The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Melvin Robinson, through sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 801.111, Florida Statutes (1975).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 4, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department had requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The final hearing in this cause was conducted on January 5 1982, following a continuance of the previously scheduled hearing of December 16, 1981, which was designed to allow the Petitioner to gain the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner was unable to make those arrangements and the hearing was held with the Petitioner appearing pro se. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner testified and offered as witnesses, Alice Butler, Section Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program, Florida State Hospital; Sterling George, Psychiatric Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; and Alfred Gerardo, a participant in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent offered as witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; Charles Shaffer, Clinical psychologist in the aforementioned program; Allison Dowling, Clinical social Worker in that program; and Lois Stevens, Clinal social Worker at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent presented two exhibits which were admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Petitioner has been in the custody of Respondent, in keeping with orders of court. During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in the program for the benefit of sex offenders, to include those persons committed under Chapter 801, Florida Statutes (1975), entitled "Child Molester Act." Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities his progress in the recognition of and the ability to deal with the underlying conditions which caused his placement in the program are at end. In the face of these circumstances, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. These opinions were made known to the Petitioner and when confronted with this information, the Petitioner requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. Robinson was admitted to the forensic service at Florida State Hospital on October 9, 1990, to begin his participation in the mentally disordered sex offender program. He had previously been enrolled in the program from March, 1979, through February, 1979, a commitment under the terms of Chapter 801, Florida Statutes. Following his initial release from the program, Robinson was accused of violating the terms and conditions of probation and was adjudicated guilty of the offense for which probation was granted. Imposition of a sentence in that case was withheld and the Petitioner was returned to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in keeping with the rationale expressed in his original commitment to the program at Chattahoochee, which original commitment had occurred by Order of Court on February 20, 1976. In the matter of the most recent offense which had caused the revocation of Robinson's probation, Robinson received a sentence of ten years in the Florida State Prison; however, service of that sentence was stayed pending release and discharge from the custody of the Respondent on this most immediate commitment for care and treatment in the mentally disordered sex offender program. Beginning with the October 9, 1980, hospital stay, the goals of the program have been to deal with the patient's problems concerning sexual deviation, pedophilia; alcoholism; inadequate and passive aggressive personality styles and cultural deprivation. Notwithstanding the efforts of the patient and those of the staff to deal with the underlying disorders, this success has not been complete. The treatment has been exhausted in this program and other similar programs in the system in the State of Florida, and the Petitioner still presents a danger based upon his sexual deviation and propensity to commit sexual acts involving children, in particular minor females. These determinations are reached in the face of the facts that follow. The program at Florida State Hospital has as its main focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs in recreational and occupational therapy, and this treatment regime relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. The Respondent's Exhibit 2 is a series of clinical summaries related to the patient's performance during the course of his treatment. The most recent evaluation points out, in general terms, the Petitioner's pattern of acting-out behavior and disregard for ward policy and, more importantly his lack of motivation and progress in the therapies which are essential to success in the program. In addition, testimony was given in the course of the hearing on the part of the Petitioner's therapist and other persons affiliated with the treatment team. Lois Stevens had been the Petitioner's primary therapist from October, 1980, to January, 1981. She observed in the Petitioner indications of low self- esteem; the fact that the Petitioner was easily disappointed; that he was easily influenced by others; that he had an inability to deal with abstract feedback and a problem of allowing himself to be abused. These were matters of concern which needed to be addressed as a prerequisite to dealing with the Petitioner's sexual deviation. In effect, this was a process of identifying the problems which underlie his sexual deviation. In this connection, Stevens found that the Petitioner had the desire to do better but evidenced poor judgment and impulse control. These circumstances were aggravated by the fact that the Petitioner had and has limited intellectual ability. During this phase no intense effort was made to discuss the sex offense, molestation of a young girl. While in this treatment situation, Robinson accepted staff criticism in an appropriate way and he did improve in personal hygiene, which had been a problem initially. After a period of time it was determined that the Petitioner should be placed with a separate therapist to go forward with his treatment. From January, 1981, to July, 1981, the Petitioner had Allison Dowling as his primary therapist. In the beginning Robinson performed reasonably well and had been given some freedom of movement within the facility and was granted a position as a patient volunteer on the ward. He was beginning to cope better in the institutional environment; however, he remained reluctant to examine, in therapy sessions, the problem of his sexual deviation. Specifically, that difficulty related to his ability to deal with insight oriented therapy. He would enter into a discussion of the offense in the therapy sessions, but tended to minimize the seriousness of his offense, demonstrating marginal understanding of the etiology and maintaining factors in his deviant sexual behavior. Moreover, between sessions with the group he tended to forget what had been dealt with on the prior occasion. He had to be prompted to participate, with one exception. As established by Dowling in this sequence of the treatment, the Petitioner began to act in an inappropriate way while on the ward and was tardy for group therapy sessions. In the connection with his misbehavior on the ward, it was necessary to force the Petitioner to engage in a discussion of those matters and the act of taking away his privileges of freedom of movement and position did not promote a change in the Petitioner. He attempted to manipulate staff members about the misbehavior and to have group members in the therapy sessions accept his side of the dispute as opposed to directly addressing problems. The items of misbehavior included homosexual activity with another participant of the program and sleeping in the nude, which were contrary to hospital policy. On another occasion the Petitioner attempted to get a staff aide to take him to an unauthorized activity, in violation of ward policy. Dowling has observed little progress in the Petitioner's attempts to control his sexual misbehavior and she correctly indicates that his sexual deviance still exists and no further progress can be made in dealing with this condition. Charles Shaffer, a clinical psychologist was the primary therapist for the Petitioner from November, 1981, to January, 1982. His observations concerning the progress of the Petitioner are in accord with those of Allison Dowling. He did note that the Petitioner has shown himself to be willing to help others with their daily problems but is unwilling to participate himself, and by way of explanation Robinson states that the other patients don't understand or can't understand his problem related to the sexual deviance. Shaffer's observations establish that the Petitioner is comfortable with his life style, and hasn't indicated any desire to change that pattern. Robert Alcorn, the director of the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital, through his testimony indicated agreement to the effect that the treatment had been exhausted in that program without success, which is an accurate depiction. Alcorn also established that conferences related to Robinson's potential placement in affiliated sex offender programs led to the conclusion that those programs could not assist the Petitioner, ergo, treatment has been exhausted in those other facilities. The Petitioner, through his testimony, acknowledged that he had participated in homosexual activities at the hospital and had been punished by the suspension of his grounds privileges and job opportunity. Following those episodes the Petitioner indicated that he lost interest in participating in the program but did in fact participate. He acknowledged that he attended occupational therapy, as well as the primary therapy, and was tardy at times. Robinson admits that he has difficulty explaining himself and has problems with impulse control. He says he can't find himself, is tired of being a nothing. Robinson believes he does not always think before acting. Finally, he has a fear of returning to court and facing the disposition of his case. Alice Butler, a witness for the Petitioner who was a co-therapist at the time that Stevens was assigned to Robinson's case, established that earlier in the treatment Petitioner was more motivated in his participation than he has been recently. And, in fact, the Petitioner has broken the rules as recently as two weeks prior to the hearing by sleeping nude. She also observed that the Petitioner has been in the so-called "observation section" for a long time and is satisfied with his placement. (This particular section is a more restricted area than some of the other advanced wards.) Sterling George, a psychiatric aide and witness for the Petitioner from his observation finds that as a general proposition the Petitioner takes part in activities with other patients and is not a problem on the ward. Finally, Alfred Gerardo, another participant in the mentally disordered sex offender program, gave testimony. He has known the Petitioner for approximately fifteen months. He has also participated in the same group with Robinson from October, 1980, through May, 1981. His initial impressions of Robinson were not favorable, but in the last few months he has gained a better appreciation of the Petitioner. In particular, he has observed Robinson to have made improvement in terms of his willingness to he concerned about matters of education and acting-out, and in the realm of the Petitioner's appearance. From this witness's understanding the Petitioner's participation in group activity is limited and particularly so in the area of the underlying sexual problem. In summary the Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner's sexual deviance, but that treatment has not been totally successful and the patient continues to be a sexual menace, and there is a likelihood that the Petitioner would commit other sexual crimes.
