The Issue The issue is whether this case should be dismissed based on Petitioner's failure to appear at the hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Notice of Hearing in this case was issued on January 12, 2011, setting the hearing for March 30 and 31, 2011, in Tavares, Florida. The hearing was scheduled to commence at 9:00 a.m. on March 30, 2011. Also on January 12, 2011, an Order of Pre-hearing Instructions was entered. Neither the Notice of Hearing nor the Order of Pre- hearing Instructions was returned as undeliverable to Petitioner. On March 23, 2011, Petitioner filed a letter at the Division of Administrative Hearings stating that she would be unable to attend the hearing on March 30, 2011, for unexplained medical reasons. This letter indicated that Petitioner was aware of the scheduled hearing dates. At the hearing on March 30, 2011, counsel for Respondent stated that Petitioner did not serve a copy of this letter to Respondent. On March 29, 2011, Petitioner filed a second letter at the Division of Administrative Hearings that declined to request a continuance of the hearing and proposed that the hearing proceed based on hearsay documents that Petitioner had previously filed at the Division of Administrative Hearings. At the hearing on March 30, 2011, counsel for Respondent stated that Petitioner did not serve a copy of this letter to Respondent. At 9:00 a.m. on March 30, 2011, counsel and witnesses for Respondent were present and prepared to go forward with the hearing. Petitioner was not present. The undersigned delayed the commencement of the hearing by fifteen minutes, but Petitioner still did not appear. The hearing was called to order at 9:15 a.m. Counsel for Respondent entered his appearance and requested the entry of a recommended order of dismissal. As noted above, Respondent had received no notice that Petitioner did not intend to appear at the hearing or that continuance was under consideration. Respondent's counsel had flown to Florida from Tennessee to appear at the hearing. One of Respondent's witnesses was a former employee whom Respondent had flown to Florida from Wisconsin at Respondent's expense. Respondent vigorously opposed any continuance of the scheduled proceeding. The undersigned declined on the record to continue the hearing. The hearing was then adjourned.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of April, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack Leebron Grand Court Tavares 111 Westwood Place, Suite 200 Brentwood, Tennessee 37027 Ann L. Brunette Post Office Box 304 Fruitland Park, Florida 34731 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice medicine based upon the alleged violations of Section 458.331(1), Florida Statutes, set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Esmildo E. Machado, was a licensed physician in the State of Florida having been issued license number ME-0028831. Respondent came to the United States from Cuba in approximately April of 1974. Respondent was and is a fervent anti-communist. Prior to coming to the United States, Respondent was imprisoned in Cuba from 1969 through 1974 for aiding anti-communists who were attempting to overthrow the government of Cuba. Respondent has been a licensed physician in Florida since 1976 and has been practicing out of an office located at 456 Southwest 8th Street in Miami, Florida, since that time. No evidence was presented of any prior disciplinary action taken by Petitioner against Respondent. In March of 1992, the Federal Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") initiated a criminal investigation into the prescribing practices of Respondent. The investigation was apparently initiated after a confidential informant (the "Confidential Informant" or the "Patient") told DEA that he could obtain drugs through Respondent. The DEA enlisted the Confidential Informant to try to buy drugs and prescriptions from the Respondent. The Confidential Informant was not otherwise employed during the time period in question. He was paid by DEA based in part upon the quantities and strength of the drugs and prescriptions obtained. On or about April 13, 1992, the Confidential Informant telephoned the Respondent's office and set up an appointment to meet with the Respondent that afternoon. The Confidential Informant had been a patient of the Respondent's several years earlier. In addition, the Confidential Informant's father had been treated by the Respondent in the recent past. As discussed in more detail below, Respondent claims that he thought the Confidential Informant came to see him to complain about Respondent's treatment of the Confidential Informant's father. Respondent contends that the Confidential Informant had visited his office approximately one week before the April 13 visit and, during the earlier meeting, the Confidential Informant told Respondent that he needed drugs for the "Nicaraguan anti-communists." Respondent claims that he felt compelled to help. The Confidential Informant denies any such conversation took place. Respondent's purported desire to help the Nicaraguan anti-communists does not relieve him of the obligation to practice medicine in accordance with community standards and the laws of Florida. In any event, Respondent's contention is not credible. As discussed in more detail below, the Confidential Informant recorded his April 13 visit to Respondent's office and also recorded several subsequent visits. None of the transcripts of the recorded conversations between Respondent and the Confidential Informant reflect that either the Confidential Informant or Respondent ever made any mention of "Nicaraguan anti- communists." Respondent also contends that he was intimidated by the Confidential Informant and alleged hints made by him of a possible malpractice lawsuit over Respondent's treatment of the Confidential Informant's father. The transcripts of the initial meetings between Respondent and the Confidential Informant reflect that Respondent was very solicitous regarding the Confidential Informant's father. However, there is no persuasive evidence that the Confidential Informant said or did anything to foster Respondent's concern about a possible malpractice action. Any subjective fears on Respondent's part were not reasonably based and provide no defense to the charges that he violated Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. The more persuasive evidence in this case did not