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ASSOCIATED COUNSELING AND EDUCATION, INC., D/B/A SUBSTANCE ABUSE FAMILY EDUCATION vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 95-000659RX (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Feb. 13, 1995 Number: 95-000659RX Latest Update: Apr. 15, 1997

The Issue The issues presented for resolution in the two consolidated cases are whether Rule 10E-16.004 (27), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and whether Petitioner violated that rule on a specified occasion and is subject to fine or other penalty.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Counselling and Education, Inc., doing business as Substance Abuse Family Education (SAFE), is a Florida corporation doing business in Orange County, Florida. SAFE provides substance abuse treatment to adolescents, mostly within the ages of twelve (12) to eighteen (18) years, with a few young adults who have turned nineteen while in treatment. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency with statutory authority to license and regulate certain treatment programs, including SAFE. At all times material to this proceeding HRS has licensed SAFE to provide substance abuse treatment services in a category titled "non-residential day and night treatment with a host home component." SAFE is not licensed as a secure facility or an addictions receiving facility. SAFE uses a program similar to the Alcoholic Anonymous twelve-step program as a tool for rehabilitating drug abusing juveniles. The program includes five phases through which the clients progress at varying rates. The "first phase" describes clients who are new to the program. As clients progress they enter into stages of increasing responsibility and freedom, until they are able to graduate and return to the everyday world. The program requires that the youths' parents or legal guardians admit them into treatment, even when children are referred by a court, by HRS or another source. The program requires rigorous participation by the parents and any siblings of the client. SAFE's contract for treatment includes a voluntary withdrawal provision which requires that the client request withdrawal through a "chain of command." The purpose of the deliberate, several-step process is to avoid withdrawal on an impulsive or transitory whim of the client. SAFE's rules, including the withdrawal provision, are explained to the client at the beginning of treatment and are reviewed daily with the clients. Clients who are just starting in the program, "first phasers," spend their days at the program and are placed at night with host parents, generally parents with experience in the program through their own children's participation. Staff and host parents are trained in crisis intervention and aggression control techniques through an HRS sanctioned training program. The techniques are progressive; they range from verbal intervention, to putting an arm around a client's shoulder, to physically forcing a client to the floor when the client has threatened to injure himself or others. SAFE contends that when a client attempts to leave treatment without going through the withdrawal process and without involving the parents or guardians in the process, the client is in serious danger of injuring himself or others immediately following departure from the program. SAFE uses physical intervention as a last resort to prevent clients from leaving the program without going through the "chain of command." At night, however, such intervention is used by host parents only to restrain dangerously aggressive behavior. SAFE instructs its host parents to not physically stop a child from leaving the host home. S. B. was a "first phaser" in SAFE's program in August 1993. During dinner one evening he had been staring or glaring at other clients and acting in a provoking and disruptive manner. After dinner, during an organized "rap" session, several clients were called on to confront S. B.'s behavior. He reacted by throwing a chair, across several rows of clients, at the client who was confronting him. Then he bolted, or attempted to bolt, from the room through the exit door. He was restrained by staff, was calmed, and he returned to his seat. Very shortly after he returned to his seat S. B. began staring or glaring at a client by the exit door. He jumped up and ran for the door. Again, he was physically restrained as he kicked, fought and yelled with anger. Staff person Pamela Mardis was one of the persons who participated in the restraint of S. B. on August 27, 1993. She considered the client to be in harm's way if he were permitted to leave the program without the assurance of proper safeguard for his well-being and safety. The January 12, 1994 amended notice of violation provided by HRS to Loretta Parrish, SAFE's owner and executive director, states, in pertinent part: As an amended complaint, the following incidents have been found to be in violation of 10E-16, F.A.C., requirements and are therefore subject to administrative fines: * * * August 27, 1993, 5:20 p.m., (report written August 27, 1993, 6:45 p.m.) in which a client was restrained in an effort to keep the client from leaving treatment, your agency will be fined $100 for non-compliance with 10E-16.004 (27)(a), F.A.C., requirements. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 6) HRS interprets its rule to prohibit restraint when the perceived danger to the client is in leaving and getting back on drugs. SAFE contends that to let one client leave voluntarily without going through the withdrawal procedures would mean that all of the clients, adolescents with poor decision-making skills, would walk out. There is a program in Palm Beach County, Florida, purportedly similar to SAFE, called Growing Together, Inc. On January 22, 1994, HRS and Growing Together, Inc., entered into a stipulated Final Declaratory Judgement in case no. CL93-9599-AO, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, which provided, in pertinent part: In the absence of a Court Order restricting the rights of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may act upon the request of a parent or legal guardian in accepting a minor client for substance abuse treatment regardless of the minor's objections. In the absence of a Court Order limiting the authority of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may reasonably restrict minor clients from terminating their participation in treatment contrary to the express direction of a parent or legal guardian. So long as the minor's rights to challenge the reasonableness of restrictions imposed at the express direction of a parent or legal guardian are protected -- that is, so long as the minor is informed of his or her rights and is provided a practical means by which to exercise those rights -- Growing Together, Inc., may continue to act in loco parent) in declining to release a minor from treatment where such release is against the will of a parent or legal guardian and no court order has been issued to direct otherwise. The State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is hereby prohibited from taking any action contrary to the legal principles enunciated herein and is expressly prohibited from enforcing any interpretation of F.S. Section 397.601 which interpretation is contrary to the findings of this Judgement. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 7)

Florida Laws (7) 120.56120.565120.57120.68397.321397.501397.601
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BOARD OF NURSING vs. MARION SANDERS, 76-001914 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-001914 Latest Update: Jul. 28, 1977

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Marion Sanders, is a registered nurse who holds license no. RN21383-4. Marion Sanders has been registered with the Board since approximately 1959 or 1960. Other than the two incidents set forth in the subject administrative complaint, the licensee had not been subjected to any disciplinary action. On January 22, she was employed with the Jacksonville Drug Abuse Program where her principal duties consisted of making "jail runs" to administer methadone medications to jail clients that had been incarcerated and treated by the Jacksonville Drug Abuse Program. On January 22, while making a "jail run" she saw a client who had been picked up by the police on January 21, and at that time had in his possession a bottle of methadone. While accompanied by a guard and correctional officers, she visited the client who was being held in the "court chute" where she medicated the patients that were being held in the presence of correctional officers, a nurse and an officer that works in the clinic. The Respondent licensee medicated client Jerald Cole with the bottle that she received from the nurse that had been picked up earlier. According to her testimony, that dosage was lower than the bottle that she had brought there from the clinic inasmuch as it contained 45 mg whereas the bottle that she brought from the clinic contained 50 mg. In the next