Findings Of Fact The facts reveal that Jose Gonzalez, a driver for the Respondent, operating one of Respondent's tractor/trailer pieces of Respondent, went to a rock company located in Hollywood, Florida, on February 13, 1978, for the purpose of picking up a load of "P" rock. This rock was purchased from Miramar Lakes, d/b/a Miramar Rock on that date and the driver, Gonzalez, was given a weight ticket. The weight ticket from Miramar Rock reflected a gross weight of 72,360 pounds, which is the total of the equipment and load. (The scales at Miramar peck used to weigh the Respondent's equipment and load had been certified by the Petitioner to be accurate on June 7, 1977, and again on April 11, 1978.) The weather on February 13, 1978, was clear and the purchase, loading and weighing done on the subject equipment was without incident, until the driver attempted to pull away from the weight scales. At that moment the universal joint and yoke snapped and this caused the vehicle to be inoperable. Gonzalez left the truck at the Miramar Rock Company. At that point, the load was covered by a canvas and the trailer was not seeping or leaking water from the rock aggregate. Later, on February 13, 1978, a mechanic employed by the Respondent came to effect repairs to the vehicle, but due to the unavailability of certain parts necessary to complete the repairs, did not finish the work until February 14, 1978. When the repairs had been completed on that date, the driver, Gonzalez, removed the truck from the Miramar Rock compound and entered the roads of Broward County, Florida. At around 9:15 a.m. on February 14, 1978, Gonzalez arrived at the intersection of Hollywood Boulevard and Flamingo Road in Broward County, Florida, eastbound on Hollywood Boulevard. At that intersection, officers employed by the Florida Highway Patrol, Weights Division, intercepted the Des Rocher truck and caused the vehicle to stop. After the stop the equipment being operated at that time was established to be a vehicle measuring between 37 feet to 38 feet from the front axle to the rear axle, and the peak of the rock load was located in the center rear portion of the trailer. Officer Wilkerson of the Florida Highway Patrol observed water dripping out of the rear tailgate after making the stop. Gonzalez was asked to produce a weight ticket and in response to this request produced the weight ticket given him by Miramar Rock on February 13, 1978. Officer Wilkerson commented that this ticket was from the day before and that a ticket bearing the current date was required. Gonzalez was then told that the truck would be weighed with the method for weighing the truck being by two portable scales. Officer Wilkerson weighed one side of the truck and Officer Herron went to the other side of the truck. Wilkerson weighed the steering axle on his side of the truck; the drive axle on his side of the truck, and two tires on the rear tandem axles on his side of the truck. It is not known what Officer Herron did, if anything, in effecting the purposes of this inspection and weigh-in, because Officer Herron did not appear at the hearing in this cause and was not seen by Officer Wilkerson in conducting his inspection activities, if any. Therefore, the total weight of the truck as ascertained from the inspection ostensibly conducted by these officers was not shown by competent evidence. However, it was demonstrated through the testimony in this hearing that the plan which the officers had for making the roadside inspections was one which called for basically stopping all trucks of the category of aggregate haulers that were eastbound through the intersection on Hollywood Boulevard, to the exclusion of pickup trucks and moving vans. After stopping the former category of trucks, some were weighed and others were not. As a result of the stop, Gonzalez was ticketed for a weight violation and that ticket was in the amount of $136.45 as an assessed penalty. Gonzalez then took the truck back to the Des Rocher installation which contained a set of scales and between 10:15 a.m. and 10:30 a.m. the truck was weighed and shown to be 35.64 tons, or 71,280 pounds as the gross weight including the equipment and load. (The scales that were utilized had been certified by the Petitioner on June 7, 1977, and again on May 8, 1978.)
