The Issue The issue is whether Petitioners' Motions for Attorney's Fees should be granted, and if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of counsel, the papers filed herein, and the underlying record made a part of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are determined: Background In this attorney's fees dispute, Petitioners, Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. (Anderson Columbia) (Case No. 00-0754F), Panhandle Land & Timber Company, Inc. (Panhandle Land) (Case No. 00-0755F), Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. (Support Terminals) (Case No. 00-0756F), Commodores Point Terminal Corporation (Commodores Point) (Case No. 00-0757F), and Olan B. Ward, Sr., Martha P. Ward, Anthony Taranto, Antoinette Taranto, J.V. Gander Distributors, Inc., J.V. Gander, Jr., and Three Rivers Properties, Inc. (the Ward group) (Case No. 00-0828F), have requested the award of attorney's fees and costs incurred in successfully challenging proposed Rule 18-21.019(1), Florida Administrative Code, a rule administered by Respondent, Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund (Board). In general terms, the proposed rule essentially authorized the Board, through the use of a qualified disclaimer, to reclaim sovereign submerged lands which had previously been conveyed to the upland owners by virtue of their having filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved the submerged lands. The underlying actions were assigned Case Nos. 98- 1764RP, 98-1866RP, 98-2045RP, and 98-2046RP, and an evidentiary hearing on the rule challenge was held on May 21, 1998. That proceeding culminated in the issuance of a Final Order in Support Terminals Operating Partnership, L.P. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 21 F.A.L.R. 3844 (Div. Admin. Hrngs., Aug. 8, 1998), which determined that, except for one challenged provision, the proposed rule was valid. Thereafter, in the case of Anderson Columbia Company, Inc. et al. v. Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund, 748 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), the court reversed the order below and determined that the rule was an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioners then filed their motions. Fees and Costs There are eleven Petitioners seeking reimbursement of fees and costs. In its motion, Anderson Columbia seeks reimbursement of attorney's fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute" while Panhandle Land seeks identical relief. In their similarly worded motions, Support Terminals and Commodores Point each seek fees "up to the $15,000 cap allowed by statute." Finally, the Ward group collectively seeks $9,117.00 in attorney's fees and $139.77 in costs. In the Joint Stipulations of Fact filed by the parties, the Board has agreed that the rate and hours for all Petitioners "were reasonable." As to all Petitioners except the Ward group, the Board has further agreed that each of their costs to challenge the rule exceeded $15,000.00. It has also agreed that even though they were not contained in the motions, requests for costs by Support Terminals, Commodores Point, Anderson Columbia, and Panhandle Land in the amounts of $1,143.22, $1,143.22, $1,933.07, and $1,933.07, respectively, were "reasonable." Finally, the Board has agreed that the request for costs by the Ward group in the amount of $139.77 is "reasonable." Despite the stipulation, and in the event it does not prevail on the merits of these cases, the Board contends that the four claimants in Case Nos. 00-754F, 00-755F, 00-0756F, and 00- 757F should be reimbursed only on a per case basis, and not per client, or $7,500.00 apiece, on the theory that they were sharing counsel, and the discrepancy between the amount of fees requested by the Ward group (made up of seven Petitioners) and the higher fees requested by the other Petitioners "is difficult to understand and justify." If this theory is accepted, it would mean that Support Terminals and Commodores Point would share a single $15,000.00 fee, while Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land would do the same. Support Terminals and Commodores Point were unrelated clients who happened to choose the same counsel; they were not a "shared venture." Each brought a different perspective to the case since Commodores Point had already received a disclaimer with no reversionary interest while Support Terminals received one with a reversionary interest on June 26, 1997. The latter event ultimately precipitated this matter and led to the proposed rulemaking. Likewise, in the case of Anderson Columbia and Panhandle Land, one was a landowner while the other was a tenant, and they also happened to choose the same attorney to represent them. For the sake of convenience and economy, the underlying cases were consolidated and the matters joined for hearing. Substantial Justification From a factual basis, the Board contends several factors should be taken into account in determining whether it was substantially justified in proposing the challenged rule. First, the Board points out that its members are mainly lay persons, and they relied in good faith on the legal advice of the Board's staff and remarks made by the Attorney General during the course of the meeting at which the Board issued a disclaimer to Support Terminals. Therefore, the Board argues that it should be insulated from liability since it was relying on the advice of counsel. If this were true, though, an agency that relied on legal advice could never be held responsible for a decision which lacked substantial justification. The Board also relies upon the fact that it has a constitutional duty to protect the sovereign lands held in the public trust for the use and benefit of the public. Because lands may be disclaimed under the Butler Act only if they fully meet the requirements of the grant, and these questions involve complex policy considerations, the Board argues that the complexity and difficulty of this task militate against an award of fees. While its mission is indisputably important, however, the Board is no different than other state agencies who likewise are charged with the protection of the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens. The Board further relies on the fact that the rule was never intended to affect title to Petitioners' lands, and all Petitioners had legal recourse to file a suit to quiet title in circuit court. As the appellate court noted, however, the effect of the rule was direct and immediate, and through the issuance of a disclaimer with the objectionable language, it created a reversionary interest in the State and made private lands subject to public use. During the final hearing in the underlying proceedings, the then Director of State Lands vigorously supported the proposed rule as being in the best interests of the State and consistent with the "inalienable" Public Trust. However, he was unaware of any Florida court decision which supported the Board's views, and he could cite no specific statutory guidance for the Board's actions. The Director also acknowledged that the statutory authority for the rule (Section 253.129, Florida Statutes) simply directed the Board to issue disclaimers, and it made no mention of the right of the Board to reclaim submerged lands through the issuance of a qualified disclaimer. In short, while the Board could articulate a theory for its rule, it had very little, if any, basis in Florida statutory or common law or judicial precedent to support that theory. Although Board counsel has ably argued that the law on the Butler Act was archaic, confusing, and conflicting in many respects, the rule challenge case ultimately turned on a single issue, that is, whether the Riparian Rights Act of 1856 and the Butler Act of 1921 granted to upland or riparian owners fee simple title to the adjacent submerged lands which were filled in, bulkheaded, or permanently improved. In other words, the ultimate issue was whether the Board's position was "inconsistent with the . . . the concept of fee simple title." Anderson Columbia at 1066. On this issue, the court held that the State could not through rulemaking "seek to reserve ownership interests by issuing less than an unqualified or unconditional disclaimer to riparian lands which meet the statutory requirements." Id. at 1067. Thus, with no supporting case law or precedent to support its view on that point, there was little room for confusion or doubt on the part of the Board. E. Special Circumstances In terms of special circumstances that would make an award of fees unjust, the Board first contends that the proposed rule was never intended to "harm anyone," and that none of Petitioners were actually harmed. But the substantial interests of each Petitioner were clearly affected by the proposed rules, and the appellate court concluded that the rule would result in an unconstitutional forfeiture of property. The Board also contends that because it must make proprietary decisions affecting the public trust, it should be given wide latitude in rulemaking. It further points out that the Board must engage in the difficult task of balancing the interests of the public with private rights, and that when it infringes on the private rights of others, as it did here, it should not be penalized for erring on the side of the public. As previously noted, however, all state agencies have worthy governmental responsibilities, but this in itself does not insulate an agency from sanctions. As an additional special circumstance, the Board points out that many of the provisions within the proposed rule were not challenged and were therefore valid. In this case, several subsections were admittedly unchallenged, but the offending provisions which form the crux of the rule were invalidated. Finally, the Board reasons that any moneys paid in fees and costs will diminish the amount of money to be spent on public lands. It is unlikely, however, that any state agency has funds set aside for the payment of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes (1999).