cell she approached Emmett Brown and she asked him if he had called the clinic. Sanders testified that she recalled Emmett Brown since her earlier days of employment with the Drug Abuse Program sometime in September of 1975. When Messenger Brown replied that he had called the clinic, she administered to him the dose that she had picked up from the jail. She testified that this was done because she was aware that he was on a 70 mg dosage in September and that she felt that it was a "humanitarian thing to do at the time". As revealed by the factual stipulation, licensee Sanders did not chart the administration of the methadone dosage to Emmett Brown on the narcotics disposition sheet. Victor A. Pena, M.D., was called and testified that he was presently employed by the City of Jacksonville Drug Abuse Program since January of 1976. According to Dr. Pena, there are two kinds of 21 day detoxifications i.e., administrative and voluntary. He expressed the opinion that the voluntary detoxification is the better method since a client can go the regular procedure of 21 days and restart in the program again whereas with the administrative detoxification method, the patient has to wait a fixed number of days after he finishes the 21 day program before he can re-enter the program. He testified that the detoxification program can only be stopped by doctor's orders which, as his testimony reveals, was based on his common judgement and the patient's medical record. Dr. Pena was shown a carbon copy of an exhibit captioned City of Jacksonville Drug Abuse Program client I.D. no. 2481 bearing the name Mark Znidorka. He indicated that the document reflected the voluntary detoxification of client Znidorka which was a voluntary detoxification procedure starting at 5:00 p.m. with a decrease of the present methadone dosage. He testified further that Mark Znidorka was a client who had been placed on voluntary detoxification and he had not been discontinued on January 29, 1976. According to the incident report submitted by Respondent Sanders, she discontinued the voluntary detox program which according to Dr. Pena was contrary to his orders. On cross examination, Dr. Pena testified that nurses are advised as to whether a client was on administrative or voluntary detox during medical staff meetings held approximately biweekly whereas standing orders and instructions were outstanding to the nurses to discontinue the detox program only pursuant to doctors' orders. Dr. Pena could not recall that Mrs. Sanders was instructed whether patient Znidorka was on administrative or voluntary detox. He again re- emphasized his opinion that the voluntary method was better inasmuch as a patient could be continued in excess of the 21 days if withdrawal signs persisted or the client showed signs of becoming ill, a flexibility not available in the administrative detoxification program. When questioned on whether he had issued written orders to Respondent Sanders for client Znidorka, Dr. Pena could only reply that he delivered the orders to the nurses' station or the nurse in charge. He testified however that it is the nurses' responsibility to check the dosage for all clients which is available to them on a cardex file. He testified that the instructions are transmitted to a cardex by whoever takes the doctors' orders and that generally would be the head nurse or any RN. When shown the transmittal order for patient Znidorka, Dr. Pena failed to recognize the signature of the staff person who received the order and transferred it to the cardex. Joan Knox, a registered nurse since approximately 1946, testified that during January 1976 she was employed by the City of Jacksonville Drug Abuse Clinic. Mrs. Knox worked with Respondent Sanders in the drug abuse program for approximately 9 months. She testified that as doctors' orders were transmitted from the doctors offices, they were placed on the nurses desk and any available staff nurse would transpose that order onto the cardex file sheet. She transferred the doctor's order information regarding Mark Znidorka stating that he was a voluntary detox client and that such information was present on the cardex system on January 26. She testified that nurses were explained the difference between voluntary and administrative detoxification, a procedure explained, according to her, at a staff meeting. Wally Campbell who is presently employed as the program psychologist at the Jacksonville Drug Abuse Program, testified that he has been employed with the program since December, 1974. He testified that the topic of voluntary detoxification and withdrawal was a topic frequently discussed at staff meetings but he could not specifically recall whether Respondent Sanders was present when this difference was discussed. In fact, he testified that there was a time when voluntary detoxification meant something different from the procedure presently utilized. He testified that this difference existed under a program called the Life Drug Program which was an adjunct of the Northeast Florida Comprehensive Drug Control Program. Patricia J. Monsour, a registered nurse who worked with the City of Jacksonville Drug Abuse Program from April, 1975 through February 13, 1976, testified that she recalled staff meetings being held from time to time prior to January 29, 1976, wherein the difference between voluntary detoxification and voluntary withdrawal was discussed. She testified that she recalled the difference being discussed twice because she was instrumental in drafting the procedural manual for the nursing staff before it was handed in and during staff meeting she went over the various procedures with the nursing staff. She considered it important that all staff nurses understood the procedures that she had written in the procedures manual and that if there were any differences or other questions, she wanted to correct them before they were turned in and made part of the manual given to nurses to control procedures. During this period of time, she was the head nurse and drafted the manual information concerning voluntary detoxification and voluntary withdrawal. She testified that she completed her portion of the manual dealing with voluntary detoxification and voluntary withdrawal during late November or early December, 1975, but that to her knowledge the manual was never completed. She testified that when she learned of the discontinuation of the treatment to client Znidorka, she approached Respondent Sanders, who admitted to terminating the voluntary detox program and that when she ordered Sanders to submit an incident report, Sanders admitted to having terminated the program based on the client's request and suggestions from Znidorka's counselor. She testified that to the best of her knowledge, counselors or medication nurses did not possess the authority to terminate the detox program without a doctor's orders. On cross examination, she testified that she did not recall Dr. Campbell ever explaining in December, 1975, or any other time the difference between administrative and voluntary detox. When questioned whether Respondent Sanders was present during the various staff meetings, she could not specifically recall whether she was present or not. She further testified that after the January 26 incident, Dr. Pena called a staff meeting three days later, on January 29, to explain the difference between voluntary detoxification and withdrawal and administrative detox. The special meeting was called to explain the difference because there was obviously a misunderstanding that had to be clarified to prevent it from recurring. She testified further that after the incident and subsequent to the January 29 staff meeting, a written communique was issued to all staff personnel explaining to them the difference between the various detoxification processes. She could not recall whether or not such a written directive or instructions were present in the nurses' station. It thus appears that the person in charge of drafting the procedures manual was not certain that the difference between the two detoxification methods were ever explained to Respondent Sanders and she further expressed her opinion that the detoxification was discontinued based on a general lack of understanding among the nursing staff personnel. This becomes more evident when reflection is given to the fact that a special staff meeting was called a few days after the January 29 incident and a special staff meeting was called to explain the differences in the two methods. Thereafter written directives were given to the nurses at the various medication stations. As an aside, there is further evidence that there is some basis in fact for a misunderstanding by nurses of the two methods in view of differences that had existed under the prior drug abuse program. Based on these facts and conclusions, it is therefore concluded that the licensee's conduct involved herein is not of the type in which she can be charged with having erroneously stopped the detoxification of patient Znidorka here without an order contrary to outstanding regulations.