The Issue Did Respondent, Hodges University (Hodges), commit an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner, Connie Leonessa, on account of her religion, as defined and prohibited by section 760.10(5), Florida Statutes (2018)?1
Findings Of Fact Parties Hodges is a university located in Ft. Myers, Florida. It offers a master's degree in counseling through the Clinical Mental Health Counseling (CMHC) program housed within Hodges' Nichols School of Professional Studies. Ms. Leonessa was a student in Hodges' CMHC master's program. Ms. Leonessa is an experienced registered nurse who has primarily served pediatric patients over the years. She also volunteered regularly to work with children in inner cities of the Northeast. Those experiences, her compassion for children, and her personal trauma of molestation drove Ms. Leonessa to want to serve children better. In her words, "and I just felt that God wanted me to go back to school to get a master's so I can help these victims." Ms. Leonessa was enrolled in Hodges from 2015 until the fall of 2018. Her goal was to prepare herself to provide counseling services to child victims of trauma. There is no persuasive, competent evidence proving that providing counseling services to child victims of trauma is a profession, occupation, or trade that requires a master's degree in counseling. In fact, paid positions in the counseling field are available without a master's degree. A master's degree, followed by two years of full-time, post- graduation, paid supervised work experience is required to obtain a mental health counselor license. So is passage of the NCMHCE Exam administered by the National Board for Certified Counselors. The persuasive, competent evidence of record does not prove that Ms. Leonessa intended to take the post-graduation steps required to obtain a mental health counselor license or to seek a mental health counselor license. Hodges' Master's Program Earning a master's degree in social work from Hodges requires successful completion of academic coursework, a 200-hour practicum, and three 267-hour internships. The providers of the practicum and internships are not part of or controlled by Hodges. The student is responsible for identifying and making arrangements with the practicum and internship providers. Hodges assists when it can. Hodges' program, like counseling itself, requires students to develop awareness of their preferences, prejudices, ethics, and philosophies and separate them from the support and guidance provided clients. Upon entering the program, students agree to abide by the requirements of a Clinical Mental Health Counseling Professional Attitude and Behavior Agreement (Agreement). Ms. Leonessa signed the agreement on September 2, 2015. The Agreement states the student's obligation to align her "personal ethics with the professional ethics as defined by the American Counseling Association (ACA) 2014 Code of Ethics [Code].” The Code was attached to the Agreement. The Agreement emphasizes the priority of avoiding harm to clients or future clients and taking care to not impose the counselor's personal beliefs, values, and behaviors on clients. The Agreement recognizes the ethical dilemmas the profession presents and articulates a student's obligation to consult others about the dilemmas and develop "an ever increasing ability to apply a professional ethic to difficult situations involving ethical dilemmas and associated law … ." As part of the Agreement, Ms. Leonessa agreed to have "an open and willing attitude toward feedback and suggestions given by faculty, peers and site supervisors to help the student reduce the possibility of harm." This tenet supports the value of requiring a counselor to put "a high priority on avoiding harm to clients or future clients." The Agreement obliges the student to understand and abide by the Code. The CMHC Student Handbook (Handbook) contains and emphasizes requirements similar to the Agreement's requirements. It encourages students to pursue personal therapy and growth, for their intrinsic benefits and to provide insight into what clients experience. The Handbook emphasizes that counselors are held to higher ethical standards and higher levels of personal growth and mental health than the average person. It states that evaluation of a student's progress in those areas is part of judging a student's suitability for the counseling profession. Hodges' program includes regular evaluation of a student's progress in "interpersonal interactions with students, faculty, site supervisors, and others involved with his/her academic progress." The program requires progress in those areas and provides for a Student Development Plan for remediation if the student does not improve his or her interpersonal interactions and skills. The Handbook directs students to review the Code. The Handbook requires students to work professionally and respectfully with fellow students, faculty, site supervisors, and site employees. The Handbook also requires students to accept others without rejection based upon, among other things, age, culture, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, or marital status. A student commits to be "respectful of differing opinions and professional practice … ." A student also commits to work "to continually improve her/his professional relationship skills and clarify professional boundaries." The Handbook, signed by Ms. Leonessa, concludes with this affirmation: I understand that the Hodges University Clinical Mental Health Counseling Program requires students to perform adequately in areas of academic assessment that include the ability to form and continue positive relationships with others; the ability to acquire and correctly use counseling knowledge and skills, and the ability to successfully complete all practicums and internships in the judgment of the faculty and site supervisors. These expectations are in addition to the didactic coursework expectations and assessment procedures. I understand that I will be expected to continually improve my ability to demonstrate counseling competencies as I progress in the program. I further understand that the American Counseling Association 2014 Code of Ethics forms the basis of professional standards to which I must adhere. In sum, the nature of the counseling field that Ms. Leonessa sought to enter and the program at Hodges required students to develop an open and tolerant and patient way of communicating with people with whom they may disagree, even disagree vehemently. Conflict in Hodges' Academic Program Ms. Leonessa performed well in her academic work. But her interactions with three fellow students and a professor were marked with conflicts. She attributed the conflict to discrimination against her on account of her religion. The evidence does not support the attribution. Ms. Leonessa's sensitivity to the age differential between herself and other students and her aggressive personality caused conflict with fellow students. Ms. Leonessa acknowledged her aggressiveness, saying, "You know, I know I have a tone and I've been honest about that. I have a tone." (Tr. V. I, p. 206). Ms. Leonessa also had a pattern of attributing any disagreement or conflict to opposition to her Christian beliefs. Dr. Thomas Hoffman taught many of Ms. Leonessa's classes. Like Ms. Leonessa, Dr. Hoffman is a Christian. In email communications each referred to scripture. For instance, Dr. Hoffman, in counseling Ms. Leonessa about alleviating her repeated personal conflicts, advised her to be "wise as a serpent, but gentle as a dove." Ms. Leonessa, in defense of her combative approach said, "Jesus Christ spoke truth and was hated for it." Neither Dr. Hoffman nor any other Hodges representative ever prohibited Ms. Leonessa from referring to her Christian beliefs in communications with them. In addition, Dr. Hoffman never asked Ms. Leonessa not to share her religious views, such as her anti-abortion beliefs, in class. As the years passed, Ms. Leonessa's communications to Dr. Hoffman grew increasingly querulous and combative. Her tone was frustrated and loud. She challenged Dr. Hoffman's competence, honesty, and integrity in a disrespectful manner. Ms. Leonessa clashed, in class and outside class, with three fellow students. She felt the students did not treat her with the respect that was her due because of her age. Ms. Leonessa had a dispute with one student about abortion. She had conflicts with another about the use of the "F" word in class. Ms. Leonessa had a conflict with a third student who said that Ms. Leonessa was trying to impose her values in class. During these conflicts, Ms. Leonessa raised her voice and spoke hostilely. Sometimes she pointed her finger. In an encounter outside of the school, one of the students told Ms. Leonessa that Ms. Leonessa's beliefs were "f…ed up" and that Ms. Leonessa should attend a Christian school. Once Ms. Leonessa jerked on another student's purse strap to make a point. Those three students did not have conflicts with other students or faculty. Also, as will be addressed below, Ms. Leonessa had significant problems in her internships, problems the other students did not have. The three students were not similarly situated to Ms. Leonessa. Due to these conflicts and ways of interacting with Dr. Hoffman, Hodges faculty met with Ms. Leonessa in February 2016 in an informal coaching session. The purpose was to address Ms. Leonessa's inability to control her emotions and express herself in an appropriate manner. These are all issues whose importance to counseling the Agreement, the Handbook, and the Code all emphasize. Ms. Leonessa's religious beliefs were not the reason for convening the coaching session or the communications during it. The faculty also conducted informal coaching sessions with the other three students. Despite the coaching sessions, Ms. Leonessa's conflicts with the students and Dr. Hoffman continued. Hodges' Handbook provides for establishing a formal Student Development Plan (SDP) to assist students who are not performing in a manner that is consistent with the Code. An SDP's purpose is to formalize concerns not resolved by the informal coaching and provide a plan for addressing them. It is a remedial measure. Hodges established SDPs infrequently. Since 2011 it has implemented seven. The faculty created an SDP for Ms. Leonessa and placed her on it in October 2016. Ms. Leonessa's religious beliefs played no part in the decision to create the plan or setting the plan's requirements. The behaviors which the SDP addressed included the changes in Ms. Leonessa's tone and raised volume when she disagreed with others, her practice of interrupting others with whom she disagreed, and her belaboring of class topics well after the instructor was trying to move the class to a resolution and on to the next subject. The plan provided supports and measurable goals for Ms. Leonessa. They were: (1) pairing her with a third-year student as a mentor, (2) completing a case study assignment, (3) completing role-playing exercises, and (4) documenting her changes of tone and volume in class. Ms. Leonessa disagreed with the SDP but agreed to follow it and signed it some two months after the faculty presented it to her. The role-playing exercises assigned to Ms. Leonessa involved same-sex attraction and abortion. The faculty selected these two topics because they recur frequently in counseling. Ms. Leonessa's religious beliefs were not the reason for selecting the topics. Ms. Leonessa successfully completed the SDP. The three students with whom Ms. Leonessa clashed were not placed on SDPs. Their issues did not match Ms. Leonessa's in frequency or intensity. Practicum Ms. Leonessa sought to establish a practicum placement at Cape Christian, also known as Samaritan Health and Wellness Center (Cape Christian). There was some uncertainty whether the supervision available at Cape Christian met Hodges' requirements. Ms. Leonessa's contact at Cape Christian, Ms. Trout, was not satisfactorily responsive to Ms. Leonessa's efforts to sort the issue out. This resulted in combative telephone calls and emails from Ms. Leonessa to Ms. Trout. An excerpt from one email illustrates Ms. Leonessa's pattern of hostility and injection of religion into disputes. In a December 5, 2016, email to Ms. Trout from Ms. Leonessa describing her displeasure with the responsiveness of Cape Christian and a conversation with one of Ms. Trout's co-workers, Ms. Leonessa wrote: You stated I chewed her out but you were not on the phone. I did not disparage her character in any way, I said as believers we are to keep our word and that now I would have to find another place at the last minute. That is all I said. The Bible says be angry and sin not. According to what I have heard, you do not believe people should be angry and I would bet there are times in your life when you have had an unprofessional tone. Also I have had to wait weeks before hearing back from you, it amazed me how quickly you called about this situation-seconds! Ms. Trout replied: If you were my student and you'd have behaved in the manner as this [sic], you would be put in a professional development status, complete with remediation, to determine your appropriateness to move forward in the field of counseling. The fact that you sent this email in its current form further highlights the display of lack of professionalism and emotional maturity now exhibited in two separate phone calls as well. I would encourage that you seek some assistance in processing your emotions, and the manner in which you communicate those. I wish you the best. Ms. Leonessa replied to Ms. Trout, "Please do not contact me further." Ms. Trout forwarded the email exchange to Sue Hook and Dr. Mary Nuosce of Hodges. Dr. Nuosce answered, "Amy, I apologize for her total lack of professionalism. We are working on this. Thank you for your patience." This incident triggered an update to the SDP. The update was because of Ms. Leonessa's conduct and unrelated to her religious beliefs. Ultimately, Ms. Leonessa obtained and successfully completed a practicum with FRS/Omega Center. Tina Friedman was her supervisor. Ms. Friedman twice noted in the July 7, 2017, evaluation form that Ms. Leonessa required ongoing attention in the area of values management. The values criterion relates to many of the requirements and principles of the Agreement, the Code, and the Handbook. The evaluation form describes it thus: "Value Management: How did the student cope with values? Were attempts made to impose the student's values during the interview?" Ms. Friedman's Session Evaluation Form noted, "Connie does repeatedly offer her own values during client/student interaction." Ms. Friedman wrote a note to Ms. Leonessa on the form stating that Ms. Leonessa's development was at an expected level save for in values management. The note went on to specify: "Please work more diligently in this area as that may [prove] to be a problem in the future." The August 17, 2017, final evaluation emphasized the problem stating, HER BURNING DESIRE TO INITIATE CHANGE, MAY PROVE TO BE HER MOST DIFFICULT PERSONAL CHALLENGE AS A CLINICIAN. IT IS HOPED THAT IN TIME AND WITH FURTHER EXPOSURE TO THE TENETS OF EFFECTIVE COUNSELING, CONNI CAN LEARN TO ACCEPT AND MEET THE CLIENT WHERE THEY ARE AT IN THE PROCESS. CONNI HAS STRONG, DEEP ROOTED BELIEFS AND VALUES, WHICH MAY BE DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OF THE CLIENTS AS WELL AS HER PEERS, THAT SHE ENCOUNTERS. I HAVE SHARED THIS OBSERVATION WITH CONNI AND HAVE ENCOURAGED HER TO CONSIDER THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING OPEN AND ACCEPTING TO THE DIVERSITY OF THE POPULATION SHE WILL SERVE. Internships Ms. Leonessa obtained an intern position with True Core Behavioral Solutions (True Core). True Core provided services to the Ft. Myers Youth Academy, a juvenile