The Issue The issues are 1) whether Petitioner has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that she is rehabilitated from her disqualifying offense(s); and, if so, 2) whether Respondent's intended action to deny Petitioner's request for an exemption from employment disqualification would constitute an abuse of discretion.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is seeking employment with The Arc of Alachua County, a service provider regulated by APD. Petitioner’s desired employment is to work as a direct service provider, which requires compliance with background screening requirements. The results of Petitioner’s background screening identified a history of criminal offenses. Petitioner received notification via letter dated April 4, 2016, from the Department of Children and Families (DCF), Respondent’s background screening entity, of her disqualification from employment due to a criminal history. The specific disqualifying offense listed in the letter was Larceny (a violation of section 810.014, Florida Statutes (2016)1/). Florida’s Legislature has designated certain criminal offenses as disqualifying offenses, which would prevent an individual from working as a direct service provider. However, an individual may seek an exemption from the employment disqualification. The granting of an exemption from employment disqualification would allow for Petitioner’s employment as a direct service provider to APD clients. APD’s clients are a vulnerable population, consisting of those individuals whose developmental disabilities are statutorily defined as: intellectual disability, autism, spina bifida, Prader-Willi syndrome, cerebral palsy, Down syndrome, and/or Phelan-McDermid Syndrome. See § 393.063(12), Fla. Stat. Without APD’s services, these clients would otherwise require institutionalization. APD’s clients often have severe deficits in their abilities to complete self-care tasks and communicate their wants and needs. These clients are at a heightened risk of abuse, neglect, and exploitation because of their developmental disabilities and inability to self-preserve; consequently, employment as a direct service provider to APD clients is regarded as a position of special trust. APD is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers for which Petitioner seeks to qualify. See §§ 110.1127(2)(c)1. and 393.0655, Fla. Stat. Many of the tasks direct service providers perform for, and/or assist individuals with disabilities with, include those of a social, personal needs, and/or financial nature. APD relies on DCF to initially receive exemption from employment disqualification requests and compile documents received related to such requests. On or around May 10, 2016, Petitioner submitted a Request for Exemption, Exemption Questionnaire, a copy of her criminal record, character references, and other various documents (the Exemption Packet) to DCF in order to demonstrate support for the granting of an exemption from employment disqualification. DCF subsequently forwarded the Exemption Packet to APD for review. In beginning its exemption review, APD considered Petitioner’s disqualifying offense. Specifically, in December 1982, Petitioner committed the disqualifying offense of Larceny/Grand Theft (a violation of section 810.014). The court’s final disposition of the case included the withholding of adjudication of guilt, two years’ probation, and payment of costs. In its continued exemption review pursuant to section 435.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes, APD considered the following non- disqualifying offenses which Petitioner committed subsequent to her December 1982 disqualifying offense: an arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05, Florida Statutes); a second arrest for Worthless Check on December 23, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); a conviction for Worthless Check on December 24, 1995 (a violation of section 832.05); an arrest for Driving While License Suspended/Revoked in June 1996 (a violation of section 322.34(2), Florida Statutes); an arrest for Worthless Check in January 2007 (a violation of section 832.05(4)(a)); and an arrest for Violation of Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court in August 2012 (a violation of section 741.31(4)(a), Florida Statutes). The Disqualifying Offense Petitioner provided an account of her disqualifying offense, Larcency/Grand Theft, in an addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire, dated August 3, 2015. Petitioner indicated in her account that she relocated to Tampa from Gainesville. She was 22 years old, single, and employed with the State of Florida. She became roommates with another female who was attending college at the University of South Florida. Petitioner stated “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner further explained that she received a two- year term of probation and completed all her court-ordered sanctions within a year. Petitioner also noted that “[s]ince that time, I have not committed any further crimes.” Petitioner provided the following record concerning her disqualifying offense: state attorney court record (13th Judicial Circuit, Hillsborough County, State Attorney). The Non-Disqualifying Offenses Court records received in evidence indicate a total of six non-disqualifying offenses as previously mentioned. Petitioner did not disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, nor did she provide accounts for such on the Exemption Questionnaire, despite the directions specifically requiring an applicant to do so. Petitioner did not provide records of her non- disqualifying offenses. Records of those offenses were obtained by APD as part of its detailed review process. Records of the non-disqualifying offenses obtained included: worthless check affidavit, witness form, copies of check, and no information filed court filing (Sears 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, and copy of check (Pic’n Save 12/23/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, and court judgment (Pic’n Save 12/24/1995); worthless check affidavit, witness form, copy of check, copy of court diversion judgment and supporting documentation, and copy of dismissal of charge (Publix 1/30/2007); and warrant affidavit for arrest (Alachua County Sheriff’s Office, August 2012). Petitioner indicated that she has no current involvement with any court system; specifically, she stated “I have not experienced any criminal charges since my last event in 1982.” Regarding whether there was any degree of harm to any victim or property, including damage or injuries, Petitioner stated “I have not experienced any harm or damage to anyone or any property since my last event in 1982.” In answering the question about stressors in her life at the time of the disqualifying incident, Petitioner indicated that there were none, other than being on probation. Regarding whether there are any current stressors in her life, Petitioner stated “I have no current stressors with the law.” Petitioner indicated that her current support system and living arrangements include being married and having one daughter and numerous grandchildren. Petitioner also explained that her community activities/volunteer efforts include volunteering with the school system (field trips/activities) and attending church and performing functions for the church’s treasury department. Regarding educational and training achievements, Petitioner stated that she graduated from high school, started a career with the State of Florida, and attended a word processing/information course where she received the Most Outstanding Student Award. The Exemption Questionnaire asks whether an applicant has ever received counseling for any reason. Petitioner indicated that she has not received counseling for any reason; if she felt stress, she would call the Employee Assistance Program. Petitioner noted she has not experienced any “major post- traumatic [stress].” As to whether she has used and/or abused drugs or alcohol, Petitioner replied that she has “not abused any type of drugs or alcohol in [her] life.” Petitioner indicated the following regarding feeling remorse/accepting responsibility for her actions: “I am the type of person to feel remorse towards everything and every person that I have contact with. I always take full responsibility for any action(s) that I encounter when I am in the wrong.” The Exemption Questionnaire asks for an applicant’s prior three years’ work history. Petitioner provided the following information: 4/2016 to 5/2016--The Arc of Alachua County (support tech/direct care); 11/2007 to 7/2014--DCF--North Florida Evaluation & Treatment Center (Human Services Worker III); 3/2004 to 7/2007—DCF--State of Florida Foster Care (word processor/data management specialist); 4/1998 to 9/2003-- American Psychiatric Association (membership coordinator/secretary). In addition to the criminal record submitted, Petitioner also provided the following additional documents that were included in her Exemption Packet: local law background checks, a volunteer award (Head Start), three letters of reference attesting to Petitioner’s character, and an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. The letters were written by persons who have known Petitioner for several years; they described Petitioner as devoted, loyal, honest, kind, and trustworthy. Finally, Petitioner submitted a copy of an exemption letter she received from DCF, dated February 12, 2016. Leslie Richards, regional operations manager for APD’s Northeast Region, advised that APD reviewed all documentation provided by Petitioner in her Request for Exemption, the information indicated in Petitioner’s Exemption Questionnaire, the various records documenting Petitioner’s criminal history, her volunteer award, character letters, and exemption from DCF. Following a review of Petitioner’s Exemption Packet, Agency Director Barbara Palmer, advised Petitioner by a letter dated September 26, 2016, that her request for an exemption from her disqualifying offense was denied. The basis for the denial was that Petitioner failed to submit clear and convincing evidence of her rehabilitation. Petitioner sent APD a request for hearing on or around October 11, 2016. APD received this request timely and subsequently forwarded this appeal to DOAH. Along with her request for hearing, Petitioner submitted a personal statement explaining her reasons for disputing the denial and requesting the hearing, a copy of the denial letter, and a copy of a training certificate summary for APD-approved courses through her former employer, the Arc of Alachua County. At hearing, Ms. Richards explained APD’s process of reviewing exemption requests and the consideration of Petitioner’s application for such. Per Ms. Richards, APD considers the disqualifying offense, the circumstances surrounding the offense, the nature of the harm caused to the victim, the history of the applicant since the incident, and finally, any other evidence indicating that the applicant will not present a danger if employment is allowed. Additionally, Ms. Richards testified that APD looks for consistency in the applicant’s account of events in his or her Exemption Questionnaire, the passage of time since the disqualifying incident, whether the applicant accepts responsibility for his/her actions, and whether the applicant expresses remorse for his or her prior criminal acts. Because an applicant will be occupying a position of special trust if granted an exemption, APD weighs all of these factors in its determination. Ms. Richards testified that all of Petitioner’s submissions were reviewed and taken into consideration; she noted that the starting point of APD’s review began with the date of the disqualifying offense and any criminal conduct occurring thereafter. Ms. Richards emphasized that in APD’s review, it was noted that Petitioner failed to disclose sufficient details of the account of her disqualifying offense. Specifically, Petitioner provided what appeared to be background information about the time frame surrounding the offense and the person whom she committed the offense with, but indicated in her statement “I have no explanation as to why the both of us committed a crime of theft.” Petitioner provided other details about this time in her life, but nothing specific about the crime itself. Ms. Richards stated that it left APD with a concern that Petitioner was not forthright with disclosure of the circumstances involving the crime. Ms. Richards also explained that APD took note that Petitioner failed to disclose any of her non-disqualifying offenses, and that this fact was also of concern. APD obtained records of the non-disqualifying offenses and considered them in its review. Ms. Richards noted that the nature of the offenses, particularly the Worthless Checks and the Violation of the Injunction Domestic Violence/Contempt of Court, were troubling