Findings Of Fact In its 1969 legislative session, the Florida Legislature enacted Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, entitled "Medical Assistance for the Needy," providing the original state legislative basis and authority for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program. Section 409.266(2), Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized the Florida Department of Social Services or any other department that the Governor might designate to: Enter into such agreement with other state agencies or any agency of the federal government and accept such duties with respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary to implement the provisions of subsection (1) and to qualify for federal aid including compliance with provisions of Public Law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965" [estab- lishing Title XIX of the Social Security Act] Section 409.266(3), Florida Statutes, as enacted, stated that: The Department is authorized and directed to prepare and operate a program and budget in order to implement and comply with the provisions of public law 86-778 and the "Social Security Amendments of 1965." No provisions of Florida law other than Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as enacted, authorized any agency to perform any function specifically to implement the Medicaid program. The State of Florida formally commenced participation in the Medicaid program effective January 1, 1970. At all times pertinent to this controversy, respondent, Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services or its predecessor agencies (referred to as "HRS"), has been and continues to be the "State Agency" identified in 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(5), and charged under Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, as amended, with the formulation of a State Plan for Medical Assistance ("State Plan"), 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a, and with the ongoing responsibility for the administration of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida. Since Florida's entry into the Medicaid program in 1970, HRS has been authorized essentially to "[e]nter into such agreements with appropriate agents, other State agencies, or any agency of the Federal Government and accept such duties in respect to social welfare or public aid as may be necessary or needed to implement the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act pertaining to medical assistance." Section 409.266(2)(a), Fla. Stat., as amended. HRS has never been authorized to enter into any agreements, accept any duties, or perform any functions with respect to the Medicaid program that are in contravention of or not authorized by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and implementing federal regulations and requirements. As a prerequisite for Florida's entry into the Medicaid program, HRS prepared and filed with the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") a State Plan, pursuant to Title XIX of the Social Security Act, and pursuant to its delegated legislative authority set forth in Section 409.266(2)(a), Florida Statutes. (In May, 1980, HEW was redesignated the United States Department of Health and Human Services, but for purposes of this action both shall be referred to as HEW.) C.W. Hollingsworth was the HRS official who had the responsibility for supervising the preparation, the filing, and for obtaining the approval of HEW of Florida's initial State Plan. Florida's initial State Plan was approved by HEW effective January 1, 1970. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, Title XIX of the Social Security Act required state plans to provide for the payment of the reasonable cost of inpatient hospital services. At the time that Florida received approval of its initial State Plan, HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid required the State Plan to provide for reimbursement of Medicaid inpatient hospital services furnished by those hospitals also participating in the Medicare program, applying the same standards, cost reimbursement principles, and methods of cost apportionment used in computing reimbursement to such hospitals under Medicare. 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a), and (b), 34 Fed. Reg. 1244 (January 25, 1969). At the time that Florida entered the Medicaid program, Medicare cost reimbursement principles in effect governing reimbursement for the cost of inpatient hospital services required payment of a participating hospital's actual and reasonable costs of providing such services to Medicare beneficiaries, and, moreover, that such payment be made on the basis of the hospital's current costs rather than upon the costs of a prior period or upon a fixed negotiated rate. 42 U.S.C. Section 1395x(v)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.451(c)(2), 405.402(a) [later renumbered 42 C.F.R. Section 405.451(c)(2) and Section 405.402(a)]. Such Medicare principles and standards also provided for interim payments to be made to the hospital during its fiscal year. At the conclusions of the subject fiscal year, the hospital was required to file a cost report wherein the hospital included all of its costs of providing covered inpatient services to Medicare beneficiaries. A settlement or "retroactive adjustment" process then was required to reconcile the amount of interim payments received by the hospital during the fiscal period with its allowable costs incurred during that period. If the hospital had been overpaid during the year, it was required to refund the amount of that overpayment to the Medicare program. Conversely, if the hospital had been underpaid during the year, the Medicare program was required to make an additional payment to the hospital, retroactively, in the amount of the underpayment. 20 C.F.R. Sections 405.402(b)(2), 405.451(b)(2). Essentially the same Medicare principles and standards governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services described in the two preceding paragraphs have been in effect at all times pertinent to this controversy. 42 C.F.R. Section 405.401, et seq. Florida's approved State Plan as of January 1, 1970, governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under the Medicaid program, committed HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The only versions of Florida's State Plan provisions that have been approved by HEW and that have governed HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, each commit HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Attached as an appendix to the recommended order is the form agreement drafted with the supervision of C.W. Hollingsworth, which has been in use from January 1, 1970, until July 1, 1981. From the inception of the Florida Medicaid program, and as a prerequisite for participation therein, a hospital has been required to execute a copy of the form agreement. A hospital may not participate in the Medicaid program without having executed such an agreement, nor may it propose any amendments thereto. The intent and effect of the form agreement is to require HRS to reimburse hospitals that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a percentage allowance in lieu of the retroactive adjustments ("percentage allowances") in determining the rates that hospitals will be paid for providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. The form agreement requires HRS to compute a new percentage allowance each year based on hospital cost trends. The meanings of the terms "allowance in lieu of retroactive adjustments" in all pertinent state plans and "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" contained in the form agreement are identical. In drafting the form agreement HRS intended that the "percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment" be set at a level sufficient to ensure that hospitals participating in the Medicaid program would be reimbursed their "reasonable costs" of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. At all times pertinent to this controversy, participating hospitals, like petitioner, have been reimbursed by HRS for inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients in the following manner: Within ninety (90) days following the close of its fiscal year, the partici- pating hospital files a Form 2551 or 2552 Annual Statement of Reimbursable Costs, as applicable, with both Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., the major fiscal intermediary respon- sible for the administration of Part A of the federal Medicare program in the State of Florida, and with HRS. This document, also referred to as a "cost report" details various hospital and financial statistical data relating to the