The Issue Whether Petitioner is liable for sales or use tax, plus interest and penalties, as asserted by the Respondent's Notice of Decision dated March 16, 1995.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida for-profit corporation whose sole stockholder is Corwin Zimmer. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner operated an air taxi charter service out of the Fort Lauderdale, Florida, airport. Respondent is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended, including the provisions of Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. At the times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner utilized three Learjets in its operations. At all times pertinent to this proceedings, each of these three jets was owned by a separate corporation and each corporation was owned by a single shareholder. Each jet was owned by a corporation to limit the liability of the individual shareholder. Each of the following owned one of these three jets: Alamo Jet, Inc., a Florida corporation wholly owned by Charles Schmidt; RLO, Inc., a Florida corporation wholly owned by Richard Owens; and Gulfstream Flight Services, Inc., a Florida corporation wholly owned by Dr. David Brown. These three corporations and their individual shareholders will be collectively referred to as the owners. These owners were unrelated to each other. Except for the agreements at issue in this proceeding, the owners were also unrelated to the Petitioner and Mr. Zimmer. None of the owners possessed the FAA licensure necessary to transport passengers for hire. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, each of the three owners had an agreement with Petitioner that was styled "Aircraft Management Agreement" (the agreement). Although written agreements could not be located for all three owners, Mr. Zimmer testified, credibly, that there existed a written agreement for each owner and that there was no material difference between the written agreement that was produced at the formal hearing and the other agreements. None of the owners fully utilized the jet it owned before entering into the agreement with Petitioner. As to each agreement, the owner was referred to as "owner" and his jet was described. Petitioner was referred to as "operator". The agreements do not contain the term "lease". The following are the responsibilities of the Petitioner as the operator pursuant to the agreement between Petitioner and Alamo Jet, Inc.: Place the Aircraft on its Air Carrier Certificate Number AT 705264 for the purpose of utilizing the aircraft in FAR 135 operations. Oversee all aircraft maintenance, aircraft records, aircraft time components, in accor- dance with the Learjet Model 55 maintenance program, Federal Aviation Regulations, and its operating certificate. Train flight crews, maintain crew records in accordance with Federal Aviation Regula- tions conduct initial, recurrent, six month proficiency flight checks. Provide the Owner with a flight crew at a rate of $450.00 per day, not to exceed $600.00 per month. Schedule all Aircraft, flight, crews and passenger activity through its dispatch department. Reimburse the Owner all moneys received from placing the Aircraft on the Garrett Engine Fleet Operations Program. Insure the Aircraft on its fleet operators policy and financially participate to recover the additional premium required for FAR 135 operations. Hanger the Aircraft at its Fort Lauder- dale facility at no charge to the owner. Provide fuel to the Owner at its Fort Lauderdale facility at $.25 above purchase cost. Insure that the aircraft [is] maintained in a like new condition with the exception of normal wear. Pay the Owner $800.00 per flight hour for the aircraft when it is utilized for FAR 135 operations. Provide the Owner with an aircraft state- ment and activity report by the 7th of the following month, and payment for the utiliza- tion of the aircraft by the 25th day of the month. Provide all charts, maps, and expendable storage at no charge to the Owner. Aggressively market the aircraft for maximum utilization. The Alamo Jet, Inc. agreement provided the following pertaining to aircraft flight utilization: Owner utilization: The Owner is responsible for all direct costs incurred from the flight. Maintenance Test Flights: The owner is responsible for all direct costs of operation. There will be no charge for the crew conducting the test flight. Flight Crew Training: The Operator shall be responsible for the direct cost of operation. This includes MSF payment, hourly maintenance cost, [and] fuel. FAR 135 Air Carrier Flights: The Operator is responsible for all cost incurred in addition to the payment of $800.00 per flight hour to the owner. The Alamo Jet, Inc. agreement provides that the Owner agrees to and is responsible for the following: Payment of the insurance premium less the additional amount required for commercial operations. Cost of maintaining the aircraft. To coordinate all flights with the Operators dispatch department. The Alamo Jet, Inc. agreement provides the following general conditions: Operator will aggressively market the charter utilization of the aircraft, and estimate its use at 600 hours the first year. No guarantee as to the amount of aircraft revenue hours are included in this agreement. Generally, Petitioner's flights are in the continental United States. During the audit period, each owner used its aircraft approximately ten days a month. Each owner could use its aircraft except when it was undergoing a major inspection or was down for maintenance. Other than those times, each owner had a key and unlimited access to its aircraft. Each owner had bumping privileges with respect to their aircraft. If an owner's aircraft was booked for a flight by Petitioner when the owner wanted to use it, the Petitioner would make the owner's aircraft available to the owner and re-book the passenger on another aircraft. Petitioner provided the pilot and crew when an owner wanted to use its aircraft at a per hour rate that was less than that charged for its taxi service. When an owner wanted to use his aircraft, he would contact one of Petitioner's employees to coordinate his use with the Petitioner. Mr. Zimmer testified that he did not intend the agreements with the owners to be leases. From the inception of the agreements, Mr. Zimmer viewed the arrangements as being contracts for the management of the aircraft so that his company and each owner could use its jet but also generate revenue when its jet was being used by Petitioner in its air taxi operations, referred to as FAR 135 operations. Mr. Zimmer testified that he intended that his relationship with the owners of the aircraft to be a marriage of operations and aircraft. Petitioner had the air carrier certificate, and the personnel and facilities to maintain the aircraft and provide air taxi service. 1/ During the audit, Mr. Dreker told Mr. Zimmer that the Respondent was treating the payments to the owners as lease payments. Before that time, no one had told Mr. Zimmer that the relationship constituted a lease. Each agreement required the owner to deliver its aircraft to Petitioner for use pursuant to the terms of the agreement. The owner gave up its exclusive possession, control, and dominion of its aircraft pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Petitioner controlled the use of the aircraft, subject to the terms of the agreement, which set forth the rights of the owner. Each agreement permitted the owner to fully utilize its jet. For the years 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991, the Petitioner reported for federal income tax purposes in connection with its use of the three jets under the category "cost of goods sold - other costs - Jet Leases" the respective amounts of $650,531.00, $753,181.00, $923,374.00, $899,917.00, and $693,603.00. For the years 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991, the Petitioner referred to the payments made to the owners as "Lease Payments". For the years 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, and 1991, the Petitioner's books referred to the payments made to the owners as "Lease Payments". Mr. Zimmer was involved in the operation of the Petitioner from the time it was incorporated. He did not, however, become the sole stockholder until 1982. During 1982, Petitioner leased an airplane from American Jet in St. Louis, Missouri. The lease of that airplane is reflected on Petitioner's 1982 Federal income tax return, which was prepared by Rosen and Santini, P.A. Beginning in 1983, after Mr. Zimmer purchased the stock of the Petitioner, Robert J. Dreker, a CPA employed by Schmidt & Co., prepared all of Petitioner's federal tax returns. Petitioner's books were set up before Mr. Dreker became its CPA. Mr. Dreker did not believe that referring to the payments to owners as lease payments in Petitioner's Federal tax return or in its chart of accounts was significant because the payments were clearly deductible for tax purposes. Consequently, he retained the nomenclature reflected on the 1983 tax return and in the chart of accounts as he found them. Petitioner's chart of accounts was maintained on a daily basis by a bookkeeper. Three individuals filled the bookkeeper position at different times, none of whom had any special training or experience in tax matters. Mr. Dreker was of the opinion that referring to the payments to owners as lease payments did not conform to generally accepted accounting principles and mischaracterizes the relationship. Mr. Dreker was of the opinion that the payments to owners should be called management expenses or owner revenue payments. Mr. Dreker or his accounting firm had never been employed to prepare a certified financial statement for the Petitioner. Respondent audited Petitioner for the period May 1, 1987, through April 30, 1992. The auditor, Cynthia McHale, reviewed Petitioner's books and records, including the agreement with Alamo Jet, and interviewed Mr. Zimmer. Based on that audit the Respondent determined that the agreements between Petitioner and the owners constituted leases and that Petitioner was liable for sales or use taxes on those leases. Ms. McHale understood that Mr. Zimmer and Mr. Dreker did not intend the agreements to be leases. The amounts determined to be due were reflected by the Notice of Decision dated March 16, 1995, which is the agency action challenged by Petitioner. Respondent asserts that Petitioner owes taxes in the amount of $238,454.24, penalty in the amount of $59,613.55, interest through August 12, 1993, in the amount of $102,633.11, for a total of $400,700.90, plus interest accruing from August 12, 1993, at the rate of $77.46 per day. Petitioner disputes that the agreements constitute leases and asserts that no tax is due. Petitioner does not challenge the underlying calculation that produced the figures contained in the Notice of Decision dated March 16, 1995. Pursuant to its agreement with the owners, the Petitioner provided hangar storage space for the storage of the jets. Respondent has not assessed any tax for that storage. Petitioner did not assess taxes on the charges made by Petitioner to the passengers using its air taxi service since these charges are specifically exempt from taxation. In 1981, Petitioner corresponded with Respondent about its need to register with Respondent for sales tax purposes. The Respondent's reply, dated July 30, 1981, advised that Petitioner did not need to register for sales tax purposes because the Petitioner's business was a nontaxable service. At about the time the sales tax on services went into effect, Mr. Dreker talked with two employees of the Respondent in separate conversations and described the Petitioner's operations to them. Based on those conversations, Mr. Dreker formed the opinion that Petitioner was not subject to either sales tax or service tax. Petitioner did not pay to the Respondent or to the owners a service tax on the payments made to the owners between July 1, 1987, and December 31, 1987, the dates the service tax was in effect in Florida. The 1981 correspondence and Mr. Dreker's telephone conversations are the only evidence that supports Petitioner's estoppel argument. Mr. Dreker did not receive a written response to his telephone inquiry and he did not send a written inquiry to Respondent requesting a Letter of Technical Advice, a request for a Technical Assistance Advisement, or a Declaratory Statement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein and sustains the assessments contained in the Notice of Decision dated March 16, 1995, that Petitioner owes taxes in the amount of $238,454.24, penalty in the amount of $59,613.55, interest through August 12, 1993, in the amount of $102,633.11, for a total of $400,700.90, plus interest accruing from August 12, 1993, at the rate of $77.46 per day. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May 1996 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May 1996.