because those offenses involved monetary transactions and interpersonal relations. Ms. Richards observed that the individuals APD serves are highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, and a person who is in a role as a direct service provider would be assisting those individuals in a social and financial capacity. APD reviewed Petitioner’s involvement with three DCF investigations involving allegations of abuse toward a vulnerable adult, Petitioner’s spouse. Although there were no findings against Petitioner in these cases, based on the issues presented, DCF did make the recommendation for Petitioner to pursue family counseling. Ms. Richards noted that there is no evidence that Petitioner followed through with DCF’s recommendation, and by Petitioner’s own admission on the Exemption Questionnaire, has “not received counseling for any reason.” In addition to both the criminal offense and DCF- related information, APD noted Petitioner’s less than stellar driving record. Ms. Richards advised that a direct service provider will often be in a position to transport clients, and Petitioner’s driving record reflects a series of both moving and non-moving violations, which pose a concern. The record reflects a total of five driving-related violations: driving while license suspended/revoked (previously mentioned); tag not assigned (criminal traffic); red light camera citation; unlawful speeding; and a second red light camera citation. Ms. Richards testified regarding APD’s consideration of Petitioner’s prior employment history with DCF, and the subsequent exemption for employment granted to Petitioner by DCF. At hearing, APD presented employment evaluations and records of written disciplinary action taken against Petitioner by DCF while in its employ. Ms. Richards specifically noted that some of the disciplinary issues for which Petitioner was cited included: sleeping on the job while employed at a forensic facility; not securing the front door of a building at a forensic facility; tardiness; inappropriately streaming media on a state-owned computer; insubordination (refusal to work a shift); failure to report to work; and poor performance/negligence (failure to answer phones/answer front door of facility). Petitioner ultimately was dismissed from DCF due to her inability to perform her job functions because of an injury. Ms. Richards explained that these disciplinary issues gave APD great pause in considering granting Petitioner an exemption, as they were indicators for potential behaviors that could pose a great risk to individuals served by APD, many of whom are unable to communicate their wants and needs. The setting in which Petitioner committed these workplace violations mirrors those in which clients of APD are served. Ms. Richards did state that APD considered the exemption granted by DCF to Petitioner, however, the weight of the prior disciplinary issues outweighed that decision when compared to the possible jeopardy in which APD clients could be placed. Should Petitioner obtain future successful employment with DCF, APD would consider that in a subsequent exemption application review. Petitioner testified on her own behalf at the hearing. She spoke about the circumstances surrounding the disqualifying offense, reiterating her statement from the addendum to the Exemption Questionnaire. She provided no new information or surrounding details about the crime. Again, she stated that she has not had any legal issues since 1982. Regarding her non- disqualifying offenses, Petitioner remarked that she “didn’t consider those bad checks as crimes,” and though she denied being convicted of such, she admitted having overdrafted checks. Petitioner also stated that regarding the DCF investigations and the Injunction Violation/Contempt of Court charge, “that’s not why we are here today, so I am not going to talk about that.” Petitioner did admit to the driving infractions on her record, but stated that two of them, running red lights, were due to the fault of her daughter, as she was the driver at the time, rather than Petitioner. Petitioner stated that she is older and wiser and has changed. She enjoyed working at the adult day care program with the Arc of Alachua County. She indicated that any bad checks she has written, she “took care of.” Petitioner offered explanations for the disciplinary situations involving her prior employment with DCF, attempting to minimize her role. She explained that she and her husband, who Petitioner described as a vulnerable, disabled adult, no longer have domestic issues; however, they are currently homeless. Petitioner stated that APD’s denial is keeping her in an adverse financial situation, stating “I cannot find a job right now because of this denial.” When cross- examined by counsel regarding her ability to obtain gainful employment with DCF and its covered providers, Petitioner admitted that she can seek a job under DCF’s purview. Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses. Her sister, Sherry McCrae, a retired police officer, stated that she lived with her sister the entire time she was in college; Petitioner provided a source of support to her during this period. Ms. McCrae stated that her sister has been working all the years since the disqualifying incident. She affirmed that their maiden name is Williams, Petitioner’s last name at the time of the disqualifying incident. Petitioner’s second witness, Faye Williams, testified that after Petitioner’s disqualifying incident, she got a job and was active in the community. Petitioner has a desire “to be a part of something.” She loves people, especially children. Petitioner asserted that she enjoys working with individuals with disabilities; at her last place of employment, she believed she found her “purpose and mission.” She loves helping people. She admits she made some mistakes, but that was long ago. Petitioner argued that she “really only committed one crime”; she has rehabilitated herself and that should be enough for APD. She believes APD abused its discretion in denying her request for exemption. The individuals APD serves are vulnerable and highly susceptible to abuse, neglect, and exploitation, due to their developmental disabilities. APD’s representative observed that APD’s clients must be assigned to direct care providers without fear of their endangerment. This necessarily requires reliance on a caregiver’s good character and trustworthiness. Individuals who provide direct care are frequently responsible for assisting individuals in making decisions of a financial, medical, and social nature. APD must weigh the benefit against the risk when considering granting an exemption. Ms. Richards cautioned that Petitioner’s criminal history reflects a pattern of poor judgment. Petitioner’s failure to disclose certain details in her account regarding her disqualifying offense calls into question her trustworthiness. Additionally, failure to disclose her non-disqualifying offenses, along with a failure to recognize that those offenses are truly crimes, is not only troubling, but calls into question Petitioner’s trustworthiness. It also demonstrates a complete lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for her actions. Petitioner did not admit to any of the harm she caused to her victims. Petitioner’s minimization of the discipline she received while employed by DCF also gives great pause, as the individuals she was charged with caring for were clients in a forensic setting, a clear parallel to the clients she would serve should an exemption be granted by APD. Petitioner’s multiple driving citations are concerning as well, and demonstrate a pattern of questionable decision- making, especially when considering her for a position where she could potentially transport clients. All of the aforementioned factors, along with proximity in time of her application to her last arrest (2012), caused APD to question Petitioner’s fitness for providing services to the vulnerable individuals for which it is responsible, the most vulnerable population in the state. Petitioner failed to meet her burden of proving clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation, and therefore, the denial of the exemption was proper.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Director of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities issue a final order upholding the denial of Petitioner’s exemption request. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of February, 2017.
The Issue The issue presented here concerns the question of the entitlement of Petitioner to be granted certification as a law enforcement officer under the provisions of Section 943.13, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 11B-16, Florida Administrative Code. In particular, the matter to be determined deals with the propriety of the denial of certification in the face of an arrest and conviction of Petitioner for a felony offense, which allegedly would cause the Petitioner to be rejected as an applicant for certification. The denial of licensure is purportedly in keeping with the dictates of Subsection 943.13(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner had made application to be certified as a law enforcement officer in the State of Florida, in keeping with the terms and conditions of Subsection 943.13, Florida Statutes. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has completed all administrative requirements for such licensure; however, he has been denied licensure based upon his arrest, a finding of guilt and judgment and sentence related to a charge of conspiracy to transport a stolen vehicle in Interstate Commerce and Foreign Commerce from New York, New York, to Miami, Florida, and from Miami, Florida, to Havana, Cuba, knowing that the motor vehicle had been stolen. This offense related to Title XVIII, Sections 2312 and 2371, U.S.C., in an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Case No. 8519-M-CR. For these matters the Petitioner was imprisoned for a period of two (2) years on two (2) counts of the indictment, Counts 3 and 6. The sentence in those counts was to run concurrently. See Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, admitted into evidence. Petitioner has had his civil rights restored in the State of Florida, together with his rights to own, possess and use a firearm. Federal firearms disability arising from the felony conviction have also been set aside. See Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 3, respectively, admitted into evidence.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondent committed the offense set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the duty and responsibility to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, in particular Section 20.165, Florida Statutes, Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated pursuant thereto. Respondent, Terrell Laverne Solomon, is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate salesperson in the State of Florida, having been issued license number SL- 0653405. On or about June 16, 1997, Respondent filed an application (dated June 10, 1997) with the Department for licensure as a real estate salesperson. Pertinent to this case, item 9 on the application required that Respondent answer "Yes" or "No" (by checking the appropriate box) to the following question: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection, or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. If you intend to answer "NO" because you believe those records have been expunged or sealed by court order pursuant to Section 943.058, Florida Statutes, or applicable law of another state, you are responsible for verifying the expungement or sealing prior to answering "NO." If you answered "Yes," attach the details including dates and outcome, including any sentence and conditions imposed, in full on a separate sheet of paper. Your answer to this question will be checked against local, state and federal records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. If you do not fully understand this question, consult with an attorney or the Division of Real Estate. Respondent answered the question by checking the box marked "Yes," and attached a handwritten note which revealed the following details: I pleaded guilty for drug possession and carrying a concealed weapon. However, I don't know the exact date, but it been [sic] 10 to 15 years ago. I also have a conviction for driving under the influence in [19]84. The application concluded with Respondent's acknowledgement before a Notary Public of the State of Florida as follows: The above named, and undersigned, applicant for licensure as a real estate salesperson under the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, as amended, upon being duly sworn, deposes and says that (s)(he) is the person so applying, that (s)(he) has carefully read the application, answers, and the attached statements, if