Findings Of Fact Respondent Cherylyn Stoppler, at all times pertinent hereto, was licensed as a real estate saleswoman in the State Of Florida, holding license No. 0467803. Her last and current license was issued authorizing practice at Escambia Realty, Inc., 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. Respondent Dorothy Diane Owens, at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, holding license No. 0380831. Respondent Escambia Realty, Inc., at all times pertinent hereto, was a licensed corporate real estate brokerage holding license No. 0232503. Its address is 310 South Pace Boulevard, Pensacola, Florida 32501. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, related to the licensure of real estate brokers and salesmen, the real estate professional practice standards embodied in that chapter and with prosecuting alleged violators of those standards. On April 13, 1986, Kenneth and Linda Williams, also known as Linda Brewer, requested that Cherylyn Stoppler show them rental property consisting of a single family residence located at 6853 Lake Charlene Drive in Pensacola. They had observed the Respondent corporate broker's sign on the front of that premises, advertising it for rental. Respondent Stoppler, Respondent Owens and the Escambia Realty, Inc. represented the owners of the property. Kenneth and Linda Williams examined the property and decided that they wanted to rent it. In their discussion with Cherylyn Stoppler concerning the terms of the rental arrangement, they requested that they be allowed to paint the premises and that the garage door be repaired. Respondent Stoppler agreed to this and indicated the owners would supply two gallons of paint and the prospective tenants, the Williamses, could do the painting with the owners ensuring repair of the garage door. Respondent Stoppler and the Williamses agreed to those terms and to the rental amount of $625 per month. They also agreed to pay Respondent Stoppler a $400 deposit, on behalf of the owners. Ms. Stoppler informed the Williamses that if they did not consummate the lease arrangement, upon which they had verbally agreed, the $400 would be retained and remitted over to the owners of the property. The Williamses agreed to this arrangement. The Williamses and Ms. Stoppler returned to Ms. Stoppler's office and she noted these terms on a lease agreement form with the additional term that the owner would steam clean the carpet in the house. The lease terms also provided that the premises would be used by no more than two adults and "zero" children, but the lease agreement has the "zero" stricken through indicating that that term was to be deleted. The striking of the zero on the term concerning the number of children to occupy the premises appears to have been executed with the same pen, inasmuch as the ink is the same color as the rest of Mrs. Stoppler's handwritten terms on the lease form. In any event, the Williamses were anxious to return to their home in Louisiana directly from the Respondent's office that same afternoon and to accommodate them Ms. Stoppler agreed to mail the lease form to them to be executed, urging them to send it back immediately. When they left the premises that day, Respondent Stoppler removed her firm's sign from the front of the premises and also told the Williamses that the property would be off the market as of that day, hence her admonishment to them to waste no time in returning the executed lease since the property would be off the market during the interim on the strength of the verbal agreement. The Williamses did not inform Ms. Stoppler that Mr. Williams had two children who might visit them from time to time or live with them at the premises. The Williamses returned to Louisiana and the lease was mailed to them by Ms. Stoppler. The Williamses decided not to execute the lease and to not consummate the rental arrangement. They informed Ms. Stoppler of this by phone on April 24, 1986, as well as communicating on that day with Respondent Owens. They indicated they did not desire to rent the premises and one reason given was that they felt that the two children were precluded by the lease terms from living on the premises for any period of time with them. In fact, the Williamses had never mentioned that they had any children and had sought to negotiate a reduction in the rent when they originally discussed the matter with Ms. Stoppler on the basis that only the two of them would live in the premises. The terms and conditions of the rental arrangement were those given to Ms. Stoppler by the Williamses themselves. When they conferred with Ms. Owens and Ms. Stoppler, they were again informed that the $400 would be retained and transmitted to the owners, to which they did not then object. In fact, they never did make any demand upon the Respondents for return of the $400 which was actually communicated to the Respondents. There is a letter in evidence (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) which the Respondents never received, as is shown by the certified mail receipt card and by Respondents' and Ms. Celano's testimony. The Williamses objected to consummating the lease because they contended that Ms. Stoppler had assured them that they could 1ive in the premises rent- free from the beginning of the lease, April 26, until May 1, during the time in which they would be painting the house and instead they were being charged $84 for those days. Mrs. Williams' testimony is somewhat equivocal in this regard in that she exhibited an incomplete memory regarding certain critical dates in the transaction, for example, the date she allegedly called Mrs. Stoppler to inform her of their refusal of the rental and the date she believed the lease was to commence. Mrs. Stoppler's testimony was corroborated by that of Ms. Owens, and was not refuted by the Williamses. It is accepted over that of Mrs. Williams in establishing that indeed the lease period and the rental there for was to commence on April 26. The Respondents' testimony shows that the house was off the rental market from April 13, when the verbal agreement with Ms. Williams was entered into and the sign was removed from the property and that both Respondents informed Mrs. Williams on two occasions that the $400 was not refundable but would be remitted to the owners of the property. The Respondents also established that Escambia Realty, Inc. followed a consistent policy of retaining deposit monies and remitting them to the owners without refund to prospective tenants when the tenants agreed to lease the premises after being informed that the deposit would be retained and the property taken off the market, when such tenants elect of their own volition to negate a lease or rental agreement. The Williamses additionally maintained that they did not want to consummate the lease arrangement because, in their view, the Respondents and the owners would not permit any children