The Issue Whether petitioner should be removed from the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979, on grounds of ineligibility.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a licensed attorney, practices law in Clewiston, Hendry County, Florida. Since at least September 1, 1970, he has continuously engaged in the private practice of law in Clewiston. On September 1, 1970, the Glades County School Board ("School Board" or "Board") hired him as the School Board attorney, a position which he continues to hold. This is a part-time position, since the Board has no need for a full-time attorney. The School Board is headquartered at Moore Haven, 16 miles northwest of Clewiston, in neighboring Glades County. The terms and conditions of petitioner's employment with the School Board have remained virtually unchanged since he was originally hired. Each year, the School Board sets his salary consisting of a monthly retainer or salary, plus a fixed amount per hour for any additional professional services or litigation required by the School Board. For the 1979-80 school year, the Board set his salary or retainer--terms which the School Board used interchangeably-- as shown by the Minutes of the July 11, 1979, meeting: 3. SALARY/SCHOOL BOARD ATTORNEY - 1979-80 Chairman Hilliard opened the floor for discussion on the salary for the school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. After some discussion between the board and Mr. Potter, the board proposed a retainer of $750.00 per month. (annual salary of $9,000.00) plus $50.00 per hour for additional pro fessional services or litigation required by the board. ON MOTION by Sapp, seconded by Johnson, the board approved this pro- posal for school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. (Vote: Arnold, yes; Johnson, yes; Taylor, yes; Sapp, yes; Hilliard, yes.) His salary is paid from the School Board's regular employee salary account. But as the School Board's attorney, unlike other School Board employees, he does not accrue annual leave, sick leave, or pay during vacations, holidays or illness, though when he is sick or on vacation, there is no adjustment to his salary. He is reimbursed for work-related travel and meals at the rates provided by Section 112.061, Florida Statutes (1983), and is covered by the School Board's group health and life insurance, and Workers' Compensation. Since 1970, the Board has withheld his Social Security contributions from his fixed monthly salary payments; has paid the employer's Social Security contributions on his salary payments; and has annually reported his monthly salary payments on Internal Revenue Service Form W-2. To this extent, the School Board considered him an employee and treated him the same as it treated its other employees. The legal services which he furnished the School Board are described in his employment agreement and the School Board's job description for the position: TYPICAL DUTIES: Attend all regular Board meetings and such special meetings as deemed advisable by Board Chairman or Superintendent. Be available for routine telephone or personal consultations with Board Chairman, Superintendent and Staff members. Perform legal research. Prepare or approve leases or agreements prior to execution by Board. Prepare and prosecute law suits in behalf of Board and defend law suits against Board, including any actions against Superintendent, Staff or other school district employees allegedly arising etc., unless special counsel is deemed necessary by Board Attorney with Board's concurrence. Attend the quarterly seminars/meetings of Florida School Board Attorneys Association; and any other approved by Board. Represent Board and/or Superintendent in personnel matters where appropriate, as well as student discipline matters. School Board meetings, held monthly, last approximately one and one-half hours. Litigation, although described as a typical duty, is considered extra work, and an hourly rate is charged over and above the monthly salary. Petitioner agrees that he would not knowingly accept any new clients which would cause a conflict of interest with his School Board employment. Although he has been free to turn down work assigned by the School Board, he never has--at least through 1976. As explained by Mr. Strope, Superintendent of Schools from 1968 to 1976, although petitioner was free to turn down work, he "shouldn't have." Petitioner is not required to maintain any set office hours, and his monthly salary does not vary with the number of hours' work. He is not furnished office space by the School Board. The majority of his legal work for the Board is performed at his private law office, in Clewiston. The cost of operating his law office is not a budget item in the School Board's budget. Under his employment arrangement with the School Board, he furnishes all personnel, equipment, and facilities needed to perform his services. He is responsible for supervising the secretaries who work in his private office. Occasionally, when he is at School Board headquarters in Moore Haven he will ask a School Board employee to type a document. At his request, however, the School Board will furnish him pencils, legal pads, legal periodicals and stationery. It also pays for his travel; for per diem expenses incurred while attending legal seminars or meetings; and for long distance telephone calls made in connection with his School Board employment. He is neither responsible for, nor supervises, any employee of the School Board. The School Board does not furnish him any legal secretaries or part-time attorney assistants. He has not shown what percentage, or amount, of his working hours are devoted to performing legal services for the School Board, as opposed to legal services which he performs for his other clients. Other than assigning specific legal tasks, the School Board exercises no more control over the means, methods, and manner by which petitioner performs the legal work given him than is ordinarily exercised by any client over an attorney. Because of ethical constraints and the nature of legal work, petitioner must exercise independent professional judgment. Since September 1, 1970 2/, petitioner has been enrolled in the FRS. This was accomplished by his filling out a prescribed form which the School Board then filed with the Division. The Board then began reporting him on its employee rolls. There is no evidence that the initial FRS entry form, filed with the Division, described petitioner's work duties or the nature of his employment with the School Board. Both the Board and the Division enrolled him in the FRS, believing that he was eligible for membership. The Division did not question or investigate the nature of his employment relationship with the Board until 1983. From his initial enrollment until January 1, 1975, when FRS became a non-contributory system, petitioner contributed one-half of the the required FRS contribution, while the School Board contributed the other half. Since January 1, 1975, the School Board has contributed 100 percent of his contributions to FRS. During the 1970s petitioner's membership in the FRS prevented him from participating in any other tax sheltered retirement plan. 3/ Since July 1, 1979, the Division has, by rule, given notice that consultants and other professional persons contracting with public employers are, ordinarily, ineligible for membership in the FRS. All public employers, including the School Board, have been asked to remove such persons from their retirement payrolls. Since at least July 8, 1981, petitioner was on notice that his status as an employee, and his eligibility for continued membership in the FRS, were in question. Both the parties stipulate that part-time electricians, plumbers, painters, combustion engine mechanics, air conditioning mechanics, janitors or sewage plant operators (and even other occupations) employed in 1983 by the Glades County School Board on a year-round salary basis (i.e., at least 10 consecutive months), and paid out of the School Board's regular salary and wage account, would be mandatory members of FRS by statute. (Prehearing Stip., para. E. 6)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter an order removing petitioner from membership in the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979; and That the Division return to petitioner and the School Board their respective FRS contributions, mistakenly made to his account. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1984.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to participate in the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from January 1, 2000, through June 13, 2002, on the basis of his employment with Florida Community College at Jacksonville (FCCJ).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert Burns, has been employed as an adjunct instructor of FCCJ since March 1989. FCCJ is a member employer under FRS. Adjunct instructors traditionally have been employed by FCCJ on a class-by-class, semester-by-semester basis, and have no expectation of employment beyond any single semester. Petitioner knew this from his date of first hire. When Petitioner began work with FCCJ, all adjunct instructors were given a contract for each term and each course. This practice continued for all instructors and classes until the year 2000. Despite the semester-to-semester, repetitive contracts, occasionally Petitioner's courses were of a duration longer than one semester, and Petitioner was sometimes evaluated only on an annual basis. These evaluations were for purposes of certifying Petitioner and similarly situated adjunct instructional personnel for further semester contracts. At all times material, Petitioner taught on three campuses and taught college courses in biology and earth science; acted as a facilitator in the laboratory; and taught Adult Studies courses. At all times material, sixty percent of Petitioner's time was spent teaching Adult Studies courses. From 1989 until January 1, 2000, Petitioner was provided semester contracts for each of the three foregoing functions: college courses, lab facilitation, and Adult Studies courses. Every contract clearly acknowledged, in pertinent part, 3. This contract shall at all times be subject to any and all laws, Florida State Board of Education Rules and Florida Community College at Jacksonville Board of Trustees rules and regulations now existing or hereinafter lawfully enacted or promulgated. In furtherance thereof, the Contractor expressly agrees to become aware of and comply with all such applicable regulations, including but not limited to those addressing discrimination/affirmative action and sexual harassment. * * * The Contractor agrees and understands that he/she is not entitled to receive benefits made available by the College to its full-time employees. The Contractor further agrees and understands that his/her services are of a temporary nature, and that the College does not agree to provide the Contractor with any future employment or contract whether temporary, permanent or otherwise. The relationship hereby created between the Contractor and the College shall be deemed to have been voluntarily terminated by the Contractor upon the termination or expiration of this agreement. The Contractor agrees and understands that the compensation described herein is the entire compensation due to Contractor for performance of services pursuant to this contract. Specifically, Contractor agrees and understands that he/she shall not be entitled to wages or hours similar to those provided to College employees. * * * 9. The Contractor and the College understand and hereby agree that this contract does not and shall not be deemed to create an employment relationship. From January 1, 2000, through June 2002, Petitioner was not provided individual contracts for his Adult Studies classes, but was provided contracts for his other courses and lab facilitation work. In 2000, FCCJ began implementing a new computer system and, as a result, some adjunct instructors were not given individual contracts for each course. Adult Studies was one program area where time cards, rather than individual contracts, were used. No one at FCCJ ever told Petitioner that he had become a full or part-time employee, as opposed to an adjunct instructor. At various times during the period after January 1, 2000, Petitioner and other adjunct instructors approached Dean of Adult Studies, Lloyd Watkins, and asked him where their contracts were. The Dean inquired of FCCJ's Human Resources Department and was told there were too many contracts to do and so they would not be issued. It is not certain that Dean Watkins ever conveyed this information to Petitioner. However, throughout the period at issue, Petitioner used the time cards and understood that his employment was on a class by class, semester by semester basis. The issue of FRS benefits vis-á-vis independent contractor status did not arise until after Petitioner had been terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement enter a final order denying Petitioner's request to participate in FRS from January 1, 2000, through June 13, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Al Millar, Esquire 4627 Ocean Street Mayport, Florida 32233 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Erin Sjostrom, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Simone