detention center. True Core terminated Ms. Leonessa's internship after two days. The problems leading to her termination were those of value imposition and boundary crossing presaged by her practicum. Ms. Leonessa participated in two counseling sessions for the juveniles. Her improper conduct included sharing personal information about her abandonment by her husband and her celibacy since then. In the counseling profession this boundary crossing behavior is often damaging to the therapeutic process. Ms. Leonessa also criticized a young man who supported his girlfriend obtaining an abortion, telling him abortion was murder and talked about holding premature babies in her hands. She criticized some of the youth for engaging in premarital sex telling them it violated God's law. She told one young man his troubles stemmed from abandonment by his father. This conduct demonstrated emotionalism and an inability to respect client perspectives that the SDP was intended to ameliorate. For this reason, Hodges updated the SDP. Ms. Leonessa acknowledges that it would be professionally wrong for a counselor to advocate her personal religious beliefs and values to clients. She denies that she did so. But the preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence proves that she did. True Core reported Ms. Leonessa's termination and the causes for it to Hodges. After Ms. Leonessa's termination from True Core, Dr. Mary Nuosce, Dean of the Nichols Schools of Professional Studies and a faculty member, tried to assist her in finding another internship placement. Dr. Nuosce was the supervisor for Ms. Leonessa's internships. She approached Janean Byrne from Serenity Counseling about accepting Ms. Leonessa as an intern. Dr. Nuosce thought Serenity might suit Ms. Leonessa more because it was a faith-based counseling provider. She gave Ms. Leonessa Ms. Byrne's contact information and asked her to follow up on establishing an internship. Ms. Leonessa did not seek the internship. She refused to contact Ms. Byrne for non-specified reasons. She told Dr. Nuosce, "I just emailed her [Ms. Byrne] and turned down the position. What occurred today has taught me that I need to find a place where my values are shared and respected so I will continue to look for a sight [sic]." When Dr. Nuosce asked how she could be so judgmental about someone she had never met, Ms. Leonessa responded, "I never said anything against her [Ms. Byrne], however, I am looking for a place that shares my biblical values especially after what occurred today that is all. I do have the right to choose where I want to intern at!" Hodges' faculty continued efforts to help Ms. Leonessa locate an intern position. Ms. Leonessa obtained an internship at HEADS. Within a few weeks, HEADS dismissed her. Ms. Leonessa worked with therapist Julie Jakobi attending sessions with clients. Jerry Sprague, HEADS's clinical supervisor for Ft. Myers, selected Ms. Jakobi to work with Ms. Leonessa because he was aware of Ms. Leonessa's ardent Christian beliefs and Ms. Jakobi held similarly strong Christian beliefs. The first client Ms. Jakobi and Ms. Leonessa saw was a 13-year old female with a long history of running away and conflict with her mother. They saw her at school in a room in the office. The student was very concerned about telling her mother that she was gay. After the student left the room, Ms. Leonessa turned and loudly and aggressively confronted Ms. Jakobi telling her she was wrong in her counseling of the student. Ms. Leonessa insisted Ms. Jakobi should have told the student that she would catch sexually transmitted diseases, she would become depressed, and she would commit suicide. The room's door was open, and a secretary sat right outside the door. The lack of privacy and danger to client confidentiality concerned Ms. Jakobi. They also visited a client, a man concerned about becoming an opioid addict and the effect on him of growing up in a rough neighborhood. He and his wife were separated and had completed the documents necessary to finalize their divorce. Ms. Jakobi had informed Ms. Leonessa of the pending divorce before they arrived at the home. Ms. Jakobi and Ms. Leonessa met with the client at his wife's home. Ms. Leonessa began talking to the man about how he could work through his problems and learn to love his wife better. This "froze" the client and sabotaged efforts to provide the addiction counseling he sought. On the drive back to the office, Ms. Leonessa was very rude and hostile to Ms. Jakobi. Ms. Leonessa was physically tense. Her tone was sharp. Ms. Leonessa brought up homosexuality again and renewed advocacy of "conversion therapy." At the time, this was not permitted. As soon as she left Ms. Leonessa at her car, Ms. Jakobi called Mr. Sprague to report the day's incidents. He concluded that quick action was required and asked Ms. Leonessa to apologize to Ms. Jakobi. It is worth noting that Mr. Sprague's email signature quotes from the Bible, Psalm 82:3. Ms. Leonessa’s apology read as follows: "I realize not everyone see's [sic] things eye to eye. However when differences occur truth needs to be spoken in a way that is gentle. I realize my 'tone' is not always gentle and I am working on this." This is no apology and was not received as one. Mr. Sprague spoke further to Ms. Jakobi and another counselor who worked with Ms. Leonessa about their experiences with her. He concluded that he was "not convinced that she will not cause harm." He decided that terminating Ms. Leonessa promptly was best. Mr. Sprague's September 27, 2018, email to Dr. Nuosce explaining his decision is persuasive and was reasonably accepted by the Hodges faculty. He began by reporting that Ms. Leonessa was very difficult to communicate with. He reported that Ms. Leonessa "failed at a very basic level to demonstrate the ability to maintain appropriate boundaries and to demonstrated basic empathy skills." His email went on to state: I would be surprised if you didn't already know this as her strong personality, strong beliefs and aggressive tendencies are hard for her to manage. She had told me she has had conflicts with professors so I imagine this is why. He concluded that Ms. Leonessa was "stuck on a superficial (immature) level of reasoning and so she is failing to both read others well and to maintain appropriate social boundaries … ." Mr. Sprague strongly suggested Ms. Leonessa consider a different career than counseling. This report, supported by the evidence in this case, caused Dr. Nuosce to conclude that Ms. Leonessa was not complying with her revised SDP. Also Ms. Leonessa had failed to complete two internship programs and one practicum. Failure to complete the practicum revealed significant problems which persisted. Three internships are required to obtain a counseling degree from Hodges. Ms. Leonessa completed none. For these reasons, Hodges administratively withdrew Ms. Leonessa. Ms. Leonessa appealed within the Hodges system. Her appeal papers did not acknowledge what she had done wrong or how she proposed to improve. Instead they discussed her background and accused Hodges of repeatedly violating its policies and procedures. Hodges' Provost reviewed the many documents generated during Ms. Leonessa's tumultuous enrollment. He noted the similarity of reports of unacceptable behavior from different and unrelated sources, within and without the University. He denied the appeal. Summary The record of Ms. Leonessa's three years in Hodges' counseling program, including her time in practicum and internships, is a record of consistent, disputatious conduct. When the subject of religion, specifically Christianity arose, it was because Ms. Leonessa initiated criticisms of others' behavior as unchristian, because Ms. Leonessa sought to advocate her Christian views to counseling clients, and because she explicitly judged clients' actions, decisions, and options by her standards. The evidence does not prove that Hodges took any actions against Ms. Leonessa, including imposition of the SDP and termination from the program because of her religion. Hodges' terminated her because she violated the fundamental counseling requirement to accept clients as they are and not seek to impose her values on them. The record does not prove that any of the practicum and internship providers took any actions against Ms. Leonessa on account of her religious beliefs. Furthermore, the practicum and internship providers were independent of Hodges. They were not subject to its control or direction or acting in its stead.
Recommendation It is Recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Connie Leonessa. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Thomas K. Rinaldi, Esquire Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC Suite 105 4001 Tamiami Trail North Naples, Florida 34103 Cheyanne Costilla, Gen. Co. Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Connie Leonessa American Liberties Institute Post Office Box 547503 Orlando, Florida 32854 Matthew Brown McReynolds, Esquire Pacific Justice Institute Post Office Box 276600 Sacramento, California 95827 Michelle Wilson, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Findings Of Fact On October 15, 1985, Petitioner, Mercy Hospital, Inc. (Mercy), filed an application with Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) for a certificate of need (CON) to convert 29 medical/surgical beds into 29 long-term substance abuse beds. On February 27, 1986, the Department denied Mercy's application, and Mercy timely petitioned for formal administrative review. Mercy is a 538-bed acute care hospital located in Miami, Dade County, Florida. Due to a declining patient census, Mercy is, however, operating only 360 of its 530 licensed beds. Mercy currently offers services in medicine, surgery, psychiatry, obstetrics, gynecology, emergency medical services and outpatient services. Need The predicate for the Department's denial of Mercy's application was a perceived lack of need for long-term substance abuse beds in District XI (Dade and Monroe Counties), and the impact such lack of need would exert on the other statutory and rule criteria. Resolution of the need issue is dispositive of Mercy's application. There currently exists no numeric need methodology for determining the need for long-term substance abuse beds. The Department has, however, adopted Rule 10-5.11(27)(h)1, Florida Administrative Code, which establishes the following occupancy standard: No additional or new hospital inpatient substance abuse beds shall normally be approved in a Department service district unless the average occupancy rate for all existing hospital based substance abuse impatient beds is at or exceeds 80 percent for the preceding 12 month period. District XI has 190 approved long-term hospital impatient substance abuse beds; however, only 30 of those beds are currently licensed. The licensed beds are located in Monroe County at Florida Keys Memorial Hospital (Florida Keys), and are operating well below the 80 percent occupancy standard established by rule. 1/ The remaining beds are to be located in Dade County where Intervenor, Management Advisory and Research Center, Inc., d/b/a Glenbeigh Hospital (Glenbeigh) holds a CON for a 100-bed unit and Mount Sinai Medical Center (Mount Sinai) holds a CON for a 60-bed unit. Glenbeigh's facility is currently under construction, and Mount Sinai is seeking licensure. While not licensed, Mount Sinai has operated its 60-bed unit under its acute care license, and for the first three quarters of 1985 reported occupancy rates of 49.7 percent, 62 percent, and 48.9 percent. While the beds approved for District XI do not demonstrate an 80 percent occupancy rate, only one unit, Florida Keys, is licensed and operational. That unit is located in Key West, serves the middle and lower keys, and is not accessible to Dade County residents. The remaining units are not licensed, and their occupancy figures are not representative of a functional substance abuse unit. Accordingly, a failure to demonstrate compliance with the 80 percent occupancy standard is not necessarily dispositive of the question of need. There currently exists, however, no recognized methodology to calculate need for long-term substance abuse services. Accordingly, to demonstrate a need in 1990 for such services, Mercy relied on a numeric need methodology devised by its health planning expert, Daniel Sullivan 2/ (Petitioner's exhibit 4). Sullivan's methodology was not, however, persuasive. The First Step in Sullivan's Methodology The first step in Sullivan's methodology was to derive an estimate of the number of substance abusers in District XI who would seek treatment in an inpatient setting. The figure he calculated (a,170) was derived-through a four- stage refinement process. Initially, Sullivan estimated the number of problem drinkers within the district for the horizon year by applying the Marden methodology. That methodology, routinely relied upon by health planners, identifies the number of problem drinkers in a given population by multiplying a probability factor to age and sex groupings. By applying the Marden methodology to the age and sex demographics of District XI, Sullivan calculated that an estimated 148,541 problem drinkers would reside within the district in 1998. Sullivan then strove to estimate the number of problem drinkers who would seek treatment in some formal setting (network treatment). To establish that estimate, Sullivan relied on a report prepared for the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) entitled "Current Practices in Alcoholism Treatment Needs Estimation: A State-of-the-Art Report". According to Sullivan, that report estimates the percentage of problem drinkers who will seek network treatment to be 20 percent. Therefore, he calculated that an estimated 29,788 problem drinkers in District XI would seek such treatment in 1990. Sullivan then strove to estimate the number of problem drinkers who would seek treatment in an inpatient setting. To establish that estimate, Sullivan relied on a survey conducted in 1982 by the NIAAA entitled National Drug and Alcoholism Treatment Utilization Survey". According to Sullivan, that survey indicated that approximately 78 percent of all problem drinkers who sought treatment did 50 on an outpatient basis. Therefore, using a factor of 22 percent, he calculated that an estimated 6,536 problem drinkers in District XI would seek such treatment in 1990. Sullivan's methodology, at stage two and three of his refinement process, was not persuasive. While Sullivan relied on the factors presented in the reports, there was no proof that health planning experts routinely relied on the reports. More importantly, there was no evidence of the type of survey conducted, the reliability of the percentage factors (i.e.: + 1 percent, 10 percent, 50 percent, etc.), or their statistical validity. In sum, Sullivan's conclusions are not credited. The final stage at step one of Sullivan's methodology, was to estimate the number of substance abusers (alcohol and drugs) who would seek treatment in an inpatient setting. To derive that estimate, Sullivan relied on a report prepared by the Department's Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Metal Health Office, contained in a draft of its 1987 state plan, which reported that 80 percent of substance abusers abuse alcohol and 20 percent abuse other drugs. Applying the assumption that 80 percent of substance abusers abuse alcohol, Sullivan estimated that 8,170 substance abusers in District XI would seek inpatient treatment in 1990. Sullivan's conclusion is again not persuasive. To credit Sullivan's methodology, one must assume that substance abusers (alcohol and drugs) seek treatments at the same rate as alcohol abusers. The record is devoid of such proof. Accordingly, for that reason and the reasons appearing in paragraph 12 