any, and that all such answers and statements are true and correct, and are as complete as his/her knowledge, information and records permit, without any evasions or mental reservations whatsoever; that (s)(he) knows of no reason why this application should be denied; and (s)(he) further extends this affidavit to cover all amendments to this application or further statements to the Division or its representatives, by him/her in response to inquiries concerning his/her qualifications. On July 28, 1997, Respondent passed the salesperson examination and was issued license number SL-0653405 as an inactive salesperson. From September 17, 1997, through the date of hearing, Respondent has been licensed as an active salesperson associated with Anita Berger Realty, Inc., a broker corporation located at 21414 West Dixie Highway, North Miami Beach, Florida. Following approval of Respondent's application, and his licensure as a real estate salesperson, the Department received the results of a state and federal records search which revealed a criminal history that included charges not disclosed on Respondent's application. That records search revealed the following criminal history in the Circuit and County Courts, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida (where Respondent was "convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld"): 2/ On April 8, 1978, Respondent was arrested and charged in Case No. M78-56023 with misdemeanor Battery, Resisting an Officer Without Violence, and Disorderly Conduct; and on August 19, 1981, was convicted of each charge and sentenced to a term of probation with special conditions. On September 17, 1979, Case No. 79- 12245, Respondent, upon entry of a plea of guilty, was found guilty of Shooting into an Occupied Dwelling; however, the court withheld an adjudication of guilt. (c) On June 17, 1985, Case No. 85-8549, Respondent, upon entry of a plea of guilty, was adjudicated guilty of Leaving the Scene of an Accident Involving Personal Injury (Count I), a third degree felony proscribed by Section 316.027, Florida Statutes, and Possession of a Controlled Substance, to- wit: Heroin (Count 2), a third degree felony proscribed by Section 893.13, Florida Statutes; however, the court stayed and withheld the imposition of sentence as to each count and placed Respondent on probation for a period of 4 years under the supervision of the Department of Corrections. Respondent's probation was subsequently revoked and on April 18, 1989, and he was committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Dade County, Florida, to be imprisoned for a term of 24 days, with credit for time served. On December 30, 1989, Case No. 89- 50035, Respondent was arrested and charged with carrying a concealed firearm, and on December 31, 1989, was convicted and sentenced (the specifics of which are not of record). As heretofore noted, Respondent's application did reveal that he had entered a plea of "guilty for drug possession" (ostensibly the June 17, 1985, conviction) and "carrying a concealed weapon" (ostensibly the December 30, 1989, conviction). The remaining criminal history was not disclosed. Upon discovery of such information, the Department apprised Respondent of its discovery and requested an explanation. Respondent addressed the Department's concerns as follows: In regard with Section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes. I answer [sic] Question 9 on my application truthfully and to best of my ability. It was never my intention to violate Section 455.225 and 475.21, Florida Statutes. I enclose[d] a letter from Metro- Dade Police Department [with my application which] stated that I have felony arrest and misdemeanor arrest. At the time I was being finger printed for DBPR, I ask [sic] the finger printing officer can I have a copy of my convictions and was denied. I also enclosed a hand written letter statement, all the conviction I can remember, and that's why I check [sic] Question 9 Yes. I'm not proud of my past life, but I work hard to obtain my real estate license and wouldn't do anything to jeodarize [sic] my license. I just didn't remember my past convictions, that's why I answer [sic] question nine Yes. (Emphasis in original.) Thereafter, on October 26, 1999, the Department issued the Administrative Complaint at issue in this proceeding which, based on Respondent's failure to disclose the aforesaid incidents on his application, charged that Respondent has "obtained a license by means of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment" in violation of Section 475.25(1)(m), Florida Statutes (Count I), and that Respondent has "failed to disclose in his application for a real estate salesperson [license] information that Rule 61J2-2.027(2), Florida Administrative Code, requires" and therefore, violated Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Count II). According to the complaint, the disciplinary action sought for such violations was stated to be as follows: . . . [T]he penalty for each count or separate offense may range from a reprimand; an administrative fine not to exceed $5,000.00 per violation; probation; suspension of license, registration or permit for a period not to exceed ten (10) years; revocation of the license, registration or permit; and any one or all of the above penalties. 3/ Consistent with the explanation he offered the Department for his failure to fully disclose his criminal history, Respondent explained, at hearing, that his response to item 9 on the application was, at the time, an accurate reflection of his recollection, and that it was not his intention to mislead the Department by failing to disclose the matters he overlooked. Specifically, the Respondent offered the following explanation at hearing: THE COURT: Why didn't you disclose your 1978 and 1979 problems with the disorderly conduct and battery and the discharging the firearm? THE WITNESS: There's no reason. When I went to get the fingerprint card done, I asked the officer, can I get a print out of my convictions and my felony record, and he told me that he didn't do that and I didn't know that I had to take it a step further. I only checked Question 9, yes, to show that I did have criminal past and I didn't know that I had to take it a step further than that. If I would have known that, I would have took the opportunity to go do that. But I didn't know that I had to check the question and to present that for the application. THE COURT: What the question asked you, if you answered, yes, then attach the details, the dates and the outcome. THE WITNESS: Yes, that's true and I know I should have done it. But I asked them to give me -- I couldn't put it on nobody but myself. I should have taken it a step further. To get the convictions. I wasn't trying to hide anything from the Department. * * * CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MS. MARSH: Q Mr. Solomon, looking at your 1978 charge with the battery, resisting the officer and disorderly conduct and the 1979 charge with the shooting in the occupied dwelling . . . were you considering that if you disclosed those to the commission, that they would deny you a licensure? A No, that's why I checked the question, yes. I don't know how you look at it, but if I wanted to tell the truth about it, I would have checked, no, to the felony arrest. * * * Q Did you believe the Department would find all of your prior criminal cases? A Yes. I knew that they would find it but I didn't know that it would lead to this here, because I did check the question, yes. I didn't know it would lead to this, I would have taken that extra day and not taken the test and gotten the background check. (Transcript, pages 24-27). Here, Respondent's explanation for his failure to disclose the full scope of his criminal history is credited, and it is resolved that, at the time he submitted his application, Respondent did not intend to mislead or deceive the Department. In so concluding, it is observed that Respondent's testimony was candid, the nature of the incidents he disclosed were serious, as opposed to trivial, and his assumption that the complete details of his criminal history would be revealed when the Department (as it stated it would do on the application) checked his response against local, state, and federal records was well founded. Consequently, while his response to item 9 on the application was incomplete, Respondent's failure to more fully detail his criminal history is more appropriately characterized as a careless, thoughtless, or heedless act as opposed to a willful or intentional effort to mislead the Department as to the true character of his history.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered adopting the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and which, for the violation found, imposes a 30-day suspension and an administrative fine of $250. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2000.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has cause to terminate the Respondent's employment as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 20, 1998.
Findings Of Fact On August 14, 1998, Respondent, a teacher employed by Petitioner, entered a plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, which is a first degree felony pursuant to Section 825.103, Florida Statutes. At the same time, Respondent also entered a plea of guilty to the charge of petit theft over $100.00, which is a first degree misdemeanor. In entering these pleas, Respondent advised the court, pursuant to Rule 3.172(d), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, that she believed the pleas were in her best interest and that she was maintaining her innocence to the charges. The court withheld adjudication of guilt as to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person, adjudicated her guilty of petit theft, sentenced her to one day of time served, placed her on probation for 20 years, and required that she pay restitution to the Estate of Lillie Keller in the amount of $52,000.00. 1/ By letter dated October 21, 1997, Petitioner reassigned Respondent to a position with no direct contact with children pending the outcome of the criminal charges. Following an investigation, the superintendent of schools recommended to the school board that Respondent's employment be suspended without pay and terminated. On October 7, 1998, the school board voted to adopt that recommendation. The recommendation and the subsequent vote to adopt the recommendation were based on Respondent's plea of guilty to the charge of exploitation of an elderly person. Petitioner followed its procedural rules in investigating this matter and in voting to terminate Respondent's employment. As of October 7, 1998, Respondent held a professional services contract and had been employed by Petitioner for approximately 13 years as a teacher. Section 231.02(1), Florida Statutes, requires school board employees to be of good moral character. Respondent, as a teacher, is required by Section 231.02(2), Florida Statutes, to be fingerprinted and screened by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) Any person for whom employment screening is required by statute must not have been found guilty of, regardless of adjudication, or entered a plea of nolo contendere or guilty to, any offense prohibited under any of the following provisions of the Florida Statutes or under any similar statute of another jurisdiction: * * * (v) Section 825.103, relating to exploitation of an elderly person or disabled adult, if the offense was a felony. Petitioner's Rule 3.12, pertaining to criminal background checks of current and prospective employees, has been duly enacted and provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Definitions: For the purposes of this policy: * * * b. "Conviction" means a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial regardless of whether adjudication is withheld. * * * 3. A prospective or current employee may be disqualified or may be terminated from continued employment if the prospective or current employee has been convicted of a crime classified as a felony or first degree misdemeanor directly related to the position of employment sought or convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude or any of the offenses enumerated in Chapter 435, Florida Statutes. Section M of the collective bargaining agreement between the Petitioner and the Palm Beach County Classroom Teachers' Association provides for progressive discipline of covered employees such as Respondent. Section M provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Without the consent of the employee and the Association, disciplinary action may not be taken against an employee except for just cause, and this must be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence which supports the recommended disciplinary action. * * * 7. Except in cases which clearly constitute a real and immediate danger to the District or the actions/inactions of the employee constitute such clearly flagrant and purposeful violations of reasonable school rules and regulations, progressive discipline shall be administered as follows: Verbal Reprimand With a Written Notation. . . . Written Reprimand. . . . Suspension Without Pay. A suspension without pay may be issued to an employee when appropriate, in keeping with the provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. ... Dismissal. An employee may be dismissed (employment contract terminated or non-renewed) when appropriate in keeping with provisions of this Section, including just cause and applicable law. Section 435.06(2), Florida Statutes, requires an employing agency, such as the Petitioner, to take the following action when an employee has failed to meet the requirements of Section 435.03(2), Florida Statutes: The employer must either terminate the employment of any of its personnel found to be in noncompliance with the minimum standards for good moral character contained in this section or place the employee in a position for which background screening is not required unless the employee is granted an exemption from disqualification pursuant to s. 435.07. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that terminates Respondent's employment based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 1999.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner James Joseph Richardson has met his burden of proving actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act.