The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints related to the real estate profession pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent Valyne Batchelor is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0311190 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent Batchelor was in care of Adventure Properties, Inc., 10800 N. Military Trail, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410. Respondent Adventure Properties, Inc. was at all times pertinent to this proceeding a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0238654 in accordance with Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent Adventure Properties, Inc., was at the address of 10800 N. Military Trail, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Batchelor was licensed and operating as a qualifying broker and officer of Respondent Adventure Properties, Inc. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Batchelor was a one-half owner of Dream Home Builders of Royal Palm Beach, Inc. (Dream Home). Joel B. Wingate was in the land clearing business and had done work prior to September 1988 for Dream Home and Dream Home's subsidiary, Redi Concrete. On September 18, 1988, Dream Home, the owner of a house located at 5510 Royal Palm Beach Boulevard, Royal Palm Beach, Florida, entered into a contract to sell that house to Joel B. Wingate, his wife, Eva C. Wingate, and his mother, Sarah F. Wingate. The contract reflected that the purchase price of the property was $87,400. The contract reflected that the sum of $4,400 was received by Adventure Properties as a deposit. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid by a first mortgage in the amount of $69,900 to be obtained by the Buyers from a lending institution and by a second mortgage in favor of Seller in the amount of $13,100 that was to be amortized over a period of 30 years with a balloon payment at the end of 5 years. Respondent Batchelor executed the contract on behalf of Adventure Properties and on behalf of Dream Home. In addition, Respondent Batchelor signed a statement on the face of the contract which acknowledged receipt of the deposit that was to have been held in escrow. The sum of $4,400 was not paid over to Respondent Adventure Properties or to Respondent Batchelor by the Wingates at the time the contract was executed and there never was a deposit made into the escrow account of Adventure Properties. Instead, Mr. Wingate agreed to pay the sum of $4,400.00 prior to the closing from sums he would earn from work he was performing for Redi Concrete. All parties pertinent to this transaction, including the bank that financed the first mortgage, knew that the Wingates had not paid that sum. The Wingates applied for financing with Security First Federal for financing of the first mortgage. The application for the loan was in the name of Sarah F. Wingate because of Joel Wingate's poor credit. On September 17, 1988, a "Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Charges" was prepared by Security First Federal which estimated that the settlement charges that would be due from the Wingates at closing would equal $4,328.30. On September 19, 1988, the Wingates, as buyer, and Dream Home, as seller, executed an addendum to the contract which provided that the Seller would pay up to $4,400 in closing costs and that the amount of the second mortgage would be increased from the sum of $13,100 to the sum of $17,500. The addendum provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Seller to pay up to $4,400 in closing costs. Buyer agrees to give seller a second mortgage in the amount of $17,500. Said Mortgage to be for a term of one year from date of contract and is to be paid as follows: Buyer agrees to do work for Redi Concrete, Inc. consisting of clearing, digging of necessary fill, building and compact ion of house pads according to Palm Beach County Building Codes, all grading and trash removal at contract price of $2,450 per lot. Of this amount $1,250 is to be applied to second mortgage until mortgage is paid in full. Additionally, any unused portion of the $4,400 allowance for closing costs not used for that purpose is to be applied to the second mortgage of $17,500. If any portion of this agreement is not kept, Redi Concrete, Inc. reserves the option to impose interest at the rate of 10% per annum against any unpaid amount of second mortgage. The fact that the amount of closing costs Dream Homes agreed to pay on behalf of the Wingates ($4,400) was identical to the amount that the Wingates were supposed to pay as a deposit ($4,400) was coincidence. Respondent Batchelor executed the addendum to the contract in her capacity as an officer of Dream Home. There was no attempt on the part of Respondents to deceive the Wingates, who had agreed to this method of financing the purchase. On October 24, 1990, the transaction closed. The buyers executed the first mortgage in favor of Security First Federal Savings and Loan Association in the principal amount of $69,900, and a second purchase money mortgage in favor of Dream Home in the principal amount of $13,100. (There was no explanation as to why the second mortgage that was executed at the closing was for $13,100 instead of for $17,500. Dream Home's letter of October 27, 1988, to the Wingates, signed by Ms. Batchelor, refers to a revised second mortgage that should be executed by the Wingates and recorded. There was no evidence that the revised second mortgage was, in fact, delivered to the Wingates or executed by them.) The second mortgage note required monthly payments commencing November 24, 1988, with a balloon payment of $12,965.22 due on October 24, 1991. The Wingates were aware of the manner in which their purchase of this property was financed. There was insufficient evidence to establish that Respondents dealt with the Wingates in anything other than an honest, straightforward manner. The unusual owner financing involved in this transaction was an attempt to accommodate the buyers. There was no intent by Respondents to deceive the Wingates, Dream Home, Security First Federal, or any other party pertinent to these proceedings. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the Wingates, Dream Home, Security First Federal, or any other party pertinent to these proceedings was, in fact, deceived or tricked by any act of Respondents. The Wingates moved into the premises prior to the closing of the transaction. Ms. Batchelor did not give the Wingates permission to move into the house prior to closing and she did not personally inform the Wingates that they would have to pay rent if they moved in prior to closing. Ms. Batchelor had been told by her business associate, Mr. Vander Meer, that the Wingates would pay a per diem rental fee until the closing. On October 27, 1990, Ms. Batchelor, on behalf of Dream Home, advised the Wingates that they were being charged a rental fee of $27.54 per day that they had occupancy prior to the closing. For the 36 days the Wingates were in the house prior to closing, the total rental claimed came to $920.52. The Wingates disputed the amount claimed for rent and had not, as of the date of the formal hearing, paid that amount. There was no evidence that Respondents were attempting to deceive, trick, or defraud the Wingates in any manner by claiming rent for the period between the time the Wingates moved in to the house and the time of the closing. By letter dated September 20, 1989, Ms. Batchelor, on behalf of Dream Home, notified the Wingates that the second mortgage balloon payment was $12,795.52 and that, according to her records, would become due on May 1, 1990. Although this statement of the due date is inconsistent with the instrument executed by the Wingates, there was no evidence that this statement was anything other than a mistake. The Wingates have defaulted on the first and the second mortgages. When Petitioner's investigator, Sharon Thayer, conducted an office inspection and escrow audit of Respondents' offices on March 13, 1990, Respondents did not have an enclosed room within which negotiations and closings of real estate transactions could be conducted and carried on with privacy. The negotiations between the buyers and sellers in the Wingate transaction were, however, conducted in private. Buyers were prompted to file a complaint against Respondents approximately one year after the closing when an unidentified bank officer told them they may have committed a fraud. Without knowledge or complicity of Respondents, Sarah F. Wingate falsified her loan application with Security First Federal Savings and Loan Association. Respondents received no commission in regard to the Wingate transaction. Respondents moved their offices and have corrected the deficiency related to the absence of an enclosed, private area.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order which finds that Respondent violated the provisions of Rule 21V-10.002, Florida Administrative Code, and consequently, Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, which finds that Respondents violated the provisions of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and which provides for the issuance of a letter of reprimand to said Respondents for such violations and the assessment of an administrative fine against Respondents in the amount of $500.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-3587 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-15 and 19-22 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence. The entry on line 501 of the copy of the closing statement introduced as Petitioner's Exhibit 8 is too faint to read. However, the copy of the closing statement included as part of Joint Exhibit 1 reflects that the entry on line 501 is the figure $4,400 and not the figure of $4,100 reflected in Petitioner's proposed finding. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Although the proposed findings correctly reflect Ms. Batchelor's statement to Petitioner's investigator, that statement was made several months after the transaction and before Ms. Batchelor had had the opportunity to review her files. Other evidence regarding the addendum is found to be more credible as reflected by the findings made. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-21 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 22 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Suite N-308 Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Lawrence Maxwell Fuchs, Esquire Fuchs and Jones, P.A. 590 Royal Palm Beach Boulevard Royal Palm Beach, Florida 33411 Darlene F. Keller Division Director Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact In the Spring of 1978, Roach purchased 1965 Piper aircraft No. 3406W from an out-of-state broker. On the assumption that sales tax had been collected, and not being familiar with Florida's Sales/Use tax laws, Roach took no other action. This aircraft was sold in August of 1978 and 1972 Piper No. 5309T was purchased in September of 1978; this aircraft was purchased under the same circumstances. No records were kept of the purchase price of either aircraft. DOR wrote Roach in August and September of 1978 regarding 3406W, without result. Thereafter, DOR used the average book value of $19,000 to arrive at a tax due of $760.00 Roach paid $720 tax on July 15, 1979; he contended that 3406W had $1000 less equipment than the average book valued aircraft. Prior to this time Roach became aware that tax was due but indicated he was financially unable to pay. On July 18, 1979, DOR sent Roach the proposed assessment for $40.00 tax, $190.00 penalty and $83.60 interest. Meantime, DOR was writing Roach regarding the second aircraft, 5309T, with no response being received until August 8, 1979. A proposed assessment was issued for $1500 tax, $375 penalty and $394.93 interest on September 10, 1979. During the subsequent informal conference, Roach advised that the tax due was in fact $1520, which was paid on October 4, 1979. Revised assessment dated October 22, 1979, was for $380 penalty and $400.20 interest. DOR's witness, Assistant Area Supervisor, Collection and Enforcement Division, received the matter from higher headquarters in December of 1979. He merely indicated that someone else in DOR used the "blue book" to determine value; he presented no evidence contrary to Roach's estimated value of $18,000 for the first aircraft or regarding the imposition of the penalty.
The Issue Whether Eli Paris is guilty of violation at Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Eli Paris is a registered real estate salesman. Eli Paris was employed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. He was paid by International Land Sales Chartered Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Eli Paris, as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Eli Paris (Represented himself) 7917 West Drive North Bay Village Miami, Florida 33141 ================================================================= AGENCY MEMORANDUM ================================================================= TO: Renata Hendrick, Registration Supervisor FROM: Manuel E. Oliver, Staff Attorney RE: JD 78-018 (PD2772) - FREC vs. Richard H. White JD 78-020 (PD2963) - FREC vs. Eli Paris CASE NO. 77-211 JD 78-021 (PD2783) - FREC vs. Marian Malt Please be advised that the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, rendered its opinion in the above cases, on July 17, 1979, unholding the Board's Final Order revoking these licensees' licenses. The DCA's order became effective on September 26, 1979, after the above named exhausted their appellate remedies.
Findings Of Fact The applicant for site approval is Downtown Heliport Corporation, Inc., a corporation with headquarters in Orlando, Florida, engaged in operating heliport facilities throughout Florida and other states. Its related company is Bulldog Airlines, which owns and operates helicopters for hire. Robert Uttal is President of both companies. On January 4, 1990, Downtown Heliport Corporation filed its application for site approval by the Department of Transportation (DOT), proposing to establish a .23 acre (10,000 square feet) helicopter pad within the jurisdictional territory of the Canaveral Port Authority. The Port Authority had already approved a land use permit and lease for the applicant on July 19, 1989 and November 14, 1989. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) also gave its approval. In a letter dated January 10, 1991, addressed to McDonald Smith, Director of Operations, Downtown Heliport Corporation, the FAA granted approval of the subject heliport under the following conditions: All operations are conducted in VFR weather conditions. The landing area is limited to private use. All approach/departure route helicopter operations are conducted in an area from 090 degrees clockwise to 160 degrees and from 250 degrees clockwise to 330 degrees using the touchdown pad as the center of a compass rose. The takeoff/landing area is appropriately marked. A nonobstructing wind indicator is maintained adjacent to the takeoff/landing area. The approval letter provides, in pertinent part: This determination does not mean FAA approval or disapproval of the physical development involved in the proposal nor is it based on any environmental or land-use compatibility issue. It is a determination with respect to the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft and with respect to the safety of persons and property on the ground. In making this determination, the FAA has considered matters such as the effect the proposal would have on existing or planned traffic patterns of neighboring airports or heliports, the effects it would have on the existing airspace structure and projects or programs of the FAA, the effects it would have on the safety of persons and property on the ground, and the effects that existing or proposed man-made objects (on file with the FAA) and known natural objects within the affected area would have on the heliport proposal. The FAA cannot prevent the construction of structures near a heliport. The heliport environs can only be protected through such means as local zoning ordinances or acquisitions of property rights. (DOT Exhibit #4) On January 30, 1990, Bronson Monteith, DOT District Aviation Specialist, inspected the proposed site and found it feasible for the proposed use and consistent with the requirements of DOT Rule Chapter 14-60, F.A.C. More specifically, he reviewed the facility diagram provided by the applicant and determined that the size of the pad, the location of the pad and the air corridor were appropriate. He considered that the Port Canaveral and FAA approval established compliance with ground and air safety standards. He determined from his inspection that existing structures would not interfere with an 8:1 glide slope to and from the pad. Once cleared from the pad the helicopters will use an existing ships' channel as the flight path. Mr. Monteith considered the distance of the streets from the heliport and the objects around it, including trees, the parking area and any major buildings that would be occupied. There are no schools close to the site. A Notice of Intent to issue a site approval for the proposed heliport was issued by the Department and advertised in an area newspaper; notices were sent, as provided in Rule 14-60, F.A.C. John Monteith conducted a public meeting, received comments and submitted a report to the DOT Aviation Bureau in Tallahassee recommending site approval. The heliport application, documentation and comments from the public meeting were reviewed by the Department's Licensing Coordinator and the Aviation Office Manager, and they determined that the application met all requirements under Chapter 330, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-60, F.A.C. for site approval. Site approval order no. 91-17 imposes the following conditions: All operations are to be conducted in VFR weather conditions. Operations are limited to private use. There are to be no flights over the City of Cape Canaveral. That the provisions in FAA Airspace Approval letter dated January 10, 1991, be complied with. Traffic patterns and operational procedures are subject to review by this Department prior to licensing or relicensing. (DOT Exhibit #9) Bulldog Airlines and Downtown Heliport Corporation intend to comply with, and enforce the conditions imposed by DOT. The flight path will be at 800 feet elevation along the corridor until the final approach for landing or takeoff, and that final approach will only be over the port itself. It will not include any flights over the Trident nuclear submarine or over storage tanks. The heliport will be private, primarily for the use of Bulldog Airlines, who flies for NASA, for the Port Authority, for various governmental agencies, including environmental monitoring agencies, and for other private hire. The heliport is open only to commercial pilots, will be used during daylight hours and only under conditions which allow for visual, noninstrument flying. Bulldog Airlines commenced operation in 1985 and has never experienced an incident, accident, or any notice of violation from the FAA, DOT or local law enforcement agencies. Because of its safety record it is able to maintain $100 million liability insurance. McDonald Smith, Director of Operations for Bulldog Airlines, is a pilot with approximately 10,000 hours of flight time. He also inspected the site and is aware of existing structures. In his opinion the flight corridor is wide enough to fly a helicopter, even if it is necessary to avoid unforeseen obstacles. Norma Townsend is a resident of the City of Cape Canaveral, approximately one-half mile south of the proposed site. She has attended the series of public meetings which preceded the DOT's proposed decision. She has amassed an impressive array of letters, maps, tapes and other documents related to the proposed site. She describes herself as a citizen and is neither a pilot nor trained in safety. Ms. Townsend is concerned about the existence of the nuclear submarine base, fuel storage tanks and other hazardous materials in the proximity of the proposed site. She feels that no amount of care by the pilots will insure that a helicopter in an emergency might not collide with an existing structure, with disastrous results. She has heard that used parts are sold for new, causing a helicopter to drop from the sky. She believes that ultra-light airplanes, low flying airplanes and weather balloons will provide extraordinary flying hazards in the Port Canaveral area. She suspects that no meaningful study was done by any agency prior to approving the site. Ms. Townsend presented no witnesses to substantiate these concerns and relies on her own common sense. In many instances this would be sufficient, but here the agency and applicant presented knowledgeable, competent expertise in support of a finding that the site is appropriate. Anything is possible, but instances of helicopters dropping out of the sky are virtually unheard of. Pilots are conscious of ultra-light planes and other possible obstacles to flying. Even large birds are a hazard. Heliports are routinely sited near or on top of buildings, in downtown areas or other places where traffic and population are congested. Helicopters are highly maneuverable, and for that reason are relied on in providing transportation and observation in circumstances where planes or ground vehicles are prohibited, for example after a hurricane or after a fire or other calamity. The substantial weight of evidence establishes that the proposed heliport at Port Canaveral can and will be safely operated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the agency enter its final order finding that site approval order no. 91-17 is valid and appropriate. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 18th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1991. Copies furnished: Robert R. Uttal Downtown Heliport Corporation, Inc. P.O. Box 621148 Orlando, FL 32862-1148 Joy C. Salamone, Mayor City of Cape Canaveral P.O. Box 326 Cape Canaveral, FL 32920 Karen S. Andreas, Commissioner Brevard County Board of County Commissioners 900 E. Merritt Island Cswy. Merritt Island, FL 32952 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Dept. of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Norma E. Townsend P.O. Box 883 Cape Canaveral, FL 32920-0883 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, M.S. 58 Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Dept. of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issue in this case is whether proposed amendments to Rule 12A-1.070 are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners and Intervenors challenge Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1) and (4)(a) and (b). Respondent published the amendments in the Florida Administrative Law Weekly on March 18, 1994 and June 10, 1994. As described in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the proposed rule amendments address, among other things, the taxation of payments to airport authorities from concessionaires like rental car companies and airport restaurants. The law imposes a sales tax on payments for the use or occupancy of real property, whether the agreement consists of a lease or a license to use real property. The main dispute in these cases is whether the proposed rule amendments illegally extend the sales tax to payments for intangibles like a concession, franchise, or privilege to do business.