supra, Sullivan's conclusions are not credited. The Second Step in Sullivan's Methodology. The second step in Sullivan's methodology was to estimate the number of hospital admissions, as opposed to other residential facility admissions, that would result from the need for substance abuse services. To quantify this number, Sullivan relied on one 1982 survey conducted by NIAAA. According to that survey, the distribution of inpatient substance abuse clients by treatment setting in 1982 was as follows: Facility Location Number Percent of Total Hospital 17,584 34.1 Quarterway House 1,410 2.7 Halfway Housed/ Recovery Home 14,648 28.4 Other Residential Facility 15,980 31.0 Correctional Facility 1,985 3.8 TOTAL 51,607 100.0 percent Therefore, using a factor of 34.1 percent, Sullivan estimated the number of substance abuse hospital admissions to be 2,784 for 1990. For the reasons set forth in paragraph 12 supra, Sullivan's conclusions are, again, not credited. The Third and Fourth Steps in Sullivan's Methodology. The third step in Sullivan's methodology was to estimate the number of substance abuse hospital admissions that would require long-term, as opposed to short-term, services. To derive this estimate, Sullivan calculated admissions to short-term beds by applying a 28-day length of stay and an 80 percent occupancy standard to the Department's short-term bed need methodology (.06 beds per 1,000 population) contained in Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. Sullivan then subtracted that number (1,182) from the estimated number of substance abuse hospital admissions for 1990 (2,784), and concluded that the estimated number of hospital admissions in 1990 that would result from the need for long-term substance abuse services would be 1,602. The final step in Sullivan's methodology was to calculate the need for long-term hospital substance abuse beds. To derive this estimate, Sullivan multiplied the estimated number of long-term substance abuse admissions (1,602) by an average length of stay of 37 days, and divided that total by an occupancy standard of 292 days (80 percent of 365 days). Under Sullivan's methodology, a gross need exists for 203 long-term substance abuse beds in District XI. To establish net need, Sullivan would reduce the 203 bed district need by the 160 beds approved for Dade County, but ignore the 30-bed unit at Florida Keys because of its geographic inaccessibility. By Sullivan's calculation, a net need exists for 43 beds in Dade County. Sullivan's analysis, at steps three and four of his methodology, is not credited. Throughout his methodology Sullivan utilized District XI population figures (Dade and Monroe Counties) to develop a bed need for Dade County. Although Monroe County accounts for only 4 percent of the district's population, the inclusion of that population inflated Dade County's bed need. More demonstrative of the lack of reliability in steps three and four of Sullivan's analysis are, however, the methodologies by which he chose to calculate short- term admissions and long-term substance abuse bed need. Sullivan calculated admissions to short-term beds by applying a 28-day length of stay and an 80 percent occupancy standard to the Department's short- term bed need methodology (.06 beds per 1,000 population) contained in Rule 10- 5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. 3/ By using a 28-day length of stay, the maximum average admission permitted for short-term beds, as opposed to the district's demonstrated average of 24-days, Sullivan inappropriately minimized the number of estimated short-term admissions and maximized the number of estimated long-term admissions. 4/ Sullivan sought to justify his use of a 28-day standard by reference to testimony he overheard in a separate proceeding. According to Sullivan, a Department representative testified that the 28-day standard was used in developing the Department's .06 short-term beds per 1,000 population rule. Sullivan's rationalization is not, however, persuasive. First, Sullivan's recitation of testimony he overheard in a separate proceeding was not competent proof of the truth of those matters in this case. Second, Sullivan offered no rational explanation of how a 28-day standard was used in developing the rule. Finally, the proof demonstrated that the average short-term length of stay in District XI is 24 days, not 28 days. The difference between a 24-day and 28-day average short-term length of stay is dramatic. Application of Sullivan's methodology to the population of Dade County, and utilizing a 24-day average, would demonstrate a need for 170 long-term beds, as opposed to Sullivan's calculated need of 203 beds. In addition to the average short-term length of stay factor, long-term bed need is also dependent on an average length of long-term admissions factor. Under Sullivan's approach, the higher the average, the higher the bed need. Accordingly, to derive a meaningful bed need requires that a reliable average length of stay be established. The data chosen by Sullivan to calculate such an average was not, however, reliable. Sullivan used a 37-day average length of stay to develop his long-term bed need. This average was developed from the CON applications of Mercy, Glenbeigh and Mount Sinai. In the applications, Mercy estimated an expected length of stay of 30-37 days, Glenbeigh 36-38 days, and Mount Sinai 28-49 days. Use of a simple average, of the expected lengths of stay contained in Mercy's, Glenbeigh's and Mount Sinai's applications, to develop an average long- term length of stay is not persuasive. The figures contained in the applications are "expected length of stay", a minimum/maximum figure. Mercy failed to demonstrate that a simple average of those figures was a reliable indicator of average length of stay. Indeed, Mercy presented evidence at hearing that its average length of stay would be 30-31 days; a figure that is clearly not a simple average of the 30-37 day expected length of stay contained in its application. Mercy's failure to demonstrate a meaningful average length of stay renders its calculated bed need unreliable. Sullivan's Methodology - An Overview Each step of Sullivan's methodology was inextricably linked to the other. Consequently, a failure of any step in his analysis would invalidate his ultimata conclusion. Notwithstanding this fundamental fact Mercy, with the exception of the Marden methodology, failed to present a reasonable evidentiary basis to demonstrate the reliability and validity of Sullivan's methodology or any of its parts. Since his methodology was not validated, or each of its inextricably linked parts validated, Sullivan's conclusions are not persuasive or credited. Other Considerations If Mercy receives a CON, it will enter into a management contract with Comprehensive Care Corporation (CompCare) to operate the substance abuse unit. The parties anticipate that Mercy will provide its existing physical plant, custodial services, support services, dietary services, complimentary medical services, medical records and pharmacy services, and that CompCare will provide the treatment team, quality assurance, public information, promotion and operational management. Under its proposed agreement with CompCare, Mercy would pay CompCare on a per patient day basis. This fee was not, however, disclosed at hearing nor were the other expenses for patient care established. 5/ Consequently, Mercy failed to establish that its proposal was financially feasible on either a short or long term basis. Mercy also proposes to provide bilingual staff, and dedicate a portion of its patient days to indigent and Medicaid patients. There was no competent proof to establish, however, that such needs were not met, or would not be met, by the existing facilities.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the application of Mercy for a certificate of need to convert 29 medical/surgical beds to 29 long-term substance abuse beds be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of February, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 1987.
The Issue The issue presented by this case concerns the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, William Thomas Massey, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In turn, the Department requested the Division or Administrative Hearings to conduct a formal hearing to consider the matters set forth in the petition and this request was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 9, 1980. A final hearing in this cause was scheduled for January 30, 1981, but was not conducted until February 4, 1981, so that Petitioner might secure representation. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called as witness Michael Pomeroy, Staff Psychologist in the forensic service at the Florida State Hospital. The Respondent called Robert H. Alcorn, Jr., Director of the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at the Florida State Hospital as its witness. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1 was admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, the Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent in keeping with the order of the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). Beginning March 1, 1979, through the present, Petitioner has resided in the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee, Florida, where he is undergoing treatment in a hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. This program and similar programs in other institutions administered by the Respondent require a high degree of motivation on the part of the patient in order to achieve success. Although the Petitioner has made progress in the course of his stay, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner through the program in which he is enrolled and has additionally concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. In that respect, the Respondent has exhausted treatment in the affiliated programs. The principal treatment modality in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital is group therapy. The Petitioner has participated in the group therapy sessions during his current hospitalization but no significant change in his behavior has been observed during this period, in fact, no significant change has been observed in the petitioner's sexually deviant condition which dates from 1960. That condition has been diagnosed as homosexuality with a secondary diagnosis of personality disorder, inadequate type. This latter condition is manifested by maladapted behavior in the sense of lack of impulse control, in the sense that the Petitioner has a short temper when matters do not transpire in a fashion that he would approve. Referring again to the Petitioner's participation in the group therapy sessions, he lacks personal involvement. In this connection, the Petitioner has a problem becoming open and honest with the other members of the group, notwithstanding his ability to deal with their problems in the group session. He presents himself superficially to the members of the group, getting along with those members but not letting the group participants get close to him nor he to them. In summary, the Petitioner has cooperated superficially but has not progressed. If the Petitioner remains in the program, he is not expected to progress in group therapy. The Petitioner was placed in the program having been found guilty by jury on a charge of sexual battery on a seventeen year old male. The Petitioner does not acknowledge that he has committed a crime and he has not progressed in dealing with his propensity to commit homosexual acts with younger men. In other words, there has been no basic personality change in the Petitioner. Petitioner, having a past history of alcohol abuse, has participated in and completed the alcohol abuse program for the forensic service at the Hospital. He still participates in the Alcoholics Anonymous program on the ward, is a member of the Jaycees and is a ward representative for grievance matters. The Petitioner has been involved in the ancillary therapies; leather and music in the past, and was involved in wood occupational therapy at the time of the hearing, but his attendance was below average. He lacked interest in that therapy program. The Petitioner also writes articles for the Hospital newspaper. The Petitioner has the freedom of movement on the grounds of the facility that includes walks and attendance at dances. At the November, 1980, staffing conference concerning the Petitioner's case, Petitioner expressed an interest in vocational rehabilitation. The ancillary programs as discussed herein in the absence of progress in the primary treatment modality, i.e., group therapy, will not promote satisfactory progress and change the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment on the patient. On December 11, 1980, the Petitioner's case was presented to the screening committee of Unit Directors of all mentally disordered sex offender units within the State of Florida, and it was the unanimous opinion of those members that the Respondent had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner as a mentally disordered sex offender. This determination comports with the conclusion reached at the staffing conference held at the Florida State Hospital and reported as Respondent's Exhibit 1, admitted into evidence, which determined that the facility where the Petitioner was assigned had exhausted treatment. The Petitioner feels like he continues to be helped by the & program and is making progress and has greater self esteem, in addition to being able to relate to others better. Specifically, the Petitioner feels that he is able to control his temper better and has gained an insight into his problem with alcoholism. Nevertheless, the Petitioner would not benefit sufficiently from further hospitalization in the sex offender program, to cause a change in the determination that the Respondent has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for William Thomas Massey, and that said William Thomas Massey be returned to the committing court for further proceedings. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Claude Arrington, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Second Judicial Circuit 211 East Jefferson Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Gerry L. Clark, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Edward G. LeGer, through available sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 917.20, Florida Statutes (1977).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 9, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department had requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The hearing was conducted on December 16, 1981. In the course of the final hearing the Petitioner testified and offered as witnesses, Larry Carroll and James Thaddeus Rogers, participants in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida. The Petitioner submitted two exhibits, composite in nature, which were admitted. Respondent called as witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the Mentally Disordered Sex Offender Program at Florida State Hospital; Michael Pomeroy, Clinical Psychologist at Florida State Hospital and Connie Smith, Clinical Social Worker at Florida State Hospital. Respondent presented no exhibits. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner has been in the custody of the Respondent, in keeping with the orders of Court and the authority of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in the hospital program for the benefit of mentally disordered sex offenders. Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities, his progress in the recognition of and ability to deal with the underlying conditions which caused him to be placed in this program have reached their zenith. In the face of these circumstances, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. These opinions were made known to the Petitioner and when confronted with this information, the Petitioner requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. LeGer was committed to the custody of the Respondent on February 27, 1979, the Court having found him to be a mentally disordered sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes (1977). He was received into the program at the Florida State Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, on April 23, 1979, and has undergone treatment beginning on that date. The objectives of the treatment program were to deal with LeGer's long standing sexual deviation, which specific condition is pedophilia and his associated difficulty with chronic alcoholism, until he no longer evidenced himself to be a menace to society in terms of sexual "acting out" or until it was concluded that he could no longer be treated for these difficulties. (The patient also had undergone treatment as a sex offender in the 1960's.) The program at Florida State Hospital has as its central focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs in recreational and occupational therapy, and this treatment regime relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. Petitioner's Composite Exhibit No. 1 is constituted of a series of progress reports or clinical summaries of Petitioner's condition during the course of his treatment. As can be seen, the patient has made significant progress in dealing with his condition of alcoholism and his general conduct and demeanor has been exemplary; however, he has gained little insight into his sexual condition of pedophilia. This is borne out by the patient's beliefs that the staff session of September 16, 1981, in which he expressed his firm belief that he had reached maximum benefits from the treatment program and felt that he was no longer a risk to commit the sexual offenses, in that he was aware of the consequences of his deviant behavior for himself and others. This belief is erroneous, in that the staff report and the testimony given by staff members in the course of the hearing lead to the conclusion that the patient has not gained sufficient insight and understanding as to his deviant sexual behavior, sufficient to deter him from committing future sexual offenses. Michael Pomeroy, the patient's primary therapist from May, 1980, through mid-January, 1981, by his testimony, established the fact that the Petitioner had never been open enough with Pomeroy for Pomeroy to gain an understanding about what the patient's underlying problems were. It was through the witness Pomeroy's review of the history of the case that Pomeroy learned of the patient's problems with alcoholism and pedophilia related to young females. Pomeroy correctly describes the patient's participation in the program to be superficial, with the exception of the alcoholic rehabilitation aspects of the treatment and care. In dealing with Pomeroy, the patient was evasive and his behavior evidenced a manipulative demeanor (con or criminal attitude). In dealing with the question of his sexual problem, the patient simply would tell Pomeroy that he, the patient, wanted treatment. Pomeroy found the patient to be of the persuasion that the patient did not feel that he had a problem other than alcoholism, which had been overcome, and having overcome the alcoholism, all other problems were taken care of. Pomeroy found LeGer to have no understanding of what caused him to do his sexual acting out or what to do about that acting out in the future. These attitudes by the patient continued through the time of the final hearing, according to Pomeroy. In view of the lack of insight and no clear changes in attitude during the course of treatment and the resulting belief by the Petitioner that he does not have a problem of sexual deviance, Pomeroy's testimony establishes the fact that the Respondent is unable to treat the patient's pedophilia and the fact that his condition of pedophilia still presents a danger to society. Connie Smith, the patient's therapist from January, 1981, to the present, identified the most recent analysis by the staff of the problems presented by the patient's clinical profile. Those problems are: (1) gaining insight and understanding into deviant sexual behavior; (2) defensiveness and evasiveness with regard to relating feedback about himself and events directly related to his sexual problems; (3) exploring his needs to be over attentive to the needs and problems of others; and (4) exploring his dependence on alcohol. In these areas, Smith has found that the patient has not progressed in dealing with his sexual deviation and tends to over exaggerate his progress in that area. LeGer tells the therapist that he will do what she wishes him to do to participate in the program; however, he does not believe that he needs the therapy. (This comports with the testimony which LeGer gave in the course of the hearing. Notwithstanding this belief, he stated that he wanted to stay six months more in the program and that he would have done better had the therapy been more intense. The witnesses Carroll and Rogers agreed with this latter remark by the Petitioner and also expressed a belief that the patient had successfully completed the program, opinions not supported by the other evidence and not accepted by this Hearing Officer.) According to Smith, when LeGer has occasionally discussed the event which placed him in the program on this occasion, i.e., sexual battery on a minor female, he has discussed it in a superficial way and tended to place some blame on the victim. Finally, Smith agrees with Pomeroy's perception that the patient does not have sufficient insight into his problem and continues to meet the definition of a sex offender within the meaning of Chapter 917, Florida Statutes, and will not make progress by additional stay in the program. These perceptions are well founded. The Clinical Director of the Florida State Hospital Sex Offender Program, Robert H. Alcorn, presented the Petitioner's situation through a staffing conference of program officials in the other sex offender programs offered by the Respondent. This occurred on November 2, 1981, and it was the feeling of the other program officials that they would not be able to assist the Petitioner further, and in that sense, as in the situation at Florida State Hospital, had exhausted treatment for the Petitioner's underlying sexual deviance. The Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the patient's sexual problem, but that treatment has not been totally successful and the patient continues to be a sexual menace and there is a likelihood that the patient would commit other sexual crimes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services finding that it has exhausted all appropriate treatment for Edward G. LeGer in its sex offender programs and that said Edward G. LeGer be returned to the committing court for further disposition. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of January, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward G. LeGer Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324 Ted Mack, Esquire Florida State Hospital Chattahoochee, Florida 32324
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent HealthSouth Corporation engaged in an unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner Mary A. King, and, if so, what relief should be granted to Petitioner, if any.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Mary A. King is a black female born on April 5, 1952. Respondent HealthSouth Corporation operates HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Tallahassee, located in Tallahassee, Florida. Petitioner was initially employed by HealthSouth in 1995 as a nurse tech or certified nursing assistant (CNA) in the nursing department. In 1998 she suffered a back injury while performing her regular CNA duties. She received treatment for the injury and returned to work with lifting limitations placed on her by her doctor. The limitations were inconsistent with her duties as a CNA and are still in effect. In 1999 Petitioner requested a transfer to the position of patient transporter aide due to her lifting limitations and concerns over her back injury. Her transfer request was granted, and she began to work as a patient transporter in the physical therapy department. She was pleased with the transfer. As a patient transporter, Petitioner was responsible for transporting patients to and from the locations in the hospital where they received treatment. She was not directly involved in the administration of treatment to patients. Subsequently, Petitioner was transferred from the physical therapy department to the occupational therapy department. Her position and job duties remained the same; the only change was in the types of patients Petitioner transported. On September 1, 2004, new federal regulations went into effect. These regulations directly impacted all in-patient rehabilitation hospitals, limiting the types of patients that HealthSouth could accept. The new regulations had a severe impact on HealthSouth, causing a dramatic drop in the patient census. The 76-bed facility had an average daily census of 65, and occasionally up to 76, prior to the effective date, but only a patient census in the 30s and 40s after the effective date of the new regulations. With the dramatic drop in patient census, HealthSouth had to dramatically reduce costs. Lynn Streetman, Administrator of HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Tallahassee, looked at a variety of ways in which costs could be reduced, including re- structuring contracts with outside vendors, reducing orders of medical supplies, reducing or substituting pharmaceutical orders, discontinuing the use of P.R.N. or as-needed staff, and, ultimately, reducing the workforce at the hospital. Streetman began reducing the workforce through attrition. As positions at the hospital became vacant, they were not filled if they were not critical to the functioning of the hospital and if there would not be a negative impact on patient care. Although reducing the workforce through attrition helped, more workforce reductions were necessary to respond to the hospital's declining patient census. In order to determine what positions to eliminate, Streetman preliminarily reviewed all positions throughout the facility and developed a list of positions she thought could be eliminated with minimal impact on the hospital's operations. The criteria she used included whether the position was a clinical or non-clinical position, whether the position was essential to the operation of the hospital or merely a luxury position, whether the duties of the position could be effectively absorbed by other positions in the hospital, and what impact the elimination of the position would have on patient care. Streetman next met individually with members of the hospital's senior management team to discuss the positions in their respective departments that she had preliminarily identified as appropriate for elimination. She obtained input from the team members as to whether it would be appropriate to eliminate those positions and what impact their elimination would have on the functioning of their respective departments. After she met with the team members to discuss the reduction in force and consider their input, Streetman made the decision to eliminate 13 positions at the hospital in December 2004 and January 2005. Three positions were eliminated in December, and ten were eliminated in January. Streetman was the person responsible for making the final decision about which positions to eliminate. Of those employees affected by the reduction in force, 6 were black and 7 were white. Of those employees affected by the reduction in force, 6 were over 40 years of age, and 7 were under 40 years of age. Each employee whose position was eliminated as a part of the reduction in force was informed that he or she would be eligible to purchase insurance benefits through COBRA for up to 18 months after his or her employment with the hospital ended, each was paid for any accrued paid time off, and each eligible employee received severance benefits in accordance with an identical formula: one week of pay for every year of service up to a maximum of ten years. With the exception of a part-time employee who was not eligible, all employees affected by the reduction in force received benefits, paid time off payments, or severance payments in accordance with these policies. One of the positions selected for elimination was that of patient transporter. When Streetman was employed by HealthSouth, there had been three patient transporters. Two of the three positions had already been eliminated through attrition, and Petitioner was the only remaining patient transporter. Since Petitioner's position was eliminated, HealthSouth has not hired anyone as a patient transporter. Petitioner's position was selected for elimination because it was not essential to the operation of the hospital, was not responsible for any direct patient care, and was a luxury position for the facility. As verification that the elimination of Petitioner's position would not have a negative impact on the level of patient care at the hospital, Streetman considered that therapists at the hospital had already been assisting in the transportation of patients to and from treatment and that the previous reduction of two patient transporters through attrition did not negatively impact patient care at the hospital. Petitioner's job duties were absorbed into the daily work routine of therapists in the outpatient therapy department. Therapists simply transported their own patients rather than have Petitioner (and the other transporters who had previously been phased out through attrition) perform this function for them. Petitioner was informed of the decision to eliminate her position on November 30, 2004, by Donna Crawford, Director of Clinical Services, and Cindy Cox, Occupational Therapy Team Leader. Crawford informed Petitioner that Petitioner's position was being eliminated, that Petitioner would receive severance pay in accordance with her years of service, that Petitioner would be paid for all of her accrued paid time off, and that Petitioner was welcome to apply for any other open position at the hospital for which she was qualified. Crawford also told her that Petitioner was welcome to discuss any open positions with Jackie Chaires, Human Resources Director at the hospital. Petitioner was paid 360 hours of severance pay (nine weeks pay for nine years of service), was compensated for all accrued paid time off, and was sent a letter informing her of her right to purchase insurance under COBRA for up to 18 months after her employment with Respondent had ended. Petitioner also applied for and received unemployment benefits as a result of her job being eliminated. After Crawford advised her that her position had been eliminated, Petitioner went to talk with Jackie Chaires, a black female. Petitioner told Chaires that she did not understand why she had been laid off and asked about any available positions. During that conversation, in an attempt to console Petitioner according to Chaires' affidavit but as an act of discrimination according to Petitioner's testimony, Chaires suggested that Petitioner could also retire and let Petitioner's husband take care of her. At no time did Chaires suggest that Petitioner's husband's situation, his income, or Petitioner's age were factors in HealthSouth's decision to eliminate her position as part of its reduction in force. Moreover, Chaires was not involved in any way in the selection of Petitioner's position for elimination. At some point after being informed that their positions were eliminated, Petitioner, along with Kim Spencer, another employee affected by the reduction in workforce, inquired as to whether there were positions available in the nursing department. However, there were no positions available in that department, and both Petitioner and Spencer were informed that their requests could not be accommodated. Spencer is a white female. HealthSouth has a written policy prohibiting employees from giving letters of recommendation. At some point after being informed that her position was eliminated, Petitioner asked Cynthia Cox, her direct supervisor, for a letter of recommendation. Cox agreed to give her one even though she was uncertain as to the correct procedure, but after ascertaining from the human resources department that a recommendation would be against corporate policy, Cox told Petitioner she could not give her the letter and told Petitioner that it was against corporate policy. That policy is clearly stated in the hospital's employee handbook, which Petitioner had been given. At no time prior to her filing her charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations did Petitioner inform any of her supervisors that she felt she was being discriminated against in any way based on either her race or her age. Patsy Kitchens is a white female who is the same age as Petitioner. HealthSouth terminated her employment at the same time as it terminated Petitioner's employment as part of the same reduction in force.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner failed in her burden of proof and dismissing the petition filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary King 1039 Idlewild Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32311 L. Traywick Duffie, Esquire Wesley E. Stockard, Esquire Hunton & Williams, LLP Suite 4100 600 Peachtree Street, Northeast Atlanta, Georgia 30308-2216