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the executive branch of the State of Florida. Mr. Crowell, prior to February, 1990, was employed as a career service employee of the Department for approximately 19 years. Mr. Crowell has worked for the State of Florida for approximately 24 years. Immediately prior to and during part of February, 1990, Mr. Crowell was employed as a Community Assistance Consultant with the Department's Community Development Block Grant Program (hereinafter referred to as the "Grant Program"). Wanda A. Jones, Planning Manager of the Grant Program, was Mr. Crowell's immediate supervisor at all times relevant to this proceeding. The Department has incorporated the provisions of Rule 22A-8.011, Florida Administrative Code, governing the use of leave, in the Department's Policies and Procedures No. 1109.01. Pursuant to Policies and Procedures No. 1109.01, Department employees are required to notify their supervisor of any illness and obtain approval of the use of annual leave. Mr. Crowell was counseled by Ms. Jones in January or February, 1989, concerning his failure to obtain authorization for use of sick leave each day that Mr. Crowell was sick. Ms. Jones also explained this requirement at two or three staff meetings. Mr. Crowell was aware of the Department's requirements concerning the use of leave. Mr. Crowell was required to travel as a part of his employment. Mr. Crowell traveled an average of two times per month. Mr. Crowell submitted an Authorization to Incur Travel Expense dated December 7, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "December 7, 1989, Request"), to the Department requesting authorization to travel on State business on December 13, 14 and 15, 1989. The December 7, 1989, Request was approved by the Department. Mr. Crowell indicated in the December 7, 1989, Request that "[p]ersonal car will be used for entire trip." Mr. Crowell did not own a motor vehicle during the period of time at issue in this proceeding. Mr. Crowell intended to rent an automobile, pay the rental charges himself and claim reimbursement only for mileage incurred in travel on State business. Mr. Crowell had been issued a Budget Rent-A-Car (hereinafter referred to as "Budget"), credit card by the Department on October 6, 1989. Mr. Crowell signed a Department form at the time the Budget credit card was issued acknowledging the following: that on the date above I received the above-described credit card; that I, by my signature hereon have acknowledged that I understand all policies and procedures governing the use of said card; and that I have been advised that abuse of the use of this card may result in dismissal from employment with this Department and possible prosecution under the laws of Florida. On December 13, 1989, Mr. Crowell rented an automobile from Budget. Mr. Crowell was given a Lincoln Town Car (hereinafter referred to as the "Lincoln") because of the unavailability of a smaller automobile. Mr. Crowell signed a rental agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Rental Agreement") for the Lincoln indicating that the rental fees were to be charged to the Department through the Budget credit card issued by the Department to Mr. Crowell. Pursuant to the Rental Agreement, Mr. Crowell was to rent the Lincoln for approximately three weeks, turning it in on January 3, 1990. The Rental Agreement listed the costs of renting the Lincoln for an hour, a day, a week or a month. Mr. Crowell submitted a Voucher for Reimbursement of Traveling Expenses dated December 19, 1989, to the Department for authorized travel on December 12-15, 1989. Mr. Crowell indicated that a "[p]ersonal car was used for entire trip" and he claimed reimbursement of $107.00 for mileage driven. During early January, 1990, Mr. Crowell went to a Budget office with the intent of returning the Lincoln he had rented on December 13, 1989. Mr. Crowell was told that he owed close to $600.00. Mr. Crowell had thought that he would owe approximately $375.00 and, therefore, had not brought enough money to pay the total rental charge. Mr. Crowell left without paying the rental charge or returning the Lincoln. On December 28, 1990, Mr. Crowell submitted three separate Authorization to Incur Travel Expense forms to the Department seeking approval of travel for State business in January and February, 1990. On the three forms "pov" was noted. Mr. Crowell used "pov" as an abbreviation for "privately owned vehicle." Mr. Crowell submitted a Voucher for Reimbursement of Traveling Expenses to the Department for two authorized trips for January, 1990. Mr. Crowell indicated that a "pov was used" on one of the vouchers and he claimed reimbursement for mileage driven on both forms. Mr. Crowell used the Lincoln he had rented on December 13, 1989, for the January, 1990, trips he was reimbursed for. Sometime during January, 1990, the Tallahassee branch manager of Budget, Russell Kennedy, became concerned that Mr. Crowell was late returning the Lincoln. Therefore, Mr. Kennedy contacted Mr. Crowell and inquired about when he intended to return the Lincoln. Mr. Crowell indicated that he would return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. On January 30, 1990, the Department's personnel director, Mark Helms, was informed by the Director of the Housing and Community Development Division, the Division in which Mr. Crowell was employed, that he had been notified that Mr. Crowell had rented the Lincoln with his Department-issued credit card and that the Lincoln had not been returned or paid for. Mr. Helms contacted Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy informed Mr. Helms that Budget considered the Department to be liable for the rental of the Lincoln. Mr. Kennedy indicated that Mr. Crowell had agreed to return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not return the Lincoln on February 1, 1990. Mr. Helms spoke with Mr. Kennedy on Monday, February 5, 1990, and was informed that Mr. Crowell had not returned the Lincoln. Mr. Helms informed the Division Director. On February 5, 1990, Ms. Jones was told by the Division Director to meet with Mr. Crowell and instruct him to resolve the problem he had created by renting the Lincoln with the Department-issued Budget credit card. Ms. Jones met with Mr. Crowell at approximately 3:00 p.m., Monday, February 5, 1990. Ms. Jones informed Mr. Crowell that the Department was concerned that he had rented the Lincoln using the Budget credit card issued to him by the Department because of the Department's potential liability for the rental. Ms. Jones informed Mr. Crowell that he had to resolve the problem he had created with Budget immediately. She suggested that, although she could not tell him how to use his leave time, he should consider taking time to take care of the matter. Mr. Crowell left the meeting and returned shortly thereafter with his time sheet. Mr. Crowell requested that Ms. Jones approve annual leave from 3:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m., February 5, 1990, and all day Tuesday, February 6, 1990. Ms. Jones approved Mr. Crowell's request. Mr. Crowell left work at approximately 3:30 p.m., February 5, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not return to work on February 6, 1990. On Wednesday, February 7, 1990, and Thursday, February 8, 1990, Mr. Crowell spoke by telephone to an employee of the Department that worked in another section and got the employee to leave a "Post-It" note on his door both days indicating "O.C./SL". Mr. Crowell did not report to work on February 7 or 8, 1990. Ms. Jones treated Mr. Crowell as having used sick leave for these two days. On February 8, 1990, Ms. Jones sent a letter to Mr. Crowell informing him that his failure to resolve the matter with Budget was a serious disciplinary matter. Ms. Jones did not attempt to telephone Mr. Crowell because he did not have a telephone. Ms. Jones did, however, telephone Cheryl Jamison, whom Ms. Jones believed to be Mr. Crowell's daughter-in-law. Ms. Jones left a message on an answering machine to have Mr. Crowell call her immediately. On Friday, February 9, 1990, and Monday, February 12, 1990, through Thursday, February 15, 1990, Mr. Crowell did not come to work, call in sick or otherwise inform the Department of the reason for his absence or obtain approval for his absence. Mr. Crowell has not returned to work at the Department since February 5, 1990. At the formal hearing Mr. Crowell testified that he did not inform Ms. Jones that he would not be at work on February 9, 1990, or thereafter because she had instructed him to not come back until he resolved the problem with Budget over the rental of the Lincoln. This testimony is inconsistent with Ms. Jones' testimony and Mr. Crowell's actions on February 5, 1990, and February 7 and 8, 1990. If Mr. Crowell had in fact been instructed not to return until he resolved the Budget problem and that he did not have to worry about following established procedures for absences, Mr. Crowell would not have gotten approval for annual leave for February 5 and 6, 1990, or informed the Department that he would not be at work on February 7 and 8, 1990, because he was sick. On February 12, 1990, Ms. Jones telephoned and spoke with Nathan Crowell, Mr. Crowell's son. Ms. Jones indicated that she needed to speak with Mr. Crowell. She was told that Mr. Crowell had been told that she was trying to contact him. Mr. Crowell received the letter sent by Ms. Jones on February 8, 1990. Mr. Crowell was also aware that Ms. Jones had called his son's telephone number attempting to get in touch with him. Mr. Crowell made no effort, however, to respond to Ms. Jones. The Division Director was informed by Ms. Jones on February 15, 1990, that Mr. Crowell had been absent for five days without authorization. The same day Mr. Helms received a memorandum from the Division Director recommending that Mr. Crowell be treated as having abandoned his employment with the Department. Mr. Helms prepared a letter for the Secretary's signature informing Mr. Crowell that the Department was treating Mr. Crowell that he had abandoned his position. At the time that the Department decided to treat Mr. Crowell as having abandoned his position, the Department was aware of efforts by Budget to contact Mr. Crowell and obtain a return of the Lincoln. Budget had sent a certified letter to Mr. Crowell on February 7, 1990, informing Mr. Crowell that criminal charges would be brought against him if he did not return the Lincoln. The return receipt was returned on February 13, 1990, signed by Mr. Crowell. Mr. Crowell still did not return the Lincoln. Mr. Kennedy had also driven by Mr. Crowell's residence several times during early February, 1990, looking for the Lincoln. The Lincoln was not found. The letter from the Secretary was sent to Mr. Crowell by certified mail, return receipt requested, on February 15, 1990. Mr. Crowell received the letter on February 22, 1990. Mr. Crowell returned the Lincoln to Budget on Sunday, February 18, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not pay for the rental of the Lincoln at that time. On February 27, 1990, Mr. Crowell telephoned Mr. Helms. This was his first contact with the Department since February 5, 1990. Mr. Crowell did not indicate that he had not abandoned his position or offer any explanation. Mr. Crowell merely asked Mr. Helms about continued insurance coverage and the payment for his accrued sick and annual leave. Mr. Crowell sent a letter to the Department of Administration dated March 6, 1990, contesting the Department's determination that he had abandoned his employment. On March 7, 1990, Mr. Crowell met with Mr. Helms and Barbara Jo Finer, a Department Senior Attorney. Mr. Crowell discussed payment of the Budget rental charges he had incurred with the payment he was to receive for his unused annual leave as a result of his termination of employment. Budget was paid the rental charges incurred by Mr. Crowell for use of the Lincoln on April 16, 1990. Budget was paid $1,734.03 of Mr. Crowell's payment from the State of Florida for his unused leave. In addition to the inconsistencies in Mr. Crowell's testimony described in Finding of Fact 29, Mr. Crowell evidenced a lack of credibility while testifying on two other matters. First, Mr. Crowell testified at the formal hearing that he did not receive a telephone call from a representative of Budget. This testimony is contrary to Mr. Crowell's testimony during his deposition taken on June 18, 1990. Secondly, Mr. Crowell testified that he was not notified that his deposition was available to read until 5:00 p.m., Thursday, July 5, 1990. This testimony was contradicted by the office manager of Accurate Stenotype Reporters, the firm which had the deposition prepared.