Findings Of Fact The Proposed Rules By notice published in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 on March 18, 1994, Respondent proposed amendments to existing Rule 12A-1.070. (All references to Sections are to Florida Statutes. All references to Rules are to the Florida Administrative Code. All references to Proposed Rules are to the rule amendments that are the subject of this proceeding.) The notice explains that the purpose of the rule amendments is to clarify the application of specific statutory sales tax exemptions for the lease or license to use real property at airports, malls and nursing homes. The rule amendments clarify that the total payment pursuant to a lease or license of real property is subject to tax, unless specifically exempt, irrespective of how the payment, or a portion thereof, is identified. However, if such leased property includes specifically exempt property, then such exemption may be applied on a pro rata basis. 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 1549 (March 18, 1994). In the notice, Respondent cites as specific authority for the proposed amendments Sections 212.17(6), 212.18(2), and 213.06(1). Respondent states that the proposed amendments implement Sections 212.02(10)(h) and (i) and (13), 212.03(6), and 212.031. By notice published June 10, 1994, in 20 Florida Administrative Law Weekly 4096, Respondent proposed amendments to the amendments previously proposed. As amended by both notices, Rule 12A-1.070 provides, with deletions stricken through and additions underlined: * 12A-1.070 Leases and Licenses of Real Property; Storage of Boats and Aircraft (1)(a) Every person who rents or leases any real property or who grants a license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property is exer- cising a taxable privilege unless such real property is: * * * <<a>>. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft. See Subsection (3). <<b. Property which is used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt. This property includes: common walkways inside a terminal building used by passengers for boarding or departing from an aircraft, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (the rooms which are used by passengers as a sitting or gathering area immed- iately before surrendering their tickets to board the aircraft). Departure lounges commonly known as VIP lounges or airport clubs which are affiliated with an airline or a club which requires a membership or charge or for which membership or usage is determined by ticket status are not included as property exempt from tax. The lease or license to use passenger loading bridges (jetways) and baggage conveyor systems comes under this exemption, provided that the jetways and baggage conveyor systems are deemed real property. In order for the jetways and baggage conveyors to be deemed real property, the owner of these items must also be the owner of the land to which they are attached, and must have had the intention that such property become a permanent accession to the realty from the moment of installation. The items shall not be considered real property if the owner, when the owner is not the airport, retains title to the items after the purchase/installation indebtedness has been paid in full. Any operator of an airport, such as an airport authority, which is the lessee of the land on which the airport has its situs is, for the purposes of this sub- subparagraph, deemed the owner of such land. Real property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft which is exempt from tax includes: office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas. If any portion of the above property is used for any other purpose, it is taxed on a pro- rata basis, which shall be determined by the square footage of the portions of the areas in the airport that are used by an airline exclusively for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft (which areas shall be the numerator) compared to the total square footage of such areas used by the airlines (which areas shall be the denominator). Example: An airline leases a total of 3,000 square feet from an airport authority. The airline uses the space as follows: 1,000 square feet are used to process tickets and check in the passengers' luggage; 1,000 square feet are used for the passengers' departure lounge; and 1,000 square feet are used for the management office and the employees' lounge. The 1,000 square feet used to process tickets and check in the luggage is exempt; the 1,000 square feet used as a passengers' departure lounge is also exempt; and the 1,000 square feet used as the management office and employees' lounge is taxable. Therefore, a total of 2,000 square feet is exempt because that portion of the total space leased by the airline is used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. However, the total amount used as office space and the employees' lounge (i.e., 1,000 square feet) is taxable, because that portion of the space leased by the airline is not used exclusively for the purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from an aircraft. Real property used for fueling aircraft is taxable when the fueling activities are conducted by a lessee or licensee which is not an airline. However, the charge made to an airline for the use of aprons, ramps, or other areas used for fueling aircrafts is exempt. From July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1), F.S., was exempt from tax.>> * * * (b)1. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of such real property. 2. However, effective July 1, 1987, a person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use such property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property. <<3. For purposes of this rule, the term "retail concessionaire," which may be either a lessee or licensee, shall mean any person .. . who makes sales of food, drinks, or other tangible personal property directly to the general public within the premises of an airport. With regard to airports, any persons which contract to service or supply tangible personal property for airline operations are considered to be providing aircraft support services and are not concessionaires for purposes of this rule.>> * * * The provisions of this rule relating to the license to use, occupy, or enter upon any real property are effective July 1, 1986, unless other- wise noted. "Real property" means the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with "realty" and "real estate." "License," with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose. <<1. Example:>> [[(g)]] An agreement whereby the owner of real property grants another person permission to install and <<operate>> [[maintain]] a full service coin-operated vending machine, coin- operated amusement machine, coin-operated laundry machine, or any like items, on the premises is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. The consideration paid by the machine owner to the real property owner <<for the license to use the real property>> is taxable. . . . <<2. Example:>> [[(h)]] An agreement between the owner of real property and an advertising agency for the use of real property to display advertising matter is a [[taxable]] license to use real property. <<The consideration paid by the advertising agency to the real property owner for the license to use the real property is taxable.>> * * * (4)(a)<<1.>> The tenant or person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use any real property from which rental or license fee is subject to taxation under s. 212.031, F.S., and shall pay the tax to his immediate landlord or other person granting the right to such tenant or person to occupy or use such real property. <<2. Where the lessor's or licensor's ability to impose fee(s) is based on its ownership or control of the real property, and the payment made to the lessor or licensor is for the lessee's or licensee's use of the real property, such fees are subject to tax. In such circumstances, the total payment for the use of real property, including airport property, is taxable, irrespective that the payment or a portion of the payment may be identified as consideration for the privilege to do business at that location, privilege fee, guaranteed minimum, concession fee, percentage fee, or by the use of similar terms which seek to distinguish such portion(s) from the payment for the lease of or license to use such real property for any purpose, unless such lease or license is otherwise specifically exempt. Example: A clothing retailer occupying a location inside a mall has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to operate its store at that location. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated real property and the percentage of gross sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall; failure to make any of these payments can cause the agreement to be terminated. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized. Example: A push cart or kiosk vendor has an agreement with the owner of the mall under which it pays a minimum rent plus a percentage of its gross sales for the right to sell its merchandise at various locations within the common areas of the mall. Failure to make the payments can terminate the right to sell merchandise in the mall. The total amount under the agreement is subject to tax because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of the privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use the real property to do business. Example: A car rental company has an agree- ment with an airport authority to operate its rental car business with a designated office and counter space within the airport terminal building. The agreement provides for a payment designated as rent for the use of real property as well as a payment based on a percentage of gross sales designated as a privilege fee for engaging in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment can terminate the agreement. The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax. All past declarations, including Temporary Technical Assistance Advisements issued pursuant to Emergency Rule 87AER-91, Technical Assistance Advisements, Letters of Technical Assistance, and similar correspondence, issued by the Department, which advised that fees or portions of fees identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and which are inconsistent with this rule are rescinded. Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease or license to use real property for business purposes. (b) Except for tolls charged to the travelling public, both commercial and non- commercial, imposed exclusively for the right to travel on turnpikes, expressways, bridges, and other public roadways, the full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking-up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities by any person providing ground transportation services to such airport, shall be taxable as a license to use airport real property, irrespective of whether the operator of such service enters the airport terminal building while engaged in providing such service. Example: The fee paid by a hotel to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its guests at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a taxicab and limousine company to an airport, for the privilege of coming on the airport property for the purpose of picking-up and dropping- off its passengers at the airport terminal, is a license to use airport real property, and is taxable. Example: The fee paid by a remote location rental car company, for the privilege of using the airport premises to pick-up and drop-off its customers at the airport terminal, is a license to use real property, and is taxable.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Statutes and Legislative History As amended by 66, Chapter 86-152, Laws of Florida, Section 212.031 states: (1)(a) It is declared to be the legislative intent that every person is exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of renting, leasing, [[or]] letting<<, or granting a license for the use>> of any real property unless such property is: * * * Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. Section 212.02(10)(h) defines "real property" as "the surface land, improvements thereto, and fixtures, and is synonymous with 'realty' and 'real estate.'" The 1986 amendments extend the sales tax to licenses for the use or occupancy of real property. Section 212.02(10)(i) defines "license." "License," as used in this chapter with reference to the use of real property, means the granting of a privilege to use or occupy a building or a parcel of real property for any purpose. Section 212.031 imposes a sale tax for the use and occupancy of real property, but not upon payments for intangibles, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. The sales tax imposed by Section 212.031 is limited to the payments, or portions of payments, for the use or occupancy of real property. Each of the ten subsections under Section 212.031 exempts from the sales tax various types of property. Three exemptions relevant to these cases are at Section 212.031(1)(a)6, 7, and 10, which exempt real property that is: 6. A public street or road which is used for transportation purposes. 7. Property used at an airport exclusively for the purpose of aircraft landing or aircraft taxiing or property used by an airline for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or property onto or from aircraft or for fueling aircraft or, for the period July 1, 1990, through June 30, 1991, property used at an airport to operate advertising displays in any county as defined in s. 125.011(1). Leased, subleased, or rented to a person providing food and drink concessionaire services within the premises of [[an airport,]] a movie theater, a business operated under a permit issued pursuant to chapter 550 or chapter 551, or any publicly owned arena, sport stadium, convention hall, [[or]] exhibition hall<<, auditorium, or recreational facility. A person providing retail concessionaire services involving the sale of food and drink or other tangible personal property within the premises of an airport shall be subject to tax on the rental of real property used for that purpose, but shall not be subject to the tax on any license to use the property. For purposes of this subparagraph, the term "sale" shall not include the leasing of tangible personal property.