Petitioner entered into a management agreement with Cotee River Outdoor Advertising Company ("Cotee River"). The management agreement provided that Cotee River would construct a sign on property owned by Petitioner on U.S. highway 19 in New Port Richey, Florida (the "Cotee River sign"). Cotee River agreed to pay Petitioner a portion of the advertising revenues from the sign. The Cotee River Permit On May 26, 1987, Cotee River applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit from Respondent. The application described the Cotee River sign as a rectangular wood sign measuring 10 feet by 20 feet, with its lowest point approximately 15 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 25 feet above the crown of the road. Respondent approved the application and mailed the approval to Cotee River on May 29, 1987. On June 3, 1987, Respondent located the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory at, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.06 in F/N." The number "5.06" indicates that the sign is located at milepost 5.06 on U.S. 19. 3/ Mileposts describe the location of each sign by the distance of the sign from a fixed point. Each of Respondent's outdoor advertising inspectors measures the milepost for each sign in his or her territory using a distance measuring instrument. Respondent then enters the milepost for each sign in Respondent's sign inventory. The milepost of 5.06 that Respondent assigned to the Cotee River permit was incorrect. In May 1987, Cotee River constructed a sign on Petitioner's property pursuant to the permit granted by Respondent. The sign was a metal monopole sign rather than the wood sign described in the application. The Cotee River sign was not constructed at milepost 5.060. Cotee River rented the sign to outdoor advertisers. However, Cotee River failed to pay any portion of the advertising revenue to Petitioner, and the parties resolved the matter by mutual agreement. Petitioner and Cotee River agreed that Cotee River would release its right to manage the Cotee River sign in consideration for the right to manage a sign located on other property owned by Petitioner. The agreement provided that Petitioner would pay Cotee River a prescribed sum in exchange for the performance of specific duties by Cotee River. Cotee River failed to perform the duties specified in the agreement. Petitioner refused to pay the balance of payments. Petitioner sued Cotee River. Cotee River went into bankruptcy and was dissolved. Petitioner's Permit On July 14, 1992, Petitioner applied for an outdoor advertising sign permit for the Cotee River sign. The application described the sign as an existing rectangular, metal, monopole "sign in place," measuring approximately 10 feet by 20 feet. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Petitioner and mailed the approval to Petitioner on October 12, 1992. Respondent again incorrectly listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/B 5.060 in F/N." Respondent issued permit tag number BG341-25 to Petitioner. Although Petitioner used the Cotee River sign to generate advertising revenue, Petitioner never displayed any tag numbers on the sign. The tag numbers remained in Petitioner's files until sometime in 1995. Dr. Goluba's Permit At about the same time that Cotee River went out of business in 1992, Robert L. Goluba, D.D.S., owned property immediately adjacent to Petitioner's property. Prior to March 1993, an unidentified representative of Respondent contacted Dr. Goluba. The representative told Dr. Goluba that there were two signs on Dr. Goluba's property that were going to be taken down if the sign permits were not renewed. The representative mistakenly identified one of the two signs as the Cotee River sign. The representative went on to explain that Respondent could avoid the expense of taking down the two signs if Dr. Goluba obtained permits for the signs. Dr. Goluba wanted the advertising revenues and agreed to obtain the necessary permits. On March 2, 1993, Dr. Goluba applied for a sign permit for the Cotee River sign he mistakenly believed to be located on his property. The application described the sign as an "existing" rectangular, metal, monopole sign measuring approximately 10 feet by 24 feet, with its lowest point approximately 18 feet above ground level and its highest point approximately 30 feet above the crown of the road. The application stated that the sign was first erected in May 1987. Respondent approved the application from Dr. Goluba and mailed the approval to him on March 8, 1993. Respondent listed the location of the Cotee River sign in Respondent's sign inventory as, Section 595, ". . . N/M.P. 4.870 in F/N." Respondent incorrectly listed Dr. Goluba's permit in the sign inventory at milepost 4.870. On March 24, 1993, Respondent issued permit number BG960-35 to Dr. Goluba. Although Dr. Goluba never derived advertising revenue from the Cotee River sign, he did display his permit on the sign. Dr. Goluba inadvertently failed to pay the fee required to renew the sign permit in 1994 and, therefore, failed to display current permits on the sign. On April 11, 1994, Respondent issued a Notice of Violation, Failure To Display Permit Tag. The New Outdoor Advertising Inspector In early 1995, a new outdoor advertising inspector assumed responsibility for the territory in which the Cotee River sign was located. On April 11, 1995, the inspector conducted a field inspection to verify the mileposts and signs in the territory for which he was responsible. The inspector correctly identified the milepost of the Cotee River sign as milepost 4.980. He found no sign subject to regulation by Respondent 4/ located at milepost 5.060. Milepost 5.060 and 4.980 are approximately 422 feet apart. Relevant law prohibits the location of regulated signs within 1,000 feet of each other. 5/ No exceptions to 1,000 foot prohibition applied to the Cotee River sign. The inspector concluded that Petitioner had removed the wood sign originally permitted to Cotee River in 1987 and which Respondent had incorrectly listed in its sign inventory as being located at milepost 5.060. On July 12, 1995, Respondent issued to Petitioner a Notice Of Violation -- Removed Sign. On August 22, 1995, Respondent ordered the revocation of Petitioner's tag permit because Petitioner had allegedly removed the Cotee River sign from milepost 5.060. Respondent never issued a Notice of Violation to Petitioner for failure to display his tag numbers on the Cotee River sign. Petitioner protested the revocation of its permit and refused to return the permit tags to Respondent. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing. In the meantime, Dr. Goluba's accountant had inadvertently failed to pay the permit fee for the Cotee River sign. Respondent placed the Cotee River sign on Respondent's "cutdown list" for failure to pay the required fees. On June 20, 1995, Respondent had the Cotee River sign cut down and removed. Respondent sent Dr. Goluba a bill in the amount of $4,990 for the cost of cutting the sign down and removing it. Prior to the date Respondent cut down and removed the Cotee River sign, Petitioner notified the inspector verbally and with written documentation that the sign was owned by Petitioner, located on Petitioner's property, and permitted to Petitioner. The inspector found that Respondent's records did not agree with Petitioner's records. The inspector informed Petitioner that the "cutdown order" came from Tallahassee and there was nothing the inspector could do. Dr. Goluba's tags were displayed on the Cotee River sign at the time it was cut down and removed. Ms. Maria Passanisi was the broker who managed the sign for Dr. Goluba. Ms. Passanisi was at the site when the sign was cut down and removed. She protested Respondent's action so vehemently that the police officers regulating traffic at the scene had to intervene to quell the disturbance. After Respondent cut down the Cotee River sign, Petitioner drove a stick into the ground where the sign had been located and displayed the permit tags for the removed sign on the stick. The tags were displayed on the stick at the time of the hearing. The Computerized Sign Inventory Respondent uses a computer system to maintain its sign inventory. The computer system does not accept the same milepost for two or more regulated signs. When Petitioner applied for its sign permit in 1992, Respondent was required to carry the Cotee River permit in the inventory as a void permit. The computer system would not accept the same milepost for Petitioner's permit and the void Cotee River permit. In order to circumvent the computer system, Respondent's supervisor of property management arbitrarily changed the milepost number entered for the Cotee River permit from milepost 5.060 to milepost 4.970. As late as September 20, 1993, Respondent's computerized sign inventory identified the Cotee River sign as being located at three incorrect mileposts. The inventory located the same sign permitted to Cotee River, Petitioner, and Dr. Goluba, respectively, at mileposts 4.970, 5.060, and 4.870. In 1995, the new outdoor advertising inspector correctly located the Cotee River sign at milepost 4.980. However, he mistakenly assumed that milepost 5.060 was the correct milepost for Petitioner's sign and erroneously concluded that Petitioner had removed its sign.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner did not remove the permitted sign and that the permits issued to Petitioner are valid. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 1997.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57479.07479.08
# 6
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. SAN ANN FOOD STORES, 85-000818 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-000818 Latest Update: Aug. 07, 1985