Recommendation Based on the above facts and conclusions including the stipulations based on the allegations contained in count one of the administrative complaint filed herein, it is hereby recommended that the licensee's earlier suspension for a 30 day period without pay by her employer as set forth in paragraph three of the administrative complaint is just and sufficient penalty for her action as found herein and that no additional penalty be subjected to her based on such conduct. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1977, in Tallahassee Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF DENTISTRY vs THOMAS ANTHONY SAITTA, D.D.S., 14-003964PL (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Aug. 21, 2014 Number: 14-003964PL Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2024
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BOARD OF NURSING vs. HILDA TEAGUE CLARK, 77-001195 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-001195 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1979

Findings Of Fact Hilda T. Clark, Respondent, is a registered nurse who holds license no. 21750-2. Evidence adduced during the course of the hearing reveals that during 1961, while Respondent was employed as a private duty nurse at Mount Sinai Hospital in Miami, she withdrew a narcotic drug, to wit: Dilaudid, for her patient, Mrs. Fanny Goldblum on approximately thirty occasions, which she administered to herself instead of the patient. Based on an Information for violation of the Florida Uniform Narcotic Drug Act (Chapter 398.19, F.S.) which was filed on March 15, 1961, the Respondent pled guilty and was placed on probation for a term of seven years on March 31, 1961. Thereafter, on January 12, 1977, the Respondent, while employed as a private duty registered nurse at the University of Miami Hospital and Clinic, converted to her own use a narcotic drug, to wit: Demerol. When confronted with this fact, the Respondent admitted to the Head Nurse, M. Francis, R.N., that she had injected herself with the Demerol and that she was addicted to narcotics for many years. The Respondent does not contest the above allegations and in fact admits that she engaged in the conduct that is alleged in the administrative complaint filed herein. However, she urges that the suspension of her license is unwarranted in these circumstances inasmuch as she was undergoing tremendous pressure based on her mother and spouse's poor health. Additionally, she related an incident wherein she was undergoing tremendous pain and was placed on the medication, Demerol for the relief of pain due to severe herpes zoster infection. Evidence and testimony introduced during the course of the hearing reveal that herpes zoster infection causes severe pain and that to control such pain, her physician, Edward E. Goldman, M.D., prescribed oral Tolwen, Demerol and Dilaudid suppositories. There also was evidence introduced during the course of the hearing which indicated that the Respondent is not now suffering from any drug related problems or addiction and that her professional abilities are beyond question. Respecting the most recent incident which occurred on January 12, 1977, evidence reveals that the Respondent was indeed laboring under a great deal of stress and mental pressures which, in her words, forced her to resort to the unlawful withdrawal and injection of the narcotic drug, Demerol. There was no evidence introduced that the Respondent engaged in any unlawful act during the period between the incident which occurred in 1961 and the January, 1977 incident. Nor was there any further evidence of any drug addiction problem by Respondent subsequent to the January, 1977 incident. The unlawful use of and procurement of drugs by nursing professionals is a serious act which should not be condoned without sanction by the Board of Nursing. It goes without saying that such acts and/or conduct constitutes a departure from the minimal standards of acceptable and prevailing nursing practice and in fact constitutes unprofessional conduct. See Chapter 464.21(b), Florida Statutes. Based on evidence received during the course of the hearing, there is substantial and competent evidence from which a finding can be made that the Respondent engaged in conduct violative of the above chapter i.e., Subsection 464.21(b), Florida Statutes. However, there was no evidence introduced on which a finding can be made that the Respondent is guilty of conduct violative of Chapter 464.21(c) and (d), as alleged. Although two instances of unlawful useage of narcotic drugs was alleged which the Respondent admits, in view of the length of time between the two occurrences, the undersigned concludes that the record fails to establish that the Respondent is habitually addicted to the use of controlled substances as provided in Chapter 464.21(c), Florida Statutes. I shall therefore recommend that the remaining two allegations be dismissed. Respecting the finding that the Respondent engaged in unprofessional conduct within the meaning of Chapter 464.21(b), Florida Statutes, I shall bear in mind and give consideration to the lengthy and creditable service that she has given to the nursing profession, a profession in which she desires to continue to practice. Based thereon and the favorable testimonials received into evidence, I shall recommend that the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two years.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law I hereby recommend that the Respondent be placed on probation for a term of two years. In all other respects, I hereby recommend that the complaint allegations be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of September, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1005 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 George A. Kokus, Esquire Cohen and Kokus 500 Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 =================================================================

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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MIAMI-DADE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs ANDREA L. DEMSEY, 00-004445 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 30, 2000 Number: 00-004445 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 2001

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner may terminate Respondent's employment as a teacher.

Findings Of Fact Respondent has been a teacher since 1993. She is a 34- year-old divorced mother of a four-year-old son. Respondent has suffered from a chemical dependency since she was 18 years old. At that time, she completed a 28- day detoxification program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center in Miami. Six or seven years later, Respondent underwent additional inpatient treatment for her addiction to drugs. She submitted to a third detoxification, lasting five to seven days, in 1993 or 1994. Respondent underwent a fourth detoxification ten months later and, in 1996, a fifth detoxification. Respondent admits that she has undergone detoxification several more times since 1996. These detoxifications and Respondent's intermittent participation in Narcotics Anonymous were parts of treatment programs attempting to relieve Respondent from her addiction to cocaine and heroin. Respondent's addiction has spanned her college years through her entire teaching career. The effects of Respondent's illness have, at times, precluded her from reaching her full potential as a classroom teacher. After a brief period of employment by Petitioner as a permanent substitute teacher, Respondent began fulltime employment with Petitioner in August 1994 as a teacher at Oak Grove Elementary School. While at Oak Grove, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, although her attendance was less than satisfactory. Also, on at least six occasions, evidently starting in her second year, Respondent fell asleep while conducting a reading tutorial session in which the students spent 20 minutes in separate cubicles. Respondent's principal at Oak Grove documented by a memorandum dated December 4, 1995, eleven full-day absences and two half-day absences during the 1995-96 school year and two instances of sleeping while charged with the instruction of a student--both on the same day and both discovered by the principal. Due to these incidents and an earlier incident of sleeping while on duty, the principal administratively referred Respondent to Petitioner's Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The December 4 memorandum documented the actions taken at a conference held the same date involving, among others, Respondent and the principal. Respondent then missed work on December 6 and 7--calling in at 10:06 a.m. on December 7 saying that she had overslept and asking if it was too late to report to work. Respondent missed a considerable amount of work during the 1996-97 school year. Some of the absences, especially from early December through early February, were due to Respondent's chemical dependency. However, some absences, especially during the latter part of the school year, may be attributed to the birth of Respondent's child on July 9, 1997, following a high- risk pregnancy. The record does not disclose much about the 1997-98 school year. However, Respondent missed ten days of work due to sick or personal leave and eleven days of work due to unpaid, but authorized, leave. The absence of additional administrative action against Respondent suggests that she may have improved her attendance and eliminated her sleeping while on duty. For the 1998-99 school year, Respondent transferred to a new school, Linda Lentin Elementary School. Again, Respondent was a satisfactory teacher, except for absenteeism. However, during a nine-day absence from May 20 through June 2, 1999, the principal received a telephone call from someone claiming that Respondent had had a breakdown and was in a "drug rehabilitation hospital." Accordingly, the principal requested that Petitioner's Office of Professional Standards (OPS) monitor Respondent's return to work. On June 8, 1999, Respondent, the principal, Petitioner's OPS Director, and others participated in a Conference for the Record (CFR). Respondent attributed her 21 absences in the 1997-98 school year, as well as 20.5 absences in the 1998-99 school year, to six miscarriages and depression. Petitioner's OPS Director explained the procedures for reasonable-suspicion drug testing. The CFR memorandum concludes by emphasizing that Respondent must report to work when scheduled and on time, obtain medical excuses for all absences, provide lesson plans for substitute teachers, and obtain approval for scheduled leave. At the same time, Petitioner's OPS Director referred Respondent to Petitioner's EAP. Subject to these actions, Petitioner approved Respondent's return to the classroom. However, Respondent's attendance did not improve the following school year, and her behavior became somewhat