Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint with leave to file an amended administrative complaint alleging post-licensure misconduct only, within twenty days of the order of dismissal. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Dean Bunch, Esquire P. O. Drawer 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Dennis S. Valente, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert Dempsey, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Mason Calvin Jackson, licensed by Petitioner at all times relevant to these proceedings to engage in the business of insurance as a life agent, a life and health agent and as a health insurance agent. On or about August II, 1987, Respondent entered a plea of guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida to dealing in counterfit obligations or securities of the United States in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 473. Respondent was adjudged guilty of the offense and subsequently sentenced to incarceration for six months followed by three years of probation. The maximum sentence for the offense is a fine of $5,000 and/or imprisonment of 10 years. Respondent's guilty plea, conviction and sentence are undisputed. No evidence was presented regarding the underlying factual basis upon which Respondent's guilty plea, conviction and sentence rest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent has demonstrated a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance in violation of Sect 626.611(7), Florida Statutes, and revoking his licenses and eligibility for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 88-1234, 88-1468 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS Addressed in finding 1. Addressed in finding 1. Addressed in finding 2. Addressed in finding 3. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-2. Addressed in finding 1. 3. Addressed in findings 2-3. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Marc Herskovitz, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 John Witt, Esquire 1610 Southern Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406 Don Dowdell, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Hon. William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether there is a disputed issue of material fact to be resolved by an administrative hearing.
Findings Of Fact On October 30, 1991, the Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, issued an administrative complaint against Marilyn Mirus, the Petitioner herein. [Administrative complaint attached to motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibit A, not disputed by Petitioner] The administrative complaint alleged three violations of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes: having been convicted or found guilty, regardless of adjudication, of a crime in violation of Section 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes; having been found guilty of a course of conduct which shows dishonesty in violation of Section 475.25(1)(o), Florida Statutes; and having failed to inform the FREC of having pled nolo contendere or having been convicted of a felony within thirty days of such conduct in violation of Section 475.25(1)(p), Florida Statutes. [Exhibit A to the motion, not disputed by Petitioner] The allegations arose as a result of a criminal case in Broward County, Florida (Case no. 91-4894CF) wherein the Petitioner was charged with 31 counts of grand theft. In connection with those charges, the Petitioner pled nolo contendere and received a five year probation. Additionally, the court withheld adjudication of guilt for all counts. [Exhibit A to the motion, not disputed by Petitioner] As an additional condition of the sentence, Petitioner was required to make restitution in the amount of $69,834.50 to the alleged victim. [Exhibit A to the motion, not disputed by Petitioner] To resolve the charges of the administrative complaint, Petitioner entered into a stipulation attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibit B. [Not disputed by Petitioner] The stipulation provided, in pertinent part: Respondent [Petitioner herein] neither admits nor denies all the allegations of essential fact contained in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent admits that the allegations of fact contained in the Administrative Complaint, if true, support a finding of a violation of the Real Estate Practice Act. There is currently pending in the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal an appeal (hereafter, "the Appeal") of the Order dated March 2, 1992 (hereafter, "the Order"), denying the Respondent's Motion to Vacate and Set Aside Plea in Case No. 91-4894, Division FM, in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. STIPULATED DISPOSITION * * * 8. The Respondent's license shall be suspended beginning on the filing date of the Final Order approving this Stipulation. Thereafter, the suspension shall remain in effect during the pendency of the Appeal. Immediately upon the conclusion of the Appeal, the Respondent's license shall be automatically and permanently revoked unless the Order is reversed as the direct and immediate result of the Appeal. In the event of such reversal, the suspension shall be lifted. * * * 13. The Respondent expressly waives all notice requirements and right to seek judicial review of or to otherwise challenge or contest the validity and enforcement of this Stipulation and resulting Final Order of the Commission adopting and incorporating this Stipulation. [Emphasis added.] A final order accepting the stipulation entered into by the parties was adopted on May 19, 1992. [Attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibit C, not disputed by Petitioner] The District Court of Appeal rendered a decision on April 21, 1993, which denied Petitioner's request to set aside the nolo contendere plea. Her requests for a rehearing on that decision were also denied. [Attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction as Exhibits D and E, not disputed by Petitioner] Petitioner maintains [Response to order issued by Hearing Officer on November 29, 1995] she should be able to challenge the denial of licensure because of the following