unrestrictedly visit or to live on the premises. That was established not to be the case. They also objected because they would not be allowed to live in the premises rent-free for several days during the time in which they were painting the premises. Additional objections involved various inconsequential technical deficiencies, such as misspellings, in the content of the lease. The employment position Mr. Williams was to have taken in the Pensacola area, and which was in large measure their reason for moving to Pensacola and renting the subject premises, failed to materialize. Ultimately, however, the Williamses moved to Pensacola and rented a different house at the lower rate of $600 per month. In short, the complaining witnesses contend that they did not want to execute the lease because of the problem of the $84 prorated rent required of them by the Respondents and the owners for the days when they thought they would live rent-free while painting the premises, because they felt that Mr. Williams' children by a previous marriage were precluded from unrestricted visits at the rental premises and because they felt that the proffered lease did not contain the proper initial date of tenancy. Thus, the Williamses breached the agreement because the Respondents refused to "correct" the lease according to the Williamses' desires. Those desires were not communicated to the Respondents until, at the very earliest, the phone conversations of April 24, 1986, some twelve days after the verbal agreement to rent the premises to the Williamses had been entered into and the $400 deposited with the Respondents on behalf of the owners. During that time, and longer, the property was taken off the rental market and the Respondents and the owners forbore the opportunity to secure other tenants. The Williamses themselves acknowledged that the letter by which they sought return of the $400 deposit was never actually received by the Respondents. Further, Ms. Williams in the telephone conversation on April 24, 1986, acknowledged that the owners were entitled to the $400 deposit. Even so, Ms. Owens waited approximately 25 days before remitting the funds over to the owners. Thus, no dispute as to the deposit was ever communicated to the Respondents, and the Respondents never misrepresented to either Mr. or Mrs. Williams the manner of disbursement of the deposit funds. It is noteworthy that Mrs. Williams is a licensed realtor herself and had some experience in similar real estate transactions. The Respondents carried out their portion of the bargain. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Respondent Owens is a well- respected real estate practitioner in the Pensacola area, having served as an officer and director of her local board of realtors and having been accorded a number of honors and certifications in connection with her professional performance as a realtor and her securing of advanced training in the field of real estate brokerage. Ms. Stoppler is relatively new to the profession, but neither she nor Ms. Owens have been shown to have ever engaged in any questionable practice or conduct in the course of their practice and neither have been shown to have been the subject of any other complaint of any nature resulting from a real estate transaction.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint against Respondents Cherylyn Stoppler, Dorothy Diane Owens and Escambia Realty, Inc. be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3982 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-4. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Rejected as to its material import. 7-9. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 10-11. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 17-18. Accepted. 19. Rejected as to its material import. 20-21. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Rejected as a recitation of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Also rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but rejected as to its material import. Accepted. Rejected as to its material import. 29-30. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 31. Accepted, but not as to its material import. 32-35. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as to its material import. Accepted, but not to the effect that a demand for refund was made. Rejected as to its material import and as not in accord with the credible testimony and evidence adduced. 39-41. Rejected. Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact: Specific rulings are not separately made here because Respondents' Proposed Findings of Fact are inseparably entwined with legal argument and recitations of, and arguments concerning, the weight and credibility of testimony and evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Cherylyn Stoppler Dorothy Diane Owens Escambia Realty, Inc. 310 South Pace Boulevard Pensacola, Florida 32501 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Harold Huff, Executive Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Llera Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker, and J.M. Llera is the active real estate broker in that corporation. Llera Realty, Inc., and J.M. Llera represented the buyers in the negotiations for purchase and sale of the subject real property. Coral Realty Corporation is a corporate real estate broker, and Alberto E. Trelles is the active real estate broker with that corporation. Coral Realty Corporation and Alberto Trelles represented the seller in the negotiations for purchasee and sale of the subject property. The property in question was owned by Saul Lerner, who was represented in these negotiations by Julius Friedman, attorney at law. The purchasers were Messrs. Delgado, Salazar and Espino, who are officers of Inter-America Housing Corp., said corporation eventually being the purchaser of the subject property. Lerner made an oral open listing on a piece of real property which included the subject property. Trelles, learning of the open listing, advertised the property to various brokers. Llera was made aware of the availability of the property through Trelles' ad and presented the property to Delgado, Salazar and Espino. Lengthy negotiations followed during which various offers were tendered by the buyers through Llera to Trelles to Friedman in Lerner's behalf. These offers were rejected. Eventually, negotiations centered on a segment of the property, and an offer was made by the buyers for $375,000 on this 7.5-acre tract. This offer was made through Llera to Trelles to Friedman, and was also rejected by Lerner. The buyers then asked to negotiate directly with the seller and agreed to pay a ten percent commission to the brokers in the event of a sale. The buyers then negotiated with the seller and eventually reached a sales price of $410,000 net to the seller for the 7.5 acres which had been the subject of the preceding offer. Buyers executed a Hold