Marstiller, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Alam Farzad is a currently licensed medical doctor practicing medicine in Dade County, Florida. The Respondent was first licensed in Florida in 1975. In February, 1972, the Respondent resided in Miami with her husband, Kiumaris Bakshandeh, having moved to the United States from Iran in 1971 where they had both studied medicine and received medical degrees. In February, 1972, the Respondent's sister, Iran Farzad Rafael, was residing in Chicago, Illinois. Prior to February, 1972, the Respondent's sister graduated as a medical doctor in Iran and after moving to the United States, attempted to qualify for eventual licensure by taking an examination for foreign medical graduates administered by the Educational Council for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG). In 1972 a passing grade was required on the examination by a foreign medical graduate in order to become eligible to take medical training in an intern program in the United States. Upon completion of the training for foreign professionals, another examination was required to be passed in order to become licensed in a state. Thus, the examination was a type of qualifying exam, the successful passage of which entitled a foreign graduate to receive medical training in the United States and eventually sit for the state medical licensing exam which was administered to all persons who desired to become licensed physicians. The Respondent's sister took the ECFMG exam three times prior to February, 1972, and failed it each time. At the request of her husband, the Respondent flew to Chicago in February of 1972, to take the ECFMG exam for her sister. The Respondent went to the examination site with the examination entrance papers she had taken from her sister, forged her sister's name at the examination site and took the examination using her sister's name. She subsequently received word from her sister that she had received a passing grade on the examination. The night after taking the examination, the Respondent received a phone call from her husband at her sister's home. During the conversation between the Respondent's husband and sister, the husband requested that the sister perform an abortion on the Respondent in return for her help on the examination. The Respondent's sister refused the husband's request. But for the Respondent taking and passing the ECFMG exam on behalf of her sister, the sister could not have practiced medicine or entered into a residency program. In 1978, the Respondent testified that her sister had practiced medicine in 1976 specializing in physical medicine and rehabilitation. However no official records were submitted by the Petitioner that the Respondent's sister is presently licensed or has been licensed as a physician in Illinois. In 1976, the Respondent's husband used his knowledge concerning the ECFMG examination to coerce the Respondent into signing a property settlement and custody agreement in a pending divorce proceeding. In exchange for agreeing to the property and custody agreement, the Respondent's husband signed an affidavit that would allegedly ensure that no information concerning the 1972 examination would be made public. In early 1978, the Respondent instituted proceedings in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, to set aside the child custody and support provisions contained in the final decree of dissolution of marriage between the Respondent and her husband on the grounds of coercion and duress. Following a lengthy hearing in which numerous witnesses were heard and exhibits entered into evidence, the Circuit Court in March, 1978, granted Respondent's motion to set aside the agreement and awarded custody of the couple's minor child to the Respondent. Dr. Bakshandeh appealed the trial court's decision to the District Court of Appeal, Third District. The court affirmed the trial court noting that there was " . . . an abundance of evidence in the record. . ." to support the Respondent's contention that she had been subjected to coercion and duress by her husband into entering into the agreement and that such coercion and duress constituted "misconduct of an adverse party" which would authorize a trial court to set aside a final judgment. See Bakshandeh v. Bakshandeh, 370 So.2d 417 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979). The court went on to make, however, the following observation: As a final note, we are disturbed by an undisputed fact which emerges from this record. The wife Dr. Alam Farzad Bakshandeh is a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida; the husband Kiumaris Bakshandeh is a chief resident urological surgeon for the University of Miami. Both were originally from Iran where they received part of their medical training. The record reveals that in February, 1972, the wife took a medical examination for her sister Iran Farzad Rafael for admission to a medical training program as a foreign physican in the State of Illinois. The examination was given in Chicago wherein the wife used her sister's name, took the exami- nation and passed it. The sister after additional training and examination was ad- mitted to practice medicine in Illinois. There is evidence that the husband urged the wife to take the examination for her sister and thereafter used this indiscretion to blackmail the wife into signing the pro- perty settlement agreement herein. The re- cord does not reflect whether the appropriate medical authorities have been notified of the above facts. We trust that such notifi- cation will be accomplished in the near future. Thereafter, on April 24, 1979, the Clerk of the Third District Court of Appeal forwarded a copy of the court's opinion to the Board of Medical Examiners for appropriate action. This was presumably the first actual notice the Petitioner received concerning the Respondent's actions on behalf of her sister in February, 1972. In July, 1981, a Board of Medical Examiners Probable Cause Panel found probable cause to believe violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes existed in this case and an Administrative Complaint was issued and filed against Respondent. Respondent was licensed by the Board of Medical Examiners as a medical physician in approximately February, 1975. The Petitioner filed the Administrative Complaint approximately 9 years after the incident in question occurred. The Petitioner failed to introduce evidence at the final hearing that while exercising due diligence it was unable to discover this incident prior to April, 1979.
The Issue The nature of the controversy is set forth in the Order Finding Probable Cause issued by the Commission on Ethics (the "Commission") on September 16, 2015, which specifically alleged that Respondent, City Attorney, code enforcement special magistrate, or special or backup counsel for the City of North Port, violated sections 112.313(3), 112.313(6), 112.313(7)(a), and 112.313(16), Florida Statutes: [B]y providing counsel and recommendations to the City Commission regarding the adoption of local Ordinance 2014-29 requiring the appointment of a Zoning Hearing Officer and encouraging the City Commission to amend Part II, Chapter 2, Article IX, of the City Code to replace the Code Enforcement Board with a Code Enforcement Special Magistrate and offering himself for consideration for the position of Zoning Hearing Officer as well as Code Enforcement Special Magistrate. The issue is whether Respondent violated these provisions of the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees as alleged in the Order Finding Probable Cause, and, if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact The City of North Port ("City") is an incorporated municipality, created by the Florida Legislature in 1959, and located in Sarasota County. Its electorate approved a revised charter in 1988. Subsequent amendments to the Charter were approved throughout the years, with the most recent amendment occurring in 2014. Article XIV, concerning the City Attorney, has never been amended. The City's form of government is Commission-Manager. The City Commission consists of five elected City Commissioners. The City Commissioners elect the Mayor, who serves as presiding officer of the City Commission, and who is elected by majority vote of the City Commissioners. The Mayor is "responsible to see that all laws, provisions of [the] Charter and acts of the [City] Commission are faithfully executed; [to] sign on behalf of the City all intergovernmental agreements . . . and any other official documents." The Charter establishes the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of the City. The Charter requires the City Commission to appoint the City Manager who serves as the chief administrative officer. The Charter empowers the City Manager to supervise the daily administrative duties and all non-charter employees, make City personnel decisions, represent the City in contract negotiations, sign contracts on behalf of the City, enforce agreements, and perform numerous other duties. The City Commissioners may not interfere with the selection of the personnel of the City Manager's subordinates, nor give orders to City personnel. The Charter establishes the City Manager, City Clerk, and City Attorney. The Charter specifies that the City Clerk and City Attorney are offices that the City Commission cannot abolish. The Charter provides for the office of City Attorney and assigns various duties to the position. As indicated in section 1.03 of the Charter, "reference to any office or officer includes any person authorized by law to perform the duties of such office." The functions of City Attorney include: attending all meetings; advising the City Commission as to its compliance with the Charter and Florida law; being the legal advisor and counselor for all departments; preparing and reviewing contracts, legal and official instruments; and endorsing each legal contract as to form and correctness. The Charter states that "[n]o legal document with [the] Municipality shall take effect until his approval is so endorsed thereon." Respondent provided legal services to the City of North Port from 2001 until August of 2014. From 2001 to 2006, Respondent was a partner in the Bowman, George, Scheb & Robinson law firm which had a contract to provide legal services to the City. The firm was designated the City Attorney for the City. In 2006, simultaneously with the renewal of the Bowman George contract, Respondent moved his practice to the Nelson Hesse law firm, in which he was a partner. From 2006 until August 2012, the Nelson Hesse law firm had a contract to provide legal services to the City. The firm was designated as the City Attorney. In each instance, the City contracted with a law firm, and not a specific individual, to serve as the City Attorney. From 2001 through August 2012, Respondent, as a member of a contracted law firm, performed the duties and responsibilities of the City Attorney as outlined in the City Charter and as provided in the contracts between the City and the Bowman George firm and the Nelson Hesse firm. In 2011, the City Commission began discussing alternatives to the way legal services were provided due to concerns with the City's rising costs for legal fees. In the spring of 2012, the City issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) which sought "proposals from experienced and qualified law firms to provide a full range of municipal legal services serving as the City's legal counsel on a contractual basis." Respondent played no role in developing the RFP or participating in any discussions concerning the RFP because he believed it "would prohibit [his] submission of a proposal to that RFP." Commissioner Linda Yates testified that Respondent said he could not participate in the creation or discussions of the RFP due to ethical issues. Throughout the RFP process, Jonathan R. Lewis served as City Manager. He had been appointed by the City Commission and acts as chief administrative officer. In addition to his various duties, he is responsible for the hiring and firing of City personnel, representing the City in contract negotiations, and signing all contracts, agreements, and applications for the City after approval by the City Commission. Mr. Lewis signed a contract with Suzanne D'Agresta to provide legal advice and counsel to the City Commission during the RFP process since Respondent removed himself from the process as he intended to submit a proposal on behalf of his firm. RFP applicants were advised in writing that "[t]he City Attorney is appointed by the [City] Commission, serves as a Charter officer, and performs duties and responsibilities pursuant to the Charter of the City of North Port section 14.05 and the general law of the State of Florida." Other specialty legal services, such as bond work and pension issues, are outsourced. Minimum qualifications for the position included seven years' experience in Florida municipal law, and licensure by and good standing with The Florida Bar. The Nelson Hesse firm, partnering with the Lewis, Longman & Walker law firm, submitted a response to the RFP. Three other firms submitted responses to the RFP. After an interview process, the Nelson Hesse firm was ranked first by three of five members of the City Commission and the general consensus was that the firm was the most qualified applicant. The