Findings Of Fact Respondent, San Ann Food Stores, is the owner of an outdoor advertising sign located 5.89 miles east of the Hillsborough County Line, on the east side of Interstate 4 in Polk County. More specifically, the sign is east of the U.S. 98 and I-4 intersection which lies just north of the City of Lakeland. The sign is two-sided, with one side facing eastward, and the other facing westward. It sits on top of two poles which are approximately sixty feet high. The parties have stipulated that the sign is visible from I-4, although just barely, and lies within five hundred feet of that highway. They have also stipulated that no permit has ever been issued by petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), authorizing its use. The sign does not lie within the corporate limits of a city; however, this is immaterial to the resolution of these cases. On an undisclosed date, a DOT inspector observed the sign while conducting an inspection of another sign and found no display of a current valid permit tag. After checking his records, he found that no permit had ever been issued authorizing its erection and use. It was also determined, without contradiction, that the sign is within five hundred feet of the interchange of I-4 and U.S. 98. Such an intersection is classified as a restricted interchange. According to Rule 14 10.06(2)(b)2. and state law, no signs are permitted within five hundred feet of such an interchange. The sign in question was erected by Sun Oil Company around 1967 or 1968 when no permit was required. Respondent purchased the property on which the sign is located in April, 1978. It assumed that Sun Oil had obtained all necessary permits from the state to maintain and use the sign. It did not learn that Sun had failed to obtain a sign permit until the Notice of Violation was issued by DOT in February, 1985. It is willing to repay all fees owed during prior years if DOT will allow the sign to remain.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's sign (facing east and west) be found in violation of the statutes and rules cited in the conclusion of law portion of this order, and that it be removed. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearings Hearings DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 7th day of August, 1985.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57479.02479.07
# 7
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs AK MEDIA GROUP, INC., 99-002863 (1999)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jun. 29, 1999 Number: 99-002863 Latest Update: May 19, 2000