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Board of Medicine was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of physicians and the regulation of the medical profession in Florida. Respondent was licensed as a physician in Florida under license No. ME 0040325, and at all times pertinent was assigned as Medical Director of Manatee Glens Corporation, (Manatee). Manatee is a corporation which operates a community mental health center and which provides out patient therapy sessions for residents of various Adult Congregate Living Facilities, (ACLF'S). One of the facilities where Manatee personnel provide therapy is Campbell House in Sarasota. A part of Respondent's responsibility as Medical Director of Manatee was to supervise the treatment of patients residing in the ACLF's, to review the appropriateness of treatment and to review the authorizations for treatment. Patient #1 and his wife, Imogene, were married for 52 years. He was a retired officer in the United States Army, and after his military service, worked for several years in the real estate and securities field in the Sarasota area. Some time after his retirement, Patient #1 was diagnosed as having Parkinson's Disease. In 1986, he began hallucinating. His condition deteriorated badly and reached the point where he could not make decisions. Because of that, Imogene obtained a durable Power of Attorney to allow her to conduct her husband's affairs. In March, 1993, when Imogene could no longer care for her husband at home, she placed him in Campbell House. At the time of the placement, Imogene provided the staff with the power of attorney and her home phone number. By this time Patient #1 had ceased communicating and, she believed, could neither talk nor read. Shortly after his placement, on March 30, 1993, the patient was interviewed by Anne Phillips, an outreach therapist for Manatee, to determine if he was a suitable participant in Manatee's outreach program. After she explained the program to him in detail and in what was described as simple terms, Ms. Phillips requested that the patient sign the consent for treatment form for enrollment in the Manatee program. As a result, Patient #1 signed a consent form authorizing Manatee Glens Corporation to provide him with therapy services at the ACLF. There is no evidence that the patient was coerced or threatened in order to make him sign the form. However, Petitioner claims, as does Imogene, that the signature is not valid because Patient #1 was not mentally competent to consent to, or otherwise authorize, such treatment for himself. There is evidence to the contrary, however. Ms. Phillips indicates the patient appeared able to concentrate on what he was being told and to understand what he was being asked to sign. On March 31, 1993, the day after Patient #1 signed the consent form, Manatee Glens began providing therapy services to him. Respondent authorized the treatment plan utilized for the patient. Imogene had never authorized any treatment for her husband, and when, in mid-October, 1993 she learned that he was receiving the therapy sessions, she asked that they be discontinued. By that time, the patient's mind had deteriorated to the point where he did not recognize his wife. There is a conflict in the evidence as to whether the patient was able to participate in or benefit from the therapy sessions which were conducted. Treatment records indicate that at times he seemed to be aware of his peers but he could not name them and could not discuss anything about them. There is some substantial doubt as to whether he even knew the name of the counselor who conducted the therapy sessions, Anne Phillips. He would, at times, sleep through all or a part of a session and often had trouble giving yes or no answers to simple questions. On the other hand, Mr. Djelic, the home operator who observed the patient on a daily basis, reports he regularly read the newspaper and occasionally read a magazine. He was capable of feeding himself, getting dressed and letting others know when he had to go to the bathroom and, in the opinion of Mr. Djelic, was relatively functional. His medications at the time included Senement which has the side effects of confusion, depression and memory impairment. He had both good and bad days depending upon the effects of his medication and his Parkinson's disease. When he was examined by Dr. Schwartzbaum on March 8, 1993, he was diagnosed as having Parkinson's disease, but there was no indication of any mental health limitation, and none of the records presented at the hearing indicated any diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease. The evidence of that diagnosis came solely from the patient's wife and is hearsay. Respondent did not examine the patient in question before authorizing the treatment complained of. He reviewed the patient's medical records, including the report by Dr. Schwartzbaum, and from them concluded that when the patient signed the consent form on March 30, 1993 he was knowledgeable, aware and cognizant about what he was signing, what the treatment entailed, and that he would be paying for the treatment. Respondent also determined that the patient participated in identifying some goals for treatment. Based on this information, Respondent concluded that the patient was competent to sign the consent form. There was no evidence that Patient #1 had ever been declared incompetent by a court or that a guardian had been appointed to manage his affairs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint in this matter charging Dr. Einisman with a violation of Section 458.331(1)(p), Florida Statutes, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of September, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein except for the diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease which is not supported by any independent evidence or record. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted and incorporated herein. Second sentence not proven by competence evidence of record. & 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. First and second sentences accepted and incorporate herein. Remainder not proven by competent evidence of record. - 11. Not proven by competent evidence of record. FOR THE RESPONDENT: - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. First 5 sentences accepted and incorporated herein. Sixth sentence not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of testimony. Seventh sentence accepted and incor- porated herein. Eighth sentence accepted. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. Accepted but considered in light of the fact that the witness is the Respondent. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven A. Rothenburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 9325 Bay Plaza Boulevard, Suite 210 Tampa, Florida 33619 Richard D. Saba, Esquire 2033 Main Street, Suite 303 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue The issues in this case, as set forth in the Prehearing Stipulation, are as follows: Whether Respondent was terminated from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count I] Whether Respondent failed to update his practitioner profile within fifteen days of the filing of the order terminating him from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with T.J.[1/] for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with T.J.; [Case No. 14-1342, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with M.B. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with M.B.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with C.J. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with C.J.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with D.K. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with D.K.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with A.H. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with A.H.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] and Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with S.D. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with S.D. [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II]
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine (the “Department”) is the State agency responsible for licensing and monitoring physicians in the State of Florida. The Department regulates the practice of medicine in accordance with section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Unless specifically stated otherwise herein, all references to Florida Statutes will be to the 2014 codification. Respondent is a licensed Florida physician, certified in the area of pain management, holding license number ME 97134. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was practicing medicine at one of two locations: the Back Authority for Contemporary Knowledge, (a pain management clinic known as the “Back Center” located in Melbourne, Florida); and Advantacare (in its Altamonte Springs and Daytona Beach offices). Respondent was employed at the Back Center from January 2008 through September 2011, and at Advantacare from March 2012 through April 2013. Respondent provided pain management services for numerous patients during his tenure at each of the clinics. While at the Back Center, he saw 50 to 60 patients per day in an 8-hour workday, doing about 15 medication injections per day. At Advantacare he was seeing about 30 patients per day. By all accounts, Respondent is a skilled and proficient pain management physician. At Advantacare, Respondent would see patients for regular office visits at the Altamonte Springs office on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday; Wednesday would be set aside for administering injections under a fluoroscope, described as sort of a C-shaped X-ray machine, performed at the Daytona Beach office. None of the sexual behavior alleged in the Administrative Complaints occurred during injections performed under fluoroscope. A general policy existed at the Back Center that required physicians to have another facility employee (medical technician, nurse, other) present in an examination room when a physician was providing care to a patient not of the same gender as the doctor. This “chaperone” policy is standard in the health care industry. There is no credible evidence that Respondent was ever shown the Back Center’s policy in writing, although it is probable the policy was accessible on the website of the entity (Osler Corporation) that owned the Back Center for a period of time. As a practicing physician, Respondent was also presumed to be aware of and to follow the chaperone policy and he admitted knowing about the policy in general. Respondent was, however, verbally apprised of the policy by his supervisor, Dr. Hynes, by the clinic operations manager, Mr. Pachkoski, and by the chief administrative officer, Cathy Bird. Respondent acknowledged that it was best to have another person in the examination room if he was providing treatment to a female patient. If no chaperone was available, it was his stated practice to keep the door open. Respondent did not feel like assistants were always available to chaperone, but neither his supervisor (Dr. Hynes) nor a co-physician (Dr. Zaidi) remembers Respondent complaining that staff was not available at the Back Center. The testimony of all six complainants in this case contradicts Respondent’s contention; each of them said they were treated by Respondent (alone) in a room with the door closed. When asked directly whether he ever treated female patients at the Back Center in a room with the door closed, Respondent admitted that it happened on occasion. The best and most persuasive evidence in this case is that a chaperone policy did exist and that Respondent did not follow the policy. Between September 2008 and January 2013, Respondent treated six female patients who are the subjects of the Department’s Administrative Complaint. Each of the patients is identified only by their initials in an attempt to maintain their confidentiality and privacy. The six patients will be addressed in chronological order based on the dates of their alleged mistreatment by Respondent. Patient S.D. Patient S.D. was a patient of Respondent between September and December 2008. S.D.’s status as a patient was stipulated to by the parties.2/ While she was Respondent’s patient, S.D. was also an employee of the Back Center. During the period of time Respondent was treating S.D., they engaged in a series of emails which could be construed as very sexual in nature. For example, on September 23, 2008, Respondent and S.D. had the following email exchange: S.D. – “You buying Dinner….Or am I your [f***ing] dinner????”Respondent – “What do you think? I want u as breakfast, lunch and dinner. My precious love.” S.D. – Ok so what am I going to eat LOL??? Let me guess a protein shake”Respondent – “If I shake it hard enough yes.” Then, on September 25, the two had this email exchange:Respondent – “NO I WANT U TO FEED ME!!! AND NO YOU R NOT GOING THERE!!! ABSOLUTELY NOT!!! I’M UR MAN AND I SAY NO.”S.D. – “Then act like it and stop flirting with the [f***ing] skank!”Respondent – “WHY? GETTING JEALOUS SWEETHEART?”S.D. - “No I guess I have no reason to be.” Respondent – “EXACTLY, YOU HAD ME AT LUNCH AND LEFT TO GO TO WORK. SO YOU CAN’T SAY ANYTHING, PRECIOUS.” Respondent denies that the exchange of emails with S.D. suggests anything of a sexual nature. He said, e.g., that in his Iranian culture, talking about eating someone was tantamount to saying you cared deeply for them. Respondent’s denial of the sexual nature of the emails is not persuasive. S.D. did not testify at final hearing nor was her testimony preserved by way of a deposition transcript. The Department offered into evidence an exhibit comprised of various emails between S.D. and Respondent, two of which were discussed above. At least one co-worker, Lizamar Korfhage (a physician’s assistant at the Back Center), heard S.D. yell loudly in the office--as S.D. was being terminated from employment--that she (S.D.) and Respondent were