Findings Of Fact On October 25, 1967, Petitioner's wife prepared a breakfast of grits for their seven children. In a separate pot she prepared the children's lunch of beans, gravy, rice, and hogs head meat. She also fried some fresh chicken which she used to make sandwiches for her and Petitioner's lunch. She and Petitioner then left to get a ride to the grove where they worked picking fruit. It was their routine for Petitioner's wife to cook the food. The eldest child, eleven-year-old Betty Jean Bryant, would later serve it to all the children after the Richardsons left for work. It is not clear whether the children actually ate their breakfast grits that day. The school-age children went to school while the younger children remained at home. It was the routine for Petitioner's neighbor Betsy Reese to look after them. Petitioner's family and Betsy Reese and her children lived in the same structure, assumedly similar to a duplex. There was a common porch across the front. There was also a shed in the back yard. The school-age children returned to the home at lunchtime. Reese divided the food in the second pot into seven equal portions, and the children ate lunch. Right after the children returned to school after lunch, they began exhibiting terrible symptoms, such as leaking from their orifices, twitching, and rigidity. Teachers began grabbing the Richardson children and rushing them to the hospital. One of the teachers, knowing there were younger children at home, drove to the Richardson home. Those children were on the shared porch, displaying the same symptoms. Reese was sitting on the porch, holding one of the children. The teacher took them to the hospital. Petitioner and his wife were summoned to the hospital. Six of the children died that same day, and the seventh child died early the next morning. At the hospital, medical personnel did not know what substance was causing the illness and deaths. Sheriff Frank Cline went to the Richardson home and conducted several searches of the home and the shed attempting to find what had poisoned the children. When Petitioner and his wife arrived at the hospital, Cline obtained from Petitioner the key to the refrigerator and searched again. The next morning Reese and Charlie Smith, who was described as the town drunk, found a bag of parathion, a highly- toxic insecticide, in the shed behind the house. Cline and his deputies had searched the shed approximately four times during the day the children became sick and Cline had searched the shed by himself late that night, and no bag of parathion had been seen by them. It was determined that parathion was present in the pot the grits were cooked in, the pot the lunch was cooked in, the frying pan the chicken may have been cooked in, flour, corn meal, sugar, and other substances found in the refrigerator. It was also determined that parathion is what killed the children. Petitioner had a key to the refrigerator as did his wife. Indications are that a third key was left on the refrigerator for the babysitter's use. Petitioner was tried for the first degree murder of the eldest child Betty Jean Bryant and was convicted. The jury did not recommend mercy, and he was sentenced to death. His conviction was reviewed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971). Petitioner's death sentence was commuted to life when Florida's death penalty was held to be unconstitutional the following year. In October 1988, 21 years after the seven children were murdered, the official file, which had been stolen ten years earlier from the office of the assistant state attorney who had prosecuted Petitioner, appeared in the office of the Governor of the State of Florida. Governor Bob Martinez ordered the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to investigate the disappearance and re-appearance of the file and accompanying information. That investigation resulted in new information and admissions surrounding the circumstances leading to the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. The Governor entered an Executive Order on July 31, 1989, appointing Janet Reno, State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida, to provide prosecutorial assistance to FDLE. That Executive Order further directed FDLE to continue its investigation into all statements and evidence concerning Petitioner's arrest and conviction and to also investigate any violations of the criminal laws or misconduct by public officials relative to the events surrounding the deaths of the children and the arrest and conviction of Petitioner. On February 13, 1989, another Executive Order, amending the first, was signed by the Governor assigning State Attorney Reno to the Twelfth and Twentieth Judicial Circuits to discharge the duties of the State Attorneys in those Circuits relating to the investigation and prosecution of Petitioner's case. On March 31, 1989, a third Executive Order was signed. It amended the first two and recited that Reno and FDLE had reported their findings to the Governor and that Reno had also advised the Governor that Petitioner had filed a motion for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit. The Executive Order directed Reno to assume and discharge the duties of the State Attorney relating to any post-conviction proceedings involving Petitioner. A fourth Executive Order was then entered amending the first three by adding to Reno's duties consideration of any further prosecution of Petitioner. As a result of the extensive investigations conducted by Reno and FDLE, Reno joined in Petitioner's pending motion for post-conviction relief. Petitioner's request that his conviction and sentence be vacated was granted, and Petitioner was released from prison. Reno also made the decision that Petitioner would not be re-tried for the murder of Betty Jean Bryant and would not be prosecuted for the murders of the six other children. On May 5, 1989, Reno issued a 35-page Nolle Prosse Memorandum explaining in detail the evidence she had reviewed, the conflicting evidence she had considered, the apparent- perjured testimony that had been given at Petitioner's trial, and the conflicting witness statements which the State had before trial but had not disclosed to Petitioner's attorneys despite a court order to do so. The Memorandum discussed additional problems she had encountered because the physical evidence from the trial 21 years earlier had been misplaced or destroyed, a witness had later recanted his trial testimony, and key witnesses had died since the trial had taken place. Further, as a result of the publicity surrounding her investigation a number of persons had come forward claiming to have evidence, but they had never come forward during the initial investigation. Reno and the two Assistant State Attorneys who worked with her on her investigation determined that in evaluating whether Petitioner should be given post-conviction relief and whether Petitioner should be re-tried, they would only consider the files, records, and evidence that existed at the time that Petitioner was tried. They considered the evidence that had not been disclosed to anyone for 21 years to be unreliable. Some of it was also conflicting. She signed the Nolle Prosse Memorandum as did the two Assistant State Attorneys Don L. Horn and Richard L. Shiffrin. At the final hearing in this cause Don Horn testified extensively as to the contents of the Memorandum. Although he, Shiffrin, and Reno had discussed the misconduct they discovered on the part of the Sheriff and the prosecuting attorneys, they knew that the statute of limitations prevented taking action against those public officials, so the Memorandum did not discuss any action to be taken against them. It only considered the evidence against Petitioner. The Memorandum concluded that a "totally inadequate and incomplete investigation" into the deaths of the seven children had been conducted. Obvious leads had not been pursued, inconsistencies were not resolved, and standard investigative procedures had not been followed. The Memorandum further opined that at the time that Petitioner was charged with murder, the State did not have sufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt. The Memorandum concluded that Petitioner "was probably wrongfully accused" based upon the evidence that existed at the time. Three years later a 260-page Memorandum Opinion prepared by United States Attorney Robert Merkle and indicating a need for further investigation into the 1968 prosecution of Petitioner was presented to the Treasurer of Florida. The Opinion, which was not admitted in evidence, was described as a "scathing indictment" of Reno's investigation. As a result, Governor Lawton Chiles issued a confidential Executive Order on October 16, 1992, appointing State Attorney Reno to further investigate all matters pertaining to or arising from the issues raised in the Opinion involving Petitioner's prosecution. On October 30, 1992, the Governor issued a second Executive Order deleting the provisions of his prior Order requiring that it be sealed and confidential. Assistant State Attorney Richard L. Shiffrin, who participated in Reno's first investigation, and Gertrude M. Novicki, Reno's Chief Assistant for Special Prosecutions, were assigned to conduct this investigation. Both of those Assistant State Attorneys signed the Response of the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit. The Response is not dated but a word-processing notation suggests it may have been issued on or about April 30, 1993. At the final hearing, Novicki testified regarding her Response. Rather than responding to or explaining each of the details set forth in Merkle's Memorandum Opinion, Novicki and Shiffrin re-examined the propriety of both the vacating of the original judgment of guilty and the decision to enter a nolle prosse. In doing so, they reviewed the original prosecution in light of the evidence at trial and of the law as it existed in 1968 and also reviewed the ability to re-prosecute Petitioner in light of the evidence currently available and admissible. The Response concluded that the Order granting Petitioner's motion to vacate his conviction and sentence was supported by the facts and the law and that the decision to enter a nolle prosse reached in 1989 was proper. The Response's summary states that the physical evidence against Petitioner did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the testimonial evidence as to Petitioner's admissions of culpability were of dubious admissibility and value, the evidence of motive was equivocal at best, and the decision to enter a nolle prosse was unquestionably correct. The summary ends as follows: "Whether or not [Petitioner] is guilty of this horrible crime is uncertain. What is certain is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of guilt is lacking." The prior proceedings involving Petitioner and the prior reviews of those proceedings have focused on the criminal law standard of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. That standard, however, is not applicable to this proceeding. In this proceeding wherein Petitioner is seeking monetary compensation for his wrongful incarceration, Section 961.03, Florida Statutes, requires Petitioner to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed neither the act nor the offense that served as the basis for the conviction