patient care activities engaged in by the hospital during the sub- ject fiscal period. Upon receipt of the participating hospital's cost report for a fiscal period, HRS makes an initial determination based upon Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards of the hospital's total allow- able inpatient costs, charges, and total patient days during the subject fiscal period, and then determines an inpatient per diem reimbursement rate for the period. To the inpatient per diem reimburse- ment rate is then added a percentage allow- ance in lieu of making any further retroactive corrective adjustments in reimbursement which might have been due the hospital applicable to the reporting period. The adjusted inpa- tient per diem reimbursement rate is applied prospectively, and remains in effect until further adjustments in the rate are required. If HRS determines that total inpa- tient Medicaid reimbursement to a partici- pating hospital during a fiscal period exceeds the hospital's allowable and rea- sonable costs of rendering such covered inpatient services applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards, then the hospital is required to remit to HRS the amount of such overpayment. If, however, HRS determines that the total inpatient Medicaid reimbursement received by a participating hospital is less than the hospital's actual and reason- able costs of rendering such covered inpa- tient services to Medicaid patients during the period applying Medicare cost reimburse- ment principles and standards, no further retroactive corrective adjustments are made; provided, however, that should an overpayment occur in a fiscal period, it may be offset and applied retroactively against an under- payment to the participating hospital which occurred during the next preceding fiscal period only. HRS has used the following "percentage allowances" in determining Medicaid reimbursement rates for inpatient hospital services: a. January 1, 1970 - June 30, 1972 . . . 12 percent July 1, 1972 - approximately March 30, 1976 . . . . . . . . . . 9 percent Approximately March 31, 1976 - June 30, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . 6 percent Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not recomputed the "percentage allowance" on an annual basis. Since at least January 1, 1976, HRS has not based the "percentage allowance" that it has applied in determining Medicaid inpatient hospital reimbursement rates upon hospital cost trends. HRS has used no technical methodology based upon hospital cost trends to develop any of the "percentage allowances." At least since January 1, 1974, HRS's "percentage allowances" have been less than the corresponding average annual increases in the costs incurred by Florida hospitals of providing inpatient hospital services. Prior to March 30, 1976, all of HRS's published regulations addressing reimbursement of participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients required HRS to reimburse such hospitals in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In certain internal documents, Petitioner's Exhibits P-44 and P-12, HRS states that the average costs of providing inpatient hospital services in the State of Florida rose at least 18 percent during calendar year 1975. In November, 1975, the Secretary of HRS was informed by HRS officials that HRS faced a projected budgetary deficit for its fiscal year ended June 30, 1976. A decision memorandum presented options to the HRS Secretary for reducing the projected deficit. Among such options presented to and approved by the HRS Secretary was to reduce the "percentage allowance" from 9 percent to 6 percent. The reduction of the "percentage allowance" by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent was effected in response to HRS's projected deficit, and was not based upon an analysis of hospital cost trends. HRS incorporated the 6 percent "percentage allowance" into its administrative rules which were published on March 30, 1976. In response to objections raised by the Florida Hospital Association to the reduction in the percentage allowance by HRS from 9 percent to 6 percent, HRS officials reexamined that reduction. During HRS's reexamination of its previous "percentage allowance" reduction, HRS was aware of and acknowledged the fact that Florida hospital costs were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of both the earlier 9 percent and the resulting 6 percent "percentage allowance." In a memorandum dated September 13, 1976, from HRS official Charles Hall to the Secretary of HRS, Petitioner's Exhibit P-45, Charles Hall informed the Secretary that the methods and standards then used by HRS to reimburse participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients was out of compliance with federal requirements. Charles Hall further informed the Secretary that the reason HRS had not theretofore been cited by HEW for noncompliance was the manner in which the Florida State Plan had been drafted, i.e., that the State Plan required HRS to reimburse hospitals under Medicaid for the reasonable costs that they would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. In a letter dated September 20, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-31, HEW informed HRS that HEW had received a complaint from the Florida Hospital Association that the methods HRS was actually using to reimburse hospitals for the costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients were in violation of Federal Regulation 45 C.F.R. Section 250.30(a). A proposed amendment to Florida's State Plan submitted by HRS to HEW in November, 1976, Petitioner's Exhibit P-49, if approved, would have allowed HRS to reimburse hospitals for the cost of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients under methods differing from Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards (an "alternative plan"). "Alternative plans" have been permitted under applicable federal regulations since October 21, 1974. A state participating in the Medicaid program may elect to establish an "alternative plan, but may not implement such "alternative plan" without the prior written approval of HEW. Florida has not had in effect an "alternative plan" of reimbursing participating hospitals for their costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients that was formally approved by HEW at any time prior to July 1, 1981. By letter dated January 7, 1977, Petitioner's Exhibit P-32, HEW notified HRS that it had formally cited HRS for noncompliance with federal regulations governing reimbursement of inpatient hospital services under Medicaid. HRS acknowledged their noncompliance and between November, 1976, and October 30, 1977, HRS attempted to revise its proposed "alternative plan" on at least two occasions in an attempt to obtain HEW approval. In October, 1977, HRS withdrew its proposed "alternative plan" then pending with HEW. HRS then contracted with an outside consultant, Alexander Grant & Company, to assist in the formulation of a new "alternative plan" proposal. In January, 1978, Alexander Grant & Company delivered its draft of an "alternative plan" to HRS. In October, 1978, HRS submitted a draft "alternative plan" to HEW for review and comment, and HEW expected HRS to submit a formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW for its approval by November 1, 1978. HRS did not submit the formal "alternative plan" proposal to HEW until August 12, 1980. In a letter dated February 21, 1979, from Richard Morris, HEW Regional Medicaid Director, Region IV, to United States Senator Richard Stone of Florida, Mr. Morris advised Senator Stone: For more than two years the Florida Medicaid Program has not met Federal Requirements for inpatient hospital services reimbursement. Their payment methodology under-reimburses certain hospitals year after year. The pros- pective interim per diem rate paid by Florida to hospitals includes a percentage allowance to cover increased costs during the forthcom- ing year that is consistently less than increased costs in some hospitals. If the payments are less than costs, the difference is not reimbursed. This results in underpay- ments. We have worked closely with Florida to develop an acceptable alternative system that would meet Federal requirements. To date, Florida has not implemented such a system despite having received informal HEW agreement on a draft plan developed more than a year ago. It is our understanding that this alternative plan is not a high priority item at this time. We will continue to work with HRS staff to secure Florida compliance re- garding this requirement. Petitioner's Exhibit P-46. Since August 12, 1980, HRS has submitted to HEW for its approval at least four more versions of an "alternative plan." Petitioner's Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. Each of these versions was approved by the Secretary of HRS, and HRS believes each to comply with applicable Florida law. Mr. Erwin Bodo, Ph.D., was and is the HRS official responsible for the development and drafting of Exhibits P-120, P-121, P-123, and P-152. In June, 1981, HEW approved an "alternative plan" for the State of Florida (Exhibit P-152), and such "alternative plan" was implemented effective July 1, 1981. Until July 1, 1981, HRS continued to use the 6 percent "percentage allowance" to compute inpatient hospital reimbursement under Medicaid. Even after its repeal, Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code, is applied by respondent in calculating reimbursement for Medicaid services provided between March 30, 1976, and July 1, 1981. From November 20, 1976, until July 1, 1981--the period in which HRS was attempting to secure HEW approval for an alternative plan--HRS was aware that the costs of inpatient hospital se vices were increasing at an average annual rate in excess of the 6 percent "percentage allowance." From September 1, 1976, through July 1, 1981, HRS has been out of compliance with its a proved State Plan provisions, and HEW regulations governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals-- including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Since the quarter ending December 31, 1976, until July 1, 1981, HEW has formally cited HRS as being in contravention of its approved State Plan provisions, and HEW (now HHS) regulations, governing reimbursement for inpatient hospital services under Medicaid because HRS's methods for reimbursing hospitals for the cost of providing those services to Medicaid patients have resulted in a substantial number of hospitals--including petitioner--being reimbursed at a lower rate than the hospitals would have been reimbursed applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. PAN AMERICAN HOSPITAL CORPORATION Petitioner, Pan American Hospital Corporation, is a not-for-profit corporation, duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida. Petitioner is a tax-exempt organization as determined by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has operated and continues to operate a duly licensed 146-bed, short-term acute care general hospital, located at 5959 Northwest Seventh Street, Miami, Florida 33126. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been and continues to be a duly certified provider of inpatient hospital services, eligible to participate in the Florida Medicaid program since January 27, 1974. The appendix to this recommended order is a true and correct copy of the "Participation Agreement" entered into between petitioner and HRS, whereunder, inter alia, petitioner became eligible to receive payment from HRS for covered inpatient hospital services provided to Medicaid patients. At all times pertinent to this controversy, petitioner has been a certified "provider of services" participating in the Medicare program. During the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner did provide covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and became eligible for payment by HRS of its reasonable costs of providing such services, determined in accordance with Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, petitioner timely filed all cost reports and other financial data with HRS or its contracting agents, including Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., to enable HRS to determine petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients. During each of the fiscal periods in dispute in this action, to reimburse petitioner for its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, determined in accordance with applicable Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards. Such costs incurred by petitioner were reasonable, necessary, related to patient care, and less than customary charges within the meaning of those Medicare principles and standards. With respect to each of the fiscal periods in dispute, HRS and/or its contracting agent, Blue Cross of Florida, Inc., reviewed and audited the cost reports filed by petitioner, and as a result of such review and audits set or adjusted, as applicable, the Medicaid inpatient per diem reimbursement rate at which petitioner would be paid during the next succeeding fiscal period or until that rate was again adjusted. On May 3, 1976, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period in respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1975, petitioner received $86,469 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On February 14, 1979, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1976, petitioner received $199,328 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On September 29, 1978, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1977, petitioner received $6,083 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On March 13, 1980, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1978, petitioner received $178,506 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On June 30, 1981, a Notice of Program Reimbursement was issued to petitioner applicable to its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, and setting forth the audited amount of petitioner's reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients during such period and the amount of interim Medicaid payments made to petitioner by HRS during the period with respect to those services. During its fiscal year ended March 31, 1979, petitioner received $302,347 less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, and no retroactive corrective adjustment has been made in connection with such underpayment. On or about June 30, 1981, the audit of petitioner's Medicaid cost report for the period ending March 31, 1980, was concluded. A formal Notice of Program Reimbursement had not been issued at the time of the hearing. MOTION TO DISMISS DENIED Respondent contends that these proceedings should be summarily concluded "for failure to join an indispensable party," viz., the Federal Government, because it "is Respondent's intention, should any liability result from this action, to make a claim for federal financial participation as to approximately fifty-nine percent of such liability . . . [See generally] 42 U.S.C. Section 1320b-2(a)(2)." Motion to Dismiss, p. 2. This contention must fail for several reasons. Neither the Division of Administrative Hearings nor the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has the power or means to bring an unwilling party into a proceeding instituted pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). At most, "the presiding officer may, upon motion of a party, or upon his own initiative enter an order requiring that the absent person be notified of the proceeding and be given an opportunity to be joined as a party of record." Rule 28-5.107, Florida Administrative Code. There exists no administrative writ for joining a non-petitioning party in a substantial interest proceeding in the way judicial process can join a party within a court's jurisdiction in a pending judicial proceeding. The two cases respondent cites in support of its motion, Bannon v. Trammell, 118 So. 167 (Fla. 1928), and Heisler v. Florida Mortgage Title and Bonding Co., 142 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1932), are inapposite, because both cases involve judicial, not administrative proceedings. HRS does not really seek joinder of the United States Department of Health and Human Services; instead, HRS argues that the petition should be dismissed and the controversy relegated to federal court because it "believes that the Secretary [of the United States Department of Health and Human Services] will not succumb voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings." 2/ Motion to Dismiss, p. 3. Participation by the Department of Health and Human Services in the present proceedings would have been welcomed, as the Hearing Officer indicated at the prehearing conference, but neither the Department itself nor either of the parties requested such participation. In any event, petitioner is seeking additional reimbursement from respondent HRS, not from any federal agency. Medicaid providers like petitioner do not receive any funds directly from the Department of Health and Human Services. Since "[t]he contracts involved are clearly between the hospitals and [H]RS [, n]o third party requirement appears," Montana Deaconess Hospital v. Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, 538 P.2d 1021, 1024 (Mont. 1975), and the Department of Health and Human Services is not an indispensable party to administrative proceedings arising out of contracts between HRS and Medicaid providers. HRS protests that it might find itself making additional reimbursement to petitioner, yet be deprived of the federal component of such expenditures. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1396b. This prospect is an unlikely one in view of the fact that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has repeatedly cited HRS for noncompliance because of under-reimbursements to Medicaid providers. If the Federal Government fails to contribute to any additional reimbursement, it would not be for want of a forum in which HRS could present its claim. There are administrative mechanisms within the Department of Health and Human Services, including its Grant Appeals Board. See 42 U.S.C. Section 1116(d). After exhaustion of administrative remedies, HRS would have access to the courts, if necessary. See Georgia v. Califano, 446 F. Supp. 404 (N.D. Ga. 1977). There is no danger that HRS will be deprived of an opportunity to litigate any question about federal contribution because the United States Department of Health and Human Services is not a party to the present proceedings. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment was amended ore tenus at the final hearing to delete "and FYE March 31, 1981," on page 1 of the motion, after leave to amend was granted, without objection by respondent. As a technical matter, the motion is a misnomer, since substantial interest proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings eventuate in recommended orders, not judgments. But, petitioner's contention that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact is well founded. The parties have so stipulated. (T. 70; Mr. Weiss's letter of November 12, 1981.) At the time the petition was filed, the parties contemplated numerous factual disputes which, however, had all been resolved by the time of final hearing through the commendable efforts of counsel. In the absence of a disputed issue of material fact, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for informal proceedings pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes (1979), "[u]nless otherwise agreed." Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (1979). On December 7, 1981, the parties filed their Stipulation and Agreement to proceed pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1979), notwithstanding the absence of any factual dispute. DISPUTE COGNIZABLE In the present case, as in Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), there "can be no doubt that the Department's contract . . . calls for agency action which potentially affects . . . substantial interests," 363 So.2d at 812, of the petitioning contractor. Cf. Solar Energy Control, Inc. v. State Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 377 So.2d 746 (Fla 1st DCA 1979) (reh. den. 1980) (disappointed bidder substantially affected). See Section 120.52(10)(a), Florida Statutes (1979). In Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 363 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), the petitioner sought "additional money and construction time under its contract," 363 So.2d at 813, with a state agency. The court found "no difficulty . . . with sovereign immunity," 363 So.2d at 813, and held that a contractor with a state agency could invoke the Administrative Procedure Act in order to enforce its contract, even though the contract purported to establish another method for settling the contract dispute. A clause in the contract at issue in the Graham Contracting case contemplated agency action outside the parameters of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, in resolving certain disputes under the contract. In contrast, each of the successive contracts on which petitioner predicates its claim in the present case contains the following provision: "The hospital agrees to comply with the rules, policies, and procedures required by [HRS's] Division of Family Services for this program." Among the rules thus incorporated by reference into the contracts between petitioner and respondent is Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, which provides: An official representative of a facility participating in Medicaid, . . . or . . . representative, may appeal Medicaid Program policy, procedure, or administrative rulings whenever the provider feels there has been an unfair, illegal or inappropriate action by the Department affecting them or their facility. (1) Provider Appeals The Administrative Procedures [sic] Act, Chapter 120 F.S., provides for provider appeals and hearings, which are conducted by the Division of Administrative Hearings in the Department of Administration. The spe- cific rule relative to the appeal and hearing process is Chapter 28-3 [sic] of the Florida Administrative Rules. . . Since, by reference to Rule 10C-7.35, Florida Administrative Code, the contract in the present case incorporates Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the applicability of the Administrative Procedure Act is even clearer here than in the Graham Contracting case. THE MERITS The parties have stipulated that petitioner has been reimbursed by respondent less than its reasonable costs of providing covered inpatient hospital services over the time period in question. Under-reimbursement of this kind is not authorized by Section 409.266, Florida Statutes, which incorporates the federal statutory requirement that hospitals which, like petitioner, provide Medicaid services be reimbursed by respondent for reasonable costs incurred, in accordance with an approved State Plan, and not some lesser amount. 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(B), Pub. L. 89-97, Section 121(a) redesignated 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(13)(D), Pub. L. 90-248, Section 224(a). All Florida "State Plan provisions . . . approved by HEW and . . . govern[ing] HRS's reimbursement of inpatient hospital services prior to July 1, 1981, commit HRS to reimburse hospitals [like petitioner] that also participated in the Medicare program for their reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services to Medicaid patients, applying Medicare cost reimbursement principles and standards." Prehearing Stipulation, Paragraph 19. The record is clear. Respondent consistently reimbursed petitioner less than its reasonable costs of providing inpatient hospital services in order to cut its own expenses and in doing so jeopardized the entire Medicaid program. This cannot be condoned, even though respondent acted under color of law, viz., Rule 10C-7.39(6), Florida Administrative Code [now repealed and declared invalid; see Pan American Hospital Corporation v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, No. 81-1480R (DOAH; December 4, 1981)], and even though a lack of money or, at least, an apparent shortage was the reason for respondent's parsimony. The question remains, however, whether this dereliction on respondent's part should inure to the benefit of petitioner; and the answer turns on the construction of the agreement between the parties attached as an appendix to this order. Petitioner argues cogently that public policy has clearly been enunciated by statute to be full reimbursement for costs reasonably incurred by Medicaid providers in furnishing covered services. There can be no clearer expression of public policy than a statute duly enacted; and the reasons behind the full reimbursement policy are themselves compelling: to deal fairly with the providers, not only for fairness sake, but also to assure their participation in the program, and to remove any temptation to give indigent patients substandard care, inter alia. But, there is surely an overriding public policy requiring that a contractor with state government who voluntarily agrees to forego a claim against the public fisc be held to that agreement in administrative proceedings like these. The form agreement between petitioner and respondent, which they renewed annually, states: "It is understood that reimbursement will be made on the basis of an interim payment plan in the form of a per diem cost rate, plus a percentage allowance for the year in lieu of retroactive payment adjustment. However, . . . in the event the hospital did not receive its audited reasonable costs in the year prior to the current year then the hospital may deduct from the refund the prior year deficiency." (Emphasis supplied.) The agreement thus contemplated under-reimbursement and specified the method for recoupment, if there was to be any. Any "retroactive payment adjustment," as the result of administrative proceedings or otherwise, is specifically ruled out. Elsewhere in the parties' agreement is found this language: [T]he fiscal responsibility of [respondent's] Division of Family Services is subjected [sic] to the appropriation and availability of funds to the Medicaid program . . . by the state legislature every year." The terms of the agreement make clear that under-reimbursement is not in itself a breach. Respondent's failure to compute annually a "new percentage . . . based on hospital cost trends" was attributable to a shortage of funds; and the agreement provided that respondent's "fiscal responsibility" was subject to just such a shortage. In sum, provisions of the agreement petitioner voluntarily entered into with respondent operate in much the same way as a liquidated damages clause and preclude the relief petitioner seeks. Petitioner's invocation of the parol evidence rule is unavailing. Even if the stipulated facts outside the four corners of the form agreement are looked to, the course of dealing between these parties buttresses the construction outlined above. The fact that respondent may have settled a case it litigated against another hospital in some other way, as asserted by petitioner, is technically irrelevant.