Harmless Agreement with the seller for any commission that might become due, agreeing to assume all responsibility for such commissions. The buyers through their corporation, Inter-America Housing Corp., purchased the property and refused to pay commissions on the sale and purchase. Thereafter, the Respondents brought suit against the buyers and their corporation. The Respondent's suit alleges the facts stated above in greater detail and asserts that the buyers took the Respondent's commission money to which they were entitled under the oral agreement with the buyers and used this money to purchase a portion of the property. The Respondents asked the court to declare them entitled to a commission and declare an equitable lien in their behalf on a portion of the subject property together with punitive damages. In conjunction with this suit, counsel for the Respondents filed a Notice of Lis Pendens. The Respondents questioned the propriety of this in light of Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and were advised by their counsel that the filing of Lis Pendens in this case was proper. The court subsequently struck the Lis Pendens on motion of the defendant buyers; however, the court refused to strike the portion of the complaint asserting the right to and requesting an equitable lien in behalf of the Respondents.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the real estate licenses of the Respondents. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Harold E. Scherr, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Peter M. Lopez, Esquire 202 Roberts Building 28 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 ================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF LLERA REALTY, INC., J. M. IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL LLERA, CORAL REALTY CORP. OF FLORIDA and ALBERTO TRELLES, THIRD DISTRICT JANUARY TERM, A.D. 1980 Appellants, vs. BOARD OF REAL ESTATE (formerly Florida Real Estate Commission), Appellee. / Opinion filed July 1, 1980. An Appeal from the Board of Real Estate. Lopez & Harris and Peter M. Lopez, for appellants. Howard Hadley and Kenneth M. Meer and Salvatore A. Cappino, for appellee. Before NESBITT, PEARSON, DANIEL, JJ., and PEARSON, TILLMAN (Ret.), Associate Judge. PEARSON, TILLMAN, (Ret.), Associate Judge. This appeal by respondents Llera Realty, Inc., J.M. Llera, Coral Realty Corp. and Alberto Trelles is brought to review the administrative decision of the Florida Real Estate Commission (now known as the Board of Real Estate), which suspended the licenses of the respondents for thirty days. The complaint filed by the Commission charge that the respondents had violated Section 475.42(l)(j), Florida Statutes (1977), by filing a notice of lis pendens on real estate in a court action brought to recover a real estate commission. 1/ The hearing officer entered a recommended order finding that the respondents had, in fact, recorded a lis pendens on real estate in order to collect the commission, and concluding that as a matter of law, the cited section was unconstitutional as applied in this case because "[o]n its face and without such limitations, the statute has a chilling effect on the right of the broker or salesman to seek redress in the courts because persons subject to the statute may have their license revoked or suspended and be prosecuted criminally." The commission rejected that portion of the hearing officer's conclusions of law which held the application of the statute to the respondents to be unconstitutional and, accordingly, the respondents were found guilty and their licenses suspended for thirty days. We affirm. The only substantial question argued in this court is whether the classification by the statute of real estate brokers and salesmen as a class of person who may not use the filing of a lis pendens in connection with a civil lawsuit filed in order to collect a real estate commission is a classification so unreasonable because real estate brokers and salesmen are privileged by the statutory law of this state in the collection of commissions. Section 475.41, Florida Statutes (1977), in effect, provides that only a real estate broker who is properly registered". . . at the time the act or service was performed "may maintain a court action for the collection of a commission for the sale of real estate. As stated in Quinn v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 425 (1927), with regard to the real estate business, "No business known to modern society has a longer or more respectable history." In this regard, the statutory law of this state demands a high standard of those engaging in the real estate business. Section 475.17 et seq., Florida Statutes (1977), through the onus of revocation or suspension of registration, demands an exemplary level of behavior within the profession; Section 475.42, Florida Statutes (1977), enumerates various violations and the consequent penalties to be exacted against those who are not properly registered; and Sections 475.482 et seq., by creating the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund to reimburse persons who have suffered monetary damages at the hands of those registered under this chapter, demonstrate this state's recognition of the sensitive and privileged position of those engaged in real estate to the public at large. Furthermore, it is well- established by the case law of this state that real estate brokers and salesmen occupy a position of confidence toward the public. See the discussion in Foulk v. Florida Real Estate Commission, 113 So. 2d 714, 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959). And see Gabel v. Kilgore, 157 Fla. 420, 26 So.2d 166 (1946); and Ahern v. Florida Real Estate Commission ex rel. O'Kelley, 149 Fla. 706, 6 So.2d 857 (1942). The work of real estate brokers and salesmen is intimately connected with the transfer of title to real estate. It is natural that their experience and knowledge in such matters should be greater than that of the people they serve in their profession. The denial to this privileged group of the availability of a lis pendens when used to collect a commission on the sale of the same real estate on which they have secured, or have attempted to secure, the transfer of title is not the denial of a right of access to the courts. It is simply the denial of a special tool which might be misused by some members of his privileged group to the disadvantage of the public. Finding no error, we affirm the administrative decision.