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order concluding that Oscar Crowell abandoned his position of employment with the Department and dismissing the petition in this case with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Crowell's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Page I: 1st Paragraph 32. 2nd Paragraph Hereby accepted. 3rd Paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page II: Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted. The rest of the paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is accepted. The rest of the paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page III: 1st paragraph Hereby accepted. Although the Department did take the position that it was not liable for the total rental charge incurred by Mr. Crowell for use of the Lincoln, Budget was taking the position that the Department was liable. Therefore, there remained a potential liability which the Department was concerned with. 2nd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4th paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5th paragraph (including part of this paragraph which appears on page IV) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page IV: 1st full paragraph Not relevant to this proceeding and not supported by the weight of the evidence. 2nd paragraph The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Even if Ms. Jones had told Mr. Crowell to resolve the problem before returning to work, it was unreasonable for Mr. Crowell to not return to work for almost two weeks without obtaining authorization for such an extended absence. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not relevant or supported by the weight of the evidence. (including part of this paragraph which appears on page V) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Page V: st paragraph Hereby accepted. nd paragraph The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Crowell was directed to leave and not return. The rest of this paragraph has been accepted in Finding of Fact 26. rd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. th paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence and argument. Page VI: 1st paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 2nd paragraph Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 3rd paragraph The first sentence is hereby accepted. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 4th paragraph 2. Except for the first sentence, these proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5th paragraph This paragraph is Mr. Crowell's recommendation and not a finding of fact. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 2, 27 and 32. 2 1-2. 3 4. 4 3. 5 7. 6 Hereby accepted. 7 5. 8 6. 9 Hereby accepted. 10 12, 23-24. 11 24. 26. The last four sentences are not relevant to this proceeding. The Department treated Mr. Crowell as having taken sick leave on February 7 and 8, 1990. The Department did not treat Mr. Crowell as being absent without authorization on those days. Hereby accepted. 14-15 27. 16 30. 17-18 28. 19 31. 20 Hereby accepted. 21 36. 22 32 and 34. The first two sentences are hereby accepted. The rest of this proposed finding of fact is not relevant to this proceeding. Mr. Crowell requested a formal hearing to contest the Department's decision by letter dated March 6, 1990. His failure to discuss the matter after that date, therefore, does not support a conclusion that Mr. Crowell was abandoning his employment. 38. The last sentence is not relevant to this proceeding for the same reasons the last part of proposed finding of fact 23 is not relevant. See 29. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. It is not clear what Mr. Crowell meant. See 5. Hereby accepted. Subparagraph (b) does not support a conclusion that Mr. Crowell abandoned his position. 29 12. 30 20. 31 23. 32 33. 33-34 33. 35 12, 14, 17-18 and 35. 36 Hereby accepted. 37-44 and 47 Mr. Crowell did make the statements referred to in these proposed findings of fact and they are not consistent. As the trier of fact, I do not find that Mr. Crowell's credibility was called into question by these inconsistencies. 45-46 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Oscar Crowell 1038 Preston Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 G. Steven Pfeiffer General Counsel Barbara Jo Finer Senior Attorney Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Thomas G. Pelham, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the parties' factual stipulations, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent Sheldon West, Inc. was the developer of Sheldon West Mobile Home Community, a "condominium," as those terms are used and defined in Chapter 718, Florida Statutes. The Declaration of Condominium was recorded in the official records of Hillsborough County on September 27, 1978. The respondent transferred control of the Sheldon West Condominium Owner's Association, Inc. to the unit owners on June 30, 1986. In the Declaration of Condominium, respondent provided a guarantee of common expenses pursuant to Section 718.116(8)(a)2, Florida Statutes. Under the guarantee, respondent was excused from the payment of common expense assessments on developer-owned units for a period of five years. During that period, respondent guaranteed to unit owners that assessments would not exceed a certain stated level, and respondent obligated itself to pay any amount of common expenses incurred during the period and not produced by the assessments at the guaranteed level receivable from other unit owners. Common expenses during the guarantee period amounted to $57,895.00. Assessments collected from unit owners during the guarantee period amounted to $49,190.00. Thus, respondent's liability for common expenses during the guarantee period was $8,705.00. Respondent's guarantee of common expenses ended September 26, 1983. From September 27, 1983, through June 30, 1986, the date of the turnover, respondent paid no assessments on the lots it still owned. The Declaration of Condominium provides that assessments not paid within five days of the due date shall bear interest at the rate of ten percent per annum from the due date until paid. Respondent's liability for assessments from September 27, 1983, through June 30, 1986, amounted to $40,870.00, and the interest on the overdue assessments amounted to $7,032.35. The Homeowners Association over-reimbursed respondent for expenses incurred during the guarantee period in the amount of $12,968.00. In addition, respondent received two payments from Association funds in June, 1986 of $7,000.00 and $8, 000.00. In January of 1986, the respondent and the Department of Business Regulation entered into a Final Consent Order, which called for a $500.00 civil penalty. The respondent paid the civil penalty, and, in March of 1986, he was reimbursed from the Association funds for payment of said penalty. The payables due from the respondent to the Homeowners Association, amounting to almost $70,000.00, were not paid to the Association at turnover. Instead, they were applied and offset against what were represented to be advances and receivables payable to the respondent from the Association in the amount of $77,142.00. This amount represents the cost of construction by the respondent of a pool and a clubhouse on the common property, interest charged on the advance of funds from respondent to the Association, and management fees due on uncollected assessments. Construction on the pool and clubhouse began in November of 1980 and ended in February of 1981. Neither the Prospectus nor the Declaration of Condominium mention the construction of a pool or clubhouse. No vote on construction of the pool and clubhouse was ever taken of unit owners other than the Board of Directors. No approval in writing was ever given by unit owners. The Declaration of Condominium was never amended to reflect the addition of a pool or clubhouse. The minutes of a special meeting of the Directors of the Association held on October 21, 1980, reflect that one of the three Directors gave a report that "residents wanted a Pool and Rec. Building" located on the common property and "were willing to pay for the same from the assessments on the residents." The minutes further reflect that a motion was made and adopted that the developer construct the pool and building and that, in return, the Association agreed to repay the developer the cost of same, estimated at $60,000.00, on or before turnover to the resident unit owners. The minutes further state "copy sent to Residents and Directors." These minutes are unsigned, but typewritten are the names of Tom F. Brown, the President of Sheldon West, Inc.; Anna K. Laughridge, Mr. Brown's daughter; and Ken Lord, who apparently was a unit owner. As reflected in a document received into evidence as petitioner's Exhibit 11, the members of the Board of Directors of the Association on January 2, 1981, consisted of Ora Katherine Brown, apparently Tom Brown's wife; and Anna K. Laughridge. The minutes of a "special joint meeting of Board of Directors" of the Association held on January 2, 1981, reflect that the resignation of Ora Katherine Brown as an officer and director was accepted, and that Tom Fairfield Brown and Anna K. Laughridge were named as Directors. The minutes of a "special meeting of directors" of Sheldon West, Inc., held at 10:00 A.M. on February 24, 1981, reflect the adoption of a motion that Sheldon West, Inc. would advance the funds for payment of the cost of construction of the pool and recreation building with the understanding that it would be repaid for the funds so advanced, and that it would receive credit therefore by the Association for any sums which might be due, owing or claimed by the Association. The minutes make reference to a promissory note evidencing the agreement. The promissory note, respondent's Exhibit 4, states that at a special meeting of the Association held on February 24, 1981, the Association agreed to repay and credit Sheldon West, Inc. for all sums advanced for the construction of the pool and recreation building. This promissory note is dated February 24, 1981, and is signed by Tom F. Brown as the President of the Association. The minutes of the "special meeting of directors" of the Association held on February 24, 1981, at 4:00 P.M. reflect that Directors Tom F. Brown, Anna K. Laughridge and Ken Lord were present. The minutes further make reference to an agreement that the costs of the pool and recreation building were to be advanced by Sheldon West, Inc. with the understanding that it would receive credit for such funds and be reimbursed for any balance on the date of turnover to the unit owners. These minutes state "copy posted outside clubhouse and del. to residents."