eccentric early in the school year. At noon on September 27, 1999, Respondent told the principal that she was ill and needed to go home for the remainder of the day and the following day. Respondent went home, but, despite requesting leave and a substitute for the following day, returned to work the following day without calling first. Near the end of the school day, while her students were in a special-area class, Respondent signed out of school and walked down the street, despite the fact that it was raining. The next day, Respondent left the school grounds without permission and, the following day, failed to attend a mandatory teachers' meeting. The situation deteriorated in mid-October 1999. From October 11-14, Respondent telephoned the school each day and reported that she was sick and in the hospital. The following Monday, October 18, Respondent reported to work. However, on October 19, Respondent failed to report to work or call, leaving her class sitting in the hallway. Respondent telephoned the school at mid-day and stated that she had been in a five-car accident. This accident did not take place. On October 20, while driving to school, Respondent was involved in a two-car accident, which resulted in her striking a fire hydrant not far from the school. The accident took place at about 8:45 a.m., which was about 15 minutes after Respondent assumed direct supervision of her students. Respondent arrived at school late, crying and disconcerted. An acquaintance transported Respondent home. The next morning, prior to the start of school, Respondent called the school and stated that she would not be at work. On the following morning, October 22, Respondent reported to work, and her principal ordered her to submit to a reasonable-suspicion drug test. Respondent complied, and the drug test revealed the presence of cocaine and morphine. The drug test accurately detected the presence of these substances because Respondent had used crack cocaine and heroin within the period for which the drug test is sensitive. By memorandum dated October 29, 1999, Respondent's principal asked Petitioner's OPS to monitor Respondent's return to work. By memorandum dated November 1, 1999, Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would require a clearance from OPS before returning to work. On November 8, 1999, Respondent requested a leave of absence without pay to extend from October 22, 1999, through June 16, 2000. Petitioner granted this request. Shortly after starting her leave from work, Respondent was first seen by Dr. John Eustace. Dr. Eustace is Board-certified in internal medicine and is also certified in the treatment of addictions. He is the medical director of the Addiction Treatment Program at Mt. Sinai Medical Center. He is also an assistant professor of psychiatry at the University of Miami medical school. In the last ten years, Dr. Eustace has performed 2000 evaluations of professionals to assess whether they can return to practice with the requisite skill and safety. During his career, Dr. Eustace has diagnosed and treated over 10,000 patients for addictions. Dr. Eustace admitted Respondent as an in-patient at Mt. Sinai for, among other things, a four- or five-day detoxification program. He found that Respondent was in the late middle stage of addiction to heroin and cocaine and that her illness was active. When releasing Respondent from the detoxification program, Dr. Eustace recommended that Respondent enter a twelve- step program to better prepare Respondent for the difficult recovery process, which requires, among other things, gaining insight into the consequences of the addiction. Following the detoxification process, Dr. Eustace opined that Respondent had an even chance of avoiding another relapse. However, this prognosis improves with time. After the first five years without relapse, the relapse rate is only ten percent. Also, after a second treatment, the recovery rate is over 90 percent. Of the 2000 professionals whom Dr. Eustace has treated, over 90 percent have recovered. Unfortunately, Respondent relapsed after her 1999 detoxification and treatment by Dr. Eustace. Despite her return to active use of illegal drugs, Respondent chose to restart the process by which she could return to the classroom. Petitioner's OPS informed Respondent that she would need OPS clearance before returning to work. Reacting to Respondent's request for a clearance, OPS scheduled a CFR with Respondent and others to take place on July 28, 2000. At the July 28 CFR, Respondent signed an Employee Acknowledgement Form concerning Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy. The form states: "Before returning to duty, I must undergo a return-to-duty . . . controlled substances test with verified negative results." At the CFR, Respondent admitted that she had had a chemical dependency, but represented that she was now clean and sober. Apparently, Respondent did not anticipate that she would be required to take a drug test at the July 28 CFR. However, with the new school year imminent, it is difficult to understand exactly when Respondent thought she would be required to take the drug test. If she were going to teach the next school year, her principal needed more than a few days' notice. In any event, Respondent took the test on July 28, and the test revealed the presence of morphine, although not cocaine. By memorandum dated September 6, 2000, from Petitioner's OPS Director to Respondent, Petitioner advised Respondent that it was reviewing its options after receiving the results of the July 28 drug test. By letter dated October 6, 2000, to Respondent, Petitioner's Superintendent advised Respondent that Petitioner was suspending her and initiating dismissal proceedings due to just cause, including incompetency, misconduct in office, gross insubordination, excessive absences, and violation of Petitioner's Rules 6Gx13-4-105 (drug-free workplace) and 6Gx13-4A-1.21 (responsibilities and duties). By letter dated October 12, 2000, and revised October 17, 2000, Petitioner's board took the action recommended by the Superintendent. The contract between Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade (Contract) provides in Article XXI, Section 1.B.1.a, that "[a]ny member of the instructional staff may be suspended or dismissed at any time during the school year, provided that the charges against him/her are based upon Florida Statutes." Article XXI, Section 2.G, sets forth the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. Section 2.G.b provides the policy statement on illegal drugs, Section 2.G.c provides the policy statement on alcohol and prescription drugs, and Section 2.G.d provides the policy statement on employee drug screening. Under employee drug screening, Section 2.G.d.5 states: [Petitioner] recognizes that chemical dependency is an illness that can be successfully treated. It is the policy of [Petitioner], where possible, to seek rehabilitation of employees with a self- admitted or detected drug problem. Disciplinary action may be instituted against employees who the Board believes will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff. Employees who have previously been referred for assistance or employees unwilling or unable to rehabilitate may be subject to appropriate action, pursuant to Board Policy, applicable Florida Statutes, State Board Rules, and applicable provisions of collective bargaining agreements. Petitioner has invoked two of its rules in this case. Rule 6Gx13-4A-1.21, which is a statement of "Responsibilities and Duties," requires, at Section 1, all employees "to conduct themselves, both in their employment and in the community, in a manner that will reflect credit upon themselves and the school system." It is unnecessary to determine whether the Contract incorporates this rule, or whether Petitioner may otherwise rely on this rule to dismiss an instructional employee during the school year. Rule 6Gx13-4-1.05 (Rule), which is the "Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement," is a restatement of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement contained in the Contract. The prominent role of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement in the Contract, as well as its provision for the dismissal of employees, justifies Petitioner’s reliance upon a violation of the Rule as a basis for dismissing an instructional employee during the school year, notwithstanding the provision of the Contract otherwise requiring that all such dismissals be based on violations of Florida Statutes. In most respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement is the same in the Rule and the Contract. The Rule provides for "disciplinary sanctions" against employees who have violated the "standards of conduct" set forth within the Rule. Like the Contract, the Rule contains three "policy statements," which supply most of the operative provisions of the Rule. For illegal drugs, the policy statement, as set forth in the Rule, provides: "Employees are expected to conduct themselves in a manner consistent with the following provisions: Employees on duty or on School Board property will not manufacture, distribute, dispense, possess or use illegal drugs, nor will they be under the influence of such drugs. Employees on or off duty will not influence students to use illegal or abuse legal drugs. An employee convicted, adjudicated guilty, or who has entered a plea of guilty for an criminal drug statute violation occurring in the workplace shall notify [Petitioner] within 48 hours after final judgment. Paragraphs A and C are limited to acts and conditions that take place while an employee is on Petitioner's property or on duty. Paragraph B is limited to acts of the employee directed toward students. The evidence does not suggest that Respondent violated any of these provisions of the Rule. Petitioner failed to serve that the incidents involving Respondent sleeping while in charge of students appear not to have been due to her cocaine or heroin intoxication; it is at least as likely that the sleeping resulted from fatigue following the use of one or both of these drugs the preceding night. The distinction between intoxicating levels of these drugs and nonintoxicating trace amounts is explicitly dismissed by the Rule's treatment of alcohol, as to which employees must be "free of measurable . . . concentrations." After the policy statements on illegal drugs and alcohol and prescription drugs, the Rule sets forth the policy statement on employee drug screening. Although this part of the Rule fails to provide explicitly that a positive drug screen is a violation of the Rule, the introductory paragraph of the Rule acknowledges that Petitioner and the United Teachers of Dade are jointly committed "to create and maintain a drug-free work environment." Paragraph D within the drug-screening policy statement restates this purpose. Also, the disciplinary sanctions provided by the Rule clearly state that a refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Rule