Findings Of Fact Dan Lee Isaacs is a real estate broker/salesman with the Petitioner, Key Realty, Inc. He seeks in this proceeding to have approved his dual licensure as a broker for Key Realty Management, Inc., as well as to retain his broker/salesman licensure with the Petitioner, Key Realty Inc. In his capacity as a broker/salesman for Key Realty Inc., he works under the supervision of Mr. Les Epperson, who is the licensed broker for that entity. Mr. Isaacs owns no stock in the corporation, Key Realty Inc. He does own stock and would be sole manager of the separate corporation known as Key Realty Management, Inc. Key Realty Management, Inc., is not affiliated in a subsidiary or other relationship with Key Realty, Inc., although there is some commonalty of ownership in that Les Epperson is a minority shareholder. The President and majority stockholder of Key Realty, Inc., Les Epperson, would have no part in the management of the operations of Key Realty Management, Inc. Mr. Isaacs desires, for personal and financial reasons, to remain active in the real estate sales field as a broker/salesman under the supervision of broker Epperson. He would, as sole manager and broker with Key Realty Management, Inc., engage in no sales activities, but rather solely in the management and supervision of various rental properties for clients of that firm. The two corporations maintain and would maintain separate accounting books and records; and, as pertinent, separate escrow and trust funds and accounts. It is to the advantage of both firms, both financially and in terms of legal liability, to maintain these escrow funds and accounts separately because of the financial and operational differences characteristic of a real estate management firm, as compared to a purely real estate sales operation as conducted by Key Realty, Inc. The Petitioner has complied with all requirements for qualification as a real estate broker pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, and the rules promulgated thereunder. In October, 1980, the Petitioner applied for the above described dual licensure. The Respondent denied the application on the basis that an individual cannot be a broker and a broker/ salesman simultaneously. The principals of both corporations, Mr. Epperson and Mr. Isaacs, have submitted the affidavits and agreements pursuant to Rule 2IV-6.06, Florida Administrative Code, attesting to the absence of any conflict of interest stemming from Mr. Isaacs' licensure as a broker of the separate corporation and that both of them agree and consent to the dual registration. There is no dispute between the parties that in essence a "salesman" and a "broker/salesman" perform some of the same real estate transaction functions under the supervision of a licensed broker, for instance, the depositing with the broker of any escrow or other funds involved in a given real estate transaction for appropriate disposition and disbursement by the broker and acting in all other pertinent operative capacities under the supervision of a broker, rather than independently. The parties also did not dispute that the real basis for the "broker/salesman" designation in the licensing scheme in Florida is to allow a licensee to demonstrate to the public that a broker/salesman is clothed with additional internship, educational and experience credentials and is thus possessed of a greater degree of expertise in real estate transactions and operations than one licensed as a salesman. The Respondent however, in its argument during and subsequent to the hearing, apparently takes the position that a "broker/salesman" and a salesman perform identical functions; and, therefore, are legally to be considered as the same type of license and licensee, for purposes of establishing its legal position that since a salesman's license may not be issued to a person registered as an active broker unless the active broker's license is surrendered that neither may a person be dually licensed as both a "broker/salesman" and a broker.
Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the pleadings and arguments of counsel, it is; therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Dan Lee Isaacs a license as an active real estate broker for, and on behalf of, Key Realty Management, Inc., and allowing his retention of licensure as a broker/salesman with Key Realty, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of September, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Kirk Brown, Esquire Post Office Box 4075 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Randy Schwartz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact In February of 1988, Petitioner took the real estate broker's examination compiled by Respondent, and otherwise complied with all applicable licensure requirements. The Petitioner received a grade of 74 on the written examination. A grade of 75 or higher is required to pass the test. Had Petitioner answered question number 62 with the answer deemed by Respondent to be correct, Petitioner's score would have been 75 and, as such, would have entitled him to licensure. Question number 62 reads as follows: The Department of Professional Regulation may withhold notification to a licensee that the licensee is being investigated IF: NOTIFICATION COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE INVESTIGATION. NOTIFICATION COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO THE LICENSEE. THE ACT UNDER INVESTIGATION IS A CRIMINAL OFFENSE. Possible answers to question number 62 were as follows: I only. II only. I and III only. I, II and III. The answer to question number 62 chosen by Petitioner was D. The Respondent determined the correct answer should have been C. The Respondent's examining board followed a standard procedure for conducting and grading the examination. Statistically, 58 per cent of candidates taking the examination and placing in percentile rankings 50 through 99, answered the question correctly. Of those candidates taking the examination and placing in the lower half (0-50 percentile), 33 per cent answered the question correctly. The results obtained to question number 62 from all applicants taking the examination revealed the question exceeded effective testing standards. Question number 62 and the appropriate answer to that question are taken directly from section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes. The purpose of the question is to determine if an applicant is knowledgeable of the law governing real estate broker licensees. The Respondent adopts the position that section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, mandates that Respondent shall notify a licensee of any investigation of which the licensee is the subject and authorizes withholding notification to that licensee only where such notification would be detrimental to the investigation, or where the act under investigation is a criminal offense. The Petitioner takes the position that section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, does not prohibit withholding notification of an investigation from a licensee when such notification would be detrimental to the licensee. The Petitioner bases this contention on the broad power provided the Real Estate Commission by section 475.05, Florida Statutes. The Commission has not, however, adopted any rule, regulation or bylaw supportive of Petitioner's position and the statutory mandate is clear. Further, the statute referenced by Petitioner specifically does not support an exercise of this power of the Commission if the result is a conflict with another law of the State of Florida. Section 455.225(1), Florida Statutes, states Respondent "shall" notify "any person" of an investigation of that person. Under that section, discretionary authority to refrain from such notification is allowed only where there is a potential for harm to the investigation, or the matter under investigation is a criminal act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered confirming the grade of the Petitioner as previously determined. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 20th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-2442 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings The Petitioner submitted a document entitled summary of hearing and consisting of seven numbered paragraphs. They are treated as follows: Rejected as unnecessary. Included in findings 5, and 7. Rejected, contrary to the weight of the evidence. 4.- 6. Rejected, contrary to evidence adduced. 7. Rejected as argument. Respondent's Proposed Findings The Respondent submitted a three page document entitled "argument" and consisting of eight unnumbered paragraphs. Numbers 1-8 have been applied to those paragraphs. They are treated as follows: 1.-5. Rejected as conclusions of law. 6. Included in findings 8, 9, and 10. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller Acting Director Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Phillip I. Salerno 11812 Timbers Way Boca Raton, Florida 33428 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the real estate license issued to the Respondent, Kathi L. Kitts, should be revoked or otherwise penalized based upon the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following findings of fact: Brickell Grove Realty Corporation ("Brickell Grove") is a licensed real estate brokerage corporation in Florida having been issued license number 0245921. From at least May 1988 through September 1, 1988, the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove was Frederick Morrison, Jr. (Morrison). At some point in mid to late 1988, (the exact date was not established by competent substantial evidence) Morrison was hospitalized with a terminal illness and his subsequent involvement in the real estate brokerage business was limited. Morrison died on September 1, 1988. Respondent, Kathi L. Kitts (formerly known as Kathi L. Abassi), was licensed by Petitioner as a salesman with Brickell Grove beginning on or about August 13, 1986. Respondent completed the required course for a real estate broker's license in April of 1988. On September 19, 1988, she passed the state exam required to obtain a broker's license. The evidence did not establish when Respondent first filed an application for a broker's license. After passing the exam in September of 1988, Respondent submitted an application which she thought would enable her to become the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove. The evidence did not establish the date that application was submitted. That application was not signed by the qualifying broker of Brickell Grove and/or the owner so it could not serve to qualify Respondent as the sole qualifying broker for Brickell Grove. On October 1, 1988, Petitioner issued Respondent a broker/salesman license as an employee of Brickell Grove. That broker/salesman license was revoked in November of 1988 when it was discovered that the corporate registration of Brickell Grove was cancelled effective September 30, 1988 as a result of the death of Morrison and the non-renewal of the corporate license. The exact date of the revocation was not established by competent substantial evidence but it was apparently on or after November 1, 1988. Prior to receiving the revocation notice, Respondent was advised by an investigator employed by Petitioner that her application to become the qualifying broker was deficient because it was not signed by the owner or broker. On October 20, 1988, Respondent filed another application to become licensed as the qualifying broker for Brickell Grove and to change the name on her license from Kathi Abassi to Kathi Kitts. This second application contained the signature of the owner of Brickell Grove. On November 4, 1988, Respondent sent a letter to the Division of Real Estate indicating that Mr. Morrison was seriously ill and that it was urgent that her application to be the active broker for Brickell Grove be approved as quickly as possible. Respondent did not, however, discover that Mr. Morrison had died on September 1, 1988, until sometime in the middle of November when she was advised by Petitioner's investigator. Petitioner approved Respondent's second application to become the qualifying broker for Brickell Grove on November 22, 1988. The approved broker's license was backdated to establish an effective date of October 20, 1988. Effective October 20, 1988, the corporate registration of Brickell Grove Realty Corporation was reinstated upon the Respondent becoming its sole qualifying broker. Respondent admitted that at least during the time period from September 1, 1988 through October 20, 1988, she operated as a salesman in the office of Brickell Grove Realty without any supervision from another broker in the office. However, no competent substantial evidence was offered to establish the nature or extent of business conducted by that office or by Respondent during this time period. Respondent did not open bank accounts or advertise as a broker until after October 20, 1988. While Respondent contends that she thought Mr. Morrison was continuing to carry on as the active broker for Brickell Grove during the time period he was hospitalized and continuing through November (after his death), she admitted that she only saw him on occasion and could not recall when he was last in the office. The limited contact between Respondent and the licensed broker for Brickell Grove is reflected by her lack of knowledge of his death until almost two months after it occurred. While there is hearsay testimony that Mr. Morrison was in the hospital for several months prior to his death and that his involvement with Brickell Grove Realty during the several months preceding his death was limited, or nonexistent, no competent substantial evidence was offered to establish the nature or extent of the business conducted by Respondent without the benefit of supervision by a licensed broker during the time period prior to September 1, 1988. Petitioner had previously initiated an investigation into unlicensed practice by one of the owners of Brickell Grove, Mahmoud Abassi (Respondent's former husband) in July of 1986. That investigation resulted in an August 29, 1986 affidavit executed by Mahmoud Abassi to cease and desist unlicensed real estate brokerage activity. However, no competent substantial evidence was offered to prove any involvement by Respondent in the activities which led to the execution of that affidavit nor was any evidence offered to show that Mahmoud Abassi was actually running Brickell Grove at any point subsequent to the execution of the affidavit. Moreover, no competent substantial evidence was offered as to Respondent's activities and/or supervision during the period from the execution of the affidavit until September 1, 1988.