having sexual relations. Cathy Bird, former chief administrative officer at the Back Center, had discussed the alleged affair with S.D. during several conversations before S.D.'s employment with the Back Center ended. Bird also talked with Respondent about the situation after S.D. was fired from the Back Center. Respondent was concerned that S.D. would tell Respondent’s wife about the affair and sought Bird’s guidance in the matter. Based upon the entirety of the clear and convincing evidence presented, Respondent was involved in a sexual relationship with S.D. at some point in time when S.D. was also a patient of the Back Center. Patient T.J. Patient T.J. was a 37-year-old patient when she saw Respondent at the Back Center on October 29, 2010. T.J. had seen Respondent professionally some 16 or so times previously. No inappropriate conduct had occurred on any of those visits. On the October 29 visit, T.J. was escorted into an examination room by a nurse as usual. Respondent came in and, after examining her, suggested that trigger point injections might help alleviate her pain, which she described as being a “2” on a scale of 1 to 10.3/ She agreed to the plan of treatment. Respondent had T.J. sit on an armless stool and lean her arms and head onto a desk. Respondent stood on her left side and began administering injections into her neck. As he leaned against her body, T.J. felt what she described as Respondent’s erect penis rubbing on her upper arm or shoulder. She felt like Respondent was intentionally rubbing her in what she later concluded to be a sexual manner. When he finished the injections, Respondent did not act any differently than usual. T.J. felt like something “weird” had just happened, but decided not to report it because she was not completely sure about her perceptions. Respondent, in contradiction to T.J.’s testimony, said he generally stayed four to five inches away from his patient when administering the injections, but would sometimes come into contact with them. T.J. returned for a follow up visit on November 24, 2010, receiving another injection by Respondent. She reported no misconduct by Respondent on that date. On December 23, 2010, T.J. returned to the Back Center for additional treatment. This time, her pain was radiating all the way down to her buttocks area and was described as a “3” out of 10. She was again escorted to an examination room to wait for Respondent. Respondent came in and closed the door, as was his usual practice during T.J.’s visits. After examining her, Respondent suggested injections for sacroiliac joint pain. T.J. was told to lie on the examination table on her left side. Respondent had T.J. lower her jeans to just below her knees. She had her left leg out straight and her right leg bent at the knee and across her left leg. Respondent then began to press his fingers on different parts of her inner thigh searching for the source of her pain. The pain was centered between her knee and buttocks area, and Respondent made an injection in that area. Respondent then had T.J. roll over to her right side as he pulled the table slightly away from the wall and placed himself between the wall and the table. Respondent began pushing on her inner thigh again, starting at her knee and moving upward toward her buttocks. As he did that, his tone of voice changed and he began panting. He continued to touch and probe her thighs as his hands went higher until he ultimately touched her vagina. T.J. immediately said, “That’s it” and quickly got off the examination table and pulled up her jeans. Respondent appeared sweaty and red-faced, looking to T.J. like a person who had just engaged in sex. T.J. then began to consider whether Respondent’s behavior during the October 29, 2010, visit had indeed been sexual in nature as well. She concluded that it was, and decided not to see Respondent for treatment in the future. She did not, however, report either of the incidents to the Back Center immediately. She ultimately did so, telling physician's assistant Korfhage about the incident some 10 months later. After seeing a report on television in 2013 that Respondent had been accused by another patient of sexual misconduct, she decided to make a report to the police about her own experiences with Respondent. When the police did not prosecute, she contacted an attorney in order to file a civil action against Respondent. T.J. appeared to be honest and forthright during her appearance at final hearing. Her testimony about her version of the events was credible, clear, and convincing. In his testimony at final hearing, Respondent did not specifically refute T.J.’s testimony so much as he explained how his normal process would not allow for the kind of touching T.J. alleged to have occurred. Respondent did not specifically or directly deny touching patient T.J.’s vagina, saying only that there would be no reason to do so. Patient D.K. (also known as D.W.) D.K. was a regular patient of Respondent and the Back Center. She had an appointment on January 13, 2011, to see Respondent for pain she was experiencing in her lower back and sides. On previous visits to the Back Center, Respondent had done localized injections to help D.K. deal with the pain. On those visits, she had simply rolled her pants down below her waist and leaned against the examination table in order for Respondent to do the injections. On the January 13 visit, she was told to lie on the table and pull her jeans down to her knees while Respondent went to prepare the medications. Respondent returned, closing the door as he came into the room. Respondent began injecting medications into her back and both sides. He then moved lower and administered injections into her thighs although she had not complained about any pain in that area. Respondent then moved her jeans down to her ankles and began administering injections into her calves. While he was injecting her, she felt him rubbing his erect penis against her thighs and heard his breathing get heavier. She could also feel Respondent lean closer to her and felt his breath on her thighs as he injected her calves. After the injections were complete, D.K. said Respondent was sweating, flushed, and “looked like my husband after we’ve had intercourse.” D.K. left the office and returned to her car. She immediately began to mentally process what had occurred to her, but did not immediately tell anyone at the Back Center. She was shocked and upset by the event but waited a few days before telling her husband what had happened. She then reported the events to someone at the Back Center. The Back Center asked her to come in so she could discuss the situation with Dr. Hynes, medical director of the Back Center. Later, D.K. made a complaint to local law enforcement about the incident. D.K. has also contacted an attorney to look into filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. In response to the complaint by D.K., Dr. Hynes mandated that Respondent have a medical assistant with him during any contact with female patients. Despite the prohibition, Respondent continued to see female patients in an examination room without others present. He was confronted several times by the site operations manager about this violation, but Respondent did not change his behavior. D.K. was a credible witness. She provided a clear and unequivocal description of what transpired during her visit to the Back Center on January 13, 2011. Patient C.J. Patient C.J. presented to the Back Center experiencing pain as a result of shrapnel wounds received while she was serving in the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. C.J. did not testify at final hearing so her physical demeanor could not be assessed. Her deposition transcript was admitted into evidence over objection. In May 2011, C.J. was referred to the Back Center by her treating physician at Patrick Air Force Base. She took the referral, called the Back Center, and was assigned to Respondent for pain management services. C.J. went to the Back Center on May 4, 2011. She was experiencing significant pain and was physically uncomfortable. C.J. was processed in by a receptionist and then led to an examination room by a female employee. The employee took C.J.’s blood pressure, gathered some personal information, and left the room. On that date, C.J. was wearing jeans, a blouse, and open- toed shoes. She had on “full underwear” that day. Respondent came into the room and examined C.J. as she sat on the examining table. He advised C.J. that an injection might benefit her. As C.J. remembered it, the injection was to be in the side of her neck, and then in her back or hip. Respondent left the room to obtain the medications as C.J. waited. Upon his return to the room, Respondent injected Depo- Medrol 40 mg, Toradol 30 mg, Lidocaine 2% 0.5 mL, and Marcaine 0.5 mL into the left side of her neck. After the initial injection, Respondent left the room while the medication took effect. C.J. began to feel very relaxed and sleepy. Respondent recollects that C.J. complained of feeling light-headed, but does not believe any medication he injected would have caused that to happen. Respondent later returned to the room and prepared to give C.J. another injection into her hip area. She sat up on the table as Respondent pulled one end of the table slightly away from the wall.4/ After moving the table, Respondent had C.J. lie down on her side, lift her blouse, and unbuckle her jeans. She then slid her jeans and underwear down past her hips as directed. At that point, Respondent began injecting a solution into C.J.’s hip. As the injection was proceeding, she felt Respondent slide his hand over her hip and “in my groin area.” While doing that, Respondent’s crotch was pressed against C.J.’s buttocks. C.J. felt what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her buttocks as he administered the injection. After the injection was completed, Respondent came around from behind the table and told C.J. she would need to come see him again in a few weeks. C.J. got up from the table and began to realize that “something was not right” about the treatment she had just received. When C.J. went to the front desk to check out, she asked a nurse to identify the medications which had been injected but was unable to get that information. C.J. then left the Back Center and immediately called her nurse case manager at Patrick Air Force Base to report what had occurred. Her nurse advised C.J. to call 911 to report the incident; C.J. did so as she walked out to her car in the parking lot. A policeman arrived some 20 minutes later and took her statement. The officer then went inside to talk to Respondent. He said Respondent appeared to be surprised and shocked by C.J.’s allegation. The police decided not to file any charges against Respondent based on C.J.’s complaint. The reporting police officer (Middendorf) seemed to question C.J.’s veracity or truthfulness on the day of the incident. He said C.J. was upset and seemed lethargic, except when she was talking on the telephone to “one of her superiors.” According to Middendorf, C.J. acted consistent with someone who may be under the influence of drugs. He did acknowledge that C.J. had just come out of a pain management clinic. Middendorf also felt C.J. was either confused or not telling the truth concerning where Respondent had allegedly touched her. C.J., who was obviously distraught at the time, indicated both her pubic area and her outer thigh when she told Middendorf that Respondent had touched her “groin.” Middendorf challenged her about that and C.J. became defensive and argumentative. He did not provide any credible testimony as to why he believed she might be lying to him. His statement that C.J.’s voice changed when she was talking to her office on the phone is not conclusive evidence that she was not telling him the truth. C.J. never returned to the Back Center. She obtained pain management treatment elsewhere. Inasmuch as C.J.’s demeanor could not be judged because she did not appear in person, her testimony must be considered using other factors. In this case, the testimony was very similar to the facts described by other patients of Respondent concerning their treatment by him. The events as described by C.J. were believable and convincing, especially when compared to the allegations by other alleged victims. Neither C.J. nor any of the other alleged victims/complainants has talked to other alleged victims about their experiences, so there does not appear to be any collusion between the victims. Patient M.B. Patient M.B. was already a regular patient at the Back Center when she first saw Respondent on July 7, 2011. Respondent’s notes in M.B.’s chart indicate the patient was presenting for “initial evaluation” that day, but that was not correct; she had already been seen several times by other physicians at the Back Center. M.B. had chronic lumbalgia (low back pain) and lower extremity dysesthesia (a burning sensation) which was increasing progressively. Respondent examined M.B., discussed his findings, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for August 2, 2011, at which time he gave her an injection of 1% Xylocaine with approximately 30 ml of Lidocaine 1% on both of her side hips. He also injected a block with a solution containing 2 ml of Marcaine 0.5%, 2 ml of Lidocaine 2%, and 2 ml of Depo- Medrol 80 mg into M.B.’s joints. M.B. reported no suspicious or untoward behavior by Respondent during the July 7 and August 2 appointments. On August 29, 2011, M.B. returned to see Respondent. She presented with pain in her hips and left side. Nurse Bobbi McDonald escorted M.B. to the examination room and took her vital signs before leaving. Respondent came into the room, alone, and closed the door. At that visit, M.B. was wearing khaki mid-thigh cargo shorts, a blouse that tied around her neck, and bikini underwear. Respondent asked about her pain, touched points on her body to identify the exact pain locations, and adjusted her back manually. He then suggested injection of a steroid as a stop-gap measure prior to scheduling her for a fluoroscope injection later. M.B. agreed to the plan. Respondent left the examination room to get the medication. When he returned, he was alone and again he closed the door. Respondent told M.B. to pull her shorts down below her waist and to cover herself with a paper gown. She pulled her shorts and underwear down about halfway across her buttocks, which was lower than she would normally pull them for fluoroscope injections. Respondent began to clean the area for the injection and asked M.B. to pull her garments down further, below her buttocks. Respondent then pulled the table out from the wall and he went between the table and the wall. He injected M.B.’s hip about five times with a solution containing Depo Medrol 80, Toradol 60, Lidocaine, and Marcaine 1 ml. As he injected her, M.B. could feel Respondent’s groin touching her hip. She could feel what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis rubbing against her in a back and forth motion. By this time, her paper gown had fallen off, exposing her buttocks and vaginal area. After the last injection, M.B. felt Respondent’s fingers touching her vagina. As she pushed upward to get off the table, M.B. felt Respondent touch her vagina again. She got off the table, pulled up her pants, and sat down as the doctor began talking to her. M.B. did not say anything to Respondent. She immediately believed that she had been sexually assaulted, but was too confused and shocked to say anything to anyone. M.B. did not initially report Respondent’s behavior to the Back Center. She later reported her allegations to the Melbourne Police Department and also filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent and the Back Center. (M.B. would continue to return to the Back Center, but did not see Respondent again for