constitutes an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation; if a refusal to submit to a drug test is a violation, a failed drug test must also be a violation. These statements are therefore sufficient to provide that the presence in employees of even nonintoxicating amounts of illegal drugs, while on duty, constitute a violation of the Rule. In two respects, the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Rule, is materially different from the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement, as described in the Contract. First, the Rule adds another objective: To communicate that persons who violate the standards of conduct cited in this rule and who refuse or cannot be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. Second, the Rule provides disciplinary sanctions for any violation--not just for violations of the drug-screening policy statement, as provided by the Contract--of the Drug-Free Workplace General Policy Statement. The Rule also adds two presumptive conditions for determining when an employee is unable to be assisted by rehabilitation. The Rule states: Employees who violate the standards of conduct cited it this rule and who the Board determines will not be assisted by rehabilitation or who have negatively impacted students and/or staff shall be dismissed. A refusal to submit to a drug test or a second violation of the Drug-Free Workplace Policy shall constitute an inability to be assisted by rehabilitation. . . . This case turns on whether Petitioner has proved that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation because Petitioner has produced little detailed evidence of any negative impact upon Respondent's students. The record lacks detail of Respondent's specific teaching duties, the specific impact of her sleeping incidents or absences, and the academic achievements of her students during the periods in which these shortcomings took place. Notwithstanding the marked shortcomings in Respondent's performance as a teacher, Petitioner did not dismiss her until first giving her a chance to rehabilitate herself. The most likely inference is that Petitioner's administrative employees found that the situation did not satisfy the first criterion for dismissal--negatively impacting students. The basic issue, then, is whether Petitioner could reasonably have determined, from July to October 2000, that Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. Petitioner could choose to show rehabilitation would be futile by relying on one of the two presumptions contained in the Rule. However, Respondent never refused to submit to a drug test, and difficult questions of her employment status in July 2000 obscure the determination as to whether her failure of the July 2000 drug test constitutes a second violation of the Rule. In this case, though, Petitioner may satisfy its standard of proof without regard to either of the presumptions in the Rule. After a display of considerable patience and good faith by Petitioner, Respondent, in July 2000, misrepresented to Petitioner that she was clean and sober and prematurely requested permission to return to teaching duties despite her knowledge that she was still abusing drugs and not ready to return to the classroom. These facts support the finding that, as of July or October 2000, Respondent would not be assisted by rehabilitation. This finding of the futility of rehabilitation, as of July or October 2000, is difficult due to the fact that subsequent events suggest that Respondent may finally be rehabilitating herself. After Petitioner dismissed her, Respondent underwent detoxification and then began treatment at St. Luke's Addiction Recovery Center, which is sponsored by Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. She was in intensive residential treatment from November 6, 2000, through January 24, 2001. She later underwent nine urinalyses, through June 1, 2001--a day after the end of the hearing in this case-- and all of them were negative. Respondent is successfully participating in the St. Luke's aftercare program, where she takes weekly drug tests. She is proud of the fact that she has turned her life over to God and has achieved the longest period of sobriety that she has experienced in many years. After regaining sobriety, Respondent substituted for awhile and then found a job teaching a third-grade class at a private school in the Miami area. At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been so employed for six weeks, she had not been late or missed a day of school, and the school had invited her to teach again for the 2001-02 school year. Dr. Eustace opines that Respondent's prognosis is much improved from the prognosis of September 2000.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing Respondent from employment. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Roger C. Cuevas, Superintendent Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 N. E. Second Avenue Room 912 Miami, Florida 33132-1308 Luis M. Garcia Attorney's Office School Board of Miami-Dade County 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132 Richard Baron Baron and Cliff 11077 Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 307 Miami, Florida 33161 Honorable Charlie Crist Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 James A. Robinson, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, Suite 1701 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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BOARD OF NURSING vs. AUDREY D. POTTS KYLE, 78-001267 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-001267 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1978

Findings Of Fact Diane Potts Kyle is a registered nurse, licensed to practice in the state and is the holder of license number 62079-2. On November 5, 1975, following a formal hearing held pursuant to Florida Statutes, Section 120.57(1), Respondent's license to practice nursing as a registered nurse in the State of Florida was suspended for a period of two years, based upon a finding that the Respondent had engaged in unprofessional conduct due to her failure to properly chart or account for controlled narcotics signed out by her for patients in her care. Thereafter, on April 22, 1978, while working as a staff relief nurse at Coral Gables Hospital, Coral Gables, Florida, the Respondent, on several occasions, converted to her own use a controlled drug, to wit: Demerol, by signing out for said narcotic which was intended for patients in her care and failed to administer said drugs to the patients. She thereafter failed to account for said drug withdrawals on the patients' medical charts. On or about May 1, 1978, Respondent voluntarily executed a notarized statement admitting to converting to her own use Demerol ordered for patients in her care by signing out for said drug but not administering same to the patient and not charting it on the patient's medical chart. Thereafter, Respondent subsequently voluntarily surrendered her license to the Petitioner. (See Board's Exhibits A, B, and C.) As stated, there is little dispute respecting the facts in this case, however, the Petitioner appeared on her own behalf and offered testimony in mitigation of the allegations of the complaint which were stipulated to by her. (Board Exhibit A.) Some time during May, 1978, the Respondent enrolled in the Spectrum Drug Abuse Program and has been under the care and guidance of drug counsellor Robert Healy. The Respondent attends weekly sessions and the course uses as a primary approach of therapy, Transactional Analysis. Counsellor Healy, who holds a Master's degree in Psychology and is a drug counsellor at the Spectrum program, appeared and testified that he has been working with the Respondent for approximately six months. He testified that Respondent has undergone serious changes on her own and that he determined that the Respondent's problems stem from stress situations in which she was involved both at work and at home. According to Healy's prognosis, the Respondent will successfully graduate from the Spectrum program within the next six months. Healy opined that the Respondent's life style is one in which she feels that all around her must be "all-perfect" and that based on such a life-style, she is constantly in a state of stress. He testified that since her enrollment in the Spectrum program, she has isolated this problem and is now able to return to work with little danger of abusing drugs. Healy testified that the likelihood of the Respondent receeding to a drug abuser is minimal inasmuch as she is a very confident person and she has a family, her husband and children. The undersigned has considered all of the mitigating factors offered on behalf of the Respondent in this case. However, as noted in the prior case, 1/ a failure to enter medication on a patient's medical chart is a very serious omission on the part of a registered nurse, since it could lead to either the administering of double dosages of medicine or a failure to properly administer medication to nurses as the case may be, which could result in fatal accidents. Such a practice amounts to unprofessional conduct within the meaning of Chapter 464.21, as alleged, and it is so found.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, it is hereby recommended that the Respondent be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years. While the period of probation is in effect, it is further recommended that the Respondent be placed in roles of employment wherein her contact with narcotics and other controlled substances is minimal. Additionally, it is recommended that the Respondent be required to submit to periodic medical examinations as requested by the Board to verify the fact that the Respondent is not abusing drugs. ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF PHARMACY vs DAVID J. MOTON, JR., R.P.T., 12-001190PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 03, 2012 Number: 12-001190PL Latest Update: Dec. 26, 2024
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CURTIS A. JACKSON vs AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, 16-005481EXE (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 20, 2016 Number: 16-005481EXE Latest Update: Mar. 08, 2017