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a Final Order finding Respondent, Kathi Kitts, guilty of operating as a broker without a license during the period from September 14, 1988, to October 1, 1988, reprimanding her and placing her on probation for one year. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of December 1989. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 1989.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was licensed as a real estate broker by the Florida Real Estate Commission. In May 1988, he was working as a broker-salesman with G.V. Stewart, Inc., a corporate real estate broker whose active broker is G.V. Stewart. On April 20, 1989, Respondent submitted a Contract for Sale and Purchase to the University of South Florida Credit Union who was attempting to sell a house at 2412 Elm Street in Tampa, Florida, which the seller had acquired in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. This offer reflected a purchase price of $25,000 with a deposit of $100 (Exhibit 2). The president of the seller rejected the offer by striking out the $25,000 and $100 figures and made a counter offer to sell the property for $29,000 with a $2000 deposit (Exhibit 2). On May 9, 1989, Respondent submitted a new contract for sale and purchase for this same property which offer reflected an offering price of $27,000 with a deposit of $2000 held in escrow by G.V. Stewart (Exhibit 3). This offer, as did Exhibit 2, bore what purported to be the signature of William P. Murphy as buyer and G. Stewart as escrow agent. In fact, neither Murphy nor Stewart signed either Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 3, and neither was aware the offers had been made at the time they were submitted to the seller. This offer was accepted by the seller. This property was an open listing with no brokerage firm having an exclusive agreement with the owner to sell the property. Stewart's firm had been notified by the seller that the property was for sale. Respondent had worked with Stewart for upwards of ten years and had frequently signed Stewart's name on contracts, which practice was condoned by Stewart. Respondent had sold several parcels of property to Murphy, an attorney in Tampa, on contracts signed by him in the name of Murphy, which signatures were subsequently ratified by Murphy. Respondent considers Murphy to be a Class A customer for whom he obtained a deposit only after the offer was accepted by the seller and Murphy confirmed a desire to purchase. Respondent has followed this procedure in selling property to Murphy for a considerable period of time and saw nothing wrong with this practice. At present, Respondent is the active broker at his own real estate firm.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that William H. McCoy's license as a real estate broker be suspended for one year. However, if before the expiration of the year's suspension Respondent can prove, to the satisfaction of the Real Estate Commission, that he fully understands the duty owed by a broker to the seller and the elements of a valid contract, the remaining portion of the suspension be set aside. ENTERED this 29th day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of November, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: John Alexander, Esquire Kenneth E. Easley 400 West Robinson Street General Counsel Orlando, Florida 32802 Department of Professional Regulation William H. McCoy 1940 North Monroe Street 4002 South Pocahontas Avenue Suite 60 Suite 106 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Tampa Florida 33610 Darlene F. Keller Division Director 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Joseph J. Kowitt, is now a licensed real estate broker-salesman, having been issued License No. 0048987. At all times pertinent to this proceeding the Respondent was registered and licensed by the Florida Real Estate Commission or the Board of Real Estate, respectively, as a non- active real estate broker. The Respondent's registration certificate bore an effective date of October 1, 1978 and an expiration date of September 30, 1980. Some time prior to October 9, 1979, Mrs. Frieda Frank of Silver Spring, Maryland, was contacted by Mr. Douglas Bradshaw, a broker-salesman in the employ of Powis Properties, Inc., a corporate real estate broker of Boca Raton, Florida, to ascertain her interest in selling two unimproved lots in Palm Beach County, Florida. Mrs. Frank, the owner of the property, indicated to Mr. Bradshaw that he should coordinate activities involved in effecting a sale through her cousin, the Respondent. Mrs. Frank had previously instructed the Respondent to attempt to sell the two lots for her for a certain minimum price. The Respondent was contacted by Mr. Bradshaw either shortly before or shortly after he contacted the seller of the property, Mrs. Frank, but after the Respondent had placed signs on the property indicating it to be for sale by the owner, with the Respondent's telephone number depicted thereon. Upon being contacted by Mr. Bradshaw or Powis Properties, Inc., the Respondent explained that he was not the owner of the property, but that he represented his cousin, Mrs. Frank, who lived in Maryland. The result of the conversation was that the Respondent agreed to give Mr. Bradshaw an "open listing" and the Respondent requested that he be reimbursed for any expenses born personally in preparing for and effecting a sale, indicating that this was his cousin's wish also. There is no evidence to reflect the precise amount of expenses incurred by the Respondent in attempting to sell his cousin's property, his testimony simply consisting of statements to the effect that he had erected four or five signs on the property during the course of the year preceding the sale and had incurred gasoline expenses traveling between the property in Palm Beach County and his home in north Dade County. On approximately October 9, 1979 Powis Properties, Inc. secured an offer to purchase the subject property in the amount of $27,000 and communicated that offer to the seller. She indicated to Mr. Kowitt that a $30,000 sales price would be acceptable, including a 10 percent brokerage fee for Powis Properties who had secured the prospective buyer. At approximately this point in time an agreement was reached between Mr. Kowitt, the Respondent, and Powis Properties, Inc. whereby