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 718.116(8)(a)2, Florida Statutes, for its failure to fund the deficit during the guarantee period; and that a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000.00 be imposed for this violation; Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 718.116(1)(a) and (8)(a), Florida Statutes, for its failure to pay assessments on developer-owned units after expiration of the guarantee period; and that a civil penalty in the amount of $5,000.00 be imposed for this violation; and Respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 7D- 23.003(3), Florida Administrative Code, for utilizing Association funds for the payment of a civil penalty; and that a civil penalty in the amount of $1,000.00 be imposed for this violation. Respectfully submitted and entered this 2nd day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1988. APPENDIX The proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted, incorporated and/or summarized in this Recommended Order, with the following exceptions: Petitioner 24 and 25. Accepted as factually correct, but not included as irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in dispute. Respondent 4 and 5. Partially rejected and discussed in the Conclusions of Law. 7 and 9. Rejected as irrelevant to the issues in dispute. 10. Amount stated rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Charlton, Esquire Peavyhouse, Grant, Clark Charlton, Opp & Martino 1715 N. Westshore Post Office Box 24268 Tampa, Florida 33623 David L. Swanson, Esquire Sandra E. Feinzig, Esquire Assts. General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 S. Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 James Kearney, Director Department of Business Regulation Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact In February, 1974 Respondent was a registered real estate salesman working for John R. Finn, a registered real estate broker who operated a branch office at Lake Panasoffkee, Florida. Sam R. Perroni, the father of Respondent, was the office manager of this branch office and a registered real estate salesman. Sam Perroni obtained an open listing on a parcel of land with a house trailer affixed thereto from Eugene Bays, President of Bays Construction Company, the owner of the property. Bays agreed to pay the usual commission of 6 percent if the property was sold through the effort of Finn Realty. The list price of the property was $12,500. Mrs. Dorothy B. Johnson was shown the property by Respondent and thereafter the property was shown to her and her husband Joseph P. Johnson. Following this visit to the property the Johnsons inquired of Respondent if seller would take $12,000, to which he replied he didn't think so. Johnson then offered to pay Respondent $250 if he could persuade the seller to sell the property for $12,000. Respondent then called Eugene Bays in the Johnsons' presence to advise Bays that he had an offer of $12,000 for the property and asked if Bays would accept. When Bays called back to advise he would accept the offer, the contract was prepared by Sam Perroni, executed by the Johnsons, and delivered to the seller for acceptance on Monday, February 25. Receipt for Johnson's earnest money deposit of $250 was dated February 23, 1974 as was the contract. When Respondent told Sam Perroni of Johnson's offer he also advised him Johnson had offered him a bonus of $250. Sam Perroni advised Respondent that this bonus offer should be reported to the seller, and that he, Sam Perroni, would take care of it. The executed contract was returned to Perroni on February 26, 1974 by C. V. Watson, an officer in Bays Construction Company. At this time Perroni says he advised Watson of the bonus offer, but Watson recalls no mention of any such deal. Bays was never advised and would not have sold the property for $12,000 if he had known of the bonus offer. Sam Perroni told Respondent that the sellers had been made aware of the bonus offer. On March 2, 1974, while having dinner at Sam Perroni's, Johnson delivered to Respondent a check (Exhibit 6) for the $250 bonus agreed upon. On the day of the closing when Johnson indicated he was a little short of cash for closing costs, Sam Perroni gave him a check for $60 drawn on Finn Realty. Joseph Finn accepted the contract as the broker in this transaction and was never made aware of the bonus. Of the $720 commission on the sale, $360 went to Respondent. He also retained the $250 bonus. Upon advising Sam Perroni of the offer and acceptance Respondent was not further involved in the property or the closing. Sam Perroni assisted the purchaser in securing a $4,000 purchase money mortgage on the property and in correcting the deed to the property. He considers the services performed on behalf of the purchaser merited the bonus. Some time later Johnson, who thought he had purchased a 10' x 60' trailer learned the trailer was only 55' in length and complained to the Real Estate Commission. During the course of the inquiry on this complaint Johnson "mentioned" the bonus and the charges herein involved resulted.
The Issue Whether Respondent, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act, chapter 760, part II, Florida Statutes (2014),2/ unlawfully discriminated against Petitioners on the basis of race and unlawfully retaliated against them; and, if so, the remedy, if any, to which Petitioners are entitled.
Findings Of Fact Background On August 31, 2016, the ALJ entered a Recommended Order determining that Respondent engaged in a discriminatory housing practice by retaliating against them, in violation of section 760.37. On November 17, 2016, FCHR entered an Interlocutory Order. The Interlocutory Order determined that Petitioners were legally entitled to recover quantifiable damages and costs incurred as a result of Respondent's unlawful housing practice, and remanded this proceeding to DOAH to afford Petitioners an opportunity to present evidence regarding those quantifiable damages and costs. Evidence Regarding Damages and Costs In this proceeding, Petitioners are seeking to recover $4,905.58 in damages and costs. They presented testimony and documents at the final hearing in an effort to substantiate this amount. Each component of the claimed damages and costs is addressed below. Rent Differential and Related Costs for Rental of Unit 11-205 As previously found in this proceeding, Petitioners leased Unit 4-207 in the Camden Waterford Lakes apartment community in Orlando, Florida. Per its express terms, the lease for Unit 4-207 began on December 31, 2013, and ended on January 4, 2015. Unit 4-207 was a three-bedroom/two-bath unit. At the time pertinent to this proceeding, Camden Waterford Lakes was a new apartment community located near ample shopping areas. As previously found in this proceeding, on or about October 20, 2014, Respondent gave Petitioners notice that it was not renewing their lease for Unit 4-207. The notice stated that "the Lease will terminate effective 1/04/2015." This notice further stated in pertinent part: "You are expected to vacate your Apartment on or before the termination date and comply with all terms of your Lease through your termination date." The undisputed evidence shows that Petitioners paid a base monthly rent of $1,434.00 for the term of their lease of Unit 4-207. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Petitioners did not wish to move out of Unit 4-207 and would have renewed their lease for that unit had they been given the opportunity to do so. As a direct result of Respondent's non-renewal of their lease, Petitioners were forced to find alternative housing. The credible evidence shows that Petitioners made reasonable efforts4/ to secure comparable housing, in terms of quality and price, in the Orlando area, but were unable to do so. As the end of the lease term for Unit 4-207 approached, Petitioners decided to move to the West Palm Beach area. Lisa Anduze was familiar with the West Palm Beach area, and Petitioners were not employed at that time. The credible evidence establishes that Petitioners made reasonable efforts5/ to find housing in the West Palm Beach area that was of comparable quality and price to Unit 4-207. After some searching, they were able to secure a two-bedroom/ two-bath apartment, Unit 11-205, at the Barcelona apartment community in Jupiter, Florida. The base monthly rent for Unit 11-205 is $1,540.00. Petitioners rented Unit 11-205 for a year starting on December 31, 2014, and ending on December 30, 2015. The rent differential between Unit 4-207 and Unit 11-205 is $106.00 per month. Thus, for the calendar year of 2015-2016, Petitioners paid $1,272.00 more per month to rent Unit 11-205 than they would have paid had they been able to remain in Unit 4-207. The credible evidence also establishes that Petitioners were required to pay, and paid, a charge of $51.00 to occupy Unit 11-205 on December 31, 2014. The evidence establishes that they were charged an application fee of $40.00 each for each occupant6/ of Unit 11-205, for a total of $120.00. The evidence also establishes that Petitioners incurred a $150.00 administrative fee when they moved into Unit 11-205. Reimbursement of Rent Charged for Unit 4-207 19. However, Petitioners vacated Unit 4-207 on Respondent charged them $199.87 in December 30, 2014. rent for the days of December 31, 2014, through January 4, 2015. 