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s request for exemption from disqualification should be granted.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for regulating the employment of persons in positions of special trust as direct service providers. Petitioner is seeking employment as a caregiver with Dynamic Healthcare Providers, Inc. (“Dynamic Healthcare”), a service provider regulated by Respondent. Since Petitioner applied to be a caregiver, a position of special trust, with Dynamic Healthcare, he is required to undergo a Level 2 background screening. The Department of Children and Families (“Department” or “DCF”) conducts initial screening on behalf of the Agency. Background screening and local criminal records revealed a history of involvement with law enforcement, as Petitioner admitted in both the paperwork he filed with the Agency and in his testimony at hearing. On September 27, 1994, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to cocaine possession, a third-degree felony, and to possession of drug paraphernalia, a first-degree misdemeanor. The cocaine possession conviction is a disqualifying offense for employment in a position of trust. He was ordered to pay court fees and costs, and sentenced to 14 days’ confinement in county jail. In the course of that same arrest, Petitioner also was charged with battery on his pregnant girlfriend, a misdemeanor offense, but that charge was later abandoned. In his response to the Exemption Questionnaire, Petitioner explained the incident as follows: A lady whom I was getting high with on a daily basis and shared my residence with[,] we got into an argument. I refused to share my drugs with her that particular day[.] She then became irate and called the police and told them I assaulted her. I was searched by the officer[s.] [T]hey found a crack pipe on my person with residue. I was charged with cocaine possession[.] At the hearing, when asked if he had another prior arrest for domestic violence, Petitioner admitted he had been arrested previously, and charged with domestic violence in a separate incident, regarding a dispute he had with a previous girlfriend. Petitioner also explained his other previous arrests. Concerning his January 22, 1995, arrest for cocaine possession, a third-degree felony, Petitioner explained in his Exemption Questionnaire: While standing on the corner in the Miami Over Town area[,] I was suddenly approached by [a] Miami Dade Police Officer. I was in possession [of] what appeared to be crack cocaine. I was arrested and charged with possession. No action was taken because it was not cocaine. It gave the appearance of an illegal substance. Concerning his March 31, 1995, arrest for cocaine possession, a third-degree felony, Petitioner explained in his Exemption Questionnaire: While traveling south on Biscayne Blvd and NW 69[th] Street[,] I was involved in an accident[.] I had a crack pipe and approximately two crack rocks in the vehicle. A search was conducted by Miami Dade Police, I was subsequently charged with possession and DWLS [;] no action was taken. Concerning his April 24, 1998, arrest for driving while license suspended/habitual offender, a felony, Petitioner explained in the Exemption Questionnaire: I was driving a young lady home who was feeling ill at the time. I was pulled over at a DUI check point on 175st [sic] NW 27th Avenue in Miami Gardens. My license was suspended during that time[.] [C]onsequently; [sic] I was arrested for DWLS and for a bench warrant[.] I really cannot remember what it was for. Eventually; [sic] I got my licenses [sic] reinstated. Concerning his May 29, 2008, arrest for failure to appear [capias] regarding a traffic offense, Petitioner explained in his Exemption Questionnaire: I was pulled over by Miramar police while going to the store. The officer informed me that there was an outstanding bench warrant for failing to appear. The charge was DWLS which was a 22 year old case. The charges [sic] was eventually dropped [;] case was dismissed. Petitioner also was questioned concerning a June 13, 1992, charge of homicide-willful kill with a weapon, which the Agency had originally listed as a disqualifying offense to employment in a position of trust. In an addendum to his Exemption Questionnaire, Petitioner explained: A guy I was hanging out with got into an argument with another individual, [sic] he produced a firearm. Consequently; [sic] he shot the guy in the leg and the guy feel [sic] to the ground. The shooter then pointed the gun at the guy’s head in an attempt to shot [sic] him in the head area. I then grabbed the shooter to stop him from shooting the other guy in the head. We then left the area in the shooter’s car. Metro Dade Police gave chase, the gun was thrown out the car [sic] consequently, the shooter pulled over. We were both taken into custody. The charged [sic] was eventually dropped down to a misdemeanor. The Agency reviewed all of Petitioner’s criminal records and determined that his 1992 charge of homicide-willful kill with a weapon had been reduced to accessory after the fact, a misdemeanor, for which adjudication of guilt was withheld on June 13, 1992. The Agency did not consider this conviction to be a disqualifying offense, but did consider it in the totality of the evidence it reviewed concerning Petitioner’s exemption from disqualification. Mr. Gerry Driscoll, the regional operations manager for the Agency’s Southeast Region, credibly testified that the Agency has a significant responsibility to a vulnerable population, many of whom lack competency, and are unable to communicate to others any negative or improper actions carried out by their caregivers. These individuals are often solely dependent on their caregivers, and are thus susceptible to exploitation. Mr. Driscoll noted that the Agency considers any prior criminal conduct involving violence or aggression with particular care when exercising its authority and discretion to grant exemptions for employment in positions of trust. In his written submission to the Agency, Petitioner did not specifically admit to causing any harm or injury to any victim. However, at the hearing, he admitted that he had caused injury to others with whom he associated during his period of addiction, especially his family, girlfriends, and children. Academically, Petitioner has accomplished a great deal. He has received the following post-secondary school degrees: an associate of arts degree from Miami Dade College (2010), a bachelor degree in Liberal Studies from Barry University (2013), and a masters in Social Work (“MSW”) (2016) from Barry University. He has been a lifetime member of the Delta Epsilon Iota Academic Honor Society since 2013. Petitioner’s résumé demonstrates an uninterrupted work history since 1997, with experience in the fields of social services, mental health, and substance abuse counseling, primarily involving individuals with mental illness and substance addictions. He was most recently employed with Dynamic Healthcare and has been providing substance abuse counseling and support to non-Agency clients with addiction issues. Petitioner submitted letters of reference and recommendations from: his current employer, Samuel E. Kelly, director of Dynamic Healthcare; Justice for Life, a psycho- education provider for the Misdemeanor Drug Court Program in Broward County; Better Way of Miami, Inc., an inpatient facility for drug and alcohol addiction; and Overtown Youth Center and John F. King, Attorney at Law, from 2008. Petitioner submitted additional training certificates that were considered by the Agency, including: The McShin Foundation Leadership Training Institute Peer Addiction Recovery Training; The Broward House HIV/AIDS Continuing Education (2014); HIPAA Basics Training (2013); Aggressive Control Training (2014); and Ethics Training (2014). Mr. Driscoll testified that the Agency also considered the following exemptions previously granted to Petitioner by other agencies: an employment waiver granted by DCF on October 10, 2008, to work with adults in mental health and substance abuse; an exemption from disqualification from employment under section 435.07, Florida Statutes, granted by the Agency for Health Care Administration on January 23, 2015; and another more recent exemption from DCF granted on April 29, 2016. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted he had suffered a “22-year addiction to a controlled substance.” He started drinking alcohol at age ten, and ended with crack cocaine. He received substance abuse counseling from two different providers: Better Way of Miami in 1995-1996, and Spectrum Programs in 2002- 2003. Moreover, he offered credible testimony that he has been clean from this addiction for 20 years and attends regular meetings of Narcotics Anonymous (“N.A.”) or Alcoholics Anonymous (“A.A.”) to this day. Mr. Driscoll’s position was that, despite there being some evidence of rehabilitation submitted with the Application for Exemption, and the subsequent request for hearing, and even the sincere testimony given by Petitioner at hearing concerning his addiction, this did not amount to sufficient evidence for him to recommend an exemption from disqualification. When considering all the evidence in its totality, he testified, the Agency did not conclude Petitioner had met his burden by the standard of clear and convincing evidence.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order granting Petitioner’s Application for Exemption from Disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis A. Jackson 2860 Northwest 187th Street Miami Gardens, Florida 33056-3131 Llamilys Maria Bello, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 201 West Broward Boulevard, Suite 305 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 (eServed) Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Barbara Palmer, Director Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed) Michele Lucas, Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 (eServed)

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57393.0655435.04435.07817.61
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A. LINCOLN SCHAUB vs. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 82-002306 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-002306 Latest Update: Nov. 05, 1982

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, A. Lincoln Schaub, was committed to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services by order of the juvenile court in Palm Beach County, Florida, on May 24, 1982, and placed in a drug program called "Here's Help" in Miami after his arrest on burglary charges. After two weeks at home prior to entering the program, Petitioner entered "Here's Help" on June 8, 1982. On June 21, 1982, Petitioner left the "Here's Help" program without consent or knowledge. On June 25, 1982, Petitioner's mother reported that Petitioner had returned home. Petitioner's parents subsequently transported him to detention. On July 17, 1982, he was arrested for burglaries allegedly committed while he was absent from the "Here's Help" program. The Department had a transfer hearing on July 29, 1982, and found that Petitioner had left "Here's Help" without consent. Based on that hearing, Petitioner was transferred to the Florida State School for Boys at Okeechobee. Petitioner left "Here's Help" because he had received demerits for a dirty locker and because he was not permitted to work. While absent from "Here's Help", Petitioner used narcotic drugs and was arrested for several burglaries. Petitioner evidenced a lack of self-discipline and an inability at this time to remain in a program voluntarily. Petitioner has a drug addiction problem.

