The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Joseph M. Conover committed the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Conover is a licensed security officer. He holds Class D, DI, G, and MB licenses from the Department. His license numbers are D9817475, DI2000134, G2003451, and MB9900202. Mr. Conover's Class G license allows him to carry a firearm, subject to the provisions of Section 493.6115, Florida Statutes. Mr. Conover has been licensed by the Department since 1998, and he has been an armed security officer since 2000 or 2001. Mr. Conover is the president and chief operating officer of Nova, which has its principle office in Brevard County. Mr. Conover resides in Brevard County. Nova's principle office is located within his home. Mr. Conover has managerial and supervisory duties in his position as president and chief operating officer of Nova. The duties include scheduling armed security guards for clients, ensuring the guards' compliance with applicable regulations, soliciting new clients, and maintaining contact with clients and the guards that are on duty. At the time of the events giving rise to the Administrative Complaints, Nova provided armed security guard services for ten apartment complexes and residential communities in Orlando. Nova did not provide security services for any location in Brevard County. On April 29, 2006, while in route to an armed security post in Orlando, Mr. Conover stopped to render aid at a motor vehicle accident in Brevard County. He rendered emergency medical care2/ to one of the individuals involved in the accident, and he also directed traffic at the scene. He was wearing his security guard uniform and carrying his firearm in plain view at the time. On May 1, 2006, while in route to an armed security post in Orlando, Mr. Conover stopped at a Starbucks in Brevard County. He got out of his car and went into the store to purchase a cup of coffee. He was wearing his uniform and carrying his firearm in plain view at the time. Mr. Conover testified that he was "on duty" at the time of each incident because he was performing managerial and supervisory duties while in route to Orlando. He testified that immediately prior to the accident on April 29, 2006, he was fielding calls on his two-way radio from the armed security guards who were on duty in Orlando, and he can be seen talking on his radio or cell phone on the videotape of the May 1, 2006, incident. However, there is no credible evidence that Mr. Conover was providing any managerial or supervisory duties to the security guards during the time that he was rendering emergency medical care and directing traffic at the accident scene. The managerial and supervisory duties that Mr. Conover was performing at the time of the incidents did not require him to be armed. First, as Mr. Conover acknowledged, there is a difference between managerial and supervisory duties and armed security guard duties. A Class G license is not required in order to perform managerial and supervisory duties for armed security guards, particularly where such duties are being performed off-site. Second, Mr. Conover was nowhere near the sites that Nova was providing armed security services at the time of the incidents. He was approximately 40 miles, and at least 25 to 30 minutes, away from the sites. Criminal charges were brought against Mr. Conover for impersonating a police officer and carrying a weapon in plain view based upon his activities at the accident scene on April 29, 2006. The charges were nol prossed by the State. The Department began its investigation of Mr. Conover in May 2006 based upon information received from the Indialantic Police Department in Brevard County concerning the incidents described above. In July 2006, Mr. Conover's attorney sent a letter to the Department requesting the Department's "official interpretation of Florida Statutes § 493.6115 regarding carrying of weapons and firearms." The letter included the following summary of a conversation between Mr. Conover's attorney and Art Varnadore, who the letter represented to be the Chief of Regulation and Enforcement for the Department: ccording to Florida Statutes Chapter 493, a security officer can only carry a firearm while on duty at an armed post. A security agency manager can only carry a firearm while on duty at an armed post. A security agency manager or security officer traveling between armed posts may keep his firearm on him in the car. However, he cannot leave the vehicle with a firearm unless at an armed post. The Department did not respond to this letter or a follow-up letter sent by Mr. Conover's attorney in August 2006. The letters were sent after the Department began its investigation into the incidents giving rise to the Administrative Complaint. There is no evidence that Mr. Conover ever sought guidance from the Department prior to the incidents. Mr. Conover has been complying with the procedures quoted above since July 2006. The Department publishes a "Security Officer Handbook," as required by Section 493.6123(2), Florida Statutes, in order to provide guidance to licensees regarding "the legal authority, rights, and obligations of his or her specific license." A copy of the handbook is supposed to be provided to each licensee. The handbook includes the following provisions pertinent to this case: e. Class "D" Security Officers who also possess a Class "G" license may carry a firearm only when the duty assignment requires armed security and only while on the post of duty. Section 493.6115(3), F.S. Example: A Class "D" Security Officer who also has a Class "G" license and is normally assigned to an armed post is assigned, temporarily, to an unarmed post. He may not carry his firearm on the temporary assignment. Example: The same security officer, while serving on his usual armed post, may not wear his firearm when he leaves his assigned post for other than duty purposes, such as for lunch, or when traveling to or from home. During such non-duty periods, the firearm must be removed and secured. * * * g. While the licensee is on duty, his firearm must be carried in a holster and in plain view. It may only be carried concealed under those conditions addressed in VIII.c. Section 493.6115(3), F.S.[3/] The handbook does not include a specific example addressing the conduct of licensees responsible for managing and supervising armed security guards. The examples in the handbook focus on licensees with assigned "posts of duties." Mr. Conover did not rely on any of the guidance in the handbook; he testified that he did not recall ever receiving a copy of the handbook. Mr. Conover has no disciplinary history with the Department. There is no credible evidence that the Department investigated or prosecuted this case for an "improper purpose," as alleged by Respondents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order that: Finds Mr. Conover guilty of carrying a firearm in violation of Section 493.6115(3), Florida Statutes, on April 29, 2006, and on May 1, 2006, as charged in Administrative Complaint No. CD2006-1316; and Imposes an administrative fine of $100 on Mr. Conover; Issues a formal reprimand to Mr. Conover. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of March, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 2008.