20. Kenneth Anduze testified that the lease for Unit 4-207 had been modified through a written lease addendum to terminate on December 30, 2014, so that Petitioners were not obligated to pay rent for the dates of December 31, 2014, through January 4, 2015. However, no lease addendum document substantiating Mr. Anduze's testimony was tendered or admitted into the record in this proceeding, either at the hearing conducted on May 25, 2016, or at the hearing after remand conducted on February 23, 2017. The credible evidence establishes that the lease term for Unit 4-207 ended on January 4, 2015. Expenses Incurred in Moving from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205 In moving from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205, Petitioners packed and moved their belongings rather than hiring professional movers. Mrs. Anduze estimated that the cost of purchasing boxes was approximately $75.00, and the cost of purchasing packing tape, bubble wrap, labels, and markers was approximately $20.00, for a total of $95.00 of expenses for moving supplies. Petitioners did not provide receipts to support their estimate of these expenses.7/ Mrs. Anduze estimated that Petitioners and their daughter collectively spent approximately 85 hours packing and moving their belongings. This labor consisted of removing their belongings from cabinets, closets, and drawers; wrapping them to help prevent damage in the move; placing them in labelled boxes; and moving them out of Unit 4-207 and into Unit 11-205. Because Petitioners moved their belongings rather than hiring professional movers, they were unable to produce a receipt precisely quantifying the number of hours spent in moving out of Unit 4-207 and into Unit 11-205. However, given that three people were involved, and given the scope of the task of moving out of a three-bedroom/two-bath apartment and into another apartment, the undersigned determines that 85 hours——which would break down to three people working eight hours per day, for approximately three-and-one-half days——is a reasonable estimate of the number of hours of labor Petitioners expended. Mrs. Anduze estimated that the value of Petitioners' labor expended for the move from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205 was $678.00. She derived this amount by multiplying the estimated 85 hours of labor by the minimum wage in Florida in 2014, which was $7.93 per hour. At the time Petitioners moved out of Unit 4-207, neither of them were employed. They have not alleged or demonstrated that they suffered lost wages as a result of moving out of Unit 4-207. They also did not allege or provide any evidence that Monique Anduze incurred lost wages in assisting Petitioners in their move. Petitioners rented a U-Haul van in Orlando to transport their belongings from Unit 4-207 to a local storage unit. They provided a receipt showing that they incurred a $25.00 rental fee for the van. Petitioners also provided a receipt showing that they had incurred a $24.50 rental fee for the storage unit. Petitioners also rented a moving van in West Palm Beach to move some of their belongings from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. The rental fee for this van was $44.44. Petitioners estimated that they spent $60.00 on gas for the van for driving a total of 390 miles between Unit 4-207 and Unit 11-205. The total expenses associated with rental and use of the van were $104.44. Mrs. Anduze testified that in the course of moving, a television and a glass-top table were damaged. Petitioners estimated the replacement cost of these items at $344.00. They did not provide receipts or other documentation, such as photographs of the damaged items, to support this claim. Mileage Petitioners provided information, consisting of Google Maps mileage calculations, showing that the one-way travel distance between Unit 4-207 and Unit 11-205 is 166 miles. Accordingly, one round-trip between Unit 4-207 and Unit 11-205 totaled 332 miles. The credible evidence establishes that Petitioners traveled by car between Unit 4-207 and Unit 11-205 a total of three round-trips and an additional one-way trip, for a total of 1,162 miles of car travel necessitated by their move from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") Standard Mileage Rates used to calculate the deductible costs of operating an automobile for moving purposes established a mileage rate of $0.235 per mile for moving purposes for the year 2014. Petitioners seek reimbursement of calculated mileage costs in the amount of $273.07, which is derived by multiplying the 1,162 miles of travel by the IRS deductible rate of $0.235 per mile. Meal and Hotel Expenses Petitioners estimated that they incurred $300.00 in meal expenses (consisting of ten meals comprised of breakfast, lunch, and dinner, plus water and snacks, for three people) while traveling associated with their relocation from Orlando to West Palm Beach. They did not provide receipts or other documentation supporting these claimed expenses. As discussed above, Petitioners vacated Unit 4-207 on December 30, 2014, a few days before their lease of that unit terminated. Because the term of their lease for Unit 11-205 commenced on December 31, 2014, they could not occupy that unit on December 30, 2014. They stayed in a hotel on the night of December 30, 2014, and began moving into Unit 11-205 the following day. Petitioners provided a statement from the hotel showing that they stayed the night of December 30, 2014, and showing a $0.00 balance.8/ Although Petitioners did not provide the receipt showing the amount of the room charge, Mrs. Anduze credibly testified that she contacted the hotel and was told that the room rate was between $130.00 and $149.00 per night. Petitioners are seeking to recover $130.00 for the hotel room expense for the night of December 30, 2014. Airline Ticket Mrs. Anduze testified that when Petitioners' daughter, Monique, was informed that Petitioners' lease of Unit 4-207 had not been renewed, "she was very upset" so wanted to fly to Orlando to "find out what's going on." According to Mrs. Anduze, Monique "could not get a straight flight to Orlando, it was too high, so she decided to fly into Miami, and then she took the bus from Miami to Orlando." Petitioners presented an eTicket Itinerary and Receipt Confirmation for a ticket issued on October 1, 2014, for a flight from Kingston Manley (Jamaica) to Miami, Florida, costing $323.20. At time the airline ticket was issued, Petitioners had not yet been notified by Respondent that the lease for Unit 4- 207 was not being renewed. As discussed above, the credible evidence establishes that Petitioners were not notified that their lease was not being renewed until on or after October 20, 2014, when Respondent posted the notice on their unit door. This was almost three weeks after the airline ticket was issued. Postage and Related Costs to Prosecute Discrimination Claims Petitioners incurred postage, overnight courier, photocopying, telefax, and related costs in filing and prosecuting their discrimination claims against Respondent. Petitioners are seeking $116.00 in costs they claim were incurred as a result of prosecuting these claims. Petitioners produced receipts for postage and other expenses totaling $97.07. However, some of these receipts do not provide any indication, on their face, showing that the expenses incurred were related to Petitioners' prosecution of their discrimination claims. Specifically, the receipts from Office Depot/Office Max dated January 26 and February 10, 2016, in the respective amounts of $6.58 and $6.24, do not contain any information indicating that these amounts were spent by Petitioners in prosecuting their discrimination claims. It is noted, however, that on January 26, 2016, Petitioners telefax-filed a one-page document at DOAH. Prorating the charges shown on the Office Depot/Office Max receipt dated January 26, 2016, the evidence indicates that Petitioners incurred $0.21 in telefax costs connected to prosecution of their discrimination claims.9/ Petitioners also provided what appears to be a receipt for U.S. Postal Service First Class Mail postage in the amount of $8.23. This receipt is almost completely illegible, and there is no visible information indicating that this amount was spent on Petitioners' prosecution of their discrimination claims. The FedEx courier receipts dated December 30, 2016, in the amounts of $1.99 and $2.40 are similarly deficient. Petitioners provided receipts for U.S. Postal Service Certified Mail that document costs totaling $71.58 for sending documents to Respondent's counsel, DOAH, FCHR, and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development in connection with Petitioners' prosecution of their discrimination claims. Collectively, Petitioners documented that they incurred $71.79 in postage-related expenses in prosecuting their discrimination claims. Medicines Mrs. Anduze testified that Petitioners experienced significant stress due to Respondent's unlawful retaliation. She testified that as a result, Petitioners suffered a range of health-related issues, requiring them to spend $300.00 for medications. Petitioners did not provide any substantial evidence, such as a physician's testimony or report, specifically linking these claimed health-related issues to being required to move out of Unit 4-207, nor did they provide receipts or any other documentation substantiating the claimed costs of these medications. Miscellaneous Expenses Petitioners also seek to recover $400.00 in miscellaneous expenses they claim to have incurred as a result of Respondent's unlawful retaliation and their move from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. Mrs. Anduze testified that such expenses included the value of personal items, such as clothing, they gave away in the move; gas expenses; a bus ticket for a trip by Monique Anduze from Miami to Orlando; Florida Turnpike tolls; and other expenses. She testified: "I'm just basing, basing it on what I remember." Petitioners did not provide receipts or other documentation to substantiate that these expenses were incurred or the amounts thereof. Findings of Ultimate Fact As discussed in greater detail below, Petitioners are entitled to recover quantifiable damages and costs that are demonstrated by the evidence in the record to be reasonably related to Respondent's unlawful retaliatory conduct. An award of damages and costs must be based on substantial evidence and cannot be based on conjecture or speculation. Based on the competent, substantial, and credible evidence presented at the hearing, the undersigned determines that Petitioners are entitled to an award of $2,221.80 in quantifiable damages and costs in this proceeding. This determination is explained below. Rent Differential and Related Costs for Rental of Unit 11-205 The credible evidence establishes that Petitioners would not have moved out of Unit 4-207, had Respondent not retaliated against them by terminating their lease. Thus, Petitioners were forced to find alternative housing as a direct result of Respondent's retaliatory conduct. The evidence establishes that Petitioners made reasonable efforts to find alternative housing in the Orlando area but were unable to do so. Thus, they moved to West Palm Beach, a city with which Mrs. Anduze was familiar. There, they made reasonable efforts to find an apartment comparable to the one they had rented in Orlando, and ultimately found