disputed matters: Did Petitioner commit the crimes of which she was accused, and to which she plead nolo contendere? The Courts have held that when there is a plea of nolo contendere filed, it raises the presumption that a crime had been [sic] convicted. However, the Courts have held that the Licensee has the opportunity to rebut this presumption and assert his or her innocence of the underlying criminal charges together with what the reasons and circumstances were to show why the plea of nolo contendere was raised. See Ayala v. Department of Professional Regulations, 478 So.2d 116 (1st DCA Fla. 1985) and Son v. Florida Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate, 608 So.2d 75 (3rd DCA Fla. 1992). Was the Petitioner advised as to what the effect of her plea of nolo contendere would have as the same relates to the revocation of her license by the Department of Business and Professional Regulations? What was the effect of revocation of one's Real Estate License on April 7, 1992, at the time the stipulation was entered into by Petitioner? Has the effect of a revocation on a license changed from April 7, 1992 [to] today, if so, was her (sic) advise proper to enter into the Stipulation had she known what the law was today as it relates to the law of 1992? (It wasn't until October 1, 1992 that revocation became permanent. Prior to that date the laws of Florida were silent as to the term of a revocation. Section 455.227(4) F.S. 1992.) Was the adjudication withheld and was the file sealed as it relates to the criminal charges which were the subject of the original complaint against Marilyn Mirus? Is the Petitioner now held accountable for a crime that under the Florida law for all intents and purposes she did not commit nor was she even charged with such a crime? Petitioner has not challenged the authenticity or accuracy of the documents attached to the motion to relinquish jurisdiction.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order dismissing the request for hearing filed by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver Assistant Attorney General Suite 107 South Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 William J. Haley, Esquire BRANNON, BROWN, HALEY, ROBINSON & BULLOCK, P.A. 10 North Columbia Street Lake City, Florida 32056-1029 Henry Solares Division Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue By a two-count Amended Administrative Complaint, the Department of Insurance has charged Respondent, a licensed Florida life and health insurance agent, pursuant to Count I with violations of Sections 626.611(7), 626.611(14) and 626.621(8), F.S. arising out of his plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge of grand theft, and pursuant to Count II with violating Section 626.611(7) F.S. arising out of adjudication of guilt to multiple misdemeanor charges of issuing worthless bank checks.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently eligible for licensure and licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent and as a health insurance agent. He has been so licensed since 1985, and except for the facts, as set out infra., no disciplinary charges have ever been filed against him. Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint On December 6, 1989, Respondent was charged by Information in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, in and for Alachua County, Florida, in Case No. 89-4842-CF, with a felony, to wit: Grand Theft in the third degree, a violation of Section 812.014, F.S. Respondent admitted that Case No. 89-4842-CF arose out of his writing a check on First Union Bank to cover computers previously contracted for by Respondent for his insurance agency. When he wrote the check, Respondent knew that he was short of funds but expected to deposit sufficient funds to the appropriate account before his check was presented for payment. When this "kiting" episode occurred, Respondent was short of funds due to an illegal conversion of funds perpetrated by one of his employee agents. Respondent did not get the money into his account in a timely manner and did not later "make the check good" before prosecution began. In accord with the appropriate regulatory rules, Respondent reported the illegal conversion by his employee agent to the Petitioner Department of Insurance and cooperated with that agency. He also reported the offending employee agent's illegal conversion to the local State Attorney. He cooperated in a criminal prosecution and filed a civil action in his own right against the offending agent. These events further depleted his assets and in part accounted for his being unable to make his check good. On July 19, 1990, in response to the Information filed against him, Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere to grand theft, a felony in the third degree, in Circuit Court Case No. 89-4842-CF. With adjudication of guilt withheld, Respondent was placed on probation for one year and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $7,139.29 to First Union Bank. Pursuant to court papers and Respondent's testimony, it appears that he was first given until July 19, 1991 to complete restitution on this charge. Respondent testified without refutation that he had received an extension from the circuit court until July of 1993 in which to make this restitution. That date had not yet been reached as of the date of formal hearing. With regard to his nolo contendere plea to a third degree felony, adjudication withheld, Respondent's unrefuted testimony is that he was represented by an attorney, Johnny Smiley, until Mr. Smiley was suspended from practicing law by the Florida Bar and that Mr. Smiley failed several times to appear on his behalf in court, did not advise him of any alternative misdemeanor pleas, and never properly advised him of all the potential consequences of pleading nolo contedere to a felony charge of grand theft, including that if that offense is construed as an offense involving moral turpitude, then Section 626.611(14), F.S. may be read to mandate revocation or suspension of his professional insurance licenses. It may be inferred from Respondent's testimony that Respondent, the prosecutor, and the circuit court judge assumed that Respondent would be able to continue selling insurance and thereby would be able to meet the restitution requirements of his plea bargain and probation. At formal hearing on January 3, 1992, Respondent represented that he had made some restitution and hoped to complete restitution under the foregoing circuit court order by January 31, 1992. Respondent further represented that a circuit judge had indicated that once Respondent made restitution on all charges (including those misdemeanor adjudications that gave rise to Count II of the instant amended administrative complaint, see infra.), the court would entertain a motion to set aside his grand theft plea. What the circuit judge may or may not have indicated is not admissible for proof of the matters asserted, but it is admissible to show Respondent's reliance thereon and his motivation beyond the obvious motivations for making restitution as soon as possible. By stipulation of the parties, the record in this instant disciplinary cause was left open for 60 days after formal hearing so that Respondent could amplify on this testimony. Pursuant to Fla. Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, and Art. I Section 16 of the Florida Constitution, Respondent has filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief in Circuit Court Case No. 89-4842-CF. However, a copy of this motion was not filed as an exhibit with the Division of Administrative Hearings until the day before the record herein closed by Order of March 5, 1992. Because the record was closed, the outcome, if any, of that circuit court motion/exhibit is not before the undersigned. Also, Respondent's motion/exhibit alone is not sufficient evidence for the undersigned to infer that Respondent has paid all required restitution amounts as of the date of this recommended order. Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint From September 7, 1990 through July 30, 1991, the Respondent was charged by several Informations in the Circuit Court of the Eighth Judicial Court, in and for Alachua County, Florida, in Case Nos. 90-3267-CF-A, 90-3310- CF-A, 90-3881-CF-A, 91-2236-CF-A, 91-2237-CF-A, 91-2238-CF-A, 91-2712-CF-A, and 91-2713-CF-A, with one count per case of a third degree felony, to wit: Issuing a Worthless Check, a violation of Section 832.05(4), F.S. According to Respondent's unrefuted testimony, the negative balance situation arising from his earlier felony plea bargain, the need to make restitution in that case, and his attorney fees and costs associated with suing the agent who had taken money from Respondent's agency and one of Respondent's insurance carriers had caused an additional shortage of personal funds at a time Respondent was desperately fighting to save his marriage and keep his family, consisting of a wife and two small daughters, together. He admitted that he had issued seventeen worthless bank checks during this stressful period for personal expenses, primarily for telephone charges, groceries, and furniture. Nonetheless, Respondent's marriage failed and the couple is now divorced. By a plea bargain executed July 30, 1991, Respondent agreed to enter a nolo contendere plea to four first degree misdemeanor charges of issuing worthless bank checks and agreed to make restitution totalling $6,492.88 on thirteen others. The restitution agreement covering 17 checks included restitution for nine worthless checks for which the State had agreed to allow deferred prosecution. Five check charges were to be dismissed. What happened next is not entirely clear because, despite an order of the circuit court accepting the plea bargain, the case numbers in the plea bargain and on the subsequent judgments do not match, and it appears that on July 30, 1991, Respondent plead nolo contendere and was adjudicated guilty of eight first degree misdemeanor charges, ordered to serve six months probation on each, the probations to run concurrently, and was further ordered to make restitution pursuant to the plea/restitution agreement. Pursuant to court papers and Respondent's testimony, it appears that he was also given six months, or until approximately January 31, 1992, to make restitution on these cases. That date had not yet been reached as of the date of formal hearing. Respondent remained on probation as of the date of formal hearing. Respondent testified at formal hearing that he hoped to make full restitution on these cases by January 31, 1992, and that unless he also made full restitution on the grand theft case, he could not file a motion to vacate his plea therein. (See, Finding of Fact 7, supra.) Respondent did not file any evidence of restitution in these misdemeanor cases, although he was given until March 5, 1992 to do so. The filing as an exhibit herein of his Motion for Post- Conviction Relief in the circuit court felony case covered in Count I of the instant amended administrative complaint is not sufficient for the undersigned to infer that Respondent has made full restitution on these misdemeanor charges covered in Count II of the instant amended administrative complaint. (See, Finding of Fact 8, supra.) Respondent presented the testimony of Reverend L.D.J. Berry, pastor of a Baptist Church in St. Thomas, Florida, to the effect that the minister has bought insurance from Respondent and has always found him to be helpful and honest in insurance matters. Although Reverend Berry has counselled with Respondent, Respondent is not a member of Reverend Berry's parish. Reverend Berry has never been a recipient of one of Respondent's bad checks. Reverend Berry considered the Respondent to be of good character, even knowing of his bad check history.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Insurance enter a final order that: Finds Respondent guilty of violating Sections 626.611(14) F.S. and 626.621(8) F.S. and not guilty of violating Section 626.611(7), F.S. as alleged in Count I of the Amended Administrative Complaint; Finds Respondent not guilty of violating Section 626.611(7) F.S. as alleged in Count II of the Amended Administrative Complaint; and Suspends Respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure as a life and health insurance agent for six months and provides for a probationary period subsequent to reinstatement of his licenses to run concurrently with any criminal probations left for him to serve, up to the maximum of two years provided by Section 626.691 F.S., during which period of license probation, Respondent's insurance business shall be monitored by the Department of Insurance upon such terms as the Department shall determine to be appropriate. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-3109 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted substantially; modified to eliminate subordinate, unnecessary, and cumulative findings: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 13, and 15. Rejected because as stated, it is a mischracterization of the weight of the evidence, but sunstantially covered within the recommended order: 6, 8, 14, 16. Accepted as modified. What has been rejected has been rejected so that the recommended order conforms the greater weight of the credible record evidence as a whole: 9, 10, 11, 12, 17. Respondent's PFOF: Accepted substantially, but modified to eliminate subordinate unnecessary, and cumulative findings or otherwise C, D, E, F. Accepted as modified. What has been rejected was rejected to conform the recommended order to the greater weight of the credible record as a whole: A, B. COPIES FURNISHED: Michele Guy, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 S. Scott Walker, Esquire Watson, Folds, Steadham, et al. P. O. Box 1070 Gainesville, Florida 32602 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer 200 E. Gaines Street 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate the Respondent's employment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Respondent, a teacher employed by Petitioner, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, which is a first degree felony pursuant to Section 825.103, Florida Statutes. At the same time, Respondent also entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petit theft over $100.00, which is a first degree misdemeanor. In entering these pleas, Respondent advised the court, pursuant to Rule 3.172(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, that she believed the pleas were in her best interest and that she was maintaining her innocence to the charges. The court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, adjudicated her guilty of petit theft, sentenced her to one day of time served, placed her on probation for 20 years, and required that she pay restitution to the Estate of Lillie Keller in the amount of $52,000.00. 1/ By letter dated October 21, 1997, Petitioner reassigned Respondent to a position with no direct contact with children pending the outcome of the criminal charges. Following an investigation, the superintendent of schools recommended to the school board that Respondent's employment be suspended without pay and terminated. On October 7, 1998, the school board voted to adopt that recommendation. The recommendation and the subsequent vote to adopt the recommendation were based on Respondent's plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person. Petitioner followed its procedural rules in investigating this matter and in voting to terminate Respondent's employment. As of October 7, 1998, Respondent held a professional services contract and had been employed by Petitioner for approximately 13 years as a teacher. Section 231.02(1), Florida Statutes, requires school board employees to be of good moral character. Respondent, as a teacher, is required by Section 231.02(2), Florida Statutes, to be fingerprinted and screened by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) Any person for whom employment screening is required by statute must not have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction: * * * (v) Section 825.103, relating to exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult, if the offense was a felony. Petitioner's Rule 3.12, pertaining to criminal background checks of current and prospective employees, has been duly enacted and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Definitions: For the purposes of this policy: * * * b. "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. * * * 3. A prospective or current employee may be disqualified or may be terminated from continued employment if the prospective or current employee has been convicted of a crime classified as a felony or first degree misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Section M of the collective bargaining agreement between the Petitioner and the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers' Association provides for progressive discipline of covered employees such as Respondent. Section M provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 7. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With a Written Notation. . . . Written Reprimand. . . . Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay may be issued to an employee when appropriate, in keeping with the provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. ... Dismissal. An employee may be dismissed (employment contract terminated or non-renewed) when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, requires an employing agency, such as the Petitioner, to take the following action when an employee has failed to meet the requirements of Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes: The employer must either terminate the employment of any of its personnel found to be in noncompliance with the minimum standards for good moral character contained in this section or place the employee in a position for which background screening is not required unless the employee is granted an exemption from disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that terminates Respondent's employment based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
Findings Of Fact By information dated March 30, 1979, respondent gas accused of forging a prescription for 20 tablets of Biphetamine and of "feloniously acquir[ing] or obtain[ing], or attempt[ing] to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance, to-wit: Amphetamine" by means of the forged prescription, on or about December 13, 1978. Respondent's exhibit No. 1. On June 20, 1979, respondent was convicted, on the basis of his guilty plea, of forgery and of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud; concurrent sentences of two years' imprisonment for each offense were imposed, but respondent was placed on probation. Department's exhibits Nos. 2 and 3.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner dismiss the administrative complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of May, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael I. Schwartz, Esquire Raymond LaPorte, Esquire Suite 201, Ellis Building 408 Madison Street 1311 Executive Center Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Nancy Kelley Wittenberg, Geraldine B. Johnson, R.N. Secretary Investigation & Licensing. Department of Professional Regulation Coordinator 2009 Apalachee Parkway Board of Nursing Tallahassee, Florida 32301 111 Coast Line Drive East Suite 504 Paul I. Perez, LPN. Jacksonville, Florida 32202 2301 W. Kirby Tampa, Florida 33804
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint issued against him, as modified at hearing, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, including the parties' prehearing stipulation filed October 21, 2004, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October 17, 1988, licensed as an insurance representative in the State of Florida holding 02-16, 02-18, and 02-40 licenses. His licensure identification number is A268617. In 2001, criminal charges were filed against Respondent in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B. On or about February 20, 2002, Respondent submitted, in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B, a verified Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty, which read as follows: My name is Robert Trueblood and I acknowledge that I am the Defendant charged in the above-styled criminal case[]. I am represented by a lawyer, Arthur L. Wallace, III. I wish to withdraw my plea of not guilty and plead guilty to: Count 2 - Sale of Unregistered Security and Count 3 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. I understand that each of these counts is a third degree felony and each is punishable by up to five (5) years in the Department of Corrections and a $5,000.00 fine. I have told my lawyer all the facts and circumstances about the charges against me. I believe that my lawyer is fully informed on all such matters. My lawyer has counseled and advised me on the nature of each charge; on any and all lesser included charges; on all possible defenses that I might have in this cause; and all the penalties that might be imposed if convicted.[1] I understand that I may plead not guilty to any offense charged against me. If I choose to plead not guilty, the Constitution guarantees me the right to maintain that plea and (a) the right to a speedy and public trial by jury; (b) the right to see, hear and face in open Court all witnesses called to testify against me and to cross- examine said witnesses; (c) the right to use the power and process of the Court to compel the production of any evidence, including the attendance of any witnesses in my favor; (d) the right to have the assistance of a lawyer at all stages of the proceedings and to have one appointed for me if necessary; and (e) also the right to take the witness stand at my sole option; and if I do not take the witness stand I understand the jury, at my request, will be told that this may not be held against me. I also understand that by pleading guilty and admitting the truth of the charges against me, I am waiving all of the rights referred to in the above paragraph and the Court may impose the same punishment as if I had ple[]d not guilty, stood trial and been convicted. I know that if I plead guilty there will be no further trial of any kind, which means that by pleading guilty I waive my right to trial. I understand that some of the charges filed against me in this case may have occurred in whole or in part in Florida Counties other than Orange. However, I wish to resolve, in Orange County, all the charges filed in case number CR 01-2309 and do affirmatively waive my right to venue in other counties where the crimes may have occurred. I am 55 years of age. I have gone to school up to and including 5 y[ea]rs [of] college. I am not under the influence of any alcoholic beverage, drug or medicine at the time I sign this plea agreement. My physical and mental health is presently satisfactory. No one has made any promise, assurance or guarantee to me that I would receive any consideration in exchange for pleading guilty other than as set out in this plea agreement. I declare that no one has subjected me to any force, duress, threats, intimidation or pressure to compel or induce me to enter a plea of guilty. I am entering this plea with the understanding that I may serve every day of the sentence I am agreeing to in this plea agreement. Although I may have received advice or opinions as to the potential for some type of early release, I hereby acknowledge under oath that I have not relied upon those opinions or that advice as an inducement to enter this plea. I believe that my lawyer has done all that a competent attorney could to counsel and assist me. He has answered all my questions about this case to my satisfaction and I AM SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE AND HELP HE HAS GIVEN ME. I understand that if I am not a United States citizen, this criminal proceeding could cause me to be deported to the country of my origin. I understand that if I fail to pay any fines or costs as ordered by the Court, there will be a lien placed against me. I understand that I waive my right to appeal any rulings of the Court previously made in this case except as specifically stated herein. I understand that I have the right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the Court within thirty (30) days from the date of sentence. I understand that any appeal must be in writing. I understand that if I wish to take an appeal and cannot afford an attorney to help in my appeal, the Court will appoint an attorney to represent me for that purpose. I request the Court to accept my plea, knowing that upon it being accepted by the Court that nothing will remain to be done except for the Court to enter its judgment and sentence. I offer my plea freely and voluntarily and of my own accord and with full understanding of all matters set forth in the Information and in this Petition, the Certificate of my lawyer and Plea Agreement which are contained herein. Though I may have been assisted by my lawyer, I certify that the statement and representations herein above made are my own and have not been suggested directly or indirectly by him or anyone else, and that the decision to plead guilty was made by me. I further represent that my attorney has advised me of considerations bearing on the choice of which plea to enter and the pros and cons of such plea, the likely results thereof as well as any possible alternative which may be open to me. I represent to the Court that the plea bargain attached hereto was negotiated by my attorney with my full and complete consent thereto and that the decision to plead guilty was made by me. I fully concur in the efforts of my attorney and agree to the terms of the bargained plea. The Plea Agreement between Respondent and the prosecutor (which was referenced in Respondent's Petition to Enter Plea of Guilty) read as follows: The Defendant, and the State, pursuant to the provisions of Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.171, agree and stipulate to recommend to the Court the following resolution of the above- styled case: Defendant agrees to plead guilty as charged to Count 2 - Sale of Unregistered Security and Count 3 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. The State will stand silent as to the issue of adjudication. The Defendant shall be sentenced to five (5) years of supervised probation with all standard conditions, as well as the following special conditions: The Defendant shall testify truthfully when requested by the State, without the necessity of subpoena, in reference to any and all matters related to the facts and circumstances surrounding the Defendant's charges in this case. The Defendant shall pay restitution in an amount to be determined. The Defendant agrees the amount of restitution owed is not limited to the transactions to which he is entering this plea. Defendant shall pay court costs as directed by the Court. Defendant shall be required to pay $3,5000.00 for costs of prosecution to the Office of Statewide Prosecution, Department of Legal Affairs for the State of Florida. The Defendant shall pay $500.00 to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and $500.00 to the Office of Comptroller, Department of Banking and Finance for costs of investigation involved in this case. The Defendant shall have no contact, directly or indirectly, with any of the witnesses in this case. [4]. If the Defendant violates any law while awaiting sentencing or if he fails to appear for sentencing as ordered by the Court, the State shall not be bound by this agreement and may recommend any lawful sentence and the Court may impose any sentence permissible under the law. The Defendant shall not be entitled to withdraw his plea of guilty in this case. [5]. The State agrees to nolle prosequi Count 4 - Sale of Unregistered Security, Count 5 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent, Count 6 - Sale of Unregistered Security, and Count 7 - Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent. [6]. If the sentence agreed upon in this plea agreement is a departure from the sentencing guidelines, both the State of Florida and the Defendant agree not to appeal this sentence. [7]. Should the Defendant violate his community control or probation, he affirmatively agrees that he shall be sentenced pursuant to the sentencing guidelines. [8]. The Defendant affirmatively agrees not to request that the Court impose a sentence lower than the sentence outlined above. [9]. Both the State and the Defendant understand that the trial judge has the ultimate responsibility for the sentence the defendant actually receives and that the recommendations made above are not binding on the trial judge unless adopted thereby. The Defendant shall not be entitled to withdraw his pleas of guilty in the event that the trial judge imposes a sentence different from that recommended above. On February 20, 2002, after Respondent entered his guilty pleas in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01- 2309/B to Count 2 (alleging the "Sale of Unregistered Security," in violation of Section 517.07, Florida Statutes) and Count 3 (alleging the "Sale of Security by Unregistered Agent," in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes), the court accepted the pleas, withheld adjudication, and placed Respondent on two concurrent five-year terms of probation, with the special condition that he "serve 1 Day[] in the Orange County Jail, with 1 Day[]'s credit for time served." Other special conditions, including those described in the Plea Agreement set out above, were also imposed.2 Respondent failed to notify Petitioner in writing within 30 days after entering his guilty pleas in Orange County Circuit Court Case No. CR-01-2309/B that he had entered the pleas. Respondent has previously been disciplined by Petitioner's predecessor, the Department of Insurance (DOI). By Consent Order issued November 1, 2000, in DOI Case No. 31036-00-AG, Respondent was suspended for a period of three months. The Consent Order approved the parties' Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order, which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: * * * The Department has caused to be made an investigation of the Respondent and other individuals involved in the marketing and promotion of Legends Sports, Inc. As a result of that investigation, the Department alleges that the Respondent induced individuals to invest in Legends Sports, Inc. and represented that the investment was guaranteed by a surety insurer. However, the investment was not a good investment, the purported surety insurer did not exist or was not authorized to conduct business in this state, and the investment resulted in substantial losses to individual investors. The investigation resulted in a multi- count criminal information (hereinafter referred to as the "criminal actions") being filed against Respondent and other Legends Sports agents in the Seminole County Circuit Court in Sanford, Florida, Case No. 98- 4569CFW. Specifically, Respondent was charged with the following felonies: sale of unregistered securities, sale of securities by an unregistered dealer and unlawful transaction of insurance. Respondent has entered or will enter a plea of guilty to lesser included charges which are first degree misdemeanors. As a result of the plea, the Court in the criminal action, among other things, placed the Respondent on probation. As a condition of probation, the Court ordered the Respondent to pay restitution to the individuals who invested in Legends Sports through the Respondent and suffered financial losses as a direct consequence of such investments. The restitution amount represents the commissions received by the Respondent (hereinafter referred to as the "restitution order in the criminal action"). The Court in the criminal action also ordered that a criminal restitution judgment, that is not dischargeable in bankruptcy, be entered for the full amount of the promissory notes sold by the Respondent, unless a judgment has already been entered in that amount in favor of the Receiver for Legends Sports. Respondent denies knowingly misrepresenting the Legends Sports investment. * * * 13. This Settlement Stipulation for Consent Order is subject to the approval of the Insurance Commissioner. Upon his approval, and without further notice, the Insurance Commissioner may issue a Consent Order providing for the following: Incorporation by reference of the terms and conditions of this Settlement Stipulation For Consent Order. Respondent's licensure and eligibility for licensure as an insurance agent within the state are SUSPENDED for a period of three (3) months pursuant to section 626.641(1), Florida Statutes. The suspension shall take effect on 11/1/2000. * * * Approximately a year earlier, by Consent Order issued July 12, 1999, in DOI Case No. 99-CE58350, Respondent was fined $250.00 for failure to comply with continuing education requirements. Respondent's health has deteriorated in recent years. He has "been in the hospital several times with . . . heart [problems]."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of twice violating Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Counts I and II of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and of violating Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint, and suspending his licenses for nine months for having committed these violations. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2004.
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent was convicted or found guilty of a crime which directly relates to the practice of chiropractic medicine; and, if so, whether Petitioner should impose discipline on Respondent's chiropractic license within the applicable penalty guidelines or take some other action.
Findings Of Fact The Parties At all times relevant to this case, Respondent Mia Ann Higginbotham, D.C., was licensed to practice chiropractic medicine in the state of Florida. The Department has regulatory jurisdiction over licensed chiropractors such as Dr. Higginbotham. In particular, the Department is authorized to file and prosecute an administrative complaint against a chiropractic physician, as it has done in this instance, when a panel of the Board of Chiropractic Medicine has found that probable cause exists to suspect that the licensee has committed a disciplinable offense. The Material Historical Facts In April 2006, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit filed an Amended Information in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Miami-Dade County, Florida, which charged Dr. Higginbotham with six counts of insurance fraud as defined in section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (2004); four counts of grand theft in the third degree, as defined in section 812.014; 24 counts of communications fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(b)1.; and one count of organized fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(a)1. Dr. Higginbotham had been arrested earlier on some or all of these (or similar) criminal charges, on October 21, 2004. The record does not contain the original information. The 38-count Amended Information also charged five other defendants, namely Francisco Javier Espinosa, Evelyn Cajuste, Romer Ferguson, Deborah Eugene, and Christopher Wesley Nelson.3 Two of these individuals——Mr. Ferguson and Ms. Eugene—— testified at the final hearing in this case. Each admitted having participated in a staged (i.e. fake) automobile accident on March 18, 2004, and, afterwards, having seen Dr. Higginbotham for treatment of "injuries" purportedly sustained in the "accident." Each claimed to have received real treatment from Dr. Higginbotham and other providers in her office. (Ms. Eugene testified that her back truly hurt at the time, not as a result of the fake accident of course, but due to a previous injury.) Each disclaimed any personal knowledge that Dr. Higginbotham had been aware that the March 18, 2004, "accident" was staged to defraud insurance companies.4 To the extent and as described in this paragraph, the undersigned credits the testimony of Mr. Ferguson and the testimony of Ms. Eugene and finds these facts, as stated, to be true. By the time the criminal case finally came to trial in February 2009, Dr. Higginbotham was the last defendant remaining, the others having previously made deals with the state pursuant to which they, or some of them, had agreed to testify against Dr. Higginbotham. During the nearly four and one-half years that elapsed between Dr. Higginbotham's arrest and the trial, the state had offered her numerous deals. Dr. Higginbotham had rejected all of the proposed deals because they would have required her to plead guilty, which she refused to do. Dr. Higginbotham consistently maintained her innocence throughout the criminal proceeding and has done the same in this proceeding as well. At the outset of the criminal trial on February 3, 2009, the state offered Dr. Higginbotham a no-prison deal under which, if she agreed to plead nolo contendere to eight of the 35 charges pending against her, the state would recommend that adjudication of guilt be withheld and that she be sentenced to a term of probation. Significantly, the state did not demand that Dr. Higginbotham relinquish her chiropractic license as consideration for the deal. Dr. Higginbotham had very little time to think about whether to accept the state's offer. Her defense attorney was adamant that she accept the deal because juries are unpredictable and the proposed plea bargain would eliminate the risk of incarceration. As Dr. Higginbotham recalled the scene, in testimony the undersigned accepts as credible and persuasive, "[My attorney] was screaming at me at the top of his lungs that he felt I needed to take this deal and all he was concerned about was that . . . I wouldn't be going to jail and he said you never know what could happen." The adverse consequences of a guilty verdict would have been devastating for Dr. Higginbotham. She faced the possibility of a lengthy prison sentence if convicted——in the worst case scenario, about 160 years, the prosecutor had stated. Were she to be incarcerated for even a fraction of that period, Dr. Higginbotham's professional life would be finished and her personal life shattered. In regard to the latter, Dr. Higginbotham wanted to start a family but felt she could not do so while the criminal case was pending. She likely would lose that opportunity if she spent her childbearing years behind bars. Ultimately, Dr. Higginbotham accepted the state's offer because, as she put it, "at the time I was scared, I was nervous, I was under a lot of stress. My attorney was putting an enormous amount of pressure on me and I felt I really had no other choice." The undersigned accepts this testimony as truthful and finds that Dr. Higginbotham agreed to plead nolo contendere, not because she had a guilty conscience, but to avoid the catastrophic downside of a guilty verdict, which she needed to reckon a possibility, despite being conscious of her own innocence. Consequently, Dr. Higginbotham pleaded no contest to four counts of insurance fraud as defined in section 817.234(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and four counts of communications fraud as defined in section 817.034(4)(b)1. (the "Uncontested Charges"). The court accepted the plea and entered an order disposing of the case, which is captioned "Finding of Guilt and Order Withholding Adjudication/Special Conditions" (the "Order"). In the Order, after reciting that it appeared Dr. Higginbotham "ha[d] been found guilty" of the Uncontested Charges "upon the entry of a nolo contendere plea," and that it appeared Dr. Higginbotham should not "presently [be required] to suffer the penalty imposed by law," the court ordered that "adjudication of guilt be . . . stayed and withheld." The court placed Dr. Higginbotham on probation for a period of four years, subject to early termination after the successful completion of two years. The court further ordered Dr. Higginbotham to pay about $2,300 in costs but reserved ruling on whether to require her to make restitution. Due to the insufficiency of the evidence, the undersigned is unable to make any findings of fact regarding the conduct of Dr. Higginbotham which gave rise to the Uncontested Charges. Simply put, given the minimal persuasive evidence regarding Dr. Higginbotham's conduct, the undersigned cannot determine what she actually did as a result of, or in connection with, the fake accident described above, besides (a) provide some chiropractic treatment to persons who falsely told her they had been hurt, as found above, and (b) plead no contest to the Uncontested Charges. In short, other than the undisputed fact of the plea, there is no persuasive evidence in the record to support a finding that Dr. Higginbotham committed any crime. Ultimate Factual Determinations Dr. Higginbotham did not impliedly admit guilt when she pleaded nolo contendere to the Uncontested Charges. Her explanation of the reasons for accepting the state's offer provides objectively reasonable grounds——consistent with innocence——for having entered the plea, refuting the implication that she acted on a guilty conscience or the substantial likelihood of a conviction. In this connection, it is further determined that Dr. Higginbotham, while being conscious of her innocence and never admitting guilt, entered the plea to avoid the possibility of being found guilty and sent to prison, potentially for many years; to be able to get on with her personal life; and to retain the ability to resume her professional career as a chiropractic physician. In addition, given that the state was willing to give up more than three-quarters of the criminal charges against Dr. Higginbotham; and that the sentence imposed (four years' probation subject to early termination) was lenient as compared to the range of potential sentences, including many years of imprisonment, which could have been imposed were she tried and convicted; the undersigned infers that the prosecutor's offer was a generous one, reflecting the strength of Dr. Higginbotham's position relative to the state's. In sum, under the circumstances, the no-prison plea bargain offered to Dr. Higginbotham was too good to refuse, given that an acquittal would have been only marginally more beneficial than a sentence of probation with a withhold of adjudication, whereas a guilty verdict would have been ruinous. Accordingly, it is determined as a matter of fact, based on the totality of the evidence including the plea of nolo contendere and the presumption of a conviction which arises therefrom, that Dr. Higginbotham was not "convicted or found guilty" of crimes relating to the practice of chiropractic medicine. Dr. Higginbotham is not guilty, as a matter of fact, of committing an offense punishable under section 460.413(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2008).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Chiropractic Medicine enter a final order finding Dr. Higginbotham not guilty of the charge set forth in the Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 11th day of May, 2011.