support Respondent's contention that he was coerced or tricked into selling the Patient prescriptions and drugs during any of the meetings. Moreover, Respondent's claim that he was "entrapped" to dispense drugs and prescriptions to the Confidential Informant was not persuasive. Before the April 13 meeting, the Patient met with DEA Investigator Robert Yakubec and another DEA agent a few blocks from Respondent's office. Investigator Yakubec instructed the Patient on the law of entrapment and the DEA procedures for making a controlled buy. The Patient and his car were both searched, after which the Patient was given two hundred dollars to purchase prescriptions or drugs. The Patient was also given a recorder to record his conversation with the Respondent. Investigator Yakubec and another DEA agent followed the Patient to the Respondent's office. They maintained surveillance outside Respondent's office until the Patient exited. They then followed him to a prearranged meeting place where he was again searched. DEA regulations mandate the procedures described in paragraph 9. The evidence established that these procedures were followed for each and every purchase attempt described in this Recommended Order. During the April 13, 1992 meeting, Respondent provided the Patient with ten (10) Hydrocodone Bitartrate 7.5 mg. tablets (Vicodin), one prescription for forty (40) Acetaminophen with Codeine 30 mg. tablets (Tylenol III) in the name of "Roberto Gomez," and one prescription for thirty (30) Vicodin 5 mg. tablets in the name of "Juan Quinones." Vicodin is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Hydrocodone, a Schedule III controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03(3), Florida Statutes. Tylenol III is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Codeine, a Schedule III controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03(3), Florida Statutes. Respondent failed to take a medical history or conduct a physical examination of the Patient during the April 13 visit or during any subsequent visits by the Confidential Informant. The Confidential Informant was in Respondent's office for approximately twenty (20) minutes on April 13. He paid Respondent's secretary ten dollars ($10) for the office visit. Upon leaving, the Patient proceeded directly to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed by the DEA agents, who searched him and his car. The Confidential Informant returned one hundred and ninety dollars ($190) to Investigator Yakubec along with the prescriptions and Vicodin provided by the Respondent. On April 16, 1992, the Patient returned to Respondent's office. Before the visit, the search and preparatory procedures described in paragraph 9 were performed by Investigator Yakubec and the Patient was given one hundred dollars ($100) to make a purchase. During the April 16 visit, Respondent asked the Patient about the money Respondent made on the prescriptions from the last visit. Respondent suggested he could help the Patient by giving him Vicodin and they could split the earnings from the drugs. Respondent did not comply with the Patient's request for a prescription for Demerol. During the April 16 visit, Respondent gave the Patient one prescription for forty (40) Tylenol III 30 mg. tablets in the name of "Edna Pavon." He also gave the Patient eight (8) Toradol tablets and a prescription for forty (40) more Toradol. The Confidential Informant paid Respondent sixty dollars ($60) for these items. Toradol is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes. The Patient was in Respondent's office for approximately ten minutes on April 16. The Patient proceeded directly from Respondent's office to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient returned forty dollars ($40) to Investigator Yakubec along with the prescriptions and Toradol provided by the Respondent. The Confidential Informant's next visit to Respondent's office was on April 21, 1992. Prior to the visit, the Patient met with Investigator Yakubec and was given two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) to make a purchase. The standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec. The Patient had to wait for more than an hour to see the Respondent on the April 21. Respondent contends that on this and other occasions he deliberately made the Patient wait in the hope that the Patient would get discouraged and leave. After considering all of the evidence, it is concluded that Respondent did very little to discourage the Confidential Informant's efforts to obtain drugs and prescriptions. While Respondent resisted some efforts by the Confidential Informant to obtain stronger drugs, this resistance appears to have been predicated on concerns that those drugs were more closely monitored. When the Patient finally got in to see the doctor on April 21, Respondent gave the Patient one hundred and sixteen (116) Vicodin 5 mg. tablets, one prescription for sixty (60) Tylenol III 30 mg. tablets in the name of "Georgio Rojas," and one prescription for sixty (60) Darvocet 100 mg. tablets in the name of "Celia Garcia." The Patient paid Respondent one hundred thirty dollars ($130) for these items. Darvocet is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Propoxyphene Napsylate, a Schedule IV controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03(4), Florida Statutes. After leaving Respondent's office on April 21, the Patient proceeded directly to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient returned one hundred and twenty dollars ($120) to Investigator Yakubec along with the prescriptions and Vicodin provided by the Respondent. On April 24, 1992, the Patient again presented at Respondent's office. The standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec before the visit, and the Patient was given two hundred dollars ($200) with which to make a purchase. During the April 24 visit, the Patient told Respondent he wanted a prescription for "Xanax" and a prescription for "Tranzene" for a "Cuban friend." Respondent gave the Patient one hundred and two (102) Vicodin 7.5 mg. tablets, one prescription for sixty (60) Xanax 25 mg. tablets in the name of "[illegible]", one prescription for thirty (30) Tranxene 3.75 mg. tablets in the name of "[illegible] Martinez," one prescription for sixty (60) Tylenol III 60 mg. tablets in the name of "Georgio Rojas", and one prescription for sixty (60) Tylenol III 60 mg. tablets in