>> Note: In the above text, language added to the statute is within the <<>>; deleted language is within the [[]]. The indicated changes in subparagraph 10 were enacted by 10, Chapter 87-101, Laws of Florida. The remaining statutes cited by Respondent as law implemented by the Proposed Rules are not relevant to this proceeding. Court Decisions In Quick and Havey v. Department of Revenue, Case No. 72-363, Second Judicial Circuit, decided December 5, 1974, Donald O. Hartwell, Circuit Judge, entered a summary judgement in favor of Respondent. Quick and Havey operated a food concession at the municipal auditorium in West Palm Beach. In return for the concession, they agreed to pay the city base rental and a percentage of gross sales. The agreement entitled Quick and Harvey to the exclusive occupancy of part of the auditorium; they also provided concession services at other locations throughout the auditorium. Quick and Harvey paid the sales tax on the base rental, but argued that the percentage payment constituted "a fee paid for the exercise of a privilege." Judge Hartwell held that the tax applied to the base rent and percentage rent because the latter payments "are so inextricably entwined and enmeshed in the agreement to pay rent that they cannot be separated or distilled . . .." Judge Hartwell reasoned that rent is the "compensation paid for the use and occupation of real property." Recognizing that a tenant might make payments to its landlord that are not rent, Judge Hartwell found that at least under the terms of the instruments before it for construction and analysis that there has not been such a sufficient separation of the source of these funds as to warrant their classification solely as a fee for the exercise of a privilege. The right to use property cannot be separated from the property itself. We, of course, do not pass upon the question of whether the so-called concession rights can be [illegible] separated from the lease of the property itself. Suffice it to say that under the facts as herein presented, the Court is of the opinion that all payments made to the City of West Palm Beach under the agreement before the Court constitute payment of rent and are therefore subject to the tax specified in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. In Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc. v. Askew, Case No. 74- 338, Second Judicial Circuit, decided January 20, 1977, Judge Hartwell decided whether certain payments made by Avis were taxable under Section 212.031. Avis had "entered into various contracts for a concession or license to do business at various airports and for the rental of real property," as well as contracts with private individuals for the rental of real property to conduct business at nonairport locations. Judge Hartwell divided the contracts of Avis into three categories. The first type of contract was for the payment of rental for the use real property. The second type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the payment of a sum explicitly identified as rent for the use of real property. The third type of contract was for the payment of a concession fee for the right to do business on the premises and for the use of real property without a sum explicitly identified as rent. Judge Hartwell concluded that all payments for the rights conveyed by the first type of contract were taxable under Section 212.031. He ruled that the payments for the right to rent real property under the second type of contract were taxable, but the payments for the remaining rights were not. Declining to aggregate payments as he had in Quick and Havey two years earlier, Judge Hartwell ruled that the payments for the rights conveyed by the third type of contract required a "reasonable allocation." The allocation was between the payments for the use of real property, which were taxed, and the remaining payments, which were not. Judge Hartwell ordered that the allocation should be based on rental rates charged for the right of occupancy of the real property charged other tenants for comparable space. In a per curiam decision not yet final, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recently considered the taxation of concession fees in Lloyd Enterprises, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 20 Fla. Law Weekly D552 (March 3, 1995). The findings of fact and conclusions of law in this final order do not rely upon Lloyd Enterprises, which is discussed merely as supplemental material. In Lloyd Enterprises, the taxpayer entered into a concession agreement with Volusia County for the rental of motorcycles at the beach. A fixed- location concessionaire, the taxpayer had the right to park its vehicles within 100 feet in either direction of its assigned spot during its assigned operating hours. Other concessionaires were allowed to roam the beach, but beach rangers would enforce the taxpayer's exclusive right to sell goods within its 200-foot territory if the free- roaming concessionaires parked or tried to sell goods in this territory. Rejecting Respondent's interpretation of its own rules, the court considered the language of the agreement, as well as a county ordinance incorporated by the agreement. The court held that neither document created a lease or license for the use of real property. Rather, they reflected the County's concern with the image that activities on the beach projected to visitors. The documents evidenced the County's intent to enhance the public's enjoyment of the beach through the provision of goods and services, as well as to raise revenue, mostly to defray cleanup costs at the beach. Thus, under the documents, the payments were nontaxable concession fees. Agency Interpretations Interpretations of Law Prior to Proposed Rule Amendments By letter dated May 14, 1968, Mr. J. Ed Straughn, Executive Director of Respondent, advised Mr. Wilbur Jones that tax is due on the space rented to car rental companies in any airport building. If the agreement makes no allocation between rental and nonrent payments, Respondent would require a "reasonable allocation" between rent and other payments with the tax due only on the amount paid for the right of occupancy. Mr. Straughn suggested that the rent component be estimated by the use of comparable rental rates for space elsewhere in the building. By letter dated August 14, 1985, Mr. Hugh Stephens, a Technical Assistant for Respondent, advised Mr. Victor Bacigalupi that a contract between an advertising company and Dade County, concerning advertising at Miami International Airport, did not involve the rental of real property. Mr. Stephens evidently relied on the nonexclusive right of posting advertising displays and the right of Dade County to require the advertiser to relocate or remove displays. By memorandum dated October 28, 1986, Mr. William D. Townsend, General Counsel, proposed policy for the taxation of licenses. Consistent with the Straughn letter 18 years earlier, the memorandum, which is directed to Mr. Randy Miller, Executive Director, states: A license in real property can be defined as a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, conferred either by writing or orally, to do one or more acts on land without possessing any interest in the land. Every license to do an act on land involves the occupation of the land by the licensee so far as it is necessary to do the act. Example: A concessionaire pays for permission (a license) to sell hot dogs in the building of a wrestling arena. The concessionaire has no possessory interest in the building. He normally has no specifically or legally described area which is his. He is allowed simply to vend his hot dogs in the building. Perhaps he delivers and vends in the stands. Without special permission, he cannot assign his license and it is normally revocable by the licensor unless specifically agreed otherwise. . . . For purposes of F.S. 212.031, however, the Department of Revenue (DOR) takes the position that either a lease or license is present in any business arrangement in which one or more owners, lessors, sublessors, or other persons holding a possessory interest in real property, permits a third party to use such real property for authorized acts unless all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement between the parties conclusively indicate that the agreement is neither a lease nor a license. The form in which the transaction is cast is not controlling. Accordingly, some portion of the consideration paid for an agreement that in form is a joint venture, profits interest, management agreement, franchise, manufacturer's discount, bailment or other arrange- ment will be presumed by the DOR to be allocable to a lease or license if the arrangement involves the use of real property to perform authorized acts by the lessee or licensee. If the terms of the agree- ment are silent with respect to the portion of the consideration allocable to the inherent lease or license or if the consideration allocated under the terms of the agreement is less than its fair market value, the DOR will allocate to the lease or license a portion of the consideration that is equal to the fair market value of the lease or license. Contrary to the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum eight months earlier, Technical Assistance Advisement 87A-011 dated July 2, 1987, which was prepared by Mr. Melton H. McKown, advised the Hillsborough County Aviation Authority that the privilege fees paid by car rental companies to the aviation authority were taxable. The agreement between the parties stated that the fees were "for the concession privileges granted hereunder, and in addition to the charges paid for the Premises .. ., [the car rental company] shall pay a privilege fee " Two months later, Temporary Technical Assistance Advisement TTAA 87(AER)-225 reversed TAA 87A-011. In TTAA 87(AER)-225, which is dated September 10, 1987, Ceneral Counsel William Townsend informed Mr. Samuel J. Dubbin that the payments made to airport authorities from concessionaires are "not for the right to use real property, but are for the right to engage in business at the airport." The letter relies upon Avis Rent-A- Car Systems, Inc. v. Askew. Respondent confirmed TTAA 87(AER)-225 in TTAA 88(AER)- 198, which is dated March 24, 1988, and in a letter dated April 6, 1989, from Mr. Robert M. Parsons, Technical Assistant, to Mr. Thomas P. Abbott. The April 6 letter confirms that payments from on- airport rental car companies are taxed only to the extent that the payments represent rent for space on airport property and not to the extent that the payments represent consideration for the privilege to do business. The April 6 letter adds that the payments from off-airport car rental companies for the right to pick up customers at the airport are not taxable because such payments are merely consideration for the privilege to engage in business. The April 6 letter discusses fees paid by other airport concessionaires. Acknowledging the recent enactment of the statutory exemption for license payments made to airports by food and drink concessionaires, the letter notes that, after July 1, 1987 (the effective date of the statutory changes), such payments, even if calculated as percentages of sales, are not taxable because such payments are construed as payments for a mere privilege or license to engage in business. The April 6 letter evidently marks the first time that, in a single document, Respondent inconsistently treats car rental company concession fees and all other concession fees. The April 6 letter adopts the Straughn/Townsend approach when it states that percentage rent is not taxable because it is payment for the privilege to do business. (The letter actually states "privilege or license" to do business, and this alternative use of "license," not involving the use or occupancy of real property, may have caused part of the confusion.) But the assurance of nontaxability of concession fees in the April 6 letter is limited to the period after July 1, 1987. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter relies on the relatively recent statutory exemption for license payments from airport retail concessionaires. Consistent with the McKown approach, the letter later adds that percentage rent was taxable after the legislature amended Section 212.031 to tax payments for a license to use real property. The April 6 letter concludes erroneously that it is treating all airport concessionaires like on-airport car rental companies. In a Notice of Decision dated July 28, 1992, Respondent addressed the taxation of payments to airport authorities from car rental companies. Under a concession agreement, the airport charged a car rental company a fixed rent for occupied airport space, such as for parking, check-in, and service. Under the same agreement, the airport also charges the car rental company the greater of a guaranteed minimum or percentage of gross revenues. Taking the Straughn/Townsend approach, the Notice of Decision reversed a tentative assessment and held that the additional payments were not taxable. The July 28, 1992 Notice of Decision also addresses the taxation of percentage payments to airport authorities from other concessionaires. Explicitly endorsing the inconsistency of the April 6 letter, Respondent determined that percentage payments from concessionaires other than rental car companies were taxable either as leases or, since July 1, 1986, as licenses. The only explanation offered for the inconsistent treatment of concessionaires is that TTAA 87(AER)-225 applies only to rental car companies. Two years later, as reflected in a March 3, 1994 internal memorandum from Ms. Nydia Men,ndez to two Miami auditors, Respondent continued to perpetuate its inconsistent policy of taxing all payments for the privilege of engaging in business at airports, except for such payments from rental car companies. Returning to advertising, the July 28, 1992, Notice of Decision also states that the payments from the advertiser addressed in the letter dated August 14, 1985, have been taxable, as payments for a license, since July 1, 1986. This conclusion represents the correct treatment of licenses, as another means of granting a right to use or occupy real property. This treatment contrasts with the apparent misinterpretation in the April 6 letter that taxable licenses include grants of privileges to do business. In an early attempt to revisit the tax treatment of payments for concessions, franchises, and other privileges to do business, especially at airports, Respondent evidently chose the Quick and Havey and McKown approach that such business payments are taxable, at least when they are combined with taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. By memorandum dated January 14, 1993, from Assistant General Counsel Jeff Kielbasa to Ms. Lorraine Yoemans, Legislative Affairs Director, Mr. Kielbasa explained the purpose of unidentified proposed rule amendments addressing the same issues addressed by the subject proposed rule amendments. He wrote: The proposed rule amendment attempts to level the field by recognizing that any charge for the right, privilege, or license to do business at an airport is fundamentally a charge for the privilege to use or occupy land. If an airport business refuses to pay the fee, the airport's remedy is to have the business removed as a trespasser. It should be pointed out that we are not concerned with true business licenses or privilege fees attendant to use of trademarks, franchises and the like. These are licenses or privilege fees unrelated to the use of real property. The proposed rule does not differentiate between businesses such as on-airport car rental companies (with counterspaces) and off-airport car rental companies. The fee (however characterized) charged by the airport for the privilege to use or occupy the airport for business purposes is subject to the section 212.031 sales tax. See section 212.02(10)(i) defining license with reference to the use of real property as the "privilege to use or occupy a building or parcel of real property for any purpose." We believe that separation of a payment by characterizing one portion as a lease or license of realty (whether site specific or not) and another for the privilege of conducting business on the premises is artificial. It would be just as easy for the property owner on the corner of College and Monroe to charge a business tenant the average commercial square footage rental in Leon County for the lease and require the tenant to pay the premium attributable to the location at College and Monroe as a separate charge in the form of a license to do business. However carved up and characterized, under the statute each charge would be taxable since both leases and licenses to use real property are taxable. Interpretations of Proposed Rule Amendments On April 14, 1994, Respondent conducted a workshop on the proposed rule amendments prior to the modification published June 10, 1994. Respondent's representatives were understandably reluctant to opine on questions of law without detailed facts. However, explaining the tax consequences of payments from a concessionaire to an airport, Assistant General Counsel Kielbasa stated: I think the notion that there is a separate privilege fee that an airport charges unrelated to the fact that the privilege is being granted to function at the airport, I don't think that's what's happening. I think it's a very simple case, and I think it's very clear. But there may be separate provisions in contracts or lease agreements which have nothing to do with operating at that location, and to that extent, I don't think it would be subject to tax at all under the statute, and that's what we're trying to get at. Respondent's Exhibit 1A, pages 33-34. A major element of the dispute between Respondent and Petitioners and Intervenors (collectively, Petitioners) concerned Respondent's choice to take the Quick and Havey and McKown approach over the Avis and Straughn/Townsend approach in taxing mixed payments for the use of real property and for business intangibles. Following the rule workshop, Respondent made some Avis and Straughn/Townsend changes to the proposed rules, but the changes did not preclude a Quick and Havey and McKown approach, as evidenced by the following statement in the Prehearing Stipulation: "The Department contends that where the amount paid for a privilege fee is so intertwined or meshed with a payment for a license or lease to use real property that it cannot be separated, the full amount is taxable." Airports and Concessions Governmental entities operate and typically own large commercial airports, such as those in Orlando, Miami, and Tampa. By law, these airport authorities are empowered to enter into contracts with third parties to supply persons using airports with goods and services, such as food and beverage, retail