The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor advertising permits BU 839 and BU 840 became void pursuant to the provisions of Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact On August 18, 1998, Petitioner issued valid state outdoor advertising permit numbers BU 839 and BU 840 to Respondent for a sign with two faces, one facing north and the other facing south, to be erected at a specified location on the west side of State Road 5, 2000 feet north of PGA Boulevard in Palm Beach County, Florida. Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: . . . If the permittee fails to erect a completed sign on the permitted site within 270 days after the date on which the permit was issued, the permit will be void, and the department may not issue a new permit to that permittee for the same location for 270 days after the date on which the permit became void. 1/ Petitioner adopted the following definition at Rule 14- 10.001(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code, on June 28, 1998: (c) "Completed Sign", for the purposes of Section 479.07(5)(a), Florida Statutes, means the erection of the sign structure as described in the permit, as well as attachment of the facing to the structure, and the posting of a message to the facing. Petitioner asserts the permits became void by operation of law on May 16, 1999, because that date is 271 days from August 18, 1998, the date the subject permits were issued. As of May 16, 1999, no completed sign had been erected by Respondent on the permitted site as the term "completed sign" has been defined by Rule 14-10.001(2)(c), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner notified Respondent on May 21, 1999, that the subject permits were void. No representative of Petitioner misled or lulled Respondent into inaction at any time pertinent to this proceeding. Palm Beach County, the local permitting agency, requires a "Special Permit" before an outdoor advertising sign can be erected within its jurisdiction. Respondent applied for such a Special Permit for the subject signs on March 10, 1998. Palm Beach County issued Respondent a Special Permit for the subject location, but imposed a special condition, to which Respondent agreed. The special condition required Respondent to remove one of its other signs worth approximately $100,000. In addition to the Special Permit, Respondent was required to obtain from Palm Beach County a building permit for this project. That building permit was issued May 14, 1998. Respondent applied to Petitioner for the two permits that are at issue in this proceeding on May 18, 1998. On June 16, 1998, Petitioner denied Respondent's application on the grounds that additional information was needed. After the additional information was supplied, the subject permits were issued on August 18, 1998. On November 15, 1998, Respondent finished the site work that had to be done before the sign could be constructed. The Palm Beach County building permit expired 160 days after it was issued. Respondent secured the renewal of that permit on January 20, 1999. Petitioner placed orders for the sign construction in February 1999. The structural components arrived at the permitted site on April 5, 1999. Between April 5 and April 9, 1999, a 25-foot deep hole was dug, into which the 47-foot long, 4-foot diameter steel monopole was lowered by crane, and six tons of concrete were poured to construct a foundation and support for the sign superstructure. On April 9, 1999, Palm Beach County approved the final inspection of the excavation and foundation. On April 13, 1999, the superstructure of the sign was lifted onto the steel monopole by crane and installed, thereby completing construction of the two-faced sign. 2/ The cost of this construction totaled approximately $50,000. On April 14, 1999, Palm Beach County issued a stop work order (red tag) to Respondent for failure to post permit and plans at the job site and because a subcontractor blocked traffic with a crane that was being used to erect the sign structure. This red tag prevented Respondent from doing any further work on the two-faced sign. Had Respondent violated the red tag, it would have been exposed to a civil penalty of $250 per day and misdemeanor charges. Shortly after it learned that a red tag had been issued on April 14, 1999, representatives of Respondent met with Palm Beach County building officials and disputed their rationale for the red tag. Believing that the red tag issue with Palm Beach County had been resolved, Respondent entered into contracts with advertisers for the respective faces of the two-faced sign, one on April 22 and the other on May 11, 1999. It would have taken less than a day to install advertising copy on these signs. Palm Beach County did not lift its red tag on these signs until July 21, 1999. On August 9, 1999, Palm Beach County approved the two-faced sign on final inspection. Respondent placed advertising copy on both faces of the sign on August 9, 1999.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that applies the doctrine of equitable tolling and declares permits BU 839 and BU 840 valid. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Hearings CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 28th day of December, 1999.