City and the Nelson Hesse firm then negotiated the terms of an agreement for legal services that were subsequently presented to the City Commission for approval. On August 15, 2012, the City of North Port approved the Agreement for Legal Services with the Nelson Hesse firm whereby the City employed, engaged, and hired "the Firm to serve as and to perform the duties and responsibilities of City Attorney pursuant to Request for Proposal No. 2012-21." The Agreement stated: The Firm designates and the City accepts Robert K. Robinson as the primary attorney for City legal work. Mr. Robinson may utilize the services of other attorneys and staff in the Firm and [Lewis, Longman and Walker] as he deems appropriate for City legal work. The Agreement, which commenced on September 1, 2012, was for a term of two years and could be renewed for one additional term of one year. The Agreement further provided: The Firm shall serve as the City Attorney who shall act as legal advisor to, and attorney and counselor for, the City and all of its officers in matters relating to their official duties. On September 10, 2012, the City Commission voted four- to-one to approve Nelson Hesse and Respondent to provide legal services to the City Commission. Commissioner Yates was the lone dissenter citing numerous reasons for her "no" vote. Nelson Hesse's compensation was fixed by contract as required by the Charter. A monthly retainer was set at $28,333.33 to cover a maximum of 2,400 hours, and the rate was fixed at $170 for "Hourly Legal Services." Expenses, including travel within the county, were to be billed to the City. The Office of City Attorney was budgeted through "Charter and Executive Services," and in FY 2012 the legal department had a budget of $776,000. Respondent was required to submit his projected budget annually. Respondent had office space for his use at City Hall. Unlike the contract with Ms. D'Agresta, which was signed by City Manager Lewis, Respondent's Agreement was signed by then-City Commission Chair Tom Jones. This indicates that Respondent or his firm was a Charter officer serving under the City Commission, and not a non-charter independent contractor serving under the City Manager on a temporary basis when Respondent and his firm recused themselves from any involvement with the RFP since they intended to submit a proposal. The Agreement reiterated and expanded the duties and powers enumerated in the Charter and provided that Respondent may not assign the Agreement without prior written consent of the City Commission. Respondent, as an individual, believes he was never appointed City Attorney by majority vote of the City Commission nor was he elected to that position. Respondent was also not an employee of the City. His firm, Nelson Hesse, in which he was a partner, served as City Attorney. From the evidence, this appears true even though the Charter refers to the City Attorney as "he or she." Following the November 2012 election of two new commissioners, the City began the process of transitioning from the use of a firm to serve as the City Attorney to the appointment of an individual to serve as the City Attorney. This process, which involved a series of meetings and workshops, included a review of all legal services for the City and eventually led to a decision to retain a consultant to conduct a search for an individual to serve as City Attorney. This process, in turn, led to the appointment of Mark Moriarty as the City Attorney by majority vote of the City Commission. Mr. Moriarty began his employment as the City Attorney on or about September 15, 2014. Well prior to Mr. Moriarty's start as City Attorney, at the June 9, 2014, City Commission meeting, at Vice-Mayor Rhonda DiFranco's request, Respondent, on behalf of his firm, Nelson Hesse, submitted a "Letter of Engagement," that he drafted, to the City Commission for approval. Since the 2012 Agreement with Nelson Hesse was going to expire on August 31, 2014, Respondent sought to provide the City with a "safety net" to ensure it would be covered for legal services until Mr. Moriarty was in place and the City had no need for further services from Nelson Hesse. The Letter of Engagement would allow Respondent, through his firm, to continue to provide advice and representation beginning September 1, 2014, as the backup attorney to the new in-house counsel, Mr. Moriarty. Additionally, the Letter of Engagement specified Respondent would "provide advice and representation to the City on zoning . . . [and as] code enforcement hearing officer." The Letter of Engagement included a higher hourly fee than the previous Agreement with the City ($275 versus $170). The reason given for the higher hourly fee was that Respondent could not ascertain how many hours, if any, his firm would work under the new arrangement and, therefore, could not offer a volume discount for his time. Nothing in the June 9 Engagement Letter required the City to use Nelson Hesse for any future work. The testimony as to Respondent's motive for placing the June 9 letter before the City Commission was disputed by the parties. Respondent was not representing a private individual or entity before the City Commission at the meeting. If he was representing anyone, he believes he was representing the City. He took no action to impede or frustrate the City Commission's move to an appointed City Attorney. If anything, the evidence suggests Respondent assisted the City in its search for an in- house City Attorney by recommending a search firm, and by speaking positively about the transition to the in-house situation. Because Mr. Moriarty was not going to assume his new position until September 15, 2014, the City Manager was authorized to enter into an interim agreement for legal services with Respondent's firm to cover the two-week period between the expiration of the prior Legal Agreement with Nelson Hesse and Mr. Moriarty's start date. Consistent with that new agreement, Respondent attended and provided legal services to the City Commission at its September 8, 2014, meeting. At this meeting, his firm was no longer the City Attorney, but was a contract attorney providing services during the interim period between City Attorneys. The Advocate's take on the post-City Attorney plans of Respondent was quite different. The argument was made that Respondent's June 9 letter was designed to hire Respondent's firm at an increased rate of $275 per hour, plus to make Respondent the Zoning Hearing Officer and Code Enforcement Special Magistrate. The Charter requires reading of a proposed ordinance at two separate public City Commission meetings at least one week apart. On the second and final reading, the proposed ordinance is offered for adoption. If adopted, it becomes local law on its effective date. Respondent, as City Attorney, supervised the drafting of Ordinance 2014-29 to create the position of Zoning Hearing Officer for zoning appeals and variance matters, effective September 1, 2014. The Zoning Hearing Officer was to be hired and could be terminated by the City Commission, which also would supervise the position. Ordinance 2014-29 was presented to the City Commission for first reading at the July 14, 2014, City Commission meeting. Respondent explained the ordinance to the commissioners and legally advised them on the document. The second reading took place at the City Commission's July 28, 2014, meeting. Again, Respondent offered legal advice to the commissioners about the ordinance's effects. Respondent suggested that an appointment needed to be made that night, effective September 1, 2014, the day after his Legal Agreement expired. He offered his services and responded "yes" to a question from City Commissioner Yates regarding whether a decision should be made that night. Respondent provided no other options other than to appoint him immediately. Other options may have been available since it was "the norm" (Respondent's words) for City Manager Lewis to contract with attorneys from a variety of law firms for services without undertaking the competitive solicitation process when specialty legal services were needed. Respondent himself could have called an experienced attorney to handle the pending petition. Instead, Respondent informed the City Commission it was not his responsibility to provide other options to the City Commission. When asked how he would be ready to go with this on September 1, 2014, Respondent said he would "take off [his] city attorney hat" and on September 1 "put on the zoning officer appeals hat." He made clear to the City Commissioners that he was "uniquely qualified" for the position, therefore no others need be considered in his opinion. With no other options before them and having been advised of the urgency of making the appointment, the City Commission appointed Respondent to serve a four-year term by a four-to-one vote (Commissioner Yates being the lone dissenter). Respondent served in the position of Zoning Hearing Officer from September 1 through September 19, 2014. He earned $1,453.50 for 5.5 hours worked ($264.27 per hour). Respondent's 2012 Agreement did not provide he could serve as Zoning Hearing Officer. Respondent drafted the June 9, 2014, Letter of Engagement allowing him to serve as Zoning Hearing Officer. As Zoning Hearing Officer, Respondent served at the pleasure of the City Commission and could be removed with or without cause by a majority of the City Commissioners. Respondent had the power to take testimony under oath and compel attendance of witnesses. He could not engage in any "ex-parte" communications with City Commissioners while serving as Zoning Hearing Officer because he was serving as a neutral arbitrator in a quasi-judicial position adjudicating controversies between two parties: the City and property owners. Respondent could not serve as backup legal advisor to the City from September 1 through 14, 2014, if at the same time he was serving as Zoning Hearing Officer since he was supposed to be in a neutral and, therefore, independent position. Ordinance 2014-30 amended the City Code to abolish the seven-member Code Enforcement Board and create one Code Enforcement Special Magistrate ("Special Magistrate") position, effective October 1, 2014. The Special Magistrate was to be hired by and could be terminated by the City Commission upon a majority vote. That ordinance was presented to the City Commission for first reading on July 28, 2014. Respondent advised the City Commissioners that the ordinance created a special magistrate position, and informed the City Commissioners he would work on the details for the position in September and October 2014, a period of time covered by the June 9 Letter of Engagement, but not the 2012 Legal Services Agreement. Respondent admitted he drafted the June 9 Letter of Engagement so that he could assume the special magistrate position himself. After advising the City Commission on the effects of the ordinance as their attorney, Respondent offered himself for consideration for the not-yet-existent position and was appointed on a four-to-one vote of the City Commissioners to a two-year term beginning October 1, 2014. Like the Zoning Hearing Officer, the Special Magistrate serves as a neutral arbitrator in a quasi-judicial position that adjudicates controversies between two parties: the City and the property owner or alleged violator. Respondent attended ethics classes taught by Chris Anderson, attorney for the Commission on Ethics. Respondent denied he had a conflict of interest because in his view a violation would occur by "the attorney getting up out of his chair and going down in front of the commission and representing John Q. Public or John Q. Developer with regard to matters that are appearing before the city commission. That was not the case with me." Respondent's term as City Attorney ended on August 31, 2014. On August 28, 2014, City Manager Lewis requested authorization from the City Commission to hire Respondent to provide legal services from September 1 through 15, because the new in-house City Attorney would not begin until September 15, 2014. At the next regularly scheduled meeting of the City Commission on September 8, 2014, Ordinance 2014-30 was read a second time and voted for adoption. Respondent attended the meeting as the City Commission's legal advisor. Mayor Blucher introduced him as the "City Attorney" and quickly realized his error and corrected himself to announce Respondent's new title as "attorney for the City." Respondent replied, "Careful." This was apparently the only time Respondent reacted when he was identified as the appointed City Attorney. Although he claims his firm is the entity that contracted with the City to provide legal services, his silence is an admission he considered himself at least to be the de facto City Attorney or appointed public officer. City Commissioner Yates strongly objected every time Respondent's name was presented for the position of interim attorney for the City (for the September 1 through 14 period), Zoning Hearing Officer, or Special Magistrate. In each instance, she asked the City Commission to delay the vote until the new in- house City Attorney came on board so that he could have some input into the decision. She was outvoted four-to-one each time. Municipal governments utilize three typical arrangements for procuring legal services: 1) an in-house attorney who is directly