sales, and car rentals. In some cases, airport authorities may obtain services by management agreements, which are not subject to sales tax. In most cases, though, airport authorities obtain goods and services for airport visitors by leases and grants of concessions, franchises, or other privileges to do business. The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "concession" as "a franchise for the right to conduct a business, granted by a government body or authority." The Dictionary of Real Estate Appraisal defines "franchise" as "a privilege or right that is conferred by grant to an individual or group of individuals; usually an exclusive right to furnish public services or to sell a particular product in a certain community." By what are normally labelled "concession" or "franchise" agreements, airport authorities permit a concessionaire to operate a business with some nexus to the airport or at least its passengers, in return for which the concessionaire pays money to the airport authority. The nexus to the airport may take various forms. Some concessionaires sell food or drink or retail merchandise at exclusively assigned locations within the airport terminal. Hotel concessionaires operate hotels at fixed locations in the terminal. Some concessionaires, like taxi companies and nonairport hotels, pick up and drop off passengers at the airport terminal in areas designated for such purpose, but not reserved exclusively for any one concessionaire. An on-airport car rental concessionaire rents cars at the airport, using fixed counter space, parking areas, car service areas, and car pick-up and drop-off areas. A variation of the car rental concession is the off- airport car rental concessionaire, which has no fixed space at the airport except for customer pick-up and drop-off areas and usually counter space. In Florida, all off-airport rental car companies use their own vans to pick-up and drop-off customers. At some airports outside Florida, such as Sacramento, Dallas, and Minneapolis, the airport authorities operate their own vans to pick up and drop off customers of off-airport rental car companies. In such cases, the off-airport rental car companies do not directly use or occupy any of the real property of the airport. In general, the payments from the concessionaires to the airport authorities consist of two categories. First, there is a fixed payment, which the concession agreement typically characterizes as consideration for the use and occupancy of real property. The airport authority normally bases this rental payment on the fair market value of the space leased, as estimated by a licensed real estate appraiser, or under a cost-based formula. Second, there is a payment representing a percentage of the gross revenue of the concessionaire derived from airport business. The concession agreement typically characterizes this payment as consideration for the privilege to do business with airport passengers. Rents typically exceed $50 per square foot per year. Most, but not all concessionaires, make total payments of considerably more that $50 per square foot per year, often totalling hundreds and sometimes thousands of dollars. In entering into concession agreements, airport authorities pursue a variety of goals. They must produce high revenues because airport authorities do not operate on public subsidies, aside from the monopoly grant of the airport operation itself. But high returns from concessionaires are not the only goal. Airport authorities must serve airport visitors in order to maintain successful relations with the airlines. And airport visitors demand a mix of goods and services at acceptable prices and quality. In selecting concessionaires and pricing concession fees, airport authorities therefore balance maximizing revenues with serving visitors' needs. Airport authorities price concession fees based on the type of goods and services offered by the concessionaire. A bank at one major Florida airport pays six times the concession fees of a travel agency, which occupies space of equal size next to the bank. At the same airport, one theme-park retailer pays concession fees of more than three times what another theme-park retailer pays for the identical space. In the typical concession arrangement, the airport authority receives payments consisting of rent and "something else." The rent is attributable to the use and occupancy of real property. The "something else" is business income, which is attributable to an intangible business asset, such as a franchise, concession, or privilege to do business. Like any other lessor, airport authorities undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide their lessees with offices or retail space for their use and occupancy. Unlike other lessors, however, airport authorities also undertake, in their concession agreements, to provide nearly all of the concessionaire's customers through operating agreements with airlines. Through concession agreements, airport authorities allow concessionaires to share in the authority's most valuable asset, which is not the real property comprising the airport, but the exclusive, governmental franchise to operate the airport. In these regards, airport authorities are in very similar roles to the county in Lloyd Enterprises with the subjects of the government monopoly being in one case a beach and another an airport. Both governmental "owner/operators" provide customers for their respective concessionaires and predicate their agreements upon the ability of the contracting party to supply the needs of the customers in a manner that does not compromise the public asset--i.e., an airport or a beach. These elements are not typical of a lessor or licensor. To varying, lesser degrees, airport authorities also distinguish themselves from mere lessors through the marketing, management, working capital, and workforce that characterize the airport operation. Respondent's key witness identified four factors useful in determining whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. These four factors assist in the determination whether a payment is for the use or occupancy of real property. But the usefulness of the four factors is limited because they do not directly address the other possible component of a mixed payment, which is a payment for a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business. It is easy to determine that concessionaire payments typically comprise rent or some other payment for the use and occupancy of real property plus a payment for an intangible, such as the privilege to do business with airport users. Obviously, Respondent is not required to accept the parties' labelling or allocations of these payments. But it is difficult to determine how much of a mixed payment is for the use or occupancy of real property, which is taxable (ignoring, as always, the special treatment of certain airport license payments, as well as other exemptions), and how much is for a privilege to do business, which is nontaxable. The issue is whether a "reasonable allocation" is possible between the two components in a mixed payment. As ordered in Avis and suggested by the Straughn letter and Townsend memorandum, the allocation process should begin with finding a fair rental value. It is difficult to estimate the fair market rent for space in a large commercial airport. The universe of comparables is small due to the uniqueness of major airports. But the appraisal of airport real property is not impossible. Nonairport comparables normally exist that, with suitable adjustments, yield reasonable approximations of fair market rentals. A real estate appraisal helps determine how much of a concessionaire's payment should be characterized as rent. However, the allocation problem can be approached at the same time from the opposite end. In appraising business assets, an accountant or business appraiser estimates the value of the concession, franchise, or other privilege to do business with airport visitors. The business-income approach to the allocation problem is aided by analysis of the payments made by completely off- airport car rental concessionaires in Sacramento, Minneapolis, and Dallas. These payments provide a rough approximation of the value of this intangible, even though they probably require major adjustments to reflect, among other things, differing passenger counts and demographics, as well as the costs incurred by the airport authorities in providing transportation to the off- airport sites. Based on the foregoing, the record demonstrates that: a) the payments of a concessionaire to an airport authority ordinarily consist in part of rent or license payments and in part of payments for an intangible, such as a franchise, concession, or other privilege to do business and b) these payments may be allocated, with reasonable precision, between the real property and business components. The Proposed Rules Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 and (b) Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)1. is not materially changed by the proposed rule amendments. Consistent with the statute, this paragraph of the rule merely imposes the sales tax in taxable transactions on the person actually occupying, using, or entitled to use the real property and requires that such person pay its immediate landlord or grantor. The next subparagraph is new. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 contains two introductory sentences followed by three examples and a notice. The first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 fairly interprets the statute. The first sentence states that the sales tax is due on payments made to lessors or licensors when the payment is for the use of the real property and is based on the ownership or control of the real property by the lessor or licensor. By limiting the tax to those payments based on the payee's interest in the real property, the proposed rule ensures that the tax is imposed only on the portion of the payment attributable to the use or occupancy of real estate. The first sentence is unobjectionable. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 is no more controversial. This sentence provides that the "total payment for the use of real property" is taxable, even though the payment or part of the payment "may be identified" as payment for a privilege to do business. The use of "may be identified" in the "even though" clause refers to the label given such payments by the parties. The second sentence of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 merely provides that the taxable consequence of the transaction is not governed by the label given the payments by the parties. In other words, just because the parties use "concession fee," "privilege fee," "percentage fee," or "similar terms" does not necessarily make them payments for the privilege to do business. The second sentence assures that Respondent will not be deterred by mere labels from its lawful responsibility to characterize properly the nature of the payments, and make reasonable allocations when allocations are indicated. The three examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2 are neither illustrative nor useful. To the contrary, they are vague and misleading and appear to reveal a misunderstanding of the proper taxation of mixed payments consisting of rent and payments for a privilege to do business. The first example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.a. A clothing retailer occupies a location in a shopping mall. The retailer pays the mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales. The agreement characterizes the minimum rent as consideration for the lease of designated space and the percentage of sales as consideration for the privilege to do business in the mall. The failure to pay either amount is grounds for termination of the agreement. The proposed rule concludes: "The total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax, regardless of how the consideration, or a portion thereof, is characterized." In fact, both payments made by the retailer to the mall owner may constitute taxable payments for the use of real property. Supplying little useful information as to how to determine the true character of payments, the proposed example ignores all of the important factors necessary in making this determination. The proposed example overrides the characterization of the payments by the parties. As discussed above, the parties' labelling of a payment may be tax-motivated, but it may also reveal their true intent. However, the proposed example offers insufficient explanation why it ignores the label of "privilege to do business" at the mall. The only possible grounds for ignoring the label are that the retailer occupies a location inside a mall under which it pays minimum rent and percentage rent and a default in the payment of either amount is grounds for terminating the agreement. The first basis is only that the payments are mixed and, except under the most strained reading of Quick and Havey, cannot, without more, possibly be considered justification for taxing the total payments. The key factor in the first proposed example is thus the presence of a cross-default clause. Such a clause may play a role in distinguishing between payments for the use of real property and other types of payments. In certain cases, the total amount actually being paid for the use of the real property may include all payments that must be paid in order for the agreement to remain in good standing. This would likely be true of base rent and additional rent, consisting of a lessee's prorata share of insurance, taxes, maintenance, and utilities. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that a cross- default clause is of such importance as to confer upon it the status that it is given in the rule example. Nothing in the record supports the assertion that all cross-defaulted payments are therefore payments for the use or occupancy of real property. For instance, Respondent concedes that a lessee/payor might be obligated under a lease to make taxable payments of rent and nontaxable payments of promotional fees, such as for the use of logos or other intangibles. It is conceivable that a prudent (and powerful) lessor/payee might provide in the agreement, even if called a "lease agreement," that a default in either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. Even so, the mere existence of such a cross-default clause does not, without more, transform the promotional fee into rent. The proper characterization of the two payments under the first proposed example requires consideration of, among other things, the four factors identified by Respondent's key witness: the relationship of the parties to the real property, the use to be made of the real property, the rights granted the parties under the agreement, and the basis for the payment or charge for the real property. The proper characterization requires consideration, in some fashion, of the elements that distinguish a real property asset from a business asset, such as any contributions by the mall owner in the form of operating agreements, other leases, marketing, management, working capital, and workforce, as well as the method by which the mall owner decides with whom it will enter into agreements and the total payments that it will require. The second example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.b. A push cart vendor pays a mall owner minimum rent plus a percentage of gross sales for the right to sell merchandise at various locations within the common area of the mall. The mall owner may terminate the agreement if the vendor fails to make either payment. The example concludes that both payments are taxable "because the statute defines a taxable license as the granting of a privilege to use real property for any purpose, including the privilege to use real property to do business." The only difference in the first two examples is that the second involves a license and the first involves a lease. Like the example of the mall retailer, the example of the push cart vendor elevates the cross-default provision to outcome-determinative status. Again, the record does not support such reliance upon this factor for the above-discussed reasons. The third example is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2.c. A car rental company pays an airport authority for designated office and counter space in the terminal. The agreement identifies a payment as rent for the use of real property. The agreement also identifies a payment, representing a percentage of gross sales, as a privilege fee for the right to engage in business at