Findings Of Fact Gus B. Patterson is an applicant for a guard license for which he has filed an application with the Division of Licensing, Department of State. On his application, Patterson reveals that he has been arrested several times for various offenses. Patterson also showed that he had been employed as an armed guard for Pat Lane from 1972 to 1974. During this period he had been promoted to a supervisor. He was subsequently employed by Bradley, and held that position for three years until a new licensing requirement was enacted. He thereafter applied and his application was denied. The primary areas of concern to the Division of Licensing, Department of State were the allegations that Patterson had been arrested for breaking and entering in 1968. In 1975 Patterson was arrested for striking another car and sentenced to ten days for driving while intoxicated in lieu of paying $150 fine. He was also arrested and paid a fine for receiving stollen property, specifically an inspection certificate for his automobile which his daughter had obtained when she was suppose to get the car inspected. Patterson explained that he had had a series of brushes with the law rising out of his marriage in New York State. This culminated in his pleading guilty to a reduced charge of assault and burglary in 1968. In addition to the facts presented at the hearing, the Hearing Officer had an opportunity to observe and consider Mr. Patterson's testimony. Mr. Patterson is a mature black male who has a dry sense of humor and can, at this point in his life, laugh about the problems which he had with his ex-wife and the problems which this created for him. Since 1968, Patterson has obtained custody of one of his children from that marriage who resides with Patterson in his home in Miami. Patterson explained that he entered his plea of guilty because he had been in pretrial confinement for approximately one year and had used all of his money to pay an attorney from Georgia to represent him who the judge would not permit to appear in his behalf because he was not a member of the bar of New York.
Recommendation Based on the findings of fact, conclusions of law and factors in mitigation, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Division of Licensing, Department of State grant Gus B. Patterson a class F license as an unarmed watchman, guard or patrolman employee. DONE AND ORDERED this 21st day of July 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 1978. COPIES FURNISHED: Arlyne Warshall, Esquire Legal Services of Greater Miami, Inc. Post Office Box 47000N Miami, Florida 33147 Gus B. Patterson 2500 North West 173rd Terrace Opa Locka, Florida Gerald B. Curington, Esquire Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Marvin Sirotowitz Bureau Chief Division of Licensing The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner seeks licensure as both an armed and an unarmed security guard ("F" and "G" licenses). In support of his applications he submitted the required health certificate for a "Statewide Gun Permit" as well as his "Certificate of Firearms Proficiency" and the required affidavit attesting to his character and to his experience as a security guard. A "Temporary Gun License," No. 18279, was issued to the Petitioner on August 25, 1980. On October 27, 1980, the Respondent ultimately, by letter of that date, denied his application for licensure and informed him of his right to an administrative hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner timely elected to exercise that right and to adduce evidence supportive of his petition. The grounds for the denial were respectively that there was a substantial connection between an alleged lack of good moral character on the part of the Petitioner and the business for which he sought the license and that he fraudulently or willfully misrepresented his status in answering questions on the applications specifically the question regarding his prior arrest record. Additionally, the application was denied on the grounds that the Petitioner had in the past been found guilty of a crime which directly related to the business for which he seeks the license. The Petitioner, in answering the question regarding past arrests, admitted that he had been arrested for armed robbery in 1959. The Petitioner did not complete the answer regarding the disposition of that arrest, but candidly admitted at the hearing that he was confined in the state prison at Raiford, Florida for five years after being convicted of armed robbery and also candidly admitted a record for various other petty offenses in 1941, 1945 and 1946, none of which three incidents involved a sentence of longer than three months. On December 23, 1947, in Bartow, Polk County, Florida he was sentenced to three years in the state prison at Raiford for grand larceny. He was discharged from confinement on May 4, 1950. The uncontroverted testimony of the Petitioner at the hearing established that, although he was convicted and sentenced for grand larceny, the articles which he was convicted of stealing were: a watermelon, a cinnamon roll and a can of sardines. The Petitioner's only other conviction and confinement occurred in 1959 when he was convicted for armed robbery. The Petitioner served out this sentence and was discharged and has had no altercations with the law since that time. Give the basis upon which the application was denied, some elaboration of the circumstances surrounding that armed robbery conviction are appropriate. The Petitioner's stepson was employed by a trucking company as a driver and periodically made collections of large amounts of cash from freight customers of the truck line. Due to their dire financial circumstances at the time the Petitioner, his stepson, and the Petitioner's wife apparently entered into an arrangement whereby the stepson would alert them of the day and time on which he would be making collections of large amounts of cash so that the trio could convert the company receipts to their own use. According to the Petitioner's uncontroverted testimony, the Petitioner, armed with a lead pipe instead of a gun, as the charge had indicated, in conspiracy with his stepson and wife staged an apparent robbery to cover the actual theft of the company's funds. In any event, the trio were apprehended and in the subsequent negotiations or the trial, the Petitioner elected to assume sole responsibility for the "robbery" in order to protect the freedom and record of his wife and stepson. Consequently, the Petitioner was sentenced to five years for armed robbery and served out his sentence. The Petitioner thus established with credible, uncontroverted testimony that this armed robbery conviction actually did not stem from the forceable taking of the property of another with a firearm, but rather was a staged, "phony" robbery to cover a simple theft of the funds in question. The Hearing Officer is impressed with the obvious candor and forthrightness of the Petitioner in describing the events surrounding this and his other miscreant conduct in his distant past and with his continued remorse at its having occurred. Since his release from the state penitentiary in 1962, Mr. Walker has had no legal difficulties whatever. Per the last fifteen years or so he has been employed as a security guard for various security agencies in the Dade County area, primarily as an unarmed security guard, but serving at least one stint for an agency as an armed security guard, apparently by local authority. The Petitioner presented evidence at the hearing of a previously valid unarmed security guard license he has held, as well as the temporary gun license issued August 28, 1980. He also presented evidence in the form of identification cards and a badge establishing his employment as a security guard in the past, pursuant to Chapter 493, by a number of private security firms in the Dade County area. He has worked in a number of large department stores and warehouses wherein valuable merchandise was stored or kept and has never been involved in any incident involving theft of such goods. Escambia County recently saw fit to employ him temporarily as a security guard at Pensacola High School. He has had good working relationships with law enforcement authorities in his capacity as a security guard both in Dade and Escambia Counties and offered to bring to the hearing members of law enforcement agencies and the clergy in both counties to attest to his good conduct since his release from prison, nineteen years ago. The Petitioner freely acknowledged at the hearing that his answer to Question 13 on his applications did not disclose his entire arrest record, however, he states that he does not write well and had the secretary at the security firm where he was working at the time, in Dade County, fill out the applications for him. He maintains that he told the secretary all information about his criminal record and assumed