and incarceration and that he did not aid, abet, or act as an accomplice to a person who committed the act or offense. Further, he must prove his actual innocence by verifiable and substantial evidence in order to meet the definition of wrongfully incarcerated person. Petitioner testified that he did not poison his children, that he did not kill his children, and that he never told anyone that he did. He also testified that he did not aid or assist anyone in poisoning or killing his children. In order to provide verifiable and substantial evidence in support of his testimony that he is innocent, Petitioner has taken two approaches. The first is by relying on the investigation detailed in the 1989 Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the testimony of Don Horn, one of the authors. (In its defense, the State offered the 1993 Response and the testimony of Gertrude Novicki, one of its authors.) In so doing, Petitioner has offered clear and convincing evidence that the investigation leading up to Petitioner’s prosecution and conviction was incomplete. The investigation revealed conflicting evidence about whether Petitioner had obtained life insurance policies on his children the night before they were murdered, which he had not, and whether Petitioner believed that he had. The investigation did not determine how the parathion got into the pots and skillet and various food products in the refrigerator or when. The investigation appeared to focus only on Petitioner as a suspect and not also on others whose involvement was suspicious. Toward the end of the investigation and prior to Petitioner’s criminal trial, the prosecutors wrote memos expressing concern about the weakness of their case and their possible inability to present even a prima facie case. After those memos were written, the Sheriff produced three jailhouse informants to testify that Petitioner admitted to them his crimes. They also gave statements that Petitioner said he thought that Reese did it and gave details of different motives she might have had. Rather than resolving the conflicting statements, the prosecution withheld the conflicting statements from the defense. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum discusses these statements and informants and finds that one of the jailhouse informants recanted his testimony after Petitioner’s trial and one was drunk when he testified. The third one, whose statements were given under circumstances that made them highly doubtful, died before the trial, and his testimony given at the preliminary hearing was given to the jury in the form of five witnesses who testified as to their recollections of his testimony. The informants were not the only ones to provide perjured testimony at Petitioner’s trial; the Sheriff also appears to have done so. A review of the Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the detailed evidence it discusses makes it clear that Petitioner was wrongfully accused based upon the evidence and lack of evidence the prosecution had gathered. It is further clear that Petitioner’s conviction and sentence based upon that insufficient evidence should have been vacated, and they were. It is further clear that re-trying Petitioner would be fruitless because the evidence available 21 years after the murders was insufficient: the physical evidence was missing or destroyed, many of the key witnesses were dead, and the evidence that might have been admissible for a re-trial was conflicting. However, the inability of the State to prove Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt does not prove that Petitioner is actually innocent of committing the murders or aiding in the commission. Petitioner’s second approach to providing verifiable and substantial evidence of his actual innocence is attempting to show that Reese, not the Petitioner, murdered the children. The 1989 investigation showed that, at the time the Richardson children were poisoned, Reese was on parole for killing her second husband with a gun. Although there was also a rumor that she had poisoned her first husband, no evidence was found to support that rumor. Parenthetically, there was also a rumor that Petitioner killed his three other children in Jacksonville, but that was also untrue. Similarly, there was a rumor that Sheriff Cline fathered Reese’s granddaughter and that was why he steered the investigation away from her. The blood tests of all concerned done as part of the 1989 investigation proved that rumor also untrue. Petitioner relies also upon the facts that Reese was the last person in the Richardson home on the day in question, the person who served the children the poisoned lunch, and the person who found the parathion in the shed. Her unconcerned behavior while the Richardson toddlers were exhibiting horrible symptoms on her porch and her lack of concern about whether her children who were playing there might be at risk from whatever was making the Richardson children so sick are suggested to be evidence that she knew why the Richardson children were sick and why her children would not be. It was also suggested that she must have been the murderer since her third husband had gone to Jacksonville with Petitioner and his wife but they had returned without Reese’s husband who never did return to her. Petitioner relies heavily on evidence which he suggests constitutes admissions of her guilt by Reese. The 1988 investigation considered an affidavit by one certified nursing assistant and a taped interview of another, both of whom worked at a nursing home where Reese became a patient in 1986. The affidavit by Belinda Romeo asserts that Romeo asked Reese on more than 100 separate occasions if she killed the seven Richardson children, that Reese replied that she did, and that Reese was competent at the times Romeo asked that question. On the other hand, the transcript of a taped interview of Doris Harris, who was present several times when Romeo questioned Reese, is clearly contrary to that affidavit. Harris states that by the time Reese was admitted to the nursing home, she was incontinent, unable to walk, unable to feed herself, only “half way aware,” unable to say what day or year it was, "back to a child's state," and suffering from Alzheimer’s. When Romeo would ask if she killed the children, she would say that she killed them, say the name Charlie, and then lapse into incoherent mumbling. Harris believed that Reese was saying she killed them because she was the one who fed them the poisoned food, and not because she was the one who put the poison in the food. Reese’s “admissions” are, therefore, ambiguous and not trustworthy. Petitioner also introduced into evidence a 1988 affidavit of Richard H. Barnard, the Chief of Police who began an investigation into the children’s deaths. After he got Reese to admit she was in the Richardson home that day and served the children their lunch, he was removed from the investigation by the “Governor’s office” in a phone call which he believes Sheriff Cline instigated. His affidavit undermines the statements of the jailhouse informants, expresses his concern that Sheriff Cline may have tampered with the jury, and states his opinion that Sheriff Cline framed Petitioner. He concludes with his opinion that Petitioner was innocent and Reese was guilty. The hearsay evidence and suggestions that Reese was guilty of the murders do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Opinion testimony does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner's innocence. The Nolle Prosse Memorandum and the Response do not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. The testimony of Horn and Novicki as to what they considered during their investigations does not constitute verifiable and substantial evidence of Petitioner’s innocence. Lastly, Petitioner’s own testimony denying his guilt is not verifiable and substantial evidence of his innocence. Simply put, the evidence in this proceeding does not establish Petitioner’s actual innocence. Since Chapter 961, Florida Statutes, does not provide a definition of “actual innocence,” Petitioner argues that the definition should be that based upon the evidence it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him. That definition is found in Supreme Court of the United States and Supreme Court of Florida cases. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 2008); Mills v. State, 786 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 2001). Petitioner’s argument is not persuasive. All of those cases involved motions for post-conviction relief, not claims for money damages. That definition of actual innocence was likely utilized when Petitioner was granted post-conviction relief by having his conviction and sentence vacated and being released from prison, which is the relief which results from meeting that definition. That definition of actual innocence tests the legal sufficiency of evidence. The Statute regulating this proceeding does not consider legal sufficiency; rather, it considers factual sufficiency by requiring the undersigned to make findings of fact as to Petitioner’s actual innocence if proven by verifiable and substantial evidence. In other words, proof of factual innocence is required. Perhaps the reason the Statute does not contain its own definition of actual innocence is that the Legislature intended the words to have their plain, ordinary meaning. A review of the two investigations of Petitioner’s prosecution clearly shows an absence of evidence proving Petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. However, a review of the two investigations does not show that Petitioner is actually innocent. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence and, thus, has failed to establish that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person eligible for compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act. RECOMMENDED DETERMINATION Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Petitioner’s claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of August, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert I. Barrar, Esquire Law Offices of Ellis Rubin & Robert I. Barrar 6619 South Dixie Highway, No. 311 Miami, Florida 33143 Raul C. De La Heria, Esquire 2100 Coral Way, Suite 500 Miami, Florida 33145 Dennis Nales, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Earl Moreland, Esquire Office of the State Attorney 2071 Ringling Boulevard, Suite 400 Sarasota, Florida 34237
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether, because of a prior regulatory and criminal history, the Petitioner is entitled to licensure in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuity agent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Eugene P. Kent, at times pertinent hereto was a licensed insurance agent in South Dakota. He was apparently an agent or broker for the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and engaged in the insurance business with regard to the various group benefits coverage for that association. Apparently in 1995, he become involved in a dispute between the Independent Community Banker's Association of South Dakota and United of Omaha Life Insurance Company. This dispute, the exact nature of which is not of record in this case, resulted in the Petitioner being charged with mail fraud by the United States Attorney for the District of South Dakota. He was prosecuted for mail fraud and ultimately was convicted by jury verdict on or shortly after October 26, 1996. He was sentenced to two years' imprisonment. The Petitioner believed that evidence existed in the home office of United of Omaha Life Insurance Company, which would exonerate him, and that his counsel during the criminal prosecution had, for unknown reasons, failed to subpoena and obtain such evidence for use in his criminal trial. He obtained new counsel who was successful in obtaining the evidence in question, which indeed proved to be exculpatory. It resulted in the presiding judge in the criminal case vacating the order of conviction, resulting in the Petitioner's release from incarceration. Because of his conviction, the insurance departments of South Dakota, as well as North Dakota and Nebraska, had revoked his insurance licenses, based upon the criminal conviction. On October 26, 1996, during the progress of the criminal trial referenced above, the Petitioner and his wife became concerned that she would not have funds to pay for his counsel, to operate her home and the business and to pay for her son's alcohol rehabilitation expenses if the jury returned a guilty verdict resulting in his incarceration. Consequently, on that day, the Petitioner made a withdrawal from his business account, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., account in the amount of $9,900, by writing a check on that account. On the same day, the Petitioner went to a different branch of the same bank and negotiated a second