Recommendation Having found that the Department's initial decision to place Petitioner in the Florida State School for Boys is in the Petitioner's best interest, it is so recommended. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 21st day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Rolle, Esquire Assistant Public Defender 224 Datura Street West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 K. C. Collette, Esquire Department of HRS 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Mr. & Mrs. Melvin Schaub Route 1, Box 642 (Loxahatchee) Pompano Beach, Florida 33060 Ms. Judith Hill, Supervisor Children, Youth and Families Program 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 David H. Pingree, Secretary Attn: Susan B. Kirkland, Esquire Department of HRS 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF NURSING vs LISA MICHELLE JACKSON, R.N., 16-004101PL (2016)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Jul. 20, 2016 Number: 16-004101PL Latest Update: Mar. 01, 2017

The Issue The issues to be determined are whether Respondent possessed Dilaudid without a legitimate purpose, and whether Respondent is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety, in violation of section 464.018(1), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Department of Health, Board of Nursing, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of nursing in the state of Florida, pursuant to section 20.43, and chapters 456 and 464, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Lisa Michelle Jackson was a licensed registered nurse in the state of Florida, holding license number RN 9375240. Respondent’s current address of record is 2358 York Street, Jacksonville, Florida 32207. On Saturday, November 7, 2015, Respondent left work and picked up her minor son from her parents’ house. She drove home, parked at her front door, and lost consciousness. At some point, Respondent’s parents called her cell phone. The phone was answered by Respondent’s son, who advised them of the situation. Respondent’s parents went to her house, and apparently called emergency medical services. EMS personnel arrived on the scene and administered Narcan to Respondent. Narcan is a medication that blocks receptors for opioid-based drugs, and is used to reverse the effects of opioids. It is commonly used when medical personnel suspect a patient of an opioid overdose. Respondent was thereafter transported to St. Vincent’s Riverside Medical Center (Riverside), and admitted with encephalopathy and acute respiratory failure. Respondent had to be placed on a respirator. A urine drug screen was performed, which returned positive for benzodiazepines and opiates. Riverside related the encephalopathy and respiratory failure to a suspected drug overdose. Respondent denied having taken anything containing benzodiazepines. She did indicate that approximately a year earlier she had undergone a tooth extraction, for which her dentist had prescribed Percocet. She had some left over, and testified that she had taken some for back pain several days before November 7, 2015. Respondent was discharged from Riverside on November 9, 2015, at approximately 11:40 a.m. After her discharge from Riverside on November 9, 2015, but later that afternoon, Respondent was speaking with her mother on the telephone. Respondent’s mother did not like the way she sounded, and came to the house. Respondent’s mother believed that Respondent was lethargic, but Respondent admitted only to being tired from her earlier hospital stay. EMS was called, and Respondent was again transported to Riverside, where she was admitted at approximately 5:45 p.m. Her diagnosis on admission was hypertensive disorder. She self-discharged against medical advice, signing the discharge papers at 6:36 p.m. There was no evidence that Respondent’s admission to Riverside on November 9, 2015, was the result of the use or abuse of any substance. On November 20, 2015, Respondent and Carl Nesmith were at Respondent’s residence. Respondent testified that she was experiencing back pain. At some time during the evening, Respondent took three or more Dilaudid tablets. Respondent testified that the tablets belonged to Mr. Nesmith, though the evidence was not sufficient to support a finding to that effect. Nonetheless, by the time of the arrival of the EMS team and her subsequent admission to Riverside as described herein, the tablets were in her possession. Dilaudid is a brand name of hydromorphone, an opioid. Pursuant to section 893.03(2)(a)1.k., Florida Statutes, hydromorphone is a Schedule II controlled substance that “has a high potential for abuse and has a currently accepted but severely restricted medical use in treatment in the United States, and abuse of the substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence.” Respondent did not have a prescription for Dilaudid. At some point during the evening of November 20, 2015, Respondent passed out in her bathroom. EMS was called and dispatched to Respondent’s residence. The inference is that Mr. Nesmith called them, but since Respondent was unconscious, and Mr. Nesmith did not testify, the identity of the caller is not known. More to the point, the identity of the caller is not relevant. When EMS personnel arrived, they found Respondent unresponsive on the bathroom floor. Mr. Gorsuch recognized Respondent’s symptoms, including agonal breathing, as characteristic of an opioid overdose, and administered Narcan to counteract the effects of the suspected drug. The Narcan “worked,” and Respondent regained consciousness. EMS personnel discovered a plastic bag with loose pills in Respondent’s purse. The pills were taken with Respondent as she was transported by EMS to Riverside. Respondent was received at the Riverside emergency room shortly after midnight on November 21, 2015. Her condition was described as “drowsy but arousable with slurred speech.” Upon her arrival at Riverside, Ms. Quartano observed that Respondent was clutching a Ziplock-type bag of pills in her hand. How the pills came to be in her hand was not explained. Whether in her purse or in her hand, the pills were in Respondent’s possession. The pills were provided to Dr. McBride Johnson, who identified the pills as Dilaudid based on their shape, color, and markings. Respondent’s diagnosis upon admission was acute encephalopathy; poisoning by unspecified drugs, medicaments, and biological substances, accidental, initial encounter; and altered mental status. Respondent underwent a urine screening, which returned positive for benzodiazepines. Despite the fact that Respondent knew that she had taken “pills” during the evening in question, she denied to hospital personnel that she had taken any drugs or alcohol. As she had on November 9, 2015, Respondent self- discharged against medical advice, signing the discharge papers at 5:30 a.m. Upon her discharge from the hospital, Respondent was taken into custody by Sergeant Coleman from the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office. Respondent told Sergeant Coleman that the Dilaudid had been given to her by a friend for back pain, and that she had them for several days. Despite her deposition testimony that she had taken pills allegedly provided to her by Mr. Nesmith, she told Sergeant Coleman that she had taken one of her previously prescribed Percocet tablets, and denied having taken any of the pills given to her by her “friend.” Respondent was then placed under arrest. Respondent’s mother had, for years, taken care of Respondent’s son while Respondent was working, often at night. Between November 2015 and January 2016, Respondent’s parents took over primary care of her son in order to provide him with a more stable environment. There is no evidence that Respondent ever diverted opioids, or any other drugs, from her employer. However, after having been visited by a Department of Health investigator, Respondent’s employer, University of Florida Health - Shands (Shands), first suspended and then, in January 2016, terminated Respondent’s employment as a registered nurse. On February 14, 2016, a Jacksonville Sheriff’s Deputy performed a traffic stop on Respondent after observing her fail to maintain her lane of traffic, stop past the stop bar at a stop light, drive up onto the curb nearly striking a pole, drive onto another curb and nearly onto the sidewalk, and while attempting to negotiate a turn, nearly strike another pole. The deputies called to the scene observed that Respondent had bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, lethargic movements, and that she was unsteady on her feet. She underwent Field Sobriety Exercises but failed to perform them to standard. Respondent testified that she had taken some over-the- counter sleeping medication at least 12 hours before being stopped. She could think of no reason why such medications would have had an effect on her by the time of the stop. Respondent stated that her erratic driving was caused by her vehicle pulling to the right and being difficult to control, which was consistent with