the airport. Failure to make either payment is grounds for terminating the agreement. The example concludes that the "total amount required under the agreement is subject to tax." As with the preceding examples, the example of the airport car rental company relies upon a cross-default clause to characterize all payments as for the use of real property. Again, for the reasons stated above, the record does not support such reliance upon this single factor. The three examples make no "reasonable allocation" between the real property and business components of what are probably mixed payments. Best revealed by the last sentence of the second example, the examples illegitimately transform business payments into real property payments simply because the business payor uses or occupies real property to conduct its business. In reality, the three examples seek to find their way back to the haven of Quick and Havey by equating cross-default clauses with inextricable intertwining and enmeshment. It is only conjecture whether a court would today so readily abandon an attempt to allocate between real property and business income. In any event, the present record demonstrates that "reasonable allocations" are achievable and require consideration of much more than cross- default clauses. Respondent's defense of the examples is inadequate. Respondent argues that the examples are modified by the language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. As previously stated, the two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2 represent a fair restatement of the statutory taxing criteria. But the role of the two examples is to illustrate the application of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, not provide a circular restatement of the rule and, thus, the statute. Given their language, the proposed examples stand alone and cannot be saved by the implicit incorporation of the first two sentences of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. Standing alone, the illustrations are erroneous in their reliance on cross-default clauses, misleading in their omission of material factors required for any reasonable allocation, and misguided in their implicit bias against making allocations between payments for real property and business components. Respondent claims that the examples create presumptions that a taxpayer may rebut. This claim is dubious on two counts. First, Respondent's key witnesses disagreed on whether the presumptions created by the examples were indeed rebuttable. One witness testified clearly that, if a nonexempt transaction fit one of the examples, then the transaction was taxable. Nothing in the examples suggests that these presumptions are rebuttable. But the examples do not work even if they establish only rebuttable presumptions. The cross-default provision cannot bear the burden even of creating a rebuttable presumption. A cross-default provision is simply not that important to the proper characterization of the payments, especially in light of far more important factors. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d warns taxpayers that all past declarations, including technical assistance advisements, that "advised that fees . . . identified as privilege fees to engage in business were exempt, and . . . are inconsistent with this rule" are rescinded. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)d concludes: "Therefore, such privilege fees are taxable payments for a lease of license to use real property for business purposes." Respondent's key witness could not identify with certainty the past declarations rescinded by Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)d or the past declarations left unaffected. This leave the proposed rule unnecessarily vague, at least as to airport authorities. There are a limited number of airport authorities and concessionaires that could be relying on past declarations and, if there are any besides those uncovered in this proceeding, they should be easily found. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) identifies as a taxable license to use real property the "full consideration paid for the license to use airport real property for the purpose of picking- up or dropping-off passengers and baggage from airport sidewalks, landings, and other facilities" by any provider of ground transportation services, regardless whether the provider "enters the airport terminal building while . . . providing such service." The full payment for the real property component is taxable, and Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) accurately interprets the statutes. However, Respondent again encounters problems in the three examples that follow Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b). In Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b)1, a hotel pays a fee to an airport authority for the privilege of coming onto airport property to pick up and drop off hotel guests at the terminal. The example states that the payment is taxable because it is for a license to use airport real property. The second and third examples are identical except they involve a taxicab and limousine company and an off-site car rental company. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) states the obvious-- i.e., that whatever the payor pays for the right to use or occupy real property is subject to sales tax. Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) does not require the characterization of all payments between such parties as taxable payments for the use or occupancy of real property. The problem with the proposed examples is that they depart from the real-property language of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(b) and use the business language of a privilege to do business. The first example baldly provides that a fee paid by a hotel to an airport for the "privilege" to enter airport property and pick up and drop off hotel guests is a license to use airport property and is taxable. There is no mention of allocation or of the factors that would go into a reasonable allocation. The fee is taxable. The language and paucity of reasoning are practically identical for the second and third examples. Respondent argues that Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) must be read in connection with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, which restates the statutory language. This argument fails for two reasons. Like the examples under Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2, Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) does not incorporate by reference the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(a)2. Respondent's argument of implicit incorporation is even weaker here because Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(4)(b) is not even a subparagraph of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(4)(a)2. The first set of proposed examples at least mentions a cross-default clause, which could have some bearing on the proper characterization of the payments, even though the omission of far more important factors invalidates the first set of examples. The second set of proposed examples fails even to mention a single factor. If the hotel, taxi cab company, or rental car company pays for the privilege of entering airport property to do business, the entire payment is taxable. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b provides that property "used by an airline exclusively for loading or unloading passengers onto or from an aircraft is exempt." The proposed rule identifies examples of such property as common terminal walkways used by passengers for boarding or exiting planes, ticket counters, baggage claim areas, ramp and apron areas, and departure lounges (but distinguished from VIP lounges or clubs that require a membership not determined by ticket status). Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c adds that "[r]eal property used by an airline for purposes of loading or unloading passengers or property . . . which is exempt from tax includes ... office areas used to process tickets, baggage processing areas, operations areas used for the purpose of the operational control of an airline's aircraft, and air cargo areas." Petitioners object to the use of "exclusively" in subparagraph b. The statute provides an exemption for property used exclusively for aircraft landing or taxiing or property used by an airline for loading or unloading persons or property or for fueling. Clearly, due to the repetition of "property used" in the second clause, the modifier "exclusively" applies only to the first clause, which is consistent with the doctrine of the nearest antecedent argued in Petitioner's proposed final order. It is unclear how Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.b and c work together because they seem to define the same exempt property under different subparagraphs. Both subparagraphs apply to real property, and both seem to describe the same examples of real property, using different words. The subparagraphs under subparagraph b present reasonable rules for determining what is real property based on ownership of the underlying land, with a special rule when the airport authority leases, but does not own, the land on which the airport is situated. The subparagraphs under subparagraph c identify a prorating process, which applies when the property is used for both exempt and nonexempt purposes. It is unclear how property could be used for exempt and nonexempt purposes under the requirement of "exclusive" use in subparagraph b, although such mixed uses is contemplated by subparagraph c. The requirement contained in the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b that the property be used exclusively for loading or unloading passengers conflicts with the language of Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, as well as the language of Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.a; neither of the latter two provisions predicates the exemption upon exclusivity of use. More importantly, the first sentence of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b conflicts with the relevant statutes. However, the remainder of Proposed Rule 12A- 1.070(1)(a)6.b, including subparagraphs (I) and (II), is a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutes, as is Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(a)6.c, including subparagraphs (I) and (II). Petitioners argue that Respondent intends to tax nonairline concessionaires for their use of property used for loading or unloading persons or property. This argument is unclear, perhaps because the unobjectionable proposed rules do not require such an application. Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 Proposed Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)3 defines "retail concessionaire" as either a lessee or licensee that makes sales directly to the public within an airport. The words "retail concessionaire" are not used elsewhere in the rule or proposed rules at issue except in Rule 12A-1.070(1)(b)1 and 2, which addresses "a person providing retail concessionaire services" involving the sale of food or drink or other tangible personal property in an airport. Subparagraph 1 imposes tax on rent paid by such persons, and subparagraph 2 exempts from tax any license payments made by such persons. Petitioners' arguments against the definitional proposed rule are misplaced. The definition covers lessees and licensees, but does not impose any tax. In conjunction with subparagraphs 1 and 2, the proposed definition of "retail concessionaire" says, in effect, that all lessees and licensees selling food and drink or other personal property are subject to tax on payments for the rental of associated real property, but are not subject to tax on payments for the licensing of associated real property. The subparagraphs that carry tax consequences honor the legislative directives as to taxability.
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted a license for a private airport some four miles east of Dundee, Florida.
Findings Of Fact Frank J. Drewniany, Petitioner, is the owner of 153 acres of undeveloped land some 4 miles east of Dundee, Florida, which he proposes to develop and on which he proposes to operate a private airport. On October 28, 1988, Petitioner applied for a site permit and license for a private airport (Exhibit 1). The application provided the information required by statute and the rules of the Department of Transportation (DOT), Respondent. This information included evidence of Applicant's right to so use the property, a list of airports within 15 miles of the proposed facility, mailing addresses of all landowners within 1000 feet of the proposed facility, FAA airspace approval and the prescribed fees. The proposed site was inspected by John Roeller, the Florida DOT airport program administrator in the district office having jurisdiction over the area. This inspection revealed the site to be adequate for the proposed airport; the airport, if constructed, would conform to minimum standards of safety; the local zoning was appropriate for the airport; the Applicant had provided a list of all airports and municipalities within 15 miles of the proposed airport and all property owners within 1000 feet of the proposed airport; and that safe air traffic patterns can be worked out for the proposed airport. Following this inspection Roeller, on October 31, 1988, executed the prescribed certification that the site is feasible for the proposed use and can meet the requirements set forth in Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code (Exhibit 5). By letter dated August 22, 1988, the Federal Aviation Administration (Exhibit 6) determined the proposed airport would not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace by aircraft if operations are conducted in VFR weather conditions and the landing area is limited to private use. By Notice of Intent to issue site approval dated March 22, 1989 (Exhibit 7), the DOT published the intent to issue the requested permit and advised protestors would be allowed to air their views at a public meeting on May 10, 1989. Following this public meeting, Site Approval Order 89-13 (Exhibit 8) was issued, a hearing was requested to contest the issuance of the requested license and these proceedings followed. Intervenors presented evidence of a general concern for the safety of residents living in the vicinity of the airport and hearsay evidence regarding crashes of private planes in various areas of the United States. No evidence was presented by Intervenors to rebut the evidence that the Applicant had complied with the requirements for site approval and licensure contained in Chapter 14-60, Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered granting Frank J. Drewniany a license to operate a private airport at Latitude 28 -00'-40" North and Longitude 81 -31'40" West, subject to restrictions established by the FAA and DOT to insure safe air patterns are established for the proposed private airport. ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger W. Sims, Esquire Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802 Thomas J. Patka, Esquire Post Office Box 1288 Tampa, Florida 33601 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas J. Hirt 1 Cypress Run Sun Air Country Club Haines City, Florida 33844 Ben G. Watts Interim Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Under the standards established by Section 330.30, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14-60.05, Florida Administrative Code, the issues presented for resolution are: Whether the site is adequate for the proposed private seaplane base. Whether the proposed seaplane base will conform to minimum standards of safety. Whether safe air traffic patterns can be worked out for the proposed airport and for all existing airports and approved sites in the vicinity.