check on this same account also made payable to him, again, in the amount of $9,900, drawn upon the Kent Insurance, Inc., business account. The bank officer upon the occasion of the second withdrawal that same day told him that a currency transaction report would have to be filed. The Petitioner readily agreed to file the report and assisted the bank officer in completing and executing the transaction report. Thereafter, the United States Attorney secured an indictment of the Petitioner, during his incarceration for the earlier criminal conviction, before it was vacated by the trial judge. He prosecuted the Petitioner for "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report." During the pendency of this second criminal proceeding, the Petitioner remained incarcerated from the earlier proceeding, which was later vacated. Because of this, his counsel in the second criminal proceeding advised him to plead guilty to the second charge in return for a light penalty, because his counsel believed that if he attempted to litigate the second criminal matter to trial, he would have difficulty convincing a jury of his innocence because he was already incarcerated on the earlier mail fraud charge. Consequently, on May 20, 1998, the Petitioner pled guilty to attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report. He was sentenced to five months' imprisonment as a result of that plea, which ran concurrently with the sentence imposed on February 24, 1997, regarding the mail fraud charge. After release, he was sentenced to supervised release for a period of approximately two years. The preponderant evidence in this proceeding shows that the Petitioner did not attempt to defraud the federal government or to prevent the bank involved from filing the report. Upon being informed of the requirement of filing the report, he freely consented and helped execute the report form involved at his bank. The funds he withdrew with the two checks were his funds from an account over which he had ownership and signatory authority. There is no evidence that the funds in the account withdrawn by the Petitioner had been obtained through an criminal alleged enterprise or that the Petitioner contemplated using them for such a purpose. The post-conviction evidence that was obtained by the Petitioner and his counsel resulted in the judge vacating the first conviction for mail fraud. This new evidence was also the basis for the South Dakota Insurance Regulatory Agency reinstating his licensure. Ultimately, the other states which had revoked his licensure reinstated his licenses. The Petitioner is now similarly licensed in 17 or 18 states. He applied for licensure as a non-resident life, health, and variable annuity agent in Florida and that application was denied by the Department due to his criminal history and the prior administrative actions against his licensure in the other states. That denial resulted in this proceeding. The other states which have since either reinstated his licensure or licensed him did so with knowledge, as reported by the Petitioner, of his prior criminal and administrative proceedings. The Department has a rule listing various crimes (in Classes A, B, and C) such that, if a petitioner has been so convicted, then that petitioner cannot be licensed for periods of times stated in that rule. Class A crimes listed in that rule carry the longest period of time during which licensure is prohibited with a waiting period extending as much as 15 years. The Division of Licensing of the Department decided that the crime involved herein was a "Class A crime." The rule allows the Department to analogize the crime of which a petitioner or applicant has been convicted with one of the crimes listed in this rule if the crime, of which an applicant was convicted, is not itself listed in the rule. The Division of Licensing thus decided to classify the crime of "attempting to cause a financial institution not to file a report" as analogous to "defrauding the government" or "obstruction of justice." The Petitioner was not charged with either defrauding the government or obstruction of justice and was not convicted of those crimes. Although the stipulation of facts between the Petitioner and the United States Attorney, attendant to the Petitioner's plea in the second federal criminal case (Petitioner's Exhibit G), shows that the Petitioner knowingly attempted to avoid the reporting requirement imposed by Title 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) on the bank for currency transactions of more than $10,000 in one day, there is no persuasive evidence that he did so for any illegal purpose or fraudulent intent, or intent to in any way "obstruct justice," or engage in dishonest conduct. There was no demonstrative harm to the public nor was there any "victim" of his purported crime. If the Petitioner had truly wanted to conceal the transaction or induce the bank to fail to report it, he could simply have presented the second $9,900 check on another day for cashing, or had his wife negotiate such a check on a different business day. Instead, when told by the bank employee, on presenting the second check, that a currency transaction report would have to be filed, he freely assented and assisted in the preparation of the report form; even the above-referenced stipulation of facts attendant to his criminal plea shows this. There was no requirement that a report be made until the second check was negotiated on the same day. The Petitioner's testimony in evidence, including the fact that 18 states have licensed him or re-instated his licensure since the criminal and administrative proceedings at issue herein, with knowledge of those proceedings, shows preponderantly that his crime did not "involve moral turpitude" and that he is fit and trustworthy for engagement in the practice of insurance. The crime to which he pled did not involve any significant, rational relationship or nexus to the two "analogized crimes" involving "obstruction of justice" or "defrauding the government" for purposes of the Department's rule cited below. Two affidavits, admitted as Petitioner's Exhibits J and K, as corroborative hearsay, in accordance with Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, bear out this finding and are worthy of quotation. The first affidavit is that of attorney James L. Volling, the Petitioner's counsel for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to his first conviction, and his counsel for purposes of the second criminal case. Mr. Volling practices in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and is admitted to practice by the Minnesota Supreme Court, as well as by the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota and for the District of North Dakota. He is also admitted to practice in the courts of appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit, the Eighth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, as well as the United States Supreme Court. He testified in pertinent part as follows: Following Mr. Kent's conviction on two counts of mail fraud, I was retained to represent him for purposes of appeal and post-conviction challenge to the conviction as well as in connection with a second case brought against him. Upon reviewing the facts and the law in Mr. Kent's case, I became convinced that his conviction was defective and inappropriate. Ultimately, the trial court agreed and his petition for post-conviction relief was granted and his conviction and sentence were vacated. The government chose not to appeal that decision which I believe clearly would have been upheld by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. During the pendency of post-conviction proceedings in Mr. Kent's case, the government brought a second case against Mr. Kent involving allegations of an attempt to avoid currency transaction reporting requirements. In my view, these allegations were petty at best, especially considering that the bank involved did file a currency transaction report and Mr. Kent expressly permitted them to do so. Mr. Kent was simply withdrawing his own money and there was no claim that those funds were the product of any illegal activity [or for any illegal purpose]. The government's second case was only technical in nature and, in my view, would not have been charged in any other jurisdiction with which I am familiar. Indeed, the assistant United States attorney representing the government told me that the only reason the government brought the second case was their concern that Mr. Kent's conviction in the first case would ultimately be overturned, which of course it was. With regard to the currency transaction reporting matter, Mr. Kent elected to enter a plea bargain to avoid further expense and burden, and which did not augment the punishment that had been given to him in the first case. I have no doubt that, if Mr. Kent, had not been convicted in the first case so that he would not have had that stigma at the time of the second case, he would have elected to try the currency transaction reporting case rather than to enter into a plea agreement. It was after that plea agreement, that the conviction and sentence in Mr. Kent's first case were vacated. I have known and dealt with Eugene Kent for approximately five years now. During that entire time, he has always been a man of his word. He has done exactly what he said he would do and has told me the truth in every respect. I have great respect and admiration for Mr. Kent as person and as a client. I believe he has suffered unfairly throughout this entire ordeal, but he has remained steadfast and persevered through some truly difficult times. I have been proud to serve as his legal counsel, and I would recommend him unhesitatingly to anyone in terms of employment or any business relationship. The second affidavit is by Mark F. Marshall. Mr. Marshall is now a lawyer and at times pertinent hereto has been admitted to the practice of law by the South Dakota Supreme Court. He has been in the active practice of law since 1981. At times pertinent hereto from January 1, 1996, until August 1, 2000, Mr. Marshall served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. Mr. Marshall testified pertinently as follows: From January 1, 1996 until August 1, 2000, I served as a United States Magistrate Judge for the District of South Dakota. In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted the initial appearance and detention hearings in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 96-40002-01. Over the objection of the United States, I ordered Mr. Kent released on conditions. A copy of the Order Setting Conditions of Release, as well as Mr. Kent's Appearance Bond in the Amount of $100,000.00 is attached hereto as Exhibits A and B respectively. [released on a non-surety bond requiring no security.] In my capacity as a United States Magistrate Judge, I conducted a hearing on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss in a matter styled the United States of America v. Eugene P. Kent, CR. 97-40111. [the currency transaction prosecution.] I denied the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss as I believed that an issue of fact existed as to the Defendant's intent. While I believed that it would be improper to dismiss the case because of that issue, I also know that if I had been the finder of fact I would have found the Defendant not guilty of all of charges in the indictment. Perhaps more so than any defendant who appeared before me, Mr. Kent comported himself with grace, dignity, and the utmost of integrity with regard to both criminal cases. Since being exonerated from all underlying criminal counts regarding this matter, Mr. Kent has asked me to submit an affidavit on his behalf. Initially, I was reluctant to do so not because Mr. Kent was unworthy of support, but because I was concerned about whether doing so would reflect adversely on my former judicial office. I have concluded that the interests of justice compel me to provide this affidavit on behalf of Mr. Kent. I am firmly of the belief that Mr. Kent committed no criminal acts in either of the cases venued in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota and as such he should not bear the stigma of any criminal record. I have been a member of the South Dakota Board of Pardons and Paroles since July of 2002. During my tenure as a member of the Parole Board, I have reviewed hundreds of applications for pardons. I have reviewed all public filings in Mr. Kent's civil actions arising from his conviction as well as all filings in the criminal action itself. Based on my experiences as a Parole Board member, my knowledge of Mr. Kent individually and professionally, and as well as my knowledge of the role that pardons serve in the state and federal judicial system, I believe that Mr. Kent is an unusually worthy applicant for such extraordinary relief. It is my personal belief that Mr. Kent poses no threat to society whatsoever. Society's interests, as well as those of Mr. Kent, would be well served by granting him the relief he seeks . . . . Dated this 11th day of November, 2003.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be granted licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Ladasiah Jackson, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Eugene P. Kent 1209 West 37th Street Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57105