that she had put it down, but signed the application hurriedly because he had to report for work and signed it as he was leaving the firm's office. He repeatedly demonstrated at the hearing that he had nothing to hide regarding his criminal record and was genuinely remorseful for its existence. He described in detail the various convictions and stipulated to the evidence of his criminal record which the Respondent offered. The Petitioner also demonstrated that during those times when he has worked as an armed security guard, primarily in Dade County, he has never had to use or display his gun to anyone and only wishes the use of a gun now for his own protection, since in his experience at his last job with the Ford Detective Agency in Dade County, the position became too dangerous for a security guard to occupy without having a firearm for protection. The Petitioner is now in his sixties and due to a slight heart condition is living entirely on Social Security disability income. He expressed the desire to go hack into security guard work in order to provide enough income to support himself, his wife and his young grandson whom he is helping to rear and who accompanied him to the hearing. He obviously has a keen desire to be able to support himself and his family without, as he put it, having to "live on the County" or the public treasury. He feels that security guard work is a duty he can readily fulfill despite his age since lie is of otherwise robust health, has substantial experience as a security guard, and the job is not a strenuous one. He has job offers with the St. Regis Paper Company and the Exxon Oil Company as well as the local newspaper. He is now working part-time collecting money for the local newspaper which is a dangerous job in his view in that he sometimes carries large amounts of cash in "high crime areas" of the county. He feels that he needs the right to possess a firearm for his own protection. Since his release from prison Mr. Walker has obviously undergone a profound change in his way of life away from repetitive confrontations with the law. He has become an exemplary family man, a church man and a Mason. He does not use alcohol or drugs whatever. He demonstrates significant independence and responsibility of character at his rather advanced age in wanting to obtain another job to support is family, rather than relying on relatives or the public treasury for subsistence.
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witness and the arguments of the parties it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of State, Division of Licensing, granting the Petitioner's application for licensure, both as an armed and an unarmed security guard. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: James V. Antista, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State Room 1801, the Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Curley Walker Post Office Box 619 Century, Florida 32535
The Issue Among the issues in this case are: Whether a court order sealing records of a criminal prosecution bars action by a school board against its employee on account of the facts underlying the prosecution? Whether the evidence showed that what was seized was actually marijuana? Whether the evidence established constructive possession? Whether the evidence showed that respondent's effectiveness as an employee of petitioner had been reduced? Whether petitioner can discipline an employee for "immorality" occurring before employment began? Whether petitioner can discipline an employee for "immorality" now that Section 231.36, Florida Statutes (1981) has been amended to delete "immorality" as such as grounds for dismissal or suspension?
Findings Of Fact After a telephone caller's report that a marijuana plant was visible in an apartment window was relayed by the Clewiston police dispatcher to Corporal Deese and Patrolman Meskin, they spotted the plant through a window on the ground floor of the Von Mach apartment building. Corporal Deese examined the specimen with binoculars, and photographs were taken. That afternoon, a warrant was issued authorizing the search of the corner apartment in which the plant stood. THE ARREST The following day, June 13, 1981, Officers Deese, Meskin and Hand executed the warrant. When they knocked at the apartment door, respondent Walton called out, "Come in." In one bedroom, they found towels lying around and men's clothing. They also found a marijuana plant and another species of plant growing in pots. A mirror had been positioned to reflect the sun's rays onto the plants. The only other bedroom in the apartment seemed to be unoccupied. The mattress in that bedroom lacked sheets. Respondent told them his roommate had moved out. Daniel Fairchild, employed, like respondent at the time, as a teacher at Clewiston High School, lived in the apartment from the beginning of October until mid-December, 1980. Norman Vaughn shared the apartment with respondent from early January of 1981, until June 12, 1981. When patrolman Meskin asked Mr. Walton to produce any other drugs in the house, respondent retrieved a plastic bag containing marijuana from among some newspapers on the floor. The searching party also seized a stained hemostat and a package of rolling papers. EFFECTIVENESS In the spring of 1981, there was "a widespread incident involving students in use of drugs" (T. 111) at Clewiston High School, with which respondent had nothing to do, as far as the evidence showed. Some students were expelled for the remainder of the school year, as a result. Mr. Walton's arrest for possession of marijuana was reported in the Clewiston News, a newspaper of general circulation in Hendry County, and became general knowledge in Hendry County. There was no evidence that any member of the public in Broward County had learned of Mr. Walton's arrest when these proceedings began. Respondent was employed by the Hendry County School Board on an annual contract basis. For reasons unrelated to this case, the 1980-1981 school year was his last as an employee of the Hendry County School Board. He finished working for the Board on June 12, 1981. PROPOSED FINDINGS CONSIDERED Both petitioner and respondent made post-hearing submissions, and their proposed findings of fact have been duly considered and, in large part, adopted in substance. To the extent they have been rejected they have been deemed irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the petition for dismissal filed against respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Whitelock, Esquire 1244 Southeast Third Street Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Richard H. Frank, Esquire Mark F. Kelly Law Offices of Frank & Kelly, P.A. 341 Plant Avenue Tampa, Florida 33606 William T. McFatter Superintendent of Schools The School Board of Broward County, Florida 1320 Southwest Fourth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s request for exemption from disqualification should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers. Petitioner is seeking employment with Always Promoting Independence, LLC, and Supporting Independence/Honor Health Care Management, both service providers are regulated by Respondent. Petitioner wants to work as a direct service provider, which requires background screening. The results of Petitioner’s background screening revealed a history of criminal offenses. Respondent relies on the Department of Children and Families Background Screening Unit (“Department”) to initially receive exemption from disqualification requests and to compile documents related to such requests. On February 8, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire (“Questionnaire”), various criminal records, character references, and other various documents (the “Exemption Packet”), to the Department seeking to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. The Department subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to the Agency for review. To begin its exemption review, Respondent considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. In May 1991, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of “Fraudulent Use of Credit Card” (six counts). Petitioner pled nolo contendere to the disqualifying offense and adjudication was withheld. She was sentenced to 24 months’ probation and payment of fines and court costs. She completed her term of probation early. In its continued exemption review, Respondent considered the following non-disqualifying offenses, which Petitioner obtained subsequent to her May 1991 disqualifying offense: an arrest for “Aggravated Assault with a Firearm” in August 1997 (a violation of section 784.021, Florida Statutes); an arrest for “Driving While License Suspended with Knowledge” in October 2007 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for “Driving While License Suspended with Knowledge” in September 2008 (another violation of section 