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent deny the prayer of the petitioner for additional reimbursement. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of December, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1981.
Findings Of Fact Both petitioner and Respondent stipulated that Petitioner is a duly licensed insurance company organized and existing in the State of Florida, and is subject to the requirements of Rule 38F-7.01, Florida Administrative Code, the validity of which is the subject matter of this proceeding. It was further stipulated by the parties that there are no disputed issues of material fact.
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether Respondent’s application of a fair rental value system of property cost reimbursement to Petitioner under the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Medicaid Reimbursement Plan is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, CONSULTING MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATION, INC., d/b/a GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (CME), is the licensed operator of a 103-bed nursing home in Clearwater, Florida, which is presently known as GULF COAST NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER (GULF COAST). CME participates in the Florida Medicaid Program as an enrolled provider. Respondent, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION (AHCA), is the agency of the State of Florida authorized to implement and administer the Florida Medicaid Program, and is the successor agency to the former Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, pursuant to Chapter 93-129, Laws of Florida. Stipulated Facts Prior to 1993, the GULF COAST nursing home facility was known as COUNTRY PLACE OF CLEARWATER (COUNTRY PLACE), and was owned and operated by the Clearwater Limited Partnership, a limited partnership which is not related to CME. In 1993 CME agreed to purchase, and did in fact purchase, COUNTRY PLACE from the Clearwater Limited Partnership. Simultaneous with the purchase of COUNTRY PLACE, CME entered into a Sale/Leaseback Agreement with LTC Properties, Inc., a Maryland real estate investment trust which engages in the financing of nursing homes. The Purchase and Sale Agreement between Clearwater Limited Partnership and CME was contingent upon the Sale/Leaseback Agreement and the proposed Lease between CME and LTC Properties, Inc. On September 1, 1993, CME simultaneously as a part of the same transaction purchased COUNTRY PLACE, conveyed the facility to LTC Properties, Inc., and leased the facility back from LTC Properties, Inc. As required, CME had notified AHCA of the proposed transaction. AHCA determined that the transaction included a change of ownership and, by lease, a change of provider. CME complied with AHCA's requirements and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider for COUNTRY PLACE. Thereafter, CME changed the name of the facility to GULF COAST. After CME acquired the facility and became the licensed operator and Medicaid provider, AHCA continued to reimburse CME the same per diem reimbursement which had been paid to the previous provider (plus certain inflation factors) until CME filed its initial cost report, as required for new rate setting. In the normal course of business, CME in 1995 filed its initial Medicaid cost report after an initial period of actual operation by CME. Upon review of the cost report, AHCA contended that the cost report was inaccurate and engaged in certain "cost settlement" adjustments. During this review, AHCA took the position that CME's property reimbursement should be based on FRVS methodologies rather than "cost" due to the lease. In November of 1995, CME received from AHCA various documents which recalculated all components of Petitioner's Medicaid reimbursement rates for all periods subsequent to CME's acquisition of the facility. In effect, AHCA placed CME on FRVS property reimbursement. The practical effect of AHCA's action was to reduce CME's property reimbursement both retroactively and prospectively. The retroactive application would result in a liability of CME to AHCA, due to a claimed overpayment by AHCA. The prospective application would (and has) resulted in a reduction of revenues. CME is substantially affected by AHCA's proposed action and by Sections I.B., III.G.2.d.(1), V.E.1.h., and V.E.4. of the Florida Medicaid Plan. Additional Findings of Fact The Florida Medicaid Plan establishes methodologies for reimbursement of a nursing home's operating costs and patient care costs, as well as property costs. The dispute in this matter relates only to reimbursement of property costs. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST nursing home facility is entitled to reimbursement of property costs in accordance with the Florida Medicaid Plan. CME as the operator of the GULF COAST facility entered into a Florida Medicaid Program Provider Agreement, agreeing to abide by the provisions of the Florida Medicaid Plan. The Sale/Leaseback Agreement entered into by CME and LTC Properties Inc. (LTC) specifically provides for a distinct sale of the nursing home facility to LTC. LTC holds record fee title to GULF COAST. LTC, a Maryland corporation, is not related to CME, a Colorado corporation. The Florida Medicaid Plan is intended to provide reimbursement for reasonable costs incurred by economically and efficiently operated facilities. The Florida Medicaid Plan pays a single per diem rate for all levels of nursing care. After a nursing home facility's first year of operation, a cost settling process is conducted with AHCA which results in a final cost report. The final cost report serves as a baseline for reimbursement over the following years. Subsequent to the first year of operation, a facility files its cost report annually. AHCA normally adjusts a facility's reimbursement rate twice a year based upon the factors provided for in the Florida Medicaid Plan. The rate-setting process takes a provider through Section II of the Plan relating to cost finding and audits resulting in cost adjustments. CME submitted the appropriate cost reports after its first year of operation of the GULF COAST facility. Section III of the Florida Medicaid Plan specifies the areas of allowable costs. Under the Allowable Costs Section III.G.2.d.(1) in the Florida Title XIX Plan, a facility with a lease executed on or after October 1, 1985, shall be reimbursed for lease costs and other property costs under the Fair Rental Value System (FRVS). AHCA has treated all leases the same under FRVS since that time. AHCA does not distinguish between types of leases under the FRVS method. The method for the FRVS calculation is provided in Section V.E.1.a-g of the Florida Medicaid Plan. A “hold harmless” exception to application of the FRVS method is provided for at Section V.E.1.h of the Florida Medicaid Plan, and Section V.E.4 of the Plan provides that new owners shall receive the prior owner’s cost-based method when the prior owner was not on FRVS under the hold harmless provision. As a lessee and not the holder of record fee title to the facility, neither of those provisions apply to CME. At the time CME acquired the facility, there was an indication that the Sale/Leaseback transaction with LTC was between related parties, so that until the 1995 cost settlement, CME was receiving the prior owner’s cost-based property method of reimbursement. When AHCA determined that the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTC was not between related parties, AHCA set CME’s property reimbursement component under FRVS as a lessee. Property reimbursement based on