Findings Of Fact In 1970, the Petitioner, WILLIAM C. HARRELL, was a student at Georgia Tech, a math major. Up to that time, he had been a very bright student and had been accepted for a full scholarship at Baylor University to study medicine. He planned to become a doctor, but that career opportunity was destroyed suddenly when he was involved in a severe automobile accident in which he was struck by a drunk driver. He sustained severe head injuries, almost died during neurosurgery, and was in a coma for many weeks thereafter. His initial medical prognosis following surgery was that he would be totally incapacitated, losing essentially all of his cognitive functions. In fact, however, he regained consciousness and over the ensuing four years, while under the care of Dr. Howard Chandler, his neurosurgeon in Jacksonville, Florida, effected a remarkable recovery. He had suffered severe memory and speech deficits as a result of the trauma, but through rehabilitation, gradually overcame much of this deficit. In 1974, his doctor released him and recommended that he try to renew his education and rebuild his life. He apparently began attending North Florida Junior College in Jacksonville, Florida, at approximately this time. He never was able to complete his college degree, however. His employment history thereafter is unclear in this record, but apparently he had some difficulty obtaining significantly rewarding employment. However, he did start his own lawn service business which he successfully operated for approximately 14 years. During this period of time in the late 1970's and early 1980's, he married and had a daughter and was enjoying some success at rebuilding a meaningful and productive life for himself and his family. Testimony adduced by the Petitioner through his witnesses, as well as evidence consisting of numerous testimonial letters regarding his character and reputation for honesty and sincerity (stipulated into evidence by the parties), established that the Petitioner is a willing and productive worker and an honest, sincere human being, both in his capacity as a husband and father and as to his dealings with customers of his lawn service business and as to his clients in his chosen career in insurance sales. In approximately late 1984 or 1985, the Petitioner's life began to go awry. He and his wife began experiencing severe marital difficulties, which ultimately culminated in the dissolution of their marriage. Thereafter, the Petitioner and his former wife became embroiled in a custody dispute regarding their young daughter. Apparently, the Petitioner's former wife had custody of their daughter, a very small child at the time; and they became embroiled in a bitter dispute over visitation rights, which was in litigation for approximately one year. The Petitioner states that he ultimately won visitation rights with his daughter as a result of this litigation, and his former wife became quite angry at this result. She was also, according to the Petitioner, quite jealous over his remarriage to his present wife and continued to actively obstruct his ability to have his daughter come to his home for visits. His former wife made statements to the effect that she would besmirch his reputation so that he would be unable to get employment and not ever be able to see his child again. The Petitioner states that his daughter at the time was subject to bed wetting frequently; and on one occasion, at least, when she was staying in his home, he would "wipe her bottom with toilet tissue". He states that during this visit or possibly on a number of them (the record is not clear), his daughter was very irritated and sore in the genital area due to bed wetting, and that he and his wife attempted to treat that condition while she was in their home. Apparently, his daughter made some mention of that incident to the former wife, who became angry and ultimately had the State Attorney file a criminal information against the Petitioner for sexual assault. This charge and the criminal litigation which ensued was the result of the bitter, ill feeling harbored against him by his former wife and was solely instigated at her behest. The date upon which the offense is supposed to have occurred was totally implausible because, according to the terms of the visitation decree, the Petitioner was only allowed to see his daughter on certain weekends. On the date he is alleged to have committed the sexual assault, his daughter was not even at his home or otherwise under his custody. Nevertheless, his former wife persisted in pursuing the matter; and ultimately, he was at the point of being tried for the charge of sexual assault, a felony. Upon advice of his attorney, an Assistant Public Defender, and after discussion with the State Attorney handling the case, an agreement was reached whereby the Petitioner would not be adjudicated guilty, but rather was given certain probationary terms. He was never convicted and adjudication was withheld in the matter. It is noteworthy that on the sentencing document executed by the Circuit Judge having jurisdiction of that case, (in evidence), the probationary sentence was noted by the judge to be less penalty than authorized by the sentencing guidelines because of the unlikelihood of any conviction should the matter be tried. The Petitioner maintains vehemently that he never committed this act and, further, that he did not consider, based upon his attorney's advice, that he had any felony charge on his record as a result of the outcome of that criminal matter. His attorney, Assistant Public Defender, E. E. Durrance, attested to that situation by a letter placed into evidence by agreement of the parties, which indicates that the Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere in that criminal case and that the court withheld adjudication of guilt which meant that the Petitioner does not have a felony conviction record. Based upon this advice at the time by his attorney, the Petitioner answered `1no" to question number 8 on the application for licensure involved in this case, wherein it was asked whether the applicant had ever been charged with a felony. The evidence in this proceeding reveals that, indeed, he was charged with a felony; but the Petitioner explained that he equated that question in his mind to mean whether he had a felony conviction on his record or a finding of guilt which he, of course, did not. The Petitioner's testimony about this entire situation was unrebutted. Due to observation of the Petitioner's obvious candor and sincerity in his testimony, as corroborated by the numerous testimonial letters stipulated into evidence, all of which testimony and evidence was unrebutted, the Petitioner's testimony is accepted in this regard. The Hearing Officer finds that, indeed, he did not commit the felony of sexual assault. The Hearing Officer further finds that he answered in the negative to the subject question on the application regarding the existence of a felony charge because he believed that he could honestly answer "no" because he had no conviction. Thus, his answer was due to a misunderstanding of the legal import of his criminal court experience in this matter and was not due to any effort to misrepresent his past record or to mislead the Respondent in an attempt to gain licensure. In 1986, the Respondent was arrested for petty theft or "shoplifting," which is the other basis for the denial of his application for licensure. This occurred when the Petitioner was embroiled in his severe marital discord described above. The dissolution of his marriage and related litigation had cost him virtually all of his significant, material possessions. He was unable to maintain steady employment, except for his lawn service, which he started himself. That was a very seasonal business; and at times, he was very short of funds. On one day, he made the mistake, as he admits himself, of going to a supermarket, buying a cup of coffee, for which he paid, but placing a package of ham into his pants pocket and walking out the door. He was arrested for stealing a $2.58 package of ham and was prosecuted and paid a small fine. The Petitioner is very remorseful that this occurred and states that it occurred at an emotional and financial low point in his life when he could obtain no regular, remunerative employment nor help from anyone. He was consequently thrust into a period of depression at this time. When he took the package of ham, he was in such an emotional state that he did not care about the consequences. He has since remarried, however, and has worked hard to rebuild his life, both his employment career and his family life. Since embarking upon his insurance sales career in recent months (as a temporarily licensed agent), he has been very successful. Although a new, inexperienced agent, he is one of the highest sales producing agents for Gulf Life Insurance Company's office, where he is employed, and is one of the highest producers in terms of collection of premiums due. His employer, supervisor and customers uniformly praise his honest, sincere and human approach to insurance sales and his sensitivity to the feelings of his customers or clients. The Petitioner's tetimony, as corroborated by other testimony and the numerous testimonial letters stipulated into evidence, establish in an unrefuted way, that he is, indeed, a sincere and honest person, who earnestly desires the opportunity to engage in an honorable profession within the field of insurance marketing. The incident involving the theft of the package of ham appears to be an isolated incident of aberrant conduct and does not, in itself, establish a lack of trustworthiness or fitness to engage in the business of insurance, given its singular nature and the emotional and financial straits in which the Petitioner found himself at the time. The Petitioner was candid in admitting this instance of petty theft, a misdemeanor. He did not fail to disclose this on the application in question because there was no category on that application calling for him to admit such an incident. The alleged failure to disclose involved question number 8, concerning the felony charge. Indeed, he did answer no? but gave that answer for the reasons delineated above. Further, it is noteworthy that upon inquiry by the Department after its own investigation had revealed indications of a criminal record incident, the Petitioner freely obtained certified copies of all pertinent court documents and otherwise cooperated and disclosed all information concerning the alleged felony charge. This full disclosure made by the Petitioner occurred before the agency took its purported final action in denying his application for examination and licensure. Thus, although he did not answer the question in an affirmative way concerning the felony charge at issue, he did fully disclose it and all circumstances surrounding it to the Department when the matter arose and was questioned in the Department's investigatory process.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the applications of William C. Harrell for examination and licensure as a life, health and general-lines agent be granted. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. Accordingly, rulings on the Respondent's proposed findings of fact will be made. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter. It was not established that a knowing misrepresentation on the application was made. Accepted, but not as dispositive of material issues presented and not to the extent that it is indicated that a misrepresentation was made in the application. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter, and as not, in itself, dispositive of the material issues presented. Rejected, as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on the subject matter, and not in accordance with the preponderant weight of the evidence since it was proven that the Petitioner did not commit sexual battery. Accepted, to the extent that it shows the factual background underlying the procedural posture of this case, but not as dispositive of material issues presented. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. William C. Harrell P.O. Box 5503 Jacksonville, FL 32247 John C. Jordan, Esq. Department of Insurance and Treasurer Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 =================================================================