Mr. Kowitt would receive $500 for his services rendered in effecting the sale and which would he paid to him at the closing of the sale of the two subject lots. This arrangement is reflected in the Respondent's own Exhibit 2, although the Respondent maintained the fee arrangement agreed upon was merely for reimbursement of his expenses incurred in preparing the property for sale and was not a referral fee, as Mr. Stingene of Powis Properties had represented in the letter which is Exhibit Two. The Respondent, however, in the face of the Petitioner's showing that a flat fee of $500 was paid with the understanding of the Petitioner's chief witness that it was for a referral or for "services rendered," offered no concrete evidence to establish what his alleged expense items consisted of nor their respective amounts. A purchase offer was redrawn at the required price of $30,000 in accordance with the seller's wishes and accepted by the seller. The transaction proceeded to closing on October 28, 1980. Approximately three days prior to the closing date, Powis Properties, Inc. inquired of the Registration Division of the Board of Real Estate regarding the status of Mr. Kowitt's registration as a realtor and was informed that he held an inactive status at that time. Powis Properties, Inc. communicated this information to Mr. Kowitt who indicated that his registration renewal application was in process and apparently such was not yet reflected in the records of the Board of Real Estate. Powis Properties, through Mr. Powis or Mr. Stingene, then requested that he evidence his valid registration at the closing in order to receive the subject $500 fee. Powis Properties then drew a check of $500 payable to Mr. Kowitt and authorized its sales agent who would be present at the closing to deliver the check to Mr. Kowitt upon his establishing proof of his registration or otherwise inform him that the fee would have to be held in escrow until he could establish the fact of his active registration. At the closing Mr. Kowitt delivered to the salesman representative of Powis Properties, Inc. a photocopy of registration Certificate No. 0048987 indicating on its face the status of "active broker" and based upon that representation, the sales agent delivered to Mr. Kowitt the $500 check which he later negotiated. Petitioner's Exhibit 7, which was unrefuted, reveals that the Respondent held Certificate No. 0048987 which is a non-active broker's certificate issued October 21, 1976 with an expiration date of September 30, 1980. Petitioner's Exhibit 8 was not contradicted and reveals that the Respondent applied for a renewal as a broker-salesman on October 27, 1979, the day prior to the subject closing. After amending his application to that for a broker-salesman certificate, since he did not maintain an office, a broker- salesman certificate was issued to the Respondent with an effective date of November 6, 1979, although with a date of issuance of December 20, 1979 (Exhibit 9). The dates reflected on Exhibit 9 corroborate the Petitioner's showing (in Exhibit 5) that it is the policy of the Board that a registration certificate reflect the effective date to be the date the request was received by the Board in proper form, as opposed to the date of mailing. At the closing the Respondent represented that he was an active broker by the display of a xerox copy of his registration certificate with the above number and expiration date of September 30, 1980. Be acknowledges and admits that he altered the copy of the certificate to remove the prefix "non" from his ostensible designation as an active broker, but the Respondent contends that he informed the representative of Powis Properties at the closing that he had been assured by "someone" with the Board of Real Estate that he could consider himself an active broker upon posting of his renewal application and fee. Shortly after the closing, Mr. Powis or his agent examined the ostensible broker certificate copy supplied them by the Respondent. Upon the belief that the copy of the broker certificate was irregular when compared to other broker certificates which simply state "broker" rather than "active broker" (as the subject one did after the alteration) inquiry was made by phone to the Registration Division of the Board regarding the Respondent's true status. The Board informed Powis Properties that Mr. Kowitt at that time continued to be a non-active broker. Powis Properties then immediately notified Mr. Kowitt of the circumstances and made demand that he return the $500 fee. After a period of days or weeks had elapsed without satisfactory response from Mr. Kowitt, the subject complaint initiating these proceedings was filed by Powis Properties with the Board of Real Estate. Finally, a meeting was held on November 19th between the Respondent and Powis Properties or its agent or representative, at which time the Respondent could not yet supply concrete evidence of his registration as an active broker or broker-salesman, although the application for active status remained pending. Thus, Powis Properties, Inc. continued to maintain its claim against the Respondent for return of the $500 fee and the Petitioner initiated these proceedings.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record, as well as the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Joseph J. Kowitt, be found guilty of a violation of Section 475.25(1)(b) Florida Statutes (1979), as well as Section 475.42(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), and that the penalty of a public written reprimand be imposed on the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 1981 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18ths day of May, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Ralph Fetner, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Joseph J. Kowitt 2030 South Ocean Drive Apartment No. 1227 Hallandale, Florida 33009