on the government payroll; 2) an attorney in private practice whose firm (or the individual attorney) is retained through a contractual relationship under which the attorney remains employed by his/her firm; and 3) an attorney who practices in a specialized area who is retained on an as-needed basis through contract. Respondent's work for the City fits into the second category of lawyers retained to perform City business. In this matter, Respondent was considered by the City as a Charter Officer holding a public office. According to the RFP, the City sought a City Attorney as contemplated by its Charter when it appointed Respondent for the office. Respondent held himself out as the City Attorney to the Florida Attorney General when requesting legal opinions, to the public on his website, and to the Commission when filing his Form 1, "Statement of Financial Interests" (which also identifies him as an employee of his firm, Nelson Hesse). Respondent has never corrected the suggestion that he is City Attorney. His name appears as the appointed City Attorney on the City's official letterhead, and his picture hangs in City Hall with the other City officers. In City Hall, the name plate below his picture identifies him as the City Attorney and Charter Officer. The official minutes of each City Commission meeting held during his tenure indicate Respondent is the appointed City Attorney. Respondent admitted, when asked at hearing, that the Charter contemplates that a person, not an entity, will be the City Attorney. Respondent denies that he was "appointed" to the position of City Attorney, yet he did not correct Commissioner Blucher when he said during a meeting, "we elected him as a city attorney." City Commissioner Yates, also testifying at the hearing, believes the City Commission approved Respondent as the City Attorney. The City Charter does not require the City Attorney to take an oath of office and, although City Commissioner Yates does not recall whether Respondent did, she testified she expected he would have taken an oath as a matter of course. Respondent's current denial of any violations of chapter 112, Florida Statutes, and insistence that Nelson Hesse is the City Attorney conflicts with previous statements he made. At one point he declared, "Either I am or I am not the City Attorney." Further, when declining to negotiate an assignability clause in his June 9, 2014, Letter of Engagement because, as he explained to the City Commission, "But, the thing you have to understand is, Number 1, is that – is I'm sort of the center of the universe, so wherever I go, that's where it [this contract] goes." Respondent accurately, and appropriately, portrayed himself as the primary attorney for the City, regardless of his firm being named in his 2012 Agreement for Legal Services to the City. Respondent regularly signed official documents as "Robert K. Robinson, City Attorney," not as "Nelson Hesse as City Attorney, by Robert K. Robinson," or some other form of signature where he states his firm is the City Attorney. It is significant that the 2012 Agreement for Legal Services was signed by Tom Jones, then-Chair of the City Commission. The City Manager did not sign the document as he would have if this contract and the legal services rendered thereunder fell into the category of non-charter personnel performing legal (or other) services for the City. Only the City Commission can appropriately sign an agreement or contract designating a Charter Officer such as the City Attorney. Respondent was accountable to the City Commission for work performed under the Agreement. He acknowledged that the Agreement was on a City Commission agenda "at a public hearing where they [the Commissioners] adopted – or they executed the contract."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent, Robert K. Robinson, violated sections 112.313(6) and 112.313(16)(c), Florida Statutes, and ordering him to pay a penalty of $5,000 per violation ($10,000 total). DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth A. Miller, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Mark Herron, Esquire Messer Caparello, P.A. Post Office Box 15579 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32317 (eServed) Brennan Donnelly, Esquire Messer Caparello, P.A. 2618 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed)
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent Three Rivers Legal Services engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner Attorney Kaimowitz was born on May 5, 1935. He attended the University of Wisconsin, served in the U. S. Army, and was a journalist early in his career. He worked to obtain voting rights for African-Americans in the Deep South as a volunteer for the Congress of Racial Equality in the summer of 1964. He attended law school at New York University and while attending law school worked for the New York Civil Liberties Union as an investigator. Upon graduating from law school in 1967, he applied for membership in the New York State Bar Association and was eventually admitted. He was employed as a staff attorney with the Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law in New York City. He was suspended from that position. In 1970 he was awarded a Reginald Heber Smith Fellowship which took him to Michigan Legal Services in Detroit, Michigan. He remained there until he took a sabbatical so that he could complete a Legal Services Corporation Research Fellowship in 1979 and 1980, which was located at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He could have returned to his employment at Michigan Legal Services but instead sued that entity. He also sued Pennsylvania Legal Services, Legal Services of North Carolina, and the Mental Health Law Project of the District of Columbia for alleged age discrimination in hiring. From December 1980 until 1984 he was employed as associate counsel for the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York and Connecticut. He left there because of a "labor dispute." In March of 1985 he was hired as director of the Greater Orlando Area Legal Services (GOALS). He was fired in 1986. He sued GOALS, and obtained a financial settlement. Subsequently he applied for jobs with Broward County Legal Services and Central Florida Legal Services. When he was turned down for those jobs, he sued both entities based on age discrimination. The action against Central Florida Legal Services ended in 1999 or 2000 with a confidential settlement involving the payment of money to Attorney Kaimowitz. At some point he also entered into a confidential settlement with Broward County Legal Services. Attorney Kaimowitz claims that the suits he filed against various legal services programs were based on his personal mission to reform the hiring practices of legal services programs, and he avers that he has been on that mission since 1980. Although he claims to have instituted these suits for altruistic motives, many of them resulted in monetary settlements that benefited him personally. None of these suits were tried to the point that a verdict resulted. After being fired by GOALS he obtained a master's in communications from the University of Central Florida in 1988. While attending school he worked as a journalist for the "Orlando Weekly," a publication targeted to African-Americans in the Orlando area. Subsequently Attorney Kaimowitz represented African- Americans in civil rights actions, including employment discrimination in the Orlando area. He was in private practice of law at that time although he had no office. In 1989 or 1990 a court assessed fees against him for engaging in frivolous litigation. Attorney Kaimowitz moved to Gainesville because his domestic partner was seeking a Ph.D. at the University of Florida. From May 14, 1999, until February 7, 2002, he worked for Alachua County as an investigator into citizen complaints of discrimination in housing and public accommodation. He was terminated from that job because of accusations of "serious misconduct." He claimed his discharge from this job was in retaliation for whistle blowing. He sued, and received a monetary settlement. He subsequently and unsuccessfully sought employment with the City of Gainesville, the University of Florida, and with the State of Florida. He had a dispute with the University of Florida based on the University's failure to publish written material that he submitted. He filed suits pro se based on age discrimination against Gainesville for failing to hire him and against the University of Florida and the Florida Board of Regents because of the publication dispute and because they refused to hire him. The suit against the Board of Regents was settled by a monetary payment to him of a confidential sum, according to Attorney Kaimowitz. In 1997, Judge Maurice Paul, a U. S. District Judge, entered an order forbidding Attorney Kaimowitz from filing pro se lawsuits in his court. Prior to 2003, Attorney Kaimowitz was disciplined by the Florida Supreme Court on two occasions. A Florida Bar report dated January 29, 2002, reported a finding on January 3, 2002, of professional misconduct. He was reprimanded for making a statement he knew to be false or with reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity concerning the integrity of a judge. He had been previously reprimanded by the Florida Supreme Court in 1998. Attorney Kaimowitz is proud that he has filed countless motions to disqualify judges. He claims he has succeeded in disqualifying, at one time or another, every judge in the Middle District of Florida, and several in the Eighth Judicial Circuit, which includes the Gainesville area. Attorney Kaimowitz agrees with the notion that he is, "the most well-known offensive personality in the Eighth Judicial Circuit," but asserts that this reputation was not fully achieved until 2004. This self-characterization is accepted based on the evidence adduced in this case. Attorney Kaimowitz suffered a hearing loss and began using hearing aids in 1992. It is found as a fact that he hears well enough to try a case, which was demonstrated in this case. At his request, counsel table was moved close to the bench. He subsequently announced that this accommodated his hearing deficiency. Attorney Kaimowitz was arrested for causing a disturbance in a Gainesville City Commission meeting in 2002. He is very proud of being arrested. On November 16, 2004, Eighth Judicial Circuit Judge Larry Gibbs Turner entered an order entitled Sentence on Judgment of Guilty of Direct and In-Direct Criminal Contempt, following a Judgment of Guilty of eight separate allegations of direct and indirect criminal contempt on October 13, 2004. This Order recited the following language: A review of the fifteen (15) volumes of the record in this cause clearly demonstrates that throughout these proceedings Mr. Kaimowitz carefully, willfully, and with calculation and premeditation abused his status as a lawyer/pro se litigant in filing repetitious and frivolous pleadings including, but not limited to, his repeated motions to recuse every judge associated with this case. Mr. Kaimowitz's most recent effort to recuse this undersigned judge was framed by his GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AND/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA AND AFFIDAVIT/CERTIFICATE WITH GABE KAIMOWITZ'S APPLICATION TO DISQUALIFY JUDGE LARRY G. TURNER, FROM TAKING ANY FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER - LAWFUL OR UNLAWFUL - BECAUSE THE JURIST HAS BEEN AND CURRENTLY APPARENTLY IS AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FLORIDA BOARD OF REGENTS, AN/OR ITS SUCCESSOR RESPONSIBLE FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA. The motions/applications seeking recusal of each of the judges in this cause provide ample evidence of Mr. Kaimowitz's "style" of litigation in which he intentionally confuses, obfuscates, insults, defames, and makes scurrilous and unsubstantiated claims against parties, judges, witnesses, and others related and unrelated to the litigation. Further evidence is found in his VERIFIED MOTION FOR ARREST OF JUDGMENT BASED ON FRAUD COMMITTED UPON THIS COURT. Beginning at page 10 of that motion Mr. Kaimowitz claims that he ". . . has learned that repeated motions for recusal as evidence pours in eventually tends to work in his favor. For instance, after Judge Jopling finally recused himself, Kaimowitz had little difficulty resolving at mediation the underlying cases. They were assigned to Judge Turner at the time, but all he did was agree to the parties' stipulated willingness to proceed to mediation." Over the following several pages, Mr. Kaimowitz recites his history of recusal litigation in other state and federal cases. Judge Turner permanently enjoined Attorney Kaimowitz from filing further pro se litigation in the county and circuit courts of the Eighth Judicial Circuit. Although Judge Turner based his finding on Kaimowitz v. The Florida Board of Regents, Eighth Circuit Case No. 01-1996-CA-3260, he noted a number of cases involving Attorney Kaimowitz going back to 1996, including Eighth Judicial Circuit Case No. 01-2003-CA-2400-A, Gabe Kaimowitz v. Gainesville, Florida, and the Gainesville Sun, in which Judge Toby S. Monaco outlined abuses as a basis for his dismissal of Attorney Kaimowitz's Complaint with prejudice. The Respondent and Its Executive Director, Allison Thompson