the name of "[illegible]." The Patient paid the Respondent one hundred thirty dollars ($130) for the drugs and prescriptions. Xanax is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Alprazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Tranxene is a legend drug pursuant to by Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes and contains Clorazepate Dipotassium, a Schedule IV controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The Patient was in Respondent's office for approximately twenty-three (23) minutes on April 24. Upon leaving, the Patient proceeded directly to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient returned seventy dollars ($70) to Investigator Yakubec along with the prescriptions and Vicodin provided by the Respondent. On April 29, 1992, the Patient returned to Respondent's office. The standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec prior to the visit. The Patient was given one hundred and seventy dollars ($170) with which to make a purchase. During the April 29 visit, the Patient asked Respondent for a prescription for Tylox. Respondent directed the Patient to wait in the office while he obtained some Vicodin. After waiting less than one hour, Respondent gave the Patient ninety (90) Tylenol III 30 mg. tablets, one hundred (100) Vicodin 5 mg. tablets, and one prescription for thirty (30) Halcion 25 mg. tablets in the name of "Carlos Quinones" and a prescription for sixty (60) Tylox in the name of "Belen Portela". The Patient paid Respondent a total of one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for these items. Tylox is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance as defined in Section 893.03(2), Florida Statutes. Halcion is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Triazolam, a Schedule IV controlled substance listed in Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The Patient was in Respondent's office for approximately fifty (50) minutes on April 29. Upon leaving, he proceeded directly to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. He returned twenty dollars ($20) to Investigator Yakubec along with the Tylenol, Vicodin and prescriptions. On May 4, 1992, the Patient again presented at Respondent's office. Prior to the visit, the standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec and the Patient was given two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) with which to make a purchase. During the May 4 visit, Respondent gave the Patient two hundred (200) Vicodin 7.5 mg. tablets and one prescription for thirty (30) Tylox tablets in the name of "Luis Moran." The Patient paid Respondent two hundred dollars ($200) for these items. The Patient was in Respondent's office for approximately twenty (20) minutes on May 4. Upon leaving, he proceeded directly from Respondent's office to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient returned fifty dollars ($50) to Investigator Yakubec along with the prescription and Vicodin provided by the Respondent. On May 6, 1992, the Patient returned to Respondent's office. Prior to the visit, the standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec and the Patient was given two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) with which to make a purchase. During the May 6, 1992 visit, the Patient asked Respondent to try to obtain some steroids, in particular Deca Durabdin, for some of his friends. Respondent gave the Patient one hundred and two (102) Vicodin 7.5 mg. tablets and three hundred (300) Vicodin 5 mg. tablets in return for which the Patient paid Respondent two hundred fifty dollars ($250). The Patient promised to pay Respondent an additional fifty dollars ($50) on his next visit. The Patient was in Respondent's office for approximately twenty (20) minutes on May 6. Upon leaving, the Patient proceeded directly to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient gave Investigator Yakubec the Vicodin provided by the Respondent. The Patient's next visit to Respondent's office was on May 15, 1992. Prior to the visit, the standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec and the Patient was given three hundred fifty dollars ($350). Fifty dollars ($50) was to pay for the drugs obtained during the previous visit. The Patient entered Respondent's office at approximately 1:00 p.m. on May 15 and remained inside for approximately fifteen (15) minutes. Petitioner paid Respondent the fifty dollars ($50) due from the previous visit. Respondent told the Patient he was trying to determine if he could obtain any steroids. Respondent and the Patient also discussed other drugs, including Dilaudid, Percodan and Percocet, and they discussed problems with obtaining such drugs from various pharmacies in the area. Respondent did not agree to provide any of these stronger drugs to the Confidental Informant at this time. Respondent told the Patient to return at 2:00 p.m. to pick up some Vicodin. The Patient returned to Respondent's office at approximately 1:45 p.m. on May 15 at which time Respondent gave the Patient two hundred and ninety seven (297) Vicodin 5 mg. tablets in return for which the Patient paid the Respondent two hundred fifty dollars ($250). The Patient left Respondent's office at approximately 2:02 p.m. and proceeded directly to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient gave Investigator Yakubec the Vicodin provided by the Respondent. On May 20, 1992, the Patient returned to Respondent's office. Prior to the visit, the standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec and the Patient was given two hundred and fifty dollars ($250) with which to make a purchase. During the May 20 visit, the Patient and Respondent discussed how prescriptions could be presented at various pharmacies so as to minimize suspicion. Respondent gave the Patient one prescription for forty (40) Percocet #40 tablets in the name of "Daysi Lopez"; one prescription for forty (40) Percocet #40 tablets in the name of "Centuedis Nundez"; one prescription for forty (40) Percocet #40 tablets in the name of "Anzetia Perez"; and one prescription for 2 vials/2cc of Deca Durabolin in the name of "Miguel Castro." The Patient paid the Respondent one hundred twenty dollars ($120) for the prescriptions. Deca Durabolin is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes. Percocet is a legend drug pursuant to Section 465.003(7), Florida Statutes, and