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the exhibits admitted in evidence at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. On August 24, 1983, Mr. Ruzakowski of 159 San Remo Drive, Venetian Shores Subdivision, Islamorada, Florida, filed an application with attachments with the Department for a private seaplane base license. The application of the proposed private seaplane base to be known as Plantation Key seaplane base proposes that landing and taking off would be in the open water area known as Florida Bay or Cotton Key Basin and that the seaplane would be parked on a ramp at the applicant's home. In order to reach the applicant's waterfront home, the application proposes a taxi route along Snake Creek which connects Florida Bay to the applicant's home. The application had attached to it a letter of zoning approval from the Building and Zoning Department of Monroe County signed by Mr. Joseph E. Bizjak, Assistant Building Official, which letter stated that the ramp on the applicant's property ". . . has never been and is not now in violation of any Monroe County zoning codes." The Department of Transportation has never been notified by the Monroe County Zoning and Building Department of any withdrawal of this zoning approval. Also attached to the application was a letter from Robert Billingsley supervisor of the program development section of the Federal Aviation Administration which stated that the FAA airspace approval for applicant's seaplane was still current and in effect. Mr. Ruzakowski's 1976 application for a seaplane base proposed using Snake Creek as a take-off and landing area. The instant application only proposes to use Snake Creek as a taxi area to and from Mr. Ruzakowski's residence (where he proposes to park the airplane) and the take-off and landing area in Florida Bay. The distance from Mr. Ruzakowski's residence to the take- off and landing area is approximately one mile. Upon receipt by DOT of Mr. Ruzakowski's 1983 application, an on-site feasibility inspection of the site was made by Mr. Steve Gordon of the DOT's Sixth District in Miami, Florida. Mr. Gordon, a District Aviation Engineer, has extensive experience as an airplane pilot and as an airport site inspector. Mr. Gordon conducted an adequate on-site inspection and concluded that the proposed seaplane base appeared to be in compliance with the applicable statutory and rule provisions. Specifically, Mr. Gordon concluded that the take-off and landing operations would be away from the area of the homes in the development, that the ramp on Mr. Ruzakowski's property was adequate for safe approach upon his lot, that his lot was a safe place to park his seaplane, that Snake Creek was wide enough for taxiing the airplane, that the take-off and landing area contained no obstructions or hazards, and that there was no hazard to other airports in the area. Following the inspection, Mr. Gordon wrote to Mr. Ruzakowski and to the DOT officials and advised them that the proposed site was feasible for a private seaplane base under the applicable licensing requirements. Thereafter, the DOT sent notice to approximately 200 addressees advising them of the proposed private seaplane base application, the inspection results, the DOT's intent to issue site approval and advising of a public meeting on the matter. The notice was also published in The Florida Keys Keynoter newspaper on October 13, 1983. Among the addressees notified by mail were adjacent property owners, the Monroe County Building and Zoning Department, the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners, and the FAA. The Marine Patrol and the Coast Guard were also notified of the public hearing. Neither the Monroe County Board of County Commissioners nor the Monroe County Building and Zoning Department sent a representative to attend the public hearing. Following the public hearing and consideration of all of the objections stated at the public hearing, Mr. Gordon recommended that site approval be granted for the proposed seaplane base. There are other licensed seaplane bases in Florida in which the take- off and landing areas are in open water such as bays and in which seaplanes using the base taxi to and from the parking area in channels used by boats. The airplane owned by Mr. Ruzakowski which he proposes to use at the subject seaplane base is a modified Republic Seabee. The modifications include modifications which make the airplane more maneuverable, quieter, and dependable. When taxiing on the water the pilot of the Seabee has excellent visibility of everything from very close to the airplane to infinity. The airplane is very maneuverable on the water, due in part to the fact that it has both water and air rudders. The airplane can be stopped very quickly on the water because the direction of the propeller thrust can be reversed. The propeller reversal also makes it possible for the airplane to back up while on the water. The airplane can taxi on the water as slowly as 5 miles per hour. Once it reaches the take-off area, the actual take-off run lasts only about 18 or 20 seconds. The airplane is approximately 40 feet wide from wingtip to wingtip. The tip of the airplane propeller is at least four feet above the water. As a result of the excellent visibility from the airplane and the high degree of maneuverability of the airplane, it is easy for the pilot of the airplane to observe and avoid any boats or other objects in the vicinity of the airplane. While operating on the water the airplane is subject to the same navigation rules which apply to boats and ships. The applicant, Mr. Ruzakowski is a 73 year old retired airline pilot. He has between 20,000 and 22,000 hours of flying experience, approximately 75 percent of which was as pilot in command. He has flown a large number of different types of airplanes, including land based airplanes, seaplanes, and amphibians. He has had extensive experience in both single- engine and multi- engine aircraft. In 54 years of flying he has never had an accident. Safety is the main factor in all of his flying. Mr. Ruzakowski is an FAA consultant engineer and does all of the maintenance and repairs on his own airplane. He has invented an improved control system for the Republic Seabee aircraft and has received FAA approval for his invention to he installed on other Republic Seabees. Mr. Ruzakowski appears to be in excellent physical and mental condition; at the hearing he appeared to be strong, agile, and alert. These appearances are confirmed by the fact that he currently holds a valid FAA pilot's license and medical certificate. He has never been denied an FAA medical certificate. His vision is excellent and is perhaps getting better because several years ago his FAA medical certificate required him to keep reading glasses in the aircraft, but his current medical certificate contains no such restriction. Snake Creek is used by a variety of large and small commercial and pleasure boats. The volume of boat traffic varies from day to day and also by time of day. At times there are also swimmers and divers in Snake Creek and in the designated take-off and landing area. However, none of the boat traffic is incompatible with the operation of the applicant's airplane because the visibility from the airplane and the maneuverability of the airplane are such that the pilot of the airplane has as much or more ability to avoid or prevent a collision as does the operator of any of the boats and ships using the waterway.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing it is recommended that the Department of Transportation issue a Final Order approving the issuance of Site Approval Order No. 83-34. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of May, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe Miklas Esquire Post Office Box 366 Islamorada, Florida 33036 James Baccus, Esquire Post Office Box 38-1086 Little River Station Miami, Florida 33138 Judy Rice, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Honorable Paul A. Pappas, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064
The Issue The issue is whether the Department of Transportation (the "Department") properly issued an Airport Site Approval Order to Monroe Airport, a private airport in Putnam County, in accordance with section 330.30, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-60.005.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the agency of the State of Florida granted authority to issue Airport Site Approval Orders, license public airports, and register private airports. § 330.30, Fla. Stat. A "public airport" is an airport, publicly or privately owned, that is open for use by the public. A "private airport" is an airport, publicly or privately owned, that is not open for use by the public but may be made available to others by invitation of the owner or manager. § 330.27(5)&(6), Fla. Stat. With some exceptions not relevant to this case, the owner or lessee of any proposed airport must obtain site approval from the Department "prior to site acquisition or construction or establishment of the proposed airport." § 330.30(1), Fla. Stat. Section 330.30(1) provides that applications for approval of a site "shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the department." The statute requires the Department to grant the site approval if it is satisfied: that the site has adequate area for the proposed airport; that the proposed airport will conform to licensing or registration requirements and will comply with local land development regulations or zoning requirements; that all affected airports, local governments, and property owners have been notified and any comments submitted by them have been given adequate consideration; and that safe air-traffic patterns can be established for the proposed airport with all existing airports and approved airport sites in its vicinity. § 330.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Michael Monroe is the owner of property in Crescent City on which he proposes to place a private airport. Mr. Monroe has in fact constructed an airstrip on the property. In constructing his airstrip in 2008, Mr. Monroe caused the dredging and filling of jurisdictional wetlands without a permit. An enforcement action by the Department of Environmental Protection led to a consent order dated October 28, 2009. The consent order required payment of a civil penalty and required Mr. Monroe to undertake various actions in mitigation of his unpermitted wetlands activities. The Department's Aviation Office sent a cease and desist letter to Mr. Monroe, dated April 27, 2010, and signed by Micki Liddell, then the Department's Private Airport Registration Manager. The letter stated as follows, in relevant part: This letter is follow-up to our telephone conversation of this date regarding a citizen complaint received by the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) April 27, 2010, concerning allegations of flight operations to and from your property. The law (section 330.30, F.S.) states that the owner or lessee of any proposed airport shall obtain approval of the airport site by the Department and subsequently shall have either a public airport license or private airport registration "prior to the operation of aircraft to or from the facility." Our records show that neither an Airport Site Approval Order nor airport license or private airport registration have been issued by the Department for your residence. Flight operations to and from your residence would confirm that your residence is being used as an "airport" and being unauthorized by the Department would constitute a violation of Florida law and could put a site approval request in jeopardy. In that regard, the Department hereby advises you to cease all flight operations to and from your residence until such time as you have followed the appropriate procedures to obtain airspace approval from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), local zoning approval, airport site approval and private airport registration from the Department, provided your site meets the criteria of chapter 330, Florida Statutes. At the final hearing, Mr. Monroe testified that he had flown planes in and out of his property on four occasions prior to the issuance of the cease and desist letter. He stated that he has only flown a plane out of his property on one occasion since receiving the cease and desist letter, and that he had received verbal approval from the Department for the flight. On July 30, 2010, Mr. Monroe received airspace approval from the FAA for a private use landing area, with the following provisos: a) all operations will be conducted in VFR weather conditions; b) the landing area will be limited to private use; and c) an operational letter of agreement ("LOA") will be entered between Mr. Monroe, and the owners of nearby airfields Eagle's Nest Aerodrome, Mount Royal Airport, Jim Finlay Airport, and Thunderbird Airpark, to provide for compatible traffic pattern operations, considering common radio frequencies, traffic pattern altitudes, and other items as appropriate. The FAA also recommended certain approach slope ratios and centerline separation from roads and other objects. On November 15, 2010, the FAA issued an amended determination providing a fourth condition to its approval: that all arrivals, departures and traffic pattern operations remain clear of a nearby military restricted area. In August 2010, Mr. Monroe applied to the Putnam County Zoning Board of Adjustment for a special use permit ("SUP") to allow a private airport on his property, which was zoned Agricultural. At its public meeting on October 20, 2010, the Zoning Board unanimously denied the SUP after hearing Petitioner and a representative of the U.S. Navy speak in opposition. The Navy had initially contended that the airport would be located within the restricted airspace of the Lake George bombing range. Further review confirmed that the airport was outside that particular restricted airspace, but the Navy continued to assert that the airport was within the generally restricted airspace of its military operating area. After clarifying that the airport property was not in restricted airspace, Mr. Monroe reapplied for the SUP in September 2011. By Final Order dated November 16, 2011, the Zoning Board issued SUP-11-009 to Mr. Monroe and his wife, finding that the Putnam County Land Development Code allowed for a private aircraft landing facility by SUP in an Agricultural zoning district and that the proposed special use "will not adversely affect the general public health, safety and welfare of the residents of Putnam County." Appended to the Final Order were minutes of the public hearings, schematics of Mr. Monroe's property, and a Department of Environmental Protection closure request form stating that the conditions of the October 28, 2009, consent order had been satisfactorily completed. On January 27, 2012, Mr. Monroe submitted a site approval application to the Department, using the interactive internet-based system established under rule 14-60.005(3)(b). Rule 14-60.005(4) sets forth the following as conditions for site approval: The Department shall grant site approval for a proposed airport that complies with all the requirements of section 330.30, Florida Statutes, subject to any reasonable conditions necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare. Such conditions shall include operations limited to VFR flight conditions,[2/] restricted approach or takeoff direction from only one end of a runway, specified air-traffic pattern layouts to help prevent mid-air collision conflict with aircraft flying at another nearby airport, airport noise abatement procedures in order to satisfy community standards, or other environmental compatibility measures. Rule 14-60.005(5)(a)-(m) sets forth the supporting documentation that an applicant for a public airport site approval must submit to allow the Department to make its site approval determination and "to ensure the applicant's satisfaction of conditions" set forth in subsection (4) above. The supporting documentation is as follows: Property Rights. Provide a copy of written legal confirmation of ownership, option to buy, or lease agreement for the real property that comprises the site on which the proposed airport would be located. Although adequate safety areas surrounding an airport site are important and a factor in the Department’s approval determination, the applicant is not required to hold property rights over those real property areas that would constitute runway approach surfaces. Facility Diagram. Provide a scale drawing showing the size and dimensions of the proposed facility; property rights of way and easements; lighting, power, and telephone poles; location of building(s) on property and surrounding areas; and direction, distance, and height of all structures over 25 feet within 1,000 feet of the site perimeter. Geodetic Position. Provide a copy of a U.S. Geological Survey quadrangle map or equivalent with the proposed site plotted to the nearest second of latitude and longitude. Location Map. Provide a copy of a map or sketch, at least 8.5 x 11 inches in size, showing the location of the proposed site, with respect to recognizable landmarks and access roads to the site clearly marked. Aviation Facilities. Provide a list of names and mailing addresses for adjacent airports, including a sample copy of the letter submitted as