The Issue Should Respondent have his Florida Real Estate Broker's License disciplined by Petitioner for violating provisions within Chapter 475, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to discipline its licensees for violations of Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and associated rules. Those actions are brought through administrative complaints. Petitioner regulates Respondent's real estate practice in Florida. Respondent practices in accordance with a Florida Real Estate Broker's license, No. 0605307. At times relevant to this inquiry Respondent has not acted as an independent broker. Rather, Respondent has conducted real estate business as a broker-salesperson with McAfee Enterprise, Inc. t/a Re-Max On Park Avenue, located at 2233 Park Avenue, Suite 500, Orange Park, Florida, 32702-5567. Within the relevant time period Respondent's supervising broker at the Re- Max firm was Ann McIvey. On February 28, 1995, Respondent, as listing agent for Re-Max On Park Avenue, entered into an exclusive right of sale listing agreement with Marguerite A. Barr to sell Ms. Barr's real estate located at 6720 S. Long Meadow Circle in Jacksonville, Florida. By the terms of the listing agreement Ms. Barr agreed to pay Re-Max on Park Avenue: . . . 5 ½% of the total purchase price whether a buyer is secured by the REALTOR, the SELLER, or by any other person, or if the Property is afterwards sold within 6 months from the termination of this agreement or any extension thereof, to any person to whom the Property has been shown during the term of this Agreement. The listing agreement entered into between Respondent in behalf of Re-Max On Park Avenue and Ms. Barr also stated that: . . . in the event this Agreement is cancelled by SELLER before its expiration, or SELLER otherwise prevents performance hereunder, the SELLER agrees to pay REALTOR on demand, as liquidated damages, the brokerage fee due REALTOR as though Property had been sold, or the amount of broker's expenses, the same being bonafide, fair and reasonable as a result of an arm's length negotiation. Separate and apart from the terms set forth in the listing agreement, Ms. Barr requested, before she signed the contract, that Respondent inform her concerning her opportunity to cancel the contract at any time. Respondent answered that the contract could be cancelled by Ms. Barr before the home was sold, in which case Ms. Barr would be responsible for paying the advertising cost by Re-Max on Park Avenue. Ms. Barr was amenable to that arrangement. On May 8, 1995, Ms. Barr called to inform Respondent that she was terminating the contract to sell her home. This was followed by correspondence dated May 9, 1995, addressed to Re-Max On Park Avenue, attention to Respondent, notifying Re-Max On Park Avenue that the contract to sell the home was being cancelled. In response to the cancellation Respondent wrote the following letter to Ms. Barr: Mrs. Marguerite A. Barr 1364 Lamboll Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32205-7140 Dear Meg: As you requested I have withdrawn your property located at 6720 Longmeadow Circle South from active listing for sale in the MLS and in my files. I hope you will be happy with your new arrangement and I wish you and your daughter the best. According to our contract, you agreed to reimburse me for expenses I incurred in marketing your property the event you decided to cancel prior to the expiration of said contract. A list of expenses follows: Two insertions in Homes & Land Magazine $249.21 500 Flyers to Realtors (250 twice) @ $.06 each 30.00 Total $279.21 Please forward a check in that amount to me at my office. Please remember that in the terms of our contract if anyone who has seen the property during my active term of the contract purchases the property you will still be obligated to pay the agreed upon commission to my firm. Regards, W. Wane Wier Broker-Salesman Per the request in the correspondence from Respondent to Ms. Barr, Ms. Barr contacted the Respondent and arranged to pay $50.00 a month to reimburse the costs described by the Respondent. Ms. Barr wrote three checks to the Respondent in his name, Wane Wier, without reference to Re-Max On Park Avenue. Respondent put those checks in his personal checking account. Respondent had originally taken money from his personal account to advertise the Barr property. On or about August 31, 1995, Ms. Barr sold her home on S. Long Meadow Circle to Jane Richardson. Respondent learned of the sale. Believing that the sale was a transaction that entitled Re-Max On Park Avenue to collect the 5 ½% real estate fee in accordance with the listing agreement, Respondent spoke to his supervising broker, Ms. McIvey, to ascertain the proper course for collecting the commission. Ms. McIvey advised Respondent that he should contact his attorney to see if the commission that was allegedly due Ms. McIvey and Respondent could be obtained by Respondent's counsel. Respondent took the advice of his supervising broker and contacted Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire, who was practicing at 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5, Orange Park, Florida 32073. In conversation Respondent explained to Mr. Santoro, that he believed that Ms. Barr owned the real estate commission. Respondent asked Mr. Santoro to write a letter to Ms. Barr to solicit the commission. Respondent feels confident that he told Mr. Santoro that Mr. Santoro should advise Ms. Barr to pay the commission to Re-Max On Park Avenue, given that was the normal course of events in seeking payment for commissions. To assist Mr. Santoro, Respondent left a written memorandum which among other things stated: . . . I feel that Ms. Barr has violated our listing agreement and should pay me and my company the full commission due under the terms of that agreement. Please take any steps necessary to have Ms. Barr honor our agreement, and advise me what I should do. On January 12, 1996, Mr. Santoro wrote Ms. Barr requesting payment of the commissions in the amount $3,397.50 related to the claimed balance due, after crediting Ms. Barr with $150.00 paid for advertising costs. This correspondence stated: Please be advised that you must forward a cashier's check in the amount of $3,397.50 made payable to W. Wane Wier, Re-Max On Park Avenue, within ten (10) days of receipt of this letter, which I have forwarded by certified mail as well as regular U.S. Mail. I have been instructed to proceed with appropriate action should you fail to make the payment as stated above Please Govern Yourself Accordingly. Respondent did not see the January 12, 1996, letter before it was sent to Ms. Barr. He did receive a copy of the correspondence. Respondent has no recollection of noticing that the correspondence said that the $3,397.50 should be made payable to W. Wane Weir, Re-Max On Park Avenue. In any event, Respondent did not take any action to correct the letter to reflect that the payment should be made to Re-Max On Park Avenue only. Prior to the charges set forth in the present Administrative Complaint Respondent has not been the subject of accusations about his conduct as a realtor.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of Section 475.42(1)(a) and (d), Florida Statutes, dismissing the complaint for alleged violations of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes, imposing a $1,000.00 fine consistent with Section 475.25(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-24.001, Florida Administrative Code. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Christine M. Ryall, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street, Suite N-308 Orlando, FL 32801-1772 Thomas C. Santoro, Esquire 1700 Wells Road, Suite 5 Orange Park, FL 32072 Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802-1900 Linda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional; Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