Unit 11-205 at the Barcelona apartment community. The Barcelona is a new community, as was Camden Waterford Lakes at the time Petitioners moved there. Petitioners provided substantial evidence that the monthly rental rate for Unit 11-205 is $106.00 more than for Unit 4-207. Units 4-207 and 11-205 are of comparable quality, and the monthly rental rates, while not identical, are very similar. Under these circumstances, it is determined Petitioners are entitled to recover the total rent differential of $1,272.00 between Units 4-207 and 11-205 for the lease term for Unit 11-205 that commenced on December 31, 2014, and ended on December 30, 2015.10/ The substantial evidence also establishes Petitioners also incurred a $51.00 rental charge for occupying Unit 11-207 on December 31, 2014; an application fee of $120.00; and an administrative fee of $150.00. These expenses were incurred as a direct result of Petitioners being forced by Respondent to move out of Unit 4-207. Accordingly, Petitioners are entitled to recover these expenses. Reimbursement of Rent Charged for Unit 4-207 As discussed above, the greater weight of the competent substantial evidence establishes that the term of Petitioners' lease ended on January 4, 2015. Even though Petitioners vacated Unit 4-207 on December 30, 2014, they were legally entitled to occupy that unit through January 4, 2015, and also were legally obligated for the rent on the unit until that date. As such, Respondent correctly charged Petitioners rent for January 1 through 4, 2015. Accordingly, Petitioners are not entitled to recover the $199.87 they were charged in rent by Respondent for December 31, 2014, through January 4, 2015. Expenses Incurred in Moving from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205 Petitioners incurred expenses directly associated with moving from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. These included $25.00 for rental of a U-Haul van, $24.50 for rental of a storage unit, and $104.44 for rental and use of a moving van. As noted above, Petitioners provided receipts quantifying these expenses. As such, an award of damages to compensate Petitioners for these expenses is not speculative. Petitioners are entitled to reimbursement for these expenses. Petitioners also seek reimbursement for approximately $95.00 in expenses for boxes and packing supplies directly related to their move from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. Although Petitioners are legally entitled to recover, as damages, their expenses that are reasonably related to Respondent's unlawful retaliation, they still must present evidence to substantiate these expenses in order to be able to recover them as damages. As further discussed below, expense estimates that are supported only by conjecture or guesses are speculative, so are not recoverable. Here, Petitioners did not provide receipts or any other evidence objectively quantifying the expenses they incurred in purchasing packing supplies. Thus, there is no substantial evidence in the record from which to determine the amount of damages that should be awarded for purchase of these supplies, and an award of damages based on conjecture would be speculative. Petitioners are not entitled to recover damages to cover expenses incurred in purchasing packing materials. Petitioners also seek to recover what they have referred to as "labor costs" for their time spent packing and moving out of Unit 4-207, in the amount of $678.00. They derived this amount by multiplying their estimated hours spent (85 hours total by Petitioners and their daughter) by the minimum wage in 2014. However, the evidence establishes that Petitioners were not employed at the time of their move. Because Petitioners were not employed, they were not being paid. Accordingly, Petitioners are not entitled to recover what effectively would constitute "lost wages."11/ Additionally, they did not provide any evidence that their daughter incurred lost wages, or the amount of any such wages, as a result of helping Petitioners pack and move out of Unit 4-207. Petitioners are not entitled to recover damages for their labor in moving from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. Petitioners also seek to recover $344.00 in replacement expenses for a damaged glass top table and damaged television. As noted above, Petitioners did not provide substantial evidence, such as photographs, showing that these items were damaged in the move, nor did they provide substantial evidence regarding the replacement costs for these items. As such, any award of damages for these items would be speculative. Petitioners are not entitled to recover damages for these items. Mileage As discussed above, Petitioners presented information, consisting of Google Maps mileage calculations, establishing that the distance between Unit 4-207 and Unit 11-205 was 166 miles one way, or 332 miles round trip. Mrs. Anduze credibly testified that it took Petitioners three round trips and one one-way trip to move from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205, for a total of 1,162 miles traveled to complete Petitioners' move between Unit 4-207 and Unit 11-205. As discussed above, Petitioners presented information showing that in 2014, the IRS Standard Mileage Rate was $0.235 cents per mile.12/ Accordingly, Petitioners are entitled to recover $273.03 for mileage expenses for their trips taken in connection with moving from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. Meal and Hotel Expenses Mrs. Anduze estimated that Petitioners spent approximately $300.00 on food for three people during their travel between Orlando and Jupiter. Petitioners did not provide receipts or any other objective means to substantiate these meal expenses. Absent substantial evidence quantifying these expenses, any award of damages would be speculative. Petitioners are not entitled to recover these meal expenses in this proceeding. As part of their move from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205, Petitioners stayed in a hotel located at 4431 PGA Boulevard, Palm Beach Gardens, the night of December 30, 2014, as verified by a document provided by the hotel that was admitted into evidence. This document did not show the amount of the hotel room for that night; Mrs. Anduze estimated that Petitioners spent $130.00 on the hotel room. Although Petitioners were unable to demonstrate precisely the amount they spent on the hotel room, they provided documentary evidence substantiating that they stayed in the room the night of December 30, 2014. A room rate of $130.00 per night in the South Florida hotel market, particularly given the time of year during which Petitioners stayed in the room, is reasonable. Accordingly, the undersigned determines that Petitioners are entitled to recover $130.00 spent for a hotel room the night of December 30, 2014. Airline Ticket As discussed above, the airline ticket for Monique Anduze's trip from Manley Airport in Kingston, Jamaica, to Miami, Florida, was purchased almost three weeks before Petitioners were given notice by Respondent, on October 20, 2014, that their lease for Unit 4-207 was not being renewed. Mrs. Anduze's testimony on cross-examination that Petitioners received notice on October 1, 2014, that their lease was not being renewed is contradicted by the non-renewal notice dated October 20, 2014.13/ Her testimony was not credible. The credible evidence establishes that the airline ticket issued on October 1, 2014, was not purchased in connection with Petitioners' move out of Unit 4-207. Accordingly, Petitioners are not entitled to recover the amount spent for this ticket. Postage and Related Costs to Prosecute Discrimination Claims As discussed above, Petitioners seek to recover $116.00 in costs associated with the prosecution of their discrimination claims against Respondent. As discussed above, Petitioners provided documentation substantiating that they incurred $71.58 in costs related to the prosecution of their discrimination claims against Respondent. Petitioners are entitled to recover these claimed costs. The remaining $44.42 in claimed costs either have not been documented by any receipts, or have not been shown to be linked to Petitioners' prosecution of their discrimination claims. As such, these claimed costs are not based on substantial evidence in the record, and any damage award would be speculative. Therefore, Petitioners are not entitled to recover these claimed costs. Medicines Petitioners seek to recover $300.00 in expenses for medicines. As discussed above, Petitioners did not provide any substantial evidence, such as a physician's testimony or report, specifically linking their claimed health-related issues to Respondent's unlawful retaliation; thus, there is no evidentiary basis for determining that Petitioners' claimed health issues are rationally related to Respondent's conduct. Further, Petitioners did not provide any substantial evidence establishing the amounts of these claimed expenses; as such, any award of damages for medication expenses would be speculative. Petitioners are not entitled to recover these claimed expenses for medications. Miscellaneous Expenses As discussed above, Petitioners also seek to recover $400.00 in miscellaneous expenses they claim to have incurred as a result of Respondent's unlawful retaliation and their move from Unit 4-207 to Unit 11-205. Mrs. Anduze generally described some of the items that Petitioners have claimed as miscellaneous expenses. However, Petitioners did not provide any substantial evidence quantifying these claimed expenses,14/ so any damages award for these claimed expenses would be speculative, and, thus, not recoverable. Additionally, the purchase of the bus ticket for Petitioners' daughter was not related to Respondent's retaliatory conduct,15/ so the cost of this ticket is not recoverable. Total Damages and Costs to Which Petitioners are Entitled Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Petitioners are entitled to recover $2,221.80 in damages and costs in this proceeding. Attorney's Fees and Costs As reflected in the record, Petitioners represented themselves in the final hearing held on May 25, 2016, which resulted in a determination that Respondent engaged in retaliation in violation of section 760.37. On January 9, 2017——after this proceeding was remanded for the undersigned to conduct a final hearing on the amount of damages and costs to which Petitioners are entitled——Petitioners retained attorneys to represent them in the proceeding on remand. The final hearing on remand was held on February 23, 2017. Petitioners did not move for an award of attorney's fees before this hearing, and the issue of attorney's fees was first raised immediately before close of this hearing. As such, the parties did not present evidence regarding the amount of attorney's fees and costs to which Petitioners may be entitled for attorney representation in the proceeding on remand. Prior to entry of this Recommended Order, Petitioners filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs, seeking to recover the attorney's fees and costs incurred in connection with this proceeding on remand. The motion does not provide any information on the legal services provided or costs incurred, and does not specify the amount of attorney's fees and costs sought.