contains Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled substance listed in Section 893.03, Florida Statutes. The Patient was in Respondent's office for approximately one (1) hour and ten (10) minutes on May 20 and proceeded directly from Respondent's office to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient returned one hundred and thirty dollars ($130) to Investigator Yakubec along with the prescriptions provided by the Respondent. On June 10, 1992, the Patient again returned to Respondent's office. Prior to the visit, the standard search and preparatory procedures were performed by Investigator Yakubec and the Patient was given one hundred and fifty dollars ($150) with which to make a purchase. During the June 10 visit, Respondent gave the Patient one prescription for "6 amps" of Deca Durabolin in the name of "Manny Lorenzana;" one prescription for Percocet #60 in the name of "Hypolita Herrera;" one prescription for Percocet #40 in the name of "Marina Quintana;" and one prescription for Percocet #40 where the name was illegible. The Patient paid the Respondent $140 for the prescriptions. The Patient was in Respondent's office for approximately forty-five minutes on June 10. Upon leaving, the Patient proceeded directly to a prearranged meeting place where he was debriefed and searched. The Patient returned ten dollars ($10) to Investigator Yakubec along with the prescriptions provided by the Respondent. As noted above, Respondent never performed a physical examination of the Patient and never took a physical history from him. The evidence established that, prior to prescribing legend drugs to a patient, a physician should perform a physical examination to arrive at a legitimate medical reason to prescribe the drugs. Prescribing controlled substances for no legitimate medical reason is below the standard of care recognized by a reasonably prudent physician. A physician is required to keep accurate written medical records of his treatment of patients. These records should include a record of all drugs prescribed or dispensed to a patient and the reasons why the drugs were dispensed or prescribed. The reasons should be supported by the results of physical examinations and/or the patient's history. Respondent failed to document adequate medical histories and physical examinations in the Patient's medical records to justify his numerous prescriptions for legend drugs, including controlled substances. Accordingly, it is concluded that Respondent failed to keep written medical records justifying the course of treatment of the Patient It is also concluded that Respondent dispensed Tylox and Percocet, Schedule II substances, outside the course of his professional practice and without a legitimate medical reason. Schedule II controlled substances have a high potential for abuse. They have a currently accepted but severely restricted medical use in treatment in the United States. Abuse of a Schedule II substance may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence. 57 The evidence also established that Respondent dispensed Vicodin and Tylenol III, both Schedule III controlled substances, outside the course of his professional medical practice and without a legitimate medical reason. Abuse of a Schedule III substance can lead to moderate or low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. In addition, Respondent dispensed the following Schedule IV substances outside the course of his professional medical practice and without a legitimate medical reason: Darvocet, Xanax, Tranxene, and Halcion. Abuse of a Schedule IV substance may lead to limited physical or psychological dependence. Respondent also inappropriately prescribed and dispensed the legend drugs Toradol and Deca Durabolin to the Patient outside the course of the physician's professional practice. On several occasions between April 13, 1992, and June 10, 1992, Respondent gave prescriptions to the Confidential Informant which included a patient name other than the Confidential Informant. These actions by Respondent are below the acceptable standard of care for a reasonably prudent similar physician. There is no indication that Respondent ever attempted to contact the police about perceived threats or coercion by the Patient. There is also no evidence that Respondent ever alerted any authorities to the Patient's admissions that he intended to resell the drugs. In fact, the evidence indicates that Respondent was a willing, albeit sometimes cautious participant in the Confidential Informant's apparent drug trafficking scheme. His deliberate decision to use the name of other patients on some of the prescriptions indicates that he was well aware of what he was doing and was trying to cover his tracks. Respondent presented testimony from several members of the community who stated that Respondent is a respected and valued member of the community and has provided needed medical services to the community. Notwithstanding the allegations in this case, they have expressed confidence in his medical judgment and want to see him continue his practice in the community. Respondent was apparently involved in the final stages of a hotly contested divorce during the period when the incidents alleged in this case took place. He suggests that the stress from his divorce may have impaired his judgment in handling what he claims were high pressure tactics from the Confidential Informant. While the Confidential Informant instigated the sales and continuously sought more and stronger drugs, the more persuasive evidence did not, however, support Respondent's claim of high pressure tactics from the Confidential Informant. The stress Respondent was feeling from his divorce can be considered in mitigation, but it does not provide an excuse for Respondent's actions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 458.331(1)(t), (q) and (m) as alleged in the Administrative Complaint. As a penalty for the violations, Respondent's license to practice medicine should be suspended for five (5) years followed by a three-year term of probation during which time Respondent's prescribing practices should be closely monitored. In addition, an administrative fine in the amount of ten thousand dollars ($10,000) should be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of November 1994. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Both parties have submitted Proposed Recommended Orders. The following constitutes my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 9 and 15. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 21 and 24. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 33. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 35. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 32. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 40. [NOTE: 59. is blank on original document filed with DOAH.] Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 44. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 49. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 7, 8 and 56. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 46, except the prescriptions were for Percocet instead of Tylox. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 49. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 50. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 50. Adopted in pertinent part in Finding of Fact 52. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 52. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14 and 53. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14 and 53. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as argumentative. The subject matter is addressed in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected as argumentative. The subject matter is addressed in Finding of Fact 54. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 14, 53 and 55. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 56. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 56. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 57. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 58. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 57 and addressed in the Conclusions of Law. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 59. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 60. Rejected as argumentative and unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7 and 8. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Rejected as unnecessary. The subject matter is addressed in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 2. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 9. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as vague and argumentative. Rejected as argumentative and unnecessary. Some of these issues are addressed in Findings of Fact 5 and 9. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 5. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Adopted in pertinent part in Findings of Fact 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Addressed in the preliminary statement. Rejected as irrelevant. As set forth in the Preliminary Statement, the Confidential Informant authenticated the transcripts. Rejected as irrelevant. The clear and convincing evidence established that the Confidential Informant paid Respondent for the drugs and prescriptions he obtained. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and argumentative. Rejected as irrelevant and argumentative. Rejected as irrelevant and argumentative. Rejected as irrelevant and argumentative. Rejected as vague and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 15. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 62. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0770 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Francesca Plendl, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold D. Lewis, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Gary Robert Fine, Esquire 633 Southeast Third Avenue #4R Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her race, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a provider of health-care services that receives funding from the West Volusia Hospital Authority (WVHA). Respondent operates health clinics in Pierson, DeLand, and Deltona, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a Certified Medical Assistant on September 25, 2009. After a period of time in Respondent’s Pierson office, Petitioner was transferred to Respondent’s DeLand office. Petitioner’s duties included those as a referral clerk. In that capacity, Petitioner arranged, scheduled, and coordinated referrals from Respondent’s medical providers to outside physicians and laboratories. Petitioner also performed blood-draws, Pap smears, and related services. Petitioner was frequently behind in her referrals. Petitioner sought assistance with her referrals. Taken in the light most favorable to Petitioner, an employee of Respondent with some apparent supervisory authority denied her requests, and advised other employees that they were not to assist Petitioner in catching up. In October 2010, Petitioner was assigned to Respondent’s newly created Emergency Room Diversion (ERD) program. That assignment caused a change in Petitioner’s shift from the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. shift, to the 12:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. shift. She was returned to her normal day shift in mid-November. The disruption in her standard shift caused Petitioner to fall further behind in her referrals. To minimize the problem, nurses began to make referrals for their doctors when they had the time. On November 19, 2010, Petitioner called Juanita McNeil, an elected commissioner of the WVHA, to discuss what Petitioner perceived to be sub-standard patient care that, in some cases, related to referrals that were not being timely completed, and for which Petitioner was receiving no assistance. Petitioner asked Ms. McNeil to keep their conversation confidential because she feared that she would be terminated for going outside of the chain of command. Later in the day on November 19, 2010, Petitioner was presented with a separation notice by which she was terminated from employment. The separation notice listed four reasons for her termination. The reasons were “employee not doing job in a timely manner, being rude with patients, being rude with other employees, [and] insubordination (calling the WVHA) instead of talking with appropriate supervisors.” During the hearing, Petitioner admitted that “100% of the reason that I was fired is because of me calling the WVHA.” Upon follow up inquiry, Petitioner reiterated that she was terminated for insubordination in bypassing her supervisors to contact a WVHA commissioner, and that reason formed the basis for her complaint that she had been the subject of discrimination or retaliation. Petitioner knew of no other employee that ever communicated directly with a WVHA commissioner, or that ever escaped disciplinary sanctions for having done so. Thus, there was no comparator upon which to measure whether Petitioner was treated differently under like circumstances as a result of her race. Petitioner’s admission of the basis for her termination is dispositive of this case. Being terminated for insubordination, in the absence of evidence that persons outside of her protected class were treated differently, is not related to Petitioner’s race. Petitioner’s admission demonstrates that her claim is not founded on an unlawful employment practice based on her race, or retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to a practice which is an unlawful employment practice. Based on Petitioner’s admission, the undersigned concluded that there was no legal basis upon which relief could be ordered under the Florida Civil Rights Act. Thus, the final hearing was adjourned.