proposal notification to these airports, and attach a copy of all airport reply correspondence. For a proposed airport or seaplane landing facility, list all VFR airports and heliports within five nautical miles and all IFR airports within 20 nautical miles. For a proposed heliport, list all VFR airports and heliports within three nautical miles and all IFR airports within 10 nautical miles. Local Government. Provide a copy of each of the letters of notification, showing the recipient's name and mailing address, that have been submitted to each zoning authority having jurisdiction, for the municipality and county in which the site lies or which is located within five nautical miles of the proposed airport site. The applicant shall also include a copy of all related correspondence from each city or county authority, including a statement that the proposed airport site is in compliance with local zoning requirements or that such requirements are not applicable. Adjacent Property. Provide a list of the names and mailing addresses of all real property owners within 1,000 feet of the airport site perimeter, or within 300 feet of the heliport or helistop site perimeter, including a single copy of the letter of notification submitted as notification to these adjacent real property owners, and include a copy of all real property owner correspondence in reply. If notification was provided by a local government as part of its review and approval process for the airport, provide written confirmation of the fact, in lieu of the above required submittal by the applicant. Public Notice. Provide a copy of the notice and of the letter, showing the recipient's name and mailing address, requesting publication of notification of the proposed airport site in a newspaper of general circulation in the county in which the proposed airport site is located and counties within five nautical miles of the proposed airport site. If this condition has been accomplished by a local government as part of its review and approval process for the airport, provide written confirmation of the fact, in lieu of the above required submittal by the applicant. Waste Sites. Provide written confirmation that the runway(s) on the proposed airport would not be located within 5,000 feet of any solid waste management facility for a proposed airport serving only non-turbine aircraft, or within 10,000 feet of any solid waste management facility for a proposed airport serving turbine-driven aircraft. Air Traffic Pattern. Provide written confirmation, including a graphical depiction, demonstrating that safe air traffic patterns can be established for the proposed airport with all existing and approved airport sites within three miles of the proposed airport site. Provide a copy of written memorandum(s) of understanding or letter(s) of agreement, signed by each respective party, regarding air traffic pattern separation procedures between the parties representing the proposed airport and any existing airport(s) or approved airport site(s) located within three miles of the proposed site. Safety Factors. Provide written confirmation that the runway and taxiway design criteria and airport design layout of the proposed airport have appropriately taken into account consideration of the manufacturer's performance characteristics for the type(s) of aircraft planned to be operated; the frequency and type(s) of flight operations to be anticipated; planned aviation-related or non-aviation activities on the airport; and any other safety considerations, as necessary, to help ensure the general public health, safety, and welfare of persons located on or near the airport. Security Factors. Provide written confirmation that the proposed airport site owner or lessee will take appropriate steps to help protect the general public health, safety, and welfare through secure airport operations and that they will develop and implement adequate airport security measures to safeguard airport and aviation-related assets from misappropriation or misuse in order to prevent potential loss or public endangerment. FAA Approval. Provide a copy of the notification to the FAA regarding the proposed airport site and a copy of the FAA's airspace approval correspondence given in response. Rule 14-60.005(6) provides that an applicant for private airport site approval is subject to the same requirements as stated for a public airport site approval applicant. However, private airport applicants are not required to submit a hard copy, written site approval application nor the supporting documentation set forth in the preceding paragraph. Private airport site approval applicants are required to "retain for their records all of the required documentation related to the site approval application, in order to be able to respond to any possible future local, state, or federal inquiry." The private airport site approval applicant submits his application through a Department website. Once the applicant obtains a user ID and password to the site, he proceeds to an interactive site approval screen that requires him to provide the following data: type of facility (airport, heliport, or ultralight); personal information (name, address, phone number, fax number, and email address); facility data (facility name, physical location, geographical information -- latitude, longitude, and elevation -- and primary type of facility use); and landing area data (runway/helipad magnetic bearing, length, width, and type of surface -- paved/unpaved). The applicant is also required to certify that he has completed all the conditions set forth in rule 14-60.005(5)(a)- (m). The applicant must check a certification box next to each and every requirement of the rule. For example, as to the requirement of rule 14-60.005(5)(c), the applicant checks a box next to the following statement: Geodetic Position -- I certify that I have a copy of a U.S. Geological Survey quadrangle map or equivalent with the proposed site plotted to the nearest second of latitude and longitude. In other words, as a private airport applicant, Mr. Monroe was not required under the rule to submit the supporting documentation demonstrating his satisfaction of the conditions set forth in rule 14-60.005(5), but he was required to certify that at the time of his application he possessed all such documentation and was capable of submitting it in response to a governmental inquiry. On March 1, 2012, the Department issued an Airport Site Approval Order to Mr. Monroe, to be effective April 15, 2012. On April 6, 2012, Petitioner timely filed a challenge to the site approval order. Petitioner is the owner of property directly abutting the southeast corner of Mr. Monroe's property. Petitioner raises goats on her property, and contends that low- flying planes frighten her animals, causing them to stampede and injure themselves. Petitioner's challenge has stayed the effective date of the site approval order. David Roberts, the Department's aviation operations administrator, testified that in preparation for this proceeding he asked Mr. Monroe to produce all the documentation which he had certified to meet the requirements of rule 14-60.005(5)(a)- (m). The Department introduced into evidence all of the documents that Mr. Monroe provided in response to Mr. Roberts' request. As to rule 14-60.005(5)(a), Mr. Monroe provided copies of his deed for and mortgage on the Crescent City property sufficient to establish his property rights to the site on which the proposed airport is to be located. As to rule 14-60.005(5)(b), Mr. Monroe provided a hand drawing of the property indicating the configuration of the airstrip and showing the general locations of the entrance gate, barn, pond, bridge, and trailer on the property. The map is not drawn to scale and does not show property rights of way and easements or lighting, power and telephone poles. The map does not indicate the "direction, distance, and height of all structures over 25 feet within 1,000 feet of the site perimeter," but Mr. Monroe's testimony that there are no such structures is credited. As to rule 14-60.005(5)(c), Mr. Monroe provided a personally commissioned survey map of the property that the Department accepted as the "equivalent" of a U.S. Geological Survey quadrangle map. As to rule 14-60.005(5)(d), Mr. Monroe provided a map, but not one that showed "recognizable landmarks and access roads." As to rule 14-60.005(5)(e), Mr. Monroe submitted a list of five airports that met the notification requirement: Eagle's Nest Aerodrome, Mount Royal Airport, Jim Finlay Airport, Thunderbird Airpark, and Palatka Municipal Airport, also known as Kay Larkin Field. Mr. Monroe also included a sample copy of the letter providing proposal notification to these airports. The only direct reply correspondence that Mr. Monroe submitted was an emailed letter of congratulations from the manager of Palatka Municipal Airport, dated May 15, 2012. Mr. Monroe also submitted a June 10, 2012, email from Jim Manus of Royal Park Airport in support of Mr. Monroe's intent to align his common traffic advisory frequency ("CTAF") with that of Mount Royal and Eagle's Nest. The tone of Mr. Manus' correspondence indicates approval of Mr. Monroe's airport. No response was provided from Jim Finlay, Thunderbird, or Eagle's Nest.3/ As to rule 14-60.005(5)(f), Mr. Monroe provided copies of his letters of notification to the Marion County director of growth management and the Volusia County growth and resource management office. Volusia County responded by stating that it took no issue with the proposed airport and that the FAA had informed the county that it needed to take no action on the matter. Mr. Monroe provided no response from Marion County. As to the notice requirements of rule 14- 60.005(5)(g)&(h), Mr. Monroe provided a list of names and addresses of nearby property owners along with a letter of notification dated August 30, 2004, stating Mr. Monroe's intention to establish an airstrip on his property. He included no reply correspondence. Petitioner rightly argues that an eight-year-old letter cannot be held to meet the notice requirement of the rule. Though the rule does not state a temporal limitation as to the notice, the context of the notice requirement clearly requires the applicant to provide his neighbors with notice of the pending site approval. However, Mr. Monroe also provided the receipt from a newspaper notice that he ran in 2010 regarding his SUP application and he credibly testified that the county notified his neighbors prior to issuance of the SUP. Thus, the requirements of rule 14- 60.005(5)(g)&(h) were met. As to rule 14-60.005(5)(i), Mr. Monroe submitted documentation that demonstrated there are no active solid waste management facilities within the prescribed distances. As to rule 14-60.005(5)(j), Mr. Monroe provided a graphical depiction of the traffic pattern and approaches to his own proposed airport. The depiction also lists radio frequencies for Mr. Monroe's airport, Mount Royal, and Eagle's Nest. Mr. Monroe did not submit any documentation to demonstrate that safe traffic patterns can be established for the proposed airport with all existing airport sites within three miles of the proposed airport. Mr. Monroe also did not submit written memoranda of understanding or letters of agreement with the other airports as regards air traffic pattern separation procedures. As to rule 14-60.005(5)(k)&(l), Mr. Monroe submitted an opinion letter from aviation consultant Robert E. Babis, dated April 19, 2012, addressing safety and security factors at the proposed airport. Mr. Babis stated that he was a retired Department public transportation manager, a flight instructor, airport inspector, and aviation planner. Mr. Babis further stated that he has inspected and landed at over 200 private airports in Florida. Mr. Babis concluded that Mr. Monroe's airport "is a safe and secure facility with a very low risk for operational accidents or illegal activities." The Department reasonably accepted this letter as satisfying the criteria of rule 14-60.005(5)(k)&(l). As to rule 14-60.005(5)(m), Mr. Monroe submitted a copy of his amended FAA approval determination, dated November 15, 2010. Petitioner noted that Mr. Monroe has yet to fulfill one of the conditions of the FAA determination: he has yet to produce an operational LOA with the owners of Eagle's Nest, Mount Royal, Jim Finlay, and Thunderbird to provide for compatible traffic pattern operations, common radio frequencies, traffic pattern altitudes, and other items as appropriate. In summary, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that, despite his certification otherwise, Mr. Monroe did not possess all the documentation required by rule 14-60.005(5)(a)-(m). Mr. Monroe did not meet the requirement of paragraph (b) that he provide a scale drawing showing property rights of way or easements, lighting, power and telephone poles. He did not meet the requirement of paragraph (d) that his map show recognizable landmarks and access roads. Most importantly, Mr. Monroe did not meet the requirement of paragraph (j) that he submit documentation demonstrating that safe traffic patterns can be established for the proposed airport with all existing airports within three miles. This failure, coupled with Mr. Monroe's failure to fulfill his commitment to the FAA that he would enter an LOA with the owners of four nearby airports, not to mention Mr. Monroe's history of building his airstrip and flying in and out of his property before obtaining legal permission to do so, indicates a casual approach to regulatory compliance that should give the Department pause in granting site approval. At the final hearing, Mr. Roberts of the Department testified that because a private applicant such as Mr. Monroe is not required to submit his supporting documentation to the Department to demonstrate compliance with rule 14-60.005(5)(a)- (m), the Department may not deny the site approval to Mr. Monroe once he has certified that he has all the documentation. Mr. Roberts testified that the Department's only recourse upon learning that Mr. Monroe in fact does not have the documentation would be to revoke the site approval order. The Department's rule sets forth the criteria for revocation of a site approval order. One of the grounds for revocation is a Department determination that "aircraft have operated on the site prior to airport licensing or registration, except as required for an in-flight emergency." Fla. Admin. Code R. 14-60.005(8)(b)3. By his own admission, Mr. Monroe flew into and out of his property prior to registration.4/ However, Mr. Roberts testified that the Department could not base a revocation action on those flights because they occurred prior to the date on which Mr. Monroe applied for site approval. Mr. Roberts could cite to no language in the rule that supported his restrictive view of the revocation provision. The Department does not persist in supporting Mr. Roberts' reasoning in its Proposed Recommended Order. The Department concedes that Mr. Monroe has failed to meet all the documentation criteria set forth in the rule and that it has the authority to deny the site approval order. The Department does not concede that the maps submitted in response to paragraphs (b) and (d) of rule 14-60.005(5) are deficient, but it does concede that Mr. Monroe failed to comply with paragraph (j) regarding the LOA setting forth jointly agreed-upon departure and arrival routes and common radio frequencies with the other nearby airports. The Department argues that Mr. Monroe should nonetheless be granted a Site Approval Order, subject to the condition that Mr. Monroe enter into an LOA establishing safe traffic patterns and radio frequencies with all airfields within three miles of his facility. The Department notes that if Mr. Monroe's application were denied in this proceeding, he could immediately procure the LOA and reapply. Granting the site approval in this proceeding would merely obviate the need for Mr. Monroe to take that largely redundant step. As authority for its contention that it may issue a site approval order prior to an applicant's compliance with all provisions of rule 14-60.005(5), the Department cites section 330.30(1)(d), which states: "Site approval may be granted subject to any reasonable conditions the department deems necessary to protect the public health, safety, or welfare."5/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying the site approval application of Michael D. Monroe and withdrawing the Airport Site Approval Order issued to Mr. Monroe on March 1, 2012, Site Approval Number SW2012-FLA-0117-AP. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2013.