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding and concluding that Petitioners are entitled to an award of $2,221.80 in damages and costs. Jurisdiction over this proceeding is retained only with respect to conducting any further proceedings pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), as necessary, to determine the amount of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to which Petitioners are entitled under section 760.35 in connection with the final hearing on remand in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 2017.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issue herein the Petitioner, Division of Real Estate, and the Florida Real Estate Commission were the state agencies responsible for the licensing of real estate professionals and the regulation of the real estate profession in Florida. Respondent was licensed as a real estate broker with license number 0414476. Respondent was operating as a real estate broker and operated a real estate brokerage under the name Roney Realty located at 424 Beach Drive Northeast, Number 205, in St. Petersburg. In early 1995, Kathleen M. Mitchell, a single mother and licensed practical nurse, while attending a garage sale, noticed a two bedroom house for sale at 805 59th Street South in Gulfport and called the broker's telephone number shown on the sign. Respondent was the broker listed. On the basis of that telephone call, Respondent and Ms. Mitchell met at the house, owned by Respondent's sister. At the time, Ms. Mitchell advised Respondent that she had credit problems and was burdened with a previous FHA mortgage which was in default. In response, Respondent urged her not to worry and assured her he could get her financing even though she had undergone a prior bankruptcy. He also indicated that the selling price for the house was variable, depending on financing and the amount of the down payment. Ms. Mitchell contends that Respondent indicated to her that he would represent both buyer and seller in a dual agency arrangement, which he got her to acknowledge in writing, and claimed he would not take a commission on the sale. The initial contract signed in this case, however, lists a commission of $1,925.00 to be paid by the seller. This inconsistency was not explained. As a result of the initial negotiations which began in January, 1995, Ms. Mitchell signed a contract for the purchase of the property on February 13, 1995, which, she claims, was to be effective in March, 1995. This agreement, reflecting a sales price of $55,000 also indicates that Ms. Mitchell had made a $200.00 cash down payment, and called for an additional payment of $800.00 within 5 days of signing and an additional $650.00 at closing, to include buyer's closing costs and prepaid items or prorations. This left a balance to be financed of $53,350. There were no other handwritten clauses placed on the contract form. Ms. Mitchell paid the initial $200.00 and agreed to pay the additional $800.00 when she moved in. On the basis of that contract and the deposit made, Ms. Mitchell was allowed to move into the house. Approximately two weeks later, when it became obvious that her financing was going to be a problem, Mr. Roney brought a second contract to the house for her to sign. At this time, Mr. Roney suggested that while the parties were waiting for her financing to be approved, Ms. Mitchell could rent the house for $500.00 per month. Ms. Mitchell agreed to do this if all the defects in the house, which she had identified and reported to Respondent, were fixed. She claims that he verbally agreed to fix everything and she thereafter signed the second contract, which is undated as to signature, but which bears an effective date of April 20, 1995. The second contract reflects a purchase price of $56,650, a deposit of $2,832.50, and a balance to finance of $53,817.50. Ms. Mitchell admits to having made the $200.00 down payment, and it is not clear whether she also paid the $800.00, but at one point in her testimony indicated that is all she paid by way of down payment. She has no idea where the figure of $2,832.50 comes from. Yet, at another point in her testimony, she claims to have given Mr. Roney $1,650.00 on March 1, 1996, which money he put into Stewart Fidelity Title Company's escrow account. The contract also reflects that the deposit is being held in escrow by Stewart Fidelity Title Co. No information was presented as to the current state of the deposit. This contract shows substantial hand-written modification to the standard contract clauses which clearly reflect that changes were made on July 7, 1995, and were "added after signing." However, there are substantial, modifications to paragraph 21 of the contract form, "additional terms", which are confusing as to when they were added and what they mean. For example, one added clause calls for the buyer to make monthly payments of $600.00 until closing ($100.00 per month credited back to buyer at closing). Another provides that the buyer accepts the property as is from day of possession and agrees to maintain the property until closing. A third indicated that the seller agrees to credit $650.00 toward buyer's costs upon closing, and a fourth states that if the buyer cannot obtain a mortgage within one year of possession, the seller may convert the agreement to a lease. The difficulty in interpretation of the above rests in the fact that arrows pointing to various of the comments are not defining in their application. For example, one arrow comes from the word "closing" down the side of the paper into the Acceptance/Rejection section where is stated, "as is meant landscaping [sic]." Another arrow points to the word "may" in the last addition and reflects, "7-7-95 added." Ms. Mitchell adamantly contends that when she signed the second contract, none of the hand-written additions were on it. Mr. Roney admitted as much at hearing, but no informationwas presented to indicate if the additions were agreed to by Ms. Mitchell at any time. She contends that when she saw those post-signing additions, she took the document to her mortgage person who directed her to contact Respondent and stop further proceedings. When Ms. Mitchell did that, she claims, she wastold by Mr. Roney not to talk to her mortgage man again, and that his, Mr. Roney's, mortgage broker would handle the obtaining of her mortgage from then on out. When Ms. Mitchell recounted those instructions to her original mortgage broker, he advised her to contact Respondent's escrow agent, get her deposit back and cancel the contract. Respondent admits to having requested Ms. Mitchell use a different mortgage broker but asserts this was because her broker was not having any apparent success in getting her qualified. Ms. Mitchell lived in the house in question for two months before she moved out. Upon the advice of an attorney, she claims, she paid no rent while she occupied the premises. While she occupied the property, she paid $250.00 to have it appraised by a state certified residential real estate appraiser who opined that as of May 9, 1995 the property was valued at $49,500. In the addendum to the appraisal report, the appraiser stated: The roof has active leaks and improperly installed areas; The front soffit has loose conditions; The electrical system has unsafe wiring and improper size fuses; The heating and AC units are not operating properly ("No source of heat"); The plumbing system has some deficiencies and possible leaks; The pool is in need of "Major Repair", including repair of leaking conditions at the main drain and tiles; termite damage was noted; the water heater needs repair (or replacement), and it is exposed to weather conditions; Window and door screens are missing; The lawn sprinkler is damaged and partially disassembled The storage shed has rust conditions. Though at hearing Respondent attempted to dismiss this appraisal as being based on the home inspection reports done at Ms. Mitchell's request previously and given the appraiser, and not his personal inspection, a review of the document clearly indicates the conditions noted above were determined from review of that report "and/or observation by the appraiser." Ms. Mitchell experienced first hand many of the problem areas noted in the appraisal report. When she mentioned to Respondent that the screen door was missing, he reportedly told her it wasn't necessary. When she complained to Respondent that she had no hot water for several days, he sent over a repairman who ultimately corrected the problem. The repairman's statement, dated "May, 1995", reflecting a charge of $445.00 for his service, indicates he repaired a water leak on the hot water heater; unblocked a restriction in the hot water supply pipe; and replaced defective control knobs on the shower. He also cut the side of the kitchen counter to fit in a new stove and delivered a replacement refrigerator with an ice maker and reconnected the water line to it. This latter installation was the result of Ms. Mitchell's continuing complaint that the refrigerator did not work for quite a while which resulted in her losing a substantial amount of perishable food. The first time that happened, she though it might be her fault and she replaced the lost food. However, when it happened again, she complained to Respondent and he told her to get it fixed. She did, at a cost to her of $100.00, which Respondent did not pay back. Finally, a refrigerator repair man was sent to the property on both April 4 and April 19, 1995. He finally recommended the unit not be repaired but replaced. This was done. When Ms. Mitchell complained to Respondent that the heating and air conditioning unit in the living room did not work, and that the bedroom unit did not heat, she admits that Respondent had a repairman come out and look at the unit. Though she claims the repairman told her it would take $483.00 to repair it, she appears to have confused the appliances, as the repairman's statement, dated April 19, 1995, refers to an estimated cost of $483.00 to replace the compressor on the refrigerator, not the heater/air conditioner. There is no evidence to indicate how the problem with those units was resolved. Ms. Mitchell contends that when she first saw the swimming pool, before she contracted to buy the house, it was clear and the pump was running. When she thereafter heard a noise in the pump, in February, 1995, before she moved in, she reported this to the Respondent. Nothing