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2012.
Recommendation By reasons of the foregoing Facts and Conclusions of Law, I recommend that the Respondent's license be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Deborah Sanchez Nelson, L.P.N., admits that on or about February 23, 1978, on the sixth floor of Palmetto General Hospital, Hialeah, Florida, several ampules of a controlled drug, to wit: Demerol (Meperedine) Injectable, were discovered to have been tampered with in that the fluid levels were not uniform as is true of untampered ampules. The Respondent was assigned to medications on the sixth floor of said hospital and was questioned concerning the incident and admitted to having taken said narcotic. A search of the Respondent's purse by an officer of the Hialeah Police Department revealed a vial labeled as water, containing approximately 12 cc of clear liquid, which upon being chemically analyzed proved to be Meperedine. Deborah Sanchez Nelson had worked at Palmetto General Hospital from February 10, 1978, until the incidents described above on February 23, 1978. Nelson has voluntarily not worked as a licensed practical nurse since that date and is currently employed at J. C. Penny's as a salesperson. Freda Drees, Director of Nursing at Palmetto General Hospital, first met Nelson upon her employment on February 10, 1978. Drees observed Nelson during the hospital's orientation program and later after she assumed her duties with the hospital. Drees described Nelson as a good nurse. Mitchell M. Ross, Director of Pharmacy, Palmetto General Hospital, testified that he had known Nelson for approximately four years, having first met her while employed as a pharmacist at Parkway General Hospital. Nelson was employed at Parkway General Hospital serving on the night shift. Ross had occasion to observe Nelson and stated that she was very good with patients. Ross stated that there had never been any trouble with Nelson at Parkway General Hospital involving drugs and that because of his position with the hospital he would have been aware of any discrepancies or violations. Dorothy Ware, State Probation Officer, Department of Corrections, testified that she had known Nelson since July, 1978, when Nelson was assigned to her as a probationer. Nelson had been placed on probation by the Broward County Court as a result of her conviction for leaving the scene of an accident which occurred on approximately February 28, 1978. Ware stated that Nelson admitted her drug involvement to her during their initial interview and sought assistance from Ware in dealing with her drug problem. Nelson was referred by Ware to a drug rehabilitation program and immediately contacted this program. However, testing by the program revealed that Nelson was not using drugs, and she was not placed in the program. Ware stated that Nelson was very responsible, had met all obligations of her probation to include paying the cost of her probation as directed by the court. Ware stated that Nelson was very remorseful about her drug involvement and having taken drugs from the hospital. Ware recommended that no action be taken that would deny Nelson her right to practice practical nursing. Deborah Sanchez Nelson testified on her own behalf and admitted she had been involved with drugs for eight months. She stated that her involvement arose when she became personally involved with an individual who was involved with drugs and started using drugs herself. The drug of use was Demerol, which her friend was supplying. She stated that she had not admitted to herself that she was addicted and needed drugs until the incident at Palmetto General Hospital. At that time she had broken off her relationship with the person with whom she was involved and who was supplying her with the drug, Demerol. Nelson stated that the accident which had led to her conviction for leaving the scene of an accident had occurred because she was distraught over her theft of drugs from the hospital, the termination from her job, and the realization that she was addicted to drugs. After the accident, Nelson was admitted by a psychiatrist to the hospital for treatment. Nelson stated her involvement with drugs was over and that she had a better self-image of herself. Her testimony concerning her no longer being involved with drugs was confirmed by Ware's testimony that the study done of Nelson by the drug referral service revealed that Nelson was not using drugs. Nelson stated that she missed nursing, desired to continue practicing nursing, and would submit to any conditions established by the Board if permitted to continue in nursing.