Florida Laws (5) 10.001120.57120.68479.01479.07 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-10.0011
# 8
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. J. B. DAVIS, INC., 75-001884 (1975)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 75-001884 Latest Update: Feb. 11, 1977

The Issue Whether the Respondent is in violation of Sections 479.07(1) and 479.11(1) and (2), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Fred C. Glass, Outdoor Advertising Inspector, testified that he had inspected an outdoor advertising sign located on State Road 8 (I-10) 3.48 miles south of State Road 53 which was not located within a municipality. Said sign was located 31 feet from the right of way of I-10. His inspection revealed that said sign did not have a permit tag affixed. Located near the sign was a small building without windows and a gas pump. There was no one present on the site when inspected. The building and pump wore locked up. Glass testified that the pump and building did not look as if it had ever been used. Glass identified Composite Exhibit 1, as polaroid pictures he had taken on October 3, 1975 at 3:00 p.m. and they were received into evidence. From his duties Glass would have been aware of any application received for such a sign, and he stated he had never received an application. Glass said he had not talked with Davis about the sign, but concluded it was Davis' sign from the nature of the sign's advertisement, and the fact that the J. B. Davis' service station was located at the next exit. J. B. Davis testified that the sign was not his but was located on the site of a service station belonging to L. H. Thurman, Route 2, Lee, Florida. J. B. Davis identified Exhibit 2A as a copy of Thurman's Sales Tax Certificate and Exhibit 2B as Thurman's gasoline Dealers License which David had obtained from Thurman. Davis testified that as the gasoline distributor for the counties in the area he supplied gasoline to Thurman who operated the station. He supplied a couple of hundred gallons to Thurman per month. The property where the station is located is leased by Thurman from a Mr. Woods. Davis further testified that one would take the "next exit" to go to Thurman's station.

Recommendation Having failed to show J. B. Davis' ownership of the sign, the Hearing Officer recommends the charges be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of February, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay Hendrickson, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 J. B. Davis, President J. B. Davis, Inc. Base and Duval Street Madison, Florida 32340

Florida Laws (2) 479.07479.11
# 10

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer