Findings Of Fact This proceeding was initiated when the Department notified the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, that its permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 were being revoked because the Respondent no longer had permission of the property owner to maintain a sign there, as required by Section 479.07(7), Florida Statutes. Permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 authorized an outdoor advertising sign on U.S. 98, 100 feet west of Hickory Avenue in Bay county, Florida. The record owner of the property where the above permits authorized the Respondent to locate a sign is E. Clay Lewis III, Trustee, who took title by deed in 1977. By letter dated August 9, 1985, the property owner notified the Respondent that the subject property was being sold, and that the Respondent had 30 days to remove the sign from the property and cancel the outdoor advertising permits for this sign. By letter dated October 17, 1985, the property owner advised the Department that the Respondent no longer had a valid lease for the site where the subject permits authorized a sign, and that the signs had been removed. Documents marked Exhibits 1-3 reflect the foregoing, as does the testimony of the Department's outdoor advertising inspector. This evidence was received without objection from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits numbered AD089-10 and Ad090-10 held by the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 31st day of July, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 William G. Warner, Esquire P. O. Box 335 Panama City, Florida 32402 Bobbie Palmer, Esquire P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. 8palla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Department of Citrus Rules 20-1.009 and 20-1.010, Florida Administrative Code, are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority, as alleged by Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact John Stephens, Inc., Petitioner, was at all times material hereto a Florida corporation duly licensed as a citrus fruit dealer in the State of Florida. J. A. Stephens, Inc., was a Florida corporation, and held a valid fruit dealer’s license in the State of Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, John A. Stephens, served as an officer and director of J. A. Stephens, Inc. John A. Stephens is not an officer, director or shareholder of John Stephens, Inc. John A. Stephens, Jr. is the president and sole director of John Stephens, Inc. and is not an officer, director nor shareholder of J. A. Stephens, Inc. On or about September 26, 1996, Petitioners, John Stephens, Inc., and John A. Stephens, applied to the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services to register John A. Stephens as an agent of John Stephens, Inc., pursuant to Section 601.601, Florida Statutes. The application form furnished by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services indicates that the licensed dealer seeking registration of an agent agrees to “... accept full responsibility for all his activities....” (Petitioners’ Exhibit 1) By letter dated December 26, 1996, Petitioners were advised by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services that their application for registration of John A. Stephens as an agent of John Stephens, Inc., had been denied on the basis of Rule 20-1.010, Florida Administrative Code. As indicated in the notice, that rule provides, in part, that an application for registration of a dealer’s agent can be disapproved if a proposed registrant has a “...record, either as an individual, co- partnership, corporation, association or other business unit, showing unsatisfied debts or orders issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture with respect to prior dealings in citrus fruit.” (Petitioners’ Exhibit 1.) Specifically, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services advised Petitioners that “...Mr. Stephens has not satisfied orders issued by the Commissioner of Agriculture with respect to prior dealings in citrus fruit...,” listing as the final orders in question Petitioners’ Exhibits 3 through 14. Between April 30, 1991, and September 30, 1992, the State of Florida, Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services entered a total of 12 final administrative orders in which it found that J. A. Stephens, Inc., was indebted to claimants for various sums arising from prior dealings in citrus fruit. (Petitioners’ Exhibits 3 through 14.) At the time of the action of the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services denying Petitioners’ application, there remained amounts due and unpaid on each of the orders entered by the Department against J. A. Stephens, Inc. Petitioner, John A. Stephens was not named as a party respondent in any of the 12 proceedings culminating in final orders against J. A. Stephens, Inc., which formed the basis for the denial by the Department of the application for registration as a citrus dealer’s agent. (Petitioners’ Exhibits 2, and 3 through 14.) In denying a Motion for Relief for Final Order in the only Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services proceeding in which a claimant sought to join Mr. Stephens individually as a party, the Department found that: The complaint filed by Claimant named J. A. Stephens, Inc. as the respondent. Because the complaint was against J. A. Stephens, Inc., it was served on J. A. Stephens, Inc. J. A. Stephens, an individual, was never subjected to the jurisdiction of the Agency with regard to this matter. J. A. Stephens, an individual, was not afforded an opportunity to defend against the allegations of the complaint. There was no discussion at the hearing about whether J. A. Stephens, Inc. was or was not the proper respondent. There was no allegation at the hearing that J. A. Stephens, an individual, was the proper respondent. The Claimant has failed to express any legal basis for grant of his motion and this Agency could find no such basis. This Agency has no personal jurisdiction over J. A. Stephens, an individual, with regard to this matter and therefore cannot enter an order with respect to him. Further, even if such an order were to be entered, it would be of no force or effect because of the lack of personal jurisdiction. (Petitioners’ Exhibit 4, pg. 2.) The rules that are the subject of this proceeding had their inception in 1964, when the Florida Citrus Commission considered and adopted rules governing the registration of agents acting on behalf of licensed citrus dealers. These rules, which appear in the text of the minutes of the Commission as Regulation 105-1.05, are almost verbatim the same rules now found in Chapter 20-1, Florida Administrative Code. (Respondent’s Exhibits 1 and 2.) As reflected in the minutes of the Florida Citrus Commission, the rules were adopted to help protect the grower and shipper or processor in matters involving the normal movement of citrus fruit in all channels of distribution. The regulation was recommended by the Fresh Citrus Shippers Association and was endorsed by a resolution of the Florida Sheriffs Association. In presenting the Sheriffs’ resolution to the Commission, Sheriff Leslie Bessenger of the Florida Citrus Mutual Fruit Protection Division cited the results of a seven-month investigation that found 71 out of 200 registered agents with criminal records. Those two hundred agents represented only nine dealers. (Respondent’s exhibit 1, June 19, 1964, meeting.) Minutes of Commission meetings after rule adoption thoroughly explain the efforts to require accountability and curb abuse of the dealer- agent relationship. The rules, as they appear today in the Florida Administrative Code, have not been revised since July 1, 1975.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent citrus dealer owes Petitioner citrus producer a sum of money for grapefruits that Respondent harvested from Petitioner’s grove.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Sunrise Citrus Groves, Inc. (“Sunrise”) is a producer of citrus, meaning that it grows citrus in this state for market. It is also a Florida-licensed citrus fruit dealer operating within the Department’s regulatory jurisdiction. Tuxedo Fruit Company (“Tuxedo”) is a Florida-licensed citrus fruit dealer. On or about October 18, 2000, Sunrise and Tuxedo entered into a contract under which Tuxedo agreed to harvest “flame” grapefruits from Sunrise’s grove known as “Gulfstream.” are a variety of grapefruit; the varieties are distinguished by the color of the fruit’s meat, e.g. red, ruby, pink.) Tuxedo agreed to pay $4.00 per box of fruit harvested at the Gulfstream grove. Between October 16, 2000 and March 14, 2001, Tuxedo harvested 5,808 boxes of flame grapefruits pursuant to its contract with Sunrise. Accordingly, Tuxedo was obligated to pay Sunrise $23,232 for the fruit. Tuxedo did not pay for the grapefruits harvested from the Gulfstream grove. On October 11, 2001, Sunrise sent Tuxedo an invoice for the past due amount of $23,232. Tuxedo did not object to this statement of account. At hearing, Tuxedo admitted the above facts. Tuxedo’s position was that Sunrise had breached a separate contract relating to red grapefruits which Tuxedo had agreed to harvest from a grove called “Sun Rock.” As a result of this alleged breach, Tuxedo claimed to have suffered damages exceeding the amount sought by Sunrise. It is not necessary to make detailed findings of fact concerning the Sun Rock transaction, however, because the undersigned has concluded that the alleged breach of contract action that Tuxedo attempted to prove is not properly before the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). Ultimate Factual Determination Tuxedo failed to pay for the citrus fruit harvested from the Gulfstream grove that was the subject of a contract between Sunrise and Tuxedo. Sunrise performed all of its duties under that contract and is not in breach thereof. Tuxedo, therefore, is indebted to Sunrise in the amount of $23,232. CONSLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has personal and subject matter jurisdiction in this proceeding pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, is known as "The Florida Citrus Code of 1949." Section 601.01, Florida Statutes. "Citrus fruit" is defined in Section 601.03(7), Florida Statutes, as all varieties and regulated hybrids of citrus fruit and also means processed citrus products containing 20 percent or more citrus fruit or citrus fruit juice, but, for the purposes of this chapter, shall not mean limes, lemons, marmalade, jellies, preserves, candies, or citrus hybrids for which no specific standards have been established by the Department of Citrus. Additionally, the term “grapefruit” is defined to mean “the fruit Citrus paradisi Macf., commonly called grapefruit and shall include white, red, and pink meated varieties[.]” Section 601.03(22), Florida Statutes. A "citrus fruit dealer" is defined in Section 601.03(8), Florida Statutes, as any consignor, commission merchant, consignment shipper, cash buyer, broker, association, cooperative association, express or gift fruit shipper, or person who in any manner makes or attempts to make money or other thing of value on citrus fruit in any manner whatsoever, other than of growing or producing citrus fruit, but the term shall not include retail establishments whose sales are direct to consumers and not for resale or persons or firms trading solely in citrus futures contracts on a regulated commodity exchange. Both Sunrise and Tuxedo are citrus fruit dealers under this definition. Sunrise also falls within the definition of “producer.” See Section 601.03(29), Florida Statutes (defining the term as “any person growing or producing citrus in this state for market”). Citrus fruit dealers are required to be licensed by the Department in order to transact business in Florida. Section 601.55(1), Florida Statutes. As a condition of obtaining a license, such dealers are required to provide a cash bond or a certificate of deposit or a surety bond in an amount to be determined by the Department "for the use and benefit of every producer and of every citrus fruit dealer with whom the dealer deals in the purchase, handling, sale, and accounting of purchases and sales of citrus fruit." Section 601.61(3), Florida Statutes. Section 601.65, Florida Statutes, provides that "[i]f any licensed citrus fruit dealer violates any provision of this chapter, such dealer shall be liable to the person allegedly injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation." This liability may be adjudicated in an administrative action brought before the Department or in a "judicial suit at law in a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. Section 601.64(4), Florida Statutes, defines as an "unlawful act" by a citrus fruit dealer the failure to pay promptly and fully, as promised, for any citrus fruit which is the subject of a transaction relating to the purchase and sale of such goods. Any person may file a complaint with the Department alleging a violation of the provisions of Chapter 601, Florida Statutes, by a citrus fruit dealer. Section 601.66(1), Florida Statutes. The Department is charged with the responsibilities of determining whether the allegations of the complaint have been established and adjudicating the amount of indebtedness or damages owed by the citrus fruit dealer. Section 601.66(5), Florida Statutes. If the complaining party proves its case, the Department shall "fix a reasonable time within which said indebtedness shall be paid by the [citrus fruit] dealer." Thereafter, if the dealer does not pay within the time specified by the Department, the Department shall obtain payment of the damages from the dealer's surety company, up to the amount of the bond. Section 601.66(5) and (6), Florida Statutes. Sunrise bore the burden of proving the allegations in its Complaint against Tuxedo by a preponderance of the evidence. See Florida Department of Transportation v. J.W.C. Co., Inc., 396 So. 2d 778, 788 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Career Service Commission, 289 So. 2d 412, 415 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); Section 120.57(1)(j), Florida Statutes. Sunrise carried its burden of proving that Tuxedo has failed and refused to pay, as agreed, for citrus fruit that Tuxedo harvested from Sunrise’s Gulfstream grove. Tuxedo’s allegation that Sunrise breached a contract unrelated to the one upon which Sunrise has based its demand for payment constitutes an independent cause of action and claim for relief. See Storchwerke, GMBH v. Mr. Thiessen’s Wallpapering Supplies, Inc., 538 So. 2d 1382, 1383 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). In the parlance of civil litigation, Tuxedo’s contentions would be called a counterclaim. See Haven Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 733 (Fla. 1991)(“A counterclaim is a cause of action that seeks affirmative relief[.]”). Had Sunrise elected to pursue its claim in circuit court pursuant to Section 601.65, Florida Statutes, rather than before the Department, then Tuxedo properly might have sought leave to bring its claim relating to the Sun Rock transaction as a permissive counterclaim. See Rule 1.170(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. But this is an administrative proceeding, and there exists no procedural vehicle through which Tuxedo may assert a permissive counterclaim for breach of contract. The question whether Tuxedo’s claim of breach is properly before DOAH is not merely procedural, but touches the fundamental consideration of subject matter jurisdiction. To be entitled to administrative remedies for Sunrise’s alleged breach of contract, Tuxedo must file a complaint with the agency having jurisdiction in the matter; it cannot directly initiate proceedings before DOAH. See Section 601.66, Florida Statutes. DOAH’s jurisdiction does not attach until the agency refers the dispute to this tribunal for adjudication. Tuxedo has not filed a complaint against Sunrise with the Department, and thus (obviously) the Department has not referred the matter to DOAH. Therefore, DOAH does not have jurisdiction to entertain Tuxedo’s claim for relief based on the alleged Sun Rock transaction. In the alternative, Tuxedo’s allegations arguably might be regarded——and reached——as an affirmative defense. See Kirian, 579 So. 2d at 733 (“[A]n affirmative defense defeats the plaintiff’s cause of action by a denial or confession and avoidance.”). Specifically, Tuxedo’s allegations, if established, might provide the basis for a set off, which is a recognized affirmative defense. See Kellogg v. Fowler, White, Burnett, Hurley, Banick & Strickroot, P.A., 807 So. 2d 669, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D2811, 2001 WL 1504231, *4 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA Nov. 28, 2001)(“A set-off is an affirmative defense arising out of a transaction extrinsic to a plaintiff’s cause of action.”). It is concluded, however, that because DOAH does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Tuxedo’s allegations as a counterclaim for breach of contract, the same allegations cannot simply be treated as an affirmative defense and adjudicated on that basis. To be heard, the defense of set off must be within the tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York v. Walker, 9 So. 2d 361, 363 (Fla. 1942). A contrary ruling would permit Tuxedo to bring in through the back door a claim that was turned away at the front. Even if Tuxedo’s claim were cognizable as an affirmative defense, notwithstanding Tuxedo’s failure properly to initiate such claim pursuant to Section 601.66, Florida Statutes, the issue could not be reached for an independent reason: implied waiver. In the context of a civil suit, a party’s failure to allege an affirmative defense in its responsive pleading effects a waiver thereof. See Gause v. First Bank of Marianna, 457 So. 2d 582, 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984)(“Affirmative defenses must be raised in the pleadings or they are waived.”). Since a dealer who disputes the allegations of a complaint filed with the Department under Section 601.66 is required by that statute to submit an answer in writing, it is concluded that a dealer-respondent, like a defendant in a civil lawsuit, waives any affirmative defenses not raised in his responsive pleading. Otherwise, a dealer-respondent could sandbag the claimant at final hearing. Having failed to plead the Sun Rock matter in its response to Sunrise’s complaint, Tuxedo waived the affirmative defense of set off.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order awarding Sunrise the sum of $23,232. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: John Scarborough, General Manager Sunrise Citrus Groves, Inc. 2410 Southeast Bridge Road Hobe Sound, Florida 33455 John A. Scotto, President Tuxedo Fruit Company 1110 North 2nd Street Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Sharon Sergeant Continental Casualty Company CNA Plaza Floor 13-South Chicago, Illinois 60685 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 500 Third Street Northwest Post Office Box 1072 Winter Haven, Florida 33882-1072
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Citrus enter a final order dismissing the application filed by the Petitioner for licensure as a citrus fruit dealer. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas Ackerman, Executive Director Department of Citrus Post Office Box 9010 605 East Main Street Bartow, Florida 33831-9010 Joseph P. Mawhinney, Esquire Reed and Mawhinney, P.L. 1611 Harden Boulevard Lakeland, Florida 33803-1826 Guillermo Vazquez East West Citrus Packers, LLC 11860 Southwest 183rd Street Miami, Florida 33177-2453
The Issue The Department of Professional Regulation charged Dr. Samy Hassan Helmy, D.V.M., with violation of Sections 474.215 and 474.214(1)(g), Florida Statutes, for failure to have a premises permit. The primary issue for factual determination is whether Citrus Fair Animal Hospital applied for licensure within thirty days subsequent to its opening. Both parties have submitted post-hearing Proposed Findings of Fact. A ruling has been made on each proposed finding of fact in the Appendix to this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Helmy is, and has been at all times material herein, a licensed veterinarian in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0028884 by the Florida Board of Veterinary Medicine. In January of 1985 the wife of Dr. Samy Hassan Helmy purchased real property in Inverness, Florida. Between January 1985 and April 1985 said facility was extensively remodeled to make it suitable as an animal hospital. Dr. Helmy frequently worked at this facility, supervising workmen and participating in the remodeling. On February 19, 1985 an investigator of the Department of Professional Regulation inspected Dr. Helmy's licensed facility in Wildwood, Florida. At that time, Dr. Helmy was not at the facility. Certain equipment required at an animal hospital was not found during this inspection. The inspector called and spoke with Dr. Helmy who was at the Inverness facility, hereinafter referred to as "Citrus Fair." Dr. Helmy advised the inspector that he had the equipment with him. Dr. Helmy told the inspector that he only treated animals at the Wildwood clinic. (See Transcript page 60, line 11-12.) After notice to their customers and the public, Dr. Helmy began to receive patients regularly at the Citrus Fair facility during the first part of April 1985. Dr. Helmy admitted that he had seen animals on an emergency basis at the facility prior to that date as opposed to transporting them to Wildwood; however, the Citrus Fair facility was not open to the public until the first part of April. A receipt for professional services dated April 9, 1985 was introduced into evidence as Respondent's exhibit #2. Although introduced by Respondent, this exhibit was part of the Petitioner's investigative file. An inspection was conducted of the Citrus Fair facility on April 12, 1985 by an employee of the Department of Professional Regulation. At the time of this inspection veterinary medicine was being practiced on the premises. An inspection of the Citrus Fair facility was conducted by an employee of the Department of Professional Regulation on April 19, 1985. At the time of said inspection, veterinary medicine was being practiced on the premises. The Citrus Fair facility is wholly owned by the wife of Dr. Helmy. Dr. Helmy is the professional veterinarian responsible for the Citrus Fair facility. On April 29, 1985, Dr. Helmy's application for licensure of the Citrus Fair facility was received by the Department of Professional Regulation. (See Petitioner's Exhibit #2)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and having determined the Respondent did not violate any of the statutes as alleged, it is recommended that the administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 19th day of February 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Mildred Gardner,Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Fred Roche,Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino,General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Cecilia Bradley, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 William E. Lackay, Esquire M. C. of Florida Building P. O. Box 279 Bushnell, FL 33513 APPENDIX Respondent's Findings of Fact Adopted. Adopted. Conclusion of Law. Adopted. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as not relevant. Adopted. It appears Respondent erroneously labeled Conclusions of Law as Findings of Fact. Petitioner's Findings of Fact Adopted. Contrary to facts - rejected. Rejected to the extent the application was dated April 23, 1985. Adopted that application was received on April 29, 1985. Adopted. While true, this proposed finding lacks any reference to when this occurred which is the key issue and is therefore rejected. Rejected. No evidence was submitted showing that Citrus Fair was operated as a veterinary facility on February 18, 1985. Evidence to the contrary was received which is more credible. See TX-60, lines 11-12. Rejected as contrary to evidence on TX-61. The Respondent stated he carried the kits to both clinics, not that he used them at both clinics. Rejected. The proposed facts are not consistent with the testimony on TX 61 & 62 and the facts presented are not probative that veterinary medicine was practiced at the Citrus Fair facility. Rejected. The witness says nothing about going to Wildwood by appointment in TX-70. The statement by Respondent that "he was working between the two offices" is not inconsistent with the Respondent's testimony that he was remodeling the Citrus Fair facility. Adopted. Adopted. Rejected as cumulative of the fact that after April 9, 1985 veterinary medicine was practiced at Citrus Fair. Same as No. 12 above.
Findings Of Fact State outdoor advertising permits numbered 108 60-10 and 10861-10 were issued in February of 1979, and are now held by Headrick Outdoor Advertising, Inc. These permits authorize a sign on the south side of U.S. 90A, approximately 300 feet west of SR 95A, in Escambia County, Florida. In July of 1985, Lamar Advertising Company applied for state outdoor advertising permits to erect a sign facing east and west on the south side of U.S. 90A, approximately 400 feet east of U.S. 29, in Escambia County, Florida. The location proposed by Lamar in its application is in conflict with the location where Headrick holds permits, in that the two sites are less than 1,000 feet apart. The land where the Headrick signs had been located, and the site where the Headrick permits authorize a sign, has been graded and paved, and is being used as a shopping center. In the course of the construction of this shopping center, the Headrick signs were removed, and Headrick no longer has a lease for its permitted site or permission of the property owner to locate a sign there. Lamar has a lease to the site where it applied for permits. This lease is from the owner of the land, and it grants Lamar permission to locate a sign at the location sought to be permitted, through February, 1992.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the state sign permits numbered 10860-10 and 10861-10 held by Headrick Outdoor Advertising, Inc., authorizing a sign on the south side of U.S. 90A, approximately 300 feet west of SR 95A, in Escambia County, Florida be revoked. And it is further RECOMMENDED that the application of Lamar Advertising Company for permits to erect a sign facing east and west on the south side of U.S. 90A, approximately 400 feet east of U.S. 29, in Escambia County, Florida, be granted. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 15th day of January, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert P. Gaines, Esquire P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Mr. Jim Baughman Vice President Headrick Outdoor Advertising, Inc. 404 Jenks Avenue, Suite "B" Panama City, Florida 32401 Thomas Drawdy, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 A. J. Spalla General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
The Issue Whether the Department of Transportation should is sue a permit under Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, for the subject outdoor advertising sign.
Findings Of Fact An outdoor advertising sign located 9.85 miles east of Volusia County line on Highway 1-4, East, with copy presently reading, "Four Seasons" was cited for violation by the Petitioner, Department of Transportation. Said violation notice was sent to the Respondent, Peterson Outdoor Advertising Company. The sign is located approximately 1200 feet north of State Road 430-A on the east side of 1-4 facing south and bears a 1974 state permit No. 6273-10. It is not disputed that this sign was owned by Rivers Advertising Company and sold by Rivers Advertising Company by Bill of Sale dated June 21, 1974 to the Petitioner, Department of Transportation. The sign did not conform to the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, as evidenced by memorandum dated May 1, 1973, Department of Transportation files, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, and upon its sale to the Department was to have been removed by the Department from its location. The payment for the sign amounted to $4,975 which was paid by check to the owner, Rivers Advertising Company. Rivers Advertising Company had leased the real property on which subject sign stood from the property owner, Mr. Gene Berna. Mr. Berna said that Rivers Advertising Company had not paid under their lease agreement at the time that the Petitioner, Department of Transportation, sought to remove the sign subsequent to its purchase from Rivers on June 21, 1974 and would not let the maintenance crew remove the structure. Dandy Signs claimed ownership of the sign by virtue of the fact that Gene Berna sold it to then and that it purchased a renewal 1974 permit tag Number 6273-10-74 and affixed it to the structure. Dandy Signs had never made an application for a permit for subject sign but through error of the Petitioner acquired the permit sign attached to subject sign through the inclusion of it in a regular renewal procedure. Subject sign was not eligible to be permitted under the renewal procedure inasmuch as said sign had been purchased by the State of Florida on June 21, 1974 and Dandy Signs was not eligible for the renewal permit issued because it did not own the sign. Dandy Signs, claiming ownership for the sign through an agreement with the owner of the property on which the sign was located, then "sold" the subject sign by Bill of Sale to the Respondent, Peterson Outdoor Advertising, by an instrument dated May 27, 1975. The proposed Recommended Order filed by the Respondent has been examined and considered in the preparation of this order. The Hearing Officer further finds: The subject sign is owned by the Petitioner. The property owner, Gene Berna, had no title to the subject sign. His only interest was as lessor of the real property. Dandy Signs was on notice that the sign did not belong to the property owner, Gene Berna, and that it belonged to Rivers Outdoor Advertising. Berna told Dandy Signs the subject sign belonged to Rivers. Dandy Signs should not have requested a renewal permit on a sign not previously owned by it and not purchased from the owner. The Petitioner erroneously issued a renewal permit on subject sign upon Dandy's representation it was the owner of the sign. Respondent, Peterson Outdoor Advertising, received no interest in the sign by the alleged Bill of Sale of May, 1975, inasmuch as it did not buy the sign from the owner, the State.
Recommendation Deny the request for a permit. Remove the subject sign which is owned by the Petitioner and should be removed from the roadside. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 William Rowland, Esquire 115 East Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789
The Issue Whether the sign of Petitioner is in violation of the Florida Statutes, Outdoor Advertising Law, Chapter 479 and particularly Chapter 479.07 for having erected this sign in violation of the zoning regulations and without a permit from the Department of Transportation.
Findings Of Fact An alleged violation notice was sent to Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corporation, Petitioner, by the Respondent, Department of Transportation, on July 27, 1977. The notice indicated that the sign owned by Petitioner located 300 feet north of 5-227, U.S. Highway 301 in Bradford County, Florida, with a blank copy was in violation of Ch. 479, Florida Statutes, Rule 14-10-05 (1)(a), Not zone for conforming sign - sign erected in a zoned agricultural area. Ch. 479.07(1) Florida Statutes, Rule 14-10.04 Sign erected without first [sic] obtaining a permit. A violation notice was received by Michael S. Nelson, lease representative for the Respondent, and a letter was sent to the District Administrator for Outdoor Advertising, Florida Department of Transportation, acknowledging receipt of the violation notice and requesting the Department of Transportation to set the cause for hearing. This administrative hearing is the result of such request. The Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corporation made an application for permit for a sign to be located at the location the subject sign now stands. The application for a permit was not approved for the stated reason that the requested location was in a zoned open rural area and outdoor advertising could not be permitted in such a location. Petitioner was so notified. Nevertheless a sign was erected by Petitioner and Respondent's inspectors found said sign at the location with no copy on it at the first inspection. Subsequent to that inspection, the sign was finished by Petitioner to advertise McDonalds, with the large golden "M", further stating: "Campers/ Buses 3 Miles Ahead on the Right, Open at 7:00 for Breakfast." The sign was erected without a permit in a zoned open rural area in Bradford County. The sign is approximately 15 feet off the right of way of Highway 301 in open rural country at least 3 miles from any industrial or commercial areas. Petitioner contends that he applied for a permit to erect the sign at the subject location but that his application was denied. Regardless, he erected the sign and has been endeavoring to have the rural area rezoned. Respondent, Department of Transportation, contends that the erection of the subject sign is in violation of the law inasmuch as it is the duty of the Department of Transportation to grant a permit before a sign is erected. Respondent further contends that the area in which the sign is located is in open rural country and the proposed sign location, even if it were rezoned to allow outdoor advertising, could not be permitted by the Department inasmuch as such rezoning would be "spot zoning" and contrary to the requirements of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, Title 1 of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 and Title 23, U.S. Code and contrary to the concept of "effective control" by the Florida Department of Transportation which has the duty to control outdoor advertising for the State of Florida. In response to a request to the Bradford County Zoning Commission, the following letter was received: Pursuant to our conversation on November 7, relating to the zoning classification of the C. M. Ritch property located approximately 2 miles South of Starke on Hwy. 301, the property is zoned Open Rural and under Bradford County Zoning Ordinances does allow outdoor advertising signs. The area in which the sign was erected is the area indicated in the letter. The Petitioner intentionally erected its sign in the open rural area of Bradford County and continues to allow it to stand although the Bradford County Zoning Ordinances show that no outdoor advertising is to be allowed.
Recommendation Remove the sign of Respondent for intentionally erecting a sign in an unzoned rural area without a permit from the Department of Transportation. Invoke the penalties provided in Section 479.18, Florida Statutes, for both the Petitioner and for the McDonald Corporation whose goods and services are advertised. Section 479.13, Penalties, provides: Any person, violating any provision of this chapter whether as principal, agent or employee for which violation no other penalty is prescribed, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in Section 775.083: and such person shall be guilty of a separate offense for each month during any portion of which any violation off this chapter is committed, continued or permitted. The existence of any advertising copy on any outdoor advertising structure or outdoor advertising sign or advertisement outside incorporated towns and cities shall constitute prima facie evidence that the said outdoor advertising sign or advertisement was constructed, erected, operated, used, maintained or displayed with the consent and approval and under the authority of the person whose goods or services are advertised thereon. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of March, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Rick Hurst, Administrator Outdoor Advertising Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Michael S. Nelson Lease Representative Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corp. P. O. Box 301 Ocala, Florida 32670 L. M. Gaines, Director Bradford County Zoning Commission P. O. Drawer B Starke, Florida 32091 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN RE: PETERSON OUTDOOR ADVERTISING NOT EFFECTIVE UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE FOR JUDICIAL Petitioner, REVIEW AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED vs. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Respondent. / CASE NO. 77-1432T
The Issue Whether Petitioner's applications for two outdoor advertising signs in Sumter County, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this permitting dispute, Petitioner, Rite Media Enterprises, Inc., seeks the issuance of two state sign permits from Respondent, Department of Transportation (DOT). In preliminary decisions dated August 24, 1998, DOT denied the applications on the ground the land owners had not given Petitioner permission to place the signs on their property. As an additional ground, DOT alleged that one sign violated the spacing requirements by being "[i]n conflict with a[n] existing permitted sign." Petitioner contends, however, that it has two legally enforceable leases with the property owners, and that its applications should be approved. If the applications are approved, the signs would be placed on two parcels of property near Interstate 75 in Sumter County, Florida, one on the east side and one on the west side of the highway. Both parcels are owned by Intervenors, William and Debra Farkus. On July 29, 1998, Dan Hucke, a real estate representative for Petitioner, was "scouting" for suitable billboard locations and decided that Intervenors' property would be a desirable location. After Hucke discussed the matter with Intervenors, the parties agreed to execute lease agreements that day for the two parcels of property in question. A copy of the lease agreements is found in Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 received in evidence. In Hucke's presence, both Debra and William Farkus executed each lease agreement and a Notice of Lease. The documents reflect that only one person, Hucke, served as a witness. Hucke then carried the agreements to Petitioner's president, who executed the agreements on behalf of the corporation. In addition, Hucke's wife, a notary public, placed her seal on the Notice of Lease indicating that the signatures had been signed in her presence after an oath was administered to the lessors. Intervenors were not present when the documents were notarized. The day after the documents were executed, Debra Farkus contacted Hucke by telephone. Hucke told her he would be in the area the following Monday (August 2) and they could "work out" any problems she might have with the agreements. The same day (July 30), Debra Farkus faxed a handwritten letter to Hucke advising him to "[c]ancel the lease as per our conversation immediately," and to not "record them as per our conversation." After receiving the cancellation notice, Hucke met briefly with the Intervenors, but contended at hearing that he could not recall the substance of that conversation. On the other hand, William Farkus testified that in that meeting he again reiterated his desire for the agreements to be cancelled. In any event, Hucke acknowledged that he left the meeting with the impression that the Intervenors objected to the agreements. Despite receiving the foregoing notice and oral advice from Intervenors, Hucke nonetheless believed he had valid leases. Whether he recorded the leases is not of record. However, he promptly filed two applications for sign permits with the DOT, and he enclosed a copy of the lease agreements to evidence the fact that he had the permission of the property owners. When a DOT inspector conducted a preliminary investigation of the applications, he learned that Intervenors did not consent to having the signs on their property. Under long-standing DOT policy (since at least 1992), when this type of dispute occurs, which the inspector says happens "[a]ll the time," it requires that the applicant either submit an affidavit (or present testimony at a hearing) evidencing the fact that the property owners have consented to the placement of a sign on their property, or submit an order of a circuit court reflecting that the lease agreement is enforceable. Where a dispute such as this occurs, in no circumstance does DOT attempt to construe the legal sufficiency of a lease agreement or adjudicate the rights of a party under a lease agreement. The foregoing policy is applied by the agency on a statewide basis, without discretion, and it has a logical and rational basis, particularly since an administrative agency lacks jurisdiction to construe contracts or make property-right determinations. At the hearing, Intervenors again stated that they did not authorize Petitioner to place its signs on their property. In addition, Petitioner did not submit a court order indicating that enforceable leases between the parties existed. DOT presented testimony which established that the proposed sign location in Case No. 98-4459T would violate statutory spacing requirements because the location conflicted with an existing nearby sign. There was no evidence to contradict this assertion.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying the applications for state sign permits filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of September, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Andrew B. Thomas, Esquire Post Office Box 4961 Orlando, Florida 32802-4961 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The remaining alleged non-conforming sign on Exhibit 2 is located within the city limits of Lakeland, Florida at Lake Parker Drive and Main Street. Petitioner acknowledged that if the sign was erected prior to 1972 and meets the requirements of the city of Lake land it is permittable. This sign was purchased by Respondent some two years ago from Outdoor Media who had obtained a permit for the sign on 3 January 1972. The sign was erected shortly thereafter. Accordingly the sign is permittable in its present location. The two signs on Exhibit 1 present a different situation. These signs were purchased by Respondent from Lawrence Company approximately one year ago and the signs were up when Lawrence was purchased. These two signs are located on US 92, 9.50 and 9.60 miles west of US 17. US 92 is a federal-aid primary highway. The zoning in the area is Rural Conservation, however, the owner of the property has applied for and obtained concept approval for a Planned Urban Development (PUD) project. Applications submitted by Lawrence to DOT for a permit to erect these signs (Exhibits 3 and 4) showed the property on which the signs were to be erected to be zoned Commercial or Industrial. A telephone call to the county zoning section by the DOT approving officer confirmed that the zoning was Commercial and a permit was issued. Actually the owner of the property had submitted a PUD application which received concept approval for a country store, boat rental and sales, and other businesses to cater to the users of Saddle Creek Park (Exhibit 7). Extensions of this concept approval have been granted by Polk County through January 24, 1979. Concept approval does not change the zoning or authorize any construction on the property inconsistent with the original zoning. Application for a zoning change to that requested in the application for which concept approval was granted is necessary before the County can or will change the zoning. Such application will be treated as all other applications for zoning changes and the fact that concept approval has been granted does not assure the application for zoning change will be approved. Accordingly the signs shown on Exhibit 1 to be in violation are erected on property presently zoned Rural Conservation and the property was so zoned when the signs were erected.