Recommendation The admissions of the Respondent clearly establish that she violated the provisions of law cited above. The testimony in mitigation establishes that the Respondent was, prior to her involvement with drugs, a fine nurse who was good with patients. The Respondent's involvement with drugs arose out of a personal involvement with an individual who was also involved with drugs and supplied the Respondent with Demerol, which was the drug of abuse. The Respondent testified that she had not admitted to herself her addiction until her supply of Demerol was cut off, when her personal relationship with the individual supplying her was terminated. Nelson has sought professional treatment for her personal and drug problems, overcoming her drug addiction and apparently the personal problems which gave rise to it. She has voluntarily not practiced nursing for approximately one year. The Director of Nursing for Palmetto General Hospital and the Director of the Pharmacy at Palmetto General Hospital both voluntarily testified in her behalf. Her probation officer voluntarily appeared and confirmed that Nelson was no longer involved in drugs, was deeply remorseful over her involvement with drugs and stealing drugs from the hospital, and had responsibly met all of the terms of her probation for conviction of an unrelated offense. Her probation officer specifically recommended that no action be taken to deny Nelson the opportunity to practice nursing. Nelson testified and exhibited remorse and concern over her actions, freely admitted her addiction, and stated that she had overcome her drug problem and personal problems and turned her life around. She stated that she missed nursing and desired to return to nursing. The use of drugs by a nurse is one of the most serious violations of Chapter 464 because of the access available to medical personnel and because they must be mentally and physically capable of attending patients whose lives and well-being are entrusted to them. If possible, the theft of drugs from patients, or the adulteration of drugs for patients' use, is more serious because it affects the strength of the drugs administered and subjects the patient receiving them to pain and suffering. However, addiction is a powerful thing, and it overcomes the natural inclinations and professional training one has received. Unquestionably, those guilty of such violations should be appropriately disciplined. Generally, in a case involving patients' drugs a suspension of no less than two years would be recommended. However, in this instance the Respondent voluntarily removed herself from nursing nearly one year ago, which should be considered in determining the final penalty. Also, her own efforts and success in overcoming her personal problems and addiction must be considered. Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Facts in Mitigation, the Hearing Officer would recommend that the Board suspend the license of the Respondent for 24 months, give credit to the Respondent for the 12 months she has voluntarily not practiced, and suspend the last six months of the remaining 12 months, permitting the Respondent to return to practice under conditions established by the Board in order that the Board may maintain closer supervision over the Respondent during her initial return to practice. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Julius Finegold, Esquire 1007 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Geraldine B. Johnson State Board of Nursing 6501 Arlington Expressway, Bldg B Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Deborah Sanchez Nelson 19414 NW 30th Court Miami, Florida 33162 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA STATE BOARD OF NURSING IN THE MATTER OF: Deborah Sanchez Nelson As a Registered Nurse Case No. 78-2056 19414 N. W. 30th Court License Number 32957-1 Miami, Florida 33162 /
Findings Of Fact On or about September 25, 2010, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination against Respondent with the FCHR. Pursuant to the FCHR's procedure, an investigation of the matter was completed, that resulted in a Notice of Determination: No Cause. Essentially, the FCHR found that based upon the allegations raised by Petitioner there was no reasonable cause to believe an unlawful employment practice occurred. Thereafter, Petitioner elected to file a Petition for Relief to challenge the determination, and to seek relief against Respondent for the alleged violation. The FCHR forwarded the matter to DOAH for formal proceedings. DOAH issued a Notice of Hearing on April 15, 2011, that was provided to all parties at their addresses of record. It is presumed, the parties received notice of the hearing date, time, and location. In fact, counsel for both parties did appear. Prior to the hearing, the parties engaged in discovery and Petitioner participated in a deposition on or about May 24, 2011. It is undisputed that Petitioner knew or should have known of the hearing date, time, and place.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 W. John Gadd, Esquire The Law Offices of W. John Gadd 2727 Ulmerton Road, Suite 250 Clearwater, Florida 33762 Glenn Michael Rissman, Esquire Stearns, Weaver, Miller, Weissler, Alhadeff & Sitterman, PA 200 East Las Olas Boulevard, Suite 2100 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulation of the parties, the testimony of the witnesses, and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On February 17, 1990, Frank Vitale was arrested at or near the ABC Liquors at 3097 Curry Ford Road, Orlando, Florida for trafficking in cocaine (400 grams or more). On February 17, 1990, Noel Frederick Shumann was arrested at or near the ABC Liquors (ABC) at 3097 Curry Ford Road, Orlando, Florida for trafficking in cocaine (400 grams or more). Noel Frederick Shumann was acquitted for both the charges of trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine on May 2, 1991. Noel Frederick Shumann was present at the ABC on February 17, 1990. Noel Frederick Shumann denies that he was involved in any illegal drug transactions; however, he admits that an illegal drug transaction occurred on February 17, 1990 at the ABC. Frank Vitale, who was convicted of the charges, testified on behalf of Noel Frederick Shumann at the criminal proceeding. Mr. Vitale's testimony is as follows: That the money used to purchase the estimated retail value of cocaine of $9,400.00 was in fact Mr. Vitale's money. That Mr. Vitale had accumulated this money from the sale of an interest in some green houses and monies from the sale of jewelry from his flea market business. He stored the money at Mr. Shumann's house while living there for a brief period of time. On February 17, 1990, he called Mr. Shumann and asked Mr. Shumann to bring envelopes containing the money to the ABC Lounge. Mr. Vitale was not living at Mr. Shumann's house at the time he called Mr. Shumann and asked him to bring the envelope containing the money to the ABC Lounge. These envelopes were stored in the bedroom Mr. Vitale resided in while living in Mr. Shumann's house. Mr. Shumann acquiesced with Mr. Vitale's request. Mr. Vitale further testified that Mr. Shumann had nothing to do with the drug transaction, did not know there was a drug transaction taking place at the ABC Lounge until such time