322.34(2)); an arrest for “Possession of Cannabis” in March 2012 (a violation of section 893.13(6)(b), Florida Statutes); and a conviction for “Possession of Drug Paraphernalia” in March 2012 (a violation of section 893.147(1)). Petitioner received notification by letters dated September 22, 2015, and January 12, 2016, from the Department, Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in both letters was “Fraud-Illegal Use of Credit Cards,” a violation of section 817.61, Florida Statutes. Petitioner provided details of the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense. In short, Petitioner indicated she gave three “associates” a ride to the mall in exchange for their promise to buy her a new pair of shoes. She left the Champs sports store with her shoes, expecting one of her companions to pay for them. She was in her car when her companions ran from the store with a security guard in pursuit. They told her to start the car which she refused because she believed she had not done anything wrong. Unfortunately for her, one of her companions had attempted to pay for her new shoes with a stolen credit card. She and her companions were arrested and charged with credit card fraud. Petitioner provided documentation of the charge, the disposition after her no contest plea, and the fact that her probation was terminated early. Petitioner provided explanations for all but one of the non-disqualifying offenses that ranged from the gun charge being at the end of a “bad relationship” (her then-girlfriend falsely accused her); to she was pulled over for a broken taillight, then charged with driving with a suspended license (she claimed she paid her tickets and the license was reinstated, although no records were provided on this point); to she was pulled over for having too dark a window tint in her car and cannabis was found (she testified it was not hers), but, since no one confessed to ownership, all were cited for possession; and finally to no explanation at all for the 2007 driving with a suspended license charge. Petitioner accepted little responsibility for her criminal offenses and concluded with the statement that she has no current involvement with any court system; she stated she is in “good standing.” Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that there was no harm to any victim or property, including damage or injury, in her past. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that there were no stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying offense. Regarding current stressors in her life, Petitioner testified she is unable to provide for her family and she is eager to obtain and keep steady employment. Petitioner listed her educational achievements as a diploma from Clearwater High School (1988), an Associate in Arts degree from Tampa Tech in computer engineering (1991), and an Associate in Science (“A.S.”) degree from St. Petersburg College in human services (2014). Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she has received no counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she has no history of alcohol and drug abuse. Petitioner indicated on her Questionnaire that she is involved with a community organization known as “Parents that Care.” As to expressing remorse or accepting responsibility for her actions, Petitioner testified she completed her probation early and that she no longer surrounds herself with negative influences and people. Petitioner’s recent work history has been stable. Her work history since 2009 indicates she has worked for two groups providing direct support/in-home support staff: Supporting Independence/Honor Health Care Management (2012-present) and Peaceful Dreams, Inc. (2009-2012). In addition to the criminal records submitted, Petitioner also offered affidavits of good moral character, written personal statements, IRS W-2 Forms, a copy of her A.S. degree from St. Petersburg College, and three letters of reference attesting to her character. The letters were written by people who have known Petitioner for many years and who believe her to be hard-working, reliable, and caring. Petitioner also submitted a copy of an exemption from disqualification she had received from the Agency for Health Care Administration (“AHCA”) dated May 27, 2014. Jeffrey Smith, regional operations manager for the Suncoast Region, testified that the Agency reviewed all the provided documentation provided by Petitioner, the information provided on the Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her educational record, her character references, and her exemption from AHCA. Following a review of all the documentation included in the Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer advised Petitioner by a letter dated May 27, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Mr. Smith testified the Agency considered all the documentation submitted by Petitioner in her Exemption Packet, as well as the additional documents provided prior to and at the hearing. He did not find that the documentation negated or refuted the official records of the disqualifying and non- disqualifying offenses. Further, the fact that the non-disqualifying offenses related to Petitioner’s driving is relevant to the position for which she seeks an exemption from disqualification. A direct service provider is often called upon to transport individuals entrusted to her care. Petitioner’s statement that her license was reinstated and that she received no more driving citations after the offenses described above was refuted by Mr. Smith, based upon subsequent driving records regarding Petitioner. Mr. Smith also noted two additional reports from the Department in which Petitioner was named the alleged perpetrator. One report showed some indicators of child abuse (cuts/punctures/bites/excessive corporal punishment), and the other report involved allegations of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, specifically, one with a developmental disability, but resulted in no official findings of exploitation. The Agency’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of individuals whose developmental disabilities are defined as intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid syndrome. Without the Agency’s services, these clients would require institutionalization. Petitioner testified passionately that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities. Working in this field inspired her to return to school to earn a degree in human services. She testified that working with persons with disabilities is her long-term goal. She admitted she made some “foolish mistakes” when she was younger, but that she now accepts responsibility for her actions. She also testified that she believed her exemption should be granted because another agency, AHCA, had granted her an exemption from disqualification. Respondent countered with the fact that this vulnerable population requires being able to rely on the direct care provider’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals entrusted with the care of the disabled are often called upon to make decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. The Agency must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Petitioner’s history shows poor judgment on her part, and she provided testimony that was inconsistent with the documentation of her criminal history and the report and allegations of abuse or neglect from the Department. Petitioner admitted to use of a credit card of a vulnerable adult, which showed poor judgment on her part. Additionally, the close proximity of Petitioner’s most recent arrest (2012) to her request for exemption demonstrates her issues with the law are not limited to the distant past. Finally, Respondent, pursuant to section 435.07(5), Florida Statutes, considered the exemption given Petitioner by AHCA. The exemption from AHCA, however, is neither binding on the Agency nor does such exemption follow the same criteria or involve the same service population as the exemption sought from Respondent. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow Petitioner to be employed as a direct service provider to Agency clients. The undersigned appreciates Mr. Smith’s thoughtful and comprehensive assessment of Petitioner’s criminal history and fitness to hold a position of trust, and finds his testimony at hearing and reasons for recommending the denial to be credible and reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosemary Brinson 1010 Eldridge Street Clearwater, Florida 33755 Jeannette L. Estes, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 200 North Kentucky Avenue, Suite 422 Lakeland, Florida 33801 (eServed) Lori Oakley, Acting Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)
The Issue Whether the Agency’s intended action to deny Petitioner’s application for exemption from disqualification from employment is an abuse of the Agency’s discretion.