TRLS exists pursuant to Title 42 U. S. Code, § 2996 et seq. It is governed, inter alia, by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1600.1, et seq. Its mission is to provide equal access to the system of justice so that those who are otherwise unable to afford adequate counsel may have high quality legal assistance to seek redress of grievances. It receives funding from the Legal Services Corporation in Washington, D.C., the Florida Bar Foundation, United Way, and other local and national government sources. TRLS is headquartered in Gainesville, Florida, and serves eleven mostly rural counties surrounding Alachua County, as well as Alachua County. It works with other volunteer agencies and with pro bono attorneys. It is essential to the success of TRLS that it maintain cordial relations with the community and the bar. Ms. Thompson hires all of the TRLS management team. TRLS does not use an application form when seeking applicants for jobs. Advertisements for positions solicit resumes. TRLS does not maintain a "pool" of applicants for any particular job. The number of employees at TRLS fluctuates depending on funding. The racial, age, and gender composition of TRLS personnel from May 2003 to May 2004, was as follows: Whites 20 Blacks 19 Asian 2 Hispanic 2 Male 11 Female 32 Of the above, the oldest was born in 1947. Three of the above were born in that year. Since 2003, new attorney hires, (including law school graduates not admitted) were as follows: Whites 10 Blacks 6 Asian 0 Hispanic 1 Male 4 Female 13 Of these, the oldest was born in 1958. TRLS has hired, since Ms. Thompson has been Executive Director, at least one person who was over the age of 70. TRLS does not have quotas or a diversity plan that requires certain races, genders, or ages to be given preference in hiring. TRLS is guided in this regard by Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.1, et seq. Specifically, Title 45, Code of Federal Regulations, § 1616.6 requires that TRLS adopt, "employment qualifications, procedures, and policies that meet the requirements of applicable laws prohibiting discrimination in employment, and shall take affirmative action to insure equal employment opportunity." The hiring record of TRLS, taken as a whole, demonstrates compliance with this requirement and does not indicate any pattern of discrimination. Ms. Thompson has been the executive director of TRLS since 1996. She is an African-American. She graduated from the University of Florida Law School and was admitted to the Florida Bar in 1974. She has extensive experience in the delivery of legal services to the poor. She worked for Tampa Legal Services beginning in 1973. It became a Legal Services Corporation program while she was employed there. She began working for Rhode Island Legal Services in 1976, practicing primarily family law. Ms. Thompson worked for Philadelphia Legal Services for five years and then, beginning in 1982, worked for a number of years in the U. S. Virgin Islands where she was litigation director. She was appointed Executive Director of TRLS in December of 1996. Job applications with TRLS in 2003 and earlier Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a managing attorney position with TRLS in 1997. Ms. Thompson interviewed him and determined that he was an "interesting person" but was not the type of person who would work well with others. She concluded he would be difficult to manage. She noted that if she had a job which did not require working well with others, she might wish to hire him in the future. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a staff attorney in 2001. He received a letter dated May 13, 2001, from Ms. Thompson, advising him that he was not selected and that she would keep his resume on file. Attorney Kaimowitz responded to this letter with a letter dated August 15, 2001, that pointed out two settlements he had received from legal services programs in Florida based on their alleged discrimination against him because of his age. He also discussed his whistle blowing with regard to GOALS and stated, "I include this information to indicate that when there really is a will, there is a way." Ms. Thompson took this as a threat. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for a job as a managing attorney in the TRLS Lake City office in 2002. He was not interviewed for that position. TRLS advertised for a fair housing attorney and a fair housing testing coordinator in various publications during April 2003. Attorney Kaimowitz applied for both of these jobs. He interviewed with Ms. Thompson and Mary O'Rourke, a staff attorney with TRLS, on May 30, 2003. Ms. Thompson asked Ms. O'Rourke to sit in as a witness to the interview because she was concerned that Attorney Kaimowitz would sue TRLS if she did not hire him. Initially, Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in both the fair housing attorney job and the fair housing testing coordinator job. However, during the interview Attorney Kaimowitz stated that he did not wish to apply for the fair housing attorney position, but wished to be considered only as an applicant for the fair housing testing coordinator position. The occupant of this position was expected to supervise individuals who would determine if discrimination in housing was occurring. Attorney Kaimowitz claimed during his testimony that he told Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke that his ability to hear was impaired. He claimed he told them he required an accommodation for his hearing loss. He stated that he had a discussion with Ms. O'Rourke during the interview about an electronic system where a court reporter would record words spoken, and the words would be displayed on a monitor so that he could read what was being said. Attorney Kaimowitz appeared at the interview wearing one hearing aid. Ms. Thompson said that Attorney Kaimowitz said that one of his hearing aids was "in the shop." Ms. Thompson testified that he announced during the interview that his hearing loss was corrected by his hearing aids. Ms. Thompson said it was clear that he had no difficulty in understanding her with only one hearing aid. In no event did she perceive him as being hearing impaired. Ms. O'Rourke stated that the conversation claimed by Attorney Kaimowitz regarding an electronic monitor system to aid hearing never occurred. Based on Ms. O'Rourke's testimony, Ms. Thompson's testimony, and Attorney Kaimowitz's credibility, which is addressed in detail below, it is found that at the time of this interview Attorney Kaimowitz did not claim the need for an accommodation based on an alleged hearing impairment and he was not perceived as being hearing impaired. Ms. Thompson wanted employees at TRLS who would maintain a good relationship with the local bar. Even though the housing testing coordinator position was not a job requiring the incumbent to be a licensed attorney, it is not helpful for TRLS to have employees who are at odds with the local bar or community. She was looking for an employee who was a team player, who could get along with the other employees at TRLS, the local bar, and with persons in the community. She also wanted someone with good references. The fair housing testing coordinator required training in Jacksonville. Ms. Thompson believed Attorney Kaimowitz could not be trained because, "He already knew everything." She believed he couldn't take orders. She was troubled because he had no references from people who had supervised him. Although attorneys who have their own practice cannot give references of supervisors, they usually can give a judge or judges as a reference, but Attorney Kaimowitz did not provide any judges as references. Attorney Kaimowitz provided a co-plaintiff in a lawsuit and a professor named Joe Little as references. Ms. Thompson called Professor Little but did not feel it would be worthwhile calling his co-plaintiff, who was embroiled in a lawsuit at the time. She was concerned because Attorney Kaimowitz told her, with regard to references, "everyone in Gainesville was suspect." Moreover, he did not provide any references from his time as director of GOALS, which was a job where he had a supervisor who could comment on his work. Ms. Thompson was aware of Attorney Kaimowitz's arrest during a Gainesville City Commission meeting, and was aware of at least one of his Florida Supreme Court reprimands at the time she decided not to hire him. She was also aware that he would occasionally write in "black English," and she found that offensive. She believed him to be a disruptive force. She stated she would not hire him if he was "the last man on earth." She stated that an equally obnoxious black man would often apply for positions at TRLS, and she would not hire him for the same general reasons that she would not hire Attorney Kaimowitz. Ms. Thompson thought Attorney Kaimowitz would be a liability to her organization. She noted that, "He makes comments without any basis. He makes sweeping comments when he knows nothing. He doesn't even check." Brenda Scafadi was eventually hired for the housing testing coordinator. She was, at the time, a 50-year-old white woman who had a disability in the form of fibromyalgia. She was not an attorney. She was hired because she was perceived to be a team player and she had good references. Ms. Scafadi resigned after about eight months and was replaced by Steve Malu, a 50-year-old Nigerian, who also was not an attorney. Attorney Kaimowitz was a person Ms. Thompson had personally known for about six years at the time of the interview. She also knew about him from his letters to the "Gainesville Sun" and numerous e-mails he sent to her and to others. She was aware of his reputation in the community. She refused to hire him because she did not believe he would be a good employee. Neither his age, nor his race, nor his claimed hearing loss was a factor in her decision. Attorney Kaimowitz received a letter from Ms. Thompson dated July 22, 2003, advising him that she had, "decided to offer the position to different applicants who I thought would be more appropriate for our needs." The Americorps positions On August 1, 2004, Americorps positions in Gainesville and Jacksonville were advertised. These jobs were targeted at inexperienced attorneys and paid "living expenses" and a promise of scholarship help rather than a salary. During the evening of August 2, 2004, Ms. Thompson offered testimony before the Gainesville City Commission. After her testimony she departed, although the meeting continued. After exiting the building, she heard footsteps behind her and turned to see Attorney Kaimowitz following her. There were no other people in the area. He stated that he wanted to "mediate our situation" but was informed by Ms. Thompson that there was nothing to mediate because she did not discriminate. She told him she was tired of him making disparaging comments about her program and her staff. Attorney Kaimowitz expressed an interest in the Americorps positions in an e-mail to Ms. Thompson dated August 5, 2004, which was in the nature of a resume. In this letter he said, "I certainly will refrain from any action I suggested I might take through this month of August, so that we can see if we can reach an accommodation in that time." Ms. Thompson regarded this as a threat. Ms. Thompson did not interview him for the Americorps positions because the "resume" e-mail of August 5, 2004, did not match the requirements of the job. Three of the positions were designed for attorneys TRLS could train so that they could recruit students from the law school to assist in the delivery of services. The other two positions required no litigation skills and were designed to provide limited legal services over the telephone to a large volume of clients. Another reason Ms. Thompson found Attorney Kaimowitz to be unsuitable for this job were statements he made to her, such as claiming she hired an "incompetent black male." She had seen, and was familiar with, another widely circulated writing in which he stated, "The real 'piece of work' is Three Rivers Legal Services, and their foolish young attorney of color Glorimil Walker, everyone's favorite minority attorney since she speaks her mind--even if it is against the adults and children at University Centre." The Americorps attorneys hired during this period, instead of Attorney Kaimowitz, included Shelly E. Beach, who was a 26-year-old white female, Melissa B. Long, a 29-year-old black female, and Julie A. Santioni, a 26-year-old white female. Ms. Thompson, and TRLS did not discriminate or retaliate against Mr. Kaimowitz in refusing him an Americorps position. He was not hired because the job was unsuitable for him and because he was unsuitable for employment at TRLS. Retaliation Attorney Kaimowitz's original claim of retaliation was based on his view that TRLS would not hire him because he had sued Central Florida Legal Services and that Ms. Thompson knew and would not hire him because of that lawsuit. Ms. Thompson denied this. Attorney Kaimowitz's second claim of retaliation was based on the complaint to the Commission concerning the refusal of TRLS to hire him for the fair housing testing coordinator position. For reasons that are abundantly clear herein, there were numerous reasons for not hiring him other than retaliation. Attorney Kaimowitz's Credibility Attorney Kaimowitz claims that he applied for the fair housing attorney position as well as the fair housing testing coordinator. Both Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke stated that at his interview he said he wished to apply only for the fair housing testing coordinator. Attorney Kaimowitz also claims that he informed Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke at his interview that he was hard of hearing and required an accommodation. Ms. Thompson and Ms. O'Rourke both said that during the interview he asserted that any hearing problems he had were resolved by hearing aids. Attorney Kaimowitz has demonstrated through his pleadings and actions in court, and before this Administrative Law Judge, that he has a low regard for the truth. As an example, he claims to believe in the equality of mankind, but during his examination of Ms. Thompson, he threw a document at her and stated that, "And then you could never find discrimination unless I don't want a nigger in here." As a consequence all issues involving credibility are resolved against Attorney Kaimowitz. That being the case, it is found by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not seek the fair housing attorney position in 2003 and that he did not assert during the interview that he was hard of hearing and thus required an accommodation.