The Issue Whether Respondent violated sections 475.42(1) (b) and (e), and 455.227(1) (j), Florida Statutes (2011), as alleged in the Administrative Complaint; and, if so, the appropriate penalty.1/
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Ms. Hendrick held real estate sales associate license number 3239708 with the State of Florida. From February 24 to April 18, 2011, Ms. Hendrick was registered with the Department as a sales associate with Florida Home Choice Realty, LLC, which is a brokerage company located in Winter Haven, Florida, and holds license number CQ 1037790. The record shows that Ms. Hendricks’s license was inactive for the time period of April 18-20, 2011. Her license was then activated for the time period of April 20, 2011, until April 20, 2012. During the time period of April 20, 2011 to April 20, 2012, Ms. Hendrick was listed in the Department's records as a sales associate affiliated with EZ Choice, Incorporated, trading as EZ Choice Realty license number CQ 1036523. Since April 20, 2012, Ms. Hendricks’s real estate sales associate license has been listed as inactive with the Department. La Roca Realty International Corporation (La Roca Realty) is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida, and listed with the State of Florida, Department of State. The Articles of Incorporation on file with Florida Department of State show that Ms. Hendrick incorporated La Roca Realty on October 27, 2010, listing herself as registered agent, initial officer, and director. On November 23, 2010, Ms. Hendrick filed an amendment to the Articles of Incorporation, removing herself as initial officer and director, and placing ownership of the stock in Mr. Harry Hunt and Ms. Louise Allen. A Certificate of Non-Licensure, dated May 10, 2012, shows "no evidence that La Roca Realty ever had a current or active license as a real estate brokerage in the State of Florida, in accordance with chapter 475, Florida Statutes." As such, it is clear that at all times pertinent to this case, La Roca Realty did not hold a brokerage license. In late March 2010, Mr. Howes, a real estate investor from Canada, sought to invest in Florida. Mr. Howes was seeking to purchase between 10 and 15 homes in the Orlando, Florida, area. Mr. Howes holds a real estate license in Canada; thus, he is familiar with purchasing and investing in real estate. Mr. Howes contacted a Florida bank located in Kissimmee, to discuss his potential investment. During the meeting, the bank loan officer informed Mr. Howes that he had a friend who was a realtor and could help him. The loan officer introduced Mr. Howes to Ms. Hendrick on March 30, 2011. During the initial meeting, Ms. Hendrick provided Mr. Howes with a business card, which showed Ms. Hendrick as a "Realtor" for "La Roca Realty." Further, Ms. Hendrick informed Mr. Howes that she could be his realtor, and she began to forward potential investment properties to Mr. Howes for consideration. Further, Ms. Hendrick showed Mr. Howes specific properties which she stated were for sale. Mr. Howes became suspicious about Ms. Hendrick because when he asked the name of the seller of the homes, Ms. Hendrick stated that all title checks would list "owner of record." Furthermore, Ms. Hendrick informed Mr. Howe that he should make any escrow deposit check for the purchase of the homes payable to La Roca Realty. Based on his prior real estate experience, Mr. Howe knew that escrow deposit checks were made payable to the listing agent, not the buyer's real estate agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that: Ms. Hendrick violated sections 475.42(1)(b) and 475.25(1)(e), as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and fining her $1,000.00; Ms. Hendrick violated section 455.227(1)(j), as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and fining her $1,000.00; and Suspending her real estate license for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 2012.
The Issue The issue is whether disciplinary action should be taken against the contracting licenses held by Respondent, Jeffrey J. Clark, for the reasons stated in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Clark, doing business as JV Clark General Contractors, Inc., is a Florida State certified general contractor with license number CGC 061010, and his license as of May 2, 2008, was "current, active." He has held this license since November 16, 1999, and there is no evidence of record that any license held by him has been the subject of disciplinary proceedings. In the same capacity Mr. Clark is a Florida State certified roofing contractor, with license number CCC 1327256 and his license as of May 5, 2008, was "current, active." JV Clark General Contractors, Inc., has a Certificate of Authority as a contractor qualified business. Its license number is QB 0018745, and as of May 5, 2008, the license was "current, active." Mr. Clark is the "qualifying agent" for JV Clark General Contractors, Inc. Mr. Clark is the sole owner and is the registered agent of a business named the Affordable Door Company, Inc. (Affordable Door), which has an address of 2811 South Nova Road, Daytona Beach, Florida. The Department is the state agency charged with providing investigation and prosecutorial services to the Board. On or about August 20, 2004, Affordable Door entered into a written contract with the Sand Dollar Condominium (Sand Dollar). The contract provided that Affordable Door would sell 13 fire doors to Sand Dollar and thereafter would install the doors. In entering into this agreement, Affordable Door was engaged in contracting, as that term is used in Subsection 489.105(6), Florida Statutes. The contract did not include Mr. Clark's license number and did not contain a written notification of the Recovery Fund. The contract required Sand Dollar to pay Affordable Door a total of $13,374.40. On August 28, 2004, Sand Dollar paid $2,769 on the contract. On October 12, 2004, Sand Dollar paid $4,430.40 on the contract, and on February 1, 2005, Sand Dollar paid the balance. On December 6, 2004, Mr. Clark applied to the City of Daytona Beach Shores Building Department for a permit to perform the work contracted by Sand Dollar. The building permit application for the Sand Dollar job was made by JV Clark General Contractors, Inc., and listed an address of 2811 South Nova Road, Daytona Beach, Florida. Mr. Clark's license number, CGC 061010, was provided on the permit application. The permit, number BP2005-41, was issued on December 20, 2004. The permit called for replacing stair doors and frames within Sand Dollar. The permit was signed by Mr. Clark and was notarized. The manufacturer of the doors to be installed required that the doors have their jams filled with grout in order to meet standards set forth in the Daytona Beach Shores Building Code. However, the grouting was not accomplished. As a result, when Daytona Beach Shores Building Inspector Steve Edmunds inspected the job, he found the work to be deficient. Marlene Wuester is the association manager for Sand Dollar. She is responsible for the operation of the 57-unit building. When Ms. Wuester learned that the doors had failed the inspection, she attempted to contact Mr. Clark. She sent a letter dated April 20, 2006, to Mr. Clark at the 2811 South Nova Road address informing him that if he did not cause the doors to meet the required standards that Sand Dollar would hire another contractor to do it, and that Sand Dollar would thereafter seek damages. Mr. Clark did not respond to the letter and did not otherwise respond to Ms. Wuester's efforts to contact him. Ultimately, Sand Dollar paid Flores-Hager and Associates, Inc., $950.00 and General Mechanical Corporation $3,900.00 to bring the doors into compliance with the applicable code. Mr. Clark testified that Affordable Door was managed by Dave Randolph and that generally the company sold doors to other contractors. The contract with Sand Dollar was exceptional and even though Mr. Clark was the permittee, the installer was a man named Jim St. Louis. Mr. Clark asserted that he did not receive communications from Sand Dollar, and therefore could not respond to Sand Dollar, because his business moved from the 2811 South Nova Road address. However, as the licensed contractor, it was Mr. Clark's duty to see that the job was completed in accordance with the applicable building code.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board enter an order finding that Jeffrey J. Clark, d/b/a JV Clark General Contractors, Inc., is guilty of Counts I through IV and Count VI, and that licenses numbered CGC 061010, CCC 1327256, and QB 0018745 be suspended until such time as Jeffrey J. Clark, d/b/a JV Clark General Contractors, Inc., pays a fine in the amount of $2,000.00 and makes restitution to the Sand Dollar Condominium Association in the amount of $4,850.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey J. Clark JV Clark General Contractors, Inc. 2027 South Ridgewood Avenue Edgewater, Florida 32132 Arthur Barksdale, IV, Esquire Wright, Fulford, Moorhead & Brown, P.A. 145 North Magnolia Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Ned Luczynski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 G. W. Harrell, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
Conclusions The record in this proceeding and the Recommended Order of the Hearing Officer have been reviewed. Respondent, Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT), has filed exceptions to the Recommended Order and Petitioner has filed a response thereto. FDOT's exceptions are considered and addressed below.1 The Findings of Fact set forth in the Recommended Order are considered correct and are incorporated as part of this Final Order with the following exception. The Hearing Officer noted that FDOT's appeal of DOAH Case No. 87-0621R, is currently pending before the First District Court of Appeal. This is incorrect. The matter is pending before the Fifth District Court of Appeal. FDOT's exceptions to Findings of Fact numbered 4, 7, 8, 9, 16, 23, 26, 27, 28, and 34 are rejected as an impermissible attempt to supplement the Hearing Officer's findings. Inverness Conval. Ctr. v. Dept. of H.R.S., 512 So. 2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Cohn v. Dept. of Professional Regulation, 477 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985). FDOT takes exception to the Findings of Fact number 24, claiming , in paragraph 1, that there is a lack of substantial record evidence that material from Merritt Island mine No. 70-1 tested less that the minimum carbonate requirement. However, closer examination of the exception reveals that the foundation of the claim lies in the Hearing Officer's omission of certain language contained in the Gammage memo of September 30, 1969. As noted above, the Department cannot supplement the Hearing Officer's finding. Consequently, paragraph one of the exception must be rejected. Similarly paragraph two, going to omitted facts must be rejected as well. The Hearing Officer's Finding of Fact number 25 is essentially a summary of Blackhawk's Exhibit 13 and is supported by competent substantial evidence. Consequently, FDOT's exceptions thereto are rejected. FDOT also takes exception to Finding of Fact number 29, Claiming first that there is competent substantial record evidence to support the finding that FDOT has never conducted a study to document the necessity of the 50 per cent carbonate requirement. Respondent is mistaken. The record reflects that FDOT personnel and their expert gave testimony indicating that such specific research had never been conducted. (TI 348, 434, 435, 480; TII 24, 71) FDOT's second and third complaints being predicated upon the omission of facts, must also be rejected. FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 30 is rejected because the record reflects that Dr. Eades testified that as used in this state, LBR is the indicator of the ultimate strength of the material. (TI 412, 434) FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 31 amounts to a challenge t the Hearing Officer's weight and credibility determinations regarding Dr. Bromwell's testimony, and consequently must be rejected. Heifetz v. Dept. Of Business Regulation, 475 So. 2d 1277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). FDOT's first two paragraphs in its exception to Finding of Fact number 32 constitute challenges to the Hearing Officer's credibility determinations, the inferences she drew from the evidence, and her failure to rely upon or cite certain facts as opposed to others. As noted above, exceptions predicated on these types of grounds must be rejected. The third paragraph of this exception must also be rejected because record testimony clearly demonstrates that Bill Wisner testified that the Merritt Island mine was in existence for three to five months -- a very short period of time. (TI 52) FDOT's exception to Finding of Fact number 35 is rejected as being immaterial to the ultimate disposition of this matter. FDOT's exceptions to Findings of Fact numbers 36, 38, and 40, in the final analysis, represent challenges based upon the credibility and weight determinations of the Hearing Officer, and the inferences drawn from the record evidence. Since weight and credibility determinations cannot be disturbed, and since the inferences drawn, while not palatable, are nonetheless arguably reasonable, these exceptions must be rejected. Heifetz v. Department of Business Regulation, supra.