her deposition testimony that it was because her car needed an alignment. That explanation was not believable. Respondent was arrested for driving while under the influence. The charges were ultimately reduced to reckless driving, but Respondent was required to attend DUI driving school, attend the DUI Victim Impact Panel, and perform community service. On March 15, 2016, Respondent was walking from her mother’s house to her car when she passed out in her mother’s yard. The Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department responded, arriving at approximately 12:15 p.m. The EMS personnel administered Narcan to Respondent, and transported her to Baptist Medical Center (Baptist). By the time she arrived, she was able to communicate with medical personnel, and attributed the incident to a fight with her mother, and lightheadedness from not eating that day. Respondent testified that “they told me at the hospital that I had morphine in my system, and I had no morphine.” Respondent’s understanding of what she was told is not substantiated by the Baptist medical records. Thus, the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding that Respondent had morphine in her system on March 15, 2016. Respondent was discharged from Baptist at approximately 1:15 p.m., about an hour after her arrival. Beginning “towards the end of 2015,” and extending “maybe up until March or April [2016], maybe a little later,” Respondent went to the Jacksonville Metro Treatment Center where she received daily methadone treatments in an effort to wean herself off of controlled substances. She “somewhat” received counseling, but the substance of her testimony indicates that the methadone was the driving cause of her visits to the treatment center. She stopped attending the treatment center due to the cost. From April 2016, when she stopped receiving methadone treatment at the Jacksonville Metro Treatment Center, until June or July 2016, Respondent received outpatient Suboxone treatment at Merit Health River Region, which accepts Medicaid. Suboxone is like methadone, but it blocks opioid receptors. Respondent stopped going to River Region because it was hard for her to get there due to transportation issues. Respondent did not complete her treatment, and she was not advised that she was in remission or that she should discontinue her treatment. Respondent has received no substance abuse treatment since she stopped going to River Region. On or about March 17, 2016, Dr. Sanchez evaluated Respondent as allowed by section 464.018(1)(j). The evaluation included not only a face-to-face interview with Respondent, but included a review of records, including medical and law enforcement records, related to each of the incidents described herein. During the evaluation, Respondent advised Dr. Sanchez that she had used opioids “opportunistically” for about 10 years, with her usage being sporadic and impulsive. Respondent further advised Dr. Sanchez that she had used a Fentanyl patch three to four days prior to the evaluation. Pursuant to section 893.03(2)(b)9., Florida Statutes, Fentanyl is a Schedule II controlled substance with the same potential for abuse as Dilaudid. Respondent did not have a prescription for Fentanyl. Dr. Sanchez opined that Respondent’s use of Fentanyl that close to the evaluation, with the risk of detection in the toxicology screen, was an indication of the strength of her addiction. Respondent did not tell Dr. Sanchez about the March 15, 2016, incident during which she passed out in her mother’s yard, an incident that occurred only two days prior to the evaluation. She agreed that the incident would have been relevant to Dr. Sanchez’s evaluation. The failure to disclose the incident is indicative of an evasive attitude towards matters that would reasonably be expected to affect Respondent’s ability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety. Dr. Sanchez noted that Respondent had a history of emergency room visits over extended periods of time with different pain complaints, including back pain, abdominal pain related to gastric bypass surgery, and a broken tooth, all of which resulted in recommendations for short-term opiate therapy. Dr. Sanchez opined that Respondent’s actions suggested drug- seeking behavior. However, the maladies described, including a bulging disc from a car accident, and chronic tooth issues including, at the time of the evaluation, an abscess, were diagnosed by physicians, who prescribed pain management medications, and were not illusory. Regardless of whether Respondent’s use of opioids was initiated as a result of a medically-prudent prescription, the evidence is clear and convincing that Respondent’s use has passed to the stage of addiction. Dr. Sanchez opined that the incident on November 7, 2015, when Respondent took some form of opioid and picked up her child on the way home, ultimately losing consciousness at the wheel of her car, was evidence of a strong compulsion to use opioids. Dr. Sanchez’s opinion that this incident indicated a significant lack of judgment and control is credited. The incident on November 20, 2016, is further strong evidence of a growing and dangerous addition. In light of the other incidents described herein, and Respondent’s familiarity with opioids over the years, both as a patient and a nurse, Respondent’s testimony that she did not understand what she was taking that evening is simply not credible. Dr. Sanchez stated the circumstances surrounding Respondent’s February 14, 2016, arrest for driving under the influence is further evidence that Respondent was “losing control” of her addiction. The suggestion that the incident was the result of poor alignment is not credible, particularly in light of Respondent’s appearance and performance during the stop. Dr. Sanchez determined that Respondent refuses to accept responsibility for her behavior and remains in denial of her substance abuse issues, a conclusion that is supported and accepted. As a result of his evaluation, Dr. Sanchez diagnosed Respondent with severe opioid use disorder. He opined that Respondent has significantly impaired judgment due to her substance abuse, which precludes her from functioning as a registered nurse with the necessary skill and safety to patients. His testimony is credited. Dr. Sanchez further opined that Respondent requires an extended period of continuous supervision with monitoring, substance abuse treatment, random toxicology testing, and an extended period of time of documented abstinence from controlled substances before Respondent would be able to practice nursing with sufficient skill and safety to patients. He recommended that Respondent complete a full course of treatment geared to substance abuse and chemical dependency, initially as inpatient treatment, followed by an intensive outpatient program after a reasonable period of abstinence. Finally, Dr. Sanchez recommended that Respondent execute an Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN) monitoring agreement. IPN is the impaired practitioner program for the Board of Nursing, pursuant to section 456.076. IPN monitors the evaluation, care, and treatment of impaired nurses. IPN oversees random drug screens and provides for the exchange of information between treatment providers, evaluators, and the Department for the protection of the public. Respondent has not entered any form of inpatient treatment, though she indicated that she is currently on a wait- list for inpatient treatment, has discontinued outpatient treatment, and has not entered into an IPN agreement.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health, Board of Nursing, enter a final order: determining that Respondent violated sections 464.018(1)(i) and 464.018(1)(j); imposing a suspension of license number RN 9375240 for one year and thereafter until such time as Respondent personally appears before the Board and can demonstrate the present ability to engage in the safe practice of nursing, with such demonstration to include at least one IPN evaluation in which the evaluator finds Respondent to be able to engage in the safe practice of nursing or recommend the conditions under which safe practice could be attained; requiring compliance with IPN recommendations and contract conditions, as imposed; imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00; and awarding costs incurred in the prosecution of this case to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of November, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 2016. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Michelle Jackson 2356 York Street Jacksonville, Florida 32207-3541 (eServed) Rob F. Summers, Esquire Brynna J. Ross, Esquire Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3265 (eServed) Nichole C. Geary, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed) Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed) Jody Bryant Newman, EdD, EdS Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.68456.072456.073464.018893.0390.803
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