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitions be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carla D. Franklin, Esquire 4809 Southwest 91st Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32608 Gabe H. Kaimowitz, Esquire Post Office Box 140119 Gainesville, Florida 32614-0119 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent at times relevant to the inquiry employed 15 or more employees in each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the year. Petitioner worked for the Respondent from May 7, 1984 through December 19, 1991. Petitioner had tendered his resignation on December 6, 1991 from his position as Engineering Technician IV. His intention was that his resignation become effective December 20, 1991. On December 6, 1991, Jerry G. Smith, District Land Surveyor for District II, State of Florida, Department of Transportation, accepted Petitioner's resignation effective December 20, 1991. This action by Mr. Smith was by virtue of his responsibility for the Mapping and Surveying Section of which Petitioner was a part. Respondent did not solicit Petitioner's resignation. In the chain of command Mr. Smith was 2 or 3 times removed from Petitioner. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 describes the duties of Engineering Technician IV incumbent upon Petitioner until November 12, 1991. Those duties were as follows: Plots and inks the final right of way and assists other Department Personnel in the preparation of maps. These maps must meet D.O.T. and Federal Highway Administration Standards. Works with the Document Preparation Section in locating property lines and determining what information is needed on maps in order to prepare legal descriptions. Assists in the verification of final right of way requirements with Road Design Personnel. Assists in the review of right of way maps prepared by Consultants. Assists in making the computations that are needed for map and deed preparation. Provides other Department Personnel and the General Public with right of way information as required. Performs related work as required. Percentages of time will vary due to work load. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 describes the job description for Engineering Technician IV related to the Petitioner from the period November 12, 1991 through December 19, 1991. Those duties were as follows: 30 percent Prepares very complicated legal descriptions of real property to be acquired by the Department of Transportation. These are written by hand and also by using "Legal Holiday", Computer Software. 30 percent Plots Title Search (Abstract) on Right of Way Maps and determines owners and encumbrances. 15 percent Reviews legal descriptions of real property and related documents prepared by other employees or/and Consultants. 15 percent Compute areas of parcels needed for right of way. Also, computes areas, distances, and bearings on property remainders. 5 percent Determines the types of instruments of conveyance to be prepared. 5 percent Performs related work as required. Percentages of time will vary, due to work load. Some unspecified person within the architectural and engineering firm, Reynolds, Smith and Hills, Inc. made contact with Petitioner concerning the possibility that he might serve as an office engineer in the firm's Lake City, Florida office. This contact was made in October, 1991. On December 3, 1991, Ed Griffin and Eric Rosenstein called Petitioner about the availability of the office engineer position. They wanted Petitioner to come to their Longwood, Florida office and interview about the position. On December 6, 1991, Petitioner went to the firm's Longwood office and was interviewed by Eric Rosenstein and Ed Griffin. They took a photocopy of his social security card and his resume to support his application for employment. Petitioner testified that Mr. Griffin and Mr. Rosenstein during the December 6, 1991 interview specifically stated that they wanted to hire him. These hearsay comments attributable to Mr. Griffin and Mr. Rosenstein were not otherwise proven. Therefore, it has not been established that Petitioner was offered a job with the Reynolds firm on December 6, 1991. Based upon the interview with Griffin and Rosenstein, Petitioner called Jerry Smith's office on December 6, 1991, and spoke to Carol Streer, secretary to Jerry Smith. He told her to prepare a letter of resignation for Petitioner and he told her to tell Jerry Smith that Petitioner would be leaving his position with Respondent in two weeks and wanted to give the Respondent two weeks' notice. This led to the resignation and acceptance of that resignation that has been addressed above. On November 1, 1991, the Reynolds firm had entered into an agreement with Respondent to serve as a consultant for purposes of construction engineering and inspection. This was in association with the resurfacing with bridge widening of Interstate 75. It is inferred that Petitioner had been interviewed by the Reynolds firm to serve as an office engineer to the Reynolds firm on the resurfacing project. In accordance with the agreement between the Reynolds firm and Respondent, related to the Interstate 75 resurfacing project, a definition is given concerning minimum training and experience standards for consultant personnel. Specifically, the training and experience anticipated for an office engineer is described in that agreement to this effect: OFFICE ENGINEER - High school graduate plus three (3) years experience in responsible charge of a construction office. Should exercise independent judgment in planning work details and making technical decisions related to office engineering aspects of the project. Accepts general supervision and verbal instructions from the Resident Engineer. Serve as the Resident Compliance Officer in surveillance of the Contractor's compliance with contract requirements. Within the agreement under Section 2.0 entitled: SCOPE, it states: . . . The Consultant shall provide technical and administrative personnel meeting the requirements set forth Section 9.0 of this Scope of Services in appropriate numbers at the proper times to ensure that the responsibilities under this Agree- ment are effectively carried out. All services shall be performed in accordance with the estab- lished standard procedures and practices of The Department. . . . Section 9.0C. entitled Staffing, within the agreement, states: . . . no personnel shall be assigned to this project by the Consultant until the qualifications of each person proposed have been reviewed and approved in writing by the Program Manager. The Consultant's personnel approval requests shall be submitted at least two weeks prior to the date an individual is to report to work. The Program Manager, according to the agreement, is: "the District employee designated to be in responsible charge and direct control of the projects covered by this agreement." On December 9, 1991, in accordance with the agreement, the Reynolds firm submitted Petitioner's name as proposed office engineer on the Interstate 75 project. This submission was made through a form seeking approval from the program manager. In support of the request to have the program manager approve the Petitioner to serve as an office manager to the consultant, the Reynolds firm submitted a resume which Petitioner had provided that firm. The resume which Petitioner gave to the Reynolds firm and the firm in turn gave to the Respondent's program manager stated as follows: R E S U M E Richard C. Bishop HOME 1605 N. E. 7th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32609 Telephone (904) 373-6510 538-5225 OFFICE Surveying & Mapping Dept. Post Office Box 1089 Lake City, FL 32056-1089 Telephone (904) 752-3300 EXT. 3662 PERSONAL: Male, Caucasian, U. S. Citizen, Good Health, 5' 10", 195 lbs. EDUCATION: Univ. of Florida Business Administration San Jose City College Associates Degree, Electronic Engineering Univ. of North Florida Communications and Electronics US Air Force EXPERIENCE: Atlantic Ballistic Missile Range with Radio Corporation of America as Electronic-Equipment-Man working with HF and VHF Receivers and Transmitters, a 200+ station North Electric all system, Emergency Networks (radio and telephone), Radar Boresight Cameras, Optical Trackers, Control Room Plotting Boards and Captain of Disaster Control Team. West Virginia Department of Highways: Completed Engineer-In-Training program covering all phases of Construction Maintenance, Soil Mechanics and Testing including Marshall Stability Tests, Los Angeles Abrasion Tests as well as standard sieve analysis, flow plasticity, density, specific gravity, extractions, gradations and concrete and asphalt mix designs. Set up and managed a Complaint Department while continuing duties as an Area Maintenance Assistant over several counties. Certified Portland Cement Concrete Technician with sampling and testing experience in both field and laboratory testing methods. Licensed Nuclear Densitometer Operator with considerable experience using the Troxler Nuclear Densitometer measuring densities on fills, sub- grades and asphaltic concrete bases and overlays. Management and/or supervision in several privately owned asphalt paving and construction companies. Construction Inspection School for 10 weeks at St. Petersburg Junior College. Construction inspection on I-75, Alligator Alley and Toll Plaza, Marco Island Road and other projects in the Naples area, then SR 21, Orange Park to Middleburg, SR 121 at Raiford, Rocky Creek Bridge, 53rd Ave and Waldo Road intersection and others in the North Florida area. Presently working in Right of Way Engineering ordering, receiving and plotting title searches on maps and producing corresponding accurate maps and all the necessary legal documents required for the actual acquisition of real property with a right of way. In December, 1991, the program manager for Respondent on the Interstate 75 resurfacing with bridge widening project was Thomas E. Brenner. Mr. Brenner has never been acquainted with the Petitioner other than responding to the Reynolds firm's request to have the Petitioner approved to be the office engineer on the project. No proof was shown that Mr. Brenner has ever made derogatory statements about the Petitioner. Mr. Brenner in carrying out his function as program manager wrote to the Reynolds firm on December 11, 1991, disapproving the request to have the Petitioner approved as the office engineer for the consultant. In disapproving that request he made the following remarks: "Needs some EEO [sic] experience and three (3) years in responsible charge of a construction office." The experience which Petitioner had prior to December 9, 1991, when the Reynolds firm requested that he be approved as office engineer did not meet the training and experience standards within the agreement which were incumbent upon a person serving as an office engineer for the consultant. Thus, the reason for disapproving the request to have Petitioner serve as office engineer is borne out. The record is not clear concerning what is meant by the need for EEOC experience and what experience the Petitioner may have had with the EEOC process. However, it was not shown that Mr. Brenner placed the requirement for EEOC experience as a means to discriminate against the Petitioner in the firm's attempt to have him approved as office engineer. Following the disapproval of the request to have Petitioner approved as the office engineer for the consultant, Mr. Rosenstein called the Petitioner around December 17, 1991. He told the Petitioner that the Reynolds firm was having a problem getting the Petitioner approved to do work with the Respondent. This refers to the work on the Interstate 75 project as office engineer. Specifically, Mr. Rosenstein told the Petitioner that the difficulty had to do with not enough EEOC experience. Petitioner explained in response that he did not consider that this was a significant problem. Two or three days after December 17, 1991, Mr. Rosenstein called the Petitioner again and told him that the problem about EEOC had settled down and