as he arrived and remained at the lounge for a period of time. Mr. Vitale further testified that Mr. Shumann was not to share in the cocaine or any expected profits from the sale of the cocaine. The drug transaction involved 500 grams of cocaine. The estimated retail value of the cocaine was $9,400.00. The money used to purchase the cocaine was in Noel Frederick Shumann's vehicle. Mr. Shumann was assessed on February 26, 1990, pursuant to Section 212.0505, Florida Statutes, for the delinquent tax, penalty and interest relating to the drug transaction which took place on February 17, 1990. The jeopardy assessment is a correct and proper assessment both as to form and content of an illegal drug transaction involving cocaine with the retail value of $9,400.00. Mr. Shumann does not contest the mathematical accuracy of the tax assessment nor the procedures followed in issuing the notice. Mr. Shumann has not paid the sales tax assessed and the amount claimed has not been paid by another on his behalf. Mr. Shumann asserts that the assessment is improper only because he was not personally involved in the illegal transaction and, therefore, committed no act to give rise to the tax. Consequently, he argues the assessment against him should be dismissed. Prior to February 17, 1990, Agent Cannon, an undercover narcotics investigator, was introduced to Frank Vitale. Mr. Vitale met Agent Cannon through a third party, a confidential informant, named Barbara Anderson. Ms. Anderson advised Agent Cannon that Mr. Vitale wanted to purchase cocaine. Ms. Anderson had known Mr. Vitale for some time prior to February 17, 1990. On some occasion prior to February 17, 1990, Mr. Vitale spoke to Ms. Anderson regarding his partner in the drug transaction. When Noel Frederick Shumann arrived at the ABC on February 17, 1990, Mr. Vitale introduced Mr. Shumann to Ms. Anderson as "his partner." Because he remained present during the activities that followed, and because he told Ms. Anderson that he was there to keep an eye on his money, Ms. Anderson presumed Mr. Shumann was the partner in the drug transaction to whom Mr. Vitale had earlier referred. When Agent Cannon arrived to complete the drug transaction, Mr. Vitale introduced Mr. Shumann to him as his partner but maintained he (Vitale) would be handling the deal. In fact, Mr. Vitale became very upset any time Agent Cannon attempted to speak with Mr. Shumann instead of dealing with him exclusively. At one point in time, Agent Cannon threatened to abort the transaction since Mr. Vitale would not let him count the money. The money, which was stored in Mr. Shumann's car at that time, was not counted until Mr. Shumann told Mr. Vitale to let Agent Cannon count the money. Mr. Shumann was aware that Mr. Vitale was attempting to purchase cocaine from Agent Cannon and was aware that the money to be utilized in that purchase was in his (Shumann's) car. During a second conversation, Mr. Shumann directed Mr. Vitale to weigh and test the cocaine to be purchased and to proceed with the transaction if the substance looked good. Mr. Vitale then left the lounge with Agent Cannon and proceeded across the street to the van where Agent Cannon's partner was located with the drugs. Following the exchange of the money for the cocaine, Mr. Vitale was placed under arrest and the MBI team converged. Subsequently, Mr. Vitale and Mr. Shumann were placed in a police patrol car that was wired to record their conversation. The taped conversation (Petitioner's exhibit 1) contains statements by Mr. Vitale to the effect that he knew the police were listening, that he was sorry to get Mr. Shumann into "this," and that Mr. Shumann should "put everything on me (Vitale)." During the counting of the money, the weighing and testing of the cocaine, and the sale and purchase of the cocaine between Agent Cannon and Mr. Vitale, Mr. Shumann remained in the lounge. Mr. Shumann continued to talk to Ms. Anderson even though he knew a cocaine transaction was proceeding, knew that he had been introduced as Mr. Vitale's partner, knew that the money for the transaction was stored first in his house then in his vehicle, and knew that the supplier (Agent Cannon) had sought authorization from him to count the money and complete the deal. It is wholly incredible to conclude that a disinterested party would have remained in the lounge throughout the foregoing events. Cocaine is a controlled substance as defined by Florida law.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue enter a final order confirming the notice of assessment and jeopardy findings and finding the amount due to be $10,575.00 plus interest (1% per month until paid). DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER: 1. Petitioner submitted proposed findings in a form such that rulings cannot be entered. Petitioner summarized: the testimony of Chuck Cannon; the testimony of Mr. Shumann; the patrol car tape (Petitioner's ex. 1); the stipulated statements of facts submitted by the parties; the deposition of Vernon Taylor; and the testimony of Barbara Anderson. Such summaries did not present paragraphs with factual allegations in a form such that specific rulings can be made. Such summaries included argument, irrelevant information and comment on the evidence. Except as set forth in the findings of fact above, they must be rejected as not supported by the weight of credible evidence or as argument. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT: Respondent listed the stipulated facts submitted by the parties. They have been accepted and incorporated in the foregoing recommended order as findings of fact. As to the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent, which began on page 4 of the proposed order, the following specific rulings are given. Paragraphs 1 through 9 are accepted. With regard to paragraph 10, it is accepted that Mr. Vitale introduced Mr. Shumann to Ms. Anderson as his partner. It is not accepted that he specifically told Ms. Anderson that Mr. Shumann was his partner in this drug transaction. That factual conclusion has been reached based upon a preponderance of all evidence presented in this case. Paragraphs 11 through 20 are accepted. Copies to: Robert J. Buonauro 14 E. Washington Street Suite 602 Orlando, Florida 32801 James McAuley Assistant Attorney General Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Vicki Weber General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