was done about it. After she moved in, the pool rapidly became unusable. The pump motor was inoperative and the water turned green. Ms. Mitchel claims she called Respondent almost daily about the pool. He told her his sister had the motor removed for repairs and he would get it back. The motor was subsequently returned, along with the pool equipment which had been removed, but the pool leaked, requiring her to add water every day, and she could not keep the water clear. In late April, 1995, a pool man was sent to the property who, according to Ms. Mitchell, indicated that there was a need to replace loose tiles and mastic because of the age of the pool, and a leak at the main drain. It is not clear from the evidence presented if these repairs were made. When the appraisal report was rendered, showing a fair market price considerably less than what she had contracted to pay, Ms. Mitchell advised Respondent on several occasions that she to cancel the contract. On May 2, 1995, after she had seen an attorney and another real estate broker, she wrote to Respondent requesting either that he refund the deposit money she had placed with him and reimburse her in the amount of $500.00 for her personal expenses, in which case she would vacate the property within one week of receipt of the money, or return her deposit within one week, in which case she would vacate the property by June 1, 1995. In either case, she indicated she would pay no more rent. In that regard, it appears she had paid no rent up to that time, though she had agreed to pay rent in the event they could agree upon the terms of a contract and the property was repaired. She claims she did not expect to live in the property rent free, but believed that what she had paid out in repairs was fair rent for her occupancy. No clear total figure for what she paid out was provided. In response, Ms. Mitchell received a letter from the Respondent in which he demanded payment of the rent due. Thereafter, on June l, 1995, Ms. Mitchell received a second letter from the Respondent in which he stated he assumed she had agreed to deduct the amount due for rent from the deposit money she had placed with him and which he held in escrow. According to Respondent's calculations, Ms. Mitchell owed $1,271.56 in back rent after crediting her with $100.00 of the $600.00 per month rent payment she was to make. When this $1,271.56 was deducted from the $1,603.45 escrow balance held by him, $331.89 would be left in the escrow account. Respondent gave her the choice of doing that or of paying what was owed in case, leaving the entire escrow account untouched. He advised her she must make her choice and advise him and the escrow agent within forty-eight hours. Respondent did not satisfactorily explain his calculations at hearing. From the state of the evidence presented, it was impossible for the undersigned to determine exactly how much money Ms. Mitchell paid by way of deposit, rent, or repairs. Between the receipt of Respondent's first and second letters, Ms. Mitchell spoke with him about the condition of the house and what she wanted to do with regard to it. At no time did she authorize Respondent to make any deduction from the amount in escrow. In the interim, she began to look for another house and to seek alternative funding. She also tried to contact Respondent but she was unable to do so, reaching only his pager. Finally, she received a three-day notice dated June 20, 1995 to pay the rent due or vacate. In response, she wrote an undated letter to Respondent in which she said she was sending $1,000.00 to pay $500.00 rent for both May and June, 1995, but neither mailed the letter nor sent the money. Thereafter, she received a second three day notice dated June 30, 1995, directing her to pay the rent due or move out. This notice was left in her mail box by the Respondent. She neither paid the rent nor moved out at that time. Ms. Mitchell finally moved out of the property in issue on July 18, 1995 and thereafter, on a weekly basis, either verbally or in writing, demanded return of her deposit. She did not get it back. Mr. Roney's account of the beginning of the parties' relationship is consistent with that of Ms. Mitchell, except that Ms. Mitchell initially indicated the property could not be worth more than in the mid-forty thousand dollar range. In response, Respondent claimed to have done a market analysis on the property which supported the asking price, and because his sister had put a lot of money into the property, it could not be sold for a price as low as even in the high forty thousand dollar range. It would appear from the independent appraisal done of the property, the true value was closer to Ms. Mitchell's estimation rather than Respondent's. Nonetheless, Ms. Mitchell liked the property and agreed to buy it at the asking price, after she had looked it over with a contractor friend of hers. Respondent admits that Ms. Mitchell was forthright with him in disclosing her financial problems. She told him of her bankruptcy of several years previous, and in response to his questioning, noted several other problems, none of which, by her account, were her fault. When Ms. Mitchell called Respondent on February 13, 1995, indicating she was ready to sign, he referred her to a mortgage company which he felt could help her. Based on what information Ms. Mitchell had provided, Respondent had been told that her financial problems were "fixable". As a result, the first contract was signed and the financing process initiated. On March 18, 1995, Ms. Mitchell called Respondent and indicated she wanted to move into the house prior to closing because her current landlord would neither acknowledge nor fix defects in her property, and she had to get out. Therefore, on or about March 20, 1995, Respondent re-wrote the contract and requested she use another mortgage broker as a condition of taking possession prior to closing. Respondent claims that the seller's disclosure as to the condition of the property was accurate but Ms. Mitchell wanted an independent inspection done to which Respondent agreed. He insisted, however, that if she wanted to move in before closing, she would have to take the property "as is." He advised Ms. Mitchell that his sister had not lived in the property for a year. It was not clear from the evidence presented whether the property was vacant for that entire year or whether it had been rented out. Ms. Mitchell moved in after signing the second contract. Respondent claims Ms. Mitchell called almost daily with some complaint or other and he would have each one fixed. Finally, he met with her and the handyman and they went around to check everything out. She seemed satisfied. Nonetheless, after that Ms. Mitchell called to complain about the swimming pool. Respondent's sister and the handyman both went to the house to explain how to work the filtration system. To insure that there was no leak in the pool, Respondent gave Ms. Mitchell the name of the pool company which had serviced the pool for ten years so that if anything went wrong, she could contact them directly to have it checked and get instruction. While Respondent contends the pool company report indicated no leak and no major problems, Ms. Mitchell wrote on the invoice submitted by the repairman dated April 25, 1993, "... notified me and Mr. Rony [sic] of need to replace loose tiles and main drain leak and re- mastic due to extreme age of pool." Unfortunately, no direct evidence was presented which resolves the apparent inconsistency in the evidence. Mr. Roney claims he tried to remedy any problem Ms. Mitchell had with the house. For example, on April 3, 1995, she called to complain about the refrigerator. On April 4, 1995 he told her to call whomever she wanted, and if the estimate were reasonable, she could deduct the repair charge from the rent. If the charge were estimated to be major, she was instructed to call back. When she called and said the charge would be $100.00, he authorized it. However, a week later, Ms. Mitchell again called and complained about the refrigerator and Mr. Roney replaced it the next day. The problems with the refrigerator are documented by independent evidence of record. The replacement there was admitted by Ms. Mitchell. Respondent asserts that the delinquency notices and track toward the closing. When he found out that Ms. Mitchell was trying to get an appraisal done on the property, he tried to tell her that an appraisal would be done as a part of the mortgage process, but she wanted her own. The results of that independent appraisal were discussed previously. Sometime thereafter, Ms. Mitchell told Respondent she wanted out of the contract. The seller agreed to let her out if Ms. Mitchell would pay some rent for the period she occupied the property. As a result, Respondent tried to get her to pay. When she would not, he sent the eviction notices. Respondent admits he did not receive $2,853.00 in deposit money from Ms. Mitchell. That figure cited was the result of her representations to him that she could come up with it. When the contract was signed, she gave him a check for a part of it and said she'd come up with the balance, but she never came up with the full amount. Any deposit payments made by Ms. Mitchell were deposited with Stewart Title Company where it remains. It is impossible to determine how much was paid as deposit by Ms. Mitchell and how much, if any as rent. Respondent asserts Ms. Mitchell never made any claim to him for return of her deposit. Any claims for return were all made to Stewart Title. Ms. Roney, the owner, did not want to lease the property or sell it on a lease option. She wanted to sell it outright because she needed the money for other investments. She agreed to a lease-purchase arrangement only because the mortgage broker assured her Ms. Mitchell could clear her credit and the sale could go through. She also agreed because Ms. Mitchell had had the property inspected and appeared to be satisfied with its condition. Ms. Roney claims she had no problems with the pool when she lived there and also claims that since the property has been sold, the new owners have not contacted her regarding any problems with the pool. She would not approve a refund of deposit under the conditions of this dispute. Respondent contends there have been no complaints filed against him for the practice of his real estate profession in the 15 years he has been licensed. No evidence of prior misconduct was shown.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of misrepresentation and breach of trust in a business transaction and dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of December, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Paul H. Roney, Jr. 424 Beach Drive Northeast, Suite 205 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Henry M. Solares Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