that the Respondent was opposing recognition of approval of the Petitioner for work as an office engineer based upon the Petitioner's lack of experience in the computer field related to LOTUS 1-2-3. Petitioner acknowledged that he did not have experience with that form of computer. The record does not bear out how those requirements with LOTUS 1-2-3 coincided with Mr. Brenner's reasons for disapproving the request to have Petitioner serve as office engineer to the consultant, if at all. Some time in January, 1992, Petitioner went to the Reynolds' Longwood, Florida office to give Ed Griffin further information in support of his application for employment. At that time Petitioner learned that the Reynolds firm did not intend to follow up their discussions held with Petitioner concerning his employment and that he would not be hired by the Reynolds firm. In addition to failing to prove that Mr. Brenner had made derogatory statements about him which might have interfered with Petitioner's opportunity to gain employment with the Reynolds firm, Petitioner failed to prove that any of Respondent's employees or managers had made derogatory statements which interfered with his opportunity to gain employment with the Reynolds' firm. The only suggestion that anyone working for the Respondent had made derogatory remarks about the Petitioner were promoted by the Petitioner himself. He told others who worked for Respondent that Jerry Smith wanted to get rid of or fire Petitioner and that Jerry Smith had said that Petitioner would never work a day for the Reynolds firm. Jerry Smith had not made these remarks. Jerry Smith had no contact with the Reynolds firm concerning the Petitioner. Moreover, Jerry Smith has had limited contact with Mr. Brenner and none of it was designed to influence Mr. Brenner in his decision to disapprove the request by the Reynolds firm to have Petitioner serve as office engineer for the consultant. Mr. Smith works in the production side of the District II operation. Mr. Brenner worked in the construction side of the District II operation while he was employed there. Unrelated to the attempt by Petitioner to gain employment with the Reynolds firm, Jerry Smith has had involvement with the Petitioner concerning personnel matters. On several occasions discussions were held between the Petitioner and Smith in which Petitioner was attempting to gain a promotion. On those occasions Smith told the Petitioner that he did not think that the Petitioner was operating at a level that warranted discussing promotion. Smith held the opinion of the Petitioner that the Petitioner could not perform the job duties incumbent upon him in his position as Engineering Technician IV. In particular, Mr. Smith did not believe that Petitioner would finish a task assigned and always had to have someone else finish the work for the Petitioner. Mr. Smith tried to have the Petitioner focus on the perceived shortcomings, but this did not lead to a satisfactory result from the point of view which Mr. Smith felt. When the Petitioner left his employment with the Respondent Mr. Smith made a notation that he would not recommend rehiring the Petitioner at some future date. There is no indication that Mr. Smith or anyone in a supervisory position with the Respondent ever took disciplinary action against the Petitioner for matters related to the Petitioner's performance as Engineering Technician IV. Robert Stewart who is a project manager for Respondent, a friend of Jerry Smith, was not involved in making the decision on December 9, 1991, to disapprove the request to have Petitioner serve as office engineer for the consultant. As stated before Robert Stewart had no contact with the Reynolds firm concerning the Petitioner and the Petitioner's possible employment with the Reynolds firm. The job description and resume information do not support the Petitioner in his claim that his experience gained while employed by the Respondent equates to the necessary experience to perform the duties as office engineer for the consultant in the Interstate 75 project. Nor does the record indicate that Mr. Brenner was aware of any experience outside the position description and resume when disapproving the request to have Petitioner serve as office engineer. Finally, the numerous requests which Petitioner made to gain additional training while employed by Respondent, which requests were not granted, were not matters which Petitioner has shown that he was entitled to be granted. Moreover, those requests have not been shown to be matters which coincide with the requirements for the position of office engineer to the consultant in the Interstate 75 project. On September 2, 1994, in the prehearing conference held by telephone, Petitioner indicated to Hearing Officer Davis that he accepted the "no charge" determination of the Florida Commission on Human Relations as to the untimeliness of his age discrimination allegation and waived his right to proceed on that claim. Petitioner's position by the Petitioner was memorialized in the order by Ms. Davis entered September 15, 1994. At the hearing held on October 20, 1994, Petitioner proceeded on the basis that the age discrimination claim was no longer viable.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which dismisses the petition for relief based upon a claim of an unlawful employment practice by the Respondent as defined in Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of December, 1994. APPENDIX The following discussion is given concerning the proposed facts found in Respondent's proposed recommended order: Paragraphs 1 through 4 are subordinate to facts. Paragraphs 5 through 7 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraphs 8 through 20 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraphs 21 and 22 are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard C. Bishop 1606 Northeast Seventh Terrace Gainesville, FL 32609 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S.-58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
Conclusions For Petitioner: Gabe H. Kaimowitz, Esquire, pro se Post Office Box 140119 Gainesville, Florida 32614-0119 For Respondent: Carla D. Franklin, Esquire 4809 Southwest 91st Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32608
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner in September 1999.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Ausbon Brown, Jr. (Petitioner), an African-American male was born on April 25, 1943. Petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR) on December 5, 1997, alleging violation by the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security (Respondent) of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as contained in chapter 760, part I, Florida Statutes. On August 18 1999, over 20 months later, FCHR issued a "Notice of Determination: No Cause." September 27, 1999, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief, alleging that Respondent had subjected Petitioner to discriminatory hiring practices on the basis of the race and age of Petitioner. While not identifying specific positions, the Petition for Relief contains the allegation that Petitioner applied for 244 positions within the hiring jurisdiction of Respondent. By order dated January 18, 2000, Administrative Law Judge Donald R. Alexander limited the final hearing to allegations pertaining to Petitioner's application for position number 02925, Research Associate, within Respondent's Division of Workers' Compensation. Respondent denies Petitioner's allegation of discriminatory hiring practice and contends that it hired the most qualified employee. While not specifically established at hearing, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that Respondent employed at least fifteen employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year and thus is an employer within the meaning of the law. Petitioner received a Bachelor of Science degree in biology in 1965 from Florida A&M University, a Master of Science degree in wildlife and fisheries science in 1978 from Texas A&M University, and a doctorate in wildlife and fisheries science in 1991 from Texas A&M University. Petitioner's job applications reflect that from June 1965 until April 1994, he worked in various positions for the U. S. Department of Commerce, National Marine Fisheries Service. Beginning on July 28, 1995, and continuing for several years, he was employed as a child support enforcement case analyst with the Florida Department of Revenue (DOR). Petitioner is currently the supervisor of science laboratories for Daytona Beach Junior College. Respondent, in the fashion of most state agencies, periodically issues a "Job Opportunity Announcement" which describes career service positions currently available in the agency. Such an announcement was issued on January 15, 1997, for position number 002925 and read as follows: 3122 Research Associate Notes: Open Competitive. Two years of Social Science or public policy research involving Production or reports: Use of PC in Two of the following four areas: word-processing, spreadsheet, statistical analysis or graphic applications preferred. Min. Qual: A bachelor's Degree from an accredited college or university and three years of professional experience in statistics, research, analysis or program evaluation. A Master's Degree from an accredited college or university can substitute for one year of the required experience. The "Vacancy Notification/Action Form" submitted in support of the Job Opportunity Announcement, dated December 17, 1996, contains the following statement: Preferred Qualifications: At least 2 years of social science or public policy research involving production of reports; use of personal computers in two of the following four areas: word processing, the spreadsheet, statistical analysis or graphic application. A vacancy announcement published in the "Tallahassee Democrat" on January 19, 1997, contains the same statement of preferred qualifications. The preferences are consistent with the official job description for position 02925 as contained in Class Code 3122 for the class title of research associate. The class specifications also include the caveat that "additional knowledge, skills and abilities may be applicable for individual positions in the employing agency." Within Respondent's structure, Ken Baugh supervised position number 02925 and was responsible for the hiring process, inclusive of the placement of the job announcement and the vacancy advertisement. Baugh based the stated job specifications upon the Career Service Class Specifications, as well as his knowledge of the requirements to perform successfully in the position. Prior to advertising the position, Baugh developed a selection package which included a work sample test, a job description, a list of knowledge, skills and abilities, a screening criteria, application review process, and interview questionnaire. Baugh submitted the package to the Office of Civil Rights and Minority Affairs within Respondent's structure where it was approved. Such approval indicates that the package reflected a process to measure core job duties. Respondent received 115 applications for position 02925. Five applicants were interviewed for the position. All met the minimum qualifications for the position. Gary Sabitsch, a white male born on September 24, 1965, was the successful candidate. Sabitsch has a bachelor's degree and has been employed for four years by a private entity as a research associate. He performed tasks in his research associate position inclusive of governmental consulting, as well as collection and analysis of data. Sabitsch's qualifications also include experience in word processing, spreadsheets, and graphics. His computer software usage and experience also are more extensive than that of Petitioner, in Baugh's estimation. The experience of Sabitsch in the public policy or social science arena more appropriately met Braugh's expectations for the successful candidate than the experience of Petitioner which was limited to the natural science area. In his evaluation and interviews, and subsequent selection of Sabitsch, Baugh used the interview package previously approved by the Office of Civil Rights. Baugh had no previous knowledge of Sabitsch prior to the interview. Applications provided to Baugh did not have the EEOC survey portion, which permits an applicant to voluntarily reveal age and race. These portions of the applications had been previously removed prior to Baugh's perusal. Baugh's selection of Sabitsch was approved by Respondent's Office of Civil Rights. Petitioner presented no evidence that the selection process was varied so as to discriminate on the basis of age or race. Further, he presented no evidence that he met the preferred criteria noticed for the position. In summary, there is no credible evidence that Respondent's actions were a pretext for discrimination, as alleged in the Petition for Relief. Further, there is no evidence that the employment decision at issue in this proceeding was grounded on discriminatory animus in any respect, or that a discriminatory reason motivated Respondent's actions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Ausbon Brown, Jr. Post Office Box 289 Daytona Beach, Florida 32636 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security Hartman Building, Suite 307 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2199