The Issue The issue presented for consideration concerns the question whether action taken by the Respondent in its efforts to comply with the mandate of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), constitutes a rule or rules which has or have not been duly promulgated in accordance with the provisions of Sections 120.53, 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact This case is here presented on the Petition of Livingston B. Sheppard, D.D.S., by an action against the Board of Dentistry, an agency of the State of Florida and the Department of Professional Regulation, an agency of the State of Florida, as Respondents. The purpose of this Petition is to have declared invalid certain activities of the Respondents pertaining to their efforts at complying with the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), in promoting license revocation or suspension cases against various dentists licensed to practice in the State of Florida. The Petitioner contends that these activities by the Respondents constitute a rule or rules which fail to comply with requirements of Sections 120.53, 120.54 and 120.56, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, Livingston B. Sheppard, D.D.S., is a dentist licensed to practice in the State of Florida and thereby regulated by the Respondents. The Petitioner is also the subject of disciplinary action in Case No. 78-1481 before the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings, and it is the action which was taken against Dr. Sheppard in the course of that prosecution, dealing with the subject of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), which the current Petitioner asserts to be an invalid rule or rules. The language of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), states: (5) No revocation, suspension, annulment, or withdrawal of any license is lawful unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings, the agency has given reasonable notice by certified mail or actual service to the licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action and the licensee has been given an opportunity to show that he has complied with all lawful requirements for the retention of the license. If the agency is unable to obtain service by certified mail or by actual service, constructive service may be made in the same manner as is provided in chapter 49. Having considered the statement found in the above-referenced Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), counsel for Dr. Sheppard in D.O.A.H Case No. 78-1481 filed a Motion to Dismiss the Administrative Complaint on August 31, 1979, alleging that the agency had failed to comply with the provisions. Oral argument on that motion was scheduled for 2:30 o'clock p.m. on September 17, 1979, and was heard at that time; however, prior to the oral argument, the Board of Dentistry on September 14, 1979, filed a docent in the case, which document attempted compliance with the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). The document was entitled "Notice of Intended Action Conference" and by its terms granted Dr. Sheppard an opportunity to appear before H. Fred Varn, Executive Director, Florida State Board of Dentistry, on September 17, 1979, at 10:00 a.m. in Tallahassee, Florida. (A copy of this "Notice of Intended Action Conference" was attached to the Petition in the case sub judice as an exhibit.) The Board of Dentistry had alerted the Hearing Officer to the action it had contemplated by its "Notice of Intended Action Conference." It did so through the Board prosecutor by correspondence of September 14, 1979, a copy of which may be found as the Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 admitted into evidence. Dr. Sheppard filed an objection to the adequacy of the "Notice of Intended Action Conference" and refused to appear at that conference. After considering the oral arguments of the parties directed to the Motion to Dismiss of August 31, 1978, in D.O.A.H. Case No. 78-1481, the Honorable Delphene C. Strickland, Hearing Officer with the Division of Administrative Hearings, entered her Order dated September 26, 1979. (A copy of that Order has been attached as an exhibit to the current Petition.) In her Order, the Hearing Officer found the "Notice of Intended Action Conference was insufficient, in that the notice did not grant Sheppard sufficient time to prepare for the conference to be held on September 17, 1979, to the extent of demonstrating his compliance with the provisions of Chapter 466, Florida Statutes, as contemplated by Sub section 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). The Hearing officer did feel that Dr. Sheppard had been notified of those allegations for which he was called upon to defend against and she granted the Board of Dentistry thirty (30) days from the date of her Order, September 26, 1978, to allow the accused an opportunity to show that he had complied with all lawful requirements for the retention of his license. There followed the current Petition which was filed on September 28, 1979. That Petition has been the subject of a Motion to Dismiss which challenged the adequacy of the Petition. The Motion to Dismiss was responded to and in the course of that response the Petitioner's counsel attached a copy of a "Notice of Informal Conference" to be held on October 23, 1979, at 9:00 a.m., in Tallahassee, Florida. (The location of that conference was subsequently changed to a place more convenient for Dr. Sheppard, specifically, St. Petersburg, Florida, but the amendment was otherwise the same as the original October 23, 1979, notice.) When the Motion to Dismiss and response to the motion were considered, the motion was denied by written Order of the undersigned dated October 22, 1979. That Order found in accordance with the Order of Hearing Officer Strickland, in D.O.A.H. Case No. 78-1481, referring to the Order dated September 26, 1979; that the efforts of complying with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), made by the Board of Dentistry in its attempted action conference to be held September 17, 1979, were not adequate and the prospective events of an action conference that would have been held on September 17, 1979, were deemed to be moot. Nonetheless, in view of the further action by the Board of Dentistry to conduct an informal conference on October 23, 1979, the present case was allowed to go forward on the basis that the Petitioner would be afforded an opportunity to show how the events leading to the written "Notice of Informal Conference" held on October 23, 1979, the notice itself, and the events at the conference constitute a rule or rules that has or have not been duly promulgated in the manner contemplated by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. In furtherance of this permission, the Petitioner was and is allowed to make the "Notice of Informal Conference" as attached to the response to the Motion to Dismiss a part of the Petition and that "Notice of Informal Conference" is hereby made a part of the Petition. In the course of the hearing a number of witnesses were presented and those witnesses included Tom Guilday, a prosecutor for the Board of Dentistry; Liz Cloud, an employee of the State of Florida, Office of the Secretary of State; H. Fred Varn, Executive Director of the Board of Dentistry; Nancy Wittenberg, Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation; and the Petitioner, Livingston B. Sheppard. In addition, the Petitioner offered three items of evidence which were admitted. The testimony of attorney Guilday established that as prosecutor for the Board of Dentistry in the action against Dr. Sheppard, he spoke with Charles F. Tunnicliff, Acting General Counsel, Department of Professional Regulation, who instructed Guilday to attempt to comply with the requirements of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), and this was in anticipation of the pending Motion to Dismiss to be heard on September 17, 1979. One of the results of that conversation was the letter of September 14, 1979, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, addressed to Hearing Officer Strickland and the primary result was that of the September 14, 1979, "Notice of Intended Action Conference." The conference alluded to was to be held at the office of Mr. Varn. Attorney Guilday did not recall whether the contemplated disposition of September 17, 1979, was one which Tunnicliff indicated would be used in all similar cases pending before the Department of Professional Regulation. After Hearing Officer Strickland's Order was entered on September 26, 1979, attorney Deberah Miller of the Department of Professional Regulation instructed Guilday to comply with Hearing Officer Strickland's Order of September 26, 1979, on the subject of the dictates of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), and this instruction was supported by Memorandum of October 5, 1979, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence. There ensued the conference of October 23, 1979, which was held in St. Petersburg, Florida. After the conference, pursuant to the instructions of attorneys Miller and Tunnicliff, Guilday prepared a memorandum on the results of that conference. This memorandum did not carry a recommendation as to the disposition of the case. Throughout this period of time, attorney Guilday was unaware of any general policy within the Department of Professional Regulation or Board of Dentistry which dealt with attempts at compliance with the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). None of the discussions which Guilday had with attorneys Tunnicliff and Miller of the Department of Professional Regulation or with other officials of that Department or Board of Dentistry led him to believe that there was any set policy for handling those issues. Guilday did acknowledge that a member of his law firm, one Michael Huey, had been instructed by Staff Attorney Miller on the technique to be utilized in refiling a prosecution against John Parry, D.D.S., wherein the action against Dr. Parry had been dismissed for lack of compliance of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). A copy of that Memorandum dated October 3, 1979, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 and it carries with it an attached form for "Notice of Informal Conference" under the terms of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1970), and that format is similar to the October 23, 1979, "Notice of Informal Conference" in the Sheppard case. Guilday indicated in connection with this Memorandum, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3, that to his knowledge no discussion on how to comply with the terms of the memorandum was made and no actual compliance with the memorandum has been taken to his knowledge. It was established through the testimony of Liz Cloud of the Office of the Secretary of State and through other witnesses that no formal rules have been filed with the Secretary of State by either of the Respondents dealing with the subject of compliance with the pie visions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978). Testimony offered by Nancy Wittenberg, Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation, and by H. Fred Varn, Executive Director, Board of Dentistry, established that neither the Department nor the Dental Board has formulated final policies on how to deal with the requirements of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), whether the cases pertain to those such as that of Dr. Sheppard in which the agency, although it has not complied with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), prior to the filing of the Administrative Complaint, has been granted an opportunity to try to comply or on the occasion where cases are in the investigative stage or the occasion where the cases have been dismissed for noncompliance with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), and are subject to refiling. It is shown through Secretary Wittenberg's testimony that such compliance with Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), is still in the formative stages and the Memorandum of October 3, 1979, by Staff Attorney Miller with the format for noticing informal conferences to be held under the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), is but one method under consideration at this time. Moreover, Secretary Wittenberg has not spoken with attorney Guilday about the matters of the Sheppard case that are now in dispute or received reports of conversations between Guilday and Staff Attorneys Tunnicliff and Miller on the subject of the pending Sheppard dispute. Finally, Wittenberg has not instructed any of the support officials within the Department of Professional Regulation, to include departmental attorneys, to formulate policy directed to the implementation of the provisions of Subsection 120.60(5), Florida Statutes (1978), which action would constitute the final statement by the Department on those matters.