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner is a 37-year-old female residing in Jacksonville, Florida. She desires to work as a Medicaid waiver provider, an independent solo provider of community-based services to the Agency’s clients with developmental disabilities. On October 12, 2009, the Agency granted Petitioner an exemption from disqualification from employment for an offense of grand theft committed on December 28, 2001. Between 2004 and 2009, Petitioner was a service provider for Agency clients both in a group home setting and as a solo provider of community-based services. On July 14, 2011, the Florida Department of Children and Families issued Petitioner a notice that she was ineligible for continued employment in a position of special trust working with children or the developmentally disabled based on a felony offense of aggravated assault committed on December 30, 2010. The Disqualifying Offense On December 30, 2010, Petitioner was driving by her boyfriend’s home and noticed a vehicle backing out of his driveway. Petitioner knew the vehicle belonged to another woman, Ms. Stevens. Petitioner called her boyfriend on his cellular phone, confirmed he was in the car, and began conversing with him. Petitioner and her boyfriend engaged in a series of calls with each other over the next few minutes while she followed Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Petitioner wanted the driver of the car to pull off the road so she could talk to her boyfriend in person. Petitioner pulled her vehicle alongside Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. The situation escalated. The vehicles were traveling on a parallel path on a two-lane road in a residential subdivision. In her anger, Petitioner threw an open soda can through the rear window of Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Finally, Petitioner’s vehicle struck Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Shortly thereafter, both vehicles pulled off the road. Petitioner’s boyfriend exited the vehicle, but Ms. Stevens took off and returned with a law enforcement officer. The police report notes approximately $700 in damage to the two vehicles. During the entire incident, Petitioner’s two minor children were back seat passengers in Petitioner’s vehicle. Following an investigation, the police determined Petitioner was the primary aggressor. Petitioner was charged with one count of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and one count of criminal mischief and reckless driving. Petitioner served two days in jail. Petitioner pled nolo contendere to both charges, adjudication was withheld, and Petitioner was placed on 12 months’ probation, ordered to complete 75 hours of community service, attend anger management training, and pay fines and fees amounting to $1,068. Petitioner attended a one-day anger management class through the Salvation Army in 2011. Petitioner was released from probation on May 3, 2012. Employment Following the Disqualifying Offense Petitioner worked as an executive housekeeper for a Hilton Garden Inn in Jacksonville from June 2012 to November 2013. Petitioner worked briefly as a manager at a Subway restaurant between March and October 2014. In November 2014, Petitioner began employment as a manager at a Burger King restaurant in Jacksonville, where she remained employed on the date of hearing. Subsequent Criminal History Petitioner has had no disqualifying offense since the 2011 aggravated battery offense. Petitioner was cited for three traffic infractions between 2011 and 2013. One of the infractions was a criminal charge of driving without a valid driver’s license. The other two citations were for speeding and failing to yield the right- of-way. Petitioner’s Exemption Request Petitioner’s exemption package was slim. In addition to the exemption questionnaire, in which she provided little information regarding herself, Petitioner submitted a one-page narrative letter and two very brief character reference letters. On the questionnaire, Petitioner reported no damage to any persons or property from the disqualifying offense. Further, Petitioner reported no stressors in her life at the time of the offense. As to her current stressors, Petitioner reported none, and listed her family, church, and herself as her current support system. Petitioner reported no counseling other than the one- day anger management class completed in 2011. Petitioner listed no educational achievements or training. As for accepting responsibility for her actions, Petitioner wrote, “I feel very remorse [sic] for my actions and I take full responsibility for them.” One of the character reference letters was from a co- worker (perhaps even someone under her supervision) and did not identify the name of the employer or dates she worked with Petitioner. The letter described Petitioner as “dependable and committed to do her best” as well as “proficient in all cores of her profession.” The author further described Petitioner as a Christian who is very involved with her church and youth ministry, and who is considered a good and loving mother. The author of the second character reference letter did not identify her relationship to Petitioner, but indicated that she had known Petitioner for six years. She described Petitioner as “dependable and committed to the community as a youth leader and big sister to the children of her church.” Further, she wrote, “[Petitioner] is a compassionate and loving person, but above all she is a Christian who loves her children and her church.” In her personal statement, Petitioner described the events surrounding the disqualifying offense as follows: I was involved with a young man at the time of this incidence [sic]. What happen [sic] on that day was this young man had been calling my phone all day and we passed each other on the street in the same neighborhood and I followed him. We both at this time kept calling each others [sic] phone back to back. After a few blocks both cars came to a stop. Neither of us got out of the car. Each of us pulled off the same time and our cars bumped each other. After a few more blocks we stopped again. He got out of the car from the passenger side. I then realize [sic] that he was not the driver. A few minutes later the car came back. An off duty police officer with JSO wrote me a ticket for reckless driving, operating a vehicle with no insurance and criminal mischief. Mean while [sic] two more officers with JSO arrived on the scene and one of the officers decided to arrest me and charged me with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (with no intent to kill). Petitioner offered nothing else related to the disqualifying offense. Petitioner’s narrative does not reveal an understanding of the seriousness of her offense or offer any explanation for her behavior. Nor does the narrative back up her statements on the questionnaire that she feels remorse and has accepted responsibility for her actions. In formulating its decision to deny Petitioner’s request for exemption, the Agency considered the following factors to be significant: Petitioner’s disqualifying offense occurred just a year after having been granted an exemption from a prior disqualifying offense of grand theft. The offense demonstrated a lack of good judgement and decisionmaking. Petitioner was the primary aggressor. Petitioner’s children were in the car at the time of the incident. Petitioner was 32 years old at the time of the incident. Petitioner reported no life stressors at the time of the disqualifying offense and no significant changes in her life subsequently. Petitioner was not forthcoming in her application about the damage to the vehicles incurred during the incident. Petitioner’s driving record raises a concern with her ability to safely transport Agency clients. The Agency also considered that Petitioner’s character references were not from past or current employers, that they revealed very little about the relationship between the author and Petitioner, and that they did not acknowledge the disqualifying offense or offer any indication of changes in Petitioner’s life. Final Hearing Petitioner’s attitude at hearing was defensive. Petitioner took issue with the description of events surrounding the disqualifying offense noted in the police report. Petitioner particularly stressed that the vehicles were stopped, rather than traveling down the one-lane road side by side, when she threw the soda can into Ms. Stevens’ vehicle. Petitioner denied that she intentionally struck Ms. Stevens’ vehicle, but rather insisted that the vehicles “bumped” as they were both pulling off the road at the same time. Petitioner offered no witnesses on her behalf. Petitioner introduced one additional character reference letter from Reverend Charles G. Skinner, Pastor, Twin Springs Missionary Baptist Church. Pastor Skinner stated that he had pastored Petitioner for 10 years and had witnessed “spiritual maturity” in her life. In the letter, Pastor Skinner described Petitioner as an active member of the church, a devout Christian and mother “with an humbling nature exhibiting a thirst for erudition.” Petitioner did not demonstrate her humble nature at the hearing. Petitioner was defensive, argumentative, and spent her time pointing out “inaccuracies” in the police report. Petitioner has no understanding of the seriousness of her offense, and was “baffled” that the charge included a reference to a deadly weapon when she had no weapon at the time. Petitioner downplayed the event, testifying that the whole incident took maybe 8 to 10 minutes, and that the vehicles were traveling slowly, perhaps 15 to 20 miles per hour. Petitioner acknowledged that her children were in the vehicle at the time of the incident, but insisted they were not in danger and that she would never do anything to put her children in danger. Throughout the hearing, Petitioner emphasized she had no idea Ms. Stevens was driving the vehicle in which her boyfriend was riding, until the vehicles pulled off the roadway. Apparently Petitioner believed that the facts were more favorable to her if it was only her boyfriend she was trying to run off the road, rather than her boyfriend and “the other woman.” Petitioner failed to appreciate that no matter who was driving the vehicle, Petitioner’s actions put them at risk.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2016.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the administrative complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. More specifically the issue is whether a federal misdemeanor can be construed as a felony for purposes of Section 943.13(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation filed by the parties, the testimony of the witness and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Respondent was certified as a law enforcement officer by the Commission on March 31, 1985, and was issued certificate no. 12-85-002-01. On January 31, 1986, the Respondent entered a plea of guilty to the offense of forgery of a United States Treasury check, a violation of Title 18 USC Section 510(b)-(c) and (2), in the United States District Court, in and for the Southern District of Florida, case no. 85-8098-Cr-PAINE. The acts which gave rise to the criminal charge against Respondent had occurred prior to Respondent's certification. The Superseding Information charged that Respondent, along with two other named defendants, had falsely made and forged an endorsement on a check made payable to another. This alleged forgery occurred on or about April 31, 1984, at Fort Pierce, St. Lucie County, Florida. Respondent had been employed as a police officer by the Fort Pierce police department for approximately seven months when the warrant for his arrest was issued. He subsequently resigned his position. Respondent was adjudged guilty of the charge set forth in paragraph 2, and was placed on probation for a period of one (1) year. Respondent was also required to make restitution to First Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association of Fort Pierce in the amount of $179.71. Respondent was not required to serve a sentence of confinement. Respondent completed his probation and made restitution as required. The original charge against Respondent had been a felony, however, during the course of negotiations the charge was reduced to a misdemeanor. Respondent refused to plead guilty to the felony charge and testified he would have continued to fight a felony conviction. Respondent pled guilty to the federal misdemeanor on the belief that it would not affect his certification. Petitioner offered no evidence to establish the facts underlying the alleged criminal offense, i.e., that Respondent did, in fact, forge an endorsement on a check payable to another.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking the Respondent's law enforcement certificate, no. 12-85-002-01. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 28th day of October, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of October, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Diamond R. Horne 101 C Seaway Drive Fort Pierce, Florida 34950 Joseph S. White Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice standard and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Francisco Palafox, Jr., made applications for licensure as an unarmed guard and an armed guard. In both applications he answered that he had never been arrested. The Petitioner's fingerprints were checked by the Respondent Division through the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a record of arrest in San Francisco, California, was revealed for Frank Madrano Palafox, Social Security #560-96-6038, born January 14, 1953, in Arizona. Correspondence with the authorities resulted in receipt of records from San Francisco, California (Exhibit 1), which reveal that Frank Madrano Palafox was arrested and charged on August 21, 1973, with possession of a prohibited weapon, but later the charge was dropped to prohibited loitering while carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor. Palafox's occupation on these records is given as Army. The Petitioner produced his military records of discharge (DD 214), on which Petitioner's name, birth date, social security number and birth place were the same as that on the FBI report. Petitioner said that at the time of his arrest he had loaned his identification to another soldier. However, his DD 214 show that he was on leave at the time the arrest occurred, and that he was charged for excessive unearned military leave for the same number of days the arrest record shows that Palafox was jailed. The Petitioner then remembered he was arrested for "aiding and abetting prostitution." The Petitioner did not report the arrest for aiding and abetting on his application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Petitioner's applications for licensure as an unarmed guard and an armed guard be denied. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of January, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Francisco Palafox, Jr. 1551 Michigan Avenue, Apt. 12A Miami Beach, Florida 33139
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioner has demonstrated eligibility for licensure as a resident life, including variable annuity, insurance agent.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation and the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, documentary material received in evidence, stipulation of the parties, and evidentiary rulings during the hearings, and the entire record complied herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: The Department is the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2004). On October 4, 2004, Petitioner filed an online application with the Department seeking licensure as a resident life, including variable annuity, insurance agent. The online application form completed by Petitioner for the licensure at issue included the following question: Have you ever been convicted, found guilty, or pled guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) to a felony or crime punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or more under the laws of any municipality, county, state, territory or country, whether or not adjudication was withheld or a judgment of conviction was entered? Petitioner answered this question in the negative. On November 9, 2004, the Department sent a letter to Petitioner, requesting she provide, among other things, certified copies of court documents relating to her 1999 arrest in Hillsborough County, Florida, for child abuse. Petitioner found the above question to be confusing and in an attempt to be completely forthcoming, she sent the Department copies of two documents: (1) an August 9, 2004, letter to Petitioner from the Department of Corrections and (2) Petitioner's two-page printout regarding the Probation/Parole record. The Department received the referenced documents on November 23, 2004. Petitioner's criminal history established a November 18, 1999, arrest on two felony counts of aggravated child abuse. Petitioner had used an electric cord to spank her daughter as punishment for stealing and had left marks on the child as a result. The two-count information was filed in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County Circuit Court, Case No. 99-20373, on January 27, 2000. On December 13, 2000, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to one felony count of child abuse, as set forth in Count II of the information, and the second count pending against Petitioner was nolle prossed. The disposition of the case was that adjudication of guilt be withheld on the one felony count of child abuse and that Petitioner be placed on four years probation and required, inter alia, to complete parenting and anger management classes, which she did. Circumstances that resulted in Petitioner's plea involved her method of disciplining her daughter. Petitioner was born and grew up in Haiti and her method of punishment, spanking her daughter with electric cord, is culturally accepted. Spanking with electric cord leaves bruises and marks on the child spanked. Petitioner's testimony indicates that she learned through her anger management classes that the Haitian method of punishment is not considered appropriate, and other nonphysical methods would bring about desired results. Petitioner now has four children. She is employed by Lakeshore Villas, a nursing home where she is responsible for caring for elderly persons, as a full-time Certified Nursing Assistant (CNA). To acquire her CNA license from the Department of Health (DOH), Petitioner testified that she reported her criminal history to the DOH, and no disciplinary action was taken by the agency because of her plea. Even though the answer to the criminal history question on her application for licensure was not correct, circumstances evident from evidence of record reveals that Petitioner, in fact, disclosed her criminal history to the Department prior to the Department's specific inquiry about that history. She testified that her "no" answer on the application was because she spent only two days in jail. Subsequently realizing the possibility of a misunderstanding, Petitioner, before a request by the Department, mailed documents to the Department that disclosed her criminal history. Viewed in the totality of circumstances, Petitioner's voluntary disclosure of her criminal history negates any reasonable inference or conclusion that Petitioner made an intentional "[m]aterial misstatement, misrepresentation, or fraud in . . . [her] attempt to obtain the licensure or appointment," Subsection 626.611(2), Florida Statutes (2004). Likewise, the simple fact that Petitioner (through misunderstanding) incorrectly answered the application question does not show that Petitioner's conduct demonstrated a "lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance." Notwithstanding the foregone findings, there is no evidence that Petitioner was under the age of 21 years when the crime was committed. There is no written documentation from the prosecuting attorney evidencing the belief that Petitioner posed no significant threat to public welfare if licensed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not attempt to obtain the license at issue through material misstatement, misrepresentation or fraud, but that Petitioner has not met the 15-year mandatory waiting period applicable to her criminal history and is, therefore, ineligible for licensure pursuant to Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2004), and denying Petitioner's request for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Alia Baptiste Sossous 10310 Birdwatch Drive Tampa, Florida 33647 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carlos G. Muniz, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307
The Issue The issues in this matter are whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, and, if so, whether Respondent’s action to deny Petitioner's request for exemption from disqualification constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks employment as a direct service provider for persons with developmental disabilities. Petitioner desires to work with Project Choice, LLC, a service provider the Agency regulates. The Agency is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers. See § 393.0655(1), Fla. Stat. A “direct service provider” is a person who has direct contact with and provides services to an Agency client. See § 393.063(11), Fla. Stat. The Agency's clients are a vulnerable population consisting of those persons who are eligible for services and support for developmental disabilities. See § 393.063, Fla. Stat. Agency clients often have severe deficits in their ability to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. Agency clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, exploitation, and neglect because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve. Consequently, employment as a direct service provider is regarded as a position of special trust. The Agency relies on the Department of Children and Families, Background Screening Unit (the “Department”), to initially receive and screen requests for exemption from disqualification from individuals seeking employment as direct service providers. On June 28, 2015, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, with attachments, to the Department. The Department subsequently forwarded Petitioner’s application to the Agency for review. To qualify as a direct service provider, Petitioner must comply with the employment screening requirement established in chapter 435. See § 393.0655(1), Fla. Stat. Petitioner's background screening revealed a criminal offense. In September 1978, Petitioner was arrested for felony possession of marijuana in the State of Texas. Petitioner pled guilty and was given a suspended sentence. The court deferred adjudication of guilt and placed Petitioner on two years of probation. At the final hearing, the Agency also produced evidence of several non-disqualifying criminal offenses Petitioner committed subsequent to her 1978 drug arrest. Petitioner was arrested for or convicted of the following crimes: 1) a misdemeanor conviction for Possession of Marijuana in 2005; 2) Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear in 2008; 3) Bail Jumping and Failure to Appear in 2010; and 4) Failure to Appear in 2013. In accordance with section 435.04(2), Petitioner’s criminal misconduct, as a “disqualifying offense,” disqualified her from working as a direct service provider for persons with developmental disabilities. Consequently, in order to be employed in such a capacity, Petitioner was required to seek an exemption from disqualification from the Agency. Therefore, Petitioner submitted to the Agency a Request for Exemption from her disqualifying offenses as provided in section 435.07. On February 4, 2016, the Agency issued a letter notifying Petitioner that it denied her Request for Exemption. The Agency denied Petitioner’s application because it did not believe Petitioner submitted clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified on her own behalf. Petitioner expressed her desire to work as a caregiver for disabled persons. Petitioner described herself as a giving, helpful, and responsible person. Petitioner further explained that she is seeking a change in her career in light of her recent health challenges. She is also the sole supporter of her family. Petitioner believes that a job as a health care assistant for persons with developmental disabilities will allow her to take care of her family, as well as accommodate her physical limitations. Regarding her disqualifying offense, Petitioner explained that her 1978 felony arrest for marijuana possession occurred when she was only 19 years old. She explained that she had little life experience after growing up in a small town, and she had just started college in Houston. Her boyfriend asked her to carry a suitcase for him in her car on a drive back to college. Unfortunately for Petitioner, a state trooper stopped her car for speeding. Even more unfortunately for Petitioner, the state trooper searched her trunk. The state trooper found her boyfriend’s suitcase. And, inside it, the state trooper found marijuana. Petitioner claimed that she had no knowledge of the contents of her boyfriend’s suitcase. Despite her lack of knowledge, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge. Regarding her four non-disqualifying offenses, Petitioner explained that her 2005 conviction for marijuana possession also involved a car trip near Houston. She disclosed that a friend asked her to carry some Christmas presents in her car. In a lamentable case of déjà vu, a state trooper stopped her car for speeding. The state trooper searched her trunk. The state trooper found her friend’s Christmas presents. And, inside a present, the state trooper found marijuana. Once again, Petitioner stated that she had no knowledge of the contents of her friend’s presents. Despite her lack of knowledge, Petitioner pled guilty to the charge. Regarding the multiple bail jumping and failure to appear convictions, Petitioner explained that she had problems knowing when her court dates were scheduled. In expressing that she has rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense, Petitioner asserts that she has moved past her criminal misconduct, and her record is now clear. She has satisfied all fees, fines, and sentences from her criminal charges. Petitioner stated that she has learned not to expose herself to these bad situations. Furthermore, her crimes did not result in harm to any victims or property. Petitioner testified that there are no present stressors in her life, and she relies on her faith for inner guidance and strength. Petitioner has had a stable work history for the past six years. Petitioner also represented that she has taken several Agency training courses in order to become better prepared to work with disabled persons. Additionally, at the final hearing, Petitioner produced evidence that she voluntarily attended a faith-based, alcohol rehabilitation program in 2006. She sought assist from the rehabilitation program based on her concerns with her alcohol consumption. Petitioner asserted that the rehabilitation program was very helpful and successful. Petitioner also provided four letters of reference attesting to her good character. The letters were written by various individuals, including some in notable positions, who have known Petitioner for several years. The letters describe Petitioner as hard-working, caring, and nurturing. At the final hearing, the Agency presented the testimony of Jeffrey Smith, regional operations manager for the Suncoast Region. Mr. Smith oversees all services to persons with developmental disabilities in his jurisdiction. Mr. Smith’s responsibilities include reviewing requests for exemption from disqualifying offenses. Mr. Smith explained that the Agency serves vulnerable individuals who are highly susceptible to abuse, exploitation, and neglect due to their developmental disabilities. Many of the tasks direct service providers offer Agency clients involve financial, personal, and/or social necessities. Therefore, the Agency must ensure that direct service providers are detail- oriented and trustworthy. When considering a request for an exemption, the Agency must weigh the benefit against the risk of endangerment to its clients. Mr. Smith described the Agency’s process when reviewing a request for exemption from disqualification. Mr. Smith relayed that the Agency considers the disqualifying offense itself, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of any harm caused to a victim, the history of the employee since the incident and, finally, any other evidence indicating that the individual will present a danger if employment is allowed. Specifically regarding Petitioner’s application, Mr. Smith explained that the Agency reviewed all of the documentation Petitioner provided in her Request for Exemption, including the various records documenting Petitioner's criminal history, her work experience, and her character reference letters. In addition to her criminal records, the Agency reviewed Petitioner’s driving record. Mr. Smith advised that a direct service provider will often be tasked to transport clients. Mr. Smith noted that Petitioner's driving record included several traffic related violations. He commented that these records show a pattern of questionable judgment by Petitioner. Mr. Smith further testified that the Agency considered Petitioner’s evidence of rehabilitation, including Petitioner’s statements submitted with her Request for Exemption and the letters of recommendation supporting her application. Mr. Smith explained that, based on its review, the Agency determined that Petitioner's criminal history indicates a pattern of poor judgment and a lack of acceptance of full responsibility for her actions. Petitioner’s repeated involvement with the criminal court system reflects a lack of remorse for her misconduct. In addition, the Agency found that Petitioner failed to disclose the full and complete details of her criminal offenses in her application. Mr. Smith testified that inconsistencies in Petitioner’s Exemption Questionnaire, including her unreported attendance at the alcohol rehabilitation program, called her truthfulness into question. Finally, Mr. Smith was concerned about the nature of Petitioner’s offenses (disqualifying and non-disqualifying), as well their close proximity in time with Petitioner’s application. Upon careful consideration of the record evidence, the undersigned finds that Petitioner did not demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense from 1978. While Petitioner has made commendable strides to change her life, her repeated criminal proceedings since 1978 raise serious concerns, and some hesitancy, in finding that she has sufficiently established that she should be employed in a position of special trust with persons with developmental disabilities. Despite the fact that Petitioner's disqualifying and non-disqualifying offenses did not result in harm to another, they do demonstrate a failure to exercise good judgment and responsibility that cannot be discounted. Therefore, based on the evidence set forth, Petitioner has not met her burden of demonstrating that she has rehabilitated from her past disqualifying offense or proven that the Agency should grant her request for exemption from disqualification under sections 393.0655 and 435.07.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2016.