The Issue Whether the Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction to hear a petition, brought pursuant to section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes (2010),1/ claiming that a state university's documents concerning the process and criteria for faculty performance evaluation; documents from the university's College of Business setting out a Framework and Standards for Contract Renewal and Promotion for faculty; and documents showing the university's organization structure and delegations of authority are "agency statements" that require rule-making under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a former associate professor with Florida Gulf Coast University. Florida Gulf Coast University is a member of the Florida state university system. Since November 2002, with the voter's adoption of article IX, section 7, Florida Constitution, the state university system has been overseen by a Board of Governors. Further, article IX, section 7, Florida Constitution, designated that each university, including Florida Gulf Coast University, would be managed by a local board of trustees. Thus, the Board of Governors and boards of trustees for universities derive power from the Florida Constitution, not legislative enactment. The Board of Governors enacted Regulation 1.001 that established power and duties for university boards of trustees. Among the Board of Governors' powers and duties delegated to the universities' board of trustees is the authority to manage university personnel and faculty. Dr. Hudson Rogers (Dr. Rogers), an associate provost with the University, testified that the University faculty are organized and represented by the United Faculty of Florida (UFF). The University and UFF are parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement.2/ The Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Florida Gulf Coast University Board of Trustees and UFF addresses the evaluation of faculty members. Under Article 10 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, each college within the University is empowered to develop its faculty evaluation procedures and forms consistent with the criteria agreed upon in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The colleges' promulgation and implementation of their respective evaluation frameworks are not subject to any special process other than that outlined in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. The University's College of Business developed its own evaluation framework for faculty evaluation, which was consistent with the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Further, Dr. Rogers credibly explained that the University faculty voted on and approved the Faculty Performance and Evaluation Document in 2003 that is used to evaluate faculty. In September 2008, the Petitioner signed a Professional Development Plan that included a performance improvement plan. The performance improvement plan identified objectives that the University expected the Petitioner to meet regarding her job duties. In August 2009, after completing a probationary period of the 2008-2009 academic year, the Petitioner was evaluated by her department chair. The department chair rated the Petitioner as not meeting expectations by failing to publish at least one journal article by the end of the 2008-2009 academic year to meet the College of Business scholarship standards. Based on the Petitioner's failure to publish, the department chair recommended that the Petitioner not be reappointed after the 2009-2010 academic year. A peer review committee for the University's College of Business also determined the Petitioner had failed to meet the minimum requirements. The peer review committee informed the Petitioner of its decision on September 12, 2009. On October 21, 2009, the Petitioner filed a grievance pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement. A review of the Petitioner's grievance shows that it alleged numerous violations of the Collective Bargaining Agreement concerning her faculty evaluation and decision not to re-appoint her as an associate professor. On October 22, 2009, the dean for the College of Business informed the Petitioner that "[a]fter reviewing your request and all documents provided me by you and the Peer Review Committee, my decision is that your contract will not be renewed." On November 20, 2009, the University representative, who reviewed the grievance, found that a majority of the claims were time barred or did not constitute a violation. The University representative found "a partial violation of [Collective Bargaining Agreement] Article 10.3A(1)" for failing to timely finalize the Petitioner's annual evaluation for the 2008-2009 academic year. The University representative noted that the Collective Bargaining Agreement did not "indicate any action to be taken in response to this violation." On December 10, 2009, the Petitioner filed a Request for Arbitration under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. On February 23, 2010, the University received the Petitioner's Notice of Intent to Arbitrate. On April 12, 2010, an arbitration hearing was held on the Petitioner's grievance. The arbitrator held that the Petitioner's Notice of Intent to Arbitrate was not timely under the Collective Bargaining Agreement; thus, it was considered withdrawn. On September 22, 2010, the Petitioner's supervisor, Dr. Robert O'Neill (Dr. O'Neill), wrote the Petitioner, confirming that her last date of employment at the University was December 17, 2010. The Petitioner's last day of employment with the University was December 17, 2010. On February 14, 2011, the Petitioner filed the Petition. The Petitioner alleged that the University is an "agency" within the definition of chapter 120 and is subject to the Administrative Procedure Act. Further, the Petitioner alleged that the University has made the following agency statements that are unadopted rules: (1) the Faculty Performance Evaluation Document for 2003 and 2008; (2) College of Business Framework and Standards for Contract Renewal and Promotion adopted on April 14, 2006, and revised on February 5, 2010 ("Framework"); (3) Delegation of Authority Memorandum accessed on October 7, 2010, from the University's web-site; and (4) Florida Gulf Coast University's organizational chart. The Petitioner also alleged that her substantial interests are affected "because her employment has been terminated based on several unadopted rules involving published documents from the [Florida Gulf Coast University] President, to the Provost, to the College." Further, a reading of the Petitioner's challenge here shows that she alleged that the University failed to the follow the "unadopted rules" when it evaluated her and decided not to re-appoint her to a teaching position. For example, the Petitioner claimed that the Florida Gulf Coast University Faculty Performance and Evaluation document is an agency statement that was not adopted as a rule under chapter 120. Next, the Petitioner alleged that Dr. O'Neill, who was her supervisor, failed to follow this Faculty Performance and Evaluation document when he evaluated her.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Ana Caos, M.D., is a applicant for a restricted license to practice Medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to the provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. Successful completion of the Florida Board Examination is a prerequisite to licensure under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes. The Florida Board Examination is also known as the FLEX examination. In an effort to meet that prerequisite, the Petitioner has already taken the FLEX examination six times since October 1, 1966. The Petitioner has passed portions of the licensure examination, but thus far she has not received a passing grade on the Basic Sciences portion of that examination. The Petitioner seeks to continue taking the licensure examination until she achieves a passing grade on all portions of the examination. The issue of whether Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, had the effect of limiting the number of times the Petitioner could take the FLEX exam was first considered by the Board of Medicine in 1992. In response to an earlier application by the Petitioner, by letter dated March 11, 1992, the Petitioner was advised by Board staff that Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, appeared to apply to her application and that the matter would be considered by the Board at the next meeting of the Board. Thereafter, by letter dated May 7, 1992, Board staff advised the Petitioner that her application would be considered by the Board's Credentials Committee, and that the Petitioner was required to attend the meeting of that committee on May 27, 1992. At the May 27, 1992, meeting, the Board's Credentials Committee, following perfunctory advice of counsel, and without discussion by the committee members, voted to recommend that the Petitioner be allowed to take the FLEX exam a sixth time after 1986, even though she had previously failed the exam five times since 1986. The committee recommendation was adopted by a majority of the Board of Medicine, and the Petitioner was allowed to take the FLEX examination for a sixth time since 1986. The Petitioner failed the FLEX examination for a sixth time since 1986. The Petitioner has reapplied for licensure under Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.), and seeks to take the FLEX exam for a seventh time since 1986. On January 19, 1993, the Board of Medicine filed and served an order regarding the Petitioner's pending licensure application. The order reads as follows, in pertinent part: You are hereby notified pursuant to Section 120.60(3), Florida Statutes, that the Board of Medicine voted to DENY your application for licensure as a physician by examination. The Board of Medicine reviewed and considered your application for licensure by examination on November 19, 1992, in a telephone conference call originating in Tallahassee, Florida and has determined that said licensure by examinatiion be denied, stating as grounds therefore: That you have failed to pass the FLEX examination six times since October 1986. Subsection 458.311(2), Florida Statutes, prohibits licensure of any individual who has failed the FLEX examination five times after October 1, 1986. Although the Board previously permitted you to sit for the the FLEX examination for a sixth time in 1992, it has since that time determined that this provision applies to all applicants for licensure. The Board of Medicine has an existing rule that interprets several provisions of Section 458.311(8), Florida Statutes (1991). (See Rule 21M-22.020 (1), Florida Administrative Code.) At the Board meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine discussed proposed amendments to the existing rule and voted to initiate rulemaking to amend Rule 21M-22.020(1), Florida Administrative Code, by adding to it new subsections specifically addressing the issue of how many times applicants under subsections (8) and (10) of Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, may take the licensure examination. At its meeting on July 11 and 12, 1992, the Board of Medicine instructed its legal counsel to initiate rulemaking to adopt the rule amendments described above. For reasons unknown to the Board's Executive Director, the Board's legal counsel did not file the proposed rule amendment for adoption until March of 1993. The March 12, 1993, issue of the Florida Administrative Weekly contains notice of the Board's intention to adopt the rule amendments described above. The full text of the proposed rule is as follows: 21M-22020 Western Hemisphere Exile Requirements. For purposes of interpreting Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, as amended by Section 6, Chapter 86-245, Laws of Florida, (codified at Subsection 458.311(8)(9)(a), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp))(1988 Supp), the following shall apply: (a) - (c) No change (d) The phrase "successfully completes the Florida Board Examination" is interpreted as requiring obtaining a passing score as defined by Rule 21M-29.001(2) within the time frame set forth in Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes. Specifically, if the applicant has failed the examination five times after October 1, 1986, the applicant is no longer eligible for licensure. For purposes of interpreting Section 458.311, Florida Statutes, as amended by Chapter 89-266, Chapter 89-541 and Chapter 92-53, Laws of Florida, (codified at Subsection 458.311(10), Florida Statutes (1992 Supp.)(1991)), the following shall apply: (a) - (g) No change. (h) The phrase "successful completion of the licensure examination" is interpreted as requiring obtaining a passing score as defined by Rule 21M-29.001(2) within the time frame set forth in Section 458.311(2), Florida Statutes. Specifically, if the applicant has failed the examination five times after October 1, 1986, the applicant is no longer eligible for licensure. It is the consistent practice of the Board of Medicine to apply the provisions of Section 458.311(1)(a)-(d), (4), and (5), Florida Statutes, to all applicants seeking licensure under Section 458.311(8), which last-mentioned section is also known as the "Cuban Exile Program."