any of her treatments.) M.B.’s testimony was not as immediately believable as that of some of the other witnesses. Based on her personality, fear of the process, or some other factor, she seemed to be fairly emotionless in describing the incident. However, inasmuch as her testimony was corroborated by what other patients had experienced, her clearly enunciated statements are convincing. Further, M.B. exhibited extreme visual cues as to her intense dislike for Respondent at the final hearing. The testimony of M.B. alone would not be clear and convincing evidence of any wrongdoing by Respondent. However, her testimony is corroboration of and support for the testimony of other victims. Respondent's employment at the Back Center was terminated shortly after M.B.'s appointment with him. There is no evidence as to Respondent's employment from September 2011 until he went to Advantacare in March 2012. Patient A.H. Patient A.H. presented to Advantacare (Daytona Beach office) on January 9, 2013, in an effort to address pain she was suffering as a result of an automobile accident that occurred in October 2012. She wanted to reduce her pain while also reducing the amount of medications she was taking. A.H. had a job which required driving, so she needed to be as drug-free as possible. A.H. was escorted to the examination room. She remembers that Respondent came in, closed the door, and propped it shut. Respondent remembers the door to that room being open, that it would open by itself unless something was placed against it. The medical technician assigned to Respondent said the door did not have any problems, but it would always be half open. There is no corroborated evidence as to whether the door to the room was open, closed, or ajar when A.H. was being examined. Respondent examined A.H. and began to show her some exercises and stretches that he thought might alleviate some of her pain. As she was sitting in a chair being shown how to stretch, A.H. felt Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her back. She quickly told Respondent “I’ve got it” in order to stop his actions. She got up quickly and moved to another chair in the office. A.H. clearly described what she had felt and had no confusion or doubt about what happened. Her testimony about the incident was credible. Respondent then told A.H. to lie on the table on her side with her arms stretched out in front of her. Despite what had just happened, A.H. complied with his directions.5/ When she got into position, Respondent had A.H. move her body over to the very edge of the table and began to manipulate her back. As his hands continued down her back, she felt his hands go down inside her panties. As this happened, she could feel Respondent “humping” her, grinding his groin area against her backside. Respondent then told A.H. to change positions on the table, moving her feet to the opposite end. Amazingly, she again complied with his instructions. Respondent began touching her upper thigh near her vagina and “did the same thing he had done before.” At that, A.H. quickly moved off the table and onto a chair, where she sat rigid and refused to move. Respondent seemed calm and relaxed, showing no sign of having acted inappropriately. A.H. did not tell anyone at Advantacare about the incident on that day because she could not fully grasp what had happened. As she began to understand the situation better, she was worried about reporting the incident because it would be her word against the doctor’s. A.H. did tell another doctor (Dr. Jacobson) about the incident when she saw him the next day for a regularly scheduled appointment. Dr. Jacobson had been an employee with Advantacare and presumably relayed A.H.’s allegations to the center. A.H. also reported the incident to the Board of Health and to law enforcement. She later contacted an attorney about filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. A.H. did not return to Advantacare for treatment after this event because of the traumatic impact of the incident. Respondent has no independent recollection of A.H. as a patient, but said he did not touch her inappropriately. A.H.’s testimony was believable. She was a credible witness and articulated her testimony clearly. It is strange that A.H. would continue to obey Respondent even after he had touched her inappropriately, but she was obviously a compliant person, especially as it relates to physicians. Respondent’s defenses to allegations by patients Respondent claims he never saw a written chaperone policy at the Back Center but that he knew that it existed. According to him, there was insufficient staff available to make it possible to comply with the policy. Respondent’s testimony in this regard is rejected as being contrary to better, more persuasive evidence. Respondent said he was on several medications for “five or six years” prior to the final hearing, including Zoloft for mild depression, Lisinopril for hypertension, and Toprol for hypertension. One of the possible side effects of those medications is impotence or erectile dysfunction. However, during the time he was taking these drugs, Respondent fathered his two children. There is no competent evidence that Respondent suffered from impotence or erectile dysfunction during the time of any of the allegations about sexual misconduct. Respondent usually wore a lab coat when treating patients. The coat is long and had large pockets in the front, at about groin level. Respondent would keep empty syringes in his coat pocket. He suggests that female patients who said they felt his erect penis were actually feeling the syringes. His suggestion is not very plausible or persuasive. Respondent demonstrated at final hearing the normal physical stance he took when doing an injection of a patient in an examination room setting. He suggested that his body would be turned at a 45-degree angle from the patient rather than facing them directly, thus eliminating the possibility of full frontal contact with the patient. He also said that he generally stood four or five inches away from the patient, but might come into contact with the patient occasionally. Neither the statements nor his demonstration were persuasive. Respondent’s contention is that each and every one of the patients who alleged sexual misconduct was lying. He suggests that patient D.K. was overweight and thus would not have sexually aroused him. Also, he maintains that her description of the injections being performed while Respondent was rubbing against her would have necessarily resulted in horrible pain at best or a broken needle at worst. He claims that since patient M.B. was married to a policeman, she would have necessarily taken photographs of her numerous injections to preserve a record and she would have complained immediately. Her failure to do so, he suggests, impugns her testimony. Respondent contends that patient T.J.’s tardiness in reporting her allegations suggests the allegations were false. Respondent refutes A.H.’s allegations on the basis that there was a disagreement as to the physical layout of the medical office. Respondent contends there is no evidence that patient S.D. (his alleged lover) was his patient, even though there is a stipulation to that effect. Despite these speculative defenses, the evidence presented by the alleged victims is credible and accepted as fact. Failure to update practitioner profile A letter dated March 27, 2013, advising Respondent of his termination from participation in the Medicaid Program, was mailed to Respondent at two separate addresses: 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard, Suite 610, Melbourne, Florida 32901, i.e., the address of the Back Center, and 930 South Harbor City Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida 32901, the address for Osler (the company with whom the Back Center merged at some point in time). The letter to 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard was received on April 1, 2013, and an acknowledgement was signed by Chandra Carrender, a Back Center employee. Respondent’s employment with the Back Center had been terminated some 16 months previously, i.e., in August 2011. The letter mailed to 930 Harbor City Boulevard was returned as undeliverable. The termination letter provided Respondent notice of his right to contest the decision. He was given 21 days from receipt of the letter to file a Petition if he wanted to challenge the termination. Respondent did not file a challenge, so on or about June 21, 2013, a Termination Final Order was filed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), setting forth Respondent’s termination from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. The termination was issued pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes. By law, Respondent was required to update his Florida practitioner profile within 15 days of receipt of the Termination Final Order. The Termination Final Order was mailed to Respondent, return receipt requested, at two different addresses: The 930 South Harbor City Boulevard address and the 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard address. Respondent denies having received the letter or TFO until just prior to the formal administrative hearing in this matter. Licensed physicians in the State of Florida are required to maintain a current address of record with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and the Department of Health. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided evidence as to what Respondent’s official address of record was at the time the TFO and the letter were sent to Respondent at the two Harbor City Boulevard addresses. According to the deposition testimony of Michael West of the AHCA Medicaid Program Integrity office, the notices were sent to Respondent’s “address of record” per section 409.913(6), Florida Statutes. West’s testimony, however, did not specify what address that was. It might be logically presumed that one or both of the Harbor City Boulevard addresses were the “address of record,” because that is where the notices were mailed. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to Respondent’s official address of record at the time the Termination Final Order was mailed. The statutory section referred to by West states: Any notice required to be given to a provider under this section is presumed to be sufficient notice if sent to the address last shown on the provider enrollment file. It is the responsibility of the provider to furnish and keep the agency informed of the provider’s current address. United States Postal Service proof of mailing or certified or registered mailing of such notice to the provider at the address shown on the provider enrollment file constitutes sufficient proof of notice. Any notice required to be given to the agency by this section must be sent to the agency at an address designated by rule. Respondent did not update his Florida practitioner profile because he claims never to have received a copy of the TFO or the letter. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided direct evidence of Respondent’s “address last shown on the provider enrollment file” as of March 27, 2013.6/ Other factual considerations Respondent was terminated from employment at the Back Center in September 2011. The termination occurred as follows: T.J. reported the alleged October 29, 2010 incident in April 2011. Dr. Hynes was already aware of another incident (from D.K. in January 2011). Dr. Hynes met with Respondent to discuss his alleged behavior. Respondent denied the allegations, saying that people just seem to like him and take advantage of him. He said the patients were lying about the incidents. Dr. Hynes mandated at that time that Respondent have a chaperone in the examining room with every female patient. Rather than being allowed to exercise “medical judgment” like other doctors in the clinic, Respondent was ordered to always use a chaperone with all female patients. After patient C.J.’s allegations came to light in May 2011, Dr. Hynes told Respondent that three times was enough; something had to be done. The Back Center commenced preparation of a termination letter. The letter was to tell Respondent that, pursuant to his Employment Agreement, the Back Center was providing him the 180-day notice of termination of employment “without cause.” The purpose of that letter was to allow Respondent time to find a job and not have a blemish on his record. One of the bases for the termination letter was that Respondent had been referred to the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) for counseling to address his behavior. Dr. Hynes presumed Respondent was obtaining that counseling. However, when C.J. reported the incident on May 4, 2011, Dr. Hynes found out that Respondent had not been going to PRN as he had previously indicated. At about the time the 180-day letter was being drafted, another incident (by patient M.B.) was reported to the Back Center. Upon hearing of that allegation, Dr. Hynes verbally fired Respondent, effective immediately, with cause. The 180-day letter was not actually delivered to Respondent until after the verbal termination, so the letter was moot when it arrived. Respondent did not tell his next employer, Advantacare, that he had been terminated from employment by the Back Center. He also did not advise Advantacare about the sexual allegations made by patients at the Back Center. In summary, Respondent engaged in activities of a sexual nature with patients at the Back Center in December 2010, January 2011, May 2011, and August 2011 (in addition to his relations with S.D. in 2008–2010). He engaged in sexually related touching of a patient at Advantacare in January 2013. His employment with the Back Center was terminated in September 2011; his employment with Advantacare was terminated in April 2013. Former patients of Respondent expressed dismay that he was being charged with the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint. They found Respondent to be a caring and professional doctor. It is clear Respondent did not treat all his patients the same way he treated the victims identified herein. Some of his co-workers said they did not see Respondent engage in any of the alleged actions. They did not receive any complaints from other patients. Respondent obviously has a stellar reputation with some of his patients and co-workers. That status, however, does not excuse his behavior with the victims in the present cases. It is also alleged that Bobbi McDonald was a rumor-mongerer and a liar. She appeared credible at final hearing and there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the dispersions cast by others. It should be noted that several witnesses identified by Respondent were displeased with the manner in which they were questioned by Department personnel prior to the final hearing. The witnesses expressed extreme discomfort when Department employees (attorneys) suggested that Respondent was “an addict” or a sociopath. While a state agency is bound to pursue all claims against individuals which it is responsible for licensing and monitoring, it is improper to harangue or disparage such persons in order to sway potential witnesses’ testimony. Upon full review of the evidence in this case, the potential witnesses who complained about the Department’s aggressive nature did not provide substantive testimony on the issues of this case. Thus, any harm which may have resulted from the Department’s statements would not affect the final decision herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health revoking Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D.’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order assess the cost of investigating and prosecuting this case, and that payment of such costs be assessed against Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2014.