the FRVS methodology does not depend on actual period property costs. Under the FRVS methodology, all leases after October 1985 are treated the same. For purposes of reimbursement, AHCA does not recognize any distinction between various types of leases. For accounting reporting purposes, the Sale/Leaseback transaction between CME and LTD is treated as a capital lease, or “virtual purchase” of the facility. This accounting treatment, however, is limited to a reporting function, with the underlying theory being merely that of providing a financing mechanism. Record fee ownership remains with LTC. CME, as the lease holder, may not encumber title. The Florida Medicaid Plan does not distinguish between a sale/leaseback transaction and other types of lease arrangements. Sections IV.D., V.E.1.h., and V.E.4., the “hold harmless” and “change of ownership” provisions which allow a new owner to receive the prior owner’s method of reimbursement if FRVS would produce a loss for the new owner, are limited within the Plan’s organizational context, and within the context of the Plan, to owner/operators of facilities, and grandfathered lessee/operators. These provisions do not apply to leases executed after October 1, 1985. Capital leases are an accounting construct for reporting purposes, which is inapplicable when the Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses this issue. The Florida Medicaid Plan specifically addresses the treatment of leases entered into after October 1985 and provides that reimbursement will be made pursuant to the FRVS method.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, the parties' prehearing stipulation, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been for approximately the past 15 years, a physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He specializes in internal medicine and cardiology and is board certified in these specialities. He currently is the Chief of Cardiology and head of the Coronary Care Unit at North Ridge Hospital and has staff privileges at approximately five other hospitals in the Broward County area. At all times material to the instant case, Health Imaging, Inc., (Health) was in the business of providing ultrasound imaging services in the State of Florida at the request of physicians, hospitals and members of the community at large. The tests performed by Health were non-invasive studies that involved no health risks. They included echocardiograms, carotid ultrasounds and other studies of the heart and vascular system done with ultrasound equipment. Unlicensed technicians operated the equipment and administered the tests. Florida-licensed physicians interpreted the test results. In August of 1987, Warren Green and his wife, the owners of Health, contacted Respondent and asked him if he would be interested in contracting with Health to provide such interpretive and diagnostic services. After looking into the matter and satisfying himself that Health's equipment was of good quality and that its technicians were well qualified, Respondent entered into a written agreement (Agreement) with Health, the body of which provided as follows: This agreement made and entered into this 18 day of August 1987 by and between Health Imaging, having its principal business address at 6278 North Federal Highway, Suite 372, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, hereinafter referred to as "HEALTH" and Jorge Flores, M.D., having his principal business address at 5700 N. Federal Highway, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, hereinafter referred to as "DOCTOR" is made with reference to the following: WHEREAS, HEALTH is engaged in business throughout the Florida area providing ultrasound and vascular services to hospitals, physician offices and the community. DOCTOR is engaged in the business of providing medical services to his patients and patients of other doctors and hospitals in the Ft. Lauderdale, Florida area. Health desires to contract from DOCTOR for certain diagnostic interpretation services for its own patients and patients of other doctors and hospitals in the Florida area. NOW THEREFORE, HEALTH AND DOCTOR AGREE AS FOLLOWS: Equipment. HEALTH agrees to provide all necessary equipment and supplies to perform the services according to the schedule set forth on Exhibit A, attached hereto. Personnel. Health shall provide qualified technologists to operate the equipment for the services set forth on Schedule A, attached hereto. Solicitation of Employees. DOCTOR shall not during the term of this agreement nor a period of One (1) year after its termination, solicit for employment or employ, whether as employee or independent contractor, any person who is or has been employed by HEALTH during the term of this agreement without the prior written consent of HEALTH. Physician Interpretation Personnel. DOCTOR agrees to provide necessary qualified physicians for interpretations. Payment. For and in consideration of the services and promises contained herein by DOCTOR, HEALTH agrees to pay DOCTOR in accordance with the fee schedule set forth on Schedule A, attached hereto. All fees are to be paid in advance or at time of interpretation. Default. In the event of the default of any payment this contract may be terminated by DOCTOR. Term, Termination. The term of this agreement is for one (1) year. After Thirty (30) days either party may terminate this agreement, without cause, by giving Thirty (30) days written notice provided that in no event may HEALTH terminate this agreement unless all monies owing to DOCTOR under the terms hereof are paid in full. Compliance with Law. Both parties agree to comply with all municipal, state and federal laws and regulations. Governing Law. This agreement shall be construed under the laws of the State of Florida. Independent Contractor. DOCTOR is performing the service and duties required hereunder as an independent contractor and not as an employee, agent, partner, or joint venturer with HEALTH. Entire Agreement. This instrument shall be deemed to contain the entire agreement between HEALTH and DOCTOR and supercedes [sic] any prior or existing agreements, understandings, arrangements, terms, conditions, negotiations, or representations, oral or written, made by either party concerning or affecting the subject matter hereof. No modification of this agreement may be made except in writing, signed by HEALTH and DOCTOR. Schedule A, which was referenced in and appended to the Agreement, read as follows: INTERPRETATION FEE SCHEDULE Community, Corporate, Club and Association Screening Program Fee Schedule. EXAM: Echocardiography only FEE: One thousand dollars (1,000.00) per month for 400 studies in any thirty (30) day period. Five dollars ($5.00) per study for all studies exceeding four Hundred (400) studies in any given thirty (30) day period. Community, Corporate, Club and Association Screening Program Fee Schedule. EXAMS: (Any combination of the following) Carotid Ultrasound with Doppler and Periorbital Doppler Echocardiography Upper and Lower Extremity Doppler Study FEE: Three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) per month for any combination of the above studies, not to exceed 1,500 studies in any thirty (30) day period. Any combination of the above studies will be at a rate of Five Dollars ($5.00) per study in any given thirty (30) day period. Hospital and Physician offices fee Schedule: (Any studies performed in a hospital or Physician office, ordered by a physician) EXAMS Carotid ultrasound with doppler $65.00 Echocardiography $65.00 Abdominal ultrasound $65.00 Holter monitoring $65.00 Peripheral arterial examination $35.00 Peripheral venous examination $35.00 The Agreement and Schedule A were drafted by the Greens without the assistance of an attorney. Respondent furnished Health with interpretive and diagnostic services under the Agreement for approximately 18 months. He provided Health with no other services. Respondent was compensated $1,000 per month the first four months and $3,000 per month the remaining 14 months for his services. Most of the individuals whose test results Respondent interpreted during his 18-month association with Health were self-referred. The remainder of the test takers were referred by physicians. None had any prior professional relationship with Respondent. 1/ Respondent prepared a signed, written report of his findings for each test taker. 2/ He sent the report, along with the materials that he had reviewed in making his findings, to Health, which in turn provided the report to the test taker or to the referring physician, if there was one. 3/ Respondent did not consider the test takers to be his patients. He therefore did not keep copies of the reports he had prepared and sent to Health or the test materials upon which these reports had been based. 4/ The Greens had assured Respondent at the outset, however, that they would maintain these records and make them available to Respondent upon his request should he need them for some reason. The Greens were true to their word. Whenever Respondent asked to see a copy of a report or test materials, 5/ the Greens complied with his request. The Greens still have in their possession copies of the reports Respondent had prepared and transmitted, as well as the related test materials. While Respondent was aware that Health advertised to generate business, he was not asked to assist in any way, either as a consultant or otherwise, in the preparation or placement of any of Health's advertisements. Indeed, the first time he saw one of these advertisements was approximately five or six months after he began his association with Health. The advertisement was in a local newspaper that he happened to be reading. Some months later he saw another advertisement in the same newspaper. He found the contents of this particular advertisement to be "totally unacceptable." He therefore telephoned the Greens and complained about the advertisement. The Greens responded to Respondent's complaint by discontinuing the advertisement. A short time thereafter, upon the suggestion of a Department investigator who warned Respondent "to stay away from these people," Respondent severed his relationship with Health. He did so, not because he believed that he had done anything wrong, but because the Department, through its investigator, had expressed its concerns regarding the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of January, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 1993.
The Issue The issue is to determine the amount of the fee to be awarded to Florida Medical Center. FEE CALCULATION Florida Medical Center was represented before the Department in its attempt to obtain a hearing and before the District Court of Appeal, First District in Florida Medical Center vs. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and Humana, Inc., appellate case no. BD-46, by Eric B. Tilton, who has been a member of The Florida Bar since 1977. He also handled the appeal of the denial of Florida Medical Center's petition for a hearing on the approval of additional beds for University, appellate case BD-45. An associate, Thomas W. Stahl, assisted Mr. Tilton in both those cases. Mr. Tilton filed, on behalf of Florida Medical Center, the following pleadings: a petition seeking a Section 120.57 hearing to challenge the certificate of need HRS agreed to grant to Humana Bennett. The petition was denied in a final order of the Department without referral to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a hearing officer or other proceedings; a notice of appeal to the District Court of Appeal, First District; a consolidated initial brief for both cases BD-46 (challenging the Humana Bennett certificate of need) and BD-45 (challenging the University certificate ofneed); a consolidated reply brief in both cases. The following papers also were filed by Mr. Tilton in case 50-46: motion for expedited review; petition for stay; reply to response to petition for stay; request for oral argument; motion to consolidate; response to motion to transfer to Fourth District Court of Appeal; response to notion to supplement record; response to motion for judicial notice; motion to strike portion brief of HRS; motion to strike answer brief of Humana Bennett; motion to strike amended answer brief of University; response to motion to correct record; response to Humana's motion to consolidate; motion for attorney's fees; motion for rehearing; response to Humana Bennett's motion for rehearing. The record on appeal before the Court of Appeals in Case BD-46 was quite brief, consisting of a petition for a hearing, a final order denying a hearing and a notice of appeal, which total 16 pages. The criteria found in Chapter 4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar, Rule 4-1.5(B)(1)-(8) and (C) govern the determination of a reasonable fee. These are the criteria which had been contained in the former Code of Professional Responsibility, and applied by the Supreme Court of Florida in Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1150 and n.6 (Fla. 1985) when the Court adopted the lodestar approach for fee determinations developed by the federal courts. Time and Labor Required, Novelty and Difficulty of Questions and Skill Requisite to Perform Legal Service Properly. Rule 4-1.5(B)(1) Mr. Tilton and his associate, Mr. Stahl, devoted 219.15 and 142.3 hours to this litigation, respectively. These hours were included in billings sent to the client, which were paid as presented without protest. The first step in determining a reasonable fee is to find the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Rowe, supra, 472 So.2d 1150. The United States Supreme Court held in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), when assessing attorney's fees in civil rights litigation under identical ethical principles that [t]he most useful starting point for deter- mining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of value of a lawyer's services. 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. at 1939. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services has not argued that any of the hours claimed were not reasonably expended on the litigation, in the sense of being the product of inaccurate or questionably reconstructed time records. The records were contemporaneously kept. Neither is there evidence of over staffing e.g., that more than one attorney attended or participated in oral argument without proof that such multiple representation was necessary. The appeal was not simply one in which the appellant argued that, as a competitor, it was entitled to a hearing as a matter of law. After initially indicating an intention to deny additional beds to both applicants, a hearing had been conducted which resulted in a Hearing Officer's recommendation that both 1931 applications be denied and the Department had entered a final order to that effect. Florida Medical Center's attorneys canvassed the entire record of the administrative proceeding on the 1981 applications of Humana Bennett and University to see whether there was any basis in it for the Department's abrupt change of position. Granting Humana Bennett and University new beds to settle the appeals in the Fourth District Court of Appeal was a fundamental shift in Department policy. The time spent in reviewing that record while preparing Florida Medical Center's appellate filings was appropriate. The time devoted to research on Florida, federal and other states' law on the authority of an agency to abandon a position taken after the conclusion of formal proceedings in order to settle an appeal from the agency's final action, while also refusing to allow others to challenge the agency's new and directly contrary position, was reasonable. Of course, "[a] lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude [excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary] hours from his fee submission . . . . Hours that are not properly billed to one's client also are not properly billed to one's adversary . . . Nestle v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. at 1940, quoting, Copeland v. Marshall 205 U.S.App.D.C. 390, 401, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (1980) (en banc) (emphasis by the Court). There has been no suggestion that the bills submitted to Florida Medical Center were not the product of a proper exercise of billing judgment. Payment of the bills as presented also betokens the reasonableness of the hours claimed. Complaint or objection by the client to the hours billed would suggest that the hours expended may have been excessive. The evidence that Mr. Tilton expended 219.15 hours and Mr. Stahl 142.3 hours on the case is accepted. The Fee Customarily Charged iii the Locality for Similar Legal Services. Rule 4-1.5(B)(3). Much of the case law concerning a reasonable hourly rate has grown up in civil rights litigation where determining a reasonable hourly rate requires after-the-fact construction. When the services were rendered in those cases, the lawyer was not working for the client at an agreed hourly rate. A survey of hourly rates paid by clients seeking legal services on an hourly basis becomes a proxy for reasonable hourly compensation for the fee claimant's lawyer. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n.11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 & n.11, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984). Here, in an arms-length transaction, Florida Medical Center paid Mr. Tilton $150 per hour and Mr. Stahl $100 per hour. The $100 hourly rate for Mr. Stahl may be at the upper end of the market for attorneys admitted to the bar in 1982, but he had experience in health care law as a law clerk before admission to the bar which should be considered. These hourly rates are paid by other clients to these lawyers. Free market transactions are powerful evidence of what a reasonable hourly rate is. For lawyers of the experience of Mr. Tilton and Mr. Stahl, the rates claimed are reasonable. No persuasive evidence has been presented that these rates are exorbitant, or are out of line with a prevailing market rate for other private counsel of comparable experience, skill and reputation. Based on these calculations the lodestar amount is: HOURS HOURLY RATE Tilton 219.15 x $150.00 = $32,872.50 Stahl 142.3 x $100.00 = $14,230.00 $47,102.50 TOTAL FEE Results Obtained. Rule 4-1.5(B)(4). The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services objects to paying for all hours billed. A major issue raised by Florida Medical Center in its appellate brief was that after having entered a final order denying Humana Bennett's 1981 application for additional beds (the subject of the appeal in the Fourth District Court of Appeal), the Department could not recede from or modify that order as part of a settlement. This argument was rejected by the First District Court of Appeal, and the Department believes the lodestar amount should be reduced to recognize Florida Medical Center's limited appellate success. The short answer to this objection is that the District Court of Appeal certainly knew this, but did not specifically condition the attorney's fee award on some segregation of the amount of work devoted to different issues on the appeal. The Court did condition its order granting attorney's fees upon proof that Florida Medical Center had not waived its point of entry; it also could have limited the fee award to the standing issue on which Florida Medical Center prevailed, but it did not. Florida Medical Center met the only condition the Court imposed and is entitled to fees for all services rendered by its attorneys. If the issue whether fees should be reduced for incomplete appellate success is open, it would be inappropriate to reduce the number of compensable hours here. The erroneous decision of the Department denying a hearing caused Florida Medical Center to incur appellate fees. The issue of the authority of an agency to recede from a final order in a settlement was one of first impression in Florida law. Although unsuccessful, the argument advanced in the appellate court was reasonable. To be made whole, Florida Medical Center should be reimbursed for hours attributable to that issue. If a party brings unrelated claims which carry attorney's fees to federal court and fails to prevail on all claims, fees are not granted for the unsuccessful claims. The focus, however, is on whether the partially successful party pursued "distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories". Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1940. Here, the relief sought was reversal of the order denying Florida Medical Center the right to participate in the Department's decision to grant additional beds to Humana Bennett. That same relief was available on either theory proposed by Florida Medical Center: that its status as a competitor of Humana Bennett conferred standing as a matter of law under Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes, or that HRS was not entitled to rescind through settlement a final order denying Humana Bennett additional beds after denial had been recommended by a Hearing Officer following a Chapter 120 formal proceeding in which the applicant, competitors and the Department had been heard, and HRS had adopted that order as its final agency action. Florida Medical Center did not advance distinctly different claims for relief based on different facts and legal theories; it presented a single claim for relief based on alternate theories. Cf., Taylor v. Sterrett, 640 F.2d 663, 669 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he proper focus is whether the plaintiff has been successful on the central issue as exhibited by the fact that he has acquired the primary relief sought.") As the Supreme Court said in Hensley, "The result is what matters." id., 461 U.S. at 435, 1030 S.Ct. at 1940. As the result of its appeal Florida Medical Center has participated in a lengthy Section 120.57 formal proceeding on remand which has permitted it to oppose the addition of 53 beds to a competitor. The potential competitive impact on Florida Medical Center of the opening of those new beds is sufficiently serious to make the hours reasonably expended a satisfactory basis for the fee award. That the record on appeal was brief, and the consolidated initial and reply briefs succinct (totaling 23 pages) does not mean the hours expended on the appeal are not properly compensable. Other Factors None of the other factors in Rule 4-1.5(B) would vary the lodestar amount. "When . . . the applicant for a fee has carried his burden of showing that the claimed rate and number of hours are reasonable, the resulting product is presumed to be the reasonable fee to which counsel is entitled." Pennsylvania v. Deleware Valley Citizens Council, U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 3088, 3398 (1986) quoting, Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1548, 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984) (emphasis by the Court). The fee is not contingent, and no special time limitations were imposed by the client or the circumstances, Rule 4-1.5(B)(8), (5). The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client is not significant here since that factor is encompassed in the determination of the hourly rate to which Florida Medical Center and its attorneys agreed, as is the factor on experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer performing the services. Rule 4-1.5(B)(6), (7). Equal Access to Justice Act The argument of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services that the $15,000 cap on fees which may be awarded under the Equal Access to Justice Act, Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, should be applied to this case is rejected. The fees the District Court of Appeal ordered HRS to pay were not awarded pursuant to that Act. That cap is permissible because an award of fees is in derogation of the American rule that a party shall bear its own fees. See, e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). Having statutorily created the entitlement to fees, the legislature may also cap those fees. The record shows that Florida Medical Center's motion to the Court which prompted this fee award was one based on Section 120.57(1)(b)(9), Florida Statutes (1985), which authorizes the courts to award "reasonable attorney's fees and costs" without any cap. The purpose of the award is to make Florida Medical Center whole for the fees and costs incurred as the result of Departmental action which was a gross abuse of agency discretion." Section 120.57(1)(b)(9), Florida Statutes (1985). The fee will not go to Florida Medical Center's attorneys--they have already been paid. As the statute prescribes, the court has awarded the fee to "the prevailing party." It is no defense to an award under the statute that the hourly rate assessed is more than the agency pays to counsel it hires. The argument advanced by the expert witness for the Department that the focus should not be on the amount the private client was willing to pay, but on what the public will approve is not accepted. The statutory standard is that the fee shall be reasonable, and the provisions of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar identify factors for applying the test of reasonableness. Public antipathy to awards made to private parties with public funds to redress grossly abusive agency conduct lacks legal significance. Costs Florida Medical Center is entitled to recover the $50.00 filing fee for Case No. BD-46, the cost of the record on appeal of $4.00, and $63.74 for printing of the reply brief. The total allowable costs are $117.74.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that fees in the amount of $47,102.50 be awarded with costs of $117.74. DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of April 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric B. Tilton, Esquire Post Office Drawer 550 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 R. S. Power, Esquire Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